vehicle was stolen = Avtar Singh had no insurable interest at the time of accident. He had already sold the vehicle to petitioner No. 2. Avtar Singh had no locus standi to file the claim. He had not even the privity of contract because petitioner no. 1 had stepped into his shoes. This is an admitted fact that the petitioner No. 1 failed to transfer the insurable claim within 14 days from the date of registration.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

                                                 NEW DELHI      

 REVISION PETITION NO.  3774 OF  2012

 (Against the order dated 29.05.2012 in First Appeal No. 1507 of 2007 of the

Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh)

1. Mushtaq Mohd.

    S/o Mr. Kamal Din,

    Village Takhar Khurd,

    Tehsil Malerkotla

    District Sangrur, Punjab

2. Mr. Avtar Singh,

    S/o Mr. Mohinder Singh,

    Raikot Road,

    Near Lok Sewa Hospital

    Barnala, Punjab                                                       ... Petitioners

 

Versus

National Insurance Company Limited,

Having its Divisional Office Outside Dhuri Gate,

Sangrur through its Divisional Manager,

Regional Office, SCO No. 332-334,

Sector 34-A, Chandigarh                                           ... Respondent

BEFORE:

  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER

  HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER

     

For the Petitioner               :  Mr. Abhineet Gulati, Advocate

Pronounced on :   6^th November, 2012

ORDER

JUSTICE J. M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER

1.      Mr. Avtar Singh, complainant/petitioner No. 2 was the owner of truck No. PB-13K – 6205.  He had obtained an insurance policy valid from 25.6.2006 to 24.6.2007 from the National Insurance Company Limited, opposite party.  In the meantime, Mushtaq Mohd.-complainant/petitioner No. 1 purchased the said vehicle in question from petitioner No. 2.  A power of attorney was also executed by petitioner No. 2 in favour of the petitioner No. 1.  Intimation was given to the Branch Office of the respondent situated at Ahmedgarh, Punjab.  Unfortunately, the said vehicle was stolen during the night intervening 26-27/1/2007 from the premises of Rehman Filling Station (Petrol Pump), Raikot Road, Malerkotla.  The F.I.R. was also lodged with the police station Malerkotla.  An intimation of theft was also given to the Branch office of the respondent at Malerkotla as well as Ahmedgarh on 8.2.2007. 

2.      The petitioner No. 2 submitted the claim which was repudiated by the opposite party. 

3.      The District Forum allowed the complaint filed by the complainants.  However, the State Commission accepted the appeal and dismissed the complaint.

4.      We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners.  He vehemently argued that the facts and circumstances of this case are different.  He contended that the claim was filed by Avtar Singh and since he had an insurable interest, therefore, the claim should have been granted in his favour. 

5.      Instead of coming to the heart of the problem, learned counsel for the petitioner touched only peripheral issues.  It is clear that Avtar Singh had no insurable interest at the time of accident.  He had already sold the vehicle to petitioner No. 2.  Avtar Singh had no locus standi to file the claim.  He had not even the privity of contract because petitioner no. 1 had stepped into his shoes.  This is an admitted fact that the petitioner No. 1 failed to transfer the insurable claim within 14 days from the date of registration.  The State Commission rightly placed reliance on the authorities reported in Complete Insulation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. New India 1996 ACJ page 65 and in Oriental Insurnace Company Ltd. vs. Reeta in revision petition No. 2299 decided on 20.10.2009 by this Commission.

5.      Under these circumstances, we find that the petitioners do not have a bone to pluck with the respondent National Insurance Company Ltd.  The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed.

……………Sd/-………….

(J. M. MALIK, J.)

PRESIDING MEMBER

                                                                                …………Sd/-……………

(VINAY KUMAR)

MEMBER

Naresh/reserved                                         

considering the nature of the activities for which allied services of the society were hired, it is a commercial purpose being a horticulture business. =“The National Commission appears to have been taking a consistent view that where a person purchases goods “with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a large scale for the purpose of earning profit”, he will not be a ‘consumer’, within the meaning of Section 2 (d) (i) of the Act. Broadly affirming the said view and more particularly, with a view to obviate any confusion – the expression “large scale” is not a very precise expression – Parliament stepped in and added the explanation to Section 2(d)(i) by Ordinance/ Amendment Act, 1993. The explanation excludes certain purposes from the purview of the expression “commercial purpose” – a case of exception to an exception. Let us elaborate: a person who buys a typewriter or a car and uses them for his personal use is certainly a ‘consumer’ but a person who buys a typewriter or a car for typing others’ work, for consideration or for plying the car as a ‘taxi’, can be said to be using the typewriter/car for a commercial purpose. The explanation however clarifies that in certain situations, purchase of goods for “commercial purpose” would not yet take the purchaser out of the definition of expression of expression ‘consumer’. If the commercial use is by the purchaserhimself for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of ‘self-employment’, such purchaser of goods is yet a ‘consumer’. In the illustration given above, if the purchaser himself works on typewriter or plies the car as a taxi himself, he does not cease to be a consumer. In other words, if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e. by self-employment, for earning his livelihood, it would not be treated as a “commercial purpose” and he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The explanation reduces the question, what is a “commercial purpose”, to a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. It is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to. The several words employed in the explanation, viz, “uses them by himself”, “exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood” and “by means of self-employment” make the intention of Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning his livelihood. A few more illustrations would serve to emphasise what we say. A person who purchases an auto-rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. Similarly, a purchaser of a truck who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier by himself would be a consumer. A person who purchases a lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. (In the above illustrations, if such buyer takes the assistance of one or two persons to assist/help him in operating the vehicle or machinery, he does not cease to be a consumer). As against this, a person who purchases an auto-rickshaw, a car or a lathe machine or other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another person, would not be a consumer”. A person cannot be said to be consumer if he purchases the second house.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

                                                   NEW DELHI       

 REVISION PETITION NO.  2430 OF  2012

 (Against the order dated 05.01.2012 in First Appeal No. A/05/595 of the

Maharashtra State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Mumbai)

Shri Kishore Ramchandra Bhide

243/6289, Gulmohar,

Pant Nagar,

Ghatkopar ( E), Mumbai-400 075                                     ... Petitioner

 

Versus

1. M/s Habitat India Agro Development

    Pvt. Ltd., Jiwan Sahakar,

    Sir P.M. Road,

    Mumbai-400 001

2. Green Acres Horticultural Development

    Cooperative Society Ltd.

    Dolkhamb Tal, Shahapur,

    District Thane

3. S.W. Sangamnehri

    Chairman/Director,

    Habitat India Agro Development

    Pvt. Ltd. Jiwan Sahakar,

    Sir P.M. Road, Mumbai-400 001                                  ... Respondent

BEFORE:

  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER

  HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER

     

For the Petitioner                   :  Mr. C.P. Deogirikar, Advocate

For the Respondents             :  Mr. Dilip Annasaheb Taur, Advocate

 

Pronounced on :  6th  November, 2012

ORDER

JUSTICE J. M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER

1.       Shri Kishore Ramchandra Bhide, petitioner/complainant is the Member of Green Acres Horticultural Development Cooperative Society Limited, opposite party No. 2/respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 was established for development of Horticulture and promoting overall growth of agricultural activities.  The society had purchased agricultural land at DolkhamTal, Shahpur Distt. Thane and plot No. 7 at survey No. 88, was allotted to the complainant.  The society was to construct the farm house belonging to the complainant.  Since the stay was granted against the society by the authority, therefore, the society could not construct the said farm house. 

2.       The complainant has filed this case with the prayer that the amount paid by him in the sum of Rs.2,18,500/-, out of total consideration of Rs.3,30,950/- alongwith interest @12% per annum, be given to him.  The District Forum dismissed the complaint.  Being aggrieved by the order of District, Forum, an appeal was preferred before the State Commission which dismissed the same. 

3.       The District Forum dismissed the complaint on two counts.  Firstly, the society was not in a position to construct the house due to stay order.  Secondly, it was observed that considering the nature of the activities for which allied services of the society were hired, it is a commercial purpose being a horticulture business.

4.       Learned counsel for the petitioner argued with vehemence that the above said farm house is being purchased for residential purpose, which would be used seasonally and to store fertilizers and transacting the cultivation of fruits and vegetables.  It was admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has got a separate residential house.

5.       We find it extremely difficult to countenance this contention.  We have perused the complaint.  The relevant paras of the complaint are reproduced as follows:

“The respondent No. 2 society is categorized as Agricultural society.  The complainant states that respondnet No. 2 socieity has purchased huge land at Dolkham Tal. Shahpur Dist. Thane for achieving its object and in turn has proposed to develop it for horticultural, forestry and agricultural cultivation.  A scheme accordingly was launched by the respondent No. 2 socieity to divide the land into several plots and allot it to its members upon certain terms and conditions.  The complainant herein is member of the respondent No. 2 society and in accordance with its scheme entered into an agreement with the said society on 10-5-1989.  In accordance with the said agreement.  The Society has allotted a plot admeasuring one acre to the complainant herein upon certain terms and conditions which are set out in the agreement dated 10.5.1989.  The complainant craves leave to refer to any rely upon the said agreement dated 10-5-1989.”

“The complainant is self-employed, a qualified Engineer.”

6.       Although, the petitioner stated that he is a consumer, yet, he has not mentioned that he is purchasing this farm house for self-employment or for earning his livelihood.  It is rather clear that this farm house is being purchased for earning profits.  The petitioner is already employed.

7.       The Supreme Court has discussed the term ‘consumer’ in the celebrated authority reported in Laxmi Engineering Works vs. PSG Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583wherein it was held:

“The National Commission appears to have been taking a consistent view that where a person purchases goods “with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a large scale for the purpose of earning profit”, he will not be a ‘consumer’, within the meaning of Section 2 (d) (i) of the Act.  Broadly affirming the said view and more particularly, with a view to obviate any confusion – the expression “large scale”  is not a very  precise expression – Parliament stepped in and added the explanation to Section 2(d)(i) by Ordinance/ Amendment Act, 1993. The explanation excludes certain purposes from the purview of the expression “commercial purpose” – a case of exception to an exception.  Let us elaborate: a person who buys a typewriter or a car and uses them for his personal use is certainly a ‘consumer’ but a person who buys a typewriter or a car for typing others’ work, for consideration or for plying the car as a ‘taxi’, can be said to be using the typewriter/car for a commercial purpose.  The explanation however clarifies that in certain situations, purchase of goods for “commercial purpose” would not yet take the purchaser out of the definition of expression of expression ‘consumer’. If the commercial use is by the purchaserhimself for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of ‘self-employment’, such purchaser of goods is yet a ‘consumer’. In the illustration given above, if the purchaser himself works on typewriter or plies the car as a taxi himself, he does not cease to be a consumer.  In other words, if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e. by self-employment, for earning his livelihood, it would not be treated as a “commercial purpose” and he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act.  The explanation reduces the question, what is a “commercial purpose”, to a question of fact to be decided in the facts of  each case.  It is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to. The several words employed in the explanation, viz, “uses them by himself”, “exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood” and “by means of self-employment” make the intention of Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning his livelihood. A few more illustrations would serve to emphasise what we say.  A person who purchases an auto-rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. Similarly, a purchaser of a truck who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier by himself would be a consumer.  A person who purchases a lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself for earning his livelihood would be a consumer.  (In the above illustrations, if such buyer takes the assistance of one or two persons to assist/help him in operating the vehicle or machinery, he does not cease to be a consumer).  As against this, a person who purchases an auto-rickshaw, a car or a lathe machine or other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another person, would not be a consumer”.

A person cannot be said to be consumer if he purchases the second house.

8.       The revision petition is without merit and the same is, therefore, dismissed.

………Sd/-……………….

(J. M. MALIK, J.)

PRESIDING MEMBER

                                                                                    ………Sd/-………………

(VINAY KUMAR)

MEMBER

Naresh/reserved                                            

the weedicide ‘Leader’ was of substandard quality as a result of which his wheat crops got damaged.= the sample for laboratory test was referred to Shri Ram Institute for Industrial Research by the petitioner/complainant himself and, therefore, it cannot be said that this will have the same effect as a reference made by a consumer fora under Section 13(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Obviously, it was not in a sealed packet and the content thereof which was subjected to the test could not be said with authenticity to be the same weedicide which the complainant had purchased from the respondent/opposite party.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

NEW DELHI

                                     

REVISION PETITION NO. 2984 OF 2012

[Against the order dated 06.06.2012 in F.A. No. 157/2010 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula]

Bhupinder Singh

S/o Shri Dariya Singh

R/o Village Hoshiarpura

Tehsil Safidon, District Jind

Haryana                                                   …      Petitioner

Versus

1.  M/s Karta Ram Rameshwar Dass

Through its Proprietor Dayanand HUF

Through its Karta Dayanand

S/o Rameshwar Dass

R/o Old Anaj Mandi, Jind

Haryana

2.  Dayanand

S/o Shri Rameshwar Dass

Proprietor Dayanand HUF

Through its Karta Dayanand

S/o Shri Rameshwar Dass

R/o Old Anaj Mandi, Jind

Haryana

3.  Dayanand

S/o Shri Rameshwar Dass

Partner M/s Karta Ram Rameshwar Dass

R/o Old Anaj Mandi, Jind

Haryana                                                    …      Respondents

BEFORE :

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R.C. JAIN, PRESIDING MEMBER

HON’BLE MR. S.K. NAIK, MEMBER

For the Petitioners      :  Mr. Gautam Godara Advocate

Pronounced on 5^th November, 2012

O R D E R

PER S.K. NAIK, MEMBER

1.     This revision petition has been filed by the original complainant Bhupinder Singh against the concurrent findings and orders dismissing his complaint firstly by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Jind (for short the District Forum) in Complaint No. 123 of 2004 on 15^th of December, 2009 and subsequently on his appeal by the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula (for short the State Commission) in First Appeal No. 157 of 2010 on the 6^th of June, 2012.

2.     Alleging that the petitioner/complainant had purchased 40 packets of weedicide ‘Leader’ @ Rs.672/- per packet, 20 packets of weedicide ‘Topic’ @ Rs.690/- per packet and 29 packets of ‘Foret’ @ Rs.200/- per packet, thus paying a sum of Rs.46,280/- to M/s Karta Ram Rameshwar Dass of Jind on 16^th of January, 2002, and sprayed the weedicide on his agricultural land.  Subsequently, he found that the weedicide ‘Leader’ was of substandard quality as a result of which his wheat crops got damaged.  His representation to the authorities such as SDO and DDA of Agriculture Department evoked no response and, therefore, he sent some samples to Shri Ram Institute for Industrial Research, Delhi on 5^th of May, 2003 for laboratory test.  The said institute clearly stated that the packets contained totally fake substance and not any weedicide.  Even thereafter the authorities failed to take any action in the matter and he had to report the matter to the police who on the directions of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court registered an FIR in the matter.  Even thereafter the police did not take any action and filed a cancellation report.  Contending that the petitioner/complainant suffered a crop loss of Rs.5,67,000/- as no wheat crop could grow on his agricultural land, he filed a consumer complaint before the District Forum which was dismissed.

3.     Aggrieved thereupon the petitioner/complainant filed appeal before the State Commission which too has been dismissed. 

4.     Learned counsel for the petitioner/complainant contends that both the fora below have ignored the report of the laboratory test undertaken by the renowned Shri Ram Institute for Industrial Research, which was very material, and have erroneously discarded the report on the ground of sample not being in sealed condition.  On the observation of the fora below that the petitioner/complainant absented himself at the time of the inspection of the field by the Deputy Director (Agriculture), learned counsel submits that the petitioner/complainant was not informed about the date and time of the visit.

5.     We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner/complainant and have carefully perused the records of the case.  Firstly, we observe that it is a case of concurrent findings and orders of the two fora below and our jurisdiction under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is rather limited, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Rubi (Chandra) Dutta v. M/s United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [II (2010) CPJ 19 (SC)], wherein the Apex Court has held as under :-

“23.  Also, it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from Section 21(b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside.  In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view than what was taken by the two Forums.  The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the Courts below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts.  This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked.  In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Act has been transgressed.  It was not a case where such a view could have been taken by setting aside the concurrent findings of two fora” .

6.     Besides, it is from the records that the sample for laboratory test was referred to Shri Ram Institute for Industrial Research by the petitioner/complainant himself and, therefore, it cannot be said that this will have the same effect as a reference made by a consumer fora under Section 13(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.  Obviously, it was not in a sealed packet and the content thereof which was subjected to the test could not be said with authenticity to be the same weedicide which the complainant had purchased from the respondent/opposite party.

7.     Further, absence of the petitioner/complainant at the time of the inspection of his field by the experts from the Agriculture Department and their finding that there was “satisfactory control of phalaris minor” goes against the allegation of the petitioner/complainant. In our view, if the petitioner/ complainant was really aggrieved by the damage to his crop due to usage of substandard weedicide, he would have himself pursued the matter with regard to the visit of agriculture expert (Deputy Director) and ascertained the date and time of his visit and be present on the site.  The conduct of the petitioner/complainant overall does not inspire credibility.  The fora below have committed no illegality, irregularity much less any jurisdictional error in dismissing the complaint.

8.     The revision petition is, accordingly, dismissed.  

Sd/-

( R. C. JAIN, J. )

PRESIDING MEMBER

Sd/-

     (S.K. NAIK)

MEMBER

Mukesh

The parties were governed by the terms and conditions contained in this policy document. Clause 3(b)(ii) of this policy document reads as under :- ‘In case of the full prepayment of the loan or restructuring of the loan resulting in full prepayment or transfer of the Loan to another Financial Institution/Company/Bank, which is not a subsidiary or branch of the Bank, the Life cover shall cease and the Surrender Value shall become payable as long as the same is at least Rs.250/-. The Surrender Value is computed as below :- 70% of the Premium Paid * outstanding terms of Life Cover Total premium of Life Cover’

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

NEW DELHI

REVISION PETITION NO. 2795 OF 2012

[Against the order dated 01.06.2012 in F.A. No. 32 of 2012 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, U.T. Chandigarh]

Japji Kaur Cheema

D/o Shri H.S. Cheema

R/o H.No. 1126, Sector 8-C

Chandigarh                                               …      Petitioner

Versus

1. ICICI Home Finance Co. Ltd.

SCO 129-130, Sector-9

Chandigarh

2.  ICICI Home Finance Co. Ltd.

ICICI Bank Towers

Bandra-Kurla Complex

Mumbai

3.  ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd.

ICICI Pru Life Tower

1089, Appa Saheb Maratha Marg

Prabhadevi, Mumbai

Old Address: 4^th Floor, Stanrose House

Appa Saheb Marathe Marg

Prabhadevi, Mumbai                                   …      Respondents

BEFORE :           

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R.C. JAIN, PRESIDING MEMBER

HON’BLE MR. S.K. NAIK, MEMBER

For the Petitioner                       :  Mr. Vishal Ahuja, Advocate

Pronounced on 5^th November, 2012

O R D E R

PER S.K. NAIK, MEMBER

1.     This revision petition is directed against the order dated 1^st of June, 2012 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, U.T. Chandigarh (for short the State Commission) passed in First Appeal No. 32 of 2012.  By the said order the State Commission has set aside the order of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-I, U.T. Chandigarh (for short the District Forum) passed in favour of the petitioner/complainant, thereby dismissing her complaint.

2.     Facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner/complainant had obtained a housing loan from respondent no.1/ICICI Home Finance Co. Ltd., which was foreclosed by paying the foreclosure charges.  However, at the time of sanctioning the loan, the petitioner/complainant had obtained a life insurance policy allegedly as a mandatory requirement to cover the sanctioned loan amount against any contingency and had paid a sum of Rs.2,68,000/- towards the one time premium.  The policy was to cover a period of 20 years.  Subsequently, the petitioner/complainant was refunded a sum of Rs.19,474/- out of the said premium amount perhaps due to an excess charge levied on her.

3.     When the entire loan amount was foreclosed after about a period of 8 months from the date of disbursement of the loan amount, the petitioner/complainant sought the refund of the amount of premium paid by her.  Respondent no.3/ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd., however, refunded only a sum of Rs.1,49,605.09 against Rs.2,48,253/- (appears to have been wrongly calculated since Rs.2,68,000 – Rs.19,474 comes to Rs.2,48,526/-) as per clause 3(b)(ii) of the policy, which prescribed the formula for the refund of the surrender value.  As against the course adopted by respondent no.3/Insurance Company, the say of the petitioner/complainant is that since she had foreclosed the loan within a period of 8 months from the date of its disbursement as against the period of 20 years for which the insurance was valid, respondent no.3/Insurance Company was entitled to deduct proportionate premium for the said period which came to only Rs.8275/- and therefore the deduction of Rs.98,647.91 was not justified.

4.     The District Forum was convinced with this line of argument of the petitioner/complainant and had directed respondent no.3/Insurance Company to refund the amount of Rs.90,372.91, which they had deducted, with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint till its realization, besides payment of a sum of Rs.10,000/- as costs.  The said order of the District Forum was challenged in appeal by respondent no.3/Insurance Company before the State Commission, which going by clause 3(b)(ii) of the policy relied upon by the Insurance Company set aside the order of the District Forum and dismissed the complaint.  This has given rise to the complainant approaching this Commission to invoke our supervisory jurisdiction under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

5.     We have heard Mr. Vishal Ahuja, learned counsel for the petitioner/complainant and have perused the records of the case.  The foreclosure of the loan obtained by the petitioner/complainant from respondents no.1 & 2/ICICI Home Finance Co. Ltd. by paying the foreclosure charges is not in dispute. The only allegation of the petitioner/complainant is against respondent no.3/ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. on the point of refund of surrender value of the insurance premium.  Learned counsel for the petitioner/complainant contends that since the petitioner had availed the insurance cover only for a period of 8 months, where-after she had discharged the entire loan amount and surrendered the policy, the Insurance Company should have refunded the premium amount after deducting only the proportionate amount of premium, which comes to Rs.8275/- and not the heavy amount of Rs.98,647.91, which is a clear deficiency in service on their part.

6.     We have noted the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner/complainant only to be rejected for the simple reason that the terms incorporated in the policy are agreement between the parties for all intents and purposes and the parties are bound by them.  Subsequent to entering into such agreement, none of the parties can go behind the terms of such agreement or allege that the conditions were not fair.  The State Commission has dealt with this aspect in detail and has stated as under :-

“11.    …… The parties were governed by the terms and conditions contained in this policy document.  Clause 3(b)(ii) of this policy document reads as under :-

‘In case of the full prepayment of the loan or restructuring of the loan resulting in full prepayment or transfer of the Loan to another Financial Institution/Company/Bank, which is not a subsidiary or branch of the Bank, the Life cover shall cease and the Surrender Value shall become payable as long as the same is at least Rs.250/-.  The Surrender Value is computed as below :-

70% of the Premium Paid * outstanding terms of Life Cover

Total premium of Life Cover’

12.     The authenticity of this document, was not at all challenged, by the complainant, during the pendency of the complaint.  …”

7.     Contentions now raised seek to challenge this clause of the policy, which is not permissible in law.  We, therefore, find that the State Commission has correctly set right the erroneous view adopted by the District Forum.  The order of the State Commission being in conformity with the settled principle and law on the terms of the contract being binding on the parties needs no interference.

8.     The revision petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

                                                           Sd/-

                                                                   ( R. C. JAIN, J. )

PRESIDING MEMBER

Sd/-

     (S.K. NAIK)

MEMBER

Mukesh