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Saturday, November 24, 2012

the promotional avenues for the teachers in Bihar Government Service.=The petition therefore prayed:- (1) for a direction to implement the decision contained in the notification dated 11.4.1977. (2) for a direction to prepare a combined gradation list of the Bihar Education Service Class II after placing the members of the Petitioner association in their appropriate places along with other constituents. (3) to restrain the respondents from acting upon the defective gradation list of 1995 (4) for the consequential reliefs, which meant increase in salary and allowances pursuant to the recommendations of the Pay Revision Committees appointed from time to time.= The State Government carried the matter further to this Court in SLP Nos.4937-4938/2001, and this Court dismissed the two SLP’s by its order dated 16.4.2001 which reads as follows:- “CORAM: Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.N Kripal Hon’ble. Mrs Justice Ruma Pal “Upon hearing the counsel the court made the following ORDER It is clear that the final direction which has been given to the Petitioner to implement the resolution dated 27th April, 1977 in the manner it is meant to be implemented. The petitions are disposed of.” Second round of litigation 12. It is, however, seen that inspite of the orders passed as above, State of Bihar did not issue the necessary orders for merger of the subordinate cadre of teachers into the Bihar Education Service, and consequential rise in pay. The law of finality of decisions which is enshrined in the principle of res-judicata or principles analogous thereto, does not permit any such re-examination, and the learned Judge clearly failed to recognize the same. The attitude of the State Govt. in this matter has caused unnecessary anxiety to a large number of teachers. The State Govt. must realise that in a country where there is so much illiteracy and where there are a large number of first generation students, the role of the primary and secondary teachers is very important. They have to be treated honourably and given appropriate pay and chances of promotion. If the orders passed by this Court were not clear to the State Govt. or any party, it could have certainly approached this Court for the clarification thereof. But it could not have setup a contrary plea in a collateral proceeding. We do not expect such an approach from the State Govt. and least from the High Court. Having stated this, although we have expressed out displeasure about the approach of the State Government, we refrain from passing any order as to costs.




                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    Civil Appeal Nos. 8226-8227  OF 2012
                               Arising Out of
                         SLP (C) Nos. 26675-26676/2010
                                    WITH
                            I.A. Nos. 19-20/2011

Bihar State Government Secondary
School Teachers Association                        ...     Appellant
                                   Versus

Bihar Education Service
Association & Ors.                                       ...
Respondents

                                     And

                     Contempt Petition Nos. 386-387/2011

Bihar State Government Secondary
School Teachers Association                        ...
Appellant/Applicants
                                   Versus

Anup Mukherjee & Ors.                              ...    Respondents
                                                         (Alleged
                                             Contemnors)



                              J U D G E M E N T

H.L. Gokhale J.


            Leave granted.

2.          These two Civil Appeals by  Special  Leave  raise  the  question
with respect to the approach the High Courts and the State  Governments  are
expected to adopt towards the orders  passed,  and  the  interpretations  of
Govt. resolutions rendered by  this  Court.   The  question  arises  in  the
context of litigation concerning the promotional avenues  for  the  teachers
in Bihar Government Service.
      The relevant facts:-
3.          The facts leading  to  the  two  Civil  Appeals  herein  are  as
follows:-
            The State of Bihar, which  is  respondent  No.66  in  these  two
appeals, set up a three member committee, in March  1976,  with  Shri  Saran
Singh, Member Board of Revenue, and Administrative Reforms Commissioner,  as
its Chairman. 
 The terms of reference of this Committee were as follows:-
           “To  hasten  the  avenues  for  promotion  in  the  Bihar  Civil
      Services, the government has  approved  junior  selection  grade  20%,
      senior selection grade 12.50% and posts  of  senior  Deputy  Collector
      2.5%.  The same percentage has been applied for junior selection grade
      and senior selection grade in the Bihar Engineering Service.  On  this
      basis,  requests  have  been  coming  from  various   state   services
      associations that due to lack of opportunity for  promotion  in  their
      cadres, there is stagnation, which must be removed.
           1.2    Hence,  keeping  in  view  the   strength   and   present
      promotional avenues in various State service cadres,  to  analyse  the
      problem of stagnation and to recommend means to  tackle  this  problem
      and promotional opportunities, a committee of the  following  officers
      is constituted:-
              1) Member, Board of Revenue-Chairman
              2) Chairman, Public Grievances Bureau- Member
              3) Finance Commissioner- Member”

4.          The committee drew its conclusions on the  basis  of  the  facts
and figures furnished by various departments.  As stated in the report,  the
approach of the committee was to find out:-
(a) what relatively, is the extent of stagnation in different services,  and
the present prospects of promotion, and
(b)  how  the  stagnation  can  be  removed  and  promotional  opportunities
enlarged.
5.          The committee noted that all  the  service  associations  staked
claims for the same percentage of the promotional posts as allowed to  Bihar
Civil Service and  Bihar  Engineering  Service.   Two  of  the  reasons  for
stagnation noted by the committee were: (i) relatively heavy recruitment  of
officers of the same age group in certain years, (ii) and lack  of  adequate
number of promotional  posts  at  different  levels  of  the  organizational
hierarchy.  The recommendations of the committee  with  respect  to  various
services are in part III of its report.
As far as Bihar  Education  Service
is concerned, it has been discussed in para (9),  thereof.
To  begin  with,
the committee dealt with the promotional chances of Class-II  officers  into
Class-I.
Then in sub-para B it has dealt  with  the  posts  in  specialized
institutes like those teaching Sanskrit, Prakrit  and  Persian.
 Thereafter
in sub-para C it has dealt with the Miscellaneous Cadre.  
The  analysis  in
this part and the recommendations read as follows:-
                 “C.   Miscellaneous cadre

           11.10.      This service  consists  of  59  posts  of  different
      categories like teachers, engineers, Doctors,  Stadium  Manager,  etc.
      and excepting the  teachers  of  Netarhat  School  who  have  adequate
      prospects of promotion within the cadre, most of the  members  of  the
      cadre hold isolated posts with no definite prospect of promotion.   No
      promotional posts can be provided for because of the  isolated  nature
      of their job.

           In order, however, to minimize the hardships in their case,  the
      committee  would  like  to   make   the   following   suggestion   for
      consideration of the Education Department:-

              1)  Education  department  may  get  the  posts  of  engineers
                 included in the cadre of the Public  Works  Department  and
                 obtain their services on deputation basis.

              2) The two posts of the doctors may also be  got  included  in
                 the Health service  and  service  of  doctors  obtained  on
                 deputation basis.
              3) The remaining posts should be included in the General cadre
                 and manned by officers of the Bihar Educational Service  as
                 far as practicable.”

      The committee suggested that the proposals  should  come  into  effect
from 1st January, 1977.
6.          The recommendations of the committee were accepted by the  State
Government,  and  the  State  Government  (Finance  Department)   issued   a
notification dated  11.4.1977,  which  was  subsequently  published  in  the
Gazette Extra-Ordinary on 27.4.1977.   The  decision  with  respect  to  the
recommendations was contained in Schedule-1 of the notification.  As far  as
the education department and the  miscellaneous  cadre  are  concerned,  the
decision notified reads as follows:-
                                 Schedule-1
|Sr.|Para No.|Page|Departmen|Name  |Recommendation the         |Govt.   |
|No.|of      |No. |t        |of    |Committee                  |Decision|
|   |committe|    |         |servic|                           |        |
|   |e report|    |         |e     |                           |        |
|1  |2       |3   |4        |5     |6                          |7       |
|7  |1.10    |25  |Education|Misc. |1) kindly merge the post of|Approved|
|   |        |    |Departmen|Cadre |the Engineers of the       |        |
|   |        |    |t        |      |Education Department into  |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |Bihar engineering Services |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |Cadre and take the Services|        |
|   |        |    |         |      |of the Engineers by means  |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |of Deputation              |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |2) The posts of doctors    |Approved|
|   |        |    |         |      |should be included in the  |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |Bihar Health Services cadre|        |
|   |        |    |         |      |and as per the requirement |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |their service should also  |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |be taken on deputation     |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |3) Various Posts such as   |Approved|
|   |        |    |         |      |Teacher (except the        |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |teachers of Netarhat) and  |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |the posts  of Stadium      |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |managers etc should be     |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |included in the Bihar      |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |Education Service cadre and|        |
|   |        |    |         |      |the Officers of the cadre  |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |should be appointed on     |        |
|   |        |    |         |      |these posts                |        |


                                                      (emphasis supplied)
      First round of litigation


7.          It is the case  of  the  petitioner  Secondary  School  Teachers
Association  that,  though  this  notification  was  issued  by  the   State
Government on 11.4.1977, the State Government took  no  steps  to  implement
the same.  
They represented for its implementation from time  to  time,  but
that was without any effect.
 They learnt  that  one  provisional  gradation
list was prepared in the year 1986, but it  was  never  circulated  or  made
known to the Petitioner association.
 Another gradation  list  was  prepared
in 1995, and they found that the same  had  left  out  the  members  of  the
Petitioner  association.
 Two  representations  were   once   again   made,
including  one  on  25.5.1998,  but  that  was  also  without  any   effect.
Therefore,  they  were  constrained  to  file  the  Writ  Petition,  bearing
No.12122 of 1998, against the State of Bihar  and  the  concerned  officers.
In  this  petition  they  specifically  claimed  (a)  that   the   aforesaid
notification of 11.4.1977 contemplated a merger of their  cadre  into  Bihar
Education Service which consists of class-II employees,  and  (b)  that  any
appointment and further promotions are to be made from the  combined  cadre.
The petition therefore prayed:-
(1)    for  a  direction  to  implement  the  decision  contained   in   the
notification dated 11.4.1977.
(2)   for a direction to prepare a combined  gradation  list  of  the  Bihar
Education Service Class II after  placing  the  members  of  the  Petitioner
association in their appropriate places along with other constituents.
(3)   to restrain the respondents from acting upon the  defective  gradation
list of 1995
(4)   for the consequential reliefs, which  meant  increase  in  salary  and
allowances pursuant to the recommendations of the  Pay  Revision  Committees
appointed from time to time.
8.          It is relevant to note that in this petition  they  specifically
pleaded in para 5 that  they  were  also  selected  through  Public  Service
Commission/ Central Selection Board, and that they also  had  qualifications
of being graduates with necessary  training,  and  further  that  from  1965
onwards they also had to have a Master’s degree.
 In para 6 of the  petition
they submitted that the Saran Singh committee had  recommended  the  merger,
despite  which  the  defective  gradation  lists  were  prepared,  first  on
19.7.1986 and thereafter on 13.11.1995,  contrary  to  the  notification  of
11.4.1977.
9.          Another Writ Petition bearing CWJC  No.8147/1999  was  filed  by
some teachers viz. Smt. Ratan Prabha and Ors.
This petition drew  attention
to the issue of pay anomaly.  They also  relied  upon  the  notification  of
11.4.1977, and prayed for preparation of a common seniority list  for  Bihar
Education Service.
 Both the Writ Petitions were heard together.  The  State
Government did not file any counter in spite of adequate  time  having  been
granted.  The learned Single Judge of Patna  High  Court,  observed  in  his
order that it appears that the orders of merger had  not  been  issued,  and
the matter was pending with the State Government,  though  in  the  meantime
separate gradation list had been published for one  or  the  other  teaching
cadre.  The learned single  judge  therefore,  passed  the  following  order
dated 2.2.2000:-
           “In the circumstances, I direct the commissioner cum  Secretary,
      Secondary, Primary and Mass Education, government of Bihar to act upon
      the government decision contained in Resolution dated 11.4.1977 so far
      it relates to the Education Service of the Education Department.”

10.         The State of Bihar felt aggrieved by this  common  order  passed
in the two Writ Petitions, and therefore filed two  Letters  Patent  Appeals
No.980 and 998 of 2000. The State Government contended  that  there  was  no
proposal to  merge  the  sub-ordinate  teachers  into  the  Bihar  Education
Service Class-II. It was  further  pointed  out  that  50%  posts  of  Bihar
Education Service Class-II were filled by the promotion of  the  subordinate
teachers.  This was however, denied by the  appellants  herein  by  pointing
out that factually however, hardly any  such  promotions  had  taken  place.
They also pointed  out  that  the  notification  dated  11.4.1977  had  been
implemented in other services in the manner in which they  were  canvassing.
The Division Bench dismissed these two appeals by  order  dated  27.11.2000,
wherein it observed:-
           “In our view, since this  court  by  order  dated  2.2.2000  has
      specifically directed the Government to take a decision  in  terms  of
      the resolution dated 11.4.1977, there appears no reason for the  State
      to be aggrieved by such order.”

11.         The State Government carried the matter further  to  this  Court
in SLP Nos.4937-4938/2001, and this Court dismissed the  two  SLP’s  by  its
order dated 16.4.2001 which reads as follows:-
                 “CORAM:
                 Hon’ble  Mr. Justice B.N Kripal
             Hon’ble. Mrs Justice Ruma Pal
            “Upon hearing the counsel the court made the following
                                    ORDER
                  It is clear that the final direction which has been  given
           to the Petitioner to implement the resolution dated  27th  April,
           1977 in the manner it is meant to be implemented.  The  petitions
           are disposed of.”


      Second round of litigation

12.         It is, however, seen  that  inspite  of  the  orders  passed  as
above, State of Bihar did not issue the necessary orders for merger  of  the
subordinate  cadre  of  teachers  into  the  Bihar  Education  Service,  and
consequential rise in pay.
This  led  a  subordinate-service  teacher,  one
Shri Janardan Rai, to file a fresh Writ  Petition,  being  CWJC  No.8679  of
2002.  He referred to the orders passed above, and prayed for  consequential
benefits along with fixation  of  pay  in  terms  of  the  State  Government
Notification dated 11.4.1977, and in  terms  of  the  order  dated  2.2.2000
passed in above referred CWJC No.12122 of 1998, which  had  been  upheld  by
the Supreme Court.
13.          This  petition  was   opposed   by   the   Additional   Finance
Commissioner of the State of Bihar, by filing an affidavit.  In para 13,  he
specifically  stated  that  the  decision   contained   in   the   aforesaid
notification is not at all related to the non-gazetted cadre of teachers  of
Government High Schools, and therefore, implementation of the order  of  the
Hon’ble Court does not require merger of the Subordinate  Education  Service
with the Bihar Education Service.
 In para 25, he contended  that  the  word
‘teachers’ mentioned in Item No.7 of Schedule-1 of the notification of  1977
referred to those isolated posts of  teachers  who  had  been  part  of  the
umbrella service, namely, Bihar Education Service, but who did not have  any
proper cadre, and therefore had no opportunities of promotion  available  to
them.  In para 26 he contended that the Saran  Singh  Committee  report  had
made clear that the report was  exclusively  about  the  cadres  within  the
Gazetted State Services.
14.          The  Director  (Administration)  cum  Deputy   Secretary,   the
Department of Secondary, Primary and Mass Education of Government of  Bihar,
filed two affidavits.  In the first affidavit, he stated in para  4(c)  that
in the notification  there  is  no  mention  of  59  posts,  and  hence  the
confusion arose.  He further stated  that  the  Government  had,  therefore,
decided  to  locate  those  59  posts  by  an  advertisement  and  call  for
information.  In para 6/A of the second affidavit, however, he  stated  that
there was no mention of any merger in the notification.
15.         The learned Single Judge who heard the petition referred to  the
earlier orders up to the Supreme Court, and  then  observed  that,  in  view
thereof, the matter should have  attained  finality.   He  further  observed
that it was really unfortunate that the state had again started  giving  its
own different meaning to interpret the aforesaid  orders,  rather  going  to
the extent of even stating that some shadow-boxing  had  been  done  in  the
High Court and the Supreme Court, to obtain certain orders.  He stated  that
it appeared from the notings on the files of the State Government  that  the
Education Department had,  in  fact,  taken  a  decision  to  implement  the
aforesaid notification, and prepared a draft notification for  the  approval
of the Finance Department, so  that  the  orders  of  the  High  Court,  for
implementing the notification of 11.4.1977,  are  complied  with.   He  also
recorded that the said draft notification speaks of about  2465  sanctioned/
created posts. He stated-
            “…The said  draft  clearly  goes  to  show  that  the  Education
      Department has found that the petitioner and other similarly  situated
      persons were also  required  to  be  merged  in  the  Bihar  Education
      Service, in view of the aforesaid resolution. However, final  approval
      of the Finance Department was sought for, before final  direction  was
      issued  in  this  regard.   The  said  resolution  speaks  about  2465
      sanctioned/created posts.  As such it appears that the  only  obstacle
      which remains in non-implementation of the resolution is concerned  is
      the  functionaries  of  the  Finance  Department,  who  are  giving  a
      different meaning to the said resolution.”


16.         The  Learned  Judge,  therefore,  heard  the  arguments  of  the
counsel for the Finance Department exhaustively, and observed  that  if  the
meaning, which is tried to be given to the notification dated 11.4.1977,  is
to be accepted, the whole  notification  relating  to  the  Bihar  Education
Service would become redundant.  That apart, he observed “today it does  not
lie in the mouth of authorities to give it any other  interpretation  rather
they are sitting over the orders of the High Court, as well as  the  Supreme
Court.”  He, therefore, directed them to implement the notification of  1977
in its totality, within a period of six weeks, failing which, they would  be
liable to be proceeded for violation of the said order and the  order  dated
2.2.2000, as well as the orders of the LPA Bench and the  Supreme  Court  of
India.  He granted liberty to the petitioner to bring a petition before  the
Court in that very writ application itself, so  that,  if  necessary  erring
respondents can be proceeded against in accordance with law.
17.         This order was again challenged by the State Government  in  LPA
No.65/2003. Additional grounds were raised in the  LPA.   One  of  them  was
that if the interpretation of the term ‘teachers’ accepted  by  the  learned
single judge was approved, it will lead to the teachers other than those  in
Government service claiming the benefits of Bihar Education  Service  Class-
II.  Secondly, it was contended that the subordinate education  service  was
not a  state  service.  The  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  however,
dismissed  the  LPA  by  its  order  dated  10.3.2003,  observing  that  the
controversy had already attained finality with  the  order  of  the  Supreme
Court and nothing more was required  to  be  recorded  before  passing  this
order.  However, in the meanwhile Division Bench had also  passed  an  order
dated 27.1.2003 directing the  Chief  Secretary,  Government  of  Bihar  and
Director Administration of Bihar to remain present in the appeal to  explain
the non-implementation.
18.         These two orders led the State Government to file  Civil  Appeal
No.4466/2003, wherein the earlier grounds were reiterated.   A  counter  was
filed on behalf of Janardhan Rai & Ors. by  the  Gen.  Secy.  Of  the  Bihar
State Government  Secondary  School  Teachers  Association  which  had  been
impleaded as a respondent by an order passed by this Court.  Therein it  was
specifically stated in paragraph 13 as follows:-
           “…… Thus,  since  the  members  of  the  Respondent  Association
      belonged to a clearly identifiable cadre known as “B.S.E.S Cadre”  and
      were not part of any isolated post and also since their posts were not
      declared “Gazetted”-then, they clearly  fell  within  the  purview  of
      those State services covered by the Saran Singh Committee.  It is also
      relevant to mention here that the term “State  Service”  used  by  the
      Petitioners has not been defined anywhere.  This is evident  from  the
      Fitment Committee report, Government of Bihar published in 1998.  Thus
      in the absence of any special definition, the  words  “State  Service”
      would mean Government Service of the State regulated by State  Service
      Code.”

    The Civil Appeal was  dismissed  by  this  Court  by  its  order  dated
19.4.2006 which we quote in the entirety:-
                       “IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.4466 OF 2003

             STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.                   …APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

          JANARDAN RAI & ANR                           …RESPONDENTS

                                    ORDER

            Heard learned counsel on both sides.

            That a Government Resolution passed in 1977  has  not  yet  been
      implemented and continues to be the  subject  matter  of  a  spate  of
      litigation, despite 14 orders of different Courts, is  something  that
      shocks the conscience of this Court.

           The Order of the High Court in Letters Patent Appeal, which  has
      resulted in the present Appeal is a short (one paragraph)  order,  but
      the background appears to be  voluminous.   Learned  counsel  on  both
      sides have taken us through the various documents  on  record.   After
      patiently plodding through the record and the various orders, the only
      point that needs to be considered is, whether the Resolution  No  3521
      F2  dated  11th  April,  1977  of  the  State  Government   has   been
      implemented in  respect  of  the  Members  of  the  Bihar  Subordinate
      Education Service comprising Male and Female teachers.   According  to
      the Respondents, its implementation would mean merger of the cadre  of
      teachers belonging to the Bihar Subordinate Education Service with the
      Bihar Education Service Class 2; the stand of the State Government  is
      that this Resolution, which accepts and implements the report  of  the
      Saran Singh Committee (Paragaph 11.10), has nothing  to  do  with  the
      Members of the Bihar Subordinate Education Service Cadre.

           Writ Petitions were filed before the High  Court  of  Patna  and
      they were allowed in favour of the teachers holding that  such  merger
      is contemplated in the concerned Government  Resolution.   A  contempt
      petition was also taken out alleging non-implementation  of  the  High
      Court’s order, which had directed the State specifically to  implement
      the concerned Resolution dated 11th April, 1977.

           The contempt petition is still pending before the High Court and
      has been stayed in the present appeal.

           At the end of  the  day,  we  are  satisfied  that  whether  the
      implementation has been done in the manner required by the  Resolution
      or not is for the High Court to decide since  the  High  Court  is  in
      seisin of the contempt petition.   Hence,  we  feel  that  it  is  not
      necessary for us to interfere in the matter,  particularly  since  our
      attention has been drawn to the statements made on the  floor  of  the
      legislative  assembly  that  the  Government  itself  is  thinking  of
      implementing the Resolution in the manner that is being  suggested  by
      the Respondents.   In  any  event,  since  the  contempt  petition  is
      pending, the High Court will examine the matter and, if satisfied that
      the Resolution has not been  implemented,  deal  with  the  contemnors
      according to law.  In this view of the matter, we do not think that it
      is necessary for us to interfere at all.

           Civil Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.   Stay  of  the
      contempt proceedings is vacated forthwith.
                                                    ...……………..……J.
                                (B.N. Srikrishna)

                                 ……………….……………J.
                           (Lokeshwar Singh Panta)
      New Delhi April 19, 2006”

19.         It appears that in view of this judgment of this  Court  in  the
second round of litigation, the State Government ultimately  moved  to  take
the decision as canvassed by the subordinate  teachers.   The  Cabinet  took
the  necessary  decision  on  3.7.2006.   The  memorandum  prepared  by  the
administration for the consideration of the Council  of  Ministers  referred
to the earlier developments in the first 10 paragraphs.   Paragraphs  11  to
18 of this memorandum which was approved by the Cabinet read as follows:-
            “11. The department prepared an  estimate  of  financial  burden
      involved.  According to a provisional estimate  the  estimated  amount
      difference is near about Rs. 64 crore.  But  because  almost  all  the
      beneficiaries have got the benefit of  first  ACP  therefore  on  this
      count after deducting a moderate amount it comes to near about Rs.  48
      crores 62 lakhs.  In additional to this, so many of the  beneficiaries
      are entitled to get the benefit of 2nd ACP.  If they are granted,  the
      2nd ACP then the estimates amount will further come down.

            12.  In the year 1977 the No. of total  created/sanctioned  post
      of the male and female teachers were 2465 against which total  working
      strength was 1336, which decreased to 880 by the years  2006,  out  of
      this if 301 units belonging to Jharkhand is deducted it comes  to  579
      only.

      13.   It is to be noted that in view of the  provisions  contained  in
      resolution No.3521 dated 11.04.1977 several  departments  have  merged
      the lower scales with the higher ones.  But  the  incumbents  of  this
      cadre of the Education Deptt. have been denied their promotions  after
      1977 which was otherwise due.  Whereas the  incumbents  of  Inspecting
      Branch of this cadre are reported to have been promoted upto 2001.

       14.    The  officers  of  the  Bihar  Education  Service   in   their
      representation against this merger are apprehending that  this  merger
      will harm their interest.  But the Deptt. has no such knowledge  about
      them to be an intervener or a party in CWJC, LPA and SLP filed in this
      regard.  Most of the beneficiaries of this merger are on the verge  of
      retirement therefore there is no possibility of a  major  harm  to  be
      caused to the officers of the Bihar Education Service.

      15.   Therefore consequent upon-complying the orders  of  the  Hon’ble
      Courts it is proposed to  upgrade  2465  created/sanctioned  posts  of
      teachers of subordinate education service male and female  cadre  with
      Bihar Education Service Class-2 w.e.f 01.07.77.

      16.   The concurrence of Finance Deptt. has been obtained.

      17.   The approval of the Departmental Minister has been  obtained  in
      the proposal.

      18.   The approval  of  the  council  of  ministers  in  the  proposal
      contained in para 15 of the memorandum is solicited.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)

20.         Accordingly, necessary resolution was issued under the order  of
the Governor of  Bihar  on  7.7.2006,  stating  that  the  teachers  of  the
Subordinate Education Service (Teaching Branch) male and female  cadre,  are
merged into Bihar Education Service Class II w.e.f. 1.1.1977, in  accordance
with  the  Finance  Department  Notification  dated  11.4.1977,   and   that
appropriate orders will follow after evaluating  personal  benefits  arising
out of the order.  A notification was also subsequently issued on  9.10.2006
giving effect to  the  above  resolution  with  respect  to  three  teachers
mentioned specifically in that notification.
      Third round of litigation
21.         Now, it was the turn of the  Bihar  Education  Service  to  file
their Writ Petition bearing CWJC  No.10091/2006,  wherein,  they  challenged
the Government resolution dated 7.7.2006 providing for  the  merger  of  the
Bihar Subordinate Education Service into the Bihar Education Service  Class-
II.  It was contended that  the  Bihar  Subordinate  Education  Service,  to
which the secondary teachers belonged was quite  different  from  the  Bihar
Education Service Class-II.  This was on the footing  that  their  modes  of
recruitment and minimum qualifications were  different.   It  was  submitted
that the merger will affect their seniority and therefore  the  decision  is
arbitrary and violative  of  Article  14  of  the  Constitution.  The  State
Government opposed this petition by filing an  affidavit.   It  was  pointed
out by the State Government that the Govt.  resolution  dated  7.7.2006  had
been issued in view of the judgments of the High Court as  approved  by  the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.   The  opinion  of  the  Advocate  General  was  also
tendered that the Govt. had no option but to implement the  notification  of
11.4.1977 as regards the merger of the two services.  The  intervener  Bihar
Education Service Association also opposed this  petition  and  pointed  out
that the earlier Writ Petitions were allowed by the High Court in favour  of
the  teachers  holding  that  the  merger  was  contemplated  in  the  Govt.
notification and the SLP therefrom had been dismissed.
22.   The learned Single Judge, however,  referred  to  the  observation  of
this Court in its order dated 19.4.2006, that it was for the High  Court  to
decide whether the notification of the State Govt. has been  implemented  in
the  manner  required  by  the  notification,  and  therefore  examined  the
legality of the  resolution  dated  7.7.2006  by  re-examining  the  earlier
notification dated 11.4.1977.  He took the  view  that  the  Govt.  decision
accepting the recommendation of the committee as recorded at Serial No.7  of
Schedule 1 was concerning the miscellaneous  cadre  only,  and  while  doing
that there was no  occasion  for  State  to  take  a  decision  about  Bihar
Education Service and to merge the teaching branch, male and female, of  the
Bihar Subordinate Education Service with the Bihar  Education  Service.   He
therefore allowed  CWJC  No.10091/2006  by  his  judgment  and  order  dated
31.10.2007 and quashed the resolution dated 7.7.2006.
23.   Along with the above writ petition, the  learned  Single  Judge  heard
another Writ Petition bearing CWJC  No.14678/2006  which  was  filed  by  51
subordinate teachers who on the other hand claimed the benefit of  the  very
Govt.  resolution  dated  7.7.2006.  The  learned  Judge  disposed  of  that
petition with same common order, but directed the Govt.  to  consider  their
cases if they are in any way situated similar to  the  miscellaneous  cadre.

24.         It is relevant to note that after this  judgment  and  order  of
learned Single Judge dated 31.10.2007, the Govt. of Bihar came  out  with  a
consequential notification dated 19.11.2007 quashing  the  above  Resolution
No.1209 dated  7.7.2006  (which  had  merged  the  teachers  of  subordinate
services  into  Bihar  Education  Service  Class-II),  and  withdrawing  the
financial benefits flowing therefrom.
25.         Some of the individual  teachers  who  felt  aggrieved  by  this
judgment and order dated  31.10.2007,  filed  LPAs  Nos.941/2007,  946/2007,
947/2007 and 974/2007.  As far as the Secondary School Teachers  Association
is concerned it directly filed an SLP to this Court against the order  dated
31.10.2007, bearing SLP No.8031/2008, but this Court vide  its  order  dated
16.3.2009 noted that those individual LPAs  were  pending  before  the  High
Court, and therefore granted liberty to  the  association  to  approach  the
High Court by way of LPA.  Accordingly,  the  petitioner  association  filed
LPA No.418/2009.  All those LPAs were heard together.
26.         The  appellant  association  as  well  as  the  Bihar  Education
Service Association reiterated their positions before  the  Division  Bench.
The appellant association principally contented that after the  decision  of
the Supreme Court dated 19.4.2006, it was not permissible  for  the  learned
Single Judge to re-open the entire controversy, otherwise there would  never
be any finality.  The decision of  the  learned  Single  Judge  was  however
defended by the Bihar Education Service Association by  contending  that  no
definite decision had been arrived at in the earlier proceedings.  As  noted
earlier the State of Bihar had defended, before the  learned  Single  Judge,
the Resolution dated 7.7.2006  approving  the  merger.  However,  the  State
changed its stand before the Division Bench.  As can be seen  from  para  38
of the judgment of the Division Bench, it was contended  on  behalf  of  the
State Govt. that neither in  the  notification  of  the  Finance  Department
dated 11.4.1977 nor in any order of this Court except  in  CWJC  No.8679  of
2002 (the contempt petition wherein was being heard with these  appeals)  it
had even remotely been decided as regards the merger of the teachers of  SES
in BES.  Thereafter, the para records  the  stand  of  the  State  Govt.  as
follows:-
            “As with regard to the order passed by the learned Single Judge
      in CWJC No.8679 of 2002, it was sought to be explained by the  learned
      Advocate General that since that case itself  was  being  heard  along
      with these appeals as per the order of the Apex Court dated 19.4.2006,
      the same could not be treated as a binding precedent”.

27.         The Division Bench took  the  view  that  the  State  Govt.  had
issued the resolution 7.7.2006 under the  threat  of  contempt,  though  the
judgment does not record any such submission on behalf of  the  State  Govt.
The judgment indicates that in the opinion of the Division Bench  the  order
of this Court dated 19.4.2006 did not  prohibit  the  learned  Single  Judge
from going into the entire controversy.  The Division  Bench  accepted  that
unless rules were framed, there could not be any merger since there  was  no
parity in the pay of  the  subordinate  teachers  and  the  Bihar  Education
Service Class-II employees.  After referring to  the  report  of  the  Saran
Singh  Committee,  the  Division  Bench  formed   the   opinion   that   the
notification of the State Govt. dated 11.4.1977 will  have  to  be  confined
only to 59 posts in the miscellaneous cadre.
28.         The LPAs were therefore dismissed by the Division Bench  by  the
impugned judgment and order dated 21.5.2010.   The  Division  Bench  by  the
same  order  also  dropped  the  contempt  matter  then  pending   in   CWJC
No.8679/2002.   The orders passed by the learned Single Judge as well as  by
the Division Bench have led to the present two Civil  Appeals  (arising  out
of SLP (C) Nos.26675-76 of 2010), which is the  third  occasion  when   this
controversy is coming up to this Court.
29.         When the Special Leave Petitions leading to these  appeals  came
up for consideration,  initially  a  notice  was  issued  on  7.3.2011,  and
lateron after hearing the counsel for  respondents,  the  operation  of  the
judgment and orders passed by the learned Single Judge as  well  as  by  the
Division Bench came to be stayed by an order passed on 4.7.2011.  The  State
of Bihar has now moved IA Nos. 19-20 of 2011 to vacate the  order  of  stay.
The appellants on the other hand have contended that in  view  of  the  stay
granted by this Court, the State of Bihar and its officers are  expected  to
take steps to implement the Resolution dated 7.7.2006, and  since  that  was
not being done they have filed the Contempt Petition (Civil)  No.386-387  of
2011 against the Chief Secretary  of  the  Govt.  of  Bihar  and  its  other
officers. The Civil Appeals, the I.A for vacating the  stay  order  and  the
Contempt Petitions have been heard, and are being  decided  together.   Shri
Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel  has  appeared  for  the  appellants,  Shri
Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel has appeared for  the  State  of  Bihar
and its officers,  and  learned  counsel  Shri  Akhilesh  Kumar  Pandey  has
appeared for the Bihar Education Service Association and its members.
      Submission of the rival parties
30.         It was submitted on behalf of the appellants  that  the  learned
Single Judge and the Judges of  the  Division  Bench  who  have  passed  the
impugned order have failed to grasp the true import of the order  passed  by
this Court on 19.4.2006.  All that remained to be  done  thereafter  was  to
monitor  the  contempt  proceedings  in  Writ  Petition  No.8679/2002.  This
limited scope was exceeded by them to re-open the  entire  controversy.   If
this is approved, there would never be any end to the  litigation.   It  was
submitted by Mr. Patwalia, learned senior counsel for the  appellants,  that
the fact of stagnation in the services of the subordinate teachers  was  not
being disputed.  What was being contended was  that  the  recommendation  of
Saran Singh Committee was concerning only 59 miscellaneous  posts  and  that
was approved by the State Govt. in the notification of  11.4.1977.   In  his
submission, this reading of the  recommendation  was  not  correct.  In  any
case, the notification of 11.4.1977 has to be read on its own.  Besides,  in
the present matter the Court is concerned with the challenge  to  the  Govt.
Resolution dated 7.7.2006.  The implementation of this notification was  not
going to cause any serious financial burden on the State  Govt.   The  State
Govt. was to upgrade the posts, and thus the subordinate  teachers  were  to
carry their own posts in the Bihar Education Service  Class-II,  though  not
many  of  those  teachers  were  going  to  benefit  since   most   of   the
beneficiaries have already retired or are on  the  verge  of  retirement  as
stated in the resolution.  As far as seniority is  concerned,  he  submitted
that the subordinate employees who remain  in  service  will  get  seniority
from 1977, and naturally those who joined the service subsequently  will  be
placed thereafter.  Mr. Patwalia  therefore  submitted  that  these  appeals
should be allowed, and the challenge to the  resolution  dated  7.7.2006  be
repelled.  He, however, fairly stated that  he  was  not  pressing  for  the
action in contempt.
31.         As against this, it was submitted on behalf of the employees  of
the Bihar Education Service that the  Subordinate  Education  Service  is  a
feeder cadre for promotion to the Bihar Education  Service.   Their  pay  is
different, and the merger, as proposed in  the  resolution  dated  7.7.2006,
will affect their  seniority  retrospectively.   In  their  submission,  the
State Govt. notification of 11.4.1977 has basically to be read in the  light
of the Saran Singh Committee report, which according to them did not  extend
the recommendations to the cadre of the subordinate teachers.  Mr.  Akhilesh
Kumar Pandey learned counsel, appearing for them, therefore  submitted  that
the SLPs should be dismissed.
32.         On behalf of the State of Bihar  submissions  were  advanced  by
Mr.  Nagendra  Rai,  learned  senior  counsel.   He   submitted   that   the
notification passed by the State Govt. on 11.4.1977  ought  to  be  read  as
confined to the Saran Singh Committee report  only.   There  was  no  merger
contemplated in the Govt. notification, and the order of  this  Court  dated
19.4.2006 should not be  read  as  confined  only  to  the  hearing  of  the
Contempt Petition by the High Court.   He  submitted  that  the  subordinate
service employees have otherwise also prospects of  promotions  under  their
service rules. The Saran Singh Committee Report was only for  the  employees
of the State Service and the subordinate service did not form  part  of  the
State Service. The report was meant for only those who did  not  have  scope
for promotion in the State Service, and therefore the SLPs be dismissed.
      Consideration of the rival submissions
33.         We have considered the submissions by the counsel for the  rival
parties. The above narration of the facts and legal submissions  shows  that
when the first Writ Petition No.12122 of 1998 was filed  by  the  appellant,
the State Government did not even care  to  file  a  counter.   The  learned
Single Judge went through the material on record and noted  that  the  order
for merger had yet not been passed, and the matter was  pending  before  the
Govt.   The  learned  Judge,  therefore,  passed  the  order  directing  the
Secretary, Education  Department  to  act  on  the  Govt.  resolution  dated
11.4.1977.  The State of Bihar chose to file an appeal before  the  Division
Bench where for the first time it stated that  there  was  no  proposal  for
merger.  The Division Bench which heard the appeal noted that the  direction
of the Single Judge was  to  act  in  terms  of  the  Govt.  resolution  and
therefore there was no reason for the State  to  feel  aggrieved.  When  the
State Govt. filed the SLP, this Court  observed  that  the  final  direction
given to the State was to implement the resolution  in  the  manner  it  was
meant to be implemented, and disposed of the SLP.  Thus,  it  was  clear  at
the end of the first round of litigation that  the  petition  filed  by  the
appellant had been allowed by learned Single Judge, and that order had  been
left undisturbed in the appeals therefrom by the Division Bench as  well  as
by this Court.
34.         As is seen from the  further  events  that  in  spite  of  these
orders the State  Government  did  not  take  the  steps  to  implement  the
notification dated 11.4.1977, in the manner accepted as valid in  the  first
round of litigation.  This inaction led Shri Janardhan Rai  and  some  other
teachers to file one more Writ Petition being CWJC No.8679 of 2002  for  the
implementation thereof, and the merger  of  subordinate  teachers  into  the
Bihar Education Service Class-II.  It is however seen that,  at  this  stage
there was a difference of opinion between the  Finance  Department  and  the
Education Department of the State Govt.  The  Finance  Department  continued
to maintain that the subordinate Education Service could not be merged  into
the Bihar Education Service Class-II.  The Education Department  however  in
its first affidavit, in this Writ Petition, recorded that  the  notification
of 11.4.1977 did not state that it is concerning only 59 posts.  Notings  on
the files of the Govt. clearly showed  that  the  Education  Department  had
understood that for the implementation of the notification,  the  merger  of
the two cadres was necessary, and had for  that  purpose  prepared  a  draft
resolution for the approval of the Finance  Department.   In  view  of  this
factual scenario, and also in view  of  the  previous  orders,  the  learned
single judge allowed the CWJC No.8679/2002, and passed the  order  directing
the steps for merger of the subordinate teachers into  the  Bihar  Education
Service. The appeal of State of Bihar was also  dismissed  by  the  Division
Bench by observing that the controversy had already attained  finality  with
the orders of the Supreme Court.
35.         The order passed by this Court, thereafter, in the Civil  Appeal
filed by the State Govt. bearing No.4466 of 2003 dated 19.4.2006 has  to  be
read on this background.  In the very first para  this  Court  has  recorded
that the non-implementation of the notification passed in 1977  for  such  a
long time had shocked its conscience.  In the second  paragraph,  the  Court
has recorded the submissions of the rival parties.  In the third  para,  the
Court specifically recorded that the writ petitions filed in the High  Court
were allowed  in  favour  of  the  teachers  holding  that  such  merger  is
contemplated  in  the  concerned  Government  notification.   All  that   is
recorded thereafter is concerning the Contempt Petition, which  was  pending
in the High Court, and which was concerning the non-implementation  of  High
Court’s  order,  which  had  directed  the  implementation  of   the   Govt.
notification dated 11.4.1977.  As  the  further  paragraphs  of  this  order
record, all that remained to be looked into was whether  the  implementation
has been done in the manner  required  by  the  notification.   It  is  also
relevant that before dismissing the Civil Appeal filed by the  State  Govt.,
the Court recorded that the Govt. was  also  thinking  of  implementing  the
notification in the manner suggested by the  respondents  before  the  Court
(that is the appellants herein).  Therefore, ultimately the  Court  directed
that  High  Court  will  examine  the  matter  and  if  satisfied  that  the
notification  has  not  been  implemented,  deal  with  the  contemnors   in
accordance with law. Therefore, the Court vacated the stay on  the  contempt
proceedings forthwith.
36.         Thus, all that remained thereafter to be done was to decide  the
pending Contempt Petition in Writ Petition CWJC No.8679 of 2002.  The  state
of Bihar understood the decisions so far  correctly,  and  therefore  passed
the resolution dated 7.7.2006 accepting the  view  point,  which  had  found
favour with the High Court as well as this Court,  recommending  the  merger
of the two cadres and upgradation of  the  teachers.   The  resolution  also
recorded that the merger would not have any serious  financial  implications
nor  would  it  affect  seniority  of  many  employees  since  most  of  the
employees, to be merged, had either retired or were on the  verge  of  their
retirement.
37.         In this background when the Bihar  Education  Service  employees
filed their Writ Petition being No.CWJC 10091 of 2006, the State  Government
rightly defended  its  resolution  dated  7.7.2006.   However,  the  learned
Single Judge failed to understand the import of the decision of this  Court,
and thought that he had the liberty to reopen the  controversy  despite  the
decisions rendered in the first  two  rounds.   He,  therefore,  passed  the
order allowing that Writ Petition. Now  what  we  find  is  that  the  State
Government  once  again  changed  its  stand,  and  issued  a   Notification
canceling the Resolution dated 7.7.2006. And when the  appellants  preferred
their LPA, the State Government continued to maintain its changed  position.
 To say  the  least  this  was  not  expected  from  the  State  Government.
Unfortunately enough, the Division Bench also approved  this  re-opening  of
the controversy once again.
38.         In the present appeals we are concerned  with  the  legality  of
the Govt. Resolution dated 7.7.2006 which the State  Govt.  defended  before
the single judge but gave up the defence in the appeal before  the  Division
Bench. The State Govt. went to the extent of contending  that  the  decision
in CWJC No.8679/2002 could not be treated as binding, although it  had  been
confirmed by Division Bench and by  this  Court.   Unfortunately  enough  we
must record that the Division Bench  also  failed  to  interfere  with  this
digression on the part of the State Govt.  and  the  learned  Single  Judge.
The Division Bench ignored that, assuming that perhaps two  views  could  be
canvassed earlier while interpreting the notification dated  11.4.1977,  the
order dated 19.4.2006 passed by this Court at the end of  the  second  round
of these proceedings left no ambiguity whatsoever, and the State  Govt.  was
expected  to  follow  and  honour  the  same.   The  State  Govt.  did   act
accordingly, and issued the Govt. resolution dated 7.7.2006  to  honour  the
judgments.  But immediately after the decision of the single judge  in  CWJC
10091 of 2006, went to the other extreme to rescind the  same,  and  not  to
defend it in appeal.  We have noted the contents  of  the  Govt.  resolution
dated 7.7.2006.  In our view it is well reasoned and justifiably  issued  to
reduce the rigour of stagnation.  Whether the resolution of the problem  was
seen as based on the notification of 11.4.1977 or  independently  under  the
resolution dated 7.7.2006, there was no reason to interfere therein.
39.    The hierarchy of the Courts requires the High Courts also  to  accept
the decision of this Court, and its interpretation of the orders  issued  by
the executive.  Any departure therefrom will lead only to  indiscipline  and
anarchy.  The High Courts cannot ignore  Article  141  of  the  Constitution
which clearly states, that the law declared by this Court is binding on  all
Courts within the territory of India.  As observed by this Court in para  28
of the State of West Bengal and others  Vs.  Shivananda  Pathak  and  others
reported in 1998 (5) SCC 513:-
           “If a judgment is overruled by the higher  court,  the  judicial
      discipline requires that the judge whose judgment  is  overruled  must
      submit to that judgment. He cannot, in  the  same  proceedings  or  in
      collateral proceedings between the same parties, rewrite the overruled
      judgment..........”


      In the same vein we may state that when the judgment  of  a  Court  is
confirmed by the higher court, the judicial discipline requires  that  Court
to accept that judgment, and it should not in collateral  proceedings  write
a judgment contrary to the confirmed judgment.  We  may  as  well  note  the
observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Fuzlunbi Vs. K. Khader Vali and  another
reported in 1980 (4) SCC 125:-
           “…….No judge in India, except a  larger  Bench  of  the  Supreme
      court, without a departure from judicial discipline can whittle  down,
      wish away or be unbound by the ratio of the judgment  of  the  Supreme
      Court.”


40.         That apart, even if  one  looks  to  the  merits  of  the  rival
contentions, there is no dispute that although the rules do  provide  for  a
channel of promotion to the subordinate teachers, actually  the  chances  of
promotion for them are very less.  There is a serious stagnation as  far  as
the subordinate teachers are  concerned.   The  Saran  Singh  Committee  was
essentially constituted to go into this very issue.  As  can  be  seen  from
the report of the committee, the various service associations in  the  State
were clamouring for appropriate provision for  promotion  on  par  with  the
Bihar Engineering Service.  It is true that  the  report  of  the  committee
does refer to the 59 posts in the miscellaneous cadre  while  examining  the
problem.  However, after directing the shifting  of  the  engineers  in  the
Education Department to the Public Works Department, and the doctors to  the
Health Services in sub-clause (1) and  (2)  of  para  11.10,  the  committee
recommended in sub-clause (3) that “the remaining posts should  be  included
in the general cadre and manned by officers of Bihar  Education  Service  as
far as possible”.  The notification issued by the State Govt.  on  11.4.1977
approved the recommendation of the committee, but  the  wording  used  while
approving the recommendation is bit different.
41.         It cannot be disputed that it was for the State  Govt.  to  take
appropriate decision on the recommendation.   The  recommendations  made  by
the committee will of course have to be seen as the material  placed  before
the Govt.  However, ultimately, it is the decision of  the  Govt.  which  is
relevant and therefore one has to look at the wording  in  the  notification
of the State Govt.  Here the approved recommendation in the wording used  by
the State Govt. is as follows:-
           “Various Posts such as Teacher (except the teachers of Netarhat)
      and the posts of Stadium managers etc should be included in the  Bihar
      Education Service cadre and  the  Officers  of  the  cadre  should  be
      appointed               on                these                posts.”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)

      This notification was clearly understood by the Education  Department.
Earlier it had prepared  the  draft  resolution  for  the  approval  of  the
Finance Department recommending the merger of the  two  cadres.   And  later
the State  Govt.  had  also  rightly  passed  the  resolution  7.7.2006  (in
concurrence with the Finance Department) after the decision  of  this  Court
at the end of the second round of litigation.
42.          Much  emphasis  was  laid  by  the  Bihar   Education   Service
Association on the absence of common service rules, to oppose the merger  of
the subordinate service employees into the State Service Class-II.  In  this
context we must note that the decision to merge the cadre  is  a  matter  of
policy as held by this Court in S.P. Shivprasad Pipal  Vs.  Union  of  India
and others reported in 1998 (4) SCC 598.  It is for the state to  decide  as
to which cadres should be merged so long as the decision  is  not  arbitrary
or unreasonable.  As stated earlier, the resolution dated 7.7.2006  is  well
reasoned and justified, and cannot be called arbitrary  or  unreasonable  to
be hit by Article 14.  It deserved to be upheld.  It is  possible  that  the
merger may affect the prospects of some  employees  but  this  cannot  be  a
reason to set-aside  the  merger.   Once  the  State  Govt.  has  taken  the
necessary decision to merge the two cadres in a given case, the State  Govt.
is expected to follow it by framing the necessary rules.
43.         One of the pleas raised by the employees of the Bihar  Education
Service was that the subordinate  teachers  did  not  belong  to  the  State
Service. We may note at this stage that in their list of  dates  and  events
of the Civil Appeals, the appellants have specifically referred to the  fact
that these subordinate services are included in  Appendix-16  of  the  Bihar
Service Code, and therefore, it is contended that it will  be  incorrect  to
state that the subordinate service is not a part of the State Service.    If
we refer to the code we find that  all  the  posts  in  subordinate  service
other than those classified as  Class-I  and  Class-II  State  Services  are
mentioned at Item 119 in  Appendix-16  of  the  Bihar  Service  Code,  1952.
Thus, there is no merit in this objection as well.
44.         This entire discussion leads us to only one conclusion that  the
learned Single Judge who heard the petition CWJC No.10091/2006, which  began
the third round of  litigation  filed  on  behalf  of  the  Bihar  Education
Service Association, had no business  to  re-open  the  entire  controversy,
even otherwise.  The State Govt.  had  already  passed  a  resolution  dated
7.7.2006 after the order of this Court  dated  19.4.2006.   While  examining
the legality of that resolution (which was defended by the  State  Govt.  at
this stage before the learned Single Judge) the entire controversy was  once
again gone into. The law of finality of decisions which is enshrined in  the
principle of res-judicata or principles analogous thereto, does  not  permit
any such re-examination, and the learned Judge clearly failed  to  recognize
the same.
45.         For the reasons stated above, these appeals (arising out of  SLP
Nos.26675-76 of 2010) are allowed.  The judgment and  order  passed  by  the
Division Bench of Patna High Court in LPA No.418/2009 and other  LPAs  dated
21.5.2010, and that of the learned Single Judge  dated  31.10.2007  in  CWJC
No.8679/2002 are set-aside and the said Writ Petition is  hereby  dismissed.
Consequently the  notification  dated  19.11.2007  issued  pursuant  to  the
decision of the Single Judge will also stand  quashed  and  set-aside.   The
State Govt. Resolution dated 7.7.2006 is upheld.  The  state  shall  proceed
to act accordingly.  I.A. Nos.19-20/2011 are dismissed.  As  stated  by  Mr.
Patwalia, learned senior counsel  for  the  appellants,  the  appellants  no
longer press for the action for contempt arising out of  CWJC  No.8679/2002.
Contempt Petition Nos. 386-387/2011, will also  accordingly  stand  disposed
of, as not pressed.
46.         The attitude of the  State  Govt.  in  this  matter  has  caused
unnecessary anxiety to a large number of teachers.  
The  State  Govt.  must
realise that in a country where there is so much illiteracy and where  there
are a large number of first generation students, the  role  of  the  primary
and  secondary  teachers  is  very  important.   
They  have  to  be  treated
honourably and given appropriate  pay  and  chances  of  promotion.
 It  is
certainly not expected of the State Govt. to  drag  them  to  the  Court  in
litigation for years together.
47.         Though the appeals stand disposed of as above,
we do record  our
strong displeasure for the manner in  which  the  State  of  Bihar  kept  on
changing its stand from time to time.  
This is not expected from  the  State
Govt.  
The manner in which the learned Single Judge proceeded with the  Writ
Petition No.1009/2006  to  reopen  the  entire  controversy,  and  also  the
Division Bench in LPA No.418/2003 in approving that  approach  is  also  far
from satisfactory.  
If the orders passed by this Court  were  not  clear  to
the State Govt. or any party, it could have certainly approached this  Court
for the clarification thereof.
But it could not have setup a contrary  plea
in a collateral proceeding.  
We do not expect  such  an  approach  from  the
State Govt. and least from the High Court.  Having stated this, although  we
have expressed out displeasure about the approach of the  State  Government,
we refrain from passing any order as to costs.
                                             …………………………………..J.
                                             ( Surinder Singh Nijjar )


                                             …………………………………..J.
                                             ( H.L. Gokhale  )
New Delhi
Dated: November 23, 2011

High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 368 and 367 of 2003 respectively whereby the High Court while setting aside the conviction and sentence of other accused, partly allowed the criminal appeals upholding the conviction of the appellants herein for the offences punishable under Sections 148 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’) and reduced the sentence for the offence punishable under Section 436 of the IPC from 7 years to 3 years while maintaining the amount of fine and directed the appellants herein to surrender themselves before the trial Court in order to serve the remaining period of sentence.= the prosecution has established the offence under Sections 148 and 436 of IPC. Insofar as the appellants are concerned, though the trial Court has awarded 7 years of imprisonment, the High Court reduced the same to 3 years while maintaining the fine amount. In fact, Section 436 IPC enables the court to award punishment with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years in addition to the fine. We have already noted that the dwelling houses of PWs 1-42 were set on fire and reduced into ashes by the above appellants/accused and the same have been duly established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Taking note of the sentence prescribed under Section 436 of IPC, we are of the view that even the reduction of sentence by the High Court is not warranted, however, in the absence of appeal by the State, we are not inclined to disturb the same. 14) In the light of the above discussion, both the appeals are dismissed. In view of the fact that this Court on 06.03.2009 enlarged all the appellants on bail, if any portion of the sentence is left out, they are directed to surrender within a period of 2 weeks from today to undergo the remaining sentence. The appeals are dismissed. In view of the fact that this Court on 06.03.2009 enlarged all the appellants on bail, if any portion of the sentence is left out, they are directed to surrender within a period of 2 weeks from today to undergo the remaining sentence.


                                     REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 454 OF 2009



Busi Koteswara Rao & Ors.                           .... Appellant(s)

      Versus

State of A.P.                                           .... Respondent(s)


                                  WITH

                      2 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 455 OF 2009






                              J U D G M E N T


P.Sathasivam,J.

1)    These appeals are directed against  the  final  judgments  and  orders
dated 20.06.2007 and 13.06.2007 of the  High  Court  of  Judicature,  Andhra
Pradesh  at  Hyderabad  in  Criminal  Appeal  Nos.  368  and  367  of   2003
respectively whereby the High Court 
while setting aside the  conviction  and
sentence of other accused, partly allowed  the  criminal  appeals  upholding
the conviction of the appellants herein for the  offences  punishable  under
Sections 148 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  (in  short  ‘the  IPC’)
and reduced the sentence for the offence punishable  under  Section  436  of
the IPC from 7 years to 3 years while maintaining the  amount  of  fine  and
directed the appellants herein to  surrender  themselves  before  the  trial
Court in order to serve the remaining period of sentence.
2)    Brief facts:
a)    There were land disputes between two groups at Pedagarlapadu  Village,
Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh in respect of the  lands  belonging  to  the
Temples which were leased out by the  Endowments  Department  to  the  upper
class people of the village and  there was resentment  in  local  dalits  for
the same.
 One day,  the  agitators  trespassed  into  the  said  lands,  in
respect of which, Pinnam Peda Subbaiah-the  leaseholder  filed  a  complaint
which resulted into a deep seated rivalry between the two groups.
b)    In order to take revenge, the other party attacked the leaseholder  to
commit his murder.  In retaliation, on 14.04.1997,  the  accused/appellants,
formed an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons, raided  the  Harijan
colony and set ablaze around 50 dwelling houses  of  the  prosecution  party
and abused them in the name of their caste.
c)    The Inspector of Police, Dachepalli took up  the  investigation  which
culminated into registration of Crime Nos. 29 and 28 of 1997 and later,  the
case was transferred to  the  Crime  Investigation  Department  (CID).   The
Deputy Superintendent of Police, CID,  Vijayawada  filed  the  charge  sheet
against the accused persons for the offence punishable under  Sections  147,
148, 435, 436 read with Section  149  IPC  and  Sections  3(1)(v),  3(1)(x),
3(2)(v) and 3(2)(iv) of  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  the  Scheduled  Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short ‘the SC & ST Act’).
d)    The cases were committed to  the  Court  of  Special  Sessions  Judge,
Guntur under the SC & ST  Act  and  numbered  as  S.C.  Nos.  63/S/2000  and
62/S/2000.  In both the cases, by separate  orders  dated  24.03.2003,   the
Special Sessions Judge found the appellants herein  and  others  guilty  for
the offence punishable under Sections 148 and 436 of the IPC  and  convicted
and sentenced each of them to suffer RI for one year and to pay  a  fine  of
Rs.2000/- each, in default, to further undergo simple imprisonment (SI)  for
one month for the offence punishable  under  Section  148  IPC  and  further
sentenced each of them to suffer RI for  7  years  and  to  pay  a  fine  of
Rs.10,000/-, in default, to further  undergo  SI  for  two  months  for  the
offence punishable under Section 436 IPC read with Section 149 IPC.
(e)   Aggrieved by the said  order  of  conviction  and  sentence,  the  two
appeals being Criminal Appeal Nos. 368 and 367 of  2003  were  filed  before
the High Court.
(f)   By impugned order dated 20.06.2007 in Criminal appeal No. 368 of  2003
and order dated 13.06.2007 in Criminal Appeal No.  367  of  2003,  the  High
Court, partly allowed the appeals and while  setting  aside  the  conviction
and sentence of other accused,  upheld  the  conviction  of  the  appellants
herein for the offences punishable  under  Sections  148  and  436  IPC  but
reduced the sentence for the offence punishable under Section 436  IPC  from
7 years to 3 years while maintaining the amount of fine.
g)    Aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  Busi  Koteswara  Rao  (A-1),  Pinnam
Nageswara Rao (A-4) and Busa Mattayya (A-30) have filed Criminal Appeal  No.
454 of 2009 and Busi Koteswara Rao  (A-1),  Katakam  Pedda  Biksham  (A-11),
Katakam China Biksham (A-12), Busa Mattayya  (A-13),  Busa  Kotaiah  (A-14),
Pinnam Rangaiah (A-15), Pinnam Sankar (A-17), Pinnam Nageswara  Rao  (A-19),
Boosa Srinu (A-21), Marasu Venkata Swamy (A-22), Pinnam  Ramana  (A-24)  and
Pinnam China Subbayya A-25 have  filed  Criminal  Appeal  No.  455  of  2009
before this Court by way of special leave.
3)      Heard   Mr.   V.   Sridhar   Reddy,   learned   counsel   for    the
appellants/accused  and  Mr.  Mayur  R.  Shah,  learned  counsel   for   the
respondent-State.
4)    In the case on hand, total 79 persons were chargesheeted  for  various
offences under IPC including Sections 147, 148 and Section 436.  Though  the
prosecution has examined 52 witnesses and exhibited 12 documents in  support
of their case, among those witnesses, PWs 1-42 alone were cited as the  eye-
witnesses to the occurrence.   Due  to  the  arson  and  violence  that  had
happened on 14.04.1997 between two groups of  the  same  village,  about  50
dwelling houses reduced into ashes.  PWs 2, 4-15, 18, 20, 22, 23  and  26-41
did not support the case  of  the  prosecution  and  were  declared  hostile
witnesses.  On the other hand, PWs 1, 3, 16, 17,  19,  21,  24,  25  and  42
supported the version of the prosecution.
5)    According to the prosecution, there was a  friction  amongst  the  two
groups of the same village.  The prosecution party belongs to  Telugu  Desam
Party and the accused Party belongs to Congress (I).  It is  also  projected
by the prosecution that apart from the  political  rivalry,  there  is  also
serious enmity between the parties in respect  of  lease  of  temple  lands.
There is no dispute that the incident occurred on  14.04.1997  was  a  group
clash between two rivalries.  In such type of incidents, an onerous duty  is
cast upon the criminal courts to ensure that no innocent  is  convicted  and
deprived of his liberties.  At the same time, in the case of  group  clashes
and organized crimes, persons behind the scene executing the  crime,  should
not be allowed to go scot-free.   In  other  words,  in  cases  involving  a
number of accused persons, a balanced approach by the court is  required  to
be insisted upon.  In a series of decisions, this Court  has  held  that  in
cases of arson and murder where  large  number  of  people  are  accused  of
committing crime, the courts should be cautious to rely upon  the  testimony
of witnesses speaking generally without specific reference  to  the  accused
or the specific role played by them.
(6)   Even, as early as in 1965, a larger Bench of this Court in  Masalti  &
Ors. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 202  considered  about  how
the prosecution case is to be believed.  The principles laid  down  in  para
16 of the decision are relevant which is as under:-


        “16. Mr Sawhney also urged that the test applied by the High  Court
      in convicting the appellants is mechanical. He argues that  under  the
      Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence given by  a  single  witness
      would be enough to convict an accused person, whereas  evidence  given
      by half a dozen witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be enough
      to sustain the conviction.  That,  no  doubt  is  true;  but  where  a
      criminal court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the  commission
      of an offence involving a large number of offenders and a large number
      of victims, it is usual to adopt the test that the conviction could be
      sustained only if it is supported by two or three  or  more  witnesses
      who give a consistent account of the incident. In a  sense,  the  test
      may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to see how it  can
      be treated as irrational or unreasonable. Therefore, we do  not  think
      any grievance can be made by the appellants against  the  adoption  of
      this test. If at all the prosecution may be entitled to say  that  the
      seven accused persons were  acquitted  because  their  cases  did  not
      satisfy the mechanical test of four witnesses, and if  the  said  test
      had not been applied, they might as well have been convicted.  It  is,
      no doubt, the quality of the evidence that matters and not the  number
      of witnesses who give such evidence. But sometimes  it  is  useful  to
      adopt a test like the one which the High Court has adopted in  dealing
      with the present case.”




7)    It is clear that when a criminal  court  has  to  deal  with  evidence
pertaining to the commission of an  offence  involving  a  large  number  of
offenders and a large number  of  victims,  the  normal  test  is  that  the
conviction could be sustained only  if  it  is  supported  by  two  or  more
witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident in question.
8)    No doubt, in State of U.P. vs. Dan Singh and Others (1997) 3 SCC  747,
a Bench of two-Judges, in para 48 has held that “……it would be safe if  only
those of the respondents should be held to be the members  of  the  unlawful
assembly  who  have  been  specifically  identified  by  at  least  4   eye-
witnesses….”

9)    We have already quoted the requirements for convicting an  accused  in
a clash between two groups as per Masalti (supra) which is  a  larger  Bench
decision of this Court.  In the light of the same,  we  reiterate  and  hold
that when an unlawful assembly or a large number of  persons  take  part  in
arson or in a clash between two groups, in order to  convict  a  person,  at
least two prosecution witnesses have to support and identify  the  role  and
involvement of the persons concerned.
10)   With the above background, let us consider whether the impugned  order
of the High Court convicting A-1, A-4 and A-30 in Criminal  Appeal  No.  454
of 2009 and A-1, A-11, A-12, A-13 to A-15, A-17, A-19, A-21, A-22, A-24  and
A-25 in Criminal Appeal No. 455 of 2009 is sustainable.

11)   We were taken through the statements of witnesses  who  supported  the
case of the prosecution.  We also perused all  the  relevant  documents  and
connected papers.  As discussed by the High Court, PWs 1-21 spoke about  the
participation of A-1 and A-38 whereas PWs 3 and 42 narrated with  regard  to
the  participation  of  A-4  and  PWs  16  and  17   described   about   the
participation of A-30.  In the same way,  the  participation  of  the  above
mentioned 12 accused persons in Criminal Appeal No. 455  of  2009  has  been
spoken to by two or more witnesses.

12)   By applying the  principles  laid  down  in  Masalti  (supra)  and  as
reiterated by  us  in  the  above  paragraphs,  inasmuch  as  at  least  two
prosecution witnesses have spoken to about  the  involvement  and  the  role
played by the above accused persons, we have no reason to  differ  with  the
decision arrived by the High Court.  It is clear from  the  statements  made
by the witnesses on the side of the prosecution that the  appellants/accused
came in a mob and set ablaze around 50  dwelling  houses  and  reduced  them
into  ashes  and  the  same  were  identified  and  their   involvement   is
established by the reliable prosecution witnesses  beyond  reasonable  doubt
which cannot be disturbed.  On the other hand, we  fully  endorse  the  view
and the ultimate decision arrived by the High Court.
13)   Coming to the sentence, the prosecution has  established  the  offence
under  Sections  148  and  436  of  IPC.   Insofar  as  the  appellants  are
concerned, though the trial Court has awarded 7 years of  imprisonment,  the
High Court reduced the same to 3 years while maintaining  the  fine  amount.
In fact, Section  436  IPC  enables  the  court  to  award  punishment  with
imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a  term
which may extend to 10 years in addition  to  the  fine.   We  have  already
noted that the dwelling houses of PWs 1-42 were  set  on  fire  and  reduced
into ashes by the above appellants/accused  and  the  same  have  been  duly
established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.  Taking note of  the
sentence prescribed under Section 436 of IPC, we are of the view  that  even
the reduction of sentence by the High Court is not  warranted,  however,  in
the absence of appeal by the State, we  are  not  inclined  to  disturb  the
same.  14)  In the light of the  above  discussion,  both  the  appeals  are
dismissed.  In view of the fact that this Court on 06.03.2009  enlarged  all
the appellants on bail, if any portion of the sentence  is  left  out,  they
are directed to surrender within a period of 2 weeks from today  to  undergo
the remaining sentence.
                                  ………….…………………………J.


                                       (P. SATHASIVAM)




















                                    ………….…………………………J.


                                      (RANJAN GOGOI)

NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 22, 2012.




ITEM NO.1-E              COURT No.3              SECTION II
(For judgment)

                S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I
                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

                 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.454/2009


BUSI KOTESWARA RAO & ORS.                          Appellant(s)

    Versus

STATE OF A.P.                                 Respondent(s)

WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.455/2009


DATE :22/11/2012       These matters were called
              on for pronouncement of judgment  today.

For Appellant(s)     Mr. V.N. Raghupathy, Adv.


For Respondent(s)          Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, Adv.
                           Mr. Mayur R. Shah, Adv.
                          Ms. Savita Devi, Adv.
                          Ms. Suchitra Hrangkhawl, Adv.
                          Mr. Amit K. Nain, Adv.
                          Mr. M.B. Shivudu, Adv.

         Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Sathasivam  pronounced the judgment of  the
  Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Gogoi.


          The appeals are dismissed.  In view of the fact that  this  Court
  on 06.03.2009 enlarged all the appellants on bail, if any portion of  the
  sentence is left out, they are directed to surrender within a period of 2
  weeks from today to undergo the remaining sentence.




    (Usha Bhardwaj)                            (Savita Sainani)
    (Court Master)                          (Court Master)

       [Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file ]



-----------------------
10


Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act,-convicted under Section 8 read with Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the NDPS Act”) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- with default stipulation. We reiterate that sub-section (1) of Section 50 makes it imperative for the empowered officer to “inform” the person concerned about the existence of his right that if he so requires, he shall be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, failure to do so vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused where the conviction has been recorded only on the basis of possession of the contraband. We also reiterate that the said provision is mandatory and requires strict compliance. Though a portion of the contraband (opium) was recovered from the vehicle for which Section 50 is not applicable, if we exclude the quantity recovered from the vehicle, the remaining would not come within the mischief of ‘commercial quantity’ for imposition of such conviction and sentence. Taking note of length of period in prison and continuing as on date and in view of non-compliance of sub-section (1) of Section 50 in respect of recovery of contraband from the appellants, we set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on them by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court. 14) As a result, the appeal is allowed and the appellants are ordered to be released forthwith, if they are not required in any other case.


                                     REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 300 OF 2009




Suresh & Ors.                                           .... Appellant(s)

            Versus

State of Madhya Pradesh                                 .... Respondent(s)



                                      2



                               J U D G M E N T


P. Sathasivam,J.

1)    This appeal is directed against the final  judgment  and  order  dated
23.08.2007 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at  Gwalior  in
Criminal Appeal Nos. 738  and 772 of 2000 whereby the High  Court  dismissed
the appeals filed by the appellants  herein  and  confirmed  the  order   of
conviction and sentence  dated  04.10.2000  passed  by  the  Special  Judge,
Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, Guna (M.P.)  in  Special  Case
No. 7 of 1998 by which  they  were  convicted  under  Section  8  read  with
Section 18 of  the  Narcotic  Drugs  &  Psychotropic  Substances  Act,  1985
(hereinafter referred to  as  “the  NDPS  Act”)  and  sentenced  to  undergo
rigorous imprisonment for ten  years  with  a  fine  of  Rs.1,00,000/-  with
default stipulation.
2)    Brief facts:
(a)   On 30.07.1998, at about 1.30 p.m., Som Singh Raghuvanshi, SHO,  Police
Station Kumbhraj, along with the police party went from the  police  station
to search for  the  accused  in  connection  with  Crime  No.  151  of  1998
registered under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC.  In the process of  searching,
when they came to Khatkya Tiraha, they saw that one Maruti  Car  was  coming
from the side of Beenaganj.  When they tried to stop that  car,  the  driver
tried to run away but they stopped the car and found three  persons  sitting
in it.  On being asked about their  names,  they  informed  their  names  as
Pramod, Suresh and Dinesh @ Pappu.
(b)   Under suspicious circumstances, Panchas Shri Lal and  Rup  Singh  were
called from the ‘Tiraha’ and consent of all those  persons  was  sought  for
their personal search and they gave  their  consent.  After  conducting  the
search, Panchnama was prepared.  During search, they found that each of  the
appellants was having polythene bag  in  their  possession  which  contained
white colour substance and on its physical test, it was found “opium”.   The
SDO (P), Radhogarh was informed about the incident.  On  weighing,  all  the
three bags were contained 825 gms, 820 gms and 800 gms of “Opium”.   Samples
of 25 gms were taken separately from each of the packets  and  the  contents
were sealed.  Thereafter, the vehicle  was  also  searched  and  inside  the
front mudguard, six packets of polythene bag containing  ‘opium’  were  also
recovered weighing 810 gms, 820 gms, 690 gms, 820 gms, 800 gms and  615  gms
respectively.  Sample of 25 gms. from each  of  them  were  also  taken  and
sealed.  Thus, a total of 7 kg. Opium valued  at  Rs.1,03,575/-  was  seized
from the appellants and they were arrested.
(c)   Thereafter, along with the appellants and seized articles, the  police
party came to Kumbhraj Police Station and FIR being Crime Case No.  165/1998
was registered against them under Section 8 read  with  Section  18  of  the
NDPS Act.   After investigation, the police filed charge sheet  against  the
accused persons and the Special Judge, NDPS Act, Guna framed  charges  under
Section 8 read with Section 18 of the Act.  After trial, the Special  Judge,
by order dated 04.10.2000, convicted  all  the  three  accused  persons  and
sentenced them to undergo RI for ten years along with fine of  Rs.1,00,000/-
 each, in  default  of  payment  of  fine,  each  would  suffer  two  years’
additional RI.
(d)   Against the said order of conviction and sentence, Suresh  and  Pramod
preferred appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 738 of 2000 and Dinesh  preferred
Criminal Appeal No. 772 of 2000 before the High Court.  By  common  impugned
judgment dated 23.08.2007, the High Court dismissed both the appeals.
(e)   Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants have filed this  appeal
by way of special leave.
3)    Heard Dr. J.N. Dubey, learned senior counsel for  the  appellants  and
Mr. C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-State.
4)    The only point urged before us is about the non-compliance of  Section
50 of the NDPS Act.  According to Dr. J.N.  Dubey,  learned  senior  counsel
for the appellant, considering the mandates provided  under  Section  50  of
the NDPS Act as interpreted by  two  Constitution  Benches  of  this  Court,
viz., State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh,  (1999)  6  SCC  172  and  Vijaysinh
Chandubha Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat (2011)  1  SCC  609,  the  prosecuting
authorities failed to apprise  the  right  of  the  suspect  provided  under
Section 50 of the NDPS Act, hence on this ground the  conviction  is  to  be
set aside.  On the other hand, Mr.  C.D.  Singh,  learned  counsel  for  the
State by pointing out the Panchnama regarding consent  for  personal  search
submitted that the conditions prescribed  in  Section  50  as  explained  in
Baldev Singh’s case (supra) have been fully complied  with  and  prayed  for
dismissal of the appeal.
5)    Since the only question pertains to compliance of Section  50  of  the
NDPS Act, it is useful to refer the same:
         “50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted.—
      (1) When any officer duly authorised under  Section  42  is  about  to
      search any person under the provisions of Section 41,  Section  42  or
      Section 43, he shall, if such person so  requires,  take  such  person
      without unnecessary delay to the nearest gazetted officer  of  any  of
      the departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.


        (2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the  person
      until he can bring him before the gazetted officer or  the  Magistrate
      referred to in sub-section (1).


        (3) The gazetted officer or the Magistrate  before  whom  any  such
      person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground  for  search,
      forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that  search
      be made.


        (4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female.


        (5) When an officer duly authorised under Section 42 has reason  to
      believe that it is not possible to take the person to be  searched  to
      the nearest gazetted officer or Magistrate without the possibility  of
      the person to be searched parting with possession of any narcotic drug
      or psychotropic substance,  or  controlled  substance  or  article  or
      document, he may,  instead  of  taking  such  person  to  the  nearest
      gazetted officer or  Magistrate,  proceed  to  search  the  person  as
      provided under Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  (2
      of 1974).


        (6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the  officer
      shall record the reasons  for  such  belief  which  necessitated  such
      search and within  seventy-two  hours  send  a  copy  thereof  to  his
      immediate official superior.”

After noticing divergence of  opinion  between  different  Benches  of  this
Court with regard to the ambit and scope of Section 50 of the NDPS Act  and,
in particular with regard to the admissibility of the evidence collected  by
an investigating officer during search and seizure  conducted  in  violation
of the provisions of Section 50, the issue was referred to the  Constitution
Bench.  These provisions have been interpreted by the Constitution Bench  in
Baldev Singh’s case (supra).  After considering the mandate of  the  law  as
provided under Section 50 of the NDPS Act  and  various  earlier  decisions,
the Constitution Bench has concluded as under:

        “57. On the basis  of  the  reasoning  and  discussion  above,  the
      following conclusions arise:


        (1) That when an empowered officer or  a  duly  authorised  officer
      acting on prior information  is  about  to  search  a  person,  it  is
      imperative for him to inform the person concerned of his  right  under
      sub-section (1) of Section 50 of being taken to the  nearest  gazetted
      officer or the nearest Magistrate for making the search. However, such
      information may not necessarily be in writing.


        (2) That failure to inform the person concerned about the existence
      of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a  Magistrate
      would cause prejudice to an accused.


        (3)  That  a  search  made  by  an  empowered  officer,  on   prior
      information, without informing the person of his right that if  he  so
      requires, he shall be taken before a gazetted officer or a  Magistrate
      for search and in case he so  opts,  failure  to  conduct  his  search
      before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, may not vitiate  the  trial
      but would render the recovery  of  the  illicit  article  suspect  and
      vitiate  the  conviction  and  sentence  of  an  accused,  where   the
      conviction has been recorded only on the basis of  the  possession  of
      the illicit article,  recovered  from  his  person,  during  a  search
      conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act.


        (4) That there is indeed need to protect  society  from  criminals.
      The societal intent in safety will suffer if persons who commit crimes
      are let off because the evidence against them is to be treated  as  if
      it does not exist. The answer, therefore, is  that  the  investigating
      agency  must  follow  the  procedure  as  envisaged  by  the   statute
      scrupulously and the failure to do so must be  viewed  by  the  higher
      authorities seriously inviting action against the  official  concerned
      so that the laxity on the  part  of  the  investigating  authority  is
      curbed. In every case the end result is important  but  the  means  to
      achieve it must remain above board. The remedy cannot  be  worse  than
      the disease itself. The legitimacy of the judicial  process  may  come
      under a cloud if the court is seen  to  condone  acts  of  lawlessness
      conducted by the investigating agency during search operations and may
      also undermine respect  for  the  law  and  may  have  the  effect  of
      unconscionably compromising the administration of justice. That cannot
      be permitted. An accused is entitled to a  fair  trial.  A  conviction
      resulting from an unfair trial is contrary to our concept of  justice.
      The use of evidence collected in breach of the safeguards provided  by
      Section 50 at the trial, would render the trial unfair.


        (5) That whether or not the safeguards provided in Section 50  have
      been duly observed would have to be determined by  the  court  on  the
      basis of the evidence led at the trial. Finding on that issue, one way
      or the other, would be relevant for recording an order  of  conviction
      or acquittal. Without giving an  opportunity  to  the  prosecution  to
      establish, at the trial,  that  the  provisions  of  Section  50  and,
      particularly, the safeguards provided therein were duly complied with,
      it would not be permissible to cut short a criminal trial.


        (6)  That  in  the  context  in  which  the  protection  has   been
      incorporated in Section 50 for the benefit of the person  intended  to
      be searched, we do not express any opinion whether the  provisions  of
      Section 50 are mandatory or directory, but hold that failure to inform
      the person concerned of his right as emanating from sub-section (1) of
      Section 50, may render the recovery of the contraband suspect and  the
      conviction and sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law.


        (7) That an illicit article seized from the person  of  an  accused
      during search conducted in violation of  the  safeguards  provided  in
      Section 50 of the Act cannot be used as evidence of proof of  unlawful
      possession of the contraband on the accused though any other  material
      recovered during that search may be relied upon by the prosecution, in
      other proceedings, against an accused, notwithstanding the recovery of
      that material during an illegal search.


        (8) A presumption under Section 54 of the Act can  only  be  raised
      after the prosecution has established that the accused was found to be
      in possession of the contraband in a search  conducted  in  accordance
      with the mandate of Section 50. An illegal search cannot  entitle  the
      prosecution to raise a presumption under Section 54 of the Act.


        (9) xxx xxxx


        (10) xxx xxxx”


6)    After the decision in Baldev Singh’s case (supra), a  Bench  of  three
Judges of this Court in Joseph Fernandez vs. State  of  Goa,  (2000)  1  SCC
707, has also considered the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS  Act  and
in para 2, observed as under:
      “Even then the searching officer informed him that “if  you  wish  you
      may  be  searched  in  the  presence  of  a  gazetted  officer  or   a
      Magistrate”.  This according to us is in ‘substantial compliance’ with
      the requirement of Section 50.  We do not agree  with  the  contention
      that there was non-compliance with the mandatory  provision  contained
      in Section 50 of the Act.”

By saying so, after finding no reason to interfere with the  conviction  and
sentence passed on the appellant therein, dismissed his appeal.
7)    In Prabha Shankar Dubey  vs. State of M.P., (2004) 2  SCC  56,  a  two
Judge Bench of this Court again considered the object of Section 50  of  the
NDPS Act.  The Bench also extracted the  conclusion  arrived  at  in  Baldev
Singh’s case (supra).  After adverting to those conclusions and  relying  on
the expression “substantial compliance”  as  stated  in  Joseph  Fernandez’s
case (supra) rejected the  plea  that  there  was  non-compliance  with  the
requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act  and  consequently  dismissed  the
appeal.
8)    After the decision in  Joseph  Fernandez’s  case  and  Prabha  Shankar
Dubey’s case, on the one hand and Krishna Kanwar  (Smt.)  @  Thakuraeen  vs.
State of Rajasthan, (2004) 2 SCC 608 on the other, again the  interpretation
relating  to  Section  50  was  considered  by  the  Constitution  Bench  in
Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja’s  case(supra).   The  question  that  was  posed
before this Constitution Bench was whether Section 50 of the NDPS Act  casts
a duty on the empowered officer to “inform” the suspect of his right  to  be
searched in the presence of a gazetted officer or a  Magistrate,  if  he  so
desires or whether a mere enquiry by the said  officer  as  to  whether  the
suspect would like to be searched in the  presence  of  a  Magistrate  or  a
gazetted officer can be said to be due compliance within the mandate of  the
Section 50?  Before going into the ultimate conclusion  arrived  at  by  the
Constitution Bench, the following details mentioned in paragraph 2 are  also
relevant which are as under:

        “2. When these appeals came up for consideration before a Bench  of
      three Judges, it was noticed that there was a  divergence  of  opinion
      between the decisions of this Court in Joseph Fernandez  v.  State  of
      Goa, Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of M.P. on the one hand and Krishna
      Kanwar v. State of Rajasthan on the other, with regard to  the  dictum
      laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in State  of  Punjab
      v. Baldev Singh, in particular regarding the question  whether  before
      conducting search, the police officer concerned is merely required  to
      ask the suspect whether he  would  like  to  be  produced  before  the
      Magistrate or a gazetted officer for the purpose of search or  is  the
      suspect required to be made aware of the existence  of  his  right  in
      that behalf under the law.”


In order to set the controversy  raised,  the  Constitution  Bench,  at  the
foremost, recapitulated the decision arrived at by  the  Constitution  Bench
in  Baldev  Singh’s  case  (supra).   After  considering  all  the   earlier
decisions,  the  latter  Constitution  Bench  arrived   at   the   following
conclusions:
        “24. Although the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case  did  not
      decide in absolute terms the question whether or not Section 50 of the
      NDPS Act was directory or mandatory yet it was held that provisions of
      sub-section (1) of Section 50 make it  imperative  for  the  empowered
      officer to “inform” the person concerned (suspect) about the existence
      of his right that if he so requires, he shall  be  searched  before  a
      gazetted officer or a Magistrate;  failure  to  “inform”  the  suspect
      about the existence of his said right would cause  prejudice  to  him,
      and in case he so  opts,  failure  to  conduct  his  search  before  a
      gazetted officer or a Magistrate, may not vitiate the trial but  would
      render the recovery of the illicit article  suspect  and  vitiate  the
      conviction and sentence of an accused, where the conviction  has  been
      recorded only on the basis of the possession of the  illicit  article,
      recovered from the person during a search conducted  in  violation  of
      the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.  The  Court  also  noted
      that it was not necessary that the information required  to  be  given
      under Section 50 should be in a prescribed form or in writing  but  it
      was mandatory that the suspect was made aware of the existence of  his
      right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, if  so
      required by him. We respectfully concur with  these  conclusions.  Any
      other interpretation of the provision would make  the  valuable  right
      conferred on the suspect illusory and a farce.


                                              [Emphasis supplied]


        28. We shall now deal with the two decisions, referred  to  in  the
      referral order, wherein “substantial compliance” with the  requirement
      embodied in Section 50 of the NDPS Act has been held to be sufficient.
      In Prabha Shankar Dubey a two Judge Bench of this Court culled out the
      ratio of Baldev Singh case on the issue before us, as follows: (Prabha
      Shankar Dubey case, SCC p. 64, para 11)


        “11. … What the officer concerned is required to do  is  to  convey
      about the choice the accused has. The accused (suspect) has to be told
      in a way that he becomes aware that the choice is his and not  of  the
      officer concerned, even though there is no specific form. The  use  of
      the word ‘right’ at relevant places in the decision  of  Baldev  Singh
      case seems to be to lay effective emphasis that it is not by the grace
      of the officer the choice has to be given but more by way of  a  right
      in the ‘suspect’ at that stage to be  given  such  a  choice  and  the
      inevitable consequences that have to follow by transgressing it.”
      However, while gauging whether  or  not  the  stated  requirements  of
      Section 50 had been met on facts of that case, finding  similarity  in
      the nature of evidence on this aspect between the  case  at  hand  and
      Joseph Fernandez the Court chose to follow the  views  echoed  in  the
      latter  case,  wherein  it  was  held  that  the  searching  officer's
      information to the suspect to the effect that “if you wish you may  be
      searched in the presence of a gazetted officer or a Magistrate” was in
      substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 50 of the  NDPS
      Act.  Nevertheless,  the  Court  indicated  the  reason  for  use   of
      expression “substantial compliance” in the  following  words:  (Prabha
      Shankar Dubey case, SCC p. 64, para 12)


        “12. The use of the expression ‘substantial compliance’ was made in
      the background that the searching officer had Section 50 in  mind  and
      it was unaided by the interpretation placed on it by the  Constitution
      Bench in Baldev Singh case4. A line or a word in a judgment cannot  be
      read in isolation or as if  interpreting  a  statutory  provision,  to
      impute a different meaning to the observations.”
      It  is  manifest  from  the  afore-extracted  paragraph  that   Joseph
      Fernandez does not notice the ratio of  Baldev  Singh  and  in  Prabha
      Shankar Dubey, Joseph Fernandez is followed ignoring the  dictum  laid
      down in Baldev Singh case.


        29. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the firm opinion
      that the object with which the right under Section 50(1) of  the  NDPS
      Act, by way of a safeguard, has been conferred on the suspect viz.  to
      check the misuse of power, to avoid harm to innocent  persons  and  to
      minimise the allegations of planting or foisting of false cases by the
      law enforcement agencies, it would be imperative on the  part  of  the
      empowered officer to apprise the person intended to be searched of his
      right to be searched before a gazetted officer  or  a  Magistrate.  We
      have no hesitation in holding that insofar as the  obligation  of  the
      authorised officer under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act
      is concerned, it is mandatory and requires strict compliance.  Failure
      to comply with the provision would render the recovery of the  illicit
      article suspect and vitiate the conviction if  the  same  is  recorded
      only on the basis of the recovery of  the  illicit  article  from  the
      person of the accused during such search. Thereafter, the suspect  may
      or may not choose to exercise the right provided to him under the said
      provision.


        30. As observed in Presidential Poll, In re: (SCC p. 49, para 13)


        “13. … It is the duty of the courts to get at the real intention of
      the legislature by carefully attending [to] the  whole  scope  of  the
      provision to be construed. ‘The key to the opening of every law is the
      reason and spirit of  the  law,  it  is  the  animus  imponentis,  the
      intention of the law maker expressed in the law  itself,  taken  as  a
      whole.’ ”


        31. We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  concept  of  “substantial
      compliance” with the  requirement  of  Section  50  of  the  NDPS  Act
      introduced and read into the mandate of the  said  section  in  Joseph
      Fernandez and Prabha Shankar Dubey  is  neither  borne  out  from  the
      language of sub-section (1) of Section 50 nor it is in consonance with
      the dictum laid down in Baldev Singh case. Needless to  add  that  the
      question whether or not the procedure prescribed has been followed and
      the requirement of Section 50 had been met, is a matter of  trial.  It
      would neither be possible  nor  feasible  to  lay  down  any  absolute
      formula in that behalf.”

9)    From the above, it is  clear  that  the  Constitution  Bench  has  not
approved the concept of “substantial compliance”  as  propounded  in  Joseph
Fernandez (supra) and Prabha  Shankar  Dubey  (supra).   Keeping  the  above
principles, as laid down in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja’s case (supra)  which
considered all the  earlier  decisions  including  the  decision  in  Baldev
Singh, in mind,  let us consider whether  the  mandates  of  Section  50  as
interpreted have been fully complied with or not?
10)   Since the main question roving only to “right  to  inform”  about  his
choice, it  is  relevant  to  refer  the  Panchnama  regarding  consent  for
personal search which is as under:
“Panchnama regarding consent for personal search
P.S. Kumbhraj, District Guna
Crime Case No. 0/98
                         Section 8/18 of N.D.P.S. Act
Place : A.B. Road, Khatakya Tiraha
Dated: 30.7.98 at 09.30 O’ Clock
Names of witnesses:
    1. Sri Lal s/o Sri Narain by  caste  Dhobi  aged  26  years  2/o  Tapra
       Colony, Kumbhraj.
    2. Bhup  Singh  s/o  Ramnarain  by  caste  Meena  aged  25  years,  r/o
       Kanakherhi P.S. Kumbhraj.
      In the presence of  aforementioned ‘panchas’, I, the  P.S.  In-charge,
      asked the driver of Maruti Car No. D.N.C./7211  namely,  Pramod  Kumar
      s/o Raghuvir Singh by caste Gadariya, aged 20 years,  r/o  Chitbhawan,
      P.S. Ekdil, District Etawah,  Suresh,  s/o  Rambabu  Khatik,  aged  18
      years, r/o Village Chitbhawan, sitting with him in the case and Dinesh
      @ Pappu s/o  Jagannath  by  caste  Dube,  aged  25  years,  r/o  Tikri
      presently at village Ballapur, P.S. Ajitmal, District Etawah,  sitting
      on the rear seat, regarding their personal search asking  them  as  to
      whether they would offer their personal search to me  or  to  Gazetted
      Officer – S.D.O.P. Sahib.  At this, all the three suspects gave  their
      consent for their personal search by me, the P.S. In-charge, and  they
      also agreed for search of the car by me.  Panchnama regarding  consent
      for search has been prepared in the presence of the ‘Panchas’.
                                                    [Emphasis supplied]


      Sd/-                              Signature of suspects
      Sri Lal                           Sd/- Suresh
                                        Sd/- Pramod Kumar
      T.I. of Bhup Singh                Sd/- Dinesh Kumar @
                                        Pappu
                  Seen Sd/- (Illegible)  30.7.98”




11)   The above Panchnama indicates that the appellants  were  merely  asked
to give their consent for search by the police party  and  not  apprised  of
their legal right provided under Section 50 of the  NDPS  Act  to  refuse/to
allow the police party to take their  search  and  opt  for  being  searched
before the Gazetted officer  or  by  the  Magistrate.
 In  other  words,  a
reading of the Panchnama  makes  it  clear  that  the  appellants  were  not
apprised about their right to be searched before a  gazetted  officer  or  a
Magistrate but consent was sought for their personal search.
Merely  asking
them as to whether they would offer their personal search to him, i.e.,  the
police officer or  to  gazetted  officer  may  not  satisfy  the  protection
afforded under Section 50 of the NDPS Act as interpreted in  Baldev  singh’s
case. 
 Further a reading of the judgments of the trial Court  and  the  High
Court also show that in the presence of Panchas, the SHO  merely  asked  all
the three appellants for their search by him and they simply  agreed.   
This
is reflected in the Panchnama.  
Though in Baldev Singh’s  case,  this  Court
has not expressed any opinion as to
 whether the  provisions  of  Section  50
are mandatory or directory but “failure to inform” the person  concerned  of
his right as emanating from sub-section (1) of Section  50  may  render  the
recovery of the contraband suspect and the conviction  and  sentence  of  an
accused bad and unsustainable in law.
In Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja’s  case
(supra), recently the Constitution Bench has explained the mandate  provided
under sub-section (1) of Section 50 and concluded that it is  mandatory  and
requires strict compliance.  
The Bench also  held  that  failure  to  comply
with the provision would render the recovery of the illicit article  suspect
and vitiate the conviction if the same is recorded only on the basis of  the
recovery of the illicit article from the person of the accused  during  such
search.  
The concept of substantial compliance as noted in  Joseph  Fernadez
(supra) and  Prabha  Shankar  Dubey  (supra)  were  not  acceptable  by  the
Constitution Bench in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja, accordingly,  in  view  of
the language as evident from the panchnama which we have quoted earlier,  we
hold that, in the case on hand, the search and seizure of the  suspect  from
the person of the appellants is bad and conviction is unsustainable in  law.

12)   We reiterate that sub-section (1) of Section 50  makes  it  imperative
for the empowered  officer  to  “inform”  the  person  concerned  about  the
existence of his right that if he so requires, he shall be  searched  before
a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, failure to do so vitiate the  conviction
and sentence of an accused where the conviction has been  recorded  only  on
the basis of possession of the contraband.  We also reiterate that the  said
provision is mandatory and requires strict compliance.

13)   Though a portion of the contraband  (opium)  was  recovered  from  the
vehicle for which Section 50 is not applicable, if we exclude  the  quantity
recovered from  the  vehicle,  the  remaining  would  not  come  within  the
mischief of ‘commercial quantity’ for  imposition  of  such  conviction  and
sentence.  Taking note of length of period in prison and  continuing  as  on
date and in view of non-compliance of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  50  in
respect of recovery of contraband from the  appellants,  we  set  aside  the
conviction and sentence imposed on them by the trial Court and confirmed  by
the High Court.
14)   As a result, the appeal is allowed and the appellants are  ordered  to
be released forthwith, if they are not required in any other case.
                                  ………….…………………………J.


                                       (P. SATHASIVAM)












                                    ………….…………………………J.


                                      (RANJAN GOGOI)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER  22, 2012.




































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