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Wednesday, August 29, 2012

The medical evidence would also indicate that Khushal had been very severally beaten. But at the same time, it can not be said to be an assault with intent to kill. There was hardly a bone in his body that was not broken. The number of injuries caused to Khushal clearly shows that the assault was premeditated. All the injuries were lacerated and caused by blunt weapons. None of the witnesses could say if any injury had been caused by Katti (sickle). According to Dr. Chaudhari, PW 3, the head injury could be the result of a rider falling from the motorcycle. when considered from all angles leads to a conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that Khushal was a victim of a premeditated assault by all the appellants with their respective weapons. 20. However, given the nature of weapons used, the location of the injuries and the nature of the injuries caused, it would not be possible to hold that the appellants shared a common object of causing the murder of Khushal. In our opinion, the accused had merely decided to teach him a lesson for having a quarrel with PW 2 on the previous day. They, therefore, appear to have made up their mind to give him a good thrashing for acting “a bit smart”. In such circumstances, it would not be possible to uphold the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 IPC. However, at the same time, the nature of injuries cannot be said to be superficial. It has come in evidence that numerous bones in the legs and arms of Khushal had been broken. The injuries being grievous in nature, the offences committed by the appellants would fall within the mischief of Section 326 IPC. 21. In view of the above, the appeals are partly allowed and the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 is set aside. Instead thereof, they are convicted under Section 326/149 IPC. For the offences under Section 326/149 IPC, the appellants are hereby sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for seven years. The conviction and sentence recorded by the courts below under any other sections of IPC are maintained. 22. The appeals are partly allowed, as indicated above.


                                                           REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.159 OF 2008




      NARAYAN MANIKRAO SALGAR               ..APPELLANT


      VERSUS


      STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                   ..RESPONDENT


                                    WITH


                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.803-804 OF 2008




      RAMRAO MHALBA SALGAR & ORS.       ..APPELLANTS


      VERSUS


      THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA            ..RESPONDENT


                                    WITH


               CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 297-298 OF 2008




      KESHAV MANIKRAO SALGAR & ANR.    ..APPELLANTS


      VERSUS


      THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA            ..RESPONDENT






                               J U D G M E N T




      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.




        1. By this common judgment, we propose to decide  criminal  appeals
           being Criminal Appeal Nos.159 of 2008, 803-804 of 2008 and  297-
           298 of 2008. For the sake of convenience, the  facts  have  been
           taken from Criminal Appeal No.159 of 2008.  All  the  appellants
           have been convicted for offences punishable under Sections  148,
           302 read with Sections 149, 341 read with Section 149, 323  read
           with  Section  149  and  sentenced  to  S.I.   for   one   year,
           imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.100/-.  It  has  also  been
           directed that, in default, they shall undergo further  S.I.  for
           six months, in the event of non payment of fine,  S.I.  for  one
           month and S.I. for one month respectively with a direction  that
           all  the  substantive  sentences  would  run  concurrently.  The
           aforesaid conviction and sentences have  been  recorded  in  the
           judgment of First  Adhoc  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Parbhani
           dated 20th August, 2005,  in  Sessions  Trial  No.180  of  1998.
           Separate appeals filed by the appellants have been dismissed  by
           the High Court. The conviction  and  sentence  recorded  by  the
           Sessions Court have been confirmed. The High Court also  noticed
           that the original accused No.2  Manikrao  and  original  accused
           No.10 Maroti had died during the pendency  of  the  proceedings.
           Therefore, the appeal filed by them had abated.
        2. We may now briefly notice the facts recorded by the High Court.
        3.  PW 9, P.S.I Mallikarjun Ingale, who was  attached  to  Tadkalas
           Police Station as a P.S.I. was informed by PW 1 Sharda about  an
           incident in which her husband had  been  viciously  attacked  by
           about 10 to 11 persons at about 6.30 pm on 9th March,  1998.  He
           was told that      PW 1 alongwith her infant son was riding on a
           motor cycle with her husband Khushal from Tadkalas to Phulkalas.
           The motor cycle was intercepted by accused No.2 Manikrao on  the
           road from Tadkalas to Phulkalas near the farm house  of  Salgar.
           PW 1 informed PW 9 that her husband  was  lying  in  an  injured
           condition near the farmhouse of the assailants.  On  receipt  of
           this information, PW 9 P.S.I. Ingale went to the  scene  of  the
           offence alongwith some other police  staff.  PW  1  Sharda  also
           accompanied the police party in a police jeep. The Police  party
           headed by PW 9 alongwith PW1 and Jiwanaji PW7  on  reaching  the
           scene of crime noticed that Khushal was lying in a pool of blood
           in a very seriously injured condition. Khushal was taken to  the
           Government Hospital at Tadkalas in a police  jeep.  However,  as
           the medical officer was  not  available  at  the  Hospital,  the
           injured was sent to the hospital at Parbhani accompanied by  one
           Head Constable and Constable in a police jeep. PW 9 recorded two
           entries in the station diary in this respect and thereafter went
           to General Hospital at Parbhani. By the  time  he  arrived,  the
           injured Khushal had already been admitted in  the  hospital.  On
           enquiry PW 8 Mukashe informed the police that Khushal was  in  a
           fit condition to give his  statement.  The  statement  was  duly
           recorded in the presence of the medical officer  Dr.Mukashe,  PW
           8.
        4. In his statement, Khushal stated that while he was going on  the
           motor cycle to Tadkalas for buying some household  goods,  about
           10 to 11 persons assaulted him near the farmhouse of Salgar.  He
           stated that the cause of  the  assault  was  an  altercation  of
           accused No.2 on the previous day when accused No.2 had  diverted
           the water which was meant for the land of  Khushal  to  his  own
           land. Khushal had in his statement named all the assailants.  On
           the same night, at about 12.00-12.15 a.m., Khushal succumbed  to
           the injuries and died.  The  statement  given  by  Khushal  has,
           therefore, been treated as a dying declaration. It was  produced
           as Exh.94 at the trial. The High Court notices that the  clothes
           of the deceased were seized vide memo at Exh.72 in the  presence
           of PW 4 Hanumant. On his return to  the  Police  Station,  PW  9
           registered the offence on the basis of statement made by Khushal
           vide crime No.14 of 1998 under Sections 307, 147, 148, 149, 341,
           323 and 504 of IPC at 11.30 p.m. On receiving information  about
              12.15 a.m. on 10th March, 1998 that injured Khushal had died,
           the offence under Section 302 IPC was also added.  Panchnama  at
           the scene of offence was duly drawn in the presence  of  panchas
           at Exh.76. Blood stained stones, blood mixed soil, a black  bead
           neckless, pieces of bangles of green colour,  one  wrist  watch,
           two sticks, one pair of Kolhapuri slipper, wooden  leg  of  cot,
           four stones of different sizes, one motor cycle were seized from
           the scene of offence. On the very same  day,  the  accused  were
           arrested. Blood stained clothes of accused  Laxman  and  Kundlik
           were seized in the presence of panchas by seizure memo at Exh.80
           and Exh.81 respectively. Subsequently, accused Narayan willingly
           pointed out during the course of the investigation to the  place
           where  the  sickle  (Katti)  had  been  hidden.  The  memorandum
           statement of accused Narayan was recorded in the presence of the
           panchas. Narayan took the police and the panchas  to  the  place
           where sickle (Katti) had been hidden under a heap of dried stock
           of grains. It was seized by memo  Exh.83.  The  seized  articles
           were duly sent to the chemical  examiner.  The  reports  of  the
           chemical analyzer were produced in court at Exh.96 and 97.
        5. At the trial, PW 1 Sharda  narrated  the  entire  incident.  She
           named all the accused. She also described how  all  the  accused
           were inter-related and belonging only to one family of  Salgars.
           She has given the details which were noticed by the trial  court
           as well the High Court. It is not necessary to recapitulate  the
           same. We may notice that she has narrated the incident which  is
           consistent with the version  recorded  by  the  injured  Khushal
           before PW 9 at the hospital. She narrates that when her  husband
           returned home evening before the assault, he had told her  about
           the scuffle that  he  had  with  accused  No.2  because  he  had
           diverted the water of the canal  to  his  own  field.  She  also
           narrated about the obstruction of the motor cycle when  she  was
           going alongwith her husband and  the  infant  from  Tadkalas  to
           Phulkalas for buying some household  goods.  She  described  how
           accused No.2 had  obstructed  the  motor  cycle  and  had  asked
           Khushal about the quarrel on the previous day. He had also  told
           Khushal that he was “acing a bit smart”. After the  motor  cycle
           was stopped, accused No.1 called the other persons from the farm
           house. All the  accused  came  there  armed  with  weapons  like
           sticks, stones, sickle (Katti). They  pushed  PW  1  Sharda  and
           deceased Khushal from the motor cycle. They  started  assaulting
           Khushal and she tried to shield her husband by lying on  top  of
           his body. However, she was pulled away by accused No.1. She  was
           badly hit by accused No.1. She was kicked and  also  given  fist
           blows. All the time Khushal and PW 1  were  shouting  for  help.
           However, all the accused dragged Khushal away from the road to a
           spot in front  of  the  farm  of  the  accused.  They  continued
           assaulting her husband with their respective weapons. She points
           out that on hearing  her  shouts,  Shivmurti  Shirale,  Shivhari
           Shirale and Ram Kubde  came  running  to  the  place  where  the
           assault was taking place. On seeing them,  the  accused  dropped
           their weapons and ran  away.  She  has  narrated  also  how  she
           stopped an auto-rickshaw and went to  the  village  Tadkalas  to
           inform her father-in-law about the assault. Subsequently, in the
           same auto-rickshaw she went to the police station  and  informed
           the police about the incident.  She  further  narrates  how  she
           accompanied her husband to the hospital at Parbhani. PW 2 Kishan
           is also an eye witness whose land is near the  land  of  accused
           No.2 Manikrao. He has stated that at about 6.30 he was  watering
           the groundnut crop in his field when he heard shouts coming from
           the farm house of the accused No.2 at about 6.30 p.m.  He  along
           with Shivmurti who was also watering his crop in  the  adjoining
           land went to the farm house, they saw  that  Khushal  was  being
           viciously assaulted by all the accused.  He  also  narrates  the
           entire incident as described by Khushal in the  statement  given
           to PW 9. PW 7, Jiwanaji is the father of deceased Khushal. He is
           not an eye witness. He was informed about the  incident  by  his
           daughter-in-law. He closed his shop and he was on the way to the
           place where Khushal had been assaulted when he noticed that  the
           police jeep coming on the road. He travelled in the police  jeep
           to the scene of the incident. He states that Khushal  was  lying
           in a pool of blood in front of the farm house of the accused. He
           states that he had asked Khushal about the incident when Khushal
           had informed him that accused No.2 to 11 had assaulted  him.  He
           then narrates how Khushal had been taken  to  the  hospital  and
           about his death. PW 9, PSI  Ingale,  also  narrated  the  entire
           incident, as noticed above. The prosecution also examined PW  3,
           Dr. Chaudhari, who had conducted the post-mortem examination. He
           had noticed the following external injuries :-
              1. “Contused lacerated wound over left wrist posteriorly 3 x 3
                 x 2 cms. Blood clots present.
              2. Contused lacerated wound right knee anteriorly size 8 x 4 x
                 1 cms. Blood clots present.
              3. Contused lacerated wound over  right  thigh  medial  aspect
                 size 5 x 4 x 2 cms., blood clots present.
              4. Contused lacerated wound right leg anteriorly size 2 x 2  x
                 1 cms. Blood clots present.
              5. Contused lacerated wound left leg 3 x  2  x  1  cms.  Blood
                 clots present.
              6. Contused lacerated wound left leg calf 6 x 2 x 1 cms. Blood
                 clots present.
              7. Contused lacerated wound left plam thenar aspect 6 x 3 x  2
                 cms. Blood clots present.”


        6. According to this doctor, all these injuries were caused by hard
           and blunt object and the injuries were caused within the last 12
           hours. He  had  noticed  the  fracture  of  middle  third  right
           humerus, fracture of lower third radius ulna, fracture of  lower
           third of right tibia and fracture of right patella. On  internal
           examination, he  noticed  that  one  contusion  on  scalp  right
           parietal region size 3 x 3 cms. On internal examination of scalp
           he  found  meninges  contested  and  subdural  of  haematoma  of
            3 x 2 cms. Brain was found  congested.  He,  therefore,  opined
           that all the injuries were ante-mortem  including  the  internal
           injuries. He also opined that the cause  of  death  was  due  to
           subdural haematoma with  pulmonary  embolism  with  haemorrhagic
           shock due to multiple fractures.  The  post  mortem  report  was
           produced as Exh.70.
        7. PW 8, Dr.  Rajeshwar  was  the  medical  officer  who  had  been
           assigned the duty of casualty on                      9th March,
           1998 from 8 pm to 8 am.  He  also  states  that  on  that  night
           Khushal was admitted in the  Civil  Hospital  Parbhani.  He  was
           having multiple injuries with cerebral concussion with  multiple
           fractures with peripheral circulatory  failure.  He  points  out
           that he was brought by police  constable  and  was  referred  by
           P.S.Tadkalas. He also states that PSI of Police Station Tadkalas
           had contacted him for recording the statement of the injured. He
           examined the  patient  and  permitted  the  PSI  to  record  the
           statement of the injured. He categorically stated that  the  PSI
           recorded the statement. He was present while  the  statement  of
           the  injured  was  being  recorded.  After  the  statement   was
           recorded, he examined the patient and gave the certificate  that
           the patient was conscious to give the statement.  He  identified
           the endorsement on the statement which was Exh.89.
        8. Relying on the aforesaid evidence, the Sessions Court  convicted
           all the accused, as noticed above. The  High  Court  re-examined
           the entire evidence and did not find any reason to  differ  with
           the findings recorded by the trial court.
        9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
       10. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the case of
           the prosecution is unbelievable and deserves to be discarded. It
           is submitted that the ocular evidence is completely inconsistent
           with the medical evidence. It is  pointed  out  that  the  whole
           story has been concocted. The entry made in  the  station  diary
           about the incident on the basis of the statement made  by  PW  1
           was never produced before the court. PW 9 PSI did  not  register
           the FIR even when he had gone to the scene of the crime.  It  is
           further pointed out that the dying declaration cannot be  relied
           upon. According to PW 9, it was recorded between  8.20  p.m.  to
           8.30 p.m. However, PW 8 says that Khushal was admitted  at  8.55
           p.m. The record says that the certificate of the doctor  stating
           that the injured was fit to give statement between  10  p.m.  to
           10.10 p.m. The FIR came to be recorded at  11.30  p.m.  and  the
           injured died at 12.15 to 12.30 a.m.  According  to  the  learned
           counsel for the appellant, the whole story is concocted. It  has
           been put forward only due to enmity between the  family  of  the
           accused with the family of the  deceased.  Learned  counsel  has
           also pointed out that the deceased was in  fact  an  undesirable
           character. Show cause notice has been issued to him as to why he
           should not  be  externed.  According  to  the  learned  counsel,
           Khushal was actually riding the motorcycle when he was under the
           influence of liquor. He lost control of  the  motorcycle,  as  a
           result of which all the three riders fell of the motorcycle. The
           injuries suffered by them were due to the  motorcycle  accident.
           Learned counsel further pointed out that the conduct of the  PW1
           is wholly unnatural. According to her,  after  the  assault  she
           left her husband alone in a seriously injured condition and went
           away in a auto rickshaw. She also left her infant child  on  the
           road. According to the learned counsel,  this  is  not  expected
           from a wife who’s husband is fighting for his life due to  fatal
           injuries. It is further pointed out that all the witnesses  have
           insisted that Khushal had been assaulted with the sickle (katti)
           but the injuries sustained by him were  contused  and  lacerated
           wounds. They have pointed out  the cross-examination of the PW 3
           Dr.Kalidas, who had conducted the post mortem on the  dead  body
           of Khushal. The doctor had clearly stated that he cannot specify
           the external injuries corresponding to the injury  mentioned  in
           Column  No.19.  This  injury  was  so  serious  that  there  was
           formation of blood on  the  brain  which  led  to  formation  of
           pressure on the  brain.  He  had  further  stated  that  due  to
           formation of blood on the brain and haematomma a person  becomes
           unconscious. Contused lacerated wounds can be caused by hard and
           blunt object and also by a fall on the ground.  Learned  counsel
           for the appellant placed heavy reliance on the observations that
           in case of major accident such types of injuries  are  possible.
           This doctor has further stated that injuries in  column  17  are
           possible if a person is driving the vehicle in drunken stage and
           the motor cycle skidded and it fell on one side  and  the  rider
           falls on the other side. The appellants had also emphasised that
           none of the witness had seen any  specific  part  on  which  the
           injuries were inflicted  with  Katti.  Since  according  to  the
           appellant, the medical evidence is inconsistent with the  actual
           evidence, the entire prosecution case needs to be discarded.
       11. Attacking  the  credibility  of  PW  1  and  2,  the  appellants
           submitted that PW 1 did not name any of  the  accused  when  she
           went to the police station though she was present there  from  7
           p.m. till 7.30 p.m. She also did not mention the  names  of  the
           accused while she was travelling in the jeep  with  the  police.
           She admitted in the cross examination that when her husband  has
           been assaulted in front of the farm house of  the  accused,  she
           could not see as to  who  had  inflicted  which  injury.  It  is
           further pointed out that although she claims that she  had  been
           badly assaulted by accused No.1 yet she did not get her  medical
           examination.
       12.  The evidence of PW2 is sought to be  discredited  on  the  sole
           ground that he happens to be related to the deceased. Lastly, it
           is submitted that the appellants have been  convicted  with  the
           aid  of  Section  149.  This  according  to  the  appellants  is
           unsustainable. As there was no occasion for all the  accused  to
           come together at that  particular  time.  All  the  accused  are
           living at different places and  there  is  no  evidence  of  any
           common intention. It is further submitted by the learned counsel
           that even if there was a common intention, it was  not  to  kill
           Khushal. At best it could be said that accused had come with the
           common intention of giving him a good thrashing because  of  the
           incident that occurred on the previous day. Therefore, at  best,
           the appellant could have convicted for the offence under Section
           326 IPC and not 302 IPC.
       13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State of  Maharashtra
           has submitted that the trial court as well as  the  High  Court,
           upon reconsideration of the entire  evidence, has concluded that
           the involvement of all the accused in the assault on Khushal has
           been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This Court,  in  exercising
           the powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, would
           not re-appreciate the evidence and substitute  its  own  opinion
           for the findings recorded by the trial court and the High Court.
           It is only in very exceptional  circumstances  when  a  decision
           shocks the conscious of this Court that powers under Article 136
           would be invoked. Learned counsel pointed out that in this  case
           there is cogent evidence which  is  sufficient  to  support  the
           conclusions recorded by the trial court  as  well  as  the  High
           Court. Learned Counsel pointed out to the evidence of  the  eye-
           witness PW 1 Sharda, wife of the deceased, and PW 2  whose  land
           virtually adjoins the land of the accused.  Both these witnesses
           had given consistent      eye-witness account. They were present
           when the assault had actually taken place. The evidence  of  the
           wife cannot be discarded as she herself is an  injured  witness.
           The evidence of these two witnesses corroborates the evidence of
           each other on three crucial aspects: (i) Genesis of the  dispute
           (ii) the manner in which the assault took place and (iii) events
           that took place after the assault. He points out that both these
           witnesses were subjected to lengthy  cross-examination  but  the
           evidence remained un-impeached. The ocular evidence of  the  two
           eye witnesses is consistent with the statement made  by  Khushal
           firstly before his father PW 7 Jiwanaji. Secondly the  statement
           which was recorded at Parbhani Hospital in the presence  of  PSI
           Ingale PW 9,  and  Dr.  Mukashe,  PW8.  The  statement  made  by
           Khushal, having been certified by the Doctor, PW 8  to  be  made
           when he was conscious to make  a  statement,  cannot  be  either
           disbelieved or discarded.  Both  these  dying  declarations  are
           consistent with the ocular evidence. The  third  most  important
           piece of evidence is  the  recovery  of  various  items  at  the
           instance of the  accused.  The  sickle  allegedly  used  by  the
           appellant Narayan  was  stained  with  human  blood.  Similarly,
           clothes of all the accused which were taken into custody by  the
           police and seized were also stained with blood. The weapons used
           by the appellant were also stained with blood.  Learned  counsel
           further pointed out that none of the accused was able to explain
           any of the evidence appearing  against  them  in  the  statement
           recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C, 1973. Learned  counsel
           further pointed out that the medical evidence clearly shows that
           there are so many injuries caused  to  Khushal  that  his  death
           resulted due to shock and hemorrhage. He submitted that none  of
           the submissions made by the learned counsel for  the  appellants
           can be supported by  the  evidence  on  record.  It  is  further
           pointed out by the learned counsel for the State of  Maharashtra
           that all the appellants have been convicted  under  Section  302
           read with Section 149 IPC. The offence under Section  149  is  a
           specific and substantive offence. It is pointed out that for the
           purpose of application of Section 149 IPC, the  prosecution  had
           to prove the presence and participation of  the  accused  in  an
           unlawful assembly. This is duly proved by the fact that all  the
           accused came together armed with various weapons which were used
           to assault Khushal. He further submits that  Section  149  which
           fastened the criminal law on the accused does  not  require  the
           prosecution to  prove  any  overt  act  against  any  particular
           accused.


       14. We have considered the submissions made by the  learned  counsel
           for the parties. At the outset, it  must  be  noticed  that  the
           Trial Court as well as the High Court, on  due  appreciation  of
           the evidence, have  found  all  the  appellants  guilty  of  the
           offences punishable under Section 302/149 IPC. The acquittal  of
           accused No.9 and  accused  No.11  of  all  the  charges  clearly
           demonstrates the care and caution with which the Trial Court  as
           well as the High Court have examined the evidence.  Even  though
           the powers of this Court under Article 136 of  the  Constitution
           are very wide, but it would not interfere  with  the  concurrent
           findings of fact, save in exceptional  circumstances.  It  would
           interfere in the findings recorded by the Trial Court as well as
           the High Court if it is found that  the  High  Court  has  acted
           perversely and/or disregarded any vital piece of evidence  which
           would shake the very foundation of  the  prosecution  case.   In
           other words, this Court would exercise the powers under  Article
           136 where  the  conclusion  of  the  High  Court  is  manifestly
           perverse and unsupportable on the evidence on record.


       15. As noticed above, we have been taken through the evidence by the
           learned counsel of both sides. We are unable to agree  with  the
           submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants  that
           the appellants have been falsely implicated, or that the assault
           did not take place in the manner projected by the prosecution.

       16.  PW 1, Sharda has clearly stated that on the  fateful  day,  she
           alongwith her infant child was riding on  the  motorcycle  which
           was being driven by her husband. She has clearly stated that her
           husband was compelled to stop the motorcycle as accused No.2 had
           come and stood in the way. It is significant that  the  incident
           had taken place firstly on the road adjacent to the farm of  the
           accused person, secondly Khushal  was  dragged  by  the  accused
           person to a place in front of the farm of the  accused  persons.
           The  assault  was  continued  by  all  the  accused  with  their
           respective weapons. This narration of the events was not  shaken
           when  she  was  subjected  to  a  lengthy  cross-examination  by
           different learned counsel for all the accused. We  do  not  find
           much substance in the submission that her evidence needs  to  be
           discarded as she did not name each and every accused  person  at
           the first opportunity, when she went to the Police Station.  Her
           plight at such a situation is not difficult to imagine. She  had
           done whatever was feasible to report the matter to her father-in-
           law.  She then proceeded to inform the police,  without  wasting
           any time.  She has narrated the entire sequence of events  as  a
           witness  in  Court.   She  has  given   the   precise   inter-se
           relationship of all the accused.  However, we find substance  in
           the submission of         Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhari  that  even
           Sharda did not think that her husband was so  seriously  injured
           that he may die.  Otherwise, her first impulse would  have  been
           to move him to the hospital or arrange for a  doctor.   She  was
           aware that he had been injured only on arms and legs.  But  this
           does not detract from the fact that the assault had taken  place
           as narrated by her. The fact that she  could  not  indicate  the
           precise  injury  caused  by  each  of  the  accused   is   quite
           understandable as her husband was  being  attacked  by  a  large
           group of people. In  such  a  situation,  it  would  perhaps  be
           humanely impossible for anyone to indicate  the  precise  injury
           caused by each one of the accused/appellant. We, therefore, find
           no infirmity in the ocular evidence given by Sharda PW1.


       17. Furthermore, her evidence is duly supported by   PW 2,  who  had
           come running to the scene of the crime on hearing the  commotion
           at the farmhouse of the accused persons. It is  noteworthy  that
           on seeing PW2, all the accused  are  stated  to  have  discarded
           their weapons and ran away. The evidence of  this  witness  also
           could not be shaken during  cross-examination.  It  has  further
           come in evidence that on receiving information about the assault
           on his son, PW7 promptly reached the scene of the crime. Luckily
           on his way he was picked up by the police jeep  which  had  been
           brought by Sub-Inspector Ingale PW9  for  investigation  of  the
           crime. On reaching the scene of the crime, both PW7 and PW9 have
           stated that they found the husband lying severely injured  in  a
           pool of blood. Both the witnesses have also fixed  the  spot  in
           front of the farm of the accused persons. PW1 had clearly stated
           that she had tried to save her husband by lying on his body  but
           she had been pulled away by accused No.1 who had then  proceeded
           to assault her. She had also further stated that the accused had
           dragged her husband by the collar of his  shirt  to  a  spot  in
           front of the farmhouse  of  the  appellant.  They  continued  to
           assault her husband with the respective weapons. The assault  on
           Khushal in front of the farmhouse is further  supported  by  the
           evidence of PW2 who has given a corresponding narration  of  the
           assault. Therefore, the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 being consistent
           cannot be lightly brushed aside. PW 7 further goes on  to  state
           that on his arrival, he inquired from his  son  as  to  who  had
           caused the injuries. The son  had  clearly  stated  that  family
           member of Salgar had assaulted him. The statement  made  by  the
           injured before PW7 is further strengthened by the statement that
           was recorded subsequently at Parbhani Hospital  by  PW9  in  the
           presence of  PW8.  The  statement  clearly  indicates  that  the
           incident took place exactly as narrated by  PW1.  The  statement
           has been recorded at  the  time  Khushal  was  certified  to  be
           conscious and in a fit medical condition to  make  a  statement.
           The dying declaration being consistent and clear also cannot  be
           discarded.


       18. The medical evidence would also indicate that Khushal  had  been
           very severally beaten.  But at the same time, it can not be said
           to be an assault with intent to kill.  Firstly, all the  accused
           are armed with sticks and bricks etc.  In our opinion, there  is
           no evidence to indicate  that  Narayan  was  holding  a  “Katti”
           (sickle).  It is noteworthy that Khushal had sustained  external
           injuries on the left wrist, right knee, right thigh, right  leg,
           left leg, left palm as well as head.  There was hardly a bone in
           his body that was not broken.  The number of injuries caused  to
           Khushal clearly shows that the assault  was  premeditated.   All
           the injuries were lacerated and caused by blunt  weapons.   None
           of the witnesses could say if any  injury  had  been  caused  by
           Katti (sickle).  According to Dr.  Chaudhari,  PW  3,  the  head
           injury  could  be  the  result  of  a  rider  falling  from  the
           motorcycle.

       19. In our opinion, the appellants have  failed  to  point  out  any
           infirmity in the conclusions recorded by the Sessions  Court  as
           well as the High Court with regard  to  the  assault.   On  this
           issue,  both  the  judgments  do  not  suffer  from   any   such
           perversity, which would shock the conscious of  this  Court.  In
           fact, in our  opinion,  the  entire  prosecution  evidence  when
           considered  from  all  angles  leads  to  a  conclusion,  beyond
           reasonable doubt, that Khushal was a victim  of  a  premeditated
           assault by all the appellants with their respective weapons.

       20. However, given the nature of weapons used, the location  of  the
           injuries and the nature of the injuries caused, it would not  be
           possible to hold that the appellants shared a common  object  of
           causing the murder of Khushal.  In our opinion, the accused  had
           merely decided to teach him a lesson for having a  quarrel  with
           PW 2 on the previous day.  They, therefore, appear to have  made
           up their mind to give him a good thrashing  for  acting  “a  bit
           smart”.  In such circumstances, it  would  not  be  possible  to
           uphold the conviction of the appellants under Section  302  IPC.
           However, at the same time, the nature of injuries cannot be said
           to be superficial. It has come in evidence that  numerous  bones
           in the legs and arms of Khushal had been  broken.  The  injuries
           being  grievous  in  nature,  the  offences  committed  by   the
           appellants would fall within the mischief of Section 326 IPC.


       21. In view of the above, the appeals are  partly  allowed  and  the
           conviction of the appellants under Section  302  is  set  aside.
           Instead thereof, they are convicted under Section  326/149  IPC.
           For the offences under Section 326/149 IPC, the  appellants  are
           hereby sentenced to  undergo  Rigorous  Imprisonment  for  seven
           years.  The conviction and sentence recorded by the courts below
           under any other sections of IPC are maintained.
       22. The appeals are partly allowed, as indicated above.










                                           …………………………….J.
                                          [Surinder Singh Nijjar]










                                        ……………………………..J.
                                          [H.L.Gokhale]

      New Delhi;
      August 28, 2012.

-----------------------
30


Notwithstanding the clear intent of the legislature to provide a summary remedy to a person illegally dispossessed of immovable property, the defendant has been persistent in its challenge to the decree passed against it. The learned trial court; thereafter the revisional court, i.e. court of the learned District Judge and lastly the Allahabad High Court have consistently held that possession of the disputed property on relevant date was with the plaintiff from which he was unlawfully dispossessed by the defendant, i.e. the petitioner herein. The unwavering view of the courts at all the three tiers of our hierarchical justice delivery system have not deterred the defendant to challenge the same by means of the present approach.


                                        NON-REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION

               CIVIL APPEAL No.    6071                of 2012
                   ( Arising out of SLP (Civil) 9042/2007)


I.T.C. LIMITED                                     … Appellant(s)

                                   Versus


ADARSH COOP. HOUSING SOC. LTD.               … Respondents



                            J  U  D  G  M  E  N T



RANJAN GOGOI, J


        Leave granted.


   2. A simple issue with regard to possession of either of the  parties  to
        this over two decade long litigation has come to the last court  at
        the instance of the defendant in a suit  under  Section  6  of  the
        Specific Relief Act, 1963.  Notwithstanding the clear intent of the
        legislature to provide a  summary  remedy  to  a  person  illegally
        dispossessed  of  immovable  property,  the  defendant   has   been
        persistent in its challenge to the decree passed  against  it.  The
        learned trial court; thereafter the revisional court, i.e. court of
        the learned District Judge and lastly the Allahabad High Court have
        consistently held that  possession  of  the  disputed  property  on
        relevant date was with the plaintiff from which he  was  unlawfully
        dispossessed by the defendant,  i.e.  the  petitioner  herein.  The
        unwavering view of the  courts  at  all  the  three  tiers  of  our
        hierarchical  justice  delivery  system  have  not   deterred   the
        defendant to challenge the same by means of the present approach.
   3. The facts in brief, may now be noticed :
        The respondent - plaintiff had filed suit No. 72  of  1989  in  the
        court of Civil Judge, Agra, under Section 6 of the Specific  Relief
        Act, 1963, (hereinafter referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’)  praying  for
        delivery  of  possession  of  the  suit  property  from  which  the
        plaintiff claimed  to  have  been  illegally  dispossessed  by  the
        defendant (petitioner herein) in the night intervening 19th/20th of
        November, 1988. According to the plaintiff, the land  comprised  in
        Khasra No. 877, measuring 2 bighas  3  biswas  located  in  Village
        Basai Mustaqi Tajganj, Agra  was jointly owned by Murari Lal on the
        one hand and Jagdish Prasad, Ramesh Chand, Suresh Chand and  Haresh
        Chand (hereinafter referred to  as  ‘Jagdish  &  others.’)  on  the
        other. According to the plaintiff, by mutual  consent,  Murari  Lal
        was in possession of his half share in northern part  of  the  land
        whereas the half share of Jagdish &  others  was  in  the  southern
        portion.  The plaintiff has averred that it came into possession of
        the southern portion of the plot (hereinafter referred  to  as  the
        Suit land) on 22.5.1985 and on 03.01.1986 Jagdish & others had sold
        the same to the plaintiff. On the basis of the aforesaid sale  made
        by a registered  deed,  the  revenue  records  were  corrected  and
        necessary entries were made  showing  the  name  of  the  plaintiff
        against the share of Jagdish & others. According to the  plaintiff,
        Jagdish & others had entered into an agreement of sale of the  same
        land with the defendant, though the land stood transferred  in  the
        name  of  the  plaintiff  and   the   revenue   records   corrected
        accordingly.  In these circumstances, according to  the  plaintiff,
        suit No. 238 of 1983 was filed by the defendant against  Jagdish  &
        others for specific performance of the agreement to sell.   Another
        Suit i.e. Suit No. 765 of 1984 was  also  filed  by  the  defendant
        against Jagdish & others for an  order  of  injunction  restraining
        Jagdish & others from raising any construction on the suit land and
        from  transferring/  alienating  the  same.    According   to   the
        plaintiff, as the property involved in both the suits  had  already
        been transferred to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was impleaded as a
        party in both  the  above  suits.   It  was  also  averred  by  the
        plaintiff that as injunction prayed for by the  defendant,  as  the
        plaintiff, in Suit No. 765 of  1984  was  refused  and  the  appeal
        against such refusal was dismissed, in  the  intervening  night  of
        19th/20th  November, 1988, forcible possession of the suit land was
        taken by the defendant which fact was  brought  to  the  notice  of
        concerned police station on 20.11.1988 itself.   According  to  the
        plaintiff,  a  proceeding  under  Section  145  C.  P.C.  was  also
        initiated at the instance of the  plaintiff  wherein  an  order  of
        attachment of the disputed land, i.e. the suit land, was passed  on
        29.11.1988.  However, as  the  defendant  continued  to  remain  in
        possession of the suit land despite the order of  attachment,  Suit
        No.72/1989 was instituted by  the  plaintiff  seeking  the  reliefs
        already noticed.

     4. The defendant contested the suit by contending that  no  partition,
        formal or otherwise, of the land covered by Khasra No.877 had taken
        place between Murari Lal  and  Jagdish  &  others.   The  defendant
        specifically contended that Jagdish was not in  possession  of  the
        suit land.  According to the  defendant,  in  the  absence  of  any
        formal partition  between  the  co-sharers,  i.e.  Murari  Lal  and
        Jagdish & others, and also in the absence of any  mutual  agreement
        between the parties with regard to possession of any specific share
        of the  land, no exclusive right in the suit  land  had  vested  in
        Jagdish & others so as to confer legitimacy to the sale deed  dated
        03.01.1986 executed by Jagdish & others in favour of the plaintiff.
          The defendant also contended that on the date of execution of the
        aforesaid sale deed, there was a pre-existing agreement executed by
        Jagdish & others to sell the same land to the defendant and in fact
        a suit for specific performance of the  said  agreement  (Suit  No.
        238/1983) was pending in the competent court.  The  defendant  also
        contended that pursuant to  the  aforesaid  agreement  between  the
        defendant and Jagdish & others, possession of the land  was  handed
        over  to  the  defendant  way  back  in  1976.  Consequently,   the
        possession sought for in Suit No. 238/84 filed by the defendant was
        not physical but proprietary possession.
     5. In the written statement filed, the  defendant,  had  also  claimed
        that it was in possession of the entire  of  the  land  covered  by
        Khasra No. 877, i.e.  both  the  northern  and  southern  portions.
        According to the defendant,  by  a  lease  deed  dated  01.04.1976,
        Jagdish & others had leased their half share of the land of  Khasra
        No. 877 in favour of an officer of the defendant-Company acting for
        and on behalf of the said  Company.   The  said  deed  was  for  an
        initial period of six months which period was  subject  to  further
        extension(s).  The defendant also claimed that  on  19.09.1976,  an
        agreement to sell was entered into by and  between  the  defendant-
        Company and Jagdish & others for sale of the half  portion  of  the
        land and further that on 28.9.1978, an agreement  was  executed  by
        and  between   Jagdish  &  others  and  Murari  Lal  by  which  the
        possession  of  the  defendant  on  the  entire  suit  land  w.e.f.
        01.04.1976 was admitted by both co-sharers.


        Furthermore, according to the defendant,  Murari  Lal  had  entered
        into a separate agreement dated 01.10.1976 for  sale  of  his  half
        share to the defendant wherein, once again,  he  had  admitted  the
        possession of the defendant over the entire land.   Thereafter,  on
        21.08.1982, Murari Lal executed the sale deed  conveying  his  half
        share of the suit property in favour of the  defendant.   According
        to the defendant, by the said sale deed dated 21.08.1982, the share
        of Murari Lal  that  was  transferred  to  the  defendant  was  the
        southern portion i.e. the suit  land.   In  the  written  statement
        filed, it was also averred that before execution of the  sale  deed
        dated 21.08.1982, Murari Lal had executed two other documents  both
        dated  03.03.1982  admitting  the  execution  of  the  unregistered
        agreement dated 01.10.1976 in favour  of  the  defendant  and  also
        admitting the delivery of possession of the half share belonging to
        him to the defendant in furtherance of the  aforesaid  unregistered
        agreement dated 01.10.1976.  The defendant contended that the  sale
        dated 03.01.1986 purported to be executed by Jagdish  &  others  in
        favour of the plaintiff was a void document and  also  hit  by  the
        principle of lis pendens.


     6. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 under which provision  of
        law the suit in question was filed by the  plaintiff-respondent  is
        pari-materia with Section 9 of the Act of 1877.   A bare reading of
        the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 1963  would  go
        to show that a person who has been illegally  dispossessed  of  his
        immovable property may  himself  or  through  any  person  claiming
        through him recover such possession by filing a suit.   In  such  a
        suit, the entitlement of the plaintiff  to  recover  possession  of
        property from which he claims to have been  illegally  dispossessed
        has to be adjudicated independently of the question of  title  that
        may be set up by the defendant in such a suit.  In fact, in a  suit
        under Section 6, the only question that has to be determined by the
        Court is whether the plaintiff was in possession  of  the  disputed
        property and he had been illegally dispossessed  therefrom  on  any
        date within six months prior to the filing of the  suit.   This  is
        because Section 6 (2) prescribes a period of six  months  from  the
        date of dispossession as the outer limit for filing of a suit.   As
        the question of possession and illegal dispossession  therefrom  is
        the only issue germane to a suit  under  Section  6,  a  proceeding
        thereunder, naturally, would partake the  character  of  a  summary
        proceeding against which the remedy by way of appeal or review  has
        been specifically excluded by sub-Section 3  of  Section  6.   Sub-
        Section 4 also makes it clear that an unsuccessful  litigant  in  a
        suit under Section 6 would have the option of filing a  fresh  suit
        for recovery of possession on the basis of title, if any.  In fact,
        the above view has found expression in  several  pronouncements  of
        this Court of which reference may be made to the decisions in Lallu
        Yashwant Singh (dead) by his LRs. Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh &  Ors.[1],
        Krishna Ram Mahale (D) by LRs  Vs.  Mrs.Shobha  Venkat  Rao[2]  and
        Sanjay Kumar Pandey & Ors. V. Gulabahar  Sheikh  &  Ors.[3]  .   In
        fact, para 4 of this Court’s judgment passed in Sanjay Kumar Pandey
        (supra) may be a useful reiteration of the law in this regard.  The
        same is, therefore, extracted hereinbelow:-
          “4.     “A suit under Section 6 of  the  Act  is  often  called  a
          summary suit inasmuch as the enquiry in the suit under  Section  6
          is confined to finding out the possession and dispossession within
          a period of six months from the date of  the  institution  of  the
          suit ignoring the question of title.  Sub-Section (3) of Section 6
          provides that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree  passed
          in any suit instituted under this section.  No review of any  such
          order or decree is permitted.  The remedy of a person unsuccessful
          in a suit under Section 6 of the Act is to  file  a  regular  suit
          establishing his title to the suit property and in  the  event  of
          his succeeding he will be entitled to recover  possession  of  the
          property notwithstanding the adverse decision under Section  6  of
          the Act.  Thus, as against a decision under Section 6 of the  Act,
          the remedy of unsuccessful party is to file a suit based on title.
           The remedy of filing a revision is available but that is only  by
          way of an exception; for the High Court would not interfere with a
          decree or order under Section 6 of the Act except on  a  case  for
          interference being made out within the well-settled parameters  of
          the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115  of  the
          Code.”


     7. It is indeed sad, if not unfortunate, that what was intended by the
        legislature to be a summary proceeding to enable a person illegally
        dispossessed  to  effect  quick  recovery  of  possession  of   the
        immovable property has, in the present case, erupted into  an  over
        two decades  old  litigation.  The  sheer  number  of  pending  lis
        permitted the learned Trial Court to  return  its  findings,  after
        almost a decade, that it is,  indeed,  the  plaintiff  who  was  in
        possession of the disputed property on the relevant  date  and  was
        dispossessed therefrom in  an  illegal  manner  by  the  defendant.
        Though Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1963 bars the remedy  of  appeal
        and review, a small window, by way of a revision, was kept open  by
        the legislature possibly to enable the High Court to have a  second
        look in the matter in an exceptional situation.   However,  section
        115 of the CPC was amended in its application to the State of Uttar
        Pradesh and the forum for exercise of the  revisional  jurisdiction
        came  to  be  recognized  as  the  next  Superior  Court  and   not
        necessarily by the  High  Court.   That  is  how  the  unsuccessful
        defendant moved the learned District Judge. Though  the  Revisional
        Court reiterated the findings of the learned Trial  Court,  another
        half a decade rolled by. Next in the hierarchical system of courts,
        i.e. the High Court was thereafter approached by  way  of  a  Civil
        Miscellaneous  Writ  Petition  filed  under  Article  277  of   the
        Constitution.  The High Court answered the question, again, against
        the defendant.  The  manner  and  content  of  the  same  has  been
        challenged before this Court in the present Appeal,  primarily,  on
        the ground that when formal partition of the  land  had  not  taken
        place the issue of possession of specific shares by the  co-sharers
        could not have been determined so as to vest  jurisdiction  in  the
        trial Court to pass a decree under Section 6 of the Act of 1963.
     8. A reading of the judgment of the learned Trial Court indicates that
        in coming to the findings recorded, the learned  Trial  Court  took
        into account the pleaded case of  the  defendant  that  it  was  in
        possession of the entire land comprised in Khasra No. 877  and  not
        only  the  southern  portion  in  respect  of  which  recovery   of
        possession was prayed for by the plaintiff.   The learned Court, at
        the outset, noticed  that  the  relevant  revenue  records  on  the
        crucial  date,  i.e.  date  of  filing  of  the  Suit,  showed  the
        possession of both parties to the Suit  over  the  land  comprising
        Khasra No. 877. According to the plaintiff,  the  southern  portion
        which is the suit property was sold  to  it  by  Jagdish  &  others
        whereas according to the defendant, the said  suit  property,  i.e.
        southern portion was sold to it by Murari Lal.  The  difference  in
        the identity of the property,  as  claimed,  would  hardly  make  a
        difference to the core issue in the case inasmuch as  according  to
        the defendant it was in possession  of  the  entire  property,  the
        northern portion by way of a  lease  deed  executed  by  Jagdish  &
        others and the southern portion by way of a sale deed  executed  by
        Murari Lal.   The  police  report  dated  21.11.1988  submitted  in
        connection with the proceeding under Section 145 CPC recorded  that
        in the northern portion of the  land  comprising  Khasra  No.  877,
        possession of the defendant was established  and  the  dispute  was
        with regard to the southern portion of the land.   From  the  above
        report, the conclusion recorded by the learned Trial Court that the
        plaintiff was in possession of the southern portion is  a  possible
        conclusion that could be reasonably reached in  view  of  what  was
        disclosed by the police  report  dated  21.11.1988  read  with  the
        relevant revenue records.  The reluctance of the  first  revisional
        court as well  as  the  High  Court  to  interfere  with  the  said
        conclusion is but natural and the same cannot be understood  to  be
        unreasonable so as to warrant interference by  us  in  the  present
        appeal.
     9. That apart, the learned Trial Court also took note of the fact that
        lease deed dated 01.04.1976 purported to be executed by  Jagdish  &
        others, on the basis of which the defendant claimed to have entered
        possession of the share of the land belonging to Jagdish  &  others
        have not been proved by the defendant.   Similarly,  the  agreement
        dated 28.9.1978, executed by Jagdish & others and Murari Lal on the
        basis of which the defendant claimed possession of the entire  land
        had also not been proved.  The reason for which the  learned  Trial
        Court came to the aforesaid conclusion, i.e., that the  lease  deed
        dated 01.04.1976 and the agreement dated 28.9.1978  have  not  been
        proved is that the signatures of the executors  and  the  witnesses
        thereon have not been proved as required by law.  Such a conclusion
        cannot be faulted. In fact, a  further  conclusion  which  has  the
        effect of casting a serious doubt with regard to the claims of  the
        defendant reasonably follows from the above.   The  fact  that  the
        defendant had instituted Suit No. 238 of 1983 and Suit No.  765  of
        1984 claiming possession and injunction  in  respect  of  the  suit
        property was rightly understood by the learned Trial Court to be  a
        reasonable indication of the fact that the defendant, on the  dates
        of filing of the said suits, was not  in  possession  of  the  suit
        property.   In  such  a  situation,  the  dispossession  which  the
        plaintiff claimed to have taken place in the intervening  night  of
        19th/20th of November, 1988, has to  be  understood  to  have  been
        proved and established.  The issues raised by  the  defendant  with
        regard to the validity of the Sale deed dated  03.01.1986  executed
        by Jagdish & others in favour of the plaintiff on  account  of  the
        pendency of Suit No. 238 of 1983 and the validity of the entries in
        the revenue records are questions surrounding  title  and  are  not
        strictly relevant for deciding the issue that was  required  to  be
        decided in the suit in question namely, who was  in  possession  of
        the suit property on the relevant date.
    10. The argument raised on behalf of the  petitioner  (defendant)  that
        highly contentious issue having arisen in the  present  proceeding,
        the same ought not to have been adjudicated in a suit under Section
        6 would hardly merit acceptance, inasmuch, the foregoing discussion
        would enable us to come to  the  conclusion  that  the  issue  with
        regard to possession was capable of being decided on the  materials
        on  record  and  was,   accordingly,   so   decided.     A   mutual
        understanding  amongst  the  original  co-sharers  with  regard  to
        possession of specific areas of the  entire  land  is  fairly  well
        established.
    11. Another argument has been raised on behalf of the  petitioner  that
        in the present case the courts below  have  decided  the  issue  of
        possession by holding the defendant not to be in possession of  the
        suit land instead of recording a finding that it was the  plaintiff
        who was in possession. The said argument, again,  would  not  merit
        acceptance by us.  In a civil proceeding, the issues that may arise
        are required to be decided by balancing  the  claims  and  counter-
        claims of the parties before the  Court  and  on  the  basis  of  a
        preponderance of probabilities.  The conclusion that the  defendant
        could not have been in possession, as claimed, was necessary to  be
        reached in order to answer the question that was before  the  Court
        in the present case.
    12. The discussion that have preceded leads us  to  conclude  that  the
        findings recorded by the learned Trial Court and  affirmed  by  the
        revisional Court as well as  by  the  High  Court  are  essentially
        findings on question of fact which have  been  arrived  at  on  the
        basis of the evidence and materials adduced by  the  parties.   We,
        therefore, find no reason whatsoever, to disturb the said  findings
        and the same are hereby affirmed.   Consequently,  we  dismiss  the
        appeal and affirm the decree passed by the learned Courts below.




                                        ...……………………J.
                                          [P SATHASIVAM]



                                        ………………………J.
                                          [RANJAN GOGOI]

      New Delhi,
      27th  August, 2012.
-----------------------
[1]    AIR 1968 SC 620
[2]    AIR 1989 SC 2097
[3]    SCC 2004 (4) 664

-----------------------
17


Tuesday, August 28, 2012

A.P. Water, Land and Trees Act, 2002 The Act is purely regulatory in nature. Sinking of bore-well is not a prohibited activity. It is only in the process of regulation that certain restrictions are placed, on the freedom of a citizen to sink bore-well in his land. Such a freedom can be curtailed, only by making reference to the relevant provisions of law. The situations contemplated under the Act are many, ranging from prohibition of pumping of water from existing wells, to the one of banning the sinking of new wells, in the area as regards which a declaration issued under Section 11 of the Act, is in operation. The sinking of well can be found fault with, if only it is found to be in contravention of any particular provision of law. Further, it is only when the reasons are communicated to the affected person, through an order in writing that he would be in a position to know the violation, if any on his part, and can pursue the remedies. It has already been pointed that the 2nd respondent did not pass any orders against the petitioner, nor any provision of any law was mentioned in the show cause notice. The seizure of the equipment and sealing of bore-well cannot be sustained. Hence, the writ petition is allowed and respondents 2 and 3 are directed to handover the seized equipment and remove the seal, if any, put on the bore-well. It is, however, left open to the 2nd respondent to pass appropriate orders, duly referring to the relevant provisions of law and take further steps as provided for under the Act and the Rules made thereunder.


THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY          

WRIT PETITION No.17648 OF 2012  
       
30.07.2012

B.Yadagiri

District Collector, Nalgonda and others.

Counsel for petitioner: Sri G.Purushotham Reddy

Counsel for Respondents : GP for Revenue

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred

ORDER:
       
        The petitioner owns Acs.4.30 guntas of land in different survey numbers of
Kasarlapahad Village, Jagireddygudem Mandal, Nalgonda District.  The common
well, in which, the petitioner and the
4th respondent have 25% share, each, and one Laxmaiah has 50% share, is a source  
of irrigation.  The petitioner sunk a bore-well, in his land, in survey No.172,
in January, 2012, on finding that the water that falls towards his share from
the common well, is not sufficient to irrigate his land.
        The 4th respondent submitted a complaint, against the petitioner, to the
Tahasildar, Jagireddygudem Mandal, the 2nd respondent herein, under the A.P.
Water, Land and Trees Act, 2002 (for short 'the Act') and the Rules made
thereunder (for short 'the Rules').  A notice, dated 17.05.2012, was issued to
the petitioner, directing him to explain as to why action be not taken against
him, under the Act and the Rules.  The petitioner submitted his explanation, on
23.05.2012.  However, on 02.06.2012, the Mandal Revenue Inspector, Kasarlapahad
Village, the
3rd respondent herein, seized the starter and other equipment and made the bore-
well non-operational.  The petitioner challenges the action of the respondents 1
to 3.  He contends that the very issuance of notice is contrary to the
provisions of the Act, since the village is not notified as over-exploited under
Section 11 of the Act, nor it is pointed out that the bore-well is within the
prohibited distance from any drinking water source.  Other grounds are also
urged.
         Heard Sri G.Purushotham Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner,
learned Government Pleader for Revenue and none appears for the 4th respondent.

The petitioner sunk a bore-well, in January 2012, in his land, in survey No.172
of Kasarlapahad Village.  Through notice, dated 17.05.2012, the 2nd respondent
required the petitioner to explain as to why, the bore-well be not seized, since
it was sunk without any permission and within a distance of 30 feet from the
existing well. The explanation submitted by the petitioner is, no doubt, not
happily worded, nor it is succinct.  Being a farmer, the petitioner seems to
have approached somebody in the locality, and he, in turn, has exhibited his
linguistic skills.  The gist of the explanation is that, the complainant i.e.,
the 4th respondent has only 25% share in the common well; that the holder of 50%
share did not make any complaint; the village is not notified as over-exploited
one, and that there is no basis for initiation of the proceedings.  The 2nd
respondent did not pass any orders, after receiving the explanation.  However,
on a direction issued by him, the
3rd respondent seized the starter and other equipment of the bore-well under a
panchanama.  Thereafter, the 2nd respondent addressed a letter, dated 06.06.2012
to the District Collector, Nalgonda, the 1st respondent, narrating the
developments and soliciting his opinion.   Therefore, it needs to be seen, as to
whether the steps taken by respondents 2 and 3 are in accordance with law.

The Act has been enacted by the A.P. State Legislature in the year 2002, with a
view to promote water conservation to regulate the exploitation of use of ground
and surface water sources, and to deal with the other matters incidental
thereto.  Chapter II provides for the constitution of the Authority under the
Act.  Chapters III and IV are devoted to conservation and protection of water
sources. Chapter V deals with the trees and Chapter VI with the miscellaneous
matters.

Section 8 mandates that with the commencement of the Act, the owners of the
wells, in the State, shall get the wells and water-bodies registered with the
Authority in a prescribed manner.  Section 9 provides for steps to preserve the
ground water levels, in general.  If, in the opinion of the Designated Officer,
the pumping of water by individuals, or organisations, in any particular area,
is likely to result in depletion of  ground water level, or damage to the
natural resources or environment, he may issue orders prohibiting such pumping
of the water, for a period not exceeding six months.  He can also issue
directions to the Transmission Corporation of A.P. not to collect the
electricity charges during that period.  The sinking of new wells, in such area,
is not allowed, when the prohibition is in force.  Section 10 of the Act is
aimed at protecting the drinking water sources.  Sub-section (1) thereof
prohibits sinking of wells within a distance of 250 metres from the existing
drinking water source.  If any person intends to sink a well within that
distance, he shall be under obligation to apply to the Designated Authority and
it is only on such permission being accorded that a well be sunk.

Section 11 of the Act empowers the Authority, on the advise of technical
experts, to declare any particular ground water basin, as defined under sub-
section (5) of Section 2, as "over exploited".  Such declaration shall be in
force for a period six months and it can be extended for a further period of not
more than six months at a time.  The parameters that are required to be taken
into account, to declare a basin as over exploited area, are indicated therein.
The Authority is also required to identify steps to improve the ground water
levels.

Section 12 has a different purpose to serve.  If an existing well is found to be
adversely affecting the public ground water source, the Authority may prohibit
extraction of water for commercial, industrial or other purposes, from such
wells within its vicinity for a period not exceeding six months and such period
can be extended thereafter.  The prohibition of extraction of water for
irrigation purposes is required to figure in the last of the priorities.  If the
situation does not improve on account of such measure, the Authority may direct
the stoppage of extraction of water and closure of wells temporarily, or
permanently.

A combined reading of these provisions, makes it clear that the sinking of a
well by an individual is prohibited,
a) when the prohibition issued by the authority under Section 9 of the Act,
against pumping of the water in respect of an area where the well is proposed to
be dug, is in force (proviso to Section 9(1));
b) when it is proposed to be sunk within a distance of 250 metres from existing
drinking water source (section 10); and
c) when it is sought to be sunk in an area,  as regards which the declaration by
the authority that it is "over exploited", is in force (section 11).

In the instant case, it is not the plea of the respondents that the Authority
has issued any declaration under Section 11 of the Act, to the effect that
Kasarlapahad Village is part of any ground water basin,  declared as "over-
exploited".  It is also not their case that the bore-well sunk by the petitioner
is within 250 metres from the existing drinking water source or that any measure
contemplated under Section 9 of the Act was initiated for the area.  Obviously
because, the officials were not sensitised properly to the provisions of the Act
and the rights of the citizens thereunder, the steps were initiated, either in
the form of issuing notice, or seizing equipment, without reference to the
relevant provisions of law, or the measures contemplated thereunder.

The Act is purely regulatory in nature.  Sinking of bore-well is not a
prohibited activity.  It is only in the process of regulation that certain
restrictions are placed, on the freedom of a citizen to sink bore-well in his
land.  Such a freedom can be curtailed, only by making reference to the relevant
provisions of law.  The situations contemplated under the Act are many, ranging
from prohibition of pumping of water from existing wells, to the one of banning
the sinking of new wells, in the area as regards which a declaration issued
under Section 11 of the Act, is in operation.  The sinking of well can be found
fault with, if only it is found to be in contravention of any particular
provision of law.  Further, it is only when the reasons are communicated to the
affected person, through an order in writing that he would be in a position to
know the violation, if any on his part, and can pursue the remedies.  It has
already been pointed that the 2nd respondent did not pass any orders against the
petitioner, nor any provision of any law was mentioned in the show cause notice.
The seizure of the equipment and sealing of bore-well cannot be sustained.
Hence, the writ petition is allowed and respondents 2 and 3 are directed to
handover the seized equipment and remove the seal, if any, put on the bore-well.
It is, however, left open to the 2nd respondent to pass appropriate orders, duly
referring to the relevant provisions of law and take further steps as provided
for under the Act and the Rules made thereunder.

        The miscellaneous petition filed in this writ petition also stands
disposed of.

        There shall be no order as to costs.
____________________  
L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J.    
Dated:30.07.2012

Agricultural Market Committee,- Significantly, the prosecution of the petitioner/accused was launched by the Secretary, Agricultural Market Committee, Kakinada under the said provision of law on the ground that the petitioner/accused failed to pay the relevant market fee as per the assessment order for procuring agricultural products from outside to the market area at Kakinada. Crl.M.P.No.742 of 2008 was filed before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Magistrate at Kakinada for discharge consequent upon setting aside the assessment order by the competent authority.-The question of prosecution is subject to the survival of the assessment order. When once the assessment order is set aside, the question of prosecution does not survive at all. When it is clear that the prosecution does not survive, the question of procedural stage to entertain the matter looses its ground or need not be entertained. Therefore, the observation of the learned Magistrate that as there was no stage to entertain the application and the matter could be disposed of only by the ultimate trial is not tenable. In the result, the petition is allowed quashing the proceedings as prayed for.


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          

CRIMINAL PETITION No.3596 of 2010  

17-8-2012

The Manager, M/s ITC Ltd., Kakinada.

State of A.P., rep. by P.P. & another.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri C.R.SRIDHARAN

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: The Public Prosecutor

Counsel for the Respondent No.2 : Ms. K.LALITHA, S.C. for Agr.Mrkt.Comt.

< Gist:

> Head Note:

 ? Cases referred:


ORDER:
        This petition is filed seeking to quash proceedings in C.C.No.373 of 2009
on the file of the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class-cum- Special
Mobile Magistrate at Kakinada.
        The petitioner is the accused and the second respondent is the complainant
in the calendar case.  For the sake of convenience, I refer the parties as
arrayed in the calendar case.
        The case of the complainant is that the accused is doing business of
purchasing, processing, storaging, weighing and selling notified commodities
i.e. paddy or rice  within the notified market area of the Agricultural Market
Committee, Kakinada.  He obtained licence to do that business for the period of
2004-2005.  He became liable to pay market fee @ 1% on their purchase value as
per Section 12(1) of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Live Stock)
Markets Act, 1966 and as amended by Act 4 of 1987 and the rules and bye-laws
made thereunder, and basing on the account books and other records filed by the
accused, the assessing authority i.e. Selection Grade Secretary, Market
Committee, Kakinada assessed the market fee dues and issued assessment order  
dated 14.10.2005 demanding the accused to pay market fee of RS.57,36,209/- for
the period of 2004-2005 in respect of procuring agricultural products from
outside into the market area.  According to the complainant, in spite of issuing
the assessment order, the accused did not pay the market fee, thereby the
accused is liable for punishment under Section 23(1) of the Act.  Admittedly the
assessment order was set aside by the Commissioner and Director of
Marketing/Revisional Authority in Revision Petition No.SI(1)516/2008 dated
22.7.2008.

        The question involved in this petition is as to whether the prosecution of
the charge would survive though the assessment order dated 14.10.2005 passed by
the Secretary, Agricultural Market Committee, Kakinada was set aside by the
competent authority i.e. the Commissioner and Director of Marketing/Revisional
Authority in Revision Petition No.SI(1)516/2008 dated 22.7.2008.
        Significantly, the prosecution of the petitioner/accused was launched by
the Secretary, Agricultural Market Committee, Kakinada under the said provision
of law on the ground that the petitioner/accused failed to pay the relevant
market fee as per the assessment order for procuring agricultural products from
outside to the market area at Kakinada.  Crl.M.P.No.742 of 2008 was filed before
the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Magistrate at Kakinada
for discharge consequent upon setting aside the assessment order by the
competent authority.  Learned Magistrate dismissed the application vide order
dated 10.3.2010 on the ground that after framing the corresponding charge, there
was no occasion to entertain the matter till the commencement and conclusion of
the trial of the case.
        Learned counsel for the petitioner/accused would contend that when once
the assessment order was set aside, the question of prosecution does not survive
at all and therefore the observations made by the learned Magistrate are not
tenable.
        The question of prosecution is subject to the survival of the assessment
order.  When once the assessment order is set aside, the question of prosecution
does not survive at all.  When it is clear that the prosecution does not
survive, the question of procedural stage to entertain the matter looses its
ground or need not be entertained.  Therefore, the observation of the learned
Magistrate that as there was no stage to entertain the application and the
matter could be disposed of only by the ultimate trial is not tenable.          
        In the result, the petition is allowed quashing the proceedings as prayed
for.

_________________________  
G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY, J
Date: 17.8.2012

D.V.C.- after the marriage, the first respondent and the complainant lived together. There is no basis to say that the respondents 2 and 3 and the complainant lived together in a shared house as defined though no doubt the other ingredients are satisfied. On this ground, the complaint is not tenable and hence ultimately the proceedings are to be quashed so far as the respondents 2 and 3 are concerned. In the result, the petition is dismissed so far as the first respondent is concerned and is allowed so far as the other respondents are concerned


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          

CRIMINAL PETITION No.4140 of 2010  

2-8-2012

Nagamuthula Kondaiah

State of A.P., rep. by P.P. & another.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri P.SRIDHAR REDDY

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: The Public Prosecutor

< Gist:

> Head Note:

 ? Cases referred:

ORDER:
1.      This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash
proceedings in D.V.C.No.1 of 2010 (D.V.C.) on the file of the Court of II
Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kothagudem.
 2.     The petitioner is the respondent and the second respondent is the
complainant in the DVC case.  The respondent filed the complaint under Sections
12, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 (for short 'the Act') against the petitioner herein with a plea to restrain
him from dispossessing her from shared household and also to pay compensation.
3.      For the sake of convenience, I refer the parties as arrayed in the DVC.
It is pleaded and alleged in the complaint as follows.
4.      (a)     The complainant is the legally wedded wife of Chembeti Chinna
Koteshwar Rao, whereas their marriage took place as per Hindu Rites and Customs
on 15.11.2008.  In fact, her husband was first married to one Uma Maheshwari,
daughter of the respondent on 11.8.2000 and a girl by name Keerthi who is aged 7
years was born to them.   On 7.3.2008 Uma Maheshwari died.  The respondent used
to reside in their house as family member.  In fact he was looking after the
affairs of the house.  Her husband reposed implicit confidence on the respondent
in all respects.  Factually, the husband of the petitioner married her as she
was a relative of him and also for taking necessary care of the minor.
According to the complainant, further she and her husband have been taking care
of the minor.  The respondent got no interest in the welfare of the minor.  On
the other hand, he made several efforts to grab the amounts kept in the name of
the minor girl.
(b)     She alleges that apart from that, the respondent has also been making
efforts to subject her to domestic violence one way or the other for the purpose
of ruining the matrimonial house.  The petitioner is always under threat and
danger in the hands of the respondent.   While such circumstances existed, on
30.6.2009 the respondent along with some anti-social elements entered the house
and threatened her with dire consequences and expressed his intention to kidnap
the minor.  Apart from that on 1.7.2009, the respondent attempted to kidnap the
minor and in that context, criminally intimidated her again threatening her with
dire consequences.  Later, she informed about the incident to her husband,
following which they gave a report in Palvancha Police Station, which was
registered in Cr.No.170 of 2009  under Sections 363, 511, 506 read with Section
34 IPC and then the respondent was arrested by the police. She claims that
because of the conduct of the respondent, her health is endangered.   It is also
stated that the respondent left the sharing roof of the petitioner's matrimonial
house, but he is continuously making an onslaught to wreck vengeance against the
family.
5.      It is to be examined whether there are grounds to quash the proceedings in
the DVC as prayed.
6.      Here Sections 2(a), 2(f), 2(g), 2(q), 2(s) and 3 coupled with Sections 18
to 22 of the Act' are important.
(a)     By virtue of Section 2(a) of the Act, "aggrieved person" means any woman
who is, or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act to domestic violence by the
respondent. So existence of domestic relationship and living in shared house as
defined in Sections 2(f) and 2(s) of the Act are the conditions precedent for
the aggrieved party to initiate proceedings under the Act.    
(b)     By virtue of Section 2(q) "Respondent" means any adult male person who is,
or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against
whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an
aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage
may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.
The meaning of the proviso can be better understood while analyzing what is
meant by domestic relationship.
(c)     By virtue of Section 2(f) of the Act, "Domestic relationship" means a
relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shred household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage,
or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family
members living together as a joint family.  Thereby to constitute domestic
relationship in between two parties, they should have lived in a shared house
and they are related by consanguinity marriage or through a relationship in the
nature of marriage, adoption or as members of a joint family.  The person
aggrieved, covered by the proviso under Section 2(q) falls within the ambit of
the definition of domestic relationship being a relative of the respondent by
marriage.
(d)     By virtue of Section 2(g)  "Domestic violence" has the same meaning as
assigned to it in Section 3.  Section 3 of the Act contemplates "Definition of
domestic violence".  For the purpose of this Act, any act, omission or
commission or conduct of the respondent shall  constitute domestic violence in
case if-
        (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-
being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and
includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to
coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for
any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to
her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b);
or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental to the
aggrieved person."

(e)     By virtue of Section 2(s) of the Act "Shared household" means a household
where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which
either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any
right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong
to the joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether
the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the
shared household.  Significantly, it is emphasized that to constitute a shared
household, it must be a household where the aggrieved person lives or lived in a
domestic relationship subject to the other formalities incorporated therein.
7.      Thereby the main requirements here are as to whether the complainant and
the respondent lived together in a shared house and whether the complainant is
related to the respondent by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship
in the nature of marriage, adoption or being a member of a joint family who
lived together as envisaged in Section 2(f) with regards to domestic violence.
Pertinently, the daughter of the respondent i.e the first wife of the husband of
the complainant died, thereby the first marriage of the husband of the
complainant does not exist now.  Thus, the complainant is altogether a different
person, who got no relationship with the respondent by virtue of any marriage
otherwise or by consanguinity or by being a member of a joint family within the
meaning of section 2(f).  What is envisaged under the proviso in Section 2(q),
which section defines what is meant by 'respondent' that an aggrieved wife or
female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may  file a
complaint against a relative of the husband or male person is well within the
ambit of the definition of domestic relationship only.  In other words, when
domestic relationship as defined in Section 2(q) is one of the conditions to
file an application under the Act, a relative of the husband or male person must
be one who comes within the ambit of that definition which excludes a relative
like the respondent in this case.
8.      With regards to the question of living in a shared house as defined in
Section 2(s), the respondent must have a right to live in the house or allowed
to live in the house under an obligation having domestic relationship as
contemplated in Section 2(f) with the other inmates of the house which is one of
the conditions to initiate the proceedings under the Act.  Importantly in the
definition of shared house also it is emphasized that the person aggrieved must
have lived in a shared house having got domestic relationship which in fact does
not include a person like the respondent herein subject to the formalities
mentioned.  That apart, neither the complainant nor her husband got any
obligation to allow him to reside in the house.  It is not a case of husband
keeping the respondent in the house aiding the respondent to harass the
complainant, rather it is admittedly a case of both the complainant and her
husband living together harmoniously and both of them facing the alleged conduct
of the respondent.  If he is residing in the house unwantedly, they can take
measures to send him out.  Thus, as the respondent cannot be brought within the
purview of the provisions enumerated that debars the complainant to file the
complaint.
9.      In addition to the discussion made above, the complaint is based only  on
surmises and conjectures.  There are no specific allegations, in other words,
there are only bald allegations against the respondent.  It clearly appear that
false allegations were made against the respondent for some purpose.  It is
something unbelievable in view of the circumstances of the case that the
respondent preferred to stay in the house of the complainant and her husband
after the death of his daughter, who was the first wife of the husband of the
complainant.  It is claimed by the respondent that the husband of the
complainant has filed D.W.O.P.No.777 of 2009 on the file of the Court of
Principal District Judge, Khammam for appointing him as the Guardian of the
minor and he has also filed O.S.No.169 of 2009 on the file of the Court of
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kothagudem for damages against him on the ground
that he made derogatory allegations against him in another legal proceedings and
he also gave report to the Station House Officer, Palvancha Police Station and
got him arrested, which establish that the complainant and her husband are bent
upon to harass him to force him to accept their terms.
10.     Hence good grounds are made out to quash the proceedings in the DVC.  No
body should be tried or enquired into unnecessarily in any proceeding.  If it is
done, it is nothing but abusing the process of law and harassing him or her.
11.     In the result, the criminal petition is allowed and the impugned
proceedings in the D.V.C.No.1 of 2010 are quashed.


______________________  
G. Krishna Mohan Reddy, J
Date: 2.8.2012
Note:
L.R. copy be marked.
        B/o
DA




THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          










Criminal Petition No.4140 of 2010




2.8.2012
















IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH            
AT HYDERABAD    


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          

Criminal Petition No.4140 of 2010


Date: 2.8.2012

Between:

Nagamuthula Kondaiah
.. Petitioner/Accused
And


The State of A.P., rep. by its
Public Prosecutor and another.
.. Respondents

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          
Criminal Petition No.5558 of 2009
ORDER:
1.      This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash
proceedings in D.V.C.No.1 of 2010 (D.V.C.) on the file of the Court of
Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Armoor, Nizamabad district.
 2.     The petitioners are the respondents 1 to 3 and the second respondent
herein is the complainant in the DVC case.  For the sake of convenience, I refer
the parties as arrayed in the DVC.
3.      The complainant filed the complaint under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21 and
22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short 'the
Act') against the petitioners herein to pass protection orders, residence order,
maintenance order, custody order and to pay monetary relief compensation order
and any other reasonable order respectively.
4.      The claim of the complainant is as follows.
        Her marriage with the first respondent was performed on 14.7.2008 at
Tirupati.  Before the marriage, the first respondent was engaged to another girl
belonging to Ramadugu, by reason of which, he expressed his unwillingness to
marry her and therefore the engagement was cancelled subject to paying damages.
For two days after the marriage, the first respondent was cordial with her.
Later, the parents of the first respondent i.e. respondents 2 and 3 started
harassing her expressing that she was not suited to the first respondent and if
another girl was married to the first respondent, they would have got a dowry of
Rs.20.00 lakhs with the help of which, the husband of their daughter i.e. the
fourth respondent could have been sent to foreign countries for getting better
jobs.  Further it is alleged that the respondents 1 to 4 harassed her asking her
to leave the house voluntarily and also suggested her to marry another male
person.  Further, she was not allowed to take coffee, breakfast and launch by
the respondents and she was also not allowed to speak to the first respondent
and lead marital life with him.  It is further alleged that whenever she was
wearing good clothes, they used to irritate her saying where you were going.  It
is also alleged that the fourth respondent pushed the complainant out of the
house while asking her to leave the house expressing that they would conduct
another marriage to the first respondent after getting rid of her.   It is
further alleged unable to bear the torture of the respondents, the complainant
left the house and has been staying with her parents house.
5.      Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the marriage
between first respondent and the complainant is in dispute, by reason of which
alone, the domestic violence case is not maintainable.  Further the complainant
and the first respondent never lived together and there was no consummation of
marriage.
6.      It is to be examined whether there are grounds to quash the proceedings in
the DVC as prayed.
7.      Here Sections 2(a), 2(f), 2(g), 2(q), 2(s) and 3 coupled with Sections 18
to 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short
'the Act')  are to be considered.
(a)     By virtue of Section 2(a) of the Act, "aggrieved person" means any woman
who is, or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act to domestic violence by the
respondent. Thereby the main criteria to file the case is that there should be
domestic relationship between the person aggrieved and the respondent.  It
necessitates to understand what is domestic relationship in this context.

(b)     By virtue of Section 2(q) "Respondent" means any adult male person who is,
or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against
whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an
aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage
may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner;
(c)     By virtue of Section 2(f) of the Act, "Domestic relationship" means a
relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shred household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage,
or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family
members living together as a joint family.  So, to satisfy this definition both
should have lived or live in a shared house and they are related by
consanguinity marriage etc.
(d)     By virtue of Section 2(s) of the Act "Shared household" means a household
where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which
either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any
right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong
to the joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether
the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the
shared household.
(e)     By virtue of Section 2(g)  "Domestic violence" has the same meaning as
assigned to it in Section 3. This is the criteria in fact to grant the reliefs
under the Sections 18 to 22.
(f)     Section 3 of the Act reads - "Definition of domestic violence".  For the
purpose of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the
respondent shall  constitute domestic violence in case if-
        (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-
being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and
includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to
coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for
any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to
her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b);
or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental to the
aggrieved person."

8.      From the pleas taken, it appears that after the marriage, the first
respondent and the complainant lived together.  There is no basis to say that
the respondents 2 and 3 and the complainant lived together in a shared house as
defined though no doubt the other ingredients are satisfied.  On this ground,
the complaint is not tenable and hence ultimately the proceedings are to be
quashed so far as the respondents 2 and 3 are concerned.
        In the result, the petition is dismissed so far as the first respondent is
concerned and is allowed so far as the other respondents are concerned.


______________________  
G. Krishna Mohan Reddy, J
Date: 9.8.2012