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Saturday, September 15, 2012

Malice an intent to defame is a must for charge of defamation/it are absent/prosecution quashed.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 

Reserved
AFR

Criminal Revision No.2929 of 2006

Dr. Vishnu Dutt Agarwal .....................Revisionist

Versus

State of U.P. and another ................ Respondents.

Hon'ble Vinod Prasad, J.

Challenge in this revision by the revisionist Dr. Vishnu Dutt Agarwal is to his summoning order dated 12.4.2006 passed by C.J.M. Muzaffarnagar in Complaint Case No.1778/9/2006, Dr. Karan Pundir Vs. Dr. Vishnu Dutt Agarwal, for offence u/s 500 I.P.C. and entire proceeding of the aforesaid trial.
A brief resume of the unfolded background facts indicate that complainant Dr. Smt. Karan Pundir was a demonstrator (Gynaecology & Obstractics) in Swami Kalyan Dev Rajkiya Aurvedik College, Rampur District Muzaffarnagar, and was also running Aishwarya Nursing Home at her residence in house no.154 Mohalla Brahmpuri, P.S. Civil Lines, Muzaffarnagar. Revisionist accused was the acting principal and superintendent of the said college and hospital and resided in House No.189/27 Mohalla Ompuri, P.S. Kotwali City, District Muzaffarnagar. In her estimation complainant was educated and belonged to a respectable family. Her father Rajpal Singh Pundir is a practising advocate in district court, Muzaffarnagar, whereas her husband Rajesh Kumar Chauhan had superannuated from Supervisor post in Bharat Electronics in 2004. Complainant is an income tax payee and her PAN No. is ADAPP 1909 H. In the estimation of general public, she was a reputed doctor, a gentle human being and a courteous family doctor and was respected as such, her husband was also respected because of her reputation. To defame the complainant and tarnish her family prestige revisionist accused, who harboured animosity against her, had, knowingly, sent frivolous and false complaints against her to the Director, Ayurvedic and Unani Services, Lucknow, U.P., because of which, complainant was physically and economically tormented and her image was tarnished in estimation of general public. All this was done for faux pas and temerity as an abash. Revisionist accused had also publicised those allegations and had even tendered them before the City Magistrate, in an inquiry, which was being conducted against him, when the City Magistrate had no concern with such writings. This was done by the accused revisionist only with the motive to bring down and lower complainant's social prestige about which many rumours were being aired. In one of the applications, dated 25.4.2005, it was mentioned".....in subordinating administrative authorities because her husband and his caste Thakur he had got lots of influence on the local goons." In another application dated 6.5.2005, it was mentioned "otherwise nursing home has got illegal income and property and therefore, had no need for any loan and because of being a woman and her husband having influenced with the local goons, to harass the principal that she had applied to withdraw GPF." Complainant had further alleged that for a period of an entire month she was under mental shock and stress for which she had got herself treated medically. After reading such allegations general public started thinking of complainant and her husband as anti-social elements, who earn livelihood by illegal means. Her nursing home income dwindled because of aforesaid allegations.
With above allegations complaint was filed by respondent complainant against the revisionist, in which two persons, Taraspal Singh, Advocate and Arvind Kumar, Advocate, were cited as witness.
Learned C.J.M., registered the complaint as complaint case no. 1778/9/2006, Dr. Karan Pundir Vs. Dr. Vishnu Dutt Agarwal and recorded the statement of the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C. on 28.1.2006, in which, complainant reiterated her allegations inked in her complaint. During an inquiry, under section 202 Cr.P.C., learned C.J.M., recorded statements of Arvind Kumar, Advocate, P.W.1 and Taras Pal Singh, P.W.2, who had supported complainant's allegations. As documentary evidences, complainant had filed copies of letters written by the accused to the Director Ayurvedic and Unani Services, Lucknow, U.P. and to the City Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar and some other letters.
Learned C.J.M. on the strength of oral and documentary evidences opined that, prima facie, offence of defamation was disclosed and there was sufficient ground to proceed against accused revisionist, and therefore, had summoned him to stand trial for charge u/s 500 IPC, for defamation, vide impugned summoning order dated 12.4.2006, which is now the subject matter of the instant revision.
I have heard learned counsel for the revisionist as well as Sri P.S. Pundir, learned counsel for the complainant respondent and Sri Patanjali Mishra, learned AGA for the State in support and opposition of this revision.
Learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that from the mentioned words in the complaint no defamation of the complainant is disclosed. It was evident that, in fact, the words mentioned in the complaint, were extracts of letters written by the revisionist to the higher departmental officer, Director, Ayurvedic and Unani Services, Lucknow, U.P., with a motive to curb insalubrious practise of not taking classes and devoting time to the hospital and instead running a nursing home, with desired objective for better functioning of the hospital and college. A copy of those letters have been annexed by the revisionist as annexure Nos. 5 and 6 to this revision. Inviting attention of the Court on these annexures, it was submitted that, the truth of the matter was that the complainant had applied for withdrawing of her GPF money but the same could not be paid to her, as her application was pending before the Director's office and for getting that money, she was pressuring the revisionist Principal with the help of staff and students. It was further mentioned in one of the letters that because of her pressure tactics, administration of the college and the hospital had become difficult. It was further disclosed that complainant used to run her own nursing home and she did not take any classes. For the said activities, even, oral complaint was made against her. In annexure No.5, it was mentioned that complainant Karan Pundir had used derogatory language in her application for withdrawing GPF money, especially when she was well aware of the fact that her pass book had not been received in the college. Accused revisionist had sought directions from Director, Ayurvedic and Unani medicine, in that respect. It was also sketched by the revisionist, in those annexures, that, on 19.4.2005 complainant had absented herself till 11 a.m., when she was marked absent by the revisionist, but inspite of that, subsequently at 11 a.m., she had signed on the attendance register, showing her presence at 9 a.m. Similarly, on 25.4.2005 at 10.30 a.m. she was marked absent, but subsequently, she signed attendance register showing her presence at 9.30 a.m. Revisionist had further elicited in those letters that the activities of Dr. Karan Pundir(Complainant) indicated that she likes to "disobey Administrative Officers and because of thakur caste her husband has got great influence in local goons" and therefore, no patient or employee is ready to narrate truth against her. Annexure No.5, also slated that complainant used to come to the hospital at 2 p.m. and returns back without devoting much time and when an explanation was called for from her regarding such dereliction of duty, she replied alleging malafides. It was further mentioned that some women employees also follow complainant's suit and disobey orders by accused revisionist, the Acting Principal. These allegations were also repeated in annexure no.6, wherein it was also mentioned that purpose for withdrawing GPF was not mentioned by the complainant and her passbook was not available and she had used derogatory and defamatory language. It was also penned down, in annexure no.6, that complainant had no requirement of her GPF funds, and, had her requirement being genuine, she would have applied for it on a correct proforma form meant for the said purpose. Besides above, it was also mentioned in that letter, annexure no. 6, that nursing home had got illegal income and property and her (complainant's) husband being a thakur had got influence over local goons, therefore, to torment and harass the Principal, that she had applied for withdrawal of her GPF, which is clear from the language used by her. It was also mentioned therein that, in respect of bigamy committed by her and regarding other properties, she(Complainant) had not intimated the college, which was a breach of Employees Conduct Rules, 1956. It is in these two complaints, which was filed by the revisionist, that extracting one or two lines, that present complaint was filed and hence in fact there was no case of defamation. Complaint was made to the higher officer for taking correctional measures against the complaint and therefore, no offence is disclosed against the revisionist accused and his case is squarely covered under seventh, eighth and ninth exceptions of section 499 IPC. It is further pointed out that, prior to the filing of complaint, revisionist accused had already filed applications against her before the Director, Ayurvedic and Unani Services, Lucknow, U.P. and therefore, to seek vengeance and with vindictive intention that the complaint was filed by the complainant. It was concludingly submitted that the present proceedings is nothing but vexatious, purposive, malafide and was instituted only to seek vendetta and therefore, impugned summoning order be quashed including revisionist prosecution.
Refuting revisionist submissions and snipping it, complainant's counsel submitted that the words mentioned in the complaint were defamatory and derogatory in nature and therefore, the complaint cannot be quashed and revisionist prosecution should be allowed to proceed. It was next submitted that, to establish the protection of exceptions, trial must be permitted to proceed as, at it's threshold, it cannot be accepted as gospel truth to scuttle a legitimate prosecution.
I have considered rival submissions and have vetted oral and documentary evidences including affidavits filed by both the sides. Some common facts, which are not disputed are that the accused is the Principal (Acting) of Swami Kalyan Dev Rajkiya Aurvedik College, in which complainant was working as Instructor (Gynaecology & Obstractics). It is also not disputed that respondent complainant runs a nursing home in her house namely Aishwarya Nursing Home. It is also not disputed that the offending words are extracts of two complaints made by the accused revisionist to the higher superior officer i.e.: Director, Ayurvedic and Unanai medicine, which were dispatched prior to the filing of the complaint by respondent complainant. From the contents of these letters, the genuineness of which are not denied, it is evident that the same were in respect of professional conduct of the complainant respondent no.2 and her behaviour. It is also admitted that respondent complainant had applied for withdrawal of her GPF money but she was not getting it, as her pass book was not with the college and the matter was pending with the Director, regarding which some directions were also sought by the accused revisionist. In such background facts, letters written by the accused revisionist, has to be read a whole to decipher true intention of the writer to determine as to whether he wanted to defame the complaint or his intention was only to curb the insalubrious, unethical practise. For determining above aspects, letters written by the accused revisionist has to read, not in isolation, but as whole with prefix and suffixes of extracted words. Summating from that point of view, it becomes evident that whatever was mentioned by the accused revisionist was that, being thakur by caste complainant's husband had got influence over local goons, because of which nobody was ready to divulge the truth against the complainant, who was not taking interest in teaching classes and was not attending the hospital and was marking her attendance ante timed. This expression was mentioned by the accused revisionist not with the idea to defame the complaint but to tune-in the working of the college and the hospital in it's functioning. It also transpires that the complainant was more worried because of dwindling nursing home income rather than the uttered words. According to her own version, she waited for a whole month, as she was mentally tormented. She herself is a doctor by profession and such her ipse dixit does not appeal to common sense. Her father-in-law is an advocate and therefore, she has an easy access to the courts of law. Being a Principal, it was the responsibility of the accused revisionist to maintain the decorum, dignity, smooth running of the college and the hospital. With such an idea in mind if the accused revisionist had written above referred sentences, while pointing out malpractices adopted by the complainant, it was not because he wanted to defame her, but because he was imbibed with the idea of rectifying the misdeed for the betterment of the institution. No personal allegation was levelled by the accused against complainant except that she had signed ante time on attendance register. As argued, case of the accused revisionist is covered in more than one exceptions of Section 499 IPC. The Director Medical Services is a superior authority and if a letter was addressed to him by the Principal of an institution, it does not necessarily mean that the Principal wanted to defame the demonstrator, who was a subordinate staff. This is absolutely clear from the illustrations, which is mentioned in seventh exception to Section 499 IPC. Case of the revisionist accused is also covered under eighth exception, as the Director has got a lawful authority over the Principal and the Demonstrator in Ayurvedic and Unani Medical College.
Moreover, I am of the view that ingredients for making out offence of defamation u/s 500 IPC are lacking in the instant case. This aspect is also clear from the statutory illustrations mentioned in eighth exception to Section 499 IPC. On such evidences, as is mentioned herein above, allowing the revisionist to face trial and go through the rigmarole of criminal trial procedure will be doing injustice to him. No doubt exceptions to section 499 IPC has to be established during a proper trial but this does not divest this court to exercise it's revisional power to curb a malafide prosecution when no offence is disclosed against the accused and the summoning order was passed in a cursory manner. This is a dispute between a Principal and a demonstrator. Accused revisionist had no personal axe to grind against the complainant. It seems that because of the strict attitude by the Principal and some technical difficulties in disbursing GPF funds that the complaint was lodged with ulterior motives. Letter written by the revisionist only expresses his apprehensions that because of connection of complainant's husband no body is ready to state the truth against her. This was only with an intention to tone down working of the college and the hospital. In this respect some of the exemplar decisions, which can be relied upon are as follows:-
In G. Janardhana Reddy v. A. Narayana Reddy and Anr:2010 Cr.L.J. 2660 it has been held as under:-

"In the case on hand, intention of the petitioner is evident that he made the same with an intention to preserve the disputed site to the deity and not with an intention to harm reputation of the first respondent. In that view of the matter, pleadings i.e., written statement, counter and appeal grounds and evidence by way of affidavit in this case cannot be defamatory in nature."
In Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande and others vs. Uttam and another: AIR 1999 SC 1028 it has been held by the apex court as under:-
"7. The next question that arises for consideration is whether reading the complaint and the report of the Treasury Officer which was obtained pursuant to the Order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) of Section 201 can it be said that a prima facie case exist for trial or exception 8 to Section 400 clearly applies and consequently in such a case, calling upon the accused to face trial would be a travesty of justice. The gravamen of the allegations in the complaint petition is that the accused persons made a complaint to the Treasury Officer, Amravati, containing false imputations to the effect that the complainant had come to the office in a drunken state and abused the Treasury Officer, Additional Treasury Officer and the Collector and circulated in the office in the filthy language and such imputations had been made with the intention to cause damage to the reputation and services of the complainant. In order to decide the correctness of this averment, the Magistrate instead of issuing process had called upon the Treasury Officer to hold inquiry and submit a report and the said Treasury Officer did submit a report to the Magistrate. The question for consideration is whether the allegations in the complaint read with the report of the Magistrate make out the offence under Section 500 or not. Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code defines the offence of defamation and Section 500 provides the punishment for such offence. Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with regard to the subject matter of accusation. The report of the Treasury Officer clearly indicates that pursuant to the report made by the accused persons against the complainant, a departmental inquiry had been initiated that the complainant was found to be guilty. Under such circumstances the fact that the accused persons had made a report to the superior officer of the complainant alleging that he had abused to the Treasury Officer in a drunken state which is the gravamen of the present complaint and nothing more, would be covered by exception 8 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. By perusing the allegations made in the complaint petition, we are also satisfied that no case of defamation has been made out. In this view of the matter, requiring the accused persons to face trial or even to approach the Magistrate afresh for reconsideration of the question of issuance of process would not be in the interest of Justice. On the other hand in our considered opinion this is a fit case for quashing the order of issuance of process and the proceedings itself. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and confirm the order of the learned Sessions Judge and quash the criminal proceeding itself."
In Vedurumudi Rama Rao vs. Chennuri Venkat Rao and another:1997 Cr.L.J. 3851 it has been held as under:-
"9th exception :- Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or others interest. - It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation has to be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good."
This exception relates to private communications which a person makes, in good faith, for the protection of his own interest, or of any other person, or for the public good. Admittedly, the petitioner-accused herein issued the said Circular only on the instructions from the Central and Zonal offices by repeating what he was asked to communicate to his Branch Managers in the region. The learned counsel for the petitioner also made available the letters issued by the Central and Zonal Offices directing the Regional Managers to issue the said Circular. Therefore, there is nothing on record to hold that the petitioner-accused had issued the said Circular with any malice against this complainant or to cause any damage to his reputation as such. He issued the said Circular at the instance of the Central and Zonal Office. Moreover, it is a confidential Circular not meant for the public at large, but to his Branch Managers to be cautious while dealing with the complainant and others mentioned in that Circular in their business transactions. Moreover, the said Circular had emanated after due investigation done by the Vigilance Department of the Central Office of Andhra Bank. There cannot be any doubt that such a Circular was issued only in good faith and also for the public good and to safeguard the interest of the public at large. In a case of this type, the truth of the imputations made against the complainant need not be proved by an accused person claiming the privilege under exception 9. Therefore, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken to be true, the offence under Section 500, I.P.C. is not made out as the exception No. 9 is squarely applicable to the facts in this case and as laid down in "State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335 : (1992 Cri LJ 527 quoted supra, the proceedings are liable to be quashed."
In Darusing Durgasing v. State of Gujarat and Anr:2006 CR.L.J. 720 it has been held as under:-

"In any case, in judicial proceeding certain facts are stated on oath and in the interest of T.L.A. and all other workers. Moreover, the said averments were made in good faith and without any malice. This Court is the proper forum where the proceedings are pending and ultimately, the Company Application No. 364 of 1998 filed by the Respondent No. 2 was rejected by this Court. The alleged averments and allegations in the affidavit-in-reply are, therefore, covered by the exceptions 7, 8, 9 to S. 499 and hence, no case is made out for defamation punishable under Section 500 of IPC.
14. Looking to the authorities relied upon by Mr. Naik, it appears that the petitioner's case is squarely covered by Exceptions 7, 8 and 9 of Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code and since the complaint does not disclose any offence against the present petitioner there is no need to send the petitioner to face the trial, as it would amount to travesty of justice. When submissions are made in good faith without any malicious motive, the person should not be sent to face criminal trial.
15. Looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case and considering the relevant law on the subject, the Court is of the view that the complaint filed by the respondent No. 2 does not disclose any offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC against the present petitioner and complaint is accordingly quashed and set aside."
In Valmiki Faleiro vs. Mrs. Lauriana Fernandes and others, etc.:2005 CR.L.J. 2498 it has been held by the apex court as under:-
"22. The essence of offence of defamation is the harm caused to the reputation of a person. Character is what a person actually is and reputation is what neighbours and others say he is. In other words, reputation is a composite hearsay and which is the opinion of the community against a person. Everyone is entitled to have a very high estimate of himself but reputation is the estimation in which a person is held by others. The commission of offence of defamation or publishing any imputations concerning any person must be "intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person (emphasis supplied.). The notice in question on the face of it does not contain any such imputation which could be said to harm the reputation of the complainant. On the other hand, a bare reading of the said notice shows that it has been published by accused Nos. 1 and 2 with a view to protect the right to the property which they believe they have a right. A person reading the said notice may at first flush be a little amused that the said accused are claiming a set of villages rather than think that it is published with a view to defame the complainant. All that the said accused have conveyed by the said notice is that the property/properties do not belong to the complainant but belong to them and that anyone dealing with the complainant will be doing so at their own risk. The contention that the said notice is per se defamatory and that it attributes dishonest intention that the complainant lacks business character and propriety appears to be a figment of the complainant's imagination. Such a conclusion cannot be culled out by a normal prudent person from a reading of the said notice which apparently was published by the said accused Nos. 1 and 2 to protect a right which they believe they have to the property and with a view to warn others that in case they enter into any transaction of sale with the complainant they would be doing so at their own risk and consequences. A reading of the notice, on the face of it, does not show that it was published with intention or knowledge to harm the reputation of the complainant. In my view, the learned Sessions Judge was right in exercising his discretion to quash and set aside the Order issuing process against the aforesaid accused."
In Harbhajan Singh versus State of Punjab :AIR 1966 SC 97 it has been held observed by the apex court as under:-
"21. Thus, it would be clear that in deciding whether an accused person acted in good faith under the Ninth Exception, it is not possible to lay down any rigid rule or test. It would be a question to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case - what is the nature of the imputation made; under what circumstances did it come to be made; what is the status of the person who makes the imputation, was there any malice in his mind when be made the said imputation; did he make any enquiry before he made it; are there reasons to accept his story that he acted with due care and attention and was satisfied that the imputation was true ? These and other considerations would be relevant in deciding the plea of good faith by an accused person who claims the benefit of the Ninth Exception."
In view of above exposition of law, when the facts of the present case are summated and vetted, there remains no doubt that the words mentioned in the complaint were not with an intention to defame the complainant or harm her reputation or lower her prestige in estimation of general public and there was total absence of any malice and mens rea and it were inked with an idea to bring about a betterment in the college and the institution and to curb the unholy practice, if at all, it was continuing. A principal was entitled to express his apprehension to the Director, Ayurvedic Unani Medical Services and, therefore, in my humble opinion, it is not a case for criminal prosecution of the revisionist accused , as there is absence of material to disclose offence u/s 500 I.P.C. It is one of those cases which falls in more than one category of apex court decision in State of Haryana Versus Bhajan Lal :AIR 1992 SC 604 wherein apex court has held as under:-
"108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I. R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
Revisionist prosecution seems to be tainted with malafide and vexatious which seems to have been launched with ulterior motives besides the fact that no offence is disclosed in the complaint.
Concluding discussion, revision is allowed. Impugned summoning order and the proceedings of the Complaint Case No.1778/9/2006, Dr. Karan Pundir Vs. Dr. Vishnu Dutt Agarwal, u/s 500 I.P.C. are hereby quashed.
Let a copy of the judgment be certified to the trial court for it's intimation.
Dt.11.4. 2012
RK/Arvind 


FABRICATED DYING DECLARATION BY POLICE OFFICER SUSPECTED COURT DIRECTS ENQUIRY PUNISHMENT POLICE OFFICER AND DOCTOR CERTIFYING DEAD PERSON'S FITNESS

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 

Court No. - 46
Criminal Misc. IInd Bail Application No. 284720 of 2011
And
Criminal Misc. Short Term Bail Application No. 109677 of 2012
In
Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL U/S 374 CR.P.C. No. - 1783 of 2010

Petitioner :- Upendra Singh @ Alalan
Respondent :- State Of U.P.
Petitioner Counsel :- Vijay Singh Sengar,J.S.P.Singh
Respondent Counsel :- Govt. Advocate

Hon'ble Amar Saran,J.
Hon'ble Anurag Kumar,J.
Heard Sri Vijay Singh Gour, learned counsel for the appellant (whose name has been wrongly printed on the list and it should be rightly printed on the next date), and the learned A.G.A. for the State.
This is the second bail application on behalf of the appellant Upendra Singh @ Allan in this criminal appeal which arises out of the judgement of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Kanpur Dehat dated 17.3.2010 in S.T. No. 241 of 2008, Crime No. 89 of 2006, P.S. Roora, Kanpur Dehat, convicting and sentencing the appellant to imprisonment for life under section 304 B IPC, and Rs. 8000 fine, in default, 1 year additional imprisonment, to 2 years R.I. and Rs. 1000 fine under section 498 A IPC, in default of payment of fine to 1 month additional imprisonment, and to 1 year R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1000 under section ¾ Dowry Prohibition Act, in default one month additional imprisonment.
The first bail application was rejected by an earlier Bench by an order dated 10.11.2010 observing that the "appellant was the husband of the deceased and according to the post mortem report, cause of death is burning and throttling. There were allegations of demand of dowry demand and torture on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry."
After its release by the earlier bench the second bail prayer has come up for consideration before us. As the learned counsel for the appellant sought to raise points on merits as well in this second bail application, we have proceeded to hear him also on merit.
The learned counsel contended that the observation in the post mortem report that the cause of death was burns and asphyxia due to throttling, were not correct, in view of the fact that there was a dying declaration (Ext. Kha-1) of the deceased Kalpana, wherein the deceased stated that she received burns when her saree caught fire whilst cooking food and that her husband and other family members were innocent. This dying declaration had been recorded by SI Radhey Shyam Yadav, and has been proved by a defence witness, DW 1, Dr. Surendra Singh, who was posted as a medical officer at the Primary Health Centre, Roora Kanpur Dehat, (Ramabai Nagar). He also urged that as the appellant had received burn injuries on his hands, the same could have only been caused when the appellant was trying to save the life of the deceased, hence no case of dowry death was disclosed.
The said dying declaration reads as follows:-
Jherh dYiuk iRuh misUnz flag fuoklh dk'khiqj Fkkuk :jk dkuiqj nsgkr us vkt fnukad 22-4-06 dks vLirky esa tyh gkyr esa c;ku fd;k fd ?kj esa [kkuk cukrs le; /kksrh esa vkx yx tkus ds dkj.k esjs 'kjhj ty x;k gS esjs ifr vkx cq>kus esa og Hkh ty x;s gSa1 gks'k gokl esa fcuk fdlh ncko ds LosPNk ls ;g c;ku ns jgh gwa fd esjs ifjokj okyksa dk blesa fdlh izdkj nksih ugha gS ;g c;ku MkDVj lkgc o iqfyl ds le{k ns jgh gwa1
g0 Jherh dYiuk
According to the post mortem report, however, the deceased had burns all over her body and her skin had peeled off. Blood was coming out from the nose, smell of kerosene oil was present. In the neck muscles clotted blood was present. There was a fracture of the hyoid bone on the left side of the neck. Soot particles were present in the trachea. Both lungs, gall bladder, spleen and kidneys were congested. Cause of death was burns and asphyxia due to throttling.
As the version contained in the dying declaration appears to be irreconcilable with the condition found in the autopsy, in view of the gravity of the injuries, the presence of burns over the entire body of the deceased and the fracture of the hyoid bone noted by the two doctors who conducted post mortem on the body of the deceased, it becomes important to determine whether the version as set out in the alleged dying declaration was correct, or whether the autopy was honestly conducted which would have ruled out the deceased making such a dying declaration.
Prima facie the dying declaration recorded by the SI Radhey Shyam Yadv and certified to be recorded by him by DW 1 Dr. Surendra Singh appears to be fabricated.
If the deceased had got burnt only because her sari caught fire whilst cooking as alleged in the dying declaration no smell of kerosene on the body would have been noticed during autopsy. With a fracture of the hyoid bone and the burns and other injuries on the corpse and the cause of death being burns and asphyxia due to throttling there was no likelihood of the deceased being alive for giving the dying declaration at the health centre between 10.20 a.m. and 10.35 a.m., after which she was referred to the Ursula Hospital, Kanpur. The contention of the appellant's counsel that the hyoid bone fracture and internal injuries could have been caused by the burns received by the deceased also does not appear acceptable to us at all.
There are tell tale lines in the dying declaration to the following effect: gks'k gokl esa fcuk fdlh ncko ds LosPNk ls ;g c;ku ns jgh gwa fd esjs ifjokj okyksa dk blesa fdlh izdkj nksih ugha gS ;g c;ku MkDVj lkgc o iqfyl ds le{k ns jgh gwa1 These lines to the effect that the deceased was in a fully conscious condition and had given the dying declaration with her own volition, free of any pressure, that her family members were innocent and that she was making the dying declaration in the presence of the doctor and the police officer appear to be extrinsic to the dying declaration and do not appear to be the natural words of a person on the verge of dying. Rather prima facie they appear to have been put into her mouth by a dishonest police official who claims to have recorded the dying declaration, in collusion with the doctor, who certified that she had made the alleged dying declaration in his presence.
Likewise the lines in the dying declaration that her husband got burnt in trying to save her could also be interpolated in the alleged dying declaration.
It could also not be ruled out that the appellant, husband of the deceased could have received the minor burn injuries in his hands etc. when he may have tried to throttle the deceased to ensure that she died, as she appears to be breathing after being burnt as there were soot particles in the trachea.
Significantly, D.W. 1 Dr. Surendra Singh did not even note the condition of the injuries on the body of the deceased, nor did he note the condition of fitness of the deceased to make the dying declaration at the beginning and conclusion of the dying declaration, (though he has mentioned administration of some medicines etc. to the deceased in a bed head ticket). But Dr. Singh has enthusiastically appeared as a witness for the defence. Neither the doctor nor the police official, Radhey Shyam Yadav (who was not examined by the prosecution or defence) made any effort to call a Magistrate to record the dying declaration, if indeed the deceased was alive at that stage.
Furthermore, it appears that conveniently, the said doctor DW 1 Surendra Singh has referred the matter to Ursula Hospital, Kanpur as that could have facilitated a dishonest police officer taking the plea that the deceased had died on the way to Kanpur. In our view, the Trial Judge has rightly observed that the conduct of this doctor and the recording of the dying declaration by the police officer appears to be highly suspicious.
This is not the first case when suspicion has arisen in the minds of the Courts that doctors and police officials at local levels may have colluded with the accused, and engaged in such a grave fraud by fabricating a false dying declaration to save the accused in a case of bride burning for dowry or other similar case. What hope does society or the victim have, if such dishonest frauds to try and save guilty offenders by avaricious doctors or police officials are allowed to go unpunished? It is indeed a matter of regret that Courts, after observing, at the most, that the conduct of such doctors or police officials appear to be not above board, leave the matters at that, and fail to pro-actively get such matters probed further and action initiated against culpable government personnel, and it is important that steps are taken to get down to the bottom of such matters and to punish the parties which are found engaged in fabricating such false documents or giving a dishonest opinion for showing a fabricated document to be genuine.
In this state of affairs we think that the Principal Secretary, Medical Health should get a thorough probe made as to whether this particular doctor DW 1 Surendra Singh, who was then posted at PHC Rura, Ramabai Nagar has genuinely found the deceased alive at the time of recording of the alleged dying declaration exonerating the accused, or has colluded with the accused persons for showing the deceased alive when she was either dead or incapable of having made the dying declaration.
The Director General of Police, U.P. should also get an inquiry conducted regarding the conduct of S.I. Radhey Shyam Yadav, as to whether, in the light of the DGP's probe and in view of the circumstances suggested above this police official may have fabricated the dying declaration, which was not made by the alleged declarant at all. In case the Principal Secretary Medical Health or the DGP, U.P., reach the conclusion after inquiry (after giving an opportunity of hearing to the charged doctor and police official to present their versions), that the dying declaration was fabricated and the claim of the doctor and the S.I. that the deceased had made the same to them was false and dishonest, they are to initiate stringent disciplinary and penal proceedings against the said persons, so that an exemplary message goes out that Courts and society will no more tolerate officials in key places indulging in such criminal acts to save accused of such grave crimes ostensibly for extraneous considerations. The Principal Secretary and the DGP are directed to submit their reports to this Court and also inform this Court about the action taken against the guilty parties within three months by 23.7.2012.
The second bail application has no force and it is rejected.
Learned counsel for the appellant also made a prayer for short term bail on the ground that his sister is to be married on 24.4.2012. As the father of the appellant who was also a co-accused, has been granted bail and is out of jail, there is no reason for granting short term bail, or even allowing the appellant to go to the venue of the marriage in custody. We do not see any merit in the short term bail application also and it is accordingly rejected.
Let a copy of this order be given to the learned A.G.A. by 23.4.2012 for compliance. The Registry is also directed to communicate this order to the Principal Secretary (Medical Health) and the DGP, U.P. within a week. Let copies of this order be also forwarded within a week to the Secretaries, Judicial Training and Research Institute and UP State Legal Services Authority, Lucknow and the National Judicial Academy, Bhopal, M.P., for communication to members of the lower judiciary, so that they may get inquiries initiated and actions taken at the stage of the trial itself against culpable police officers or doctors, or other government personnel or others when in similar circumstances they appear to be involved in fraudulent conduct or in giving false opinions.
List again on 23.7.2012
Order Date :- 20.4.2012
HSM 


Release of property u/s 17 of the Gangster's Act and punishment of crime u/s 3 of the Gangster's Act are different proceedings.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 

Reserved
AFR

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3000 OF 2003

Kailash Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited, Kanpur Nagar, through it's President Shaila Nath Srivastava.............................................................Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. and others...................................................Respondents.

Hon'ble Vinod Prasad J
In the most chequered background facts germinating this appeal, the pivotal of mooted question to be adjudicated peripheries in a rather narrow compass as to the scope and interpretation of section 17 of U.P. Gangster's and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act (Act VII of 1986), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and entitlement to possession there under, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this appeal.
Appellant Kailash Sahkari Avas Samiti, hereinafter referred to as Samiti (Society), through it's President Shaila Nath Srivastava, has preferred this appeal, challenging impugned judgement and order dated 19.5.2003, passed by Special Judge, Gangster's Act, Kanpur Nagar, in case no. 96 of 1987, Kailash Sahkari Avas Samiti versus Nand Lal and others, u/s 16/17 of the Act, P.S. Nawab Ganj, district Kanpur Nagar, by which impugned order Special Judge, Gangster's Act, has ordered that various involved landed case properties, be released in favour of respondents no. 2 to 18, u/s 17 of the Act, subject to the litigation pending in the competent court, and at the same time directing appellant Samiti and contesting private respondents to get their rights and title adjudicated and determined in the competent civil and revenue courts.
Narrated concisely, a glimpse of background facts indicate that the property involved in the case, which is subject matter of dispute, was originally owned by one Lala Gurdeen who was zamindar of village Jewra Nawabganj, district Kanpur Nagar. Lala Gurdeen had married twice. From his pre-deceased wife he had a daughter Hazaro Kunwar, who had two sons Maharaj Bahadur and Vijai Bahadur. From his second wife namely Amrit Kunwar, Lala Gurdeen had two daughters Mewa Kunwar, and Prago Kunwar. Mewa Kunwar was survived by his son Ram Dayal and grandson Madho Dayal. Lala Gurdeen expired on 10.12.1861. After demise of Lala Gurdeen, his widow second wife and his three surviving daughters had alienated certain properties, albeit they were limited owners. Smt. Amrit Kunwar died on 1.8.1880. After their demise, the three daughters inherited their real estate as limited owners without any alienation/transferable rights. Smt. Prago Kunwar lost breath on 8.7 1907, Hazaro Kunwar died on 24.1.1914, and Mewa Kunwar expired on 14.6.1923.. For succession of properties between sons of Hazaro Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar, namely Maharaj Bahadur, Vijai Bahadur, and Ram Dayal, two original suits were filed and litigation ensued in between them. First suit O.S.No. 25 of 1935, was filed by Maharaj Bahadur and Vijai Bahadur as plaintiffs claiming 2/3 share in the estate and second O.S. No. 34 of 1935 was instituted by Madho Dayal s/o Ram Dayal and grandson of Mewa Kunwar, claiming 1/3 share in the property. Trial court partly decreed both the suits on 4.10.43 as it held that most of the alienations made by the limited owners were illegal. For the reliefs, in respect of which both the suits were dismissed, two FAs were filed against trial court's judgement and decree in this court being FA Nos. 239 of 1945, and 171 of 1946. Both the FAs were judgmented by this court 14.5.63 and this court also concurred that most of the alienations made by the limited owners were illegal. However, it remanded the case back to the trial court to consider certain alienations made in favour of various persons, which also included alienation made in favour of Brahmavart Sanatan Dharm Mahamandal defendant no. 8 in the suit and also in respect of defendants no. 9 to 22 thereof. Order passed in above FAs, dated 14.5.63, was challenged by defendant no. 8 and 9 to 22 in the Hon'ble Supreme Court in civil appeals no. 636 to 639 of 1971. The apex court upheld certain part of trial court judgement and set aside remand order passed by this court.
Case of appellant Samiti is that it is a registered housing society and it allots plots to it's members on no profit no loss basis. Through various registered sale deeds of different dates it had purchased lands, which earlier consisted of erstwhile estate of Lala Gurdeen, from it's lawful owners. Details of various purchases are mentioned in separate Supplementary affidavit dated 8.10.2007, filed by the appellant. The disputed properties were mentioned in schedule Aa, Ba, Sa,Da,Ya,Ra and La. All these lands were non ZA, non - agricultural lands and were recorded as Usar, Banjar etc.
Schedule "Aa" was concerned with plot no. 71 to 76 of Mohal Parago Kunwar. Through registered sale deeds from it's registered owners mentioned in Khawat (Register of ownership) appellant Samiti had purchased said plots and, through Revenue case no. 267 of 1985, decided on 24.9.85, appellant Samiti had got it's name mutated over said plots as owners and since then it continued to be in possession.
Schedule "Ba" related to plot no. 61 of Mohal of Dargahi Lal, which too was purchased by appellant Samiti through registered sale deed from it's registered owners and, through revenue case no. 270 of 1985, decided on 24.9.85, appellant Samiti had got it's name mutated over said plots as owners and since then it continued to be in possession.
Schedule "Sa" related to plot Nos.61 (part) and 68 of Mohal of Dargahi Lal which too was purchased by appellant Samiti through registered sale deed from it's registered owners and, through revenue case no. 269 of 1985, decided on 24.9.85, appellant Samiti had got it's name mutated over said plots as owners and since then it continued to be in possession.
Schedule "Da" related with plot no. 78 of Mohal of Dargahi Lal which too was purchased by appellant Samiti through registered sale deed from it's registered owners and, through revenue case no. 2, decided on 30.1.87, appellant Samiti had got it's name mutated over said plots as owners and since then it continued to be in possession.
Schedule "Ya" related with plot no. 61 (Part) of Mohal of Hazaro Kunwar which too was purchased by appellant Samiti through registered sale deed from it's registered owners and, through revenue case no. 3, decided on 30.1.87, appellant Samiti had got it's name mutated over said plots as owners and since then it continued to be in possession.
Schedule "Ra" related with plot no. 217 Mohal of Hazaro Kunwar which too was purchased by appellant Samiti through registered sale deed from it's registered owners and, through revenue case no. 266 of 1985, decided on 24.9.85, appellant Samiti had got it's name mutated over said plots as owners and since then it continued to be in possession.
Schedule "La" related with plot no. 421 of Mohal of Shitala Prasad, Parago Kunwar, Mewa Kunwar and Dargahi Lal which too was purchased by appellant Samiti through registered sale deed from it's registered owners and, through revenue cases no. 264 of 1985,265 of 85, 268 of 85, 270 of 85, decided on 24.9.85, appellant Samiti had got it's name mutated over said plots as owners and since then it continued to be in possession.
On the basis of aforementioned revenue court proceedings name of appellant Samiti was also entered in Khewat( register of ownership).
Further case of appellant Samiti is that respondents are antisocial elements and they indulge in land grabbing. After purchase and mutation of it's name as owners in the revenue records, when the appellant Samiti started levelling and demarcating work on the aforesaid plots then respondents started interfering and creating hurdles into it's work with the help of anti-social elements.
Unable to resist respondent's manuvours, appellant Samiti approached the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar on 21.5.86, u/s 14 of the Act to undo the civil wrong committed by respondents. District Magistrate instituted an inquiry into the matter and ultimately appellant's allegations against respondents were found to be correct and hence police of P.S. Nawabganj attached the property in question on 21.11.87 under the orders of ACM, Kanpur Nagar, from the actual physical possession of the appellant Samiti and Sri Jagdish Narayan, a govt. employee, was appointed Administrator over the property. Ganga Deen and Abujar Khan were the two witnesses of attachment. It seems that under the orders of ACM, Kanpur Nagar, attached property was ex parte released in favour of respondents vide orders dated 5.12.87/9.12.87 u/s 15 of the Act. Appellant Samiti, therefore challenged that order by moving to Ld. Special Judge, Gangster's Act u/s 16(2) of the Act, on 24.12.87. It was on this application that case no. 96 of 87 was registered before Special Judge, Gangster's Act u/s 16(2) of the Act. Special Judge, finding ex parte order illegal, same day, directed re-attachment of involved properties. In pursuance of the orders by the Ld. Special Judge, properties were reattached by Nawabganj Police on 26.12.87. Besides many grounds urged in the application filed before Ld. Special Judge, appellant Samiti also rued, through an affidavit dated 6.1.88, that even though it was the sole claimant over property mentioned in schedule "Da", but even then the same was not released to it. While directing re-attachment, Special Judge, had also called for comments from District Magistrate and the police, who both submitted their comments on 30.6.88 and 1.6.88 respectively.
What is noticeable at this stage is that at every step of proceedings, one or the other Party, approached this court in it's various jurisdictions and filed various proceedings and in some cases interim orders were passed and in one such case (writ Petition) an interim order of status quo on the spot was also passed. Fate of all these proceedings shall be dealt with later on in the subsequent part of this judgement.
Reverting back to the proceedings pending before learned Special Judge, Gangster's Act, he, vide it's order dated 10.9.90, decided claim of appellant Samiti for release of disputed properties in it's favour, by holding that respondents had committed offences under the Act by raising false and fictitious claims and institution of malicious and sham legal proceedings to grab the properties and therefore disputed properties are liable to be released in favour of appellant Samiti. It however refrained from making a final order in those terms because of a stay order of status quo passed by this court in one of the writ petition No. 2480 of 88 as is referred to herein above. Ld. Special Judge however directed that after decision of this court, final determination regarding possession of properties shall be made. Besides aforesaid order Special Judge further allowed application filed by Public Prosecutor and u/s 10 of the Act, took cognizance of the offence against the respondents and summoned them to stand trial fixing 3.10.90 for their appearance in court to defend charge under the Act.
Record further revealed that after adjudication of entitlement of possession by the Ld. Special Judge, dated 10.9.90, respondents did not refrain from their illegal activities and hence appellant Samiti filed a FIR against them on 31.12 90 u/s 3 of the Act, which proceeding was challenged in this court in a 482 Cr.M.Application.
All the case filed this court concerning disputed properties were ordered to be clubbed together by Hon'ble The Chief Justice and were allotted to a Division Bench for disposal. The Division Bench ordered on 13.9.97 that Criminal Misc. Application No. 1866 of 1995, Nand Lal Gupta versus State of U.P., shall be treated as the leading case. All the connected cases were decided by the Division Bench vide it's order dated 4.9.97 and it was pleased to quash criminal prosecution of the accused under the Act instituted by Shaila Nath Srivastava by observing that the dispute relates to the estate belonging to Late Lala Gurdeen, regarding which many litigations were pending on the civil side and hence respondents had not earned the properties by gangasterism and hence they cannot be treated as gangsters and criminal prosecution was instituted to circumvent civil proceedings and no offence under the Act is made out against accused, who are respondents in this appeal. Division Bench however did not pass any order regarding possession of properties and entitlement thereof.
Since in order dated 10.9.90 Learned Special Judge had kept the matter of possession alive to be finally ordered after decision by this court, hence Ld. Special Judge took up that issue and passed the impugned order on 19.5.2003 and released the disputed properties to the respondents, which order is under challenge in this appeal.
On the aforesaid preceding input facts, I have heard Sri R.K.Saksena, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Niraj Tiwari, counsel for all the contesting respondents no. 2 to 18 and learned AGA for respondent State. At this juncture it is pointed out that interregnum, three respondents Jayant Kumar (Respondent No. 18), Sant Kumari (respondent no.15) and Ram Krishna Verma (respondent no.9) expired and proceeding of this appeal in their respect were abated, but their heirs were brought on record.
A priory, a preliminary objection was raised by the respondents counsel regarding maintainability of this appeal in this court, which issued was decided as preliminary issue and it was held that appeal is maintainable as section 372 of the Code (Cr.P.C.) read with section 18 of the Act read jointly preserves all the appeals provided for under the Code. It was noted that the Act is not a self-contained Code and for trial procedure it falls back on the provisions of the Code. It was further noted that since chapter XXIX of the code applies mutatis mutandis to appeals under the Act, hence in view of section 372 of the Code appeal against attachment or release of property shall be maintainable under the Act, just as appeal u/s 454 of the Code is maintainable. It was also noted that the appeal was entertained on 10.7.2003 and Act does not prohibit entertaining appeal against attachment u/s 18.
After deciding preliminary objection, appeal was heard on merits.
Snipping and castigating impugned judgement it was submitted by appellant's counsel that the impugned order is indefensible and cannot be sustained for too many reasons. First and foremost, it was submitted that same court, Special Judge Gangster's Act, on an earlier occasion, in it's final order dated 10.9.90, had held that the disputed properties belonged to the appellant society, which had purchased it through valid sale deeds and it's name had also been mutated in revenue records and revenue courts have also validated it's purchase and registration of name and hence society was entitled to the possession of disputed properties and respondents had no right or title over it and they were trying to grab it illegally and through illegal means. Aforesaid finding recorded by Ld. Special Judge, in earlier order dated 10.9.90, was never set aside nor upturned and hence had attained finality. In this respect incumbent Ld. Special Judge, while passing the impugned order, committed error on the face of the record when it observed that the said order was challenged in Writ Petition No. 6096 of 88, but it failed to take note of the fact that said writ petition was dismissed in default and it was never restored and hence order dated 10.9.90 was revived and was in operation, on the date when the impugned order was passed and consequently observations to the contrary in the impugned order is against the factual matrix of the case and cannot be concurred. Secondly it was urged that while passing the impugned order Special Judge did not advert to the question of entitlement of possession on the merits of evidences adduced before it and without considering that question it ordered that the properties be handed over to the respondents, which order is illegal. Once the respondents were adjudged not to be gangsters, first portion of section 17 does not apply and under the second portion the matter was not even considered by the lower court as to entitlement of possession and hence impugned order cannot be countenanced. It was further submitted that in the impugned order Ld. Special Judge had taken a contradictory opinion than that of his predecessor in office and hence it was incumbent upon it to meet the reasoning recorded by said predecessor, which Ld. Special Judge eschewed conveniently and hence it's opinion suffers from the vice of non-application of mind making impugned order indefensible and unsustainable. In fact, now two diametrically opposite opinions exist on record of the appeal regarding entitlement to possession and hence property could not have been released in favour of respondents. It was also submitted that on the earlier occasion, while passing order dated 10.9.90, Learned predecessor Special Judge had taken note of various revenue court proceedings and orders, which the Learned successor Special Judge completely ignored while passing impugned order. Next it was argued that the appellant Samiti had purchased disputed properties from it's registered owners through valid registered sale deeds and the same had not yet been declared to be a nullity and hence appellant Samiti possessed a valid title over the properties. It was further submitted that enough convincing and uncontroverted sufficient clinching proofs were filed by the appellant establishing that at the time of attachment disputed properties were in actual physical possession of the appellant society and hence Ld. Special Judge was under the mandate of law, u/s 17 of the Act, to return it to the society, when proceedings under the Act were quashed by this court. Section 17 postulates only such an eventuality submitted learned counsel. It was further submitted that the division bench, while quashing the FIR under the Act did not direct quashing of the order dated 10.9.90 and it only quashed criminal prosecution of the respondents under the Act and hence opinion in the impugned judgement that quashing of criminal proceedings against the respondent will entitle them to possession of disputed properties is wholly illegal and against the provisions of section 17 of the Act. Entitlement to possession, under the Act, is different from prosecution for criminal offence argued learned counsel.
Further castigation was for the ground that relevant and important material evidences, which had a direct bearing on the question of possession, were completely eschewed from consideration by Ld. Special Judge while passing the impugned order and hence impugned order is indefensible and prone to criticism and therefore has to be set aside. Elaborating the contention, it was argued that documents such as memo of attachment, application by appointed Administrator Jagdish Narayan and attachment witnesses Ganga Deen and Abujar Khan along with their affidavits testifying that the properties were attached from the actual physical possession of appellant Samiti, various sale deeds and mutation orders passed by competent revenue courts at various stages of the proceedings, police report dated 20.10.97, etc. all were kept out of consideration, albeit these documentary evidences were relevant and germane to consider question of possession. It was further submitted that all these documents unerringly proved that appellant's possession over the properties in question was actual and real and consequently impugned order, for non-consideration of above to referred relevant documentary evidences, is liable to be interfered with and scored out.
It was next submitted that Ld. Special Judge failed to distinguish between two separate proceedings and fell in error of joining of two separate cases, one u/s 16(2) of the Act and other u/s 3. Former was not a crime punishable under the Act whereas later was a punishable crime. In fact pending consideration of the application u/s 16(2) of the Act for release of properties, that FIR was lodged against the respondents for committing crime. Subject matter of FIR was entirely different from that of proceedings u/s 16 initiated by the appellant for possession over disputed properties and hence impugned order has been passed on wrong understanding of nature of proceeding and marshalling of facts and hence it is vulnerable and cannot be affirmed. Attour, this court in it's Division bench order dated 4.9.97 nowhere observed that respondents were entitled to possession over properties and hence handing over properties to the respondents on the basis of Division Bench judgement, through impugned order, is wholly illegal argued learned counsel. It was further submitted that respondents had purchased a non- executed time barred decree from unauthorised sellers and therefore they had got no right or title over the properties, which are subject matter of proceedings. During revenue proceedings mutation of their names were struck off. It was further submitted that finding that "So question of attachment of property under the provisions of U.P.Gangster's Act from possession of Samiti becomes unbelievable" is contrary to the documentary evidences produced by appellant Samiti and not denied by respondent State, which had carried out the attachment, and hence impugned order suffers from the vice of misreading of evidences.
It was also argued that since order dated 10.9.90 was not set aside by this court hence observations that it was not a final order is also unsustainable. Findings recorded in appellant's favour by the said earlier order had a binding effect and Ld. Special Judge, successor in office, could not have taken a contrary view argued learned counsel.
It was also submitted that observations by the Division Bench against the character of President of appellant society was wholly unwarranted as neither any opportunity was afforded to him nor there was any occasion to make those observations nor there was any prima facie material existing on record warranting such observations. Being a President of the society it was duty of Shaila Nath Srivastava to protect society's interest and hence his character could not have been castigated.
Learned appellant counsel also contended that although in respect of property mention in schedule "Da" no other claimant appeared before the Learned Special Judge, except the appellant society, yet that property was also not released in society's favour and hence impugned order cannot be sustained.
Primarily on above to referred submissions, it was prayed that appeal be allowed, and impugned order be set aside and properties be released in favour of appellant society u/s 17 of the Act.
Conversely respondents counsel argued that disputed properties were purchased by Nand Lal Gupta from decree holder Sukhbaksh Singh through a valid registered sale deed on 2.4.70. Sukhbaksh Singh had got decree of O.S.No. 25 of 1935 executed. Samiti had instituted a case u/s 145 of the Code but the same was dismissed. Name of Nand Lal Gupta was recorded in revenue record on 18.10.73. Against mutation of names in favour of Samiti , litigation is still pending. Case of other respondents is that they had also purchased it from Giriraj Kishore, Lakshami Narayan and Raj Veer Singh through various sale deeds dated 15.6.70, 26.10.70, 5.11.71. They also pleaded that through various civil and revenue court proceedings they had got orders in their favour and hence appellant's claim is bogus and sham and appeal lacks merits and be dismissed. They further contended that properties were attached from their possession and it was rightly released in their favour. It was also submitted that earlier order dated 10.9.90 was not a final order and hence impugned order does not suffer from any error and should be upheld. They therefore prayed that the appeal be dismissed and impugned order be affirmed.
I have considered rival submissions and have vetted through various evidences filed by both the sides through various affidavits, supplementary affidavits, counter affidavits and rejoinder affidavits, and raised arguments.
Before adverting to the merits of the case, it is essential to peep through and have glimpse of the relevant provisions under the Act so as to decipher legislative intended scope and ambit of relevant sections and what are the rights vested in the parties to the litigation under the Act and powers of the Court.
Section 14 to 18 of the Act ordains that proceedings under the Act has been bifurcated into two. One, in the nature of a civil wrong and the other regarding punishment of the crime. It is so evident from Section 14 of the Act itself. It provides that the District Magistrate, if he has reason to believe that any property whether movable or immovable has been acquired by a gangster as a result of commission of offence under Act, "he may order attachment of such property whether or not cognizance of such offence has been taken by any Court" (emphasis supplied). Thus, Section 14 postulates that whether cognizance of crime under the Act is taken or not property acquired by commission of an offence under the Act can be attached? Thus clearly it is perceptible that Section 14 creates a distinction between proceedings of attachment of property and crime trial under the Act. Section 17 further countenanced such an enunciated legal position as it provides that if on an inquiry court finds that any property has not been acquired by a gangster through commission of offences under the Act then that property has to be released to the person "from whose possession it was attached "or in any other case the court may make such order for disposal of property by delivering it "to the person entitled to the possession thereof "or it's disposal by attachment, confiscation etc. Thus, under Section 17 statute confer power on the Court to deliver property, to a person from whose possession it has been attached or the Court can hand it over to the person "entitled to possession thereof". Thus, the inquiry, contemplated under section 16 of the Act has to be a meaningful inquiry for determining firstly, whether any property has been acquired by a gangster by commission of offence under the Act or not and secondly, as to from whose possession property has been attached or who is entitled to it's possession, in case Act does not apply. Thus, there are two separate phases of inquiries to be conducted under section 16 of the Act. Although, those inquiries are woven inseparably and second one immediately succeeds the first but, the net result of both the inquiries are somewhat different. First part relates to acquisition of property whereas later one relates to it's release. Thus, Section 14 to 17 of the Act contemplates an inquiry, which is primarily civil in the nature and has nothing to do with trial of offences and punishment. This inquiry certainly is different from prosecution of an accused for a crime committed under the Act. Special Judge Gangster Act while passing the impugned order committed ex facie error by clubbing both types of proceedings into one and deciding the claim of respondents in their favour. It completely lost sight of Section 14, 16 and 17 of the Act and totally misdirected himself on above aspect. It failed to bifurcate criminal trial for an offence under the Gangster Act and an inquiry, as is contemplated under Sections 14, 16 and 17 of the Act regarding acquiring and disposal of property. Learned Special Judge failed to make aforementioned legal distinction and to note the fact that inquiry under section 16 of the Act is in the nature of a quasi-civil proceeding. The facts of the present appeal unerringly indicate that when respondents started interfering with the peaceful possession, then appellant society moved an application before the District Magistrate under section 14 of the Act and under the orders passed by A.C.M., that the properties were attached but subsequently it were released ex-parte in favour of respondents by the A.C.M. Aggrieved by the ex-parte release of the properties that the appellant had moved to the Special Judge Gangster Act under Section 16 (2) of the Act. On the said application field by appellant society that Case No. 86 of 87, which has germinated the present appeal, was registered before Special Judge Gangster Act. Thus, the application under Section 16(2) filed by appellant society was to undo the civil wrong committed against the appellant society by respondents. Through that application, appellant society never prayed for prosecution of the respondents for committing offence under section 3 of the Act. It only desired that the property, of which it was entitled to possession be attached and be released in it's favour. Thus, appellant society, had invoked the jurisdiction of learned Special Judge, Gangster's Act to rectify the civil wrong.
It is further noted that pending consideration of application under section 16(2) of the Act that an FIR was lodged as an ancillary proceeding as the respondents continued to interfere with the properties in question. Hence, proceedings of FIR under section 3 of the Act was entirely separated and related with altogether different facets of criminal trial. Learned Special Judge further committed a mistake in judging that under section 16(4) it has to acted as a quasi-civil court and it possessed Civil Courts power as is provided under sub section 16 (4) of the Act and hence findings recorded by it's predecessors were findings recorded by a quasi-Civil Court.
Learned Special Judge further ignored the fact that section 17 of the Act contemplates two types of releases and is bifurcated into two parts. In the first part, if the Court finds that the property was not acquired by a Gangster, as a result of commission of offence under the Act, the property has to be released to the person from whose possession it was attached, but the second part requires that in other cases, the Court may makes such order for disposal of property by attachment, confiscation or delivery of property to the person "entitled to the possession thereof" or otherwise. Thus, power of the Court under section 17 of the Act is wide enough to imbibe it for disposal of the property in any manner, as it likes which is just and legal. Learned Special Judge, therefore, committed an error of law in joining FIR lodged by the President of the appellant society with that of it's right to possession under section 16 read with section 17 of the Act.
Further, it is evident from the impugned order that Ld. Special Judge did not addressed himself to the question of possession on the date of attachment to determine from whose possession, property was attached. Impugned judgement is completely silent on the said aspect of the matter and hence is contrary to section 17 of the Act. Respondents have also not produced any documentary evidence in that respect for establishing their claim of possession over properties in dispute. They further failed to bring forth any convincing evidence to establish their entitlement to possession. What is interesting to note is that some of the respondents (respondents no. 15,16 and 17) have pleaded that there was no civil dispute between them and appellant society and hence it was all the more incumbent upon Ld. Special Judge to determine entitlement of possession. In this connection, it is also pointed out that by mere raising of some constructions will not entitle a person to get possession over the property unless it is established that he was in lawful possession. Entitlement of possession under law means lawful possession and not illegal possession. View adopted by Ld. Special Judge therefore seems to be faulty and unsustainable.
Moreover, pleadings made by both the sides and cases put forth by them indicate that some of the facts inter se were not in dispute. Firstly, it was not disputed that the properties in question related with Plot No. 71 to 76 of Mohal of Prago Kunwar and Plot No. 61 to 68 of Mohal of Dargahi Lal and Plot No. 61 and 215 of Mohal of Hazaro Kunwar. It was also not disputed that an application in respect of the said property was filed by appellant society before the District Magistrate on 21.5.86 under section 14 of the Act raising grievance against the illegal activities of respondents and praying therein that the properties in dispute be attached and be released in favour of appellant society. It is also not in dispute that on the application filed by the appellant society, District Magistrate ordered an inquiry and in that inquiry, claim of appellant society was found to be correct and, therefore, A.C.M., Kanpur Nagar directed for attachment of the properties, which, in fact were attached on 21.11.87. It is also not in dispute that the said attached properties were released by Ex-party order on 9.12.87 by A.C.M., Kanpur Nagar in favour of respondents against which appellant society went up before Special Judge, Gangster's Act under section 16(2) of the Act on 24.12.87. It is also not in dispute that under the orders passed by Learned Special Judge, properties were reattached on 26.12.87. It is also not in dispute that after initial attachment, an Administrator Jagdish Narain was appointed over the disputed properties under section 14 of the Act and Ganga Deen and Abujar Khan were the witnesses of said attachment. Respondents have also not disputed application and affidavits filed by the Administrator as well as witnesses of attachment that when the properties were actually attached, it was from the actual physical possession of the appellant society. In this respect, the police report also supported appellant's claim as it mentioned that at the time of attachment, only the President of the appellant society was present at the spot and none of the respondents were present, which fact was also inked in the attachment memo prepared by the police. It is also not in dispute that the name of the appellant society was mutated over the disputed properties and they were also recorded as owners in Khewat (register of ownership). Both the parties were also not at discord that the disputed properties originally belong to Lala Gurdeen and in respect of these properties, the decree was passed in 1943. What has also not been disputed is the fact that on 2.4.70, respondent Nand Lal got his name muted over the disputed property. Thus, it is admitted to both the sides that after more than three decades, the decree passed in the Civil suit in 1943 was got executed.
The disputed facts were that according to the appellants claim, it was time barred execution under which, respondents had got no right or title and they, with an idea to grab the entire properties in question and to divest the appellant Samiti of it's lawful possession and claim indulged in illegal design. From the pleadings of appellant, it is clear that the appellants society had claimed the properties as a registered purchaser whose name were also recorded in the register of ownership and mutations were also carried out in it's name. This aspect of the matter has been completely ignored by the Learned Special Judge which passing impugned order as, Learned Special Judge has not at all considered what will be the effect of various orders passed in mutation proceedings by revenue courts and effect of various registered sale deeds in favour of the society as well as registered sale deeds alleged to have been executed in favour of respondents. These sale deeds and orders in mutation cases have been filed by appellant society through a supplementary affidavit filed on 8.10.2007.
The records further reveals that this Court in it's order dated 4.9.1907 had not at all touched the question on entitlement of possession and it only quashed the FIR which was lodged by the president of appellant society against the respondents under section 3 of the Act. The entire order of this Court does not at all considered the question of possession which was never raised before this Court. It is also admitted that on the earlier occasion, vide order dated 10.9.1990, question of possession was considered by the Learned Special Judge, Gangsters Act and it had held that appellant society is entitled to the possession of the disputed properties and respondent were trying to illegally grab it by indulging into illegal activities and filing of sham and vexatious litigations. Learned Special Judge Gangsters Act while passing the impugned order contrary to such findings did not at all meted out the reasons recorded in the order dated 10.9.1990 and completely ignored it. It observed that the said order was not a final order but it forget to look into the fact that the findings in favour of the appellant society was recorded there under and the same was under section 17 of the Act which was appealable under section 18 and no such appeal was filed against it. Learned Special Judge mentioned that the said order was not a final order and was challenged in this High Court but it committed apparent error on the face of the record, as in the order dated 10.9.1990, predecessor Special Judge has observed that the said order (10.9.1990) will be subjected to any order passed by the High Court but, since the High Court did not set aside that order, there was no occasion for the successor in offence to take a contrary opinion and record diametrically divergent findings without meeting the reasoning of the earlier order.
It is also noted that quashing of FIR by this Court had no adverse effect on the claim of entitlement of possession over the properties in question by the appellant society as, the proceeding under section 16 (2) was initiated much earlier than the FIR and it was only during pendency of that proceeding that FIR was lodged to curb the illegal activities of respondent and hence, quashing of FIR could not have affected the claim of appellant society regarding their entitlement to possession under section 16 (2) of the Act.
Learned Special Judge also committed glaring error on the face of the record in not looking into the reasoning, various judicial orders passed by revenue Courts in mutation proceedings and thereby completely eschewed from consideration relevant and germane evidences in favour of appellant Samiti, which conclusively had clinched the case in favour of appellant. Learned Special Judge also ignored the fact that the decree was never executed and it was time barred decree under which no right accrued to the respondents. It recorded a perverse finding against the merits of the evidence on record on the question of possession. The affidavit by the administrator and the witnesses of attachments, who all were totally independent witnesses and had no axe to grind against any of the parties were ignored albeit it was averred that at the time of attachment properties in dispute were in actual physical possession of the appellant society. Thus, the findings recorded in the impugned judgment are contrary to the undisputed uncontroverted documentary evidences produced by the appellant society and hence, impugned order is susceptible to criticism.
Learned Special judge further ignored the fact that appellant society's name was entered into Khewat (registered of ownership) and no challenge was made by the respondents in any revenue Court and therefore, it committed error on the face of the record to hold otherwise. It also ignored that principle of res judicata applies on the facts of the appeal. Appellant's counsel in this respect relied upon Apex Court judgment reported in Mohan Lal Vs. Kartar Singh and others 1995 SC 573.
In Kalpu and another versus Sanaurar Khan and another : AIR 1982 Allahabad 307 it has been observed by this court as under :-
"5. The applicability of the rule of res judicata prescribed by S.11. of the Civil P.C. does not depend upon the correctness or the incorrectness of the former decision. whether right or wrong, the former decision is binding between the parties. The subsequent deletion of Rule 26-A and the view of this Court that the rule was ultra vires could not have the effect of wiping out the earlier decision that the trees had been nurtured by the plaintiffs and belonged to them as they stood on Banjar land."
Learned Special Judge also ignored the fact that the challenge to the order dated 10.9.1990 was made in writ petition but that writ petition was dismissed in default and no order was passed by this Court setting aside the said order.
In respect of effect of the order passed by Division Bench of this court dated 4.9.1997, appellant's counsel relied upon Apex Court decision in State of Orissa Vs. Sudhar Shekhar Mishra: AIR 1968 S C 647 wherein it has been held Apex Court as under:-
"A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence is a decision in its ratio and not every observation found therein nor of the logically follows from the various observations made in it. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and built upon it."
In State of M.P. versus Ramesh Chandra Bajpai: (2009)13 SCC 635 it has been held as under:-
"26. In our view, the aforementioned decision has been misapplied and miscontrued by the High Court. It is now well-settled principle of law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom."
In Bombay Dyeing and Mfg.Co.Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group and Ors:AIR 2006 SC 1489 it has been held as under:-
"312. So far as order of this Court dated 11.5.2005 is concerned, again the validity or otherwise of the BIFR Scheme and / or implementation thereof was not in question. An order of this Court, in which the same was passed. For the said purpose, the orders of this Court were required to be read in their entirety. A judgment, it is well-settled cannot be read as a statute. (See Sarat Chandra Mishra Vs. State of Orissa and State of Karnataka Vs. C. Lalitha.) Construction of a judgment, it is well-settled should made in the light of the factual matrix involved therein. What is more important is to see the issues involved therein and the context wherein the observations were made. Any observation made in a judgment, it is trite, should not be read in isolation and out of context."
Further it is noted that the learned special Judge while passing the impugned order fell in error and appendaged two different proceedings one having a civil textures, and other regarding a criminal offence. The proceedings under section 16(2) of the act was entirely different from the FIR lodged subsequently and related with crime no. 266 of 1990, under section 3 of the Act. Thus, the entire approach adopted by the learned Special Judge in passing the impugned order was faulty and hence cannot be countenanced.
The opinion by the Special Judge that vide order dated 4.9.1997, this Court had set aside the order dated 10.9.1990, passed by Special Judge Gangsters Act is also wrong and against the merits of evidence on record. Property was attached under the orders passed by the Special Judge Gangster's Act prior to registration of FIR and therefore, quashing of FIR or criminal proceeding would not have invalidated earlier findings recorded on 10.9.90.
It also ignored the police report dated 20.9.1997, wherein it was specifically mentioned that at the time of attachment, properties in question were in actual physical possession of appellant society and it was from their physical possession that the same was attached. In support of the submissions that no findings can be recorded on conjectures and surmises against the merits of evidence on record, appellant's counsel relied upon the Apex Court decision in State of U.P. Vs. Pheru Singh etc. AIR 1989 SC 1205 wherein it has been held as under:-
"It is well-settled principle of law in criminal jurisprudence that no finding can be rendered either on mere surmise or conjecture and every finding should be based on satisfactory and acceptable evidence."
Special Judge, so far as properties mentioned under scheduled "Da" is concerned, itself recorded a finding that the respondents therein had illegally grabbed the property of plot no. 78 and they have not filed any affidavit to contest the claim of the appellants Samiti and therefore, it committed illegality in not releasing said property to the appellant society.
Since I find that the impugned order is against the merits of evidences on record and has been passed without application of mind ignoring documentary evidences and on a wrong premise altogether, that I am of the opinion that the said order cannot be sustained and is liable to be interfered with and rectified.
In view of above, appeal is allowed. Impugned order dated 19.5.2003 passed by Special Judge (Gangster), Kanpur Nagar in Case No.96 of 1987, Kailash Sahkari Avas Samiti versus Nand Lal and others under Section 16/17 U.P. Gangster and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act is hereby by set aside and all the properties involved in the case and attached on 16.12.87 under the orders of Special Judge, Gangster's Act is directed to be released in favour of appellant society.
Appeal is allowed.
Dt.22.5.2012
RK/AKG/Tamang










Reasonable prognosis of right of private defence is sufficient to acquit the accused-appeal allowed.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 

Reserved
AFR

Criminal Appeal No.2270 of 1981

Azad Khan & another .........................................Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ....................... .....................Opposite Party.

Hon'ble Vinod Prasad, J.
This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated 18.9.1981 rendered by Session's Judge, Kanpur in S.T. No. 595 M of 1980, State Vs. Azad Khan & others, u/s 302/34, 324/34 I.P.C. P.S. Bithoor, District Kanpur. By the impugned judgment, both the appellants, though acquitted u/s 302/34 and 324/34 but were convicted u/s 304(II) I.P.C. and were sentenced to 7 years R.I. Their another sibling brother Fazal Khan, however, was acquitted of all the charges by the Ld. trial Judge, by the impugned judgment.
Background prosecution allegations against the appellants indicate that on 1.10.1978 at 3.45 p.m. Jamal, P.W.5, was grazing his she-goats near the agricultural field of appellant Azad Khan. The cattle intruded into lahi (mustard) field of the appellants, on which, appellant Azad Khan slapped Jamal, P.W.5, who, crying, returned back to his house and narrated the incident to his father Hazi Saleem (deceased). Hazi Saleem came to appellant's field and remonstrated them for slapping his son. This infuriated the appellants, and their acquitted brother, who all started assaulting Hazi Saleem with their respective weapons. Accused Afzal Khan was armed with an axe, whereas rest of the two were armed with lathi. Commotion of scuffle between both the fractions attracted Haleem, P.W.2, Kamal, sons of the deceases, Dullu, P.W.3, and Rasuli, P.W.4 at the assault scene, who all intervened into the marpeet and saved the deceased. Accused Azad Khan was apprehended at the spot by the prosecution witnesses, whereas two others escaped from the spot. Sustaining injuries Hazi Saleem, injured, later on deceased, squatted on the ground and became unconsciousness. On a cot, he was brought to his house by his sons along with apprehended accused Azad Khan. Haleem, P.W.2, got scribed a F.I.R., Ext. Ka.2, from one Tahir Husain, travelled to police station Bithoor and lodged his FIR as Crime No.147 of 1978, under Section 324 I.P.C. at 5.30 p.m. same day.
Head Constable Ram Badan Singh, had registered the crime by preparing Chik F.I.R., Ext. Ka 13 and GD entry, Ext. Ka-14. After demise of injured Hazi Saleem, same constable had converted the crime under Section 302 I.P.C. by inking GD entry, Ext. Ka-15.
Investigation into the crime was conducted by Lal Bihari, S.I., P.W. 7, who had interrogated the injured and the scribe at the police station. He had also interrogated accused Azad Khan at the police station itself and thereafter had penned down informant's statement u/s 161 of the Code. At informant's pointing out I.O. had conducted spot inspection and had prepared site plan Ext. Ka-4. Thereafter two accused Afzal and Fazal were interrogated by him. On 29.10.1978, I.O. came to Lucknow where he interrogated S.I., who had conducted inquest on the cadaver of the deceased and thereafter had recorded statements of witnesses Ram Pratap and Dullu P.W.3. Thereafter, attachment proceedings u/s 82, 83 Cr.P.C. were conducted, vide Ext. Ka-6, Ka-7, Ka-8 and concluding investigation I.O. had charge sheeted the accused vide Ext. Ka-5.
Injured was medically examined by P.W.1 Dr. V.D. Agarwal on 1.10.1978 at PHC Kalyanpur at 7.00 p.m. who had noted following injuries in his medical examination report vide vide Ext. Ka-1.
"Examined Sri Haji Saleem Ahmad aged about 50 years S/o Karim Ahmad R/o Bithoor Naya, P.S. Bithoor District Kanpur on 1.10.78 at 7 P.M. brought and identified by C.No.691 Sri Surya Prakash of P.S. Bithoor, Kanpur.
M/I. : A black mole on left clavical away from its medial end.
Injuries:
1. Lacerated wound 1 1/4" x 1/4" x bone deep on scalp, 2 1/2" above middle point of left eyebrow and 4 1/2" above left ear with traumatic swelling 4" x 4" all around bleeding present, oblique direction.
2. Lacerated wound 1/4" x 1/8" x skin deep on scalp 2 1/4" above medial 1/4th point of left eyebrows, bleeding present.
3. Abrasion 3/4" x 1/2" on left cheek.
4. Fracture of medial 1/3rd of left clavical with swelling up 1" x 1". Blackening of both eye-lids of both eyes present with oedematous swelling pupils could not be seen due to marked swelling of eyelids of both eyes. Pt. is unconscious, involuntary movement of Rt. upper extremities present, pulse 96 p.m. and no vol. BP 100/60 M.M. of Hg. G.C. Poor."
All injuries caused by blunt object. Duration fresh, injury No.(4) is grievous and (3) simple and rest U.O. Patient is referred to L.L.P. Hospital Kanpur for immediate admission and further treatment and observation. Inj. No. (6) simple and (5) U.O."
According to the noting by the doctor patient was unconscious and underneath his eyes blackening and swelling were present, his pupils were dilated and general condition was poor. All the injuries sustained by the injured were caused by blunt object and were fresh in duration and injury no. 4 was grievous in nature. Injury no.3 was simple and rest of the two injuries were kept under observation. P.W.1 had referred the injured to L.L.P. Hospital, Kanpur Nagar for immediate admission and better management of his injuries.
After demise of the injured, autopsy of his cadaver was performed by Dr. V.N. Baghre P.W.6 on 3.10.1978 at 3.15 p.m. According to the doctor's estimation, deceased was 50 years of age and he had expired at 7.20 a.m. in Civil Hospital, Lucknow. Following ante-mortem injuries were noted by P.W.6 Dr. V.N. Baghre in the autopsy report Ext. Ka-2.
ANTI MORTEM INJURIES
"1. Hospital Bandage and dressing on the head and across to left shoulder and leucoplast strips on the front of neck.
2. Abraded contusion 15cm x 4cm on the top of left shoulder.
3. St. wound (3 stitch) 3.5cm long on the head on left side (P.T.) from left eye and 11cm from left ear on removing the stitches return of wound was lacerated and was bone deep.
4. Abrasion 2 cm x 2 cm on the left side face 15 from nose.
5. Abrasion 2 cm x 1cm. On the Rt. infra clavicular the region. On opening Echymoses present on whole of scalp with fracture depressed and communited of frontal bone extending to parietal bones and both and both temporal bones 22 cm. X 21 cm membranous are lacerated and congested, Brain lacerated under the front bone 3.5 cm. X 2 cm with subdural hemorrhage-14 cm. X 12 cm. Wt. 1250 gm. There is also liner fracture (SIC) ? Extending from one end to other end a cross the (SIC) ? Is continuant with fracture of skull, left clavicle is fracture and middle ribs 1st to 6th are fracture out latterly on left side. Pleura is lacerated. Plural cavity contains dark clotted and fluid blood present. Left lung is lacerated (P.T.) sternum fractured. Left lung is lacerated (P.T.) sternum fractured on the space between 1st, 2nd side."
According to the doctor's estimation death had occurred due to shock and hemorrhage due to injury and multiple fractures, as deposed by him and injuries no.1 to 3 collectively were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Charge-sheeting of the accused resulted in their summoning and finding their guilt triable by Session's Court, their case was committed to the court of Session's, where it was registered as S.T. No.595 M of 1980. Session's Judge, Kanpur charged the accused under Sections 302/34 and 324/34 IPC on 21.5.1981, which charges were denied by all of them, who claimed to be tried and therefore, to succeed and establish their guilt, trial procedure was undertaken during course of which, prosecution examined four fact witnesses viz: Haleem informant P.W.2, Dullu P.W.3, Rasuli P.W.4, Jamal P.W.5. Two doctors, who had examined injured/deceased medically and had conducted post-mortem examination Dr. S.C. Katiyar and Dr. V.N. Baghre, were examined as P.W.1&P.W.6. I.O. of the crime Lal Bihari was tendered as P.W.7. Court had examined doctor S.K. Chaddha as C.W.1.
In their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused pleaded exercise of right of private defence. Azad Khan stated that Jamal was grazing she-goats in his field and when he remonstrated him, he returned to his house and thereafter came back along with his brother Sagir and others, who started belaboring him. Hazi Saleem sustained injuries in that scuffle and fell down on the ground. It was also stated that after sustaining injuries, injured had become unconscious and was unable to speak. To substantiate their defence, accused had examined Rama Shanker Tiwari, D.W.1, as a defence witness.
Vide impugned judgment and order, learned Session's Judge, Kanpur Nagar held that prosecution had failed to substantiate charge under Section 324/34 IPC against all the accused persons and therefore, acquitted them of the said charge. Learned trial Judge further concluded that so far as Fazal Khan was concerned, prosecution had remained unsuccessful in establishing his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt and therefore, had acquitted him of all the charges. It, however, concluded that so far as the two appellants are concerned, prosecution has anointed their guilt beyond any shadow of doubt u/s 304(II) I.P.C. and therefore, convicted them for the said crime and sentenced them to 7 years R.I., which conviction and sentence is under challenged in the instant appeal.
In the backdrop of above facts, I have heard Sri D.M. Singh, learned amicus curiae for the appellants and Sri Patanjali Mishra, learned AGA for the respondent state.
Castigating impugned judgment, learned amicus curiae submitted that learned trial Judge committed patent error of law in convicting the appellant while recording findings, which unerringly disproved prosecution case and three real sibling brothers were framed in a feigned and fabricated version alleged by the prosecution. Real fact were that, it was the prosecution side, who was the aggressor and appellants had exercised right of private defence of person and property both, while defending the person of Azad Khan and their property(agricultural crop), which was being grazed by the she-goat of informant side. It was further submitted that the motive for committing the crime lay with the prosecution side as they had created mischief of getting accused crops grazed by the she-goat. None of prosecution fact witnesses were wholly reliable as learned trial Judge himself disbelieved presence of one of the accused during the incident as was alleged by fact witnesses and hence no implicit reliance could have been placed on them to hold appellants guilty and consequently, conviction of the appellants is unsustainable. Eye witness account is also dicey and does not indicate that the incident occurred as alleged by the prosecution as allegation regarding use of sharp edged weapon (kulhari) axe, during the incident, is a disproved fact and learned trial judge acquitted all the accused of the charge u/s 324/34 I.P.C. and for this reason also, guilt of the appellants was not proved beyond all reasonable doubt. It was further submitted that the accused were required to prove their defence on preponderance of probabilities only and they were not required to establish their defence to the hilt beyond all reasonable doubt. Findings were recorded by the Session's Judge are contrary to the evidences on record and since, prosecution had failed to furnish any explanation of the injuries sustained by Azad Khan accused, none of the prosecution witnesses can be taken to be wholly reliable nor any credence can be attached to their testimonies. It was lastly contended that in case, the appellants' appeal do not succeed on merits, then looking to the period already undergone by and sufferings of the appellants, their sentence be reduced suitably and they deserves a compassionate consideration in matter of sentence.
Learned AGA argued to the contrary and contended that prosecution has anointed appellant's guilt unambiguously, clear of all doubts and, therefore, impugned judgment does not require any interference of this Court. Number of injuries sustained by the injured deceased itself is an indication, as to who was the aggressor and that is the safest criteria to determine, as to who had launched the attack submitted learned AGA. It was next contended that learned Session's Judge has not committed any error either in marshaling of facts, critical appreciation thereof and recording a finding of conviction and sentence. Appeal lacks merit and be dismissed concluded learned AGA.
I have pondered over rival contentions and have critically appreciated both oral and documentary evidences. Perusal of the record indicate that some of the facts in the present case are not in dispute and, therefore, so far as those aspects are concerned, they stands proved. First of all, there is no controversy regarding date, time and place of the incident. Genesis of the incident also is not in dispute, as both sides admit that the incident had occurred because of grazing of she-goat of the lahi field belonging to the accused appellants. It is also not in dispute that Jamal was present at that point of time and it was because of the slap of the Jamal that the incident had occurred. Thus, on all these aspects, prosecution was not required to establish it's case beyond all reasonable doubt, as these are admitted facts, which were not required to be proved. The only controversy, which remains to be considered is, as to whether the prosecution version of assault by the accused is a probable case or the defence of the appellants of assault being launched on accused Azad Khan and exercise of right of private defence is a more confidence inspiring and credible story. When evidences are analyzed in the aforesaid light, it transpires that the learned trial Judge himself was in doubt regarding genesis of the incident as was stated by the prosecution. It had recorded many findings, which goes to demolish the prosecution charge in it's entirety. First of all, learned trial Judge has disbelieved the statement made by the injured to the Investigating Officer in the hospital, which by virtue of death of the deceased was his dying declaration. It has recorded a finding "the I.O. Lal Bihari has referred to the same vide Ext. Ka-16 and if genuine, this could be made use of as the dying declaration of the deceased. There is inherent evidence, however, to show that this alleged statement is thoroughly unreliable as genuine. P.W. 2 Haleem accompanied his father to the police station. He points that Haji Saleem Ahmad was unconscious at the field when the witness reached at that place. He brought him to the house on the cot but then too he was not in position to speak. He admits also that his father did not utter a word at the hospital. Even at the police station, according to him, Haji Saleem Ahmad was only nodded uttering han hun." After noting these features of the evidences, learned trial Judge had concluded that "Haji Saleem Ahmad could not have been in fit condition of mind at the time to have given the said statement which must, therefore, be discarded from consideration. In such a view, the most important evidence tendered by the prosecution in the form of dying declaration of the injured has lost all its corroborative value and had indicated that all was not well during investigation and the prosecution side had even ventured to fabricate a story against the appellants."
Further, learned trial Judge held "as regards the accused Afzal Khan, the case of the prosecution stands on doubtful footing. No injury of any kind is alleged or shown to have been caused to him ..................... In the course of evidence, it was narrated that there was only one kulhari wielded by Afzal Khan and others had lathis, which is not consistent."
After recording such findings, so far as accused Fazal Khan was concerned, Ld.trial Judge has held "in my view this accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt."
State has not come up in appeal against acquittal of the said accused Fazal Khan nor has challenged the findings recorded by learned trial Judge.
Further learned trial Judge wrongly recorded that the accused appellants were being aggressors. It was recorded by him that "even assuming that the accused has acted in exercise of right of self defence, the same was exceeded in having caused the injuries of the kind upon Haji Saleem Ahmad. It arises in a sudden fight in the heat of passion." If the trial Judge was of the opinion that the incident had occurred all of sudden in the heat of passion, then to hold appellants guilty for the charge under section 304(II) I.P.C. was wholly unjustified. From the perusal of the injury as well as autopsy report of the injured, it transpires that injury nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the injured/deceased as was described by P.W.2 in the medical examination report were not fatal at all. These injuries were either of insignificant nature or were non vital part of the body, which could not have contributed to the death of the deceased at all. It was only injury no. 1, which was grievous in nature and was the cause of his death. Even in the autopsy report, from the injuries, which were noted by the doctor, injury nos. 1, 3 and 4 could not have caused the death of the deceased. It was only injury no. 2, which was the cause of his demise. In such a view, the deceased has sustained only a single fatal injury and his rest of the injuries were not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Opinion by P.W. 1 also indicate that but for a solitary injury, rest of the injuries sustained by the deceased were not sufficient in the ordinary course of the nature to cause his death or were so eminently dangerous that in all probability, they could have resulted in his death. In such a view, regarding a finding that the accused had exceeded right of private defence, the same is against relevant material on record and cannot be sustained.
Further learned trial Judge also committed mistake in judging accused as aggressors, whereas the fact indicated that it was the prosecution side which had gone to the accused and had picked up the quarrel. It was admitted that the incident had occurred in the mid field of appellant's Lahi field. Site of the incident is fixed by dripping and recovery of blood from that field which unambiguously indicated that deceased had trespassed into that field of the appellants. Against a trespasser appellants had a right to chase him away in legal exercise of right of private defence of property (crop). Appellants were at their field during the incident. In natural course of human conduct deceased must have been accompanied by his family members when he was proceeding to the appellant's Lahi field to remonstrate them for slapping his son. Thus what seems to be real happening is that it was prosecution side who had arrived at place of incident to pick up the fight. Ld. Trial Judge albeit cogitated over said aspect and observed that "it is true that Haji Saleem Ahmad and his sons might have felt annoyed in the natural course because of the beating or scolding done to Jamal over the petty issue, .........." but it fell in error in concluding otherwise that the appellants were the aggressors because the appellants "reacted shortly having felt aggrieved themselves." It also wrongly placed reliance on informant's testimonies after holding that he was not an eye witness of actual assault on his father. It also recorded a finding that the actual possession over the place of the incident lay with the appellants. It is further noted that presence of (P.W. 2) Jamal and accused Azad Khan at the place of the incident, is admitted and hence defence case spelt out by him could not have been brushed aside easily. He had sustained following injuries vide Ext. Kha-1 and was examined by Dr. S.K. Rastogi on 2.10.1978 at 2.30 P.M. at Kanpur.:-
"1. Abraded contusion 2cm x 3/4cm on the left front of parietal region 8cm above eye brow.
2. Contusion 6cm x 2cm on the back of left shoulder.
3. Contusion 3cm x 1cm on back of left arm middle.
4. Contusion 4cm x 1.5cm on back of left forearm lower 1/3rd.
5. Contusion 2cm x 1cm on antro lateral aspect on right thigh lower part."
Learned trial Judge has disbelieved his injuries for the reason that he had not got his medical examination done on the date of the incident itself. This could not have been a valid reason to disbelieve the defence story as his presence at the spot is not doubted, especially when Injuries sustained by the accused have been admitted by the fact witnesses during their depositions in Court. P.W. 2, during his cross examination was compelled to admit that Rasuli had carried a danda with him and he had assaulted the appellants from it. P.W. 3 also admitted the same fact during cross examination. He had further admitted that the chhari wielded by Rasuli had caused injury to Azad Khan and Fazal Khan accused although he expatiated his statement by saying that he had not seen the injuries to Afzal Khan but the fact remains is that the two appellants were also assaulted during the incident and they had sustained injuries. So is the statement of P.W. 4 when he had admitted that the only accused Azad Khan had sustained injuries but he had eschewed from divulging, as to who had caused the said injury. On a question put by the Court, he had admitted that he had wielded his danda two or three times, which had hit Azad Khan appellant. On an overall assessment of facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the prosecution had not explained the injuries sustained by the accused in an incident which had occurred because of prosecution mischief and it were they, who had gone to the spot to pick up the quarrel after the she-goat had damaged appellant's Lahi crop. Why the prosecution suppress causing of injuries to the two appellants during the course of incident and in the examination-in-chief, creates a doubt the truthfulness of their story. Accused has to probabilize his story on preponderance of probability only unlike prosecution who had to prove it's case to the hilt clear of all doubts and consequently once appellants succeeded in showing that prosecution had suppressed injuries sustained in the same incident by the accused, it is hazardous to rely on their depositions which are not wholly true. Either these PWs were not present at the spot or they had narrated a fabricated version are the two inescapable conclusions. In this respect reliance can be had from apex court decision in Lakshmi Singh and others etc. vs. State of Bihar:AIR 1976 SC 2263, wherein it has been held by the apex court as under :-
"According to the Doctor injury No.1 was grievous in nature as it resulted in compound fracture of the fibula bone. The other two injuries were also serious injuries which had been inflicted by a sharp-cutting weapon. Having regard to the circumstances of the case there can be no doubt that Dasrath Singh must have received these injuries in the course of the assault, because it has not been suggested or contended that the injuries could be self-inflicted nor it is believable. In these circumstances, therefore, it was the bounded duty of the prosecution to give a reasonable explanation for the injuries sustained by the accused Dasrath Singh in the course of the occurrence. Not only the prosecution has given no explanation, but some of the witnesses have made a clear statement that they did not see any injuries on the person of the accused. Indeed it the eye-witnesses could have given such graphic details regarding the assault on the two deceased and Dasain Singh and yet they deliberately suppressed the injuries on the person of the accused, this is a most importance circumstance to discredit the entire prosecution case. It is well settled that fouler the crime, higher the proof, and hence in a murder case where one of the accused is proved to have sustained injuries in the course of the same occurrence, the non-explanation of such injuries by the prosecution is a manifest defect in the prosecution case and shows that the origin and genesis of the occurrence had been deliberately suppressed which leads to the irresistible conclusion that the prosecution has not come out with a true version of the occurrence. This matter was argued before the High Court and we are constrained to observe that the learned Judges without appreciating the ratio of this Court in Mohar Rai v. State of Bihar, (1968) 3 SCR 525 = (AIR 1968 SC 1281) tried to brush it aside on most untenable grounds. The question whether the Investigating Officer was informed about the injuries is wholly irrelevant to the issue, particularly when the very Doctor who examined one of the deceased and the prosecution witnesses is the person who examined the appellant Dasarath Singh also. In the case referred to above, this Court clearly observed as follows :
"The trial Court as well as the High Court wholly ignored the significance of the injuries found on the appellants. Mohar Rai had sustained as many as 13 injuries and Bharath Rai 14. We get it from the evidence of P.W.15 that he noticed injuries on the person of Mohar Rai when he was produced before him immediately after the occurrence. Therefore the version of the appellants that they sustained injuries at the time of the occurrence is highly probabilised. Under these circumstances the prosecution had a duty to explain those injuries ......... In our judgement the failure of the prosecution to offer any explanation in that regard shows that evidence of the prosecution witnesses relating to the incident is not true or at any rate not wholly true. Further those injuries probabilities the plea taken by the appellants."
This Court clearly pointed out that where the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the accused, two results follow : (1) that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is untrue; and (2) that the injuries probabilise the plea taken by the present case has not correctly applied the principles laid down by this Court in the decision referred to above. In some of the recent cases, the same principle was laid down. In Puran Singh v. The State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 266 of 1971 decided on April 25, 1975 = (reported in AIR 1975 SC 1674) which was also a murder case, this Court, while following an earlier case, observed as follows :
"In State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima (Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1971 decided on March 19, 1975) = (reported in AIR 1975 SC 1478) one of us (Untwalia, J.,) speaking for the Court, observed as follows :
"In a situation like this when the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the person of an accused depending on the facts of each case, any of the three results may follow :
(1) That the accused had inflicted the injuries on the members of the prosecution party in exercise of the right of self defence.
(2) It makes the prosecution version of the occurrence doubtful and the charge against the accused cannot be held to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(3) It does not affect the prosecution case at all.
The facts of the present case clearly fall within the four corners of either of the first two principles laid down by this judgement. In the instant case, either the accused were fully justified in causing the death of the deceased and were protected by the right of private defence or that if the prosecution does not explain the injuries on the person of the deceased the entire prosecution case is doubtful and the genesis of the occurrence is shrouded in deep mystery, which is sufficient to demolish the entire prosecution case."
It seems to us that in a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the Court can draw the following inferences:
(1) That the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version.
(2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable;
(3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case.
The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one. In the instant case, when it is held, as it must be, that the appellant Dasrath Singh received serious injuries which have not been explained by the prosecution, then it will be difficult for the Court to rely on the evidence of PWs. 1 to 4 and 6 more particularly, when some of these witnesses have lied by stating that they did not see any injuries on the person of the accused. Thus neither the Sessions Judge nor the High Court appears to have given due consideration to this important lacuna or infirmity appearing in the prosecution case. We must hasten to add that as held by this Court in State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima, Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1971 decided on March 19, 1975 : (Reported in AIR 1975 SC 1478) there may be cases where the non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution case. This principle would obviously apply to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and credit-worthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. The present, however, is certainly not such a case, and the High Court was, therefore, in error in brushing aside this serious infirmity in the prosecution case on unconvincing premises."
Aforesaid view of the apex court has been consistently followed up till now. In Bihari Rai versus State of Bihar:AIR 2009 SC 18 it has been observed by the apex court as under:-
"13. The number of injuries is hot always a safe criterion for determining who the aggressor was. It cannot be stated as a universal rule that whenever the Injuries are on the body of the accused persons, a presumption must necessarily be raised that the accused persons had caused injuries in exercise of the right of private 'defence. The defence has to further establish that the injuries so caused on the accused probabilises the version of the right of private defence. Non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance. But mere non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution case in all cases. This principle applies to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. [See : Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1976 SC 2263). A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. Section 97 deals with the subject-matter of right of private defence. The plea of right comprises the body or property (i) of the person exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; and the right may be exercised in the case of any offence against the body, and in the case of offences of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, and attempts at such offences in relation to property. Section 99 lays down the limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled by Section 99. To claim a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he had a right of private defence which extended to causing of death. Sections 100 and 101, IPC define the limit and extent of right of private defence.
14. Sections 102 and 105, IPC deal with commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of body and property respectively. 'The right commences', as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt, or threat to commit the offence, although the offence may not have been committed but not until that there is that reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 612), it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence."
Adopting above view neither prosecution witnesses of fact are wholly reliable nor prosecution has offered any explanation of accused injuries nor it has proved clear of all doubts that accused were the aggressors. Conversely it has been probabilised that it was prosecution side which had approached the accused at their field and had picked up the fight and it's witnesses had suppressed the injuries sustained by the appellants and therefore in my opinion appellants are entitle to acquittal.
Residue of above discussion is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Conviction of both the surviving appellants for the charge under section 304(II) I.P.C., recorded by Session's Judge, Kanpur, through impugned judgment and order, are hereby set aside and they are acquitted of that offence and are set at liberty. Both the appellants are on bail, they need not surrender, their personal and surety bonds are discharged.
Let a copy of the judgment be certified to the trial court for it's intimation.
Dt.30.5.2012
Rk/Arvind/-
Hon'ble Vinod Prasad,J.
Sri D.M. Singh, learned Amicus Curiae has rendered valuable assistance in deciding the appeal, which was pending since last three decades and, therefore, he is directed to be paid Rs. 8,000/- as his fees by the office of this Court.
Dt.30.5.2012
Rk/Arvind/-