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Thursday, September 27, 2012

The provisions of Section 313(4) explicitly provides that the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in evidence against the accused in any other enquiry or trial for any other offence for which such answers may tend to show he has committed. In other words, the use is permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution.” 20. If the above is the avowed purport and object of the examination of an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., we do not see as to how the appellant (second accused) can be denied an access to the documents in respect of which prayers have been made in the applications dated 29.3.2012 (for certified copies of the unmarked documents) and dated 18.4.2012 (for inspection) before the learned trial Court. While the anxiety to bring the trial to its earliest conclusion has to be shared it is fundamental that in the process none of the well entrenched principles of law that have been laboriously built by illuminating judicial precedents is sacrificed or compromised. In no circumstance, the cause of justice can be made to suffer, though, undoubtedly, it is highly desirable that the finality of any trial is achieved in the quickest possible time. In view of what has been stated above and to balance the need to bring the prosecution in the present case to its earliest conclusion and at the same time to protect and preserve the right of the accused to a fair trial we are of the view that the following directions would take care of the conflicting interests that have surfaced in the present case:- (1)The accused No.2, i.e. the appellant herein, be allowed an inspection of the unmarked and unexhibited documents referred to by her in the application dated 29.3.2012, i.e., IA No. 711 of 2012 in CC No. 2008/2004 filed in the Court of XXXVI Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bangalore; (2) Such inspection will be completed within a period of 21 days from the date of receipt of this order by the learned trial court. The venue of such inspection and also the persons who will be permitted to be present at the time of inspection will be decided by the learned trial court. (3) The right of inspection conferred by this order will not affect the validity of any part of the trial till date, including, the examination of the accused No.1 under Section 313 Cr.P.C. which has since been completed or any part of such examination of the second accused that may have been completed in the meantime. (4) In the event the third and the fourth accused also desire inspection of the unmarked and unexhibited documents such inspection will be allowed by the learned trial court. In such an event the process of inspection will also be simultaneously carried out and completed within the period of 21 days stipulated in the present order. 21. In the result, both the appeals shall stand disposed of in terms of the directions as above.


|REPORTABLE       |



           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

            CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION

              CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1497 of 2012

               (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.4560 of 2012)



V.K. SASIKALA                                  … Appellant

Versus

STATE REP. BY SUPERINTENDENT               …Respondent   OF POLICE

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1498 of 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.4561 of 2012)


                            J  U  D  G  M  E  N T



RANJAN GOGOI, J



      Leave granted.

2.    Two orders of the High Court of Karnataka dated 16th April,  2012  and
28th May, 2012 upholding the rejection of two separate applications made  by
the appellant  herein  for  certified  copies  or  in  the  alternative  for
inspection of certain unmarked and unexhibited documents in a trial  pending
against her is  the  subject  matter  of  challenge  in  the  appeals  under
consideration.  The facts leading  to  the  applications  filed  before  the
learned trial court and the grounds of rejection being largely similar  both
the appeals were heard analogously.

3.    A convenient staring point for the required narration of the  relevant
facts could be the order of this court dated 18th November, 2003  passed  in
Transfer  Petitions  (Criminal)  Nos.77-78  of  2003  (K.   Anbazhagan   vs.
Superintendent of Police and others[1]). By the aforesaid order  dated  18th
November, 2003 this court had transferred the proceeding in CC No.7 of  1997
from the court of the 11th Additional Sessions Judge (Special  Court  No.1),
Chennai to a Special Court in Bangalore to be constituted by  the  State  of
Karnataka in consultation with the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court  of
Karnataka.   The appellant before us is the second accused in the  aforesaid
transferred proceeding which has been registered as  Spl. CC.No.208 of  2004
and is presently pending in the court of the 36th Additional Sessions  Judge
and Special Judge, Bangalore. It may also be  noticed  that  along  with  CC
No.7 of 1997 there was another proceeding i.e. CC No. 2 of  2001 pending  in
the file of the same court, i.e. 11th  Additional  Sessions  Judge  (Special
Court No.1), Chennai against the same accused which was also transferred  to
the Special Court in Bangalore by  the  order  dated  18th  November,  2003.
However, the said proceeding would not be of any relevance  at  the  present
stage as the chargesheet in the said case has since been withdrawn  and  the
matter stands closed.

4.    The transfer of  CC No.7 of 1997 and CC No. 2 of 2001  from the  court
at Chennai was sought  by one Shri K. Anbazhagan, General Secretary  of  DMK
Party, a recognised political party in the State  of  Tamil  Nadu.  In  case
No.CC No. 7  of  1997  then  pending  in  the  competent  court  at  Chennai
allegations of commission of offences  under  Section  120B  of  the  Indian
Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (e) of  the  Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 were made against  the  present  appellant  who  was
arrayed as the second accused in the case and   also  against  one  Smt.  J.
Jayalalitha, who was arrayed as the first accused.   There  were  two  other
accused in the aforesaid proceeding, namely, accused No.3  and  4,  who  are
relatives of the  present  appellant,  i.e.,  accused  No.2.   The  offences
alleged arose out of certain acts and omissions attributed  to  the  accused
during the period 1991-1996 when the first accused was  the  Chief  Minister
of the State which office she had demitted after the General Elections  held
in  the  State  in  1996.  According  to  the  petitioner  in  the  Transfer
Petitions, chargesheet  in  the  aforesaid  case  had  been  filed  on  21st
October, 1997 and more than 250 prosecution witnesses had been  examined  by
the end of August, 2000. The accused  No.1, once  again,  became  the  Chief
Minister of the State following  the General Elections held  in  May,  2001.
Though the appointment of the  first  accused  as  the  Chief  Minister  was
nullified by this court  and  the  accused  ceased  to  be  Chief  Minister,
w.e.f., 21st September, 2001, she was elected to the State assembly in a by-
election held on 21st February, 2002 and was, once again,  sworn in  as  the
Chief Minister of the State on 2nd  March,  2002.   It  was  stated  in  the
Transfer Petitions that, thereafter, the course of trial of CC.No.7 of  1997
took a peculiar turn and a large number  of  prosecution  witnesses  (76  in
all) who had been discharged were recalled  without  any  objection  of  the
public  prosecutor.   64  of  such  witnesses  resiled  from  their  earlier
versions tendered in  court.   It  was  also  alleged  that  none  of  these
witnesses were declared hostile  by  the  public  prosecutor.   Furthermore,
according to the petitioner, the presence of the first accused in court  for
her examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was dispensed with  and,  instead,
a questionnaire was sent to the first accused to which  she  had  responded.
It is in these circumstances that the Transfer Petitions were  filed  before
this Court.

5.    Transfer Petitions Nos.77-78 of 2003 were  allowed  by  the  order  of
this  court  dated  18th  November,  2003  with   certain   directions.   To
recapitulate the said directions, Paragraph  34  of  the  judgment  of  this
court may be extracted:

      “34. In the result, we deem it expedient for the ends  of  justice  to
      allow these petitions. The only point that remains  to  be  considered
      now is to which State the cases should be transferred. We are  of  the
      view that for the convenience of the parties the  State  of  Karnataka
      would  be  most  convenient  due  to  its  nearness  to  Tamil   Nadu.
      Accordingly, the petitions are allowed. CC No. 7 of 1997 and CC No.  2
      of 2001 pending on the file of  the  XIth  Additional  Sessions  Judge
      (Special Court No. 1), Chennai in the State of Tamil Nadu shall  stand
      transferred with the following directions:

           (a) The State  of  Karnataka  in  consultation  with  the  Chief
           Justice of the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  shall  constitute  a
           Special Court under the Prevention of Corruption  Act,  1988  to
           whom CC No. 7 of 1997 and CC No. 2 of 2001 pending on  the  file
           of the XIth Additional Sessions Judge  (Special  Court  No.  1),
           Chennai in the State of Tamil Nadu shall stand transferred.  The
           Special Court to have its sitting in Bangalore.


           (b) As the matter is pending since 1997 the State  of  Karnataka
           shall appoint a Special Judge within a month from  the  date  of
           receipt of this order and the trial  before  the  Special  Judge
           shall commence as soon as possible and will  then  proceed  from
           day to day till completion.
           (c) The State  of  Karnataka  in  consultation  with  the  Chief
           Justice of the High Court of Karnataka shall  appoint  a  senior
           lawyer having experience in criminal trials as Public Prosecutor
           to conduct these cases. The Public Prosecutor so appointed shall
           be entitled to assistance of another lawyer of his  choice.  The
           fees and all other expenses of the  Public  Prosecutor  and  the
           Assistant shall be paid by  the  State  of  Karnataka  who  will
           thereafter be entitled to get the same reimbursed from the State
           of Tamil Nadu. The Public Prosecutor to be appointed within  six
           weeks from today.
           (d)  The  investigating  agency  is  directed  to   render   all
           assistance to the Public Prosecutor and his Assistant.
           (e) The Special Judge so appointed to  proceed  with  the  cases
           from such stage as he deems fit and  proper  and  in  accordance
           with law.
           (f) The Public Prosecutor will be at liberty to apply  that  the
           witnesses who have  been  recalled  and  cross-examined  by  the
           accused and who have resiled from their previous statement,  may
           be again recalled. The Public Prosecutor would be at liberty  to
           apply to the court to have these witnesses declared hostile  and
           to seek permission to cross-examine them. Any  such  application
           if made to the  Special  Court  shall  be  allowed.  The  Public
           Prosecutor will also be at  liberty  to  apply  that  action  in
           perjury to be taken against some or all such witnesses. Any such
           application(s) will be undoubtedly considered on its merit(s).
           (g) The State of Tamil Nadu shall ensure that all documents  and
           records are forthwith transferred to the Special  Court  on  its
           constitution. The State of Tamil Nadu shall also ensure that the
           witnesses are produced before the Special  Court  whenever  they
           are required to attend that court.
           (h) In case any  witness  asks  for  protection,  the  State  of
           Karnataka shall provide protection to that witness.
           (i) The Special Judge shall after completion of evidence put  to
           all the accused all relevant evidence  and  documents  appearing
           against them whilst recording their statement under Section 313.
           All the accused shall personally appear in  court,  on  the  day
           they are called upon to do so,  for  answering  questions  under
           Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code.


           These petitions are allowed in the above terms.”



6.  Though a  detailed  recital  will  not  be  necessary  it  appears  that
notwithstanding the above directions of this court  not  much  progress  has
been achieved to bring to trial in  Special  CC  No.  208  of  2004  to  its
logical conclusion. Soon after  the  proceedings  were  transferred  to  the
Special Court at Bangalore an order dated 27th June,  2005  was  passed   by
the learned trial court for clubbing of the two cases.  This order  came  to
be  challenged  before  this  court  by  the  petitioner  in  the   Transfer
Petitions, i.e. Shri K. Anbazihagan and until  the  Special  Leave  Petition
filed (SLP No.3828/2005) was disposed of on 22nd January, 2010 the  criminal
proceedings had remained stayed.  It also appears that  from  time  to  time
applications had been filed before the learned trial court  by  one  or  the
accused  raising  different  interlocutory  issues  and  also   seeking   to
vindicate different facets  of the  right of the accused to a free and  fair
trial.  Such applications, inter alia, were for translation  of  depositions
of prosecution witnesses running into thousands of  pages;  for  corrections
in such translations; for appointment or assistance of  an  interpreter  and
such are the incidental matters.  The orders passed by the  trial  court  on
all such applications invariably came  to  be  challenged  before  the  High
Court and even before this court. On several of  such  occasions  the  trial
came to be  halted  due  to  interim  orders  passed  by  different  courts.
Consequently, as on date the examination of  the  appellant  (accused  No.2)
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is going on, the same  having  commenced  on  18th
February, 2012.  While such examination of the appellant was midway and  she
had answered over 500 questions out of the contemplated double the   number,
an  application dated 16th April, 2012 was filed  by  the  appellant  before
the learned trial court seeking certified copies  of  certain  unmarked  and
unexhibited documents which were claimed to be in the custody of  the  court
on being so forwarded alongwith the report of  investigation  under  Section
173(5) Cr.P.C.  The learned trial court dismissed the  said  application  by
its order 3rd April, 2012, whereafter,  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  was
approached by means of Criminal Petition  No.1840  of  2012.   The  petition
having been dismissed by the High Court on 16th April, 2012,  the  appellant
forthwith filed another application before the  learned  trial  court,  this
time, seeking an inspection of the said unmarked and  unexhibited  documents
in respect of which the earlier application was filed  but  rejected.   This
application was also rejected by the learned trial court by its order  dated
21st April, 2012 which led to the inception of Criminal Petition No.2483  of
2012 in the High Court which was dismissed on 28th May,  2002  .   The  said
order dated 28th May, 2012 as well as the earlier order  dated  16th  April,
2012 of the High Court have  been  challenged  before  this  court  in   the
present appeals.

7.     A reading of the orders passed by the  learned  trial  court  on  the
applications filed by the present appellant as  well  as  the  two  separate
orders passed by the High Court affirming the  orders  of  the  trial  court
would go to show that the grounds that found favour with the learned  courts
to reject the prayer made by the appellant are largely similar.  It  is  the
view of the learned trial court as well  as  the  High  Court  that  in  the
present case the charges against the appellant were framed way back  in  the
year 2007. At the time of the framing of the charge the  court  is  required
to satisfy itself that all papers, documents and statements required  to  be
furnished to the accused under Section 207 Cr.P.C. have been  so  furnished.
No grievance in this regard was raised  by  the  appellant  or  any  of  the
accused.  The issue was also not raised at any point of time in  the  course
of examination of any of the prosecution witnesses (over 250  witnesses  had
been examined). It has also been expressed by the  High  Court  that  though
the appellant had answered over  532  questions  in  her  examination  under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. no grievance was raised or any prejudice claimed by  the
appellant at any earlier point of time. It is also  the  view  of  the  High
Court that non furnishing of the copies of the documents  or  not  conceding
to the prayer for inspection will not automatically render  the  prosecution
bad in law in as much as the effect of such action must result in  prejudice
to the accused which question can well be decided  when the matter is  being
considered  on  merits.   The  High  Court  also  took  the  view  that  the
documents, copies or inspection of which  was  sought,  being  unmarked  and
unexhibited documents, objections can always be raised if the accused is  to
be questioned in connection with such documents  in  her  examination  under
section 313 Cr.P.C.  In addition to the above, the High  Court  was  of  the
view that this court having passed clear directions in its order dated  18th
November, 2003 that the criminal proceedings against the accused  should  be
brought to its earliest conclusion by conducting the trial  on  day  to  day
basis, the filing of the applications  for  certified  copies/inspection  of
the unmarked and unexhibited documents constitute  another  attempt  on  the
part of the appellant to over reach  the order of this court and  delay  the
trial.  It is the correctness of the reasons assigned by the High Court  for
ultimate conclusions reached by it that has been assailed before us  in  the
present appeals.

8.     We have heard Shri Shekhar Naphade and Shri  V.Giri,  learned  senior
counsel for the appellant and Shri Rakesh Dwivedi,  learned  senior  counsel
for the respondent. We have also  heard  Shri  T.R.  Andhiyarujina,  learned
senior counsel  appearing  for  the  applicant  Shri  K.Anbazhagan,  General
Secretary,  DMK  Party,  who  has  sought   impleadment   in   the   present
proceedings.  The learned senior counsel had been heard, primarily,  on  the
prayer for impleadment, in the course of which, naturally, he was  permitted
to traverse the relevant facts of the case. Upon hearing the learned  senior
counsel we do not consider it necessary to pass any specific  order  on  the
impleadment application as we are finally disposing both the appeals by  the
present order.

9.    Learned counsel for the appellant have vehemently contended that  from
the objections filed to the applications  seeking  certified  copies  or  an
inspection of the unmarked and unexhibited documents as  well  as  from  the
orders of the learned trial courtpassed on  the  said   applications  it  is
clear that out of the papers forwarded to the court   under  Section  173(5)
Cr.P.C. alongwith the report  of  investigation  some  documents  have  been
marked and exhibited by the prosecution while  some  other  documents   have
not been so utilised.  As all such  documents  had  been  forwarded  to  the
court  upon  completion  of  investigation  the  unmarked  and   unexhibited
documents are in  the  custody  of  the  court.  According  to  the  learned
counsel, the appellant in her application to the  learned  trial  court  (IA
No.711/2012)  had  set  out  a  complete  list  of  the  unmarked  documents
mentioning the particulars of the  search   lists  by  which  the  documents
were seized in the course of investigation.   Learned  counsel  has  further
argued that the conduct of the prosecution in  not  marking  and  exhibiting
the said documents can only indicate  that  the  same  do  not  support  the
prosecution case and in fact may assist the defence of the accused.  As  the
answers to the questions put to the accused under Section  313  are  capable
of being relied upon against or in favour of the accused, the appellant  had
sought copies/inspection of such documents so as to  be  in  a  position  to
assess as to which of the documents can come to the aid of  her  defence  so
that the answers given by her in her examination under Section  313  Cr.P.C.
can be projected without reflecting any inconsistency with the defence  that
may be adduced. The attention of  the  court  has  also  been  drawn  to  an
affidavit filed by  the  petitioner  pinpointing  as  to  how  some  of  the
documents could be  relevant  to  certain  specific  questions  put  to  the
appellant in the course of her examination  under  Section  313  Cr.P.C.  In
fact, according to the learned counsel the right of the appellant to  copies
or, at least, to an inspection of the documents constitute  a  part  of  the
larger right of the appellant to  a  fair  trial  of  the  charges  levelled
against her.  Reliance has been placed on the decisions  of  this  court  in
Sidhartha  Vashisht  alias  Manu  Sharma  vs.  State  (NCT)  of  Delhi[2]  ,
Sanatan   Naskar  and  another vs.  State of  West  Bengal[3]  and Manu  Sao
vs. State of Bihar[4].

10.   On the other hand, learned counsel for the State  has  contended  that
when the documents copies or inspection of which has  been  sought  are  not
being relied on by the prosecution,  in  any  manner,  to  bring  home   the
charge against the appellant it is not open for the appellant to  insist  on
any right to the copies of such documents or to inspect  the  same.   It  is
urged that the documents relevant to the charge had been  furnished  to  the
appellant under Section 207at the appropriate stage of the  proceeding   and
also that such documents had been duly considered at the time of framing  of
charges.  No issue in this  regard  was  raised  by  the  appellant  at  any
earlier point of time.  In fact,  though  different  objections  to  various
other facets of the trial were raised by the appellant from time to time  by
filing repeated/successive applications it is only when the  examination  of
the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had reached a fairly advanced  stage
that the present applications  have  been  filed.   Both  the  applications,
therefore, are in utter abuse of the process of  law  and  being  calculated
only to delay the trial the same have been rightly rejected by  the  learned
trial courtwhich orders have been  affirmed  by  the  High  Court.   Learned
counsel has also  pointed out that the contention to  the  effect  that  the
documents are required to enable the appellant to  prepare  her  defence  is
wholly untenable as the said stage  would arise only after  the  examination
of all the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is complete.

11.   The parameters governing the process of investigation  of  a  criminal
charge; the duties of the investigating agency and the role  of  the  courts
after the  process  of  investigation  is  over  and  a  report  thereof  is
submitted to the court is exhaustively laid down in the  different  Chapters
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.).  Though the power of  the
investigating agency is large and expansive and the courts  have  a  minimum
role in this regard there are inbuilt provisions in the Code to ensure  that
investigation of a criminal  offence  is  conducted   keeping  in  mind  the
rights of an accused to a fair process  of   investigation.   The  mandatory
duty cast on the investigating agency to maintain  a  case  diary  of  every
investigation on a day to day basis   and  the  power  of  the  court  under
Section 172 (2) and the plenary  power  conferred  in  the  High  Courts  by
Article 226 the Constitution are adequate safeguards to ensure  the  conduct
of a fair investigation.  Without dilating on the said aspect of the  matter
what has to be taken note of now are the provisions of the  Code  that  deal
with a situation/stage after completion of the investigation of a case.   In
this regard the provisions of Section 173 (5)  may  be  specifically  noted.
The said provision  makes  it  incumbent  on  the  Investigating  agency  to
forward/transmit to the concerned court  all  documents/statements  etc.  on
which the prosecution proposes to rely in the course of the trial.   Section
173(5), however, is subject  to  the  provisions  of  Section  173(6)  which
confers a power on the investigating officer to request the concerned  court
to exclude any part of the statement or documents  forwarded  under  Section
173(5) from the copies to be granted  to  the  accused.   The  court  having
jurisdiction to deal with the matter, on  receipt  of  the  report  and  the
accompanying documents under Section 173, is next required to decide  as  to
whether cognizance of the offence alleged is to  be  taken  in  which  event
summons for the appearance of the accused before the court is to be  issued.
 On such appearance, under Section 207 Cr.P.C., the   concerned   court   is
required  to furnish to the accused  copies of the following documents:

        i) The police report;
       ii) The first information report recorded under section 154;
      iii) The statements recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161  of
           all persons whom the prosecution  proposes  to  examine  as  its
           witnesses, excluding therefrom any part in  regard  to  which  a
           request for such exclusion has been made by the  police  officer
           under sub-section (6) of section 173;
       iv) The confessions and statements, if any, recorded  under  section
           164;
        v) Any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded to  the
           Magistrate with the  police  report  under  sub-section  (5)  of
           section 173.
12.   While the first proviso to Section 207 empowers the court  to  exclude
from the copies to be furnished to the  accused  such  portions  as  may  be
covered by Section 173(6), the second proviso to Section  207  empowers  the
court to provide to the accused an inspection of the  documents  instead  of
copies thereof, if, in the opinion of the court it  is  not  practicable  to
furnish  to  the  accused  the  copies  of  the  documents  because  of  the
voluminous content thereof.  We would like  to  emphasise,  at  this  stage,
that while referring to the  aforesaid  provisions  of  the  Code,  we  have
deliberately  used  the  expressions  “court”  instead  of  the   expression
“Magistrate”   as  under  various  special  enactments  the  requirement  of
commitment of a  case  to  a  higher  court   (court  of  Sessions)  by  the
Magistrate as mandated by the Code has been dispensed with and  the  special
courts constituted under a special statute have been  empowered  to  receive
the report of the investigation along with the relevant  documents  directly
from the investigating agency and  thereafter  to  take  cognizance  of  the
offence, if so required.

13.   It is in the  context  of  the  above  principles  of  law  and  the
provisions of the Code that the rights of the appellant will  have  to  be
adjudicated upon by us in the present case.  It is  not  in  dispute  that
after the appearance of the accused in the Court of the  Special  Judge  a
large number of documents forwarded to  the  Court  by  the  Investigating
Officer along  with  his  report,  had  been  furnished  to  the  accused.
Thereafter, charges against the accused had been framed way  back  in  the
year 2007 and presently the trial has reached the stage of examination  of
the second accused, i.e. appellant under the  provisions  of  Section  313
Cr.P.C.  At no earlier point of time (before the examination of the second
accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.) the accused had pointed out that  there
are documents in the Court which have been forwarded to it  under  Section
173 (5) and which have not been relied upon by  the  prosecution.   It  is
only at such an advanced stage  of  the  trial  that  the  accused,  after
pointing out the said facts, had claimed an entitlement to copies  of  the
said documents or at least an inspection of the same on  the  ground  that
the said documents favour the accused.

14.    Seizure  of  a  large  number  of  documents  in  the   course   of
investigation of a criminal case is a common feature.  After completion of
the process of investigation and before submission of the  report  to  the
Court under Section 173 Cr.P.C., a fair amount of application of  mind  on
the part of the  investigating  agency  is  inbuilt  in  the  Code.   Such
application of mind is both with regard to the  specific  offence(s)  that
the Investigating Officer may consider  to  have  been  committed  by  the
accused and also the identity and particulars of  the  specific  documents
and records, seized in the course of  investigation,  which  supports  the
conclusion of the Investigating Officer  with  regard  to  the  offence(s)
allegedly committed.  Though it is only such  reports  which  support  the
prosecution case that are required to be  forwarded  to  the  Court  under
Section 173 (5) in every situation where some of  the  seized  papers  and
documents do not support  the  prosecution  case  and,  on  the  contrary,
supports the accused, a duty is  cast  on  the  Investigating  Officer  to
evaluate the two  sets  of  documents  and  materials  collected  and,  if
required, to exonerate the accused at that stage itself.  However,  it  is
not impossible to visualize a situation whether the Investigating  Officer
ignores the part of the seized documents  which  favour  the  accused  and
forwards to the Court only those documents which support the  prosecution.
If such a situation is pointed by the accused and such documents have,  in
fact, been forwarded to the Court would it not be the duty of the Court to
make available such documents  to  the  accused  regardless  of  the  fact
whether  the  same  may  not  have  been  marked  and  exhibited  by   the
prosecution?  What would happen in a situation where  such  documents  are
not forwarded by the Investigating Officer to the Court is a question that
does not arise in the present case.   What  has  arisen  before  us  is  a
situation where evidently the unmarked and unexhibited  documents  of  the
case that are being demanded by the accused  had  been  forwarded  to  the
Court under Section  173  (5)  but  are  not  being  relied  upon  by  the
prosecution.  Though the prosecution has tried to cast some cloud  on  the
issue as to whether the unmarked and unexhibited documents are a  part  of
the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., it is not denied by the  prosecution
that the said unmarked and unexhibited  documents  are  presently  in  the
custody of the Court.  Besides, the accused in her application before  the
learned Trial court(IA 711/2012) had furnished  specific  details  of  the
said documents and had correlated the  same  with  reference  to  specific
seizure  lists  prepared   by   the   investigating   agency.    In   such
circumstances, it can be safely assumed that what has been happened in the
present case is that along with the report of investigation a large number
of documents have been forwarded to the Court out of which the prosecution
has relied only on a part  thereof  leaving  the  remainder  unmarked  and
unexhibited.

15.   In a recent pronouncement in  Siddharth  Vashisht  @  Manu  Sharma  V.
State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) to which  one  of  us  (Sathasivam,  J)  was  a
party, the role of a public prosecutor and his  duties  of  disclosure  have
received a wide and in-depth consideration of this Court.   This  Court  has
held that though the primary duty of a Public Prosecutor is to  ensure  that
an accused is punished, his  duties  extend  to  ensuring  fairness  in  the
proceedings and also to ensure that all  relevant  facts  and  circumstances
are brought to the notice of the Court  for  a  just  determination  of  the
truth so that due justice  prevails.   The  fairness  of  the  investigative
process so as to maintain the citizens’ rights under Articles 19 and 21  and
also  the  active  role  of  the  court  in  a  criminal  trial  have   been
exhaustively dealt with by this Court.  Finally, it was held that it is  the
responsibility of the investigating agency as well as that of the courts  to
ensure that every investigation is fair and does not erode  the  freedom  of
an individual except in accordance with law.  It was also held that  one  of
the established facets of a just, fair and transparent investigation is  the
right of an accused to ask for all such documents that he  may  be  entitled
to under the scheme contemplated by the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.   The
said scheme was duly considered by this Court  in  different  paragraphs  of
the report.  The views expressed would certainly be useful  for  reiteration
in the context of the facts of the present case:-

      “216. Under  Section  170,  the  documents  during  investigation  are
      required to be forwarded to the Magistrate, while in terms of  Section
      173(5) all documents or relevant extracts and the  statement  recorded
      under Section  161  have  to  be  forwarded  to  the  Magistrate.  The
      investigating officer is entitled to collect all the  material,  which
      in his wisdom is required for proving the guilt of  the  offender.  He
      can record statement  in  terms  of  Section  161  and  his  power  to
      investigate the matter is a very wide one, which is regulated  by  the
      provisions of the Code. The statement recorded under  Section  161  is
      not evidence per se under Section 162 of the Code. The  right  of  the
      accused to receive the documents/statements submitted before the court
      is absolute and it must be adhered to by the prosecution and the court
      must  ensure  supply  of  documents/statements  to  the   accused   in
      accordance with law. Under the proviso to Section 162(1)  the  accused
      has a statutory right of confronting the witnesses with the statements
      recorded under Section 161 of the Code thus indivisible.




      217. Further, Section 91 empowers the court to  summon  production  of
      any document or thing which the court considers necessary or desirable
      for the purposes of  any  investigation,  inquiry,  trial  or  another
      proceeding under the provisions of the Code.  Where  Section  91  read
      with Section 243 says that if the accused is called upon to enter  his
      defence and produce his evidence there he  has  also  been  given  the
      right to apply to the court for issuance of process for compelling the
      attendance of any witness  for  the  purpose  of  examination,  cross-
      examination or the production of any document or other thing for which
      the court has to pass a reasoned order.




      218. The liberty of an accused cannot be interfered with except  under
      due process of law. The expression “due process of law” shall deem  to
      include fairness in trial. The court (sic Code) gives a right  to  the
      accused to receive all documents and statements as well as to move  an
      application for production of any record or witness in support of  his
      case. This constitutional mandate and statutory rights  given  to  the
      accused place an implied obligation upon the prosecution  (prosecution
      and the Prosecutor) to make  fair  disclosure.  The  concept  of  fair
      disclosure would take in its ambit furnishing of a document which  the
      prosecution relies upon whether filed in court or not.  That  document
      should essentially be furnished to the accused and even in  the  cases
      where during investigation a document is bona  fide  obtained  by  the
      investigating agency and in the opinion of the Prosecutor is  relevant
      and would help in arriving at the truth, that document should also  be
      disclosed to the accused.




      219. The  role  and  obligation  of  the  Prosecutor  particularly  in
      relation to disclosure  cannot  be  equated  under  our  law  to  that
      prevalent under the English system as aforereferred  to.  But  at  the
      same time, the demand for a fair trial cannot be ignored. It may be of
      different consequences  where  a  document  which  has  been  obtained
      suspiciously, fraudulently  or  by  causing  undue  advantage  to  the
      accused during investigation such document  could  be  denied  in  the
      discretion of the Prosecutor to the accused  whether  the  prosecution
      relies or  not  upon  such  documents,  however  in  other  cases  the
      obligation to disclose would be more certain. As already  noticed  the
      provisions of Section 207 have a material bearing on this subject  and
      make an interesting  reading.  This  provision  not  only  require  or
      mandate that the court without delay and free of cost  should  furnish
      to the accused copies of the police report, first information  report,
      statements, confessional statements  of  the  persons  recorded  under
      Section 161 whom the prosecution wishes to examine  as  witnesses,  of
      course, excluding any part of a statement or document as  contemplated
      under Section 173(6) of the  Code,  any  other  document  or  relevant
      extract thereof which has been submitted  to  the  Magistrate  by  the
      police under sub-section (5) of Section 173. In  contradistinction  to
      the provisions of Section 173, where  the  legislature  has  used  the
      expression “documents on which the prosecution relies”  are  not  used
      under Section 207 of the Code. Therefore, the  provisions  of  Section
      207 of the Code will have to be given liberal and relevant meaning  so
      as to achieve its object. Not only this, the  documents  submitted  to
      the Magistrate along with the report under Section 173(5)  would  deem
      to include the documents which have  to  be  sent  to  the  Magistrate
      during the course of investigation as per the requirement  of  Section
      170(2) of the Code.




      220. The right of the accused with regard to disclosure  of  documents
      is a limited right but is codified and is the  very  foundation  of  a
      fair investigation and trial. On  such  matters,  the  accused  cannot
      claim an indefeasible legal right  to  claim  every  document  of  the
      police file or even the portions which are permitted  to  be  excluded
      from the documents annexed to the report under Section 173(2)  as  per
      orders of the court. But certain rights of the accused flow both  from
      the  codified  law  as  well  as  from  equitable  concepts   of   the
      constitutional  jurisdiction,  as  substantial   variation   to   such
      procedure would frustrate the very basis of a  fair  trial.  To  claim
      documents within the purview of scope of Sections 207, 243  read  with
      the provisions of Section 173 in its entirety and power of  the  court
      under Section 91  of  the  Code  to  summon  documents  signifies  and
      provides precepts which will govern the right of the accused to  claim
      copies of the  statement  and  documents  which  the  prosecution  has
      collected during investigation and upon which they rely.




      221. It will be difficult for the Court to say that the accused has no
      right to claim copies of  the  documents  or  request  the  Court  for
      production of a document which is part of the general diary subject to
      satisfying the basic ingredients of law  stated  therein.  A  document
      which has been obtained bona fide and has bearing on the case  of  the
      prosecution and in the opinion of  the  Public  Prosecutor,  the  same
      should be disclosed to the accused in the interest of justice and fair
      investigation and trial should be furnished to the accused. Then  that
      document should be disclosed to the accused giving him chance of  fair
      defence, particularly when non-production  or  disclosure  of  such  a
      document would affect  administration  of  criminal  justice  and  the
      defence of the accused prejudicially.”

                                                         (emphasis supplied)

                (Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1)




16.   The declaration of the law in Sidhartha Vashisht  (supra)  may  have
touched upon the outer fringe of the issues arising in the  present  case.
However, the positive advancement that has been achieved  cannot,  in  our
view, be allowed to take a roundabout turn and the march has  only  to  be
carried forward.  If the claim of the appellant is viewed in  context  and
perspective outlined above, according to  us,  a  perception  of  possible
prejudice, if the documents or at least an inspection thereof  is  denied,
looms large.  The absence of any claim on the part of the accused  to  the
said documents at any earlier point of time  cannot  have  the  effect  of
foreclosing such a right of the accused.   Absence of such a  claim,  till
the  time  when  raised,  can  be  understood  and  explained  in  several
reasonable  and  acceptable  ways.   Suffice  it  would  be  to  say  that
individual notion of prejudice, difficulty or handicap in putting  forward
a defence would vary from person to person and there  can  be  no  uniform
yardstick to measure such  perceptions.   If  the  present  appellant  has
perceived certain difficulties in answering or explaining some part of the
evidence brought by the prosecution on the basis of specific documents and
seeks to ascertain if the allegedly incriminating documents can be  better
explained by reference to some other documents which are  in  the  court’s
custody, an opportunity must be given to the accused to satisfy herself in
this regard.  It is not for the prosecution or for the Court to comprehend
the prejudice that is likely to be caused to the accused.  The  perception
of prejudice is for the accused to develop and if the same is founded on a
reasonable basis it is the duty of the Court as well as the prosecution to
ensure that the accused should not  be  made  to  labour  under  any  such
perception and the same must be put to rest at the earliest.  Such a view,
according to us, is an inalienable attribute of  the  process  of  a  fair
trial that Article 21 guarantees to every accused.

17.   The issue that has emerged before us is, therefore, somewhat  larger
than what has been projected by the State and what has been dealt with  by
the High Court.  The question arising would no longer be one of compliance
or non-compliance with the provisions of Section  207  Cr.P.C.  and  would
travel beyond the confines of the strict language of the provisions of the
Cr.P.C. and touch upon the larger doctrine of a free and fair  trial  that
has  been  painstakingly   built  up  by  the  courts   on   a   purposive
interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution.  It is not the stage  of
making of the request; the efflux of time that has occurred or  the  prior
conduct of the accused that is material.  What is of significance is if in
a given situation the accused comes to  the  court  contending  that  some
papers forwarded to the Court by the investigating agency  have  not  been
exhibited by the prosecution as the same favours  the  accused  the  court
must concede a right to in the accused to  have  an  access  to  the  said
documents, if so claimed.  This, according to us, is the core issue in the
case which must be answered affirmatively.  In this regard, we would  like
to be specific in saying that we find it difficult to agree with the  view
taken by the High Court that  the  accused  must  be  made  to  await  the
conclusion of the trial to test the plea of prejudice  that  he  may  have
raised.  Such a plea must be answered at the earliest and certainly before
the conclusion of the trial, even though it may be raised by  the  accused
belately.  This is how the scales of justice in our Criminal Jurisprudence
have to be balanced.

18.   There is yet another possible dimension of  the  case.   It  is  the
specific  contention  of  the  accused  in  both  the  applications  dated
29.3.2012 (for certified copies of the unmarked documents)  and  18.4.2012
(for inspection) that it is in  the  course  of  the  examination  of  the
accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that a perception had developed that the
accused may be giving incomplete/ incorrect answers  in  response  to  the
questions put to her by the  Court  and  that  she  needs  copies  of  the
documents or at least an opportunity of inspection of the same  to  enable
her to provide effective answers and to appropriately prepare her defence.

19.   Any debate or discussion with regard to the purport  and  object  of
the examination  of  an  accused  under  Section  313  Cr.P.C.  is  wholly
unnecessary as the law in this regard is fairly well  settled  by  a  long
line of the decisions of this Court.  The examination of an accused  under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. not  only  provides  the  accused  an  opportunity  to
explain the incriminating  circumstances  appearing  against  him  in  the
prosecution evidence but such examination also permits him to put  forward
his own version, if he so chooses,  with  regard  to  his  involvement  or
otherwise in the crime alleged against him.  Viewed from the latter  point
of view, the examination of an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. does have
a fair nexus with the defence that he may choose to  bring,  if  the  need
arises.  Any failure on the part of the accused to put forward his version
of the case in his examination under Section  313  Cr.P.C.  may  have  the
effect of curtailing his rights in the event the accused chooses  to  take
up a specific defence and examine defence witnesses.  Besides, the answers
given by the accused in his examination, if incorrect or  incomplete,  may
also jeopardise him as such incorrect or incomplete answers may  have  the
effect of strengthening the prosecution case against the accused.  In this
connection it may be  appropriate  to  refer  to  two  paragraphs  of  the
judgment of this Court in  Manu  Sao  Vs.  State  of  Bihar[5]  which  are
extracted below:-

            “13. As already noticed, the object of recording  the  statement
      of  the  accused  under  Section  313  of  the  Code  is  to  put  all
      incriminating evidence against the accused so as  to  provide  him  an
      opportunity to  explain  such  incriminating  circumstances  appearing
      against him in the evidence of the prosecution. At the same time, also
      to permit him to put forward his own version  or  reasons,  if  he  so
      chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the crime. The
      court has been empowered to examine the accused  but  only  after  the
      prosecution evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory  obligation
      upon the court and besides ensuring the compliance therewith the court
      has to keep in mind that the accused gets a fair chance to explain his
      conduct. The option lies with the accused to maintain silence  coupled
      with simpliciter denial or in the alternative to explain  his  version
      and reasons for his alleged involvement in the  commission  of  crime.
      This is the statement which the accused makes without fear or right of
      the other party to cross-examine him. However, if the statements  made
      are false, the court is entitled to draw adverse inferences  and  pass
      consequential orders, as may be called for, in  accordance  with  law.
      The primary purpose is to establish  a  direct  dialogue  between  the
      court and the accused and  to  put  to  the  accused  every  important
      incriminating piece of evidence and grant him an opportunity to answer
      and explain. Once such a statement is recorded, the next question that
      has to be considered by the court is to what extent  and  consequences
      such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial. Over  the
      period of time, the courts have explained this concept and now it  has
      attained,  more  or  less,  certainty  in  the   field   of   criminal
      jurisprudence.




            14. The statement of  the  accused  can  be  used  to  test  the
      veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission, if any,  made  by
      the accused. It can be taken into  consideration  in  any  enquiry  or
      trial but  still  it  is  not  strictly  evidence  in  the  case.  The
      provisions of Section 313(4)  explicitly  provides  that  the  answers
      given by the accused may be taken into consideration in  such  enquiry
      or trial and put in evidence against the accused in any other  enquiry
      or trial for any other offence for which such answers may tend to show
      he has committed. In other words, the use is permissible  as  per  the
      provisions of the Code but has its own  limitations.  The  courts  may
      rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him  guilty
      in consideration  of  the  other  evidence  against  him  led  by  the
      prosecution, however, such statements made under this  section  should
      not be considered  in  isolation  but  in  conjunction  with  evidence
      adduced by the prosecution.”




20.   If the above is the avowed purport and object of the examination  of
an accused under Section 313  Cr.P.C.,  we  do  not  see  as  to  how  the
appellant (second accused) can be denied an access  to  the  documents  in
respect of  which  prayers  have  been  made  in  the  applications  dated
29.3.2012 (for certified copies  of  the  unmarked  documents)  and  dated
18.4.2012 (for inspection) before  the  learned  trial  Court.  While  the
anxiety to bring the trial to its earliest conclusion has to be shared  it
is fundamental that in the process none of the well entrenched  principles
of  law  that  have  been  laboriously  built  by  illuminating   judicial
precedents is sacrificed or compromised.  In no circumstance, the cause of
justice can be made to suffer, though, undoubtedly, it is highly desirable
that the finality of any trial is achieved in the quickest possible  time.
In view of what has been stated above and to balance the need to bring the
prosecution in the present case to its earliest conclusion and at the same
time to protect and preserve the right of the accused to a fair  trial  we
are of the view that the following  directions  would  take  care  of  the
conflicting interests that have surfaced in the present case:-

(1)The accused No.2, i.e. the appellant herein, be  allowed  an   inspection
of the unmarked  and  unexhibited  documents  referred  to  by  her  in  the
application dated 29.3.2012, i.e., IA No. 711 of 2012 in  CC  No.  2008/2004
filed in the  Court  of  XXXVI  Additional  City  Civil  &  Sessions  Judge,
Bangalore;

(2) Such inspection will be completed within a period of 21  days  from  the
date of receipt of this order by the learned  trial  court.   The  venue  of
such inspection and also the persons who will be permitted to be present  at
the time of inspection will be decided by the learned trial court.

 (3) The right of inspection conferred by this order  will  not  affect  the
validity of any part of the trial till date, including, the  examination  of
the accused No.1 under Section 313 Cr.P.C. which has  since  been  completed
or any part of such examination of the second accused  that  may  have  been
completed in the meantime.
(4) In the event the third and the fourth accused also desire inspection  of
the unmarked and unexhibited documents such inspection will  be  allowed  by
the learned trial court.  In such an event the process  of  inspection  will
also be simultaneously carried out and completed within  the  period  of  21
days stipulated in the present order.


21.   In the result, both the appeals shall stand disposed of in terms  of
the directions as above.



                                       ...…………………………J.
                                        [P. SATHASIVAM]



                                        .........……………………J.
                                        [RANJAN GOGOI]
New Delhi,
September 27, 2012.







-----------------------
[1]         (2004) 3 SCC 767

[2]         (2010) 6 SCC 1

[3]         (2010) 8 SCC 249

[4]         (2011) 7 SCC 310

[5]    2010 (12) SCC 3100



-----------------------
42





there is little difference between the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act and the Pondicherry Act, which is to protect the interests of depositors who stand to lose their investments on account of the diversion of the funds collected by M/s PNL Nidhi Ltd. for the benefit of the Appellant Mill, which is privately owned by Shri V. Kannan and Shri V. Baskaran, who are also Directors of M/s PNL Nidhi Ltd. 48. The Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with costs assessed at Rs.1,00,000/-.


                               REPORTABLE | |


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS.6673-6674 OF 2009





M/s New Horizon Sugar Mills Ltd.        … Appellant



           Vs.





Govt. of Pondicherry                         … Respondent







                               J U D G M E N T




ALTAMAS KABIR, J.



1.    Several Special Leave Petitions (now  Civil  Appeals)  were  filed  in
this Court against the common judgment and order  dated  27th  March,  2007,
passed by the Madras High Court, including Writ Appeal Nos.1788  &  1919  of
2005,  1142  to  1144,  1209,  1342  to  1345  of  2006,  293  of  2007  and
W.P.Nos.44991, 45805 of 2006 & 1460 of 2007.  Of the said  appeals,  we  are
concerned with Writ Appeal Nos.1144 of 2006 and 293 of 2007, which  are  the
subject matter of Civil Appeal Nos.6673-6674  of  2009,  filed  by  M/s  New
Horizon Sugar Mills Ltd.

2.    As will be evident from the various writ petitions  and  writ  appeals
filed by the various parties, there are several skeins running  through  the
fabric of the matter before us.  The main issue,  however,  relates  to  the
challenge thrown to G.O.Ms.No.12 dated 18.2.2006 issued  by  the  Department
of Revenue and Disaster Management, Government of Pondicherry, under  powers
conferred under the Pondicherry Protection of  Interests  of  Depositors  in
Financial Establishments Act, 2004 (Act 1 of 2005), ordering  attachment  of
properties acquired by Pondicherry Nidhi Ltd.

3.    For a proper understanding of the background in which  the  said  G.O.
came to be issued, it is necessary to set out, in brief, the  facts  of  the
case.

4.    The lis between the parties to these appeals can  be  traced  back  to
the credit facilities availed of by the Appellant, M/s   New  Horizon  Sugar
Mills Pvt.  Ltd.,  from  the  Indian  Bank,  Pondicherry,  to  the  tune  of
Rs.26,50,00,000/-.  The Directors of the Mill,  viz.,  Shri  V.  Kannan  and
Shri V. Baskaran, stood as guarantors for repayment of the loan and  offered
their personal properties as collateral securities. As  the  Appellant  Mill
defaulted in payment of the loan amount, the Bank, after declaring the  loan
account of the Mill to be a “non-performing  asset”,  initiated  proceedings
for recovery by issuing notice under Section  13(2)  of  the  Securitisation
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security  Interest
Act, 2002,  (“SARFAESI  Act”).   The  said  notice  was  challenged  by  the
Appellant by filing Writ Appeal No.33700 of 2004,  before  the  Madras  High
Court.  By order  dated  6th  December,  2004,  the  said  Writ  Appeal  was
disposed of with a direction to the Appellant Mill to repay the entire  loan
amount in three instalments.

5.    In the  same  order,  the  Court  also  indicated  that  in  case  the
Appellant defaulted in payment of the instalments, the  Bank  could  proceed
against the Appellant Mill, in accordance  with  law.  Since  the  Appellant
Mill committed default even in payment of the  first  instalment,  the  Bank
proceeded further and under the provisions of Sub-Sections (2)  and  (4)  of
Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act took possession of the  property  offered  as
security and also initiated steps for sale of the same by  auction.  In  the
auction proceedings, M/s E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd. (“Parry  Ltd.”)  was  the
successful bidder. The said auction was challenged by  several  other  banks
and financial agencies to safeguard  and  protect  their  respective  claims
against the Mill.  On 12th July, 2005, all  the  Writ  Petitions,  including
the  one  filed  by  the  workers/employees  of  the  Appellant  Mill,  were
dismissed.  In respect of the Writ Petition filed by Pondicherry Nidhi  Ltd.
(PNL)  Depositors  Welfare  Association,  the  High   Court   directed   the
Association to work  out  their  remittance  under  the  provisions  of  the
Reserve Bank of India Act (“RBI Act”) as also Act 1 of 2005.

6.    On receiving the Sale Confirmation Letter from the  Bank,  Parry  Ltd.
remitted their entire balance amount and  fulfilled  all  other  formalities
for getting the Sale Certificate registered in  its  favour.   At  the  same
time, on the basis of a complaint  received  from  one  of  the  depositors,
alleging that Shri V. Kannan and Shri V. Baskaran,  said  to  be  the  major
shareholders of M/s PNL Nidhi Ltd. as well as being  the  Directors  of  the
Appellant Mill, had misappropriated a sum of  Rs.12.5  crores  belonging  to
M/s PNL Nidhi Ltd. and diverted the same for  their  own  trade,  the  Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Pondicherry, ordered attachment of  various  properties
standing in their names  and  in  the  name  of  one  Sivapriyal.  This  was
followed by  the  Government  Order,  being  G.O.Ms.No.12  dated  18.2.2006,
ordering attachment of  the  properties  acquired  by  M/s  PNL  Nidhi  Ltd.
Inasmuch as, by virtue of the said orders  of  attachment,  M/s  Parry  Ltd.
could not get the Sale Certificate registered in  respect  of  the  property
auctioned, it filed Writ Petition No.6453 of  2006  for  quashing  the  said
G.O.Ms.No.12 dated 18.2.2006 and for a direction to the District  Registrar,
Registration Department, Pondicherry, to register the  Sale  Certificate  in
their favour with regard to the properties in which they  had  succeeded  in
the auction sale. The Indian Bank also filed Writ Petition No.5389  of  2006
for the same relief so that they could comply with  the  provisions  of  the
SARFAESI Act for registering the Sale Certificate in  favour  of  M/s  Parry
Ltd.  The Appellant  Mill  filed  Writ  Petition  No.1897  of  2006  for  an
appropriate direction to the Indian Bank to return  to  them  such  sums  as
would be due from out of the total sale consideration  after  deducting  the
dues of the Bank incurred as  on  1st  January,  2005,  the  date  on  which
possession of the property in question was taken over and for return of  the
remaining documents pertaining  to  the  movable  and  immovable  properties
belonging  to  the  Appellant  after  satisfying  the  Bank’s  charge.   The
Appellant Mill filed another Writ Petition No.8797 of 2006  challenging  the
validity of G.O.Ms.No.12 dated  18.2.2006.   Several  other  Writ  Petitions
were filed by Shri V. Kannan and Shri V. Baskaran and M/s  Indian  Renewable
Energy Development Agency Ltd. (“IREDA”), New  Delhi,  and  M/s  Arunachalam
Sugar  Mills  Ltd.,  Pondicherry,  also   filed   several   Writ   Petitions
challenging the validity of the aforesaid Government Order.

7.    A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court took up  the  Criminal
Revision Petition No.1352 of 2005 filed by the Bank  questioning  the  Order
dated 18th February, 2005, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in  Crime
No.31 of  2004,  along  with  various  Writ  Petitions  filed  by  different
parties, and by his order dated 23rd August, 2006, the learned Judge  lifted
the order of attachment passed in respect of the properties in question  and
also directed the District Registrar, Registration Department,  Pondicherry,
to register the Sale Certificate issued in favour of M/s  Parry  Ltd.    The
learned Single Judge further directed  the  Appellant  (Writ  Petitioner  in
Writ Petition No.1897 of 2006)  to  approach  the  Debts  Recovery  Tribunal
under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act regarding their claim of refund of  the
excess amount alleged to have been retained by the Bank.  The learned  Judge
also made it clear that as far as the properties included  in  the  impugned
orders were concerned, it would be open to third  parties  to  approach  the
Designated Court under Act 1 of 2005 for appropriate relief.

8. Questioning the said common order, the Appellant Mill and  its  Directors
filed Writ Appeal Nos.1142 to 1144 of 2006 and the  Pondicherry  Non-Banking
Investors Protection Association preferred Writ Appeal Nos.1342 to  1345  of
2006.  However, while upholding the validity of Act 1 of 2005,  the  learned
Judge limited its operation to Unincorporated  Institutions.   Aggrieved  by
the said decision, the  Government  of  Pondicherry  preferred  Writ  Appeal
No.293 of 2007.

9.    Yet another facet of the issues involved in these Appeals is the  Writ
Petitions filed by the Banks and Financial Institutions to  safeguard  their
interests in regard  to  attachment  and  sale  of  the  properties  of  the
Appellant Mill.  The said Writ Petitions were considered by another  learned
Judge of the Madras High Court, who by his order dated 12th July,  2005,  in
PNL Investors’ Welfare Association Versus Union of India, with reference  to
the SARFAESI Act, the Sick Industrial  Companies  (Special  Provision)  Act,
1958, Act 1 of 2005 and the  provisions  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,
1947, and  in  particular,  Section  25FF  thereof,  disposed  of  the  Writ
Petitions   upon   holding   that    the    members    of    the    workers’
association/workers,  either  individually  or  through   their   respective
Unions, were entitled to the benefit available under  Section  25FF  of  the
1947 Act from the Appellant Mill and Parry Ltd., in view  of  Section  13(6)
of the SARFAESI Act.  In the same order,  the  learned  Judge  directed  the
members of the Depositors’ Association and others to avail of  the  remedies
provided under the SARFAESI Act, as well as Act 1  of  2005,  for  necessary
reliefs.  The said decision of the learned Single Judge  was  questioned  by
Parry Ltd. and the Commissioner of Central Excise,  Pondicherry,  who  filed
W.A. Nos.1787 of 2005 and 1999  of  2005  respectively,  claiming  that  the
Department’s claims were superior to those of others against  the  Appellant
Mill and its properties.

10.   A third set of Writ Petitions was filed by  Puduvai  Pradesa  Sarkarai
Aalai Thozhilalar Sangam; Indian Bank  and  the  Ariyur  Sugar  Mills  Staff
Welfare Union being W.P. Nos.24834, 30532 and 36900  all  of  2005,  praying
for appropriate directions.  By a common order  dated  7th  December,  2005,
another learned Judge of  the  Madras  High  Court  appointed  Justice  K.P.
Sivasubramaniam, a retired Judge of the Madras High Court,  as  Commissioner
to go into the claims of the workmen.  By the same order the  learned  Judge
directed the Indian Bank to deposit Rs.6 crores in a no-lien account in  the
Indian Bank, Pondicherry Main Branch, on 8th  December,  2005.   Questioning
the said order, the Appellant Mill filed Writ Appeal No.1209 of  2006.   All
the said matters were taken up for consideration together  by  the  Division
Bench.  In its  impugned  judgment,  the  Division  Bench  agreed  with  the
conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge with leave to the  parties
to approach the Tribunal to protect their interests.   Writ  Appeal  No.1142
of 2006 was, accordingly, dismissed, with liberty to the Appellant  Mill  to
approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal for appropriate relief.

11.   Apart from the submissions relating to Section 25FF of the  Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, what we are really concerned with in  these  appeals  is
with regard to the validity of the Pondicherry Protection  of  Interests  of
Depositors in Financial  Establishments  Act,  2004  (Act  1  of  2005)  and
G.O.Ms.No.12 dated  18.2.2006  issued  by  the  Department  of  Revenue  and
Disaster Management.  As indicated hereinbefore, the object of the  Act  was
to protect the interests of depositors in financial  establishments  in  the
Union Territory of Pondicherry.   The  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court
observed that, inasmuch as,  the  Tamil  Nadu  Protection  of  Interests  of
Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1997,  were  in  pari  materia
with the provisions of the Pondicherry Act of 2005  and  the  provisions  of
the Tamil Nadu Act had been upheld, nothing further was required to be  gone
into in that regard.  However, after the decision of a  Full  Bench  of  the
Bombay High Court in the case of Vijay C. Puljal vs.  State  of  Maharashtra
[(2005) 4 CTC 705], by which  the  Maharashtra  Protection  of  Interest  of
Depositors (in Financial Establishments)  Act,  1999,  was  struck  down,  a
batch of Writ Petitions came to  be  filed  before  the  Madras  High  Court
challenging the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act.  Since the  provisions  of
the Maharashtra Act had been struck down by a Full Bench of the Bombay  High
Court, the Writ Petitions were also contested before  a  Full  Bench,  which
considered the  contentions  relating  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State
Government, with reference to various Entries in  the  Seventh  Schedule  to
the Constitution, provisions of the Companies Act,  Reserve  Bank  of  India
Act and the Maharashtra Act and after examining the challenge thrown to  the
vires of the Act, came to the conclusion that the Tamil  Nadu  Act  did  not
suffer  from  any  legislative   incompetency,   nor   was   it   arbitrary,
unreasonable, or violative of the principles of natural justice.   The  Writ
Petitions  were,  accordingly,  dismissed.    The   Division   Bench   after
considering the pronouncement of the Full Bench in regard to the Tamil  Nadu
Act and finding that the entire provisions of the Pondicherry Act 1 of  2005
were in pari materia with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu  Act,  held  that
the  challenge  to  the  legislative  competency  and  jurisdiction  of  the
Government of Pondicherry in enacting the impugned Act,  was  liable  to  be
rejected.

12.   A question of considerable importance also came up  for  consideration
in the appeal filed by the Government of  Pondicherry  with  regard  to  the
observations of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.1897  of  2006,
wherein the learned  Single  Judge  while  upholding  the  validity  of  the
enactment, went on to observe that the impugned enactment was made  only  in
relation to unincorporated trade establishments and  the  State  Legislature
of Pondicherry  had  legislative  competence  to  legislate  in  respect  of
unincorporated financial establishments only.  In this regard, a  submission
was made on behalf of the Government  of  Pondicherry  to  the  effect  that
Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution was  only  a
residue of Entry 42 in the Central List  and  that  Entry  32  also  covered
incorporated companies.  It was submitted that the learned Single Judge  had
erroneously  held  that  Pondicherry   Act   1   of   2005   only   governed
unincorporated trade establishments.

13.   In this regard, it was submitted before the Madras High Court  by  the
learned Government Pleader that on a complaint received by  the  Pondicherry
Police from one Boothanathan, alleging that the amount deposited by  him  in
PNL Nidhi Ltd. had not been returned, the Pondicherry  Police  registered  a
case in Crime No.31 of 2004 on the file of the  C.I.D.,  Pondicherry,  which
took  up  the  investigation.   Subsequently,  about  3000  complaints  were
received from mostly aged people and retired  Government  servants  who  had
invested their savings in the various financial establishments.  On  inquiry
it was found that PNL Nidhi Ltd. had changed its name five  times.   It  was
initially a company known as “Pondicherry  Mutual  Fund  Ltd.”  incorporated
under the Companies Act, 1956.  The name of the Company  was  later  changed
to Prasanan Narayanan Laxmi Nidhi Ltd.  The name of the  Company  was  again
changed to PNL Nidhi Ltd.  The Company  floated  various  schemes,  such  as
Fixed Akshaya Deposit and Locker facility and accepted  deposits  under  the
said  scheme.   It  was  also  discovered  that  PNL  Nidhi  Ltd.   was   an
unregistered  and  unrecognized  financial  establishment   and   that   the
promoters of PNL Nidhi Ltd. were Kannan and Baskaran, who were brothers  and
were also the Directors of the Appellant Mill.  It also transpired that  the
funds of the PNL Nidhi Ltd. were utilized for the purchase of properties  in
the name of the Appellant, New Horizon Mills,  Pondicherry,  and  Arunachala
Sugar Mills, Thiruvannamalai, and also for purchase of land  at  Kumbakonam,
and land and  buildings  in  Pondicherry  and  Chennai.   The  investigation
conducted by the C.I.D., Pondicherry, revealed that the  deposits  collected
from the depositors of PNL Nidhi Ltd. had been channelised  to  New  Horizon
Sugar Mills, wherein also Kannan and Baskaran were the  Directors.   It  was
on account of the bogus cheques which had been issued  and  dishonoured  for
want of funds, that the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Pondicherry,  ordered
attachment of the properties of the Appellant Mill and its Directors and  in
order to save the innocent investors from  such  companies  and  firms,  the
Government  of  Pondicherry  introduced  the   Pondicherry   Protection   of
Interests of Depositors (in  Financial  Establishments)  Bill,  1997,  which
ultimately became an Act in 2004.

14.   Appearing  for  the  Appellant,  Mr.  A.K.  Ganguli,   learned  Senior
Advocate, submitted that the primary question  for  determination  in  these
appeals is whether the subject matter covered  by  the  Pondicherry  Act  is
referable to Entries 43, 44, 45 and 97 of the Union List or  to  Entries  1,
30 and 32 of the State  List.   The  other  question  for  determination  is
whether the decision of this Court in K.K. Baskaran Vs. State of Tamil  Nadu
[(2011) 3 SCC 793], rendered in the context of the Tamil Nadu Protection  of
Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act,  1997,  could  be
regarded as a precedent for determining the questions which have  arisen  in
relation to the Pondicherry Act.

15.   Mr. Ganguli urged that the Tamil Nadu Act dealt  with  the  protection
of deposits made by the public in  the  financial  establishments.   Section
2(3) of the said Act defines “financial establishments”  not  to  include  a
Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, or a  Banking  Company  as
defined under Section 5(c) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949, (“the  1949
Act”), or a non-banking financial  company  as  defined  in  clause  (f)  of
Section 45(1) of the Reserve Bank of India  Act,  1949.  Mr.  Ganguli  urged
that in 2003, Section 2(3) of the Tamil Nadu Act was  amended  omitting  the
words “a company registered under the Companies Act,  1956”  and   inserting
the words “a non-banking financial company” as  defined  in  clause  (f)  of
Section 45-I of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1949, after the  words  “does
not include”.  By the same amendment, the words “a company registered  under
the Companies Act, 1956” were introduced into Sub-Section (3) of Section  2.
 The amended provision now reads as follows :-


      “(3)’financial establishment’ means an individual, an  association  of
      individuals, a firm or a company registered under the  Companies  Act,
      1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956) carrying on  the  business  of  receiving
      deposits under any scheme or arrangement or in any  other  manner  but
      does not include a corporation or  a  co-operative  society  owned  or
      controlled by any State Government or  the  Central  Government  or  a
      banking company as defined in Section 5 (c) of the Banking  Regulation
      Act, 1949 (Central Act 10 of 1949).”

16.   Mr. Ganguli urged that in contrast, the Pondicherry  Act  defined  the
expression “financial establishment” in Section 2(d) to mean :-


      “…. Any person or group of individuals or a firm carrying on  business
      of accepting deposits under any scheme or arrangement or in any  other
      manner but does not include a corporation or  a  co-operative  society
      owned or controlled by the Government, any  State  Government  or  the
      Central Government, or a banking company as defined under Section 5 of
      the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.”

17.   Referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the enactment  of
the Pondicherry Act,  2004,  Mr.  Ganguli  pointed  out  that  it  had  been
specifically indicated that there had been a mushroom growth of  non-banking
financial  establishments  and  deposit-taking  unincorporated  bodies   not
covered under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934,  in  different  parts  of
the country.  Accordingly, it was proposed to undertake a legislation  which
sought  to  protect  the  deposits  made  by   the   public   in   financial
establishments not being  companies  registered  under  the  Companies  Act,
1956, or a Corporation or a Cooperative Society owned or controlled  by  the
State Government or the Central Government or a Banking  Company  under  the
Banking Regulation Act.   The Division Bench of the  Madras  High  Court  in
the impugned judgment has referred to the Full Bench decision  of  the  said
Court from which the appeals in K.K. Baskaran’s case arose. In paragraph 13-
g of the said judgment, it was recorded that it was also useful to refer  to
the stand taken by the Advocate General who  defended  the  Tamil  Nadu  Act
before the Full Bench by stating that the Act was intended  to  realize  the
deposits made by the public in the financial  establishments,  whether  they
were incorporated or not.  The Division Bench went on to hold  further  that
the entire reasoning of the Full Bench was applicable to  the  impugned  Act
of the Government of Pondicherry. Accordingly, the Division Bench held  that
the financial establishments referred to in Section  2(d)  of  the  impugned
Act covered both unincorporated and incorporated trading establishments.

18.   Mr. Ganguli tried to impress upon us that in  view  of  the  aforesaid
decisions  in  the  language  adopted  in  the  definition   of   “financial
establishments” in the two Acts, the Court would be required to examine  the
issue carefully to determine as to whether the decision in  K.K.  Baskaran’s
case (supra) relating to the  Tamil  Nadu  Act  could  ipso  facto  be  made
applicable to determine the scope and ambit of the Pondicherry Act.

19.   Coming to the next question as to  whether  the  State  enactments  as
well as  the  Parliamentary  enactments  covered  the  same  field,  namely,
“investor’s protection”, Mr. Ganguli submitted  that  the  decision  of  the
Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of S.  Bagavathy  Vs.  State
of Tamil Nadu [2007) 1 LW 892] dealing with the Tamil  Nadu  Act  and  other
Parliamentary  legislations  prohibiting  and   regulating   acceptance   of
deposits by financial establishments, held the same to be a valid  piece  of
legislation.  The Full Bench, inter alia, observed that the  existing  laws,
namely, Section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, regulates the acceptance  of
the deposits and Section 45S  of  the  Reserve  Bank  of  India  Act,  1934,
prohibits  the  acceptance  of  deposits  and   also   prescribes   suitable
punishments and penalties for contravening the  same,  but  neither  of  the
existing laws  provide  for  regulating  the  activities  of  the  financial
establishments, which not only duped the innocent  depositors  and  accepted
deposits from them, but also  siphoned  off,  diverted  or  transferred  the
funds for their own use in a mala fide manner.  Mr. Ganguli  submitted  that
the existing laws did not provide for the attachment of the properties  that
were procured either in the name of the financial establishments or  in  the
name of any other person from and out  of  the  deposits  collected  by  the
financial establishments.  Mr.  Ganguli  also  urged  that  the  Full  Bench
further observed that in the absence of any effective remedy in the  Central
legislation to regulate control of  either  unincorporated  or  incorporated
companies in the matter of depositors, who have deposited their  hard-earned
money with the financial establishments,  the  State  Government  was  fully
competent to bring out legislation to suit the needs of the  public  and  to
protect the interests of the depositors as well as in the  public  interest.
Mr. Ganguli submitted that even though the Reserve Bank of India Act,  1934,
prohibits acceptance of deposits and prescribes a penalty on  any  violation
of the provisions of the Act, no provision or mechanism  had  been  included
for attaching  the  properties  of  the  financial  establishments  and  the
properties of mala fide transferees.  Referring to paragraph 91 of the  Full
Bench judgment, Mr. Ganguli submitted that it  had  been  clearly  indicated
therein that the mere absence of exercise  of  such  power  conferred  under
Section 58B (5A) or 58G of the Reserve Bank  of  India  Act,  could  not  by
itself validate the impugned legislation where the Government  had  proposed
to protect the interests of depositors, in the public interest and in  order
to regulate the activities  of  such  financial  institutions,  which  power
could be traced to the field of legislation under Entries 1 and 32  of  List
II of the Seventh  Schedule  to  the  Constitution.   It  was  categorically
observed by the Full Bench that where no licence had been obtained from  the
Reserve Bank of India to commence and continue operations, the  question  of
applicability as well as violation of the directions  issued  under  Section
45S of the Reserve Bank of India Act by the Reserve Bank  of  India  remains
unanswered.  The Full Bench had also observed that concededly  none  of  the
Petitioners had obtained licence from the Reserve Bank of India nor can  the
business of financial  establishments  in  accepting  deposits  be  strictly
construed to be “banking”, as defined under  the  Banking  Regulations  Act,
1949. Mr. Ganguli urged that since none of  the  Petitioners  are  companies
registered under the Companies Act, 1956, the provisions  of  the  said  Act
would not be applicable to them.  It was also  observed  that  the  impugned
legislation was enacted in the public interest to  regulate  the  activities
of the financial establishments falling under Entries 1 and 32 of the  State
List.  Mr. Ganguli urged that it is in such background that the  Full  Bench
concluded that  the  Tamil  Nadu  Act  could  be  traced  to  the  field  of
legislation under Entries 1 and 32 of  List  II  of  the  Seventh  Schedule,
without analyzing the full scope of the said Entries on  the  one  hand  and
Entries 43, 44 and 45 of the Union List, on the other.

20.   Referring to the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay  High  Court
in Vijay C. Puljal’s  case  (supra),  which  had  declared  the  Maharashtra
Protection of Interests of  Depositors  (in  Financial  Establishment)  Act,
1999, to be ultra vires for want of  legislative  competence  of  the  State
legislature, Mr. Ganguli contended that the Full Bench had relied  upon  the
decision of this Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Vs. Union  of  India
[(1983) 4 SCC 166] in which the validity of Section  58A  of  the  Companies
Act, 1956, which regulated deposits accepted by  companies,  was  questioned
on the ground that  the  subject  matter  of  the  enactment,  in  pith  and
substance, fell within the subject matter of Entry 30  of  the  State  List.
This Court had, however, upheld the validity of Section 58 of the  Companies
Act, upon holding that the  subject  matter  of  the  legislation  could  be
referred to Entries 43 and 44 of the Union  List  and  the  Parliament  was,
therefore, alone competent to enact the said law.  Mr. Ganguli  pointed  out
that the subsequent enactment of Section 58AA which made special  provisions
in relation  to  small  depositors  and  declared  non-compliance  with  the
provisions thereof as a criminal offence  punishable  with  imprisonment  of
three years and fine, was also referable to Entries 43 and 44 of  the  Union
List,  being  an  amendment  to  the  Companies  Act  which  was  a  central
enactment.

21.   Several other decisions on the same lines  were  referred  to  by  Mr.
Ganguli which need not, however, detain us as the Full Bench of  the  Bombay
High Court had held that the  Maharashtra  Act  fell  within  the  exclusive
jurisdiction of the Parliament being referable to Entries 43, 44, 45 and  97
of List I of the Seventh Schedule.

22.   Reference was then  made  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  K.K.
Baskaran’s case (supra).  Mr. Ganguli urged that in the  said  case  it  was
the validity of the Tamil Nadu Act alone which was considered by this  Court
and this Court took note of the fact that the “financial companies” had  not
obtained any licence from the Reserve Bank of India and hence they were  not
governed by the Reserve Bank of India Act, nor the Banking  Regulation  Act,
1949.  In the context of the above, this Court observed that the Tamil  Nadu
Act is not focused on the transactions  of  banking  or  the  acceptance  of
deposits, but is focused on remedying the situation of  the  depositors  who
were deceived by the  fraudulent  financial  establishments.   Applying  the
doctrine of pith and substance, this  Court  held  that  the  said  Act  was
referable to Entries 1, 30 and 31 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to  the
Constitution and not Entries 43, 44 and 45 of List I thereof.   Mr.  Ganguli
urged that the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court  was  the
subject matter of the pending appeal when the decision  in  K.K.  Baskaran’s
case (supra) was rendered.  The appeal from the decision of the  Full  Bench
of the Bombay  High  Court  came  to  be  considered  subsequently  on  29th
September, 2011, when the constitutional validity  of  the  Maharashtra  Act
was upheld with the rider that if any party wished to  submit  that  it  was
not covered by the Maharashtra Act or the Tamil Nadu Act, it would  be  open
to them to take appropriate proceedings before the forum concerned.

23.   Mr. Ganguli lastly urged that the decision  in  K.K.  Baskaran’s  case
(supra) was rendered ex-parte without any  representation  from  either  the
State or the Union Government and while the judgment may be binding  between
the parties, it  had  no  precedence  value.   Submitting  that  there  were
several other similar matters pending  with  regard  to  the  acceptance  of
deposits by companies and  regulation  thereof  with  a  view  to  providing
protection to investors, Mr. Ganguli urged that the appeals were  liable  to
be allowed.

24.   Concluding  his  submissions,  Mr.  Ganguli  reiterated  that  it  was
evident that the subject matter of  the  Pondicherry  Act  is  referable  to
various  Parliamentary  laws  in  existence  which  deal   with   investors’
protection and provide measures  for  recovery,  which  were  covered  under
Entries 43, 44, 45 and 97 of the Union List :  Mr.  Ganguli  submitted  that
the attempt to make the said Entries referable to Entries 1, 30  and  32  of
the State List, was erroneous and the appeals  were  liable  to  be  allowed
upon the setting aside of the judgment and  order  passed  by  the  Division
Bench of the Madras High Court.

25.   At the very initial stage of his submissions,  Mr.  R.  Venkataramani,
learned  Senior  Advocate  appearing  for  the  Government  of  Pondicherry,
submitted that the present litigation  was,  in  fact,  a  proxy  litigation
since the companies  which  had  received  the  deposits  from  the  various
depositors had not come to the High Court, but were being represented  by  a
sister concern, namely, M/s New Horizon Sugar Mills Ltd.  It  was  submitted
that the State Government had acted in accordance with the Entries  in  List
II as there was no occupied field  to  oust  the  competence  of  the  State
Government to  legislate  in  regard  to  Entries  1  and  30  of  List  II.
According to Mr. Venkataramani, the question of repugnancy  of  the  Central
legislation having an overriding effect on the State  legislation,  did  not
arise in the facts of the case.  In the light of his aforesaid  submissions,
Mr. Venkataramani contended that the issues which  arose  for  consideration
in these  appeals  were  :  (i)  Whether  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in
Baskaran’s case has any relevance for disposal of the appeal? (ii)  Even  if
the said judgment was not to be relied upon, whether the Pondicherry Act  of
2005 is constitutionally valid being protected by the provisions of  Section
18 and 21 of the Government  of  Union  Territories  Act,  1963?  and  (iii)
Whether the Appellant not being an “establishment” which  has  received  the
deposits in question and not  being  one  of  the  class  of  establishments
within the meaning of Section  2(d)  of  the  Act,  could  be  permitted  to
challenge  the  validity  of  the  Act  as  a  proxy  for   the   defaulting
establishment?

26.    Mr.  Venkataramani  urged  that   the   second   question   indicated
hereinabove involved the interpretation of  Articles  246  and  254  of  the
Constitution and the Government of Union  Territories  Act,  1963.   It  was
urged further that having regard to the distinction between the position  of
States and Union Territories in the Scheme of  the  Constitution  and  under
the provisions of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, this  Court
would have to consider the said issue as a pure  question  of  law  relevant
for determination of the vires of  the  law.   Mr.  Venkataramani  submitted
that regardless of the submissions made by the Appellant with regard to  the
judgment in K.K. Baskaran’s  case  (supra),  the  Pondicherry  Act  of  2005
deserves to be upheld for special reasons  and  on  other  grounds  emerging
from the provisions of the aforesaid Act.  Mr. Venkataramani also  contended
that the challenge thrown to G.O.Ms.No.12 dated 18.2.2006 being  beyond  the
scope of the Act, was not acceptable, since the Appellant  neither  received
any deposits directly from the depositors nor did it directly engage in  the
business of granting financial loans, and would not, therefore,  fall  under
Section 2(d) of the Act which deals with financial  establishments.  It  was
further urged that since the Appellant was a stranger  to  the  legislation,
its locus could be confined only to infringing actions taken under the  Act.


27.   Mr. Venkataramani submitted that the Appellant Company  had  been  set
up primarily to lend support to the  challenge  to  the  G.O.Ms.No.12  dated
18.2.2006.  Mr.  Venkataramani  submitted  that  M/s  PNL  Nidhi  Ltd.,  the
offending establishment, had not filed any petition relating either  to  the
Act or the Government order.  As a  consequence,  the  actual  establishment
which would fall under Section 2(d) of the Act was  not  before  the  Court.
It was contended that M/s PNL Nidhi Ltd. has been shown  as  the  Respondent
in both the two writ petitions,  while Writ  Appeal  Nos.1142  and  1143  of
2006 were filed by M/s Kannan and others, with M/s PNL  Nidhi  Ltd.  as  the
second respondent. In  the  absence  of  appeals  by  the  parties  directly
covered by the Act, the Appellant  could  not,  as  an  alter  ego  of  such
parties, claim any locus to challenge the validity of  the  Pondicherry  Act
of 2005.  Interestingly, it was also pointed out that  the  licence  granted
to Pondicherry Nidhi Ltd. by the Reserve Bank of India in terms  of  Section
45 IA of the Reserve Bank of  India  Act,  1934,  stood  cancelled  on  14th
September, 2005. Mr. Venkataramani submitted that it was  also  required  to
be taken into consideration that the licence granted  to  Pondicherry  Nidhi
Ltd. by the Reserve Bank of India in terms of Section 45 IA of  the  Reserve
Bank of India Act, 1934, stood cancelled on 14.9.2005 and technically  there
is, therefore, no company licenced  or  registered  to  carry  on  the  non-
banking financial activities, which were pending before this Court.

28.   On the Scheme of the legislative powers of Union Territories  and  the
Parliament, Mr. Venkataramani submitted that the  absence  of  Parliamentary
legislation on a Union List subject does not clothe  the  State  Legislature
with  the  competence  to  enact  a  legislation  and  that  deficiency   in
Parliamentary legislation, referable to  the  Union  List,  could  not  also
confer competence on the State Legislature  to  fill  in  the  gaps,  having
regard to the Scheme of the Union Territories Act, 1963.  It  was  submitted
that the judgments cited on behalf of the Appellant in support of  his  two-
fold  submissions  referred  to  above,  all  relate  to  conflicts  between
Parliamentary and State Legislations referable to Lists  I  and  II  of  the
Seventh Schedule and the Scheme of Article 246 of the Constitution. In  such
cases, overlapping of Parliamentary and  State  Legislations,  referable  to
Entries in the Concurrent  List,  stand  on  a  different  footing  and  the
threshold embargo on the State Legislature to enact laws relatable to  Union
List, does not exist. In such cases, the  only  issue  which  could  at  all
arise would  be  with  regard  to  repugnancy  and  that  too  provided  the
legislations contained conflicting provisions. Referring to the decision  of
this Court in Ramji and others vs. State of U.P. & others [(1956  SCR  393],
Mr. Venkataramani submitted that the doctrine of pith  and  substance  could
not be applied to the facts of this case on account of the  fact  that  when
both the Central, as well as the State Legislatures, were operating  in  the
concurrent field, there was no  question  of  trespass  upon  the  exclusive
jurisdiction vested in the Centre under  Entry  52  of  List  I.   The  only
question which, therefore, survived was whether putting both the  pieces  of
legislations enacted by the Centre and the State  together,  any  repugnancy
could be traced, in  which  event  a  different  set  of  consequences  will
follow.  In the instant case there being no question of  any  inconsistency,
any further question relating  to  the  overriding  effect  of  the  Central
provision, would not  arise.   The  question  which  necessarily  arises  is
whether the Parliament and the  State  Legislature  exercised  their  powers
over  the  self-same  subject  matter,  or  whether  the  laws  enacted   by
Parliament  were  intended  to  be  a  complete  and  exhaustive   code   in
themselves.

29.   Mr. Venkataramani submitted  that  the  law  in  question  is  not  in
substance a matter relating to incorporation, regulation  or  winding-up  of
either incorporated or unincorporated entities and Entries   43  and  44  of
List  I  would  have  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of  laws  relating  to
corporations and different modes of incorporation.  It  was  submitted  that
Entry 33 in the Federal List of the Government of India Act, 1935,  combined
Entries 43 and 44 under List I of the Seventh Schedule to the  Constitution,
as they are concerned with incorporation and regulations and  providing  for
measures regulating the business of corporations.  Reliance  was  placed  on
the decision of this Court in R.C. Cooper vs. Union of India [(1970)  3  SCR
530], wherein the  fine  distinction  between  regulation  of  the  business
activities of  and  regulation  of  a  corporation  was  noticed.  In  fact,
Sections 58A and 58AA of the Companies Act, 1956, and  Section  45S  of  the
Reserve Bank of India Act,  1934,  could  well  fall  within  the  scope  of
Entries 43 and 44 of List I.   Mr.  Venkataramani  argued  that  an  offence
whether committed by individuals or other legal entities would  fall  within
the scope of Entry I List III viz. “criminal law”.  It is for  that  purpose
that Entry I List III provides for an exclusion from “offences against  laws
with respect to any of the matters specified in List I and List II”.

30.   It was further pointed out that Entries 93 in List I and  64  in  List
II are similarly worded and do not  refer  to  offences  against  laws  with
respect to any of the  matters  in  the  List.   In  that  context,  it  was
submitted that the Pondicherry Act is not a new  law  within  the  scope  of
Entry 93 of List I. It was further submitted that  the  Pondicherry  Act  of
2005 not being a law falling within the scope of Entries 43 and  44  of  the
Union List and falling within the Entries  in  List  III,  the  question  of
threshold lack of competence or invasion of a forbidden territory  does  not
arise.  Whether or not the Parliament could effect any further expansion  of
the provisions of Sections 58A or 58AA, could  not,  therefore,  occupy  the
field relating to offences or crimes which are questions that  can  only  be
raised in the  context  of  List  I  and  List  II  controversies,  and  are
irrelevant for the purposes of the present case.

31.   According to Mr. Venkataramani, one of the other reasons for  enacting
the Pondicherry Act of 2005 was to protect the interests of  depositors  and
the Pondicherry Act of 2005 has primarily made  the  retention  of  deposits
as a wrongful and fraudulent act  and  thus  constituting  a  crime  and  an
actionable wrong. It was further submitted  that  the  Act  provides  for  a
special procedure and machinery  for  retrieval  of  the  deposits  or  such
property as may answer and satisfy the claims of the depositors.   The  law,
therefore, essentially provides for tracing the source  of  the  monies  and
the deposits in the hands of third parties and make it available to  satisfy
the  claims  of  the  depositors.   According  to  Mr.  Venkataramani,   the
aforesaid legislation would fall under  Entry  I  (criminal  law);  Entry  8
(actionable wrong), Entry 13 (civil procedure) and Entry 21 (commercial  and
industrial  monopolies)  of  List  II  of  the  Seventh  Schedule   to   the
Constitution. According to Mr. Venkataramani,  none    of    the    measures
under   the   Act could be said to relate  to  regulation  of  the  business
activities of any corporation and even if such submission  is  taken  to  be
correct, the Pondicherry Act of 2005 could not be traced to  Entries  43  or
93 of List I. Reference was also made to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in
Greater Bombay Co-op Bank vs. United Yarn [(2007) 6 SCC 236].

32.   Going a step  further,  Mr.  Venkataramani  urged  that  even  if  the
reference to Entries 1 and 30 of List II could be open  to  question,  Entry
32 of List II, insofar as it permitted any law relating to  incorporated  or
unincorporated establishments, would be available not as  a  law  regulating
the business activities of the establishments, but as  a  law  dealing  with
actionable   wrongs   committed   by   establishments.    Consequently,   no
interference was called for with the decision of the Madras  High  Court  as
the law in question had been  enacted  to  deal  with  securing  the  public
order, which is a concept of wide amplitude.  It was  contended  that  apart
from the decision of this  Court  in  Romesh  Thapar  Vs.  State  of  Madras
[(1950) SCR 594] and Ram Manohar Lohia (1991) 1 SCR  709],  this  Court  had
also considered the question in Rev. Stainislaus Vs. State of  M.P.  [(1977)
2 SCR 611] and Arun Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal [(1970) 3  SCR  288]  and
has in no uncertain terms held that certain deviations could be resorted  to
in order to deal  with  securing  public  order.  Furthermore,  security  of
transactions and their integrity are equally and deeply relevant  to  public
order. The reference to and reliance placed upon Entry 97  of  List  I  was,
therefore, misconceived.

33.   It was then submitted that the  submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the
Appellant that  Section  2(d)  of  the  Pondicherry  Act  does  not  include
incorporated entities, as distinct from the corresponding provisions of  the
Tamil Nadu  Act,  is  misconceived.   While  the  definition  of  “financial
establishment” in the Tamil Nadu Act was apparently different, the  ultimate
result was the same. Furthermore, the Pondicherry Act  uses  the  expression
“person” in wide terms to  include  natural  persons  (as  individuals)  and
companies. Mr. Venkataramani submitted  that  the  expression  “person”  has
been exhaustively dealt with in P. Ramanatha Ayyar’s “Advanced Law  Lexicon”
and did not require any further elucidation. Referring to Section 11 of  the
Indian Penal Code, Mr. Venkataramani  submitted  that  the  same  defines  a
person to include a company  or  association  or  body  of  persons  whether
incorporated or not.  Accordingly, the use of  the  expression  “person”  in
the  Pondicherry  Act  also  included  both  unincorporated   as   well   as
incorporated companies.

34.   Mr. Venkataramani urged that there was no repugnancy  at  all  between
the provisions of the Pondicherry Act or the Companies Act, 1956 and/or  the
Reserve Bank of India Act and in the absence  of  any  occupied  legislation
enacted under the provisions of the Companies Act and the  Reserve  Bank  of
India Act, the question as to whether the Pondicherry  Act  was  subservient
to the Central legislation was no longer  relevant,  particularly  when  the
said Act had received the  assent  of  the  President  and  was,  therefore,
protected under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.  Consequently,  the  law
being traceable to Entry 32 of List II and Entries 1, 8, 13 and 21  of  List
I and the same having received the assent of  the  President,  stands  fully
protected by the provisions of Section 31 of the 1963 Act.   In  support  of
his submissions Mr. Venkataramani referred to the decisions  of  this  Court
in S. Pushpa and others Vs. Sivachanmugavelu and others [(2005)  3  SCC  1],
New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. State of Punjab & Others [(1997) 7  SC  339]
and T.M. Kanniyan Vs. I.T.O. Pondicherry [(1968) 2 SCR 103].   In the  first
of the said three decisions, this Court had the  occasion  to  consider  the
question  of  reservation  in  regard  to  recruitment  of  Scheduled  Caste
candidates in the Union Territory of Pondicherry.  It was  held  that  those
Scheduled Caste candidates who had  migrated  from  other  States  would  be
eligible for selection and appointment to posts reserved for  the  Scheduled
Caste candidates in  the  Union  Territory  of  Pondicherry,  since  it  had
consistently followed  the  policy  of  the  Central  Government  where  all
candidates irrespective of the State/Union Territory were given the  benefit
of reservation and the selections made pursuant to such policy  were  valid.
The second decision in the case of New  Delhi  Municipal  Council  was  with
regard to the powers of the Central Government to make laws with respect  to
Union Territories under Article 246(4) of the Constitution of India.   While
deciding the said issue, it was held by this Court that where the  enactment
could be related to and upheld with reference to some constitutional  value,
its validity should be upheld.  The third  decision  is  also  on  the  same
lines.

35.   Mr. Venkataramani ended on the note that since the  Parliamentary  Act
had received the assent of the President, it would have effect  irrespective
of the Central legislation and as decided in Charan Lal Sahu  Vs.  Union  of
India [(1990) 1 SCC 613] conceptually and jurisprudentially there is no  bar
on the State to  assume  responsibilities  analogous  to  parens  patria  to
discharge the State’s obligations under the Constitution.   Learned  counsel
also referred to the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act, which has been traced  to
Entry 13 of the Concurrent List. Mr. Venkataramani urged  that  the  Appeals
were entirely misconceived and were liable to be dismissed.

36.   From the case made out  on  behalf  of  the  Appellant  Mill  and  the
submissions in support thereof, what emerges for  decision  is  whether  the
subject matter covered by the Pondicherry Act is relatable  to  Entries  43,
44, 45 and 97 of the Union List or to Entries 1, 30  and  32  of  the  State
List. Coupled with the aforesaid  question  is  the  other  question  as  to
whether the  decision  of  this  Court  in  K.K.  Baskaran’s  case  (supra),
upholding the validity of the Tamil Nadu Act, would also be  applicable  for
determining the validity of the Pondicherry Act,  having  particular  regard
to Mr. Ganguli’s submissions that there were major differences  in  the  two
enactments.

37.   As far as the first question  is  concerned,  on  a  scrutiny  of  the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, it will be seen that  Entries  43,  44
and 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution deal  with  the
following matters, namely,

      “43.    Incorporation,  regulation   and   winding   up   of   trading
      Corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations,
      but not including Co-operative Societies.


      44.    Incorporation,  regulation  and  winding  up  of  corporations,
      whether trading or not, with objects not confined to  one  State,  but
      not including universities.


      45.   Banking.”

38.   In other words, each of the above-mentioned Entries deal with  matters
relating to trading  corporations,  which  include  banking,  insurance  and
financial corporations, whereas Entries 1, 30 and 32 of List  II  deal  with
the following :-

      “1.   Public order (but not including [the use of any naval,  military
      or air force or any other armed force or the Union  or  of  any  other
      force subject to the control of the Union or of any contingent or unit
      thereof] in aid of the civil power).


      30.    Money-lending  and  money-lenders;   relief   of   agricultural
      indebtedness.


      32.   Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations,  other
      than those specified  in  List  I,  and  universities;  unincorporated
      trading, literary,  scientific,  religious  and  other  societies  and
      associations; co-operative societies.”


39. The Entries relating to  the  State  List  referred  to  above,  and  in
particular Entry 30, appear to be a more appropriate source  of  legislative
authority of the State Assembly for enacting laws  in  furtherance  of  such
Entry.  The power to enact the Pondicherry Act, the Tamil Nadu Act  and  the
Maharashtra Act is relatable to Entries 1, 30 and  32  of  the  State  List,
which involves the business  of  unincorporated  trading  and  money-lending
which falls within the ambit of Entries 1, 30 and 32 of the State List.

40.   In addition to the above, it has also to be noticed that  the  objects
for which the Tamil Nadu Act, the Maharashtra Act and  the  Pondicherry  Act
were enacted, are identical, namely,  to  protect  the  interests  of  small
depositors from fraud perpetrated on unsuspecting investors,  who  entrusted
their  life  savings  to  unscrupulous  and  fraudulent  persons   and   who
ultimately betrayed their trust.

41.   However, coming back to the constitutional  conundrum  that  has  been
presented on account of the two views expressed by  the  Madras  High  Court
and the Bombay High Court, it has to be considered as to which  of  the  two
views would be more consistent  with  the  constitutional  provisions.   The
task has been simplified to some extent by the fact  that  subsequently  the
decision of the Bombay High Court declaring the Maharashtra Act to be  ultra
vires, has been set aside by this Court, so  that  there  is  now  a  parity
between the judgments relating to the Maharashtra Act  and  the  Tamil  Nadu
Act.

42.   The three enactments referred  to  hereinabove,  were  framed  by  the
respective legislatures to safeguard the interests of  the  common  citizens
against exploitation by unscrupulous  financial  establishments  mushrooming
all over the country.  That is, in fact, the main object  indicated  in  the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the three different enactments.

43.   Even if it is to be accepted that the Pondicherry Act is relatable  to
Entries 43, 44 and 45 of List I, it  can  be  equally  said  that  the  said
enactment is also relatable to Entries 1, 30 and  32  of  List  II,  thereby
leaving the field of legislation open, both to the  Central  Legislature  as
well as the State  Legislature.   In  such  a  situation,  unless  there  is
anything repugnant in the State Act in relation  to  the  Central  Act,  the
provisions of the State Act will have primacy in determining the lis in  the
present case.  Apart from the above, the provisions of the  Pondicherry  Act
are also saved by virtue of Article  254(2)  of  the  Constitution.   For  a
proper understanding of the legal position, the provisions  of  Article  254
are extracted hereinbelow :-


      “254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws  made  by
      the Legislatures of States – (1) If any provision of a law made by the
      Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made  by
      Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision
      of an existing law with respect to one of the  matters  enumerated  in
      the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions  of  clause  (2),
      the law made by Parliament, whether passed before  or  after  the  law
      made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the  case  may  be,  the
      existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the
      State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void;


      (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one
      of  the  matters  enumerated  in  the  concurrent  List  contains  any
      provision repugnant to the  provisions  of  an  earlier  law  made  by
      Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter,  then,  the
      law so made by the Legislature of such State shall,  if  it  has  been
      reserved for the consideration of the President and has  received  his
      assent, prevail in that State:


      Provided that nothing in this clause  shall  prevent  Parliament  from
      enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including
      a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the
      Legislature of the State.”


44.   As will be evident from the above, clause (1) of Article 254  provides
that when there are two  laws  enacted  by  the  Parliament  and  the  State
Legislature in which certain inconsistencies  occur,  then  subject  to  the
provisions of clause (2), the law made by the Parliament would  prevail  and
the law made by the State Legislature to the extent it is repugnant  to  the
Central law, shall be void.  Clause (2), however, also provides  that  in  a
given situation where a law of a State is in conflict with the law  made  by
Parliament, the law so made by  the  State  Legislature  shall,  if  it  has
received the assent of the President, prevail in that State. In the  instant
case,  the  Pondicherry  Act  had  received  the  assent  of  the  President
attracting the provisions of Article 254(2) of the Constitution.

45.    At  this  stage,  it  may  also  be  worthwhile   to   consider   Mr.
Venkataramani’s submissions that the power  to  enact  the  Pondicherry  Act
could be traced to Entries 1, 8, 13 and 21 of the Concurrent List.  Entry  1
of List III deals with criminal law, including all matters included  in  the
Indian Penal Code at the commencement of this  Constitution,  but  excluding
offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified  in  List
I or List II and excluding the use of naval, military or air forces  or  any
other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power.   Entry  8  deals
with actionable wrongs.  Entry 13 deals with civil procedure while Entry  21
deals with Commercial and Industrial monopolies, combines and trusts.   Such
submission has been advanced by Mr. Venkataramani in view of the  provisions
of Section 58A, 58AA and 58AAA of the Companies Act, 1956,  which  all  deal
with deposits invited and accepted by Companies.  The  said  submission  is,
however, subject to the condition that the provisions of the  Companies  Act
are also attracted to the provisions of the Pondicherry Act.   Although,  it
has been argued by Mr. Ganguli that the  provisions  of  the  Companies  Act
would not be attracted, we cannot overlook the amendment to  the  definition
of “financial establishment” included in the Tamil Nadu Act and  as  defined
in the  Pondicherry  Act.   The  definition  of  the  expression  “financial
establishment” in Section 2(d)  of  the  Pondicherry  Act,  which  has  been
extracted in paragraph 14 hereinbefore, includes  any  person  or  group  of
individuals or a firm carrying on business of accepting deposits  under  any
scheme or arrangement or in  any  other  manner,  but  does  not  include  a
Corporation or a cooperative society  owned  or  controlled  by  either  the
Central Government or the State Government or a banking company  as  defined
under Section 5 of the Banking Regulation  Act,  1949.   In  our  view,  the
expression “any person” is wide enough to cover both  a  natural  person  as
also a juristic person, which would  also  include  a  Company  incorporated
under the Companies Act, 1956. In that view of the  matter,  the  definition
in Section 2(d) of the Pondicherry Act would also include a Company such  as
the  Appellant  Mill,  which  accepts  deposits  from  investors,   not   as
shareholders of such Company, but merely as investors  for  the  purpose  of
making profit.  In this regard, reference may also be made to Section 11  of
the Indian Penal Code which defines a  “person”  to  include  a  Company  or
Association or body of persons, whether incorporated  or  not.  Accordingly,
we  are  inclined  to  accept  Mr.  Venkataramani’s  submissions  that   the
expression “person” in the Pondicherry Act  includes  both  incorporated  as
well as unincorporated companies.

46.   The decision in K.K. Baskaran’s case (supra) so far as it  relates  to
protection of interests of depositors, cannot be ignored.  In our  view  the
decision rendered by the Madras High Court in K.K. Baskaran’s  case  (supra)
would be equally applicable to the facts of this case.  We have to  bear  in
mind that the validity of the Tamil Nadu Act and the  Maharashtra  Act  have
been upheld by the Madras High Court and this Court.   The  objects  of  the
Tamil Nadu Act, the Maharashtra Act and the Pondicherry Act being  the  same
and/or similar in nature, and since the validity of the Tamil Nadu  Act  and
the Maharashtra Act have been upheld, the decision of the Madras High  Court
in upholding the validity of the Pondicherry Act must also be affirmed.   We
have to keep in mind the beneficial nature of the three  legislations  which
is to protect the interests of small depositors,  who  invest  their  life’s
earnings and savings in schemes for making profit  floated  by  unscrupulous
individuals and  companies,  both  incorporated  and  unincorporated.   More
often than not, the investors end  up  losing  their  entire  deposits.   We
cannot help but observe that in the instant case  although  an  attempt  has
been made on behalf of the Appellant to state that it was not the  Appellant
Company which had accepted the deposits, but M/s PNL Nidhi Ltd.,  which  had
changed its name five times, such an argument  is  one  of  desperation  and
cannot prima facie be accepted.  This appears to be one of such cases  where
funds have been collected from the gullible public  to  invest  in  projects
other than those indicated  by  the  front  company.   It  is  in  fact  the
specific case of  the  Respondents  that  the  funds  collected  by  way  of
deposits were diverted to create the assets of the Appellant Mill.

47.   In such circumstances, we are not inclined to accept  the  submissions
made by Mr. Ganguli, since in our view there is  little  difference  between
the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act and the Pondicherry Act,  which  is  to
protect the interests of depositors who stand to lose their  investments  on
account of the diversion of the funds collected by M/s PNL  Nidhi  Ltd.  for
the benefit of the Appellant Mill, which  is  privately  owned  by  Shri  V.
Kannan and Shri V. Baskaran, who are also Directors of M/s PNL Nidhi Ltd.

48.   The  Appeals  are,  accordingly,  dismissed  with  costs  assessed  at
Rs.1,00,000/-.



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (ALTAMAS KABIR)







                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                         (J. CHELAMESWAR)
New Delhi
Dated:27.09.2012