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Thursday, November 1, 2012

the High Court could not have directed the recognition to be retrospectively operative because certain formalities remained to be complied with. It could not have put the clock back. It needs no special emphasis to state that the High Court did not keep itself alive to the conceptual difference between “letter of intent” and “formal recognition”. True it is, there was delay but that could not have enabled the High Court to issue a writ for treating the recognition to be effective for the year 2011-12 with intake of fifty students. That apart, the respondent-institution had not obtained affiliation from the university. Therefore, the direction of the High Court is contrary to the provisions of law and the interpretation of the Act and the Regulations made by this Court and, accordingly we are compelled to set aside the same, and we so direct.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7749            OF 2012
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 11385 of 2012)


National Council for Teacher
Education and another.                                   ... Appellants

                                   Versus
Venus Public Education Society and others                     ...
Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

      Leave granted.

2.    Acquisition of knowledge  and  obtaining  of  necessary  training  for
imparting education have their immense signification.  As C.  Simmons  would
like to put it “The secret of successful teaching is  to  teach  accurately,
thoroughly, and earnestly” and one may  fruitfully  add  that  accuracy  and
thoroughness can be achieved by cultivated education, matured  training  and
keen intellect.  That is  why  teaching  becomes  a  teacher’s  passion  and
religion.   A  good  teacher,  in  a  way,  represents   country’s   orderly
civilization.  A teacher is expected to kindle interest  in  the  taught  by
method  of  investigation,   incessant   implantation   of   knowledge   and
demonstration of experience that is replete  with  intellectual  pragmatism.
A student who is keen on getting training has to keep in  mind  the  concept
of reason, conception of logic and sanctity of rationality. He  is  expected
to distance himself from habitual disobedience and unfettered  feeling,  for
a civilized society which is governed by Rule of Law  does  not  countenance
such characteristics.  The aspiration to become a  teacher  after  obtaining
training requires these qualities as they constitute the base on  which  the
superstructure is built.

3.    Importance of teachers and their training, significance  of  qualified
teachers in schools and colleges and their centripodal role in  building  of
the nation have been highlighted in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s  College  Society
v. State of Gujarat[1], Andhra Kesari Educational  Society  v.  Director  of
School Education[2], State of Maharashtra v Vikas Sahebrao Roundale[3],  St.
John’s Teachers Training Institute (for Women) v. State of T.N.[4] and  N.M.
Nageshwaramma v.  State  of  A.P.[5],  and  recently  reiterated  in  Adarsh
Shiksha Mahavidyalaya and others v. Subhash Rahangdale and others[6].

4.    It is to be clearly stated that an  institution  that  is  engaged  or
interested in getting involved in imparting a course  for  training  has  to
obey the command  of  law  in  letter  and  spirit.   There  cannot  be  any
deviation.  But, unfortunately, some of the institutions flagrantly  violate
the norms with adamantine audacity and seek indulgence of the  court  either
in the name of mercy or sympathy for the students  or  financial  constraint
of the  institution  or  they  have  been  inappropriately  treated  by  the
statutory regulatory bodies.  None of these grounds justify deviation.   The
case at hand graphically depicts deviations but the High Court  putting  the
blame on the statutory authority  has  granted  relief  to  the  respondent-
institution which is impermissible.

5.     The  factual  exposition  of  the  present  litigation   demonstrably
reflects the combat between the truth and falsehood, battle between  justice
and  injustice,  the  contestation  between  the  accord  and  discord,  the
collision  between  fairness  and  manipulation,  the  scuffle  betwixt  the
sacrosanctity of the majesty of law and its abuses  and  the  clash  between
the mandated principles and  invocation  of  sympathy.  Such  a  controversy
emerges because majesty, sanctity and purity of law have been  corroded  and
truth, however, relative it may  be  in  the  mundane  world,  has  its  own
command and the  same  has  been  deliberately  guillotined  forgetting  the
fundamental fact that none can afford to build a  castle  in  Spain  in  the
realm of truth. It is  worthy  to  note  that  justice  in  its  connotative
expanse engulfs the liberalism of an ocean, the magnanimity of the Sun,  the
sternness of a mountain, the simplicity of  a  saint,  the  austerity  of  a
Spartan and the humility of a river. The concept of justice  has  to  remain
embedded in spite of adversities. It should  remain  unshaken,  unterrified,
unperturbed and loyal to the Rule of  Law.   In  the  case  at  hand,  as  a
maladroit effort has been made to give an indecent burial to the command  of
law and pave the path of injustice, the same has to be  dealt  with  sternly
sans sympathy.

6.    Presently to the factual narration.  The respondent-society  submitted
an application on 27.10.2009 to the Western Regional  Committee  (for  short
“the WRC”) of National Council  for  Teacher  Education  (for  brevity  “the
NCTE”) for grant of recognition  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  D.El.Ed.
course  from  the  academic  session  2010-11.   On  receipt  of  the   said
application the WRC, after scrutiny of  the  same,  issued  a  communication
dated 10.2.2010 to remove certain deficiencies, namely, the institution  had
submitted the lease deed issued by Gwalior Development Authority  in  favour
of the Society for a period of thirty years but the same was  not  certified
by the competent authority; that it had submitted copy of the building  plan
approved by Nagar Nigam, Gwalior meant for school purposes and not  for  the
college; that the land use certificate issued by  the  competent  Government
authority was not submitted;  that  the  building  completion  certification
from the competent Government authority was not filed; that the  encumbrance
certificate from the competent Government authority was not  submitted;  and
that necessary undertaking in the prescribed format was not  enclosed.   The
respondent institution was advised to remove the deficiencies within a  span
of sixty days.  It was also required to submit a  reply  pertaining  to  the
deficiencies pointed out by the WRC.  The respondent submitted its reply  on
20.3.2010 and the same was considered in the 133rd meeting of the  WRC  held
on 20-21.04.2010.  On 11.5.2010 the WRC  informed  the  respondent  that  it
would conduct an inspection for D.El.Ed. course  for  the  academic  session
2010-11 on a  date  between  21.5.2010  to  30.5.2010.   The  visiting  team
carried out the inspection and submitted its report to  the  WRC  which,  in
its 136th meeting held on 5-7.6.2010, decided to issue a show  cause  notice
under Section 14(3)(b) of the National Council for  Teacher  Education  Act,
1993 (for brevity ‘the 1993 Act’) and, accordingly, a show cause notice  was
issued on 19.6.2010 requiring the  respondent  to  file  its  representation
within twenty one days.  The reply to show  cause  notice  was  received  on
7.7.2010 and the WRC considered the  same  and  took  the  decision  on  20-
21.7.2010 to refuse recognition on the ground  that  the  approved  building
plan submitted by the college showed a square building with ground  and  two
floors, whereas the videograph  showed  the  building  was  rectangular  and
having ground and one floor.  The said decision was communicated vide  order
dated 3.8.2010 whereunder the WRC refused recognition in exercise  of  power
under Section 14(3)(b) of the 1993 Act.

7.    As the factual matrix further gets unfolded, the respondent  preferred
an appeal on 29.9.2010 under Section 18 of the 1993 Act  and  the  appellate
authority by order dated 10.11.2010 opined as follows: -

                 “AND WHEREAS Shri Vivek  Gupta,  President,  Venus  Public
           Education Society, Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh presented the case of
           the appellant institution on  20.10.2010.   In  the  appeal  and
           during personal presentation, it was submitted  that  there  was
           not  at  all  any  mismatch  between  the  approved   plan   and
           videography.  The  building  with  Ground  and  two  floors  was
           constructed in the same shape according  to  the  building  plan
           which was  also  proved  by  the  completion  certificate.   The
           similarity was  also  proved  with  the  relevant  clip  of  the
           videography which was submitted wherein the building was visible
           with ground and two floors with the visiting team.  The position
           of the existing building with ground plus two  floors  was  also
           proved by the photographs of the building taken  from  different
           angles.  The ground taken by  the  WRC  that  the  building  was
           square and rectangular was an after thought  which  was  totally
           unlawful.  The WRC did not communicate such  type  of  objection
           earlier.  The building was more than sufficient and fulfills the
           norms and standards of the NCTE.

                 AND WHEREAS the Council noted that the VT report  did  not
           indicate the dimensions of the rooms as well as the total  built
           up area available for the proposed course.  The report also  did
           not contain an essential data sheet  in  which  the  particulars
           with regard to land and built up area details are to be  filled.
           It merely stated the infrastructural facilities were as per  the
           NCTE norms.  Further the photographs annexed with the appeal  do
           not confirm to the VCD available in the WRC’s file.  In view  of
           this the Council came to the conclusion that  an  inspection  of
           the institution may be conducted by the NCTE Hqrs. for taking  a
           final decision in the appeal.”

      On the basis of the aforesaid  order  a  team  was  constituted  which
submitted the report and eventually, after perusal of the report, the  NCTE,
on 11.3.2011, passed the following order: -

                 “AND WHEREAS the Council noting that  the  report  of  the
           visiting team from the Hqrs. of the Council  has  clarified  the
           position, came to the conclusion that the appeal deserves to  be
           accepted and the order of the WRC reversed with a  direction  to
           process the case further on merits.

                 AND WHEREAS after  perusal  of  documents,  memorandum  of
           appeal, affidavit and after considering oral arguments  advanced
           during the hearing, the  Council  reached  the  conclusion  that
           there was adequate ground to accept the appeal and  reverse  the
           WRC’s order dated 03.08.2010 with the direction to  the  WRC  to
           process the case further on merits.  Accordingly, the appeal was
           accepted and the order of the WRC dated 03.08.2010 reversed.”

8.    After the appeal was disposed of, the  WRC  decided  to  constitute  a
visiting team.  In the meantime the respondent preferred Writ  Petition  No.
4541 of 2011 for issue of writ of mandamus to the NCTE to grant  recognition
for the academic session 2010-11 for D.El.Ed. course.  During  the  pendency
of the writ petition, on  22.7.2011  the  WRC  decided  to  conduct  further
inspection between 22.7.2011 to 30.7.2011.  The inspecting team visited  the
respondent institution on 27.7.2011 and submitted its  report  to  the  WRC.
The report indicated that a functionary of the Society told  the  team  that
as the matter was subjudice, the WRC had no authority to inspect.   However,
the team went to the institution  and  took  photographs  of  the  building.
When the matter came up before  the  High  Court  on  28.7.2011,  it,  after
narrating the chronological events and the order  passed  by  the  appellate
authority, issued the following directions: -

           “(i)  That the decision of the Respondent No. 1  for  inspection
                 of the petitioner institution vide letter  dated  22.7.2011
                 is hereby quashed;

             ii) The respondent is directed to  consider  the  case  of  the
                 petitioner for grant of recognition in accordance with  the
                 order passed by Appellate Authority dated 11.3.2011.

            iii) The case of the petitioner shall be considered for grant of
                 recognition within a period of two weeks from the  date  of
                 receipt of a copy of this order.”

9.    As the order was not complied with within  the  stipulated  time,  the
respondent preferred Writ  Petition  No.  5776  of  2011.   The  High  Court
disposed of the same by observing that the grievance of the  petitioner  was
that in spite  of  direction  issued  by  the  court  in  the  earlier  writ
petition, the respondents had yet not complied with the  direction  and  for
the aforesaid purpose, the petitioner was at  liberty  to  file  a  contempt
petition.  The High Court further observed that it  was  expected  that  the
respondents shall obey the direction issued by  the  court  in  W.P.  C  No.
4541/2011.

10.   As is perceptible, the WRC in its 154th meeting held  on  11-12.9.2011
considered the matter and vide order dated 22.9.2011  issued  a  “letter  of
intent” for grant of recognition for D.El.Ed. course under  clause  7(9)  of
National Council for Teacher Education (Recognition,  Norms  and  Procedure)
Regulations, 2009 (for short “2009 Regulations”).  The relevant part of  the
said letter of intent reads as follows: -

           “3.   Before grant of formal recognition under Regulation  7(11)
           of the NCTE Regulations 2009, is considered, you  are  requested
           to submit the following:

              i) The institution shall initiate the process of  appointments
                 of qualified staff as per Policy  of  State  Government  or
                 University Grants Commission or University and ensure  that
                 the staff or faculty is appointed as  per  the  NCTE  norms
                 within two months.  (in case of  M.Ed.  six  months).   The
                 Institute shall submit the list of faculty as  approved  by
                 the affiliating body to the Western Regional Committee.  An
                 affidavit on the enclosed format of  Rs.100/-  Non-Judicial
                 Stamp Paper from each faculty member appointed  are  to  be
                 submitted.

             ii)  The  institute  shall  launch  its  own  website  covering
                 interalia, the details of the  institution,  its  location,
                 name of the course applied for with intake, availability of
                 physical infrastructural  (land,  building,  office,  class
                 rooms  and  other  facilities/amenities),   infrastructural
                 facilities  (laboratory,  photographs,  Permanent   Account
                 Number (PAN) or Unique Identity Number (UIN) of the teacher
                 educator whenever issued by the NCTE), for  information  of
                 all concerned.  The institution shall also  make  available
                 on its website information relating to:

                    i. Sanctioned programmes along with annual intake in the
                       institution.

                 j. Name of faculty and staff in full as mentioned in school
                    certificate along with their qualification, scale of pay
                    and photograph.

                 k. Name of faculty Members who left or  joined  during  the
                    last quarter.

                 l. Names of students admitted during  the  current  session
                    alongwith qualification,  percentage  of  marks  in  the
                    qualifying examination and in the entrance test, if any,
                    date of admission etc.

                 m. Fee charged from students

                 n. Facilities added during the last summer.

                 o. Number of books in the library, journals  subscribed  to
                    and addition, if any, in the last quarter.

                 p.  The  institution  shall  be  free  to  post  additional
                    relevant information, if it so desires.

            iii) The institution shall submit FDR of  Rs.500  Lakhs  towards
                 Endowment Fund and Rs.300 Lakhs towards reserve fund in the
                 joint name of authorised representative of  the  management
                 and the Regional Director,  WRC,  NCTE and the  same  shall
                 be maintained perpetually by way of renewal of FDR’s at the
                 intervals of every five years.  The FDRs submitted  by  the
                 institution are returned  herewith  for  conversion/renewal
                 (this time to be added in case FDRs are not in the office).

              4. Any wrong or incomplete information on website shall render
                 the institution liable for withdrawal of recognition, under
                 the Act of NCTE.

              5. Admission should not be made until formal recognition order
                 under Clause 7(11) of  the  NCTE  (Recognition,  Norms  and
                 Procedures) Regulation, 2009 is issued by Western  Regional
                 Committee,  NCTE  and  affiliation  is  obtained  from  the
                 University/examining body concerned.

              6. You are advised to  comply  the  above  requirement  before
                 formal recognition is considered under regulation 7(11)  of
                 NCTE (Recognition, Norms and Procedures)  Regulation,  2009
                 under section 14(3)(a) of the Act.”

                                                         [emphasis supplied]

11.   Be it noted,  in  the  meantime  the  respondent  had  filed  Contempt
Petition No. 677 of 2011 for non-compliance of order dated 28.7.2011  passed
in Writ Petition No. 4541 of 2011.  On 28.9.2011 a submission was put  forth
that as the court had  decided  to  grant  recognition  to  the  respondent-
institution, an interim direction should be issued  to  admit  the  students
for D.Ed. course because after 30.9.2011 it would not be able to  admit  the
students.  The High Court, dealing  with  the  said  submission,  opined  as
follows: -

                 “In our opinion, no such interim direction can  be  issued
           in favour of the petitioner vide clause 3  of  the  letter,  the
           petitioner has been directed to submit certain  information  and
           documents and that has to be verified by the NCTE.  Even  apart,
           in a contempt matter, by way  of  interim  direction,  a  relief
           could  not  be  granted.   However,  we  observe  that  if   the
           petitioner is eligible, the authority shall consider the case of
           the petitioner on 30th September, 2011.”

12.   It is worthy to note that the WRC was to file the reply  within  three
weeks.  During  the  pendency  of  the  contempt  petition,  the  respondent
preferred Writ Petition No. 6674  of  2011  for  grant  of  recognition  for
academic session 2011-12 for D.El.Ed. course.  The High  Court,  vide  order
dated 30.9.2011, directed  the  Regional  Director  of  the  WRC  to  remain
present and explain as to why the decision had not been taken in  regard  to
grant of recognition of the respondent institution.  As  is  perceived,  the
WRC vide order  dated  27.10.2011  issued  an  order  of  recognition.   The
relevant portion of the same is reproduced hereinbelow: -

           “4.   .......the institution is required to comply with all post-
           recognition conditions enumerated from clause 8 (11)  to  Clause
           8(16) of NCTE (Recognition, Norms  and  Procedures)  Regulations
           2009.

           6.    The institution shall make admission only after it obtains
           affiliation from the examining body in terms of clause 8(12)  of
           the NCTE (Recognition Norms and Procedures) Regulation, 2009 for
           the academic session .........

           7.    The institution/permission will operate for  2012-13  only
           if the requirement of  200  teaching  days  in  the  session  is
           fulfilled as per calendar of the university/affiliating body.”

                                                         [emphasis supplied]

13.   Being grieved by the aforesaid order  the  respondent  preferred  Writ
Petition No. 7664 of 2011 with  a  prayer  to  command  the  NCTE  to  grant
recognition from the academic session 2011-12  for  D.El.Ed.  course  or  to
treat the recognition dated 27.10.2011  for  the  academic  session  2011-12
instead of 2012-13.  The High Court dealt with the said writ petition  along
with the contempt petition and, after referring to its earlier order  passed
in Writ Petition No. 4541 of 2011, the chronology of events,  the  issue  of
“letter of intent” and eventual grant of recognition, concluded as under: -

           “8.   In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the petitioner
           is entitled to have recognition for the academic session 2011-12
           also because the case of the petitioner was pending  before  the
           Western Regional Committee and in pursuance to the directions of
           the  Court  dated  28.07.2010  passed  in  writ   petition   No.
           4541/2010, it was obligatory on the part of the  respondents  to
           include the claim of the petitioner  for  recognition  from  the
           academic session 2011-12 also.  In our opinion, the  respondents
           have deliberately not included the same due to pendency  of  the
           Contempt Proceeding and other proceedings.”

14.   After so stating the Bench disposed of the contempt petition  and  the
writ petition by directing that in the recognition  order  dated  27.10.2011
it shall be added that the institution was entitled for recognition for  the
D.El.Ed. course with an annual intake of 50 students  for  academic  session
2011-12 also.  The said order  is  the  subject-matter  of  assail  in  this
appeal.

15.   The thrust of the matter is whether the High  Court  by  the  impugned
order passed on 7.12.2011 could have issued a direction as has  been  stated
hereinabove.


16.   It is  submitted  by  Mr.  Amitesh  Kumar,  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants that the order of recognition passed in favour of the  respondent
was conditional and there was a clear stipulation that admission should  not
be made until formal recognition under clause 7(11) of the 2009  regulations
is  issued   by   the   WRC   and   affiliation   is   obtained   from   the
University/examining body.  That  apart,  the  order  of  recognition  dated
27.10.2011  clearly  laid  a  postulate  that  the  institution  shall  make
admission only after it obtains  affiliation  from  the  examining  body  in
terms of clause 8(12) of 2009 Regulations  for  the  academic  session  and,
therefore, the High Court has fallen into  error  by  holding  that  it  was
obligatory on the part of the NCTE to include the aim of the respondent  for
recognition  for  the  academic  session  2011-12  as  the  same   was   not
deliberately done.  The learned counsel would submit the direction given  by
the High Court that  the  institution  was  entitled  for  recognition  with
annual intake of 50  students  for  academic  session  of  2011-12  also  is
legally impermissible inasmuch as the  institution  had  not  fulfilled  the
NCTE  norms  and  further  the  recognition  could  not   have   been   made
retrospectively effective.


17.   Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the  respondents,  per
contra, would contend that the WRC had acted mala fide in  constituting  the
inspection team and after the High Court quashed the same it was  obligatory
on its part to confer recognition without any delay.   It  is  canvassed  by
him that the appellant under the circumstances was compelled  to  admit  the
students and, therefore,  the  students  who  have  been  admitted  for  the
academic session 2010-11 should be allowed to undertake the examinations  in
respect of added intake  seats  as  directed  by  the  High  Court.   It  is
vehemently proponed by him that the educational institutions  cannot  remain
at the total mercy of the WRC and such an attitude on the part  of  the  WRC
is likely to lead to anarchy and a state of uncertainty which would  corrode
the financial backbone of the educational  societies  that  are  devoted  to
imparting education.  It is also urged by him that such  a  situation  would
smother the legitimate expectations of the students.


18.   Mrs. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned  counsel  appearing  for  respondent
No. 2,  M.P.  Board  of  Secondary  Education,  has  contended  that  it  is
obligatory on the part  of  the  Board  to  verify  whether  an  educational
institution has obtained recognition from the NCTE and affiliation from  the
Board and then only the said institution can admit the students, but in  the
case at hand as the respondent No.  1  has  admitted  the  students  without
recognition and affiliation, they cannot  be  permitted  to  appear  in  the
examination and conferment of such privilege would destroy  the  fundamental
fibre of the education system.

19.   At this juncture, we may fruitfully refer to Section 14  of  the  1993
Act  which  deals  with  recognition  of  institutions  offering  course  or
training in teacher education.  It reads as follows: -

          “14. Recognition of institutions offering course or  training  in
          teacher education. – (1) Every institution offering or  intending
          to offer a course or training in teacher education  on  or  after
          the appointed day, may, for grant of recognition under this  Act,
          make an application to the Regional Committee concerned  in  such
          form and in such manner as may be determined by regulations:

                 Provided that an institution offering a course or training
          in teacher education immediately before the appointed day,  shall
          be entitled to continue such course or training for a  period  of
          six months, if it has made an application for recognition  within
          the said period and until the disposal of the application by  the
          Regional Committee.

             2) The fee to be paid along with the  application  under  sub-
                section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed.

             3) On receipt of an application by the Regional Committee from
                any institution under sub-section (1), and after  obtaining
                from the institution concerned such other particulars as it
                may consider necessary, it shall –

             a) if it  is  satisfied  that  such  institution  has  adequate
                financial  resources,  accommodation,   library,   qualified
                staff, laboratory and that it fulfills such other conditions
                required for proper functioning of  the  institution  for  a
                course  or  training  in  teacher  education,  as   may   be
                determined  by   regulations,   pass   an   order   granting
                recognition to such institution, subject to such  conditions
                as may be determined by regulations; or

             b) if it is of the  opinion  that  such  institution  does  not
                fulfill the requirements laid down in sub-clause  (a),  pass
                an  order  refusing  recognition  to  such  institution  for
                reasons to be recorded in writing:

            Provided that before passing an order under sub-clause (b), the
            Regional Committee shall provide a  reasonable  opportunity  to
            the institution concerned for making a written representation.

            (4)        Every order granting or refusing recognition  to  an
            institution for a course or training in teacher education under
            sub-section (3) shall be published in the Official Gazette  and
            communicated  in  writing  for  appropriate  action   to   such
            institution and to the  concerned  examining  body,  the  local
            authority or the State Government and the Central Government.

            (5)  Every institution, in respect  of  which  recognition  has
            been refused  shall  discontinue  the  course  or  training  in
            teacher education from the end of  the  academic  session  next
            following the date of receipt of the order refusing recognition
            passed under clause (b) of sub-section (3).

            (6)  Every examining body shall, on receipt of the order  under
            sub-section (4) –

            (a)  grant affiliation to the  institution,  where  recognition
                 has been granted; or

            (b)   cancel  the  affiliation  of   the   institution,   where
                 recognition has been refused.”



20.   Section 32 of the Act empowers the council  to  make  regulations  not
inconsistent with the provisions of the  Act  and  rules  framed  thereunder
generally to carry out under the provisions of the Act.  Sub-section  (2)(d)
provides for the norms, guidelines  and  standards  in  respect  of  certain
categories of employees who are to be  employed  in  the  institution.   The
said provision reads as follows:-

        “(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality  of  the
        foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the
        following matters, namely—

        (a)      ..........

        (b)      ..........

        (c)      ..........

        (d)      the norms, guidelines and standards in respect of —

           (i)   the minimum qualifications for a person to be employed  as
                 a teacher under clause (d) of Section 12;

           (ii)  the specified category of courses or training  in  teacher
                 education under clause (e) of Section 12;

           (iii)       starting of new courses or  training  in  recognised
                 institutions under clause (f) of Section 12;

           (iv)  standards in respect of examinations  leading  to  teacher
                 education qualifications  referred  to  in  clause  (g)  of
                 Section 12;

           (v)   the tuition fees and other fees chargeable by  institution
                 under clause (h) of Section 12;

           (vi)  the schemes for various levels of teachers education,  and
                 identification  of  institutions   for   offering   teacher
                 development programmes under clause (l) of Section 12;”


21.   It is apt to note that in exercise of the aforesaid  power,  the  NCTE
has, from time to time, framed certain regulations.  Initially,  regulations
were framed in the year 1995.  Thereafter  in  2002,  2005,  2007,  and  the
latest one in 2009 have been framed.

22.   The lis in the present case is governed by 2009  Regulations.   Clause
5(5) of 2009 Regulations provides as follows: -

           “5(5) All applications received on-line on or  before  the  31st
           day of the October of the year shall be processed for  the  next
           academic session and final decision, either recognition  granted
           or refused, shall be communicated to the applicant on or  before
           the 15th day of May of the succeeding year.”



23.   On a perusal of the said Regulation, it is  clear  as  noon  day  that
recognition can only be granted for the next academic  session.   Regulation
7(9) provides for issue of “letter of intent”.  The said  regulation  is  as
follows: -

           “7(9) The Institution concerned  shall  be  informed  through  a
           letter  of  intent,  regarding  the  decision   for   grant   of
           recognition or permission subject to  appointment  of  qualified
           faculty members before the commencement of the academic session.
            The letter of intent issued under  this  clause  shall  not  be
           notified in the Gazette but would be sent to the Institution and
           the affiliating body  with  the  request  that  the  process  of
           appointment of qualified staff as per policy of State  Govt.  or
           University Grants Commission or University may be initiated  and
           the Institution may be provided all assistance  to  ensure  that
           the staff or faculty is appointed as per  National  Council  for
           Teacher Education Norms  within  two  months.   The  Institution
           shall submit the  list  of  the  faculty,  as  approved  by  the
           affiliating Body, to the Regional Committee.”



24.   Regulation 7(9) stipulates what the  institution  is  required  to  do
after receipt of the “letter of  intent”.   Regulation  7(11)  of  the  2009
Regulations provides when a formal order of recognition  is  to  be  issued.
The said Regulation is as follows: -

           “7(11)      The  institution  concerned,  after  appointing  the
           requisite faculty  or  staff  as  per  the  provisions  of  sub-
           regulation (9) and after fulfilling the  conditions  under  sub-
           regulation (10), shall formally inform  the  Regional  Committee
           concerned that the faculty has been appointed  as  per  National
           Council for Teacher Education Norms and has been approved by the
           affiliating  body.   The  letter  granting  approval   for   the
           selection or appointment of faculty shall also  be  provided  by
           the institution to the  Regional  Committee  with  the  document
           establishing that the Fixed Deposit Receipt  of  Endowment  Fund
           and Reserve Fund have been converted into a joint account.   The
           Regional Committee concerned shall then issue a formal order  of
           recognition which shall be notified  as  per  provision  of  the
           National Council for Teacher Education Act.”

                                                            [emphasis added]



25.   Regulations 8(1) and 8(12) of the 2009  Regulations  which  deal  with
norms and standards being in a composite compartment  are  quoted  below:  -


           “8(1) An institution must fulfill all the prescribed  conditions
           pertaining to norms and  standards  as  prescribed  by  National
           Council for Teacher Education for conducting course or  training
           in teacher education.  These norms, inter-alia, cover conditions
           relating  to  financial   resources,   accommodation,   library,
           laboratory,  other  physical  infrastructure,  qualified   staff
           including teaching and non-teaching personnel etc.

           (12)  The University or Examining Body shall  grant  affiliation
           only after issue of the  formal  recognition  order  under  sub-
           regulation (11) of Regulation 7 of these Regulations.   Further,
           admissions  by  the  institution  shall  be  made   only   after
           affiliation by the University or Affiliating body and as per the
           State policy.”

                                                         [emphasis supplied]



26.   On a keen scrutiny of Section 14 and the aforesaid Regulations  it  is
vivid that the university or examining body is required to issue  letter  of
affiliation  after  formal  recognition   under   sub-regulation   (11)   of
Regulation 7 of the 2009 Regulations is  issued.   It  is  also  clear  that
certain obligations are to be carried out by the  institution  after  letter
of intent is received.  It is clear as a cloudless sky that  the  letter  of
intent was communicated to the institution as well  as  to  the  affiliating
body with a request that the process of appointment of  qualified  staff  as
per the policy of the State Government or University  Grants  Commission  or
university may  be  initiated  and  the  institution  may  be  provided  all
assistance to ensure that the staff or  faculty  is  appointed  as  per  the
norms of the NCTE within two months.  It was obligatory on the part  of  the
institution  to  submit  the  list  of  the  faculty,  as  approved  by  the
affiliating body, to the Regional Committee.  Thus  understood,  the  letter
of intent laid down the  conditions  which  were  to  be  fulfilled  by  the
institution.  The said letter was issued on 22.9.2011 and the  formal  order
of recognition was issued on 27.10.2011.   Clause  6  of  the  same  clearly
stipulates that the institution shall make admission only after  it  obtains
its affiliation from the examining body in terms  of  clause  8(12)  of  the
2009 Regulations.  Clause 8(12),  which  has  been  reproduced  hereinabove,
clearly lays a postulate that the university or  the  examining  body  shall
grant affiliation only after issue of formal recognition  order  under  sub-
clause (11) of Regulation 7 and thereafter the institution  shall  make  the
admissions.

27.   In Chairman,  Bhartia  Education  Society  and  another  v.  State  of
Himachal Pradesh and others[7] this Court in the context of 1993  Act  after
drawing a distinction between “recognition” and “affiliation”  proceeded  to
state as follows: -
           “The examining body can therefore impose its own requirements in
           regard to eligibility of students for admission to a  course  in
           addition to those prescribed by NCTE. The State  Government  and
           the examining body may also regulate the manner  of  admissions.
           As a consequence, if there is any irregularity in admissions  or
           violation  of  the  eligibility  criteria  prescribed   by   the
           examining body or any irregularity with reference to any of  the
           matters regulated  and  governed  by  the  examining  body,  the
           examining body may cancel the affiliation  irrespective  of  the
           fact that the institution continues to enjoy the recognition  of
           NCTE. Sub-section (6) of Section 14 cannot be interpreted  in  a
           manner so as to make the process of  affiliation,  an  automatic
           rubber-stamping consequent upon recognition, without any kind of
           discretion  in  the  examining  body  to  examine  whether   the
           institution deserves affiliation  or  not,  independent  of  the
           recognition. An institution requires the recognition of NCTE  as
           well as affiliation with the examining body, before it can offer
           a course or training in teacher education or admit  students  to
           such course or training.”


28.   In Shri Morvi Sarvajanik Kelavni Mandal Sachalit MSKM BEd  College  v.
National Council for Teachers’ Education and others[8]  a  two-Judge  Bench,
after referring to the decisions in N.M.  Nageshwaramma  (supra),  State  of
T.N. v. St. Joseph Teachers Training Institute[9], Vikas  Sahebrao  Roundale
(supra) and Bhartiya Education Society case (supra), eventually opined  that
there was no justification to strike a discordant note.

29.   In Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya (supra) this  Court,  after  referring
to Sections 12, 14 to 16, 17, 17-A, 18, 20, 29  and  32  of  the  1993  Act,
Regulations 3, 5, 7 and 8 of the 2005 Regulations and further  referring  to
paras 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the  amended  Regulations  made  by
notification dated 12.7.2006, has categorically laid down thus:-

           “What needs to be emphasised is that  no  recognition/permission
           can be granted to any institution desirous of conducting teacher
           training course unless the  mandatory  conditions  enshrined  in
           Sections 14(3) or  15(3)  read  with  the  relevant  clauses  of
           Regulations 7 and 8 are  fulfilled  and  that  in  view  of  the
           negative mandate contained in Section 17-A read with  Regulation
           8(10), no institution  can  admit  any  student  unless  it  has
           obtained unconditional recognition from the  Regional  Committee
           and affiliation from the examining body.”

30.   After laying down the aforesaid principle the Bench proceeded to  deal
with  the  cases  of  students  who  had  taken  admission  in  unrecognized
educational institutions.  The question posed by the Bench is as follows: -

           “The question which remains to be  considered  is,  whether  the
           students who had taken admission in unrecognised institutions or
           the institutions which had not been granted affiliation  by  the
           examining body have the right to appear in the  examination  and
           whether the Court can issue a mandamus for  declaration  of  the
           result of such students simply  because  they  were  allowed  to
           provisionally appear in the examination in compliance  with  the
           interim orders passed by the High Court and/or  this  Court.  An
           ancillary  question,  which  would  require  consideration   is,
           whether the students who had not completed  the  requirement  of
           minimum teaching days were entitled to appear in the examination
           and a direction can be given for declaration of their result.”

31.    Thereafter,  the  Bench  referred  to  the  pronouncements  in   A.P.
Christian  Medical  Educational  Society  v.   Govt.   of   A.P.[10],   N.M.
Nageshwaramma (supra),  Vikas  Sahebrao  Roundale  (supra)  and  St.  John’s
Teachers Training Institute (for Women) (supra) and eventually recorded  its
conclusions in paragraph 87  by  reiterating  certain  conclusions  some  of
which are apposite to be reproduced regard being had to the  fact  situation
of the present case: -


           “87.  ................

           (iv) The recognition granted by the  Regional  Committees  under
           Section 14(3)(a) of the 1993 Act read with Regulations 7  and  8
           of the Regulations and permission granted under Section 15(3)(a)
           read with the relevant Regulations shall  operate  prospectively
           i.e. from the date of communication of the order of  recognition
           or permission, as the case may be.

                       xxx        xxx        xxx

           (x) In view of the mandate of Section 16, no examining body,  as
           defined in Section 2(d) of the 1993 Act, shall grant affiliation
           unless the applicant has obtained recognition from the  Regional
           Committee under Section 14 or  permission  for  starting  a  new
           course or training under Section 15.

           (xi) While granting affiliation, the  examining  body  shall  be
           free to demand rigorous compliance with the conditions contained
           in the statute like the University Act or  the  State  Education
           Board Act under which it was established or the guidelines/norms
           which may have been laid down by the examining body concerned.

           (xii) No institution  shall  admit  any  student  to  a  teacher
           training course or programme unless it has obtained  recognition
           under Section 14 or permission under Section 15, as the case may
           be.

           (xiii) While making admissions, every recognised institution  is
           duty-bound to strictly adhere to Paras 3.1 to 3.3 of  the  Norms
           and  Standards  for   Secondary/Pre-School   Teacher   Education
           Programme contained in Appendix 1 to the Regulations.

           (xiv) ..........

           (xv) The  students  admitted  by  unrecognised  institution  and
           institutions which are not affiliated to any examining body  are
           not entitled to appear  in  the  examination  conducted  by  the
           examining body or any other authorised agency.”


                                                         [emphasis supplied]


32.   The direction contained in paragraph 88(ii), being  relevant  for  the
present purpose, is reproduced hereinbelow: -

           “(ii) The result of the students  admitted  by  an  unrecognised
           institution or by an institution  which  had  not  been  granted
           affiliation by the examining body shall  not  be  declared.  The
           result of the students who were admitted without qualifying  the
           entrance examination shall also not be declared. In other words,
           the students admitted by the private institutions on  their  own
           shall not be entitled to declaration of  their  result.  If  any
           private institution had not complied with  the  requirements  of
           completing the prescribed training, then the result of  students
           of such institution shall also not be declared.”
                                                       [underlining is ours]

33.   On a studied  scrutiny  of  the  statutory  provisions,  the  relevant
Regulations of 2009 Regulations framed under section 32 of the 1993 Act  and
the pronouncements in the field, we are disposed  to  think  that  the  High
Court has clearly erred in misconstruing its earlier order  passed  in  Writ
Petition 4541 of 2011.  True it is, there was  some  delay  and,  therefore,
the High Court was moved  in  another  writ  petition  wherein  the  it  had
granted liberty to file a contempt petition expecting  that  the  directions
in the earlier order  would  be  duly  complied  with.   Thereafter,  as  is
manifest, letter of  intent  was  issued  but  the  institution  instead  of
complying with the same moved the High Court for grant of  recognition.   As
has been stated earlier, the High Court in the initial  order  had  directed
to consider the case of the respondent-institution for grant of  recognition
without further inspection.  Issuance of  letter  of  intent  was  necessary
prior to grant of formal letter of recognition.   However,  the  High  Court
being moved directed for issuance of formal letter of recognition which  was
issued with a postulate that the  institution  shall  only  grant  admission
after obtaining affiliation from the  examining  body  in  terms  of  clause
8(12) of 2009 Regulations.  The order of recognition clearly mentioned  that
it was meant for the academic session 2012-13.

34.   Adjudged in the aforesaid perspective the High Court  could  not  have
directed the recognition to be  retrospectively  operative  because  certain
formalities remained to be complied with.  It could not have put  the  clock
back.  It needs no special emphasis to state that the  High  Court  did  not
keep itself alive to the conceptual difference between  “letter  of  intent”
and “formal recognition”.  True it is, there was delay but  that  could  not
have enabled the High Court to issue a writ for treating the recognition  to
be effective for the year 2011-12  with  intake  of  fifty  students.   That
apart, the respondent-institution had  not  obtained  affiliation  from  the
university.  Therefore, the direction of the High Court is contrary  to  the
provisions of law and the interpretation of  the  Act  and  the  Regulations
made by this Court and, accordingly we are compelled to set aside the  same,
and we so direct.

35.   Now, to the last plank of submission of the learned  counsel  for  the
appellant.  It is  urged  by  him  that  the  NCTE  had  procrastinated  its
decision at every stage and such delay was deliberate  and,  therefore,  the
society was compelled to admit the students  and  impart  education,  regard
being had to the fact that there were  really  no  deficiencies.     As  has
been  laid  down  in  many  a  pronouncement  of  this  Court  that  without
recognition from the NCTE  and  affiliation  from  the  university/examining
body,  the  educational  institution  cannot   admit   the   students.    An
educational institution is expected to be aware of the  law.   The  students
who take admission are not young in age.   They  are  graduates.   They  are
expected  to  enquire  whether   the   institution   has   recognition   and
affiliation.  If we allow ourselves to say so,  the  institution  had  given
admission in a nonchalant manner.   Possibly,  its  functionaries  harboured
the idea that they had incomparable fertile  mind.   The  students  who  had
taken admission possibly immersed with the idea that ignorance is  a  bliss.
 It is also  necessary  to  state  that  the  institution  had  the  anxious
enthusiasm to commercialize education and earn money forgetting  the  factum
that  such  an  attitude  leads  to  a  disaster.   The  students  exhibited
tremendous anxiety to get a degree without bothering for  a  moment  whether
their effort, if any, had the sanctity of law.  Such  attitudes  only  bring
nemesis.  It would not be wrong to say that this is not  a  case  which  put
the institution or the students to choose between Scylla and charybdis.   On
the contrary, both of them were expected to be Argus-eyed.  The basic  motto
should have been “transparency”.  Unfortunately,  the  institution  betrayed
the trust of the students and  the  students,  in  a  way,  atrophied  their
intelligence.   The  institution  decidedly  exhibited  characteristics   of
carelessness.  It seems that they had forgotten that  they  are  accountable
to law.  The students, while  thinking  “vision  of  hope”,  chose  to  play
possum.  The law does not countenance either of the ideas.  Hence, the  plea
propounded  with  anxiety,  vehemence  and  desperation  on  behalf  of  the
appellant is not acceptable and, accordingly  we  unhesitatingly  repel  the
same.

36.   Before parting with the case, we are obliged to state  that  the  NCTE
should have acted in quite promptitude, for a statutory authority  which  is
conferred with the power, is required to act within the  parameters  of  law
and the directions given by the court and further not to  create  a  feeling
among the educational institutions  that  they  are  harassed.   This  Court
expects that the NCTE shall function with propriety regard being had to  the
statutory responsibility bestowed on it  by  the  Parliament.   Its  actions
neither should show arbitrariness nor  should  it  reflect  any  indulgence.
Objectivity, reliability and trust are to be the motto of the NCTE  and  the
committees working under it.  We say no more on this score.

37.   In view of our aforesaid premised reasons, the appeal is allowed,  the
order passed by the High Court  is  set  aside  and  that  of  the  NCTE  is
restored.  There shall be no order as to costs.



                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]



                                                             ……………………………….J.
New Delhi;                               [Dipak Misra]
November 01, 2012.
-----------------------
[1]    (1974) 1 SCC 717
[2]    (1989) 1 SCC 392
[3]    (1992) 4 SCC 435
[4]    (1993) 3 SCC 595
[5]    1986 Supp SCC 166
[6]     (2012) 2 SCC 425
[7]    (2011) 4 SCC 527
[8]    (2012) 2 SCC 16
[9]    (1991) 3 SCC 87

[10]   (1986) 2 SCC 667


-----------------------
32





Wednesday, October 31, 2012

whether removing tin sheets and making cement slab amounts to permanent construction or not – the lower court correctly held that it amounts to permanent constructions , where as High court negatived the same, where as the Apex court set aside the High court order and confirm the Lower court order



                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  7710  OF 2012
                 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.4629 of 2008)

Purushottam Das Bangur & Ors.   …Appellants
      Versus
Dayanand Gupta                  …Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T
1.      Leave granted.
2.      This appeal arises out of a judgment and order passed  by  the  High
Court of Calcutta whereby Civil First Appeal No.290 of  1986  filed  by  the
respondent-tenant has been allowed, the judgment and decree  passed  by  the
trial Court set aside and the suit for  eviction  filed  by  the  plaintiff-
appellant against the defendant-respondent dismissed.
3.      A residential premise comprising two rooms with  a  gallery  situate
at the first floor bearing no.95-A, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta and  owned
by Gauri Devi Trust of which the appellants are trustees was let out to  the
respondent-tenant on a monthly rental of Rs.225/-.  One  of  the  conditions
that governed the jural  relationship  between  the  parties  was  that  the
tenant shall not make any  additions  or  alterations  in  the  premises  in
question without obtaining the prior permission of the landlord in  writing.
Certain differences appear to have arisen between the  parties  with  regard
to the mode of payment of rent as also with regard to repairs, sanitary  and
hygiene  conditions  in  the  tenanted  property  which  led  the  landlord-
appellant to terminate the tenancy  of  respondent  in  terms  of  a  notice
served upon the latter under Section 106 of the  Transfer  of  Property  Act
read with Section 13 (6) of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,  1956.   Since
the respondent-tenant did not oblige,  the  plaintiff-appellant   instituted
Ejectment Suit No.391 of 1976 in the City Civil  Court  at  Calcutta  asking
for eviction of the former inter alia on the ground that respondent-  tenant
had illegally and unauthorisedly removed the corrugated  tin-sheet  roof  of
the kitchen and the  store  room  without  the  consent  of  the  appellant-
landlord and replaced  the  same  by  a  cement  concrete  slab  apart  from
building a permanent brick and mortar passage which did not  exist  earlier.
These additions and alterations were, according to the  plaintiff-appellant,
without the consent and permission of the Trust and,  hence,  violative  not
only of the provisions of clauses (m), (o) and (p) of  Section  108  of  the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 but also the  conditions  stipulated  in  the
lease agreement executed between the parties.  Eviction  of  the  respondent
was also sought on the ground that the respondent  and  his  family  members
were using the  passage  constructed  by  them  for  creating  nuisance  and
peeping into the bedroom of Shri Bharat Kumar Jethi, another  tenant  living
on the second floor of the premises.
4.      The defendant-respondent contested the suit primarily on the  ground
that his tenancy had not been terminated in terms of  the  notice  allegedly
issued by the landlord and that there was no violation of the provisions  of
clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act.   A
Court  Commissioner  deputed  by  the  trial  Court  carried  out  a   local
inspection of the suit premises on  12th  July,  1978  in  presence  of  the
parties.  The  Commissioner  formulated  five  different  points  for  local
inspection and answered the same in the report submitted to the Court.   One
of the aspects on which the  Commissioner  made  a  report  related  to  the
existence of a passage leading to the concrete roof of the kitchen  and  the
store space.  The Commissioner appears to have found that  the  kitchen  and
store space had a concrete cemented  plastered  roof  with  a  small  window
inside the kitchen.
5.      Long after the Commissioner’s report  was  submitted  to  the  trial
Court, the tenant filed an additional written statement in which he for  the
first time took the stand that although he was inducted into  the  premises,
comprising two rooms and two small rooms with  corrugated  tin-sheet  for  a
roof, the latter required replacement  on  account  of  the  tin-sheet  roof
getting worn out.  It was further submitted that it  was  only  on  repeated
demands of the defendant-tenant that the  landlord  had  replaced  the  said
corrugated tin-sheet by putting a cement concrete slab over the kitchen  and
store room. He further alleged that he  had  not  made  any  alterations  or
additions or committed any act contrary to  clauses  (m),  (o)  and  (p)  of
Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act.
6.      On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court raised as  many  as
eight issues in the suit and allowed parties to adduce  their  evidence.  In
support of his case  the  plaintiff  examined  four  witnesses  while  three
witnesses were examined by the defendant-tenant. A careful appraisal of  the
evidence so  adduced  led  the  trial  Court  to  the  conclusion  that  the
plaintiff had made out a case for the grant of a  decree  for  ejectment  of
the respondent-tenant.  The  trial  Court  in  the  process  held  that  the
removal of the tin-sheet roof over  the  kitchen  and  store  room  and  its
replacement with a concrete slab was carried out  by  the  respondent-tenant
and not by the plaintiff-trust.  In coming to that conclusion,  one  of  the
circumstances which  the  trial  Court  mentioned  was  the  fact  that  the
defendant had not made any whisper in the first written statement  filed  by
him about the construction of the concrete roof having  been  undertaken  by
the landlord.  The story that the landlord had replaced the tin  roof  by  a
concrete slab was propounded  belatedly  and  for  the  first  time  in  the
supplementary written statement. The trial Court observed:
         “Lastly, it must not be lost sight of that when the defendant first
         filed the written statement there was no whisper from the  side  of
         the defendant that the construction was made by  the  landlord  for
         the convenience of the tenants.  This story was first propounded by
         the convenience of the tenants.  This story was first propounded by
         the defendant by filing an additional  written  statement  in  1983
         i.e. about seven years after the institution  of  the  suit.   This
         belated plea of the defendant should be taken  with  the  grain  of
         salt.”


7.      The trial Court accordingly held that it  was  the  defendant-tenant
who had made a permanent structural change in the premises in  violation  of
the conditions stipulated in the  lease  agreement  and  in  breach  of  the
provisions of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act.  The trial  Court
further held that the tenant had not, while doing so, obtained  the  written
consent of the landlord.  The trial Court also found that the  legal  notice
for determining the tenancy of the respondent-tenant had  been  served  upon
him and accordingly decreed the suit.
8.      Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed against him, the tenant-
respondent herein appealed to the High Court of Calcutta  which  appeal  has
been allowed by the Division Bench of that  Court  in  terms  of  the  Order
impugned before us. While the High Court has not disturbed  the  finding  of
fact recorded by the trial Court that the replacement of the tin-sheet by  a
concrete slab was undertaken by the respondent-tenant, it has  reversed  the
view taken by the trial Court on the ground that  any  such  replacement  of
the roof did not tantamount to violation of clauses  (m),  (o)  and  (p)  of
Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The High Court held that  since
the replacement of the tin-sheet  roof  by  cement  concrete  slab  did  not
result in addition of the accommodation available to the tenant, the act  of
replacement  was  not  tantamount  to  the  construction  of   a   permanent
structure.  The  replacement  instead  constituted  an  improvement  of  the
premises in question, observed the High Court.  In support  the  High  Court
placed reliance upon the decisions of this  Court  in  Om  Prakash  v.  Amar
Singh  AIR 1987 SC 617 and Waryam Singh v. Baldev Singh (2003) 1 SCC 59 .
9.      The High Court also relied upon an earlier decision  of  that  Court
in Ratanlal Bansilal & Ors. v. Kishorilal Goenka & Ors.  AIR  1993  Cal  144
and held that unless a case of waste or damage is proved, there  can  be  no
violation of clauses (m), (o), (p) of the  Transfer  of  Property  Act.  The
High Court held that proof of waste and damage because of  the  construction
of a cement  concrete  roof  over  the  kitchen  and  store  space  and  the
construction of a brick-built passage for reaching the  roof  of  that  area
was completely absent in the instant case.  The High Court, on  that  basis,
set aside the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the  suit  filed  by
the appellant.
10.     Section 13 of the West Bengal  Premises  Tenancy  Act  1956,  starts
with a non-obstante clause and forbids passing of an  order  or  decree  for
possession of any premises by any  Court  in  favour  of  the  landlord  and
against the tenant except on one or more of the grounds stipulated  therein.

11.     Among other grounds stipulated in Section  13  of  the  Act  is  the
ground that the landlord can sue  for  eviction  of  the  tenant  where  the
tenant or any person residing in the premises let to  the  tenant  has  done
any act contrary to the provisions of clauses (m), (o)  or  (p)  of  Section
108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 13 (1) (b) reads thus:
         “13. Protection of  tenant  against  eviction.—(1)  Notwithstanding
         anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or  decree  for
         the recovery of possession of any premises shall  be  made  by  any
         court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on  one  or
         more of the following grounds, namely:
         (a)    *       *       *
         (b) where the tenant or any person residing in the premises let  to
         the tenant has done any act contrary to the  provisions  of  clause
         (m), clause (o) or clause (p) of Section 108  of  the  Transfer  of
         Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882);”




12.     Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of  Property
Act referred to in clause 1 (b) of Section 13 (supra) may also be  extracted
at this stage :
          “108. Rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee.—In the  absence
         of a contract or local usage to the contrary, the  lessor  and  the
         lessee of immovable property, as against one another, respectively,
         possess the rights and are subject to the liabilities mentioned  in
         the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to  the
         property leased:
         *      *       *
         (m) the lessee is bound to keep, and  on  the  termination  of  the
         lease to restore, the property in as good condition as  it  was  at
         the time when he was put in possession, subject only to the changes
         caused by reasonable wear and tear or irresistible  force,  and  to
         allow the lessor and his agents, at all reasonable times during the
         term, to enter upon the property and inspect the condition  thereof
         and give or leave notice of any defect in such condition; and, when
         such defect has been caused by any act or default on  the  part  of
         the lessee, his servants or agents, he is bound  to  make  it  good
         within three months after such notice has been given or left;


         *      *       *
         (o) the lessee may use the property and its products (if any) as  a
         person of ordinary prudence would use them if they  were  his  own;
         but he must not use, or permit another to use, the property  for  a
         purpose other than that for which it was leased, or  fell  or  sell
         timber, pull down or damage buildings belonging to the  lessor,  or
         work mines or quarries not open  when  the  lease  was  granted  or
         commit any other act which is destructive or permanently  injurious
         thereto;


         (p) he must  not,  without  the  lessor's  consent,  erect  on  the
         property  any  permanent   structure,   except   for   agricultural
         purposes;”




13.     The appellant has in the case at hand pressed  into  service  clause
(p) of Section 108 (supra) inasmuch as,  according  to  the  appellant,  the
respondent-tenant had without his consent erected on the demised property  a
permanent structure which rendered him liable to eviction under  Section  13
(1) (b) extracted above. The question, however, is whether  the  alterations
which the respondent-tenant is found  by  the  Courts  below  to  have  made
tantamount to erection of a “permanent  structure”  within  the  meaning  of
clause (p) of Section 108 of the Act  (supra).   The  expression  “permanent
structure” has not been  defined  either  under  the  West  Bengal  Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956 or in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.  The  expression
has all the same fallen for interpretation by the Courts in the  country  on
several occasions. We may briefly refer to some of those  pronouncements  at
this stage.
14.     In Venkatlal G. Pittie & Anr. v. Bright Bros. Pvt.  Ltd.  (1987)   3
SCC 558, the landlord alleged  that  the  tenant  had  without  his  consent
raised a permanent structure in the demised premises.  The  trial  Court  as
also the first appellate Court had taken  the  view  that  the  construction
raised by the tenant was permanent in  nature.   The  High  Court,  however,
reversed the said finding aggrieved whereof the landlord  came  up  to  this
Court in appeal. This Court referred to several  decisions  on  the  subject
including a decision of the High Court  of  Calcutta  in  Suraya  Properties
Private Ltd. v. Bimalendu Nath Sarkar AIR 1965 Cal  408  to  hold  that  one
shall have to look at the nature of the structure, the purpose for which  it
was intended to be used and take a whole perspective as to  how  it  affects
the enjoyment and durability of the building etc. to come  to  a  conclusion
whether or not the same was a permanent structure. This Court  approved  the
view taken in Suraya Properties Private Ltd. v. Bimalendu  Nath  Sarkar  AIR
1965 Cal 408 and Surya Properties Private Ltd.  &  Ors.  v.  Bimalendu  Nath
Sarkar & Ors. AIR 1964  Cal  1,  while  referring  to  the  following  tests
formulated by Malvankar J.  in  an  unreported  decision  in  Special  Civil
Application No.121 of 1968:
         “(1) intention of the party who put  up  the  structure;  (2)  this
         intention  was  to  be  gathered  from  the  mode  and  degree   of
         annexation; (3) if the structure cannot be  removed  without  doing
         irreparable damage to the  demised  premises  then  that  would  be
         certainly one of the circumstances to be considered while  deciding
         the question of intention. Likewise, dimensions  of  the  structure
         and (4) its removability had to be taken  into  consideration.  But
         these were not the sole tests. (5)  The  purpose  of  erecting  the
         structure is  another  relevant  factor.  (6)  The  nature  of  the
         materials used for the structure and (7) lastly the  durability  of
         the structure”.




15.     In Surya Properties Private Ltd. & Ors. v. Bimalendu Nath  Sarkar  &
Ors. AIR 1964 Cal 1 a Special Bench  of  the  High  Court  of  Calcutta  was
examining the meaning of the expression “permanent structure”  appearing  in
Clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.  The  Court
held that whether a particular structure is a permanent structure or not  is
a question that depends on the facts of each case  and  on  the  nature  and
extent of the particular structure as also the  intention  and  purpose  for
which the structure was erected. No hard and fast rule, declared the  Court,
could be laid down for determining what would be a permanent  structure  for
the purposes of Section 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act.   When  the
very same case came up for final adjudication on merits  before  a  Division
Bench of the High Court of Calcutta, the High Court in its order dated  20th
March, 1964 reported in Suraya Properties Private  Ltd.  v.  Bimalendu  Nath
Sarkar AIR 1965 Cal 408 held that the expression “permanent  structure”  did
not mean ‘everlasting’. The word “permanent” had been  used  to  distinguish
it from “temporary” and that while a lessee has the power to raise any  type
of temporary structure, he has no power to raise a permanent structure.  The
Court held that on a true  construction  of  Section  108  (p)  Transfer  of
Property Act the words “permanent structure” could  only  mean  a  structure
that lasts till the end  of  the  term  of  the  lease  and  does  not  mean
“everlasting” nor does it mean a structure which would last 100 years or  50
years.  The Court observed:
         “In  all  these  cases  condition  (p)  will  operate.  The  phrase
         “permanent structure” does not mean “ever lasting”.  But  the  word
         “permanent” has been used to distinguish  it  from  “temporary”.  A
         lessee has the power to raise any type of temporary structure,  but
         he  has  no  power  to  raise  a  permanent  structure.  The   word
         “permanent” is also a relative term, because the  absolute  meaning
         of the word “permanent” is “ever lasting”.  But  we  cannot  accept
         the meaning if  the  word  “permanent”  is  a  relative  term,  the
         question is, - relative of what?  The answer immediately is  –  for
         purposes of Section 108(p) relative  to  the  term  of  the  issue.
         Therefore, the word “permanent” means “which lasts till the end  of
         the term of the lease” and does not mean “ever lasting” nor does it
         mean “which would last 100 years or 50 years”. The term, as  stated
         above, is a relative one and the relation here is to the period  of
         the lease.  There may be a lease from month to month or  from  year
         to year and we do not know when the lease is  going  to  terminate.
         But the meaning of the words “permanent structure”  would  be  that
         the lessee intended that he  would  enjoy  the  structure  that  he
         raises as long as he be continuing in possession. That  period  may
         be definite, that period may be indefinite.  But that period is the
         period of the  lease  and  the  person,  namely,  the  lessee,  who
         constructs the structure, should have an intention  to  use  it  as
         long as he remains a lessee.”


16.     Applying the above to the case before it, the High Court  held  that
the tenant in that case had constructed a kitchen which he intended  to  use
till the time he remained in occupation.  The  Court  found  that  the  case
before it was not one where the tenant had constructed the structure  for  a
special purpose like a marriage in the family. Any structure which was  used
for any such limited period or definite event, function  or  occasion,  even
if made of bricks and mortar would not amount  to  building  or  erecting  a
permanent structure.  The Court observed:
         “A person raises a struct (sic) for the purpose of  a  marriage  in
         the family. There he intends to use it only during the occasion and
         has no intention to use it thereafter and  intends  to  remove  the
         structure thereafter. We cannot say that it would  be  a  permanent
         structure even  if  it  is  made  of  brick  and  mortar.   In  the
         circumstances, of this case, the lessee has said that he wanted  to
         use it as a kitchen.  He never says that the kitchen  was  required
         for a particular purpose temporarily.  Therefore, we get  from  the
         evidence of  the  tenant  that  the  tenant  intended  to  use  the
         structure as a kitchen during the continuance of the lease, because
         the tenant requires a kitchen  as  long  as  the  tenant  uses  the
         premises and as he wants, to use it as a kitchen,  he  sufficiently
         express his intention to use it as a kitchen during the term of his
         tenancy which in this case is not definite. Therefore, for purposes
         of Section108(p) of the Transfer of Property  Act,  we  would  hold
         that the kitchen raised must be considered to be  for  a  permanent
         purpose.”


17.     To sum up, no hard and fast rule can be prescribed  for  determining
what is permanent or what is  not.  The  use  of  the  word  ‘permanent’  in
Section 108  (p)  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act,  1882  is  meant  to
distinguish the structure from what  is  temporary.   The  term  ‘permanent’
does not mean that the structure must last forever.  A structure that  lasts
till the end of the tenancy can be treated as a  permanent  structure.   The
intention  of  the  party  putting  up  the  structure  is  important,   for
determining whether it is permanent or temporary.  The nature and extent  of
the structure is similarly an important circumstance  for  deciding  whether
the structure is permanent or temporary within the meaning  of  Section  108
(p) of the Act.  Removability of the structure without  causing  any  damage
to the building is yet another test that can be applied while  deciding  the
nature of the structure.  So also the durability of the  structure  and  the
material used for erection of the same will help  in  deciding  whether  the
structure is permanent or temporary.   Lastly  the  purpose  for  which  the
structure is intended is also an important factor that cannot be ignored.
18.     Applying the above tests to the instant case the structure  was  not
a temporary structure by any means.   The  kitchen  and  the  storage  space
forming part of the demised premises was meant to be used till  the  tenancy
in favour of the respondent-occupant subsisted.  Removal  of  the  roof  and
replacement thereof by a concrete slab was also meant to continue  till  the
tenancy subsisted. The intention of the tenant while replacing the tin  roof
with concrete slab, obviously was not to make a  temporary  arrangement  but
to provide a permanent solution for the alleged failure of the  landlord  to
repair the roof. The construction  of  the  passage  was  also  a  permanent
provision made by the tenant  which  too  was  intended  to  last  till  the
subsistence of the lease. The concrete slab was a permanent feature  of  the
demised premises and could not be easily  removed  without  doing  extensive
damage to the remaining structure.  Such being the position, the  alteration
made by the tenant fell within the  mischief  of  Section  108  (p)  of  the
Transfer of Property Act  and,  therefore,  constituted  a  ground  for  his
eviction in terms of Section 13(1)(b) of the West  Bengal  Premises  Tenancy
Act, 1956.
19.     We may at this stage refer to the decision of this  Court  in  Ranju
alias Gautam Ghosh v. Rekha Ghosh and Ors.  (2007)  14  SCC  81  where  this
Court found that cutting of a collapsible gate by  5/6”  and  replacing  the
same without the consent and permission of the landlord  was  tantamount  to
violation of Section 108 (p) of the  Transfer  of  Property  Act  read  with
Section 13 (1)(b) of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,  1956.   It  is  thus
immaterial whether the structure has resulted in creating additional  usable
space for the tenant who carries out  such  alteration  and  additions.   If
addition of usable space was ever intended to be  an  essential  requirement
under Section 108 (p) of the Act, the Parliament could have easily  provided
so. Nothing of this sort has been done even in Section 13  (1)  (b)  of  the
State Act   which clearly shows that addition of space is not the  test  for
determining whether the structure is permanent or temporary.
20.     Reliance  upon  the  decisions  of  this  Court  in  Brijendra  Nath
Bhargava and Anr. v. Harsh Wardhan and Ors. (1988) 1 SCC 454, Om Prakash  v.
Amar Singh and Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 458, Waryam Singh v. Baldev Singh (2003)  1
SCC 59 and G. Reghunathan v. K.V. Varghese (2005) 7 SCC 317 do  not  in  our
opinion advance the case of the respondent.  In  Brijendra  Nath  Bhargava’s
case (supra) this Court was dealing with a case  arising  out  of  Rajasthan
Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section  13  (1)  (c)  of
the said Act required the landlord to prove that  the  tenant  had,  without
his permission, made or permitted to be made any construction which  had  in
the opinion of the Court, materially altered the premises or was  likely  to
diminish the value thereof.  Section 13 (1)(c)  of  the  Rajasthan  Premises
(Control of Rent and Eviction)  Act,  1950   is  to  the  following  effect:

         “13(1) (c) that the  tenant  has  without  the  permission  of  the
         landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction as,  in
         the opinion of the court, has materially altered the premises or is
         likely to diminish the value thereof”


21.     The above provision is materially different from  the  provision  of
Section 13(1)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 applicable  in
the present case which does not require the landlord  to  prove  that  there
was any material alteration in the premises  or  that  such  alteration  was
likely to diminish  the  value  thereof.  The  decision  in  Brijendra  Nath
Bhargava’s case (supra), is therefore, distinguishable and  would  not  have
any application to the case at hand.
22.     In Om Prakash’s case (supra) this Court  was  dealing  with  a  case
under Section 14 (c) of the U.P. Cantonment Rent  Control  Act,  1952  which
reads as under:

           “14.  Restrictions  on  eviction.—No  suit  shall,  without   the
         permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil  court
         against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except  on
         one or more of the following grounds, namely:
         (c) that the tenant has, without the permission  of  the  landlord,
         made or permitted to be  made  any  such  construction  as  in  the
         opinion of the court has materially altered the accommodation or is
         likely substantially to diminish its value.”




23.     A perusal of the above would show the language employed  therein  is
materially different from the provision of  Section  13(1)(b)  of  the  West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 with which we are concerned in the  present
case. In the case at hand the landlord is not required  to  prove  that  the
construction have been materially altered  or  is  likely  to  diminish  its
value as was the position in Om Prakash’s case (supra).
24.     In Waryam Singh v. Baldev Singh (2003)  1  SCC  59  this  Court  was
dealing with a case under Section  13(2)(iii)  of  East  Punjab  Urban  Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 which was to the following effect:

         “13. Eviction of tenants.—(1)  *       *       *
         (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant  shall  apply  to  the
         Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after
         giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against
         the applicant, is satisfied—
         *      *       *
         (iii) that the tenant has committed such  acts  as  are  likely  to
         impair materially the value or utility of the  building  or  rented
         land,
         *      *       *”




25.     It is evident from the above that this provision was different  from
the language employed in  Section  13(1)(b)  of  the  West  Bengal  Premises
Tenancy Act 1956. The ratio of that case also, therefore, does not lend  any
support to the respondent.  Same is true even in regard to the  decision  in
G. Reghunathan’s case (supra) where this Court was dealing with an  eviction
petition under Section 11(4)(ii) of the Kerala  Buildings  (Lease  and  Rent
Control) Act, 1965 which was to the following effect:

          “11. (4) A landlord may apply to the Rent  Control  Court  for  an
         order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the
         building—
         (i)    *       *       *
         (ii) if the tenant uses the building in such a manner as to destroy
         or reduce its value or utility materially and permanently;”




26.      The  above  provision  is  also  materially  different   from   the
provisions with which we are concerned in the present  case.  The  ratio  of
that case does not, therefore, have any application to the question  whether
the structure raised by the respondent was a permanent structure within  the
meaning of Section 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act.   In Om  Pal  v.
Anand Swarup (dead) by Lrs. (1988) 4 SCC 545 also  this  Court  was  dealing
with a case under the East Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction  Act,  1949  which
makes material impairment of the property  an  important  consideration  for
purposes of determining whether the tenant has  incurred  the  liability  on
the premises leased to him.
27.     In the result, therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the  order
passed by the High Court and restore that of the  trial  Court.   Respondent
is, however, given one year’s time to vacate the premises in his  occupation
subject to his filing an undertaking on usual terms within four  weeks  from
today. The grant of time to vacate the premises is further  subject  to  the
condition that the respondent shall either pay directly  to  the  appellants
or deposit in the trial Court compensation of the premises @ Rs.1500/-  p.m.
from 1st October, 2012 till the date of vacation. The deposit shall be  made
by the 15th of every succeeding calendar  month  failing  which  the  decree
shall become executable by the Court.
                                                  ……………………………………….……….…..…J.
                                                               (T.S. Thakur)




                                                   ……………………..…………………..…..…J.
                                                          (Gyan Sudha Misra)
New Delhi
October 31, 2012

Whether the CESTAT has discretionary power under Section 129A (5) of the Customs Act, 1962 to condone the delay caused in filing the appeal under Section 129D(3) [sic, 129D(4)] of the said Act, when there was sufficient cause available to appellant for not filing it within the prescribed period before the Appellate Authority”. = Any delay in presentation of appeal under Section 129A is condonable by the Tribunal by virtue of sub-section (5) thereof. The Tribunal has been invested with the same power for consideration of the applications under Section 129D(4) if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting such application within prescribed period as the provisions relating to the appeals to the Tribunal have been made applicable to such applications. In Fairgrowth Investments Ltd.4, the question raised before this Court was whether the Special Court constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (for short, ‘1992 Act’) has power to condone the delay in filing a petition under Section 4(2) of the Act. Dealing with the said question, the Court considered various provisions of the Limitation Act, including Sections 5 and 29(2), and ultimately it was held that the provisions of the Limitation Act had no application in relation to a petition under Section 4(2) of the 1992 Act and the prescribed period was not extendable by the Court.- In light of the above discussion, we hold that it is competent for the Tribunal to invoke Section 129A(5) where an application under Section 129D(4) has not been made within the prescribed time and condone the delay in making such application if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. 21. In view of the above, the appeal must fail and it fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.


                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                    CIVIL  APPEAL NO.   7696      OF 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP (C ) No. 4356 of 2011)




        M/s Thakker Shipping P. Ltd.                      ….
        Appellant




                                   Versus






        Commissioner of Customs (General)
         ….Respondent






                                  JUDGMENT






        R.M. Lodha, J.


                Leave granted.
        2.      The High Court answered in the affirmative   the  following
        question:


                    “Whether  the  CESTAT   has  discretionary  power  under
                    Section 129A (5) of the Customs Act,  1962   to  condone
                    the delay caused in  filing  the  appeal  under  Section
                    129D(3) [sic, 129D(4)] of the said Act, when  there  was
                    sufficient cause  available to  appellant for not filing
                    it within the prescribed  period  before  the  Appellate
                    Authority”.


        3.      The facts leading to  the  present  appeal  are  these.   A
        container was intercepted by M & P Wing of Commissioner of  Customs
        (Preventive), Mumbai  on  11.01.2001.   It  was  found  to  contain
        assorted electrical and electronic goods of  foreign  origin.   The
        said goods were imported by  M/s  Qureshi  International   and  the
        cargo was cleared from Nhava Sheva.  The clearance of the goods was
        handled by  M/s Thakker Shipping P. Ltd., the  appellant,  referred
        to as the Custom  House  Agent  (‘CHA’  for  short).   On  physical
        verification, the value  of  seized  cargo  was  estimated  at  Rs.
        77,10,000/- as local market value as against the declared value  of
        Rs. 10,03,690/-.  The  importer  could  not  be  interrogated.   On
        search of  premises  of CHA, the books relating  to  import  export
        clearance were  not found for verification.  In the   statement  of
        Vijay Thakker, proprietor of the CHA, recorded  under  Section  108
        of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short, ‘the Act’), he  accepted  that
        he attended the import clearance work and introduced  the  importer
        to the overseas suppliers  and bankers for   financial  assistance;
        the  bill of entry for the clearance  of  subject  goods  had  been
        filed without proper description and correct value and he failed to
        inform the Customs Officers about the subject goods, despite having
        attended the examination of 5%   goods   prior  to  the  clearance.
        Accordingly, the inquiry officer recorded his findings.
        4.      Initially, the appellant’s CHA   licence was  placed  under
        suspension pending inquiry under  Regulation  23  of  Custom  House
        Agent Licencing Regulations, 2004   but the suspension  order   was
        set aside by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal
        (for short, ‘Tribunal’) and CHA licence was restored.  The  inquiry
        under Regulation 23, however, proceeded against the CHA on  diverse
        charges.  The Commissioner  of  Customs  (General)  Mumbai  by  his
        order  in original dated  21.07.2004 dropped  the proceedings under
        Regulation 23 by rejecting the findings of the inquiry officer.
        5.      The Committee of Chief Commissioners of Customs (for short,
        ‘the Committee’) constituted  under sub  section  (1B)  of  Section
        129A of the  Act  called  for  and  examined  the  records  of  the
        proceedings leading to order in original dated 21.07.2004 passed by
        the Commissioner of Customs  (General)  Mumbai   (for  short,  ‘the
        Commissioner’)  for  satisfying  itself  as  to  the  legality  and
        propriety of the said order.    The Committee on consideration   of
        the entire matter  directed  the  Commissioner   to  apply  to  the
        Tribunal for determination of the  following  points,  namely;  (1)
        whether taking into  consideration   the  facts  and  circumstances
        noticed in the order, the order of  the  Commissioner  was  legally
        correct and proper;   and (2)  whether by an  order  under  Section
        129B of the Act, the Tribunal should set  aside the  order  of  the
        Commissioner dropping the proceedings against the CHA.
        6.       The Commissioner, accordingly,  made an application  under
        Section 129D(4)  of the Act  before  the  Tribunal.   As  the  said
        application could not be made within the prescribed period and  was
        delayed by 10 days, an application for condonation of    delay  was
        filed with a  prayer for condonation.  The Tribunal on  28.11.2005,
        however, rejected  the application for  condonation  of  delay  and
        consequently  dismissed the appeal by the following brief order:


                 “This appeal has been filed  by the applicant  Commissioner
                 in pursuance of Order of Review passed by  a  Committee  of
                 Chief Commissioners.  In the application for condonation of
                 delay filed by the applicant  Commissioner,  a  prayer  has
                 been made for condoning delay of 10 days.  In the  case  of
                 CCEx. Mumbai vs. Azo Dye Chem-2000 (120) ELT 201  (Tri-LB),
                 Larger Bench of the Tribunal has  held  that  the  Tribunal
                 has no power to condone the delay  caused  in  filing  such
                 appeals by the Department beyond the prescribed  period  of
                 three months.  Even though  the  said  decision  was  in  a
                 central Excise case, the ratio of this decision is  equally
                 applicable to  Customs cases  since  the  legal  provisions
                 under both the enactments are similar.
                 2.  Accordingly,  following  the ratio  of  Azo   Dye  Chem
                    (Supra), we have no option but to reject the application
                    for condonation of  delay.   We  order  accordingly  and
                    consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed”.

        7.      This appeal raises the question, whether  it  is  competent
        for the Tribunal to invoke Section 129A(5)  of  the  Act  where  an
        application  under  Section  129D(4)  has  not  been  made  by  the
        Commissioner within the prescribed time and condone  the  delay  in
        making  such  application  if  it  is  satisfied  that  there   was
        sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.
        8.      Learned counsel for the appellant  submitted  that  Section
        129D(4)  of the Act was  self  contained  and  if  the  application
        contemplated therein was not made within the prescribed period, the
        Tribunal has no power or competence  to  condone  the  delay  after
        expiry of the prescribed period.  In support of  his  arguments  he
        relied upon a larger Bench decision of the Customs, Excise and Gold
        (Control) Appellate Tribunal (‘CEGAT’)  in Commissioner of  Central
        Excise v. Azo Dye Chem[1].  He also placed heavy  reliance  upon  a
        three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Commissioner of Customs
        and Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt. Ltd. and Another[2]. Learned
        counsel  for the appellant also placed reliance upon  decisions  of
        this Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.  v.  State  of
        Rajasthan and Ors.[3], Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. v.  Custodian[4]
        and UCO Bank and Anr. v. Rajinder Lal Capoor.[5]
        9.               On  the  other  hand,   Mr.  R.P.  Bhatt,  learned
        senior counsel for the respondent, supported the view of  the  High
        Court in passing the impugned order.  He submitted that the  answer
        to the question under consideration was dependent  on  construction
        of Sections 129D and 129A of the Act.
        10.      Section 129D (omitting the  parts not relevant)  reads:
                 “S.129D. -Power of  Committee  of  Chief  Commissioners  of
                 Customs or Commissioner of Customs to pass certain  orders.
                 – (1) The Committee of Chief Commissioners of Customs  may,
                 of its own motion, call for and examine the record  of  any
                 proceeding  in  which  a  Commissioner  of  Customs  as  an
                 adjudicating authority has passed  any  decision  or  order
                 under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself  as  to
                 the legality or propriety of any such decision or order and
                 may, by order, direct such Commissioner ... to apply to the
                 Appellate    Tribunal  …  for  the  determination  of  such
                 points arising out of the  decision  or  order  as  may  be
                 specified  by  the  Committee  of  Chief  Commissioners  of
                 Customs in its order;
                 … ……………………………………………………………………..
      . ….. ……………………………………………………………
      . The Committee of Chief Commissioners  of  Customs    …  shall  make
        order under sub-section (1) …. within a period of three months from
        the  date  of  communication  of  the  decision  or  order  of  the
        adjudicating authority;
      .  Where  in  pursuance  of  an  order  under  sub-section  (1)    ….
        Commissioner of Customs  makes  an  application  to  the  Appellate
        Tribunal  …. within three months from the date of communication  of
        the order under sub-section (1)  …. such application shall be heard
        by the Appellate Tribunal  …. as   if  such  applications  were  an
        appeal made against the  decision  or  order  of  the  adjudicating
        authority  and  the  provisions  of  this  Act  regarding  appeals,
        including the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 129A  shall,
        so far as may be, apply to such application.
      . …………………………………………………………………”




        We may clarify that sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section  129D  have
        been amended from time to time.  What has been reproduced above are
        the provisions existing at the relevant time.


                   11. Section  129A  (omitting  the   parts  not  relevant)
                       reads:
                 “S.129. - Appellate Tribunal. –
                 (1) ………………………………………………………………..
                 (2) …………………………………………………………..
                 (3) Every appeal under this section shall be  filed  within
                 three months from the date on which the order sought to  be
                 appealed against is communicated  to  the  Commissioner  of
                 Customs, or as the case may be, the other party  preferring
                 the appeal.
                 (4)On receipt of notice that an appeal has  been  preferred
                 under this section, the party against whom the  appeal  has
                 been preferred may, notwithstanding that he  may  not  have
                 appealed against such order  or  any  part  thereof,  file,
                 within forty-five days of the  receipt  of  the  notice,  a
                 memorandum of cross-objections verified in such  manner  as
                 may be specified by rules made in this behalf  against  any
                 part of the order  appealed  against  and  such  memorandum
                 shall be disposed of by the Appellate  Tribunal  as  if  it
                 were an appeal presented within the time specified in  sub-
                 section (3).
                 (5) The Appellate Tribunal may admit an  appeal  or  permit
                 the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after expiry
                 of the relevant period referred to in  sub-section  (3)  or
                 sub-section  (4),  if  it  is  satisfied  that  there   was
                 sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period”.



        12.      Section 129D(4) makes it clear that where an application is
        made by the Commissioner to the Tribunal in pursuance  of  an  order
        under sub-section (1) within a prescribed period from  the  date  of
        communication of that order,  such application shall be heard by the
        Tribunal  as if  it was an appeal made against the decision or order
        of  the adjudicating authority and the provisions regarding  appeals
        under  Section  129A  to  the  Tribunal,  in  so  far  as  they  are
        applicable, would be applicable to such  application.   The  crucial
        words  and expressions in  Section 129D(4) are, “such  application”,
        “heard”, “as if such application were an appeal” and “so far as  may
        be”.   The expression “such application”, inter alia,  is  referable
        to the application made by the  Commissioner  to  the   Tribunal  in
        pursuance of an order under sub-section (1)   of Section 129D.   The
        period prescribed in Section 129D for making  application  does  not
        control the expression  “such  application”.   It  is  difficult  to
        understand how an application made under Section 129D(4) pursuant to
        the order passed under sub-sections (1) or (2)  shall  cease  to  be
        “such application”  merely because  it  has  not  been  made  within
        prescribed  time.   If  the  construction   to   the   words   “such
        application”  is  given  to  mean  an  application  filed   by   the
        Commissioner before the Tribunal within the prescribed period  only,
        the subsequent expressions “heard”, “as if such an application  were
        an appeal’” and   “so far as may be” occurring in Section 129D(4) of
        the Act may be rendered ineffective.   The view of the larger  Bench
        of the CEGAT  in Azo Dye Chem1  and the reasons in  support  thereof
        do  not commend to us.  We are unable to accept the view  adumbrated
        by the CEGAT.   The  clear  and  unambiguous  provision  in  Section
        129D(4) that the application made therein  shall  be  heard  by  the
        Tribunal as if it was an appeal made against the decision  or  order
        of  the  adjudicating  authority  and  the  provisions  of  the  Act
        regarding  appeals,   so  far  as  may  be,   shall  apply  to  such
        application leaves no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section
        129A (1) to (7)  have been mutatis mutandis made  applicable,   with
        due  alteration   wherever  necessary,  to  the  applications  under
        Section 129D(4).

        13.      From the plain language of Section  129D(4),  it  is  clear
        that  Section 129A has been incorporated in Section  129D.  For  the
        sake of brevity, instead of repeating  what  has  been  provided  in
        Section 129A as regards the appeals to the Tribunal,   it  has  been
        provided that  the  applications  made  by  the  Commissioner  under
        Section 129D(4) shall be heard as if they were appeals made  against
        the  decision  or  order  of  the  adjudicating  authority  and  the
        provisions  relating  to  the  appeals  to  the  Tribunal  shall  be
        applicable in so far as they may  be  applicable.   Consequentially,
        Section 129A(5) has become integral part of Section 129D(4)  of  the
        Act.   In other words, if the Tribunal  is satisfied that there  was
        sufficient cause for not presenting the  application  under  Section
        129D(4)  within prescribed period,  it  may  condone  the  delay  in
        making such application and hear the same.

        14.       Parliament  intended  entire  Section  129A,  as  far   as
        applicable, to be supplemental to Section 129D(4)  and that  is  why
        it provided that the provisions  relating  to  the  appeals  to  the
        Tribunal shall be applicable to the applications made under  Section
        129D(4).  The expression, “including the provisions  of  sub-section
        (4) of Section 129A”  is by way of clarification  and  has  been  so
        said expressly to remove any doubt about the  applicability  of  the
        provision relating to cross objections   to  the  applications  made
        under Section 129D(4)  or  else  it  may  be  said  that  provisions
        relating to appeals to the Tribunal have been  made  applicable  and
        not the cross objections.   The use of expression  “so  far  as  may
        be” is to bring  general provisions   relating  to  the  appeals  to
        Tribunal  into Section 129D(4).  Once the provisions relating to the
        appeals to the Tribunal have been made applicable,  Section  129A(5)
        stands incorporated in Section 129D(4)  by way of legal fiction  and
        must be given effect to.  Seen thus, it becomes clear that  the  Act
        has given express   power to  the  Tribunal  to  condone   delay  in
        making the application under Section 129D(4) if it is satisfied that
        there was sufficient  cause  for  not   presenting  it  within  that
        period.

        15.      We do not think that any useful purpose will be  served  in
        discussing the cases  cited by the learned counsel for the appellant
        in detail.   In none of these cases, the question  which has come up
        for decision in  the  present  appeal  arose.   We  shall,  however,
        briefly refer to these decisions.

        16.                In  Hongo  India  Pvt.  Ltd2,  the  question  for
        consideration before this Court was whether the High Court had power
        to condone the delay in presentation of  the  reference  application
        under unamended Section 35-H(1) of  the  Central  Excise  Act,  1944
        beyond the prescribed period by applying Section 5 of the Limitation
        Act, 1963.  Sub-section   (1)  of  Section  35-H,  which  was  under
        consideration before this Court,  read as follows:

                 “35-H.  Application to High Court. – (1)  The  Commissioner
                 of Central Excise  or  the  other  party  may,  within  one
                 hundred and eighty days of the date upon which he is served
                 with notice of an order under Section  35-C  passed  before
                 the 1st day of July, 2003 (not  being  an  order  relating,
                 among other things, to the determination  of  any  question
                 having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or  to  the
                 value of goods for purposes of assessment), by  application
                 in the prescribed form, accompanied, where the  application
                 is made by the other party, by a fee of two hundred rupees,
                 apply to the High Court to direct the  Appellate   Tribunal
                 to refer to the High Court any question of law arising from
                 such order of the Tribunal”.




        This Court observed that except providing a period of 180  days  for
        filing reference application to the High Court, there was  no  other
        clause for condoning the delay if reference was made beyond the said
        prescribed period.  Sections 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act  were
        noted.  This Court then held that the language  used in Sections 35,
        35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that  an  appeal
        and reference  to the High Court should be made within 180 days only
        from the date of communication of the decision or order and  in  the
        absence of any clause condoning  the  delay  by  showing  sufficient
        cause after the prescribed period, there was complete  exclusion  of
        Section 5 of the Limitation Act.  In  conclusion  this  Court   held
        that the time limit prescribed  under  Section  35-H(1)  to  make  a
        reference  to the High Court was absolute  and unextendable  by  the
        Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.  In the  present  case,
        as noted above, the  provisions  relating  to  the  appeals  to  the
        Tribunal have been made applicable to  an  application   made  under
        Section  129D(4)   and  it  has  been  further  provided  that  such
        application shall be heard as if  it was an appeal made against  the
        decision or order of the  adjudicating  authority.    Any  delay  in
        presentation of appeal under  Section  129A  is  condonable  by  the
        Tribunal by virtue of sub-section (5)  thereof.   The  Tribunal  has
        been  invested  with  the  same  power  for  consideration  of   the
        applications under Section 129D(4) if it is satisfied that there was
        sufficient  cause  for  not  presenting  such   application   within
        prescribed  period as the provisions relating to the appeals to  the
        Tribunal have been made applicable  to  such  applications.    Hongo
        India Pvt. Ltd2   does not help the appellant at all.

        17.      In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd3.  the concept  of
        legal fiction has been explained.  This Court observed,  “the  legal
        consequences cannot be deemed nor, therefrom,  can the  events  that
        should have preceded it.  Facts may be deemed and,   therefrom,  the
        legal consequences that follow”.

        18.      In   Fairgrowth  Investments  Ltd.4,  the  question  raised
        before this Court was whether the Special  Court  constituted  under
        the Special Court (Trial  of Offences Relating  to  Transactions  in
        Securities) Act, 1992 (for  short, ‘1992 Act’) has power to  condone
        the delay in filing a petition under   Section  4(2)   of  the  Act.
        Dealing  with  the  said  question,  the  Court  considered  various
        provisions of the Limitation Act, including Sections  5  and  29(2),
        and ultimately it was held that the provisions of the Limitation Act
        had no application in relation to a petition under Section  4(2)  of
        the 1992 Act and the prescribed period was  not  extendable  by  the
        Court.

        19.      In UCO Bank.5, this Court restated,  what has  been  stated
        earlier with regard to interpretation of statutes,  that  the  court
        must give effect to purport and object of the enactment.
        20.     In light of the  above  discussion,  we  hold  that  it  is
        competent for  the Tribunal to  invoke  Section  129A(5)  where  an
        application under Section 129D(4) has  not  been  made  within  the
        prescribed time and condone the delay in making such application if
        it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not  presenting
        it within that period.
        21.     In view of the above, the appeal must fail and it fails and
        is dismissed with no  order as to  costs.
                                                 …………………..J.
                                                   (R.M. Lodha)


                                                 …………………..J.
                                                  (Anil R. Dave)
        NEW DELHI
        OCTOBER 30, 2012.






-----------------------
[1]       (2000) 120 ELT 201 (Tri-Delhi)
[2]       (2009) 5 SCC 791
[3]       (1996) 2 SCC 449
[4]       (2004) 11 SCC 472
[5]       (2008) 5 SCC 257