LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Thursday, November 22, 2012

whether in the case at hand the policy is an “Act Policy” or “Comprehensive/Package Policy”. There has been no discussion either by the tribunal or the High Court in this regard. True it is, before us Annexure P-1 has been filed which is a policy issued by the insurer. It only mentions the policy to be a comprehensive policy but we are inclined to think that there has to be a scanning of the terms of the entire policy to arrive at the conclusion whether it is really a package policy to cover the liability of an occupant in a car.” 14. We have quoted in extenso to reiterate the legal position. In the case at hand, the policy has not been brought on record. The learned counsel for the appellant-insurer would submit that it is an “Act Policy”. The learned counsel for the respondent would seriously dispute and submit that extra premium might have been paid or it may be a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”. When Certificate of Insurance is filed but the policy is not brought on record it only conveys that the vehicle is insured. The nature of policy cannot be discerned from the same. Thus, we are disposed to think that it would be appropriate to remit the matter to the tribunal to enable the insurer to produce the policy and grant liberty to the parties to file additional documents and also lead further evidence as advised, and we order accordingly. 15. It needs no special emphasis to state that whether the insurer would be liable or not would depend upon the nature of the policy when it is brought on record in a manner as required by law. 16. As far as quantum is concerned, though numbers of grounds were urged, yet the learned counsel for the parties did not really address on the same and, therefore, we do not think it necessary to dwell upon the same and treat it as just and proper compensation requiring no interference. 17. In the result, the appeals preferred by the insurer, namely, Oriental Insurance Company Limited are allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove and to that extent the award is set aside and the matter is remitted to the tribunal and the appeals preferred by the claimant for enhancement of compensation are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1345-1346 OF 2009

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.              ...Appellant

                                   Versus
Surendra Nath Loomba and Others              ...Respondents

                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1347-1348 OF 2009

Surendra Nath Loomba                         ...Appellant

                                   Versus
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & ors.       ...Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

      In the present  batch  of  appeals,  two  preferred  by  the  Oriental
Insurance Company Limited and two preferred by claimant, the  assail  is  to
the common judgment passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at  Nainital  in
A.O. No. 201 of 2003 and A.O. No.  284  of  2003  wherein  the  award  dated
19.5.2003 passed by the  Motor  Accidents  Claims  Tribunal,  Dehradun  (for
short ‘the tribunal’) in M.A.C.T. Petition No. 10 of 1999 was challenged  by
the insurer and the claimant from different spectrums.

2.    The facts which are requisite to  be  stated  are  that

  •  on  9.10.1998

about 4.30 a.m. claimant, Surendra Nath Loomba, was travelling in  a  Maruti
Esteem Car bearing Registration No. DL 8C-5096 belonging to  the  respondent
No. 3, Savita Matta, and driven by the respondent No.  2,  Raj  Loomba,  the
son of the claimant.

  •  Near the President Body-guard House, Rajpur Road,  the

vehicle dashed against a tree and

  •  in the accident the windscreen (front)  of

car was smashed and its pieces got inserted into the eyes  of  the  claimant
as a consequence of which he lost his both eyes. 
 As set forth, at the  time
of the accident  the claimant was working  as  a  Senior  Manager  in  Punjab
National Bank and his gross salary was Rs.18,949.86 per  month  and  various
perquisites were also attached to the service.
 Keeping in view his  salary
and other perquisites

  • he filed an  application  under  Section  166  of  the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before  the  tribunal  putting  forth  a  claim  of
Rs.62,00,000/- with 18% interest as compensation.

3.    The  respondent  No.  2,  Raj  Loomba,  filed  his  written  statement
contending, inter alia, that  at  the  time  of  accident  the  vehicle  was
insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Limited and hence, it being  the
insurer was liable to pay the compensation.

4.    The insurance company resisted  the  claim  of  the  claimant  on  the
ground that

  • the driver of the vehicle did not have a valid driving  licence;

that the proceedings had been initiated in  a  collusive  manner;  and

  •  that

even if the accident as well as the injuries were  proven  the  insurer  was
not liable to indemnify the owner  as  the  claimant  was  travelling  as  a
gratuitous passenger.

5.    The tribunal on the basis of material brought on record came  to  hold
that as the insurer had issued Certificate of Insurance in  respect  of  the

  • vehicle in question and it was valid during the  period  when  the  accident

occurred, it was liable to pay the compensation;  that  the  opposite  party
No. 1 had a valid driving licence and the accident had  occurred  and  there
was no collusion between the parties; and that the victim  was  entitled  to
get a total sum of Rs.20,97,984/- towards compensation with 9% interest  per
annum regard being had to the pecuniary and  non-pecuniary  losses.   Be  it
noted, the tribunal, while computing the amount, had  deducted  certain  sum
under certain heads which need not be stated in detail.

6.    Aggrieved by the aforesaid award the insurance company preferred  A.O.
No. 201 of 2003 and the injured claimant preferred  A.O.  No.  284  of  2003
before the High Court.

  •  The  High  Court,  by  the  common  impugned  order,

reduced the amount of compensation to Rs.16,42,656/- and concurred with  the
conclusion arrived at by the tribunal as  regards  the  liability.  
 Thus,
the appeal preferred by the insurance company was allowed in  part  and  the
appeal preferred by the claimant was dismissed.  Hence,  the  present  batch
of appeals by the insurance company as well as by the claimant.

7.    First, we shall deal with  the  appeals  preferred  by  the  insurance
company

  • It is worth noting that  the  Certificate  of  Insurance  was  filed

before the tribunal which clearly showed that the vehicle was  insured  with
the  appellant-company.
 Dr.  Meera  Agarwal,  learned  counsel   for   the
appellant-insurer would submit  that
 it  was  only  an  “Act  Policy”  and,
therefore, the liability of the insurer does not arise.
She  has  commended
us to the decisions in United India Insurance  Co.  Ltd.,  Shimla  v.  Tilak
Singh  and  Others[1],  Oriental  Insurance  Company  Ltd.  v.  Jhuma   Saha
(Smt.)[2], Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sudhakaran K.V. and  others[3]
and New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Sadanand Mukhi and others[4].

8.    Learned counsel for the respondents would  contend  that

  • whether  the

policy is an “Act Policy” or a  “Comprehensive/Package  Policy”  or  whether
any extra premium was paid to cover the passenger,  is  not  reflected  from
the Certificate of Insurance as the policy was  not  brought  on  record  by
tendering the same before the tribunal.

9.    In Tilak Singh (supra) this Court referred to the  concurring  opinion
rendered in a three-Judge Bench decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd.  V.
Asha Rani[5] and ruled thus:-

           “In our view, although the observations made in Asha  Rani  case
           were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods  vehicle,
           the same would apply with equal force to  gratuitous  passengers
           in any other vehicle also.  Thus, we must uphold the  contention
           of the appellant Insurance Company that  it  owed  no  liability
           towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who
           was a pillion rider, as the insurance  policy  was  a  statutory
           policy, and hence it did not cover  the  risk  of  death  of  or
           bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.”




It is worthy to note in the said case the controversy related to  gratuitous
passenger carried in a private vehicle.

10.   In Jhuma Saha (Smt.) (supra) this Court has stated thus: -

           “The additional premium was not paid in respect  of  the  entire
           risk of death or bodily injury of the owner of the vehicle.   If
           that be so, Section 147 (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act  which  in
           no uncertain terms covers a risk of a third party only would  be
           attracted in the present case.”

11.    In  National  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Laxmi  Narain  Dhut[6]  after
elaborately referring to the analysis made in Asha Rani  (supra)  the  Bench
ruled thus:-

           “Section 149 is part of Chapter XI which is titled “Insurance of
           Motor Vehicles against Third-Party Risks”.  A significant factor
           which needs to be  noticed  is  that  there  is  no  contractual
           relation between the insurance company and the third party.  The
           liabilities and the obligations relatable to third  parties  are
           created only by fiction of Sections 147 and 149 of the Act”.




  • In the said case  it  has  been  opined  that  although  the  statute  is  a

beneficial one qua the third party but that benefit cannot  be  extended  to
the owner of the offending vehicle.  
The said principle  was  reiterated  in
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Meena Variyal  and  Other[7],  Sudhakaran
K. V. (supra) and Sadanand Mukhi (supra).


12.   It is apt to note here that this Court in Bhagyalakshmi and others  v.
United Insurance Company Limited and another[8], after dealing with  various
facets and considering the authorities in Amrit  Lal  Sood  and  Another  v.
Kaushalya  Devi  Thapar  and  Others[9],  Asha  Rani  (supra),  Tilak  Singh
(supra), Jhuma Saha (supra),  Sudhakaran  K.  V.  and  Others  (supra),  has
observed thus :-

           “Before this Court, however, the nature of policies  which  came
           up for consideration were Act policies. This Court did not  deal
           with a package policy. If the Tariff Advisory Committee seeks to
           enforce its decision in regard to coverage of  third-party  risk
           which would include  all  persons  including  occupants  of  the
           vehicle and the  insurer  having  entered  into  a  contract  of
           insurance in relation thereto, we are of the  opinion  that  the
           matter may require a deeper scrutiny.”



13.    Recently  this  Bench  in  National   Insurance   Company   Ltd.   v.
Balakrishnan  &  Another[10],  after  referring  to  various  decisions  and
copiously to the decision in Bhagyalakshmi (supra), held  that 

  •  there  is  a

distinction  between  “Act  Policy”  and   “Comprehensive/Package   Policy”.
Thereafter, the Bench took note of a decision rendered by

  • Delhi  High  Court

in  Yashpal  Luthra  and  Anr.  V.  United  India  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.  and
Another[11] wherein the High Court had referred to the circulars  issued  by
the  Tariff  Advisory  Committee  (TAC)   and   Insurance   Regulatory   and
Development Authority  (IRDA).  

  • This  Court  referred  to  the  portion  of

circulars dated 16.11.2009 and 3.12.2009 which had been  reproduced  by  the
High Court and eventually held as follows: -

           “19.  It is extremely important to  note  here  that  till  31st
           December, 2006 Tariff Advisory Committee and thereafter from 1st
           January, 2007,  IRDA  functioned  as  the  statutory  regulatory
           authorities and they are entitled to fix the tariff as  well  as
           the terms and  conditions  of  the  policies  by  all  insurance
           companies.  
The High Court  had  issued  notice  to  the  Tariff
           Advisory Committee and the IRDA to explain the factual  position
           as regards the liability of the insurance companies  in  respect
           of an occupant  in  a  private  car  under  the  “comprehensive/
           package policy”. 
 Before the High Court the Competent  Authority
           of IRDA had stated that on 2nd June, 1986  the  Tariff  Advisory
           Committee had issued instructions to all the insurance companies
           to cover the pillion rider of  a  scooter/motorcycle  under  the
           “comprehensive policy” and the said position continues to be  in
           vogue till date.  
He had also admitted  that  the  comprehensive
           policy is presently called a package policy.  
It is the admitted
           position, as the decision  would  show,  the  earlier  circulars
           dated 18th March, 1978 and 2nd June, 1986 continue to  be  valid
           and effective and all insurance companies are bound to  pay  the
           compensation in respect of the liability towards an occupant  in
           a car under the “comprehensive/package policy”  irrespective  of
           the terms and conditions contained in the policy.  
The competent
           authority of the IRDA was also examined before  the  High  Court
           who stated that the circulars dated 18th  March,  1978  and  2nd
           June, 1986 of the Tariff Advisory Committee were incorporated in
           the Indian Motor Tariff effective from 1st July, 2002  and  they
           continue to be operative and binding on the insurance companies.
            Because of the aforesaid factual position the  circulars  dated
           16th November 2009  and  3rd  December,  2009,  that  have  been
           reproduced hereinabove, were issued.

           20.   It is also worthy  to  note  that  the  High  Court  after
           referring to individual circulars issued  by  various  insurance
           companies and eventually stated thus:-

                 “In  view  of  the  aforesaid,  it  is   clear   that   the
                 comprehensive/package policy of  a  two  wheeler  covers  a
                 pillion  rider  and  comprehensive/  package  policy  of  a
                 private car covers the occupants and where the  vehicle  is
                 covered under a comprehensive/package policy, there  is  no
                 need for Motor Accident Claims  Tribunal  to  go  into  the
                 question  whether  the  Insurance  Company  is  liable   to
                 compensate for the death or injury of a pillion rider on  a
                 two-wheeler or the occupants in a private car. In fact,  in
                 view of the TAC’s directives and those of the IRDA, such  a
                 plea was not permissible and ought not to have been  raised
                 as, for instance, it was done in the present case.”


           21.   In view of the aforesaid  factual  position  there  is  no
           scintilla of doubt that a “comprehensive/package  policy”  would
           cover the liability of the insurer for payment  of  compensation
           for the occupant in a car.  There  is  no  cavil  that  an  “Act
           Policy”   stands    on    a    different    footing    than    a
           “Comprehensive/Package Policy”.  As the circulars have made  the
           position very  clear  and  the  IRDA,  which  is  presently  the
           statutory  authority,  has  commanded  the  insurance  companies
           stating  that  a  “Comprehensive/Package  Policy”   covers   the
           liability, there cannot be any dispute in that regard.  
We  may
           hasten to clarify that the earlier pronouncements were  rendered
           in respect of the “Act Policy” which admittedly cannot  cover  a
           third party risk of an occupant in a car.
 But, if the policy is
           a  “Comprehensive/Package  Policy”,  the  liability   would   be
           covered.  
These  aspects  were  not  noticed  in  the  case  of
           Bhagyalakshmi (supra) and, therefore, the matter was referred to
           a larger Bench.
 We are disposed  to  think  that  there  is  no
           necessity to refer the present matter to a larger Bench  as  the
           IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has  clarified
           the position by issuing circulars which have been reproduced  in
           the judgment by the Delhi High Court and we have also reproduced
           the same.

           22.   In view of the aforesaid legal position the question  that
           emerges for consideration is
whether in the  case  at  hand  the
           policy is an “Act  Policy”  or  “Comprehensive/Package  Policy”.
           There has been no discussion either by the tribunal or the  High
           Court in this regard.
True it is, before us  Annexure  P-1  has
           been filed which is a policy issued by  the  insurer.  
It  only
           mentions the policy to be a  comprehensive  policy  but  we  are
           inclined to think that there has to be a scanning of  the  terms
           of the entire policy to arrive at the conclusion whether  it  is
           really a package policy to cover the liability of an occupant in
           a car.”

14.   We have quoted in extenso to reiterate the  legal  position.   In  the
case at hand, the policy has  not  been  brought  on  record.   The  learned
counsel for the appellant-insurer would submit that it is an  “Act  Policy”.
The learned counsel for the respondent would seriously  dispute  and  submit
that   extra   premium   might   have   been   paid   or   it   may   be   a
“Comprehensive/Package Policy”.

  • When Certificate of Insurance is filed  but

the policy is not brought on record it only  conveys  that  the  vehicle  is
insured.  The nature of policy cannot be discerned from the same.  Thus,  we
are disposed to think that it would be appropriate to remit  the  matter  to
the tribunal to enable the insurer to produce the policy and  grant  liberty
to the parties to file additional documents and also lead  further  evidence
as advised, and we order accordingly.

15.   It needs no special emphasis to state that whether the  insurer  would
be liable or not would depend upon the nature  of  the  policy  when  it  is
brought on record in a manner as required by law.

16.   As far as quantum is concerned, though numbers of grounds were  urged,
yet the learned counsel for the parties did not really address on  the  same
and, therefore, we do not think it necessary to  dwell  upon  the  same  and
treat it as just and proper compensation requiring no interference.

17.   In the result, the appeals preferred by the insurer, namely,  Oriental
Insurance Company Limited are allowed to the  extent  indicated  hereinabove
and to that extent the award is set aside and the matter is remitted to  the
tribunal and the appeals  preferred  by  the  claimant  for  enhancement  of
compensation are dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.


                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]



New Delhi;                      ……………………………….J.
November 20, 2012                    [Dipak Misra]
-----------------------
[1]    (2006) 4 SCC 404
[2]    (2007) 9 SCC 263
[3]    (2008) 7 SCC 428
[4]    (2009) 2 SCC 417

[5]    (2003) 2 SCC 223
[6]    (2007) 3 SCC 700
[7]    (2007) 5 SCC 428
[8]    (2009) 7 SCC 148
[9]    (1998) 3 SCC 744
[10]   Civil Appeal No.8163 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1232/2012)
decided on 20.11.2012

[11]   2011 ACJ 1415



-----------------------
10





Wednesday, November 21, 2012

“272. The action of the appellant in trying to suborn the court witness in a criminal trial was reprehensible enough but his conduct before the High Court aggravates the matter manifold. He does not show any remorse for his gross misdemeanour and instead tries to take on the High Court by defying its authority. We are in agreement with Mr. Salve and Mr. Subramanium that punishment given to him by the High Court was wholly inadequate and incommensurate to the seriousness of his actions and conduct. We, accordingly, propose to issue a notice to him for enhancement of punishment. 273. We also hold that by his actions and conduct the appellant has established himself as a person who needs to be kept away from the portals of the court for a longer time. The notice would therefore require him to show cause why the punishment awarded to him should not be enhanced as provided under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. He would additionally show cause why he should not be debarred from appearing in courts for a longer period. The second part of the notice would also cure the defect in the High Court order in debarring the appellant from appearing in courts without giving any specific notice in that regard as held in the earlier part of the judgment.”



                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1393 OF 2008

R.K. ANAND                                     APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

REGISTRAR, DELHI HIGH COURT       … RESPONDENT


                                  O R D E R

Aftab Alam, J.

1.    In a proceeding initiated  suo  motu   [registered  as  Writ  Petition
(Criminal) No.796 of 2007],

  •   the Delhi High Court found the contemnor  guilty

of suborning the court witness in a criminal trial in which  he  represented
the accused as the senior advocate.

  • The High Court, thus,  held  him  guilty

under clauses (ii) and (iii) of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts  Act,
1971 and

  •  in exercise of the power under Article 215 of the  Constitution  of

India the High Court prohibited him, by way of  punishment,  from  appearing
in the Delhi High Court and the courts subordinate to it  for  a  period  of
four months from the date of the judgment  dated  August  21,  2008  leaving
him,  however,  free  to  carry  on  his  other   professional   work   e.g.
consultations, advices, conferences, opinions etc.

  • The High  Court  further

held that the contemnor had forfeited  his  right  to  be  designated  as  a
senior advocate and recommended to the full  court  to  divest  him  of  the
honour.  In addition,  the  High  Court  also  imposed  on  him  a  fine  of
Rs.2,000/-.

2.    The contemnor brought  the  matter  to  this  Court  in  appeal  under
Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act.  This  Court  by  judgment  and
order dated July 29, 2009 (R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High)[1]  affirmed
the finding of the High Court as to the guilt of the contemnor.

  •  But so  far

as the punishment is concerned, this Court took the view that in  the  facts
and circumstances of the case, the punishment given  to  the  contemnor  was
wholly inadequate.  In paragraphs 272 and 273 of the  judgment,  this  Court
held and observed as follows:-

      “272. The action of the  appellant  in  trying  to  suborn  the  court
      witness in a criminal trial was reprehensible enough but  his  conduct
      before the High Court aggravates the matter  manifold.   He  does  not
      show any remorse for his gross misdemeanour and instead tries to  take
      on the High Court by defying its authority.  We are in agreement  with
      Mr. Salve and Mr. Subramanium that punishment given to him by the High
      Court was wholly inadequate and incommensurate to the  seriousness  of
      his actions and conduct.  We, accordingly, propose to issue  a  notice
      to him for enhancement of punishment.


      273.  We also hold that by his actions and conduct the  appellant  has
      established himself as a person who needs to be  kept  away  from  the
      portals of the court for a longer time.  The  notice  would  therefore
      require him to show cause why the punishment awarded to him should not
      be enhanced as provided under Section 12 of  the  Contempt  of  Courts
      Act.  He would additionally show cause why he should not  be  debarred
      from appearing in courts for a longer period.  The second part of  the
      notice would also cure the defect in the High Court order in debarring
      the appellant from appearing in courts  without  giving  any  specific
      notice in that regard as held in the earlier part of the judgment.”

3.    Accordingly, this Court directed for issuing a notice  of  enhancement
of punishment to him and directing him to file a  show  cause  within  eight
weeks from the date of service of the notice.
4.    In response to the notice issued by the  Court,  the  contemnor  filed
his show cause on January 13, 2010.  In the show cause he  tendered  apology
to the Court and made the  prayer  to  drop  the  proceedings.  There  were,
however, certain statements made in the show cause that  showed  a  lack  of
remorse for the wrong done by him.  When it was pointed out to  the  learned
counsel representing the contemnor, he filed an additional affidavit on  May
4, 2011  accepting  all  the  observations  and  findings  recorded  in  the
judgment of this Court and seeking to withdraw all statements  made  in  the
Court that suggested any lack of contrition on his part.
5.    Here, it may be stated that the hearing of the  case  took  place  for
brief periods after long gaps because we, the three members on  this  Bench,
were sitting  in  different  combinations  and  this  Bench  could  assemble
specially for this matter only when all three of us could get free from  the
regular  combinations.  As  a  result,  the  hearing  was  protracted   till
September  24,  2012  when  the  contemnor  filed  yet  another   additional
affidavit proposing to undertake certain steps in atonement of his guilt.
6.    Paragraph 2 of the affidavit which  enumerates  the  steps  which  the
contemnor wishes to undertake is reproduced below:-
           “2.   That this matter has been pending for quite some time  and
      it has allowed the Deponent to  introspect  and  in  addition  to  the
      unconditional apologies dated January,  2010  and  04.05.2011  already
      tendered by the Deponent  before  this  Hon’ble  Court,  the  Deponent
      voluntarily submits before this Hon’ble Court as under:-


           A.    That the Deponent has decided to donate  a  sum  of  Rs.21
      Lakhs (Rupees Twenty Lakhs (sic.) Only) through cheque  favouring  Bar
      Council of India for establishment of Computer Centre/ Library in  any
      Law College / Institution/University which the Bar  Council  of  India
      may deem fit.  Photostat copy of the Cheque No.010592 dated 20.09.2012
      drawn on UCO Bank, High Court of Delhi, New Delhi in the sum of  Rs.21
      Lakhs (Rupees Twenty One Lakhs Only) favouring Bar  Council  of  India
      along with a copy of covering letter dated 20.09.2012 addressed to the
      Secretary, Bar Council of India is  enclosed  herewith  as  ANNEXURE-A
      (Colly).  The Deponent undertakes to send the cheque  along  with  the
      covering letter to Bar Council of India immediately on passing of  the
      final order by this Hon’ble Court in the present case on 24.09.2012.


           B.    That the Deponent  also  undertakes  before  this  Hon’ble
      Court that the Deponent shall not make any earning out  of  the  legal
      profession by way of Practice/Conference/ Consultation/ Legal Opinion/
      Arbitration etc. in any form whatsoever for a period of  1  year  from
      the date of order on which the apology is  accepted  by  this  Hon’ble
      Court and during this  period  his  services  rendered  as  a  Lawyer/
      appearances, if any will all be pro bono.


           C.    That the Deponent also undertakes to offer his services as
      a lawyer for a period of 1 year as aforesaid for rendering  legal  aid
      to the poor and needy persons and for this purpose his services can be
      utilized by the Delhi Legal Services Authority, Patiala House  Courts/
      Delhi High Court Legal Services Authority, High Court  of  Delhi,  New
      Delhi/ Supreme Court Legal  Services  Authority,  Supreme  Court,  New
      Delhi.”

7.    The offence committed by the contemnor  was  indeed  odious.   In  the
judgment, the gravity of the  offence  committed  by  him  is  discussed  in
detail and it is pointed out that the contemnor’s action  tended  to  strike
at the roots of the administration of  criminal  justice.  We  reaffirm  the
observations and findings made in the earlier judgment.   Further,  we  have
not the slightest doubt  that  normally  the  punishment  for  the  criminal
contempt of the nature committed by  the  contemnor  should  be  a  term  of
imprisonment.
8.    In a judicial  proceeding,  however,  it  is  important  not  to  lose
complete objectivity and that compels us to take note  of  certain  features
of this case. The contemnor is 69  years  old.   His  wife  has  suffered  a
stroke of multiple sclerosis in the year 1992 and she  is  confined  to  the
bed and a wheel chair for  over  20  years.   The  contempt  proceeding  was
initiated against the contemnor in the year 2007  and  he  has,  thus,  been
facing the rigours of the proceeding for five years.
9.     In  the  meanwhile,  the  criminal  trial  from  which  the   present
proceeding arises was concluded by the  trial  court  and  the  accused  was
found guilty under Section 304 Part II of the Penal Code.   In  appeal,  the
High Court converted his conviction to one under Section 304-A of the  Penal
Code.  But, on further appeal by the State to this Court, the conviction  of
the accused was, once again, brought under Section 304 Part II of the  Penal
Code by judgment and order  dated  August  3,  2012.  In  other  words,  the
criminal trial from which the present proceedings arise  has  also  attained
finality.
10.   The aforesaid facts and circumstances persuade us to take  a  slightly
lenient view of the matter.  We feel that no useful purpose will  be  served
by sending the contemnor to jail.  On the contrary, by keeping him  out  and
making him do the things that he has undertaken to do would serve  a  useful
social purpose. We, accordingly, accept the offer made by the contemnor.
11.   In terms of his undertaking, the contemnor shall not do  any  kind  of
professional work charging any fees or for any personal  considerations  for
one year from today.  He shall exclusively devote his professional  services
to help pro bono the accused who, on account of lack of resources,  are  not
in a position to engage any lawyer to defend themselves and  have  no  means
to have their cases effectively presented before the  court.  The  contemnor
shall place his professional services at the disposal  of  the  Delhi  Legal
Services Authority which, in coordination with the Delhi  High  Court  Legal
Services Authority,  will  frame  a  scheme  to  avail  of  the  contemnor’s
services for doing case of undefended accused either at the trial or at  the
appellate stage. The contemnor shall appear in court only in cases  assigned
to him by the Legal Services Authority.
12.   The Delhi Legal Services Authority shall keep  a  record  of  all  the
cases assigned to the  contemnor  and  the  result/progress  made  in  those
cases.  At the end of the year, the Delhi  Legal  Services  Authority  shall
submit a report to this Court in  regard  to  all  the  cases  done  by  the
contemnor at its instance which  shall  be  placed  before  the  Judges  for
perusal.
13.   At the end of one year it will be open to the contemnor to resume  his
private law practice. 
 But he shall not leave any case assigned  to  him  by
the Legal Services Authority incomplete. 
 He  shall  continue  to  do  those
cases, free of cost, till they come to a close.
14.   The contemnor shall pay a sum of  Rs.21,00,000/-  (Rupees  Twenty  One
Lakhs) through a demand draft to the Bar Council of India  within  one  week
from today.  
The  Bar  Council  shall  give  the  money  to  a  law  college
preferably situated at a muffassil place and  attended  mostly  by  children
from the under-privileged and deprived sections of the society.   
The  money
may be used for developing the infrastructure of the college, such as  class
rooms, library, computer facilities or moot court facilities, etc.  
The  Bar
Council of India will ensure a proper utilisation of the money.
15.   With the aforesaid observations and  directions,  the  proceedings  of
this case are closed.
16.   The criminal miscellaneous  petition  No.21373  of  2012  also  stands
disposed of.



                                        …….. ………………………J.
                                        (G.S. Singhvi)



                                        …….. ………………………J.
                                        (Aftab Alam)



                                        …….. ………………………J.
                                        (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)
New Delhi;
November 21, 2012.

-----------------------
[1] (2009) 8 SCC 106

whether the first respondent, the Managing Director of the respondent No. 2, a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, is entitled to sustain a claim against the appellant-insurer for having sustained bodily injuries. = “comprehensive/package policy” would cover the liability of the insurer for payment of compensation for the occupant in a car. There is no cavil that an “Act Policy” stands on a different footing from a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”. As the circulars have made the position very clear and the IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has commanded the insurance companies stating that a “Comprehensive/Package Policy” covers the liability, there cannot be any dispute in that regard. We may hasten to clarify that the earlier pronouncements were rendered in respect of the “Act Policy” which admittedly cannot cover a third party risk of an occupant in a car. But, if the policy is a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”, the liability would be covered.=whether in the case at hand, the policy is an “Act Policy” or “Comprehensive/Package Policy”. There has been no discussion either by the tribunal or the High Court in this regard. True it is, before us, Annexure P-1 has been filed which is a policy issued by the insurer. It only mentions the policy to be a “comprehensive policy” but we are inclined to think that there has to be a scanning of the terms of the entire policy to arrive at the conclusion whether it is really a “package policy” to cover the liability of an occupant in a car. 23. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we think it apposite to set aside the finding of the High Court and the tribunal as regards the liability of the insurer and remit the matter to the tribunal to scrutinize the policy in a proper perspective and, if necessary, by taking additional evidence and if the conclusion is arrived at that the policy in question is a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”, the liability would be fastened on the insurer. As far as other findings recorded by the tribunal and affirmed by the High Court are concerned, they remain undisturbed. 24. Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and the matter is remitted to the tribunal for the purpose of adjudication as directed hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8163                OF 2012
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1232 of 2012)

National Insurance Company Ltd.                    ... Appellants

                                   Versus
Balakrishnan & Another                       ...  Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

      Leave granted.

2.    The singular issue that arises for consideration  in  this  appeal  is
whether the first respondent, the Managing Director of  the  respondent  No.
2, a company registered under  the  Companies  Act,  1956,  is  entitled  to
sustain a claim against the appellant-insurer for  having  sustained  bodily
injuries.  Succinctly stated, the facts are that the respondent  No.  1  met
with an accident about 8.30  p.m.  on  23.3.2001  while  travelling  in  the
Lancer  car  bearing  registration  No.  TN  49  K  2750  belonging  to  the
respondent No. 2, as it dashed against a  bullock  cart  near  Muthandipatti
Pirivu Road-I.  He  knocked  at  the  doors  of  the  Motor  Accident  Claim
Tribunal (for short “the the tribunal”) in  MACOP  No.  357  of  2004  under
Sections 140, 147 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity  “the
Act”) claiming compensation of Rs.20,00,000/-  jointly  and  severally  from
the appellant as well as the company on the foundation that the  vehicle  in
question was insured with the appellant-company.  Be it  noted,  the  amount
was calculated on the basis of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.

3.    The insurer resisted the claim on the grounds that  the  claimant  had
suppressed the fact that he was the Managing Director  of  the  company  and
hence, the application deserved to be thrown overboard;  that  even  if  the
petition was entertained the insurance company could not be held  liable  to
indemnify the respondent as the appellant was himself the  owner  being  the
Managing Director and under no circumstances he could be treated as a  third
party; that the policy taken by the company did not  cover  an  occupant  in
the vehicle but only covered the owner for a limited quantum and hence,  the
claim was not allowable as sought for.

4.     The tribunal, in its award dated 19.4.2007, addressed to  the  issues
of rash and negligent driving of  the  driver,  injuries  sustained  by  the
insured and the liability of the insurance company.  On  the  basis  of  the
material brought on record, it came to hold that the accident  had  occurred
due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the 1st respondent;  that
the claimant was injured in the accident;  that  regard  being  had  to  the
injuries sustained he was entitled  to  get  Rs.8,63,200/-  as  compensation
with interest @ 7.5% per annum  from the date of the petition till the  date
of deposit; and that the insurance company was liable to  indemnify  as  the
owner of the vehicle was the company, and the injured was travelling in  the
car as a third party.

5.    Being dissatisfied with the award passed by the tribunal, the  insurer
preferred C.M.A. (M.D.) No. 1624 of 2008 before the Madurai Bench of  Madras
High Court and in  appeal  it  was  urged  that  the  victim,  the  Managing
Director, who was running the hospital in the name of his  deceased  father,
was the legal owner of the car though the vehicle was insured  in  the  name
of the company and, therefore, the liability was to the  limited  extent  as
stipulated in the policy.  It was also canvassed, in any case, he was a non-
fare paying passenger in the car for which no extra  premium  was  paid  and
hence, the liability could not be fastened on the insurer.   The High  Court
treated the company to be the owner of the vehicle and  repelled  the  stand
that the Managing Director was the owner, and further held that  as  he  was
only an occupant of the car the insurance company was  liable  to  indemnify
the owner for the claim put forth by the victim.  It is worthy to note  that
the High Court opined that if no premium is paid to  cover  the  owner,  the
insurer is not liable to make good the loss but if  another  person  travels
with the owner and suffers  injuries  the  insurer  is  liable  to  pay  the
compensation.  Being of this view, the  High  Court  dismissed  the  appeal.
Hence, the present appeal by the insurer.

6.    We have heard the learned counsel for  the  parties  and  perused  the
record.  As has been indicated  at  the  beginning,  the  seminal  issue  is
whether the appellant-company  is  liable  to  make  good  the  compensation
determined by the tribunal to the victim in the accident.  On a scrutiny  of
the award passed by the tribunal which has been given the stamp of  approval
by the High Court, it is manifest that the 1st respondent was  the  Managing
Director of the respondent No. 2 and the vehicle was registered in the  name
of the company but the  Managing  Director  had  signed  on  behalf  of  the
company in the R. C. book of the car that  was  involved  in  the  accident.
The High Court has returned a finding that  the  company  and  the  Managing
Director are two different legal entities and hence, the  Managing  Director
cannot be equated with the owner.  On  that  foundation,  the  claimant  has
been treated as a passenger and, accordingly, liability  has  been  fastened
on the insurer.   The  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  insurer  would
contend that assuming he is the owner being a signatory in  the  R.C.  book,
the liability of the company is limited  upto  Rs.2,00,000/-  and  under  no
circumstances a  non-fare  paying  passenger  would  be  covered  under  the
policy.  In oppugnation, the learned  counsel  for  the  respondent-claimant
has proponed that barring the insurer and the insured, all others are  third
parties and, therefore, he is covered by the policy.  It is  also  urged  by
him that as he had travelled as an occupant in a private car he is  a  third
party vis-à-vis the insurer and hence, it is bound to  indemnify  the  owner
as the risk of the third party is covered.

7.    As per the command of Section 146 of the Act, the owner of  a  vehicle
is obliged to obtain an insurance for the vehicle to cover the  third  party
risk.  Section 147 deals with the requirements of  policies  and  limits  of
liability.  Section 147 (1) which is relevant for  the  present  purpose  is
reproduced below:-

            “147.  Requirement  of  policies and  limits  of   liability.  –
      (1)   In   order   to   comply   with   the   requirements   of   this
      Chapter,  a  policy  of  insurance  must  be  a  policy  which -

      (a) is  issued  by  a  person  who is  an  authorised   insurer;   and



      (b) insurers  the  person   or  classes  of   persons   specified   in
      the  policy  to  the  extent  specified  in  sub – section (2) –

      (i) against  any  liability  which may   be   incurred   by   him   in
      respect   of    the    death    of    or    bodily  [injury   to   any
      person,   including   owner   of   the   goods   or   his   authorised
      representative  carried  in   the   vehicle]  or   damage   to     any
      property    of    a    third    party    caused   by  or  arising  out
       of  the  use of  the  vehicle  in  a  public  place ;

      (ii) against  the  death  of  or  bodily  injury  to   any   passenger
      of  a  public  service  vehicle  caused  by  or  arising  out  of  the
       use  of  the  vehicle  in  a  public  place;

      Provided that a policy shall not be required –

      (i) to  cover  liability  in respect  of  the   death,   arising   out
      of  and in  the  course  of  his  employment,  of  the   employee   of
      a  person  insured  by   the   policy   or  in   respect   of   bodily
      injury  sustained  by  such  an  employee  arising  out  of   and   in
      the  course  of  his  employment  other  than  a   liability   arising
      under  the  Workmen’s  Compensation   Act,  1923  (8   of   1923)   in
      respect  of  the  death  of,   or   bodily   injury   to,   any   such
      employee -

      (a) engaged in  driving  the  vehicle,  or

      (b) if    it    is    a   public    service  vehicle, engaged   as   a
      conductor  of  the   vehicle   or   in   examining   tickets  on   the
      vehicle  or

      (c) if  it  is  a  goods  carriage,  being  carried  in  the  vehicle,
      or

      (ii) to cover  any  contractual  liability.

      Explanation. –  For     the     removal    of    doubts,     it     is
      hereby   declared    that    the  death  of  or   bodily   injury   to
      any  person  or  damage   to   any   property  of   a   third    party
      shall   be   deemed    to   have   been    caused  by   or   to   have
      arisen  out  of,  the  use   of   a   vehicle   in  a   public   place
      notwithstanding  that  the  person  who  is   dead   or   injured   or
      the  property  which  is  damaged  was  not  in  a  public  place   at
      the  time  of  the  accident,  if  the  act  or  omission  which   led
      to  the  accident  occurred  in  a  public  place.”



      On a scanning of the aforesaid  provision,  it  is  evident  that  the
policy of insurance must be a policy  which  complies  with  the  conditions
enumerated under Section 147 (1) (a)  &  (b).   It  also  provides  where  a
policy is  not  required  and  also  stipulates  to  cover  any  contractual
liability.

8.    In United  India  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.,  Shimla  v.  Tilak  Singh  and
Others[1], this Court referred to  the  concurring  opinion  rendered  in  a
three-Judge Bench decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V.  Asha  Rani[2]
and ruled thus:-

      “In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in
      connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would
      apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any  other  vehicle
      also.  Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant  Insurance
      Company that it owed no liability towards the injuries suffered by the
      deceased Rajinder Singh who was a  pillion  rider,  as  the  insurance
      policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk  of
      death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.”



It is worthy to note that in  the  said  case  the  controversy  related  to
gratuitous passenger carried in private vehicle.

9.    In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jhuma Saha (Smt) and Others[3],  the
controversy related to fastening of liability on the insurer for  the  death
of the owner of a registered vehicle, Maruti van.  The Court  observed  that
the accident did not involve any other motor vehicle than the one  which  he
was driving and as the liability of the insurer Company is to the extent  of
indemnification of the insured against the respondent or an injured  person,
a third person or in respect of damages of property, the insured  cannot  be
fastened with any liability under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles  Act,
and, therefore, the question of the insurer being liable  to  indemnify  the
insured does not arise.  Thereafter, the Bench referred to the  decision  in
Dhanraj v. New India Assurance co. Ltd.[4] and ruled thus:-

      “The additional premium was not paid in respect of the entire risk  of
      death or bodily injury of the owner of the vehicle.  If  that  be  so,
      Section 147 (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act which in no uncertain  terms
      covers a risk of a third party only would be attracted in the  present
      case.”


10.   In  National  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Laxmi  Narain  Dhut[5],  after
elaborately referring to the analysis made in Asha Rani (supra),  the  Bench
stated thus:-

      “Section 149 is part of Chapter XI which is titled “Insurance of Motor
      Vehicles against Third-Party Risks”.  A significant factor which needs
      to be noticed is that there is no  contractual  relation  between  the
      insurance company and  the  third  party.   The  liabilities  and  the
      obligations relatable to third parties are created only by fiction  of
      Sections 147 and 149 of the Act.”


In the said case, it  has  been  opined  that  although  the  statute  is  a
beneficial one qua the third party, yet that benefit cannot be  extended  to
the owner of the offending vehicle.

11.   In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v.  Meena  Variyal  and  Others[6],
the facts were that a Regional Manager of the company, which was  the  owner
of the vehicle, was himself driving a vehicle of the company  and  met  with
an accident and eventually succumbed to the injuries.  It was  contended  by
the insurer before this Court that the policy did not cover the employee  of
the owner who was driving the vehicle while attending the  business  of  the
employer-company and the deceased was not a third  party  in  terms  of  the
policy or in terms of the Act.  It was also urged that  the  same  would  be
the position even if the deceased was only travelling  in  the  car  in  his
capacity as a Regional Manger of  the  owner-company  and  the  vehicle  was
being driven by  the  driver.   This  Court  observed  that  a  contract  of
insurance is ordinarily a contract of indemnity and when a car belonging  to
an owner is insured with the insurance company and it is being driven  by  a
driver employed by the insured, when it meets with an accident, the  primary
liability under law for payment of  compensation  is  that  of  the  driver.
Once the driver is liable, the owner  of  the  vehicle  becomes  vicariously
liable for payment of compensation.  It is this vicarious liability  of  the
owner that is indemnified by the insurer.  Dealing with the said  liability,
the Bench analysed the language employed under Section 147 (1)  of  the  Act
and observed as follows:-

      “The object of the insistence on insurance under Chapter XI of the Act
      thus seems to be to compulsorily cover the liability relating to their
      person or properties of third parties and in respect of  employees  of
      the insured employer, the liability that may arise under the Workmen's
      Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the driver, the conductor and the
      one  carried  in  a  goods  vehicle  carrying  goods.  On  this  plain
      understanding of Section 147, we find it difficult to  hold  that  the
      Insurance Company, in the case on hand, was liable  to  indemnify  the
      owner, the employer Company, the insured, in respect of the  death  of
      one of its employees, who according to the claim, was not the  driver.
      Be it noted that the liability is not one arising under the  Workmen's
      Compensation Act, 1923 and it is doubtful, on the case put forward  by
      the claimant, whether the deceased could be understood  as  a  workman
      coming within the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.  Therefore,  on  a
      plain reading of Section 147 of the Act, it appears to be  clear  that
      the Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the  insured  in  the
      case on hand.”
12.   After so stating, the Bench adverted  to  the  decisions  in  National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh[7], Laxmi Narain Dhut (supra), Asha  Rani
(supra) and Tilak Singh (supra)  and  opined  that  a  policy  in  terms  of
Section 147 of the Act does not cover  persons  other  than  third  parties.
Eventually, it ruled thus:-

       “The victim was the Regional Manager of the Company  that  owned  the
      car. He was using the car given to him by the Company for use. Whether
      he is treated as the owner of the vehicle or as an employee, he is not
      covered by the insurance policy taken in terms of the Act—without  any
      special  contract—since  there  is  no  award  under   the   Workmen's
      Compensation Act that is required to be satisfied by the  insurer.  In
      these circumstances, we hold that the appellant Insurance  Company  is
      not liable to indemnify the insured and is also not obliged to satisfy
      the award of the Tribunal/Court and then have recourse to the insured,
      the owner of the vehicle.”



13.   In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sudhakaran K. V. and  Others[8],
a two-Judge Bench, while dealing with the issue whether a pillion  rider  on
a scooter would be a third party within the meaning of Section  147  of  the
Act, after referring to number of authorities, stated thus:-

      “The contract of insurance did not cover the  owner  of  the  vehicle,
      certainly not the pillion-rider. The  deceased  was  travelling  as  a
      passenger, stricto sensu may not be as a gratuitous passenger as in  a
      given case she may not (sic) be a member of the family,  a  friend  or
      other relative. In the sense of the  term  which  is  used  in  common
      parlance, she might not be even a passenger. In view of the  terms  of
      the contract of insurance, however, she would not be covered thereby.

                  xxx       xxx     xxx     xxx   xxx

        The law  which  emerges  from  the  said  decisions,  is:  (i)  the
      liability of the insurance company in a case of  this  nature  is  not
      extended to a pillion-rider of the motor vehicle unless the  requisite
      amount of premium is paid for covering his/her risk;  (ii)  the  legal
      obligation arising under Section 147 of the Act cannot be extended  to
      an injury or death of the owner of vehicle or the pillion-rider; (iii)
      the pillion-rider in a two-wheeler was not to be treated  as  a  third
      party when the accident has taken place owing to  rash  and  negligent
      riding of the scooter and not on the part of  the  driver  of  another
      vehicle.”


14.    In  New  India  Assurance  Company  Limited  v.  Sadanand  Mukhi  and
Others[9], the son of the owner of  the  insured  while  driving  the  motor
cycle met with an accident and died.  The accident allegedly took  place  as
a stray dog came in front of  the  vehicle.   The  stand  of  the  insurance
company was that in view of the relationship between the  deceased  and  the
owner of the vehicle being father and son  the  deceased  was  not  a  third
party.  The Bench relied on the decisions  in  Tilak  Singh  (supra),  Jhuma
Saha (supra),  Meena Variyal (supra), Laxmi Narain Dhut (supra)  and  United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Davinder Singh[10] and came  to  hold  that  the
insurance company was not liable to indemnify the owner.

15.   At this juncture, we may  refer  with  profit  to  a  two-Judge  Bench
decision in Bhagyalakshmi and others v.  United  Insurance  Company  Limited
and another[11] wherein the learned Judges took note of  the  contention  of
the learned senior counsel for  the  claimant-appellant  which  was  to  the
effect that after the deletion of the second  proviso  appended  to  Section
95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in the 1988 Act, the  liability  of
a passenger in a private vehicle must also be  included  in  the  policy  in
terms of the provisions of the 1988 Act. The Bench  reproduced  the  policy,
referred to Section 64-B of the Insurance Act, 1938, took note of  the  role
of the Tariff  Advisory Committee and referred to  the  decisions  in  Amrit
Lal Sood and Another v. Kaushalya Devi  Thapar  and  Others[12],  Asha  Rani
(supra), Tilak Singh  (supra), Jhuma Saha (supra) and  Sudhakaran K. V.  and
Others (supra) and observed thus :-

      “Before this Court, however, the nature of policies which came up  for
      consideration were Act policies.  This  Court  did  not  deal  with  a
      package policy. If the Tariff Advisory Committee seeks to enforce  its
      decision in regard to coverage of third-party risk which would include
      all persons including occupants of the vehicle and the insurer  having
      entered into a contract of insurance in relation thereto,  we  are  of
      the opinion that the matter may require a deeper scrutiny.”



      On a perusal of the aforesaid paragraph, it is clear as  crystal  that
the decisions that have been referred to in Bhagyalakshmi  (supra)  involved
only “Act Policies”.  The Bench felt that the matter would be  different  if
the Tariff Advisory Committee seeks to enforce its  decision  in  regard  to
coverage of third party risk which would include an occupant in  a  vehicle.
It is worth noting that the Bench referred to  certain  decisions  of  Delhi
High Court and Madras High Court and thought it  appropriate  to  refer  the
matter to a larger Bench.  Be it noted, in the  said  case,  the  Court  was
dealing with comprehensive policy which is also  called  a  package  policy.
In that context, in the earlier part of the judgment, the Bench  had  stated
thus:-

      “The policy in question is a package policy. The contract of insurance
      if given its face value covers the risk not only of a third party  but
      also of persons travelling in the car including the owner thereof. The
      question is as to whether the policy in question  is  a  comprehensive
      policy or only an Act policy.”


16.   Thus, it is quite vivid that the Bench had made a distinction  between
the  “Act   policy”   and   “comprehensive   policy/package   policy”.    We
respectfully concur with the said distinction.  The crux of  the  matter  is
what  would  be  the  liability  of  the  insurer  if  the   policy   is   a
“comprehensive/package  policy”.   We  are  absolutely  conscious  that  the
matter has been referred to a larger Bench, but, as is  evident,  the  Bench
has also observed that it would depend upon the view of the Tariff  Advisory
Committee pertaining to enforcement of its decision to cover  the  liability
of an occupant in a  vehicle  in  a  “comprehensive/package  policy”  regard
being had to the contract of insurance.

17.   At this stage, it is apposite  to  note  that  when  the  decision  in
Bhagyalakshmi (supra) was rendered,  a  decision  of  High  Court  of  Delhi
dealing with the view  of  the  Tariff  Advisory  Committee  in  respect  of
“comprehensive/package policy” had not come into the  field.   We  think  it
apt to refer to the same as it deals with  certain  factual  position  which
can be of assistance.  The High Court of Delhi in Yashpal  Luthra  and  Anr.
V. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.  and  Another[13],  after  recording  the
evidence of the competent authority of Tariff Advisory Committee  (TAC)  and
Insurance  Regulatory  and  Development  Authority  (IRDA),   reproduced   a
circular dated 16.11.2009 issued by  IRDA  to  CEOs  of  all  the  Insurance
Companies restating the  factual  position  relating  to  the  liability  of
Insurance companies in respect of a  pillion  rider  on  a  two-wheeler  and
occupants in a private  car  under  the  comprehensive/package  policy.  The
relevant portion of the circular which  has  been  reproduced  by  the  High
Court is as follows:-

      “IRDA

      Ref: IRDA/NL/CIR/F&U/073/11/2009
      16.11.2009

      To

      CEOs of all general insurance companies

      Re: Liability of insurance companies in  respect  of  occupants  of  a
      Private car and pillion rider on a two-wheeler  under  Standard  Motor
      Package Policy (also called Comprehensive Policy).

      Insurers’ attention is drawn to wordings of Section  (II)  1  (ii)  of
      Standard Motor Package Policy (also called Comprehensive  Policy)  for
      private car and two-wheeler under the (erstwhile) India Motor  Tariff.
      For convenience the relevant provisions are reproduced hereunder:-


                  ‘Section II - Liability to Third Parties

      1. Subject to the limits of liabilities as laid down in  the  Schedule
      hereto the company will indemnify the  insured  in  the  event  of  an
      accident caused by or arising out of the use of  the  insured  vehicle
      against all sums which the insured shall become legally liable to  pay
      in respect of -

      (i) death or bodily injury to any person including  occupants  carried
      in the vehicle (provided such occupants are not carried  for  hire  or
      reward) but except so far as it is necessary to meet the  requirements
      of Motor Vehicles Act, the Company shall  not  be  liable  where  such
      death or injury arises out of and in the course of employment of  such
      person by the insured.’

      It is further brought to the attention  of  insurers  that  the  above
      provisions are in line with the following circulars earlier issued  by
      the TAC on the subject:

      (i) Circular M.V. No. l of 1978 - dated 18th  March,  1978  (regarding
      occupants carried in Private Car) effective from 25th March, 1977.

      (ii) MOT/GEN/10 dated 2nd June, 1986 (regarding pillion  riders  in  a
      two-wheeler) effective from the date of the circular.

      The above circulars make  it  clear  that  the  insured  liability  in
      respect of occupant(s) carried in a  private  car  and  pillion  rider
      carried on two-wheeler is covered under  the  Standard  Motor  Package
      Policy. A copy each of the  above  circulars  is  enclosed  for  ready
      reference.

      The Authority vide circular No. 066/IRDA/F&U/Mar-08  dated  March  26,
      2008 issued under File & Use Guidelines has  reiterated  that  pending
      further orders the insurers shall not vary  the  coverage,  terms  and
      conditions wording, warranties, clauses and endorsements in respect of
      covers that were under the erstwhile tariffs.  Further the  Authority,
      vide circular No. 019/IRDA/NL/F&U/Oct-08 dated November  6,  2008  has
      mandated that insurers are not  permitted  to  abridge  the  scope  of
      standard covers available  under  the  erstwhile  tariffs  beyond  the
      options permitted in the erstwhile tariffs.  All general insurers  are
      advised to adhere  to  the  afore-mentioned  circulars  and  any  non-
      compliance of the same would be viewed  seriously  by  the  Authority.
      This is issued with the approval of competent authority.
                                                                        Sd/-
                                                           (Prabodh Chander)
                                                         Executive Director”
                                                         [emphasis supplied]

18.   The High Court has also reproduced a circular issued by IRD dated
3.12.2009.  It is instructive to quote the same:-
      “IRDA


      IRDA/NL/CIR/F&U/078/12/2009
      3.12.2009.


      To

      All CEOs of All general insurance companies (except ECGC,  AIC,  Staff
      Health, Apollo)


      Re: Liability of insurance companies  in  respect  of  occupant  of  a
      private car and pillion rider in a two-wheeler  under  Standard  Motor
      Package Policy (also called Comprehensive Policy).


      Pursuant to the Order of the Delhi High Court dated 23.11.2009 in  MAC
      APP No. 176/2009 in the case of Yashpal Luthra  v.  United  India  and
      Ors., the Authority convened a meeting on November  26,  2009  of  the
      CEOs of all the general  insurance  companies  doing  motor  insurance
      business in the presence of the counsel appearing  on  behalf  of  the
      Authority and the leaned amicus curie.

      Based  on  the  unanimous  decision  taken  in  the  meeting  by   the
      representatives of the general insurance companies to comply with  the
      IRDA  circular  dated  16th  November,  2009  restating  the  position
      relating to the liability of all the general insurance companies doing
      motor insurance business in respect of the occupants in a private  car
      and pillion rider on a two  wheeler  under  the  comprehensive/package
      policies which was communicated to the court  on  the  same  day  i.e.
      November 26, 2009 and the court was pleased to  pass  the  order  (dt.
      26.11.2009) received from the  Court  Master,  Delhi  High  Court,  is
      enclosed for your ready reference and adherence. In terms of the  said
      order  and  the  admitted  liability  of  all  the  general  insurance
      companies doing motor insurance business in respect of  the  occupants
      in a private  car  and  pillion  rider  on  a  two-wheeler  under  the
      comprehensive/package policies, you are  advised  to  confirm  to  the
      Authority, strict compliance of the circular dated 16th November, 2009
      and orders dt. 26.11.2009 of the High Court. Such compliance  on  your
      part would also involve:


        i) withdrawing the plea against such a contest  wherever  taken  in
           the  cases  pending  before  the  MACT,  and  issue  appropriate
           instructions to  their  respective  lawyers  and  the  operating
           officers within 7 days;


       ii) with respect to all appeals pending before the  High  Courts  on
           this point, issuing instructions within 7 days to the respective
           operating officers and the counsel to withdraw  the  contest  on
           this ground which would require identification of the number  of
           appeals pending before the High Courts  (whether  filed  by  the
           claimants or the insurers) on this issue within a  period  of  2
           weeks and the contest on this ground being  withdrawn  within  a
           period of four weeks thereafter;


      iii) With respect to the appeals  pending  before  the  Hon'ble  Apex
           Court, informing, within a period of 7  days,  their  respective
           advocates on record about the IRDA  Circulars,  for  appropriate
           advice  and  action.   Your  attention  is  also  drawn  to  the
           discussions in the CEOs  meeting  on  26.11.2009,  when  it  was
           reiterated that insurers must take immediate  steps  to  collect
           statistics about accident claims on the above subject through  a
           central point of reference decided by them as the same has to be
           communicated in due course to the Honourable High Court. You are
           therefore advised to take up  the  exercise  of  collecting  and
           collating the information within  a  period  of  two  months  to
           ensure necessary & effective compliance  of  the  order  of  the
           Court. The information may be centralized with  the  Secretariat
           of the General Insurance Council and also furnished to us.


      IRDA requires a written confirmation from you on the action  taken  by
      you in this regard.


      This has the approval of the Competent Authority.
                                                                        Sd/-
                                                           (Prabodh Chander)
                                                         Executive Director”
                                                            [emphasis added]
19.   It is extremely important to note here that till 31st  December,  2006
the Tariff Advisory Committee and, thereafter, from 1st January, 2007,  IRDA
functioned as the statutory regulatory authorities and they are entitled  to
fix the tariff as well as the terms and conditions of the  policies  by  all
insurance companies.  The  High  Court  had  issued  notice  to  the  Tariff
Advisory Committee and the IRDA to explain the factual position  as  regards
the liability of the insurance companies in respect  of  an  occupant  in  a
private car under the “comprehensive/  package  policy”.   Before  the  High
Court, the Competent Authority of IRDA had stated that on  2nd  June,  1986,
the Tariff Advisory Committee had issued instructions to all  the  insurance
companies to cover the pillion  rider  of  a  scooter/motorcycle  under  the
“comprehensive policy” and the said position continues to be in  vogue  till
date.  It had also admitted that the  “comprehensive  policy”  is  presently
called a “package policy”.  It is the admitted  position,  as  the  decision
would show, the earlier circulars dated 18th March, 1978 and 2nd June,  1986
continue to be valid and effective and all insurance companies are bound  to
pay the compensation in respect of the liability towards an  occupant  in  a
car under the “comprehensive/package policy” irrespective of the  terms  and
conditions contained in the policy.  The competent  authority  of  the  IRDA
was also examined before the High Court who stated that the circulars  dated
18th March, 1978 and 2nd June, 1986 of the Tariff  Advisory  Committee  were
incorporated in the Indian Motor Tariff effective from 1st  July,  2002  and
they continue to be  operative  and  binding  on  the  insurance  companies.
Because  of  the  aforesaid  factual  position,  the  circulars  dated  16th
November  2009  and  3rd  December,  2009,   that   have   been   reproduced
hereinabove, were issued.

20.   It is also worthy to note that the  High  Court,  after  referring  to
individual circulars  issued  by  various  insurance  companies,  eventually
stated thus:-

      “In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the  comprehensive/package
      policy   of   a   two   wheeler   covers   a   pillion    rider    and
      comprehensive/package policy of a private car covers the occupants and
      where the vehicle is covered  under  a  comprehensive/package  policy,
      there is no need for Motor Accident Claims Tribunal  to  go  into  the
      question whether the Insurance Company is liable to compensate for the
      death or injury of a pillion rider on a two-wheeler or  the  occupants
      in a private car. In fact, in view of the TAC’s directives  and  those
      of the IRDA, such a plea was not permissible and  ought  not  to  have
      been raised as, for instance, it was done in the present case.”
21.   In view of the aforesaid factual position, there is  no  scintilla  of
doubt that a “comprehensive/package policy” would  cover  the  liability  of
the insurer for payment of compensation for the occupant in  a  car.   There
is no cavil that an “Act Policy”  stands  on  a  different  footing  from  a
“Comprehensive/Package Policy”.  As the circulars  have  made  the  position
very clear and the IRDA, which is presently  the  statutory  authority,  has
commanded the insurance  companies  stating  that  a  “Comprehensive/Package
Policy” covers the liability, there cannot be any dispute  in  that  regard.
We may hasten to clarify that the earlier pronouncements  were  rendered  in
respect of the “Act Policy” which admittedly  cannot  cover  a  third  party
risk  of  an   occupant   in   a   car.    But,   if   the   policy   is   a
“Comprehensive/Package Policy”,  the  liability  would  be  covered.   These
aspects  were  not  noticed  in  the  case  of  Bhagyalakshmi  (supra)  and,
therefore, the matter was referred to a larger Bench.  We  are  disposed  to
think that there is no necessity to refer the present  matter  to  a  larger
Bench  as  the  IRDA,  which  is  presently  the  statutory  authority,  has
clarified the position by issuing circulars which have  been  reproduced  in
the judgment by the Delhi High Court and we have also reproduced the same.

22.   In view of the aforesaid legal position,  the  question  that  emerges
for consideration is whether in the case at hand,  the  policy  is  an  “Act
Policy” or “Comprehensive/Package Policy”.  There  has  been  no  discussion
either by the tribunal or the High  Court  in  this  regard.   True  it  is,
before us, Annexure P-1 has been filed which  is  a  policy  issued  by  the
insurer.  It only mentions the policy to be a “comprehensive policy” but  we
are inclined to think that there has to be a scanning of the  terms  of  the
entire policy to arrive at the conclusion whether it is  really  a  “package
policy” to cover the liability of an occupant in a car.

23.   In view of the aforesaid analysis, we think it apposite to  set  aside
the finding of the High Court and the tribunal as regards the  liability  of
the insurer and remit the matter to the tribunal to  scrutinize  the  policy
in a proper perspective and, if necessary,  by  taking  additional  evidence
and if the conclusion is arrived  at  that  the  policy  in  question  is  a
“Comprehensive/Package Policy”, the  liability  would  be  fastened  on  the
insurer.  As far as other findings recorded by the tribunal and affirmed  by
the High Court are concerned, they remain undisturbed.

24.   Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above  and
the matter is remitted to the tribunal for the purpose  of  adjudication  as
directed hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.


                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]



                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                               [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
November 20, 2012.



-----------------------
[1]    (2006) 4 SCC 404
[2]    (2003) 2 SCC 223
[3]    (2007) 9 SCC 263
[4]    (2004) 8 SCC 553
[5]    (2007) 3 SCC 700

[6]    (2007) 5 SCC 428
[7]    (2004) 3 SCC 297
[8]    (2008) 7 SCC 428
[9]    (2009) 2 SCC 417
[10]   (2007) 8 SCC 698
[11]   (2009) 7 SCC 148
[12]   (1998) 3 SCC 744
[13]   2011 ACJ 1415



-----------------------
23