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Wednesday, August 29, 2012

Notwithstanding the clear intent of the legislature to provide a summary remedy to a person illegally dispossessed of immovable property, the defendant has been persistent in its challenge to the decree passed against it. The learned trial court; thereafter the revisional court, i.e. court of the learned District Judge and lastly the Allahabad High Court have consistently held that possession of the disputed property on relevant date was with the plaintiff from which he was unlawfully dispossessed by the defendant, i.e. the petitioner herein. The unwavering view of the courts at all the three tiers of our hierarchical justice delivery system have not deterred the defendant to challenge the same by means of the present approach.


                                        NON-REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION

               CIVIL APPEAL No.    6071                of 2012
                   ( Arising out of SLP (Civil) 9042/2007)


I.T.C. LIMITED                                     … Appellant(s)

                                   Versus


ADARSH COOP. HOUSING SOC. LTD.               … Respondents



                            J  U  D  G  M  E  N T



RANJAN GOGOI, J


        Leave granted.


   2. A simple issue with regard to possession of either of the  parties  to
        this over two decade long litigation has come to the last court  at
        the instance of the defendant in a suit  under  Section  6  of  the
        Specific Relief Act, 1963.  Notwithstanding the clear intent of the
        legislature to provide a  summary  remedy  to  a  person  illegally
        dispossessed  of  immovable  property,  the  defendant   has   been
        persistent in its challenge to the decree passed  against  it.  The
        learned trial court; thereafter the revisional court, i.e. court of
        the learned District Judge and lastly the Allahabad High Court have
        consistently held that  possession  of  the  disputed  property  on
        relevant date was with the plaintiff from which he  was  unlawfully
        dispossessed by the defendant,  i.e.  the  petitioner  herein.  The
        unwavering view of the  courts  at  all  the  three  tiers  of  our
        hierarchical  justice  delivery  system  have  not   deterred   the
        defendant to challenge the same by means of the present approach.
   3. The facts in brief, may now be noticed :
        The respondent - plaintiff had filed suit No. 72  of  1989  in  the
        court of Civil Judge, Agra, under Section 6 of the Specific  Relief
        Act, 1963, (hereinafter referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’)  praying  for
        delivery  of  possession  of  the  suit  property  from  which  the
        plaintiff claimed  to  have  been  illegally  dispossessed  by  the
        defendant (petitioner herein) in the night intervening 19th/20th of
        November, 1988. According to the plaintiff, the land  comprised  in
        Khasra No. 877, measuring 2 bighas  3  biswas  located  in  Village
        Basai Mustaqi Tajganj, Agra  was jointly owned by Murari Lal on the
        one hand and Jagdish Prasad, Ramesh Chand, Suresh Chand and  Haresh
        Chand (hereinafter referred to  as  ‘Jagdish  &  others.’)  on  the
        other. According to the plaintiff, by mutual  consent,  Murari  Lal
        was in possession of his half share in northern part  of  the  land
        whereas the half share of Jagdish &  others  was  in  the  southern
        portion.  The plaintiff has averred that it came into possession of
        the southern portion of the plot (hereinafter referred  to  as  the
        Suit land) on 22.5.1985 and on 03.01.1986 Jagdish & others had sold
        the same to the plaintiff. On the basis of the aforesaid sale  made
        by a registered  deed,  the  revenue  records  were  corrected  and
        necessary entries were made  showing  the  name  of  the  plaintiff
        against the share of Jagdish & others. According to the  plaintiff,
        Jagdish & others had entered into an agreement of sale of the  same
        land with the defendant, though the land stood transferred  in  the
        name  of  the  plaintiff  and   the   revenue   records   corrected
        accordingly.  In these circumstances, according to  the  plaintiff,
        suit No. 238 of 1983 was filed by the defendant against  Jagdish  &
        others for specific performance of the agreement to sell.   Another
        Suit i.e. Suit No. 765 of 1984 was  also  filed  by  the  defendant
        against Jagdish & others for an  order  of  injunction  restraining
        Jagdish & others from raising any construction on the suit land and
        from  transferring/  alienating  the  same.    According   to   the
        plaintiff, as the property involved in both the suits  had  already
        been transferred to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was impleaded as a
        party in both  the  above  suits.   It  was  also  averred  by  the
        plaintiff that as injunction prayed for by the  defendant,  as  the
        plaintiff, in Suit No. 765 of  1984  was  refused  and  the  appeal
        against such refusal was dismissed, in  the  intervening  night  of
        19th/20th  November, 1988, forcible possession of the suit land was
        taken by the defendant which fact was  brought  to  the  notice  of
        concerned police station on 20.11.1988 itself.   According  to  the
        plaintiff,  a  proceeding  under  Section  145  C.  P.C.  was  also
        initiated at the instance of the  plaintiff  wherein  an  order  of
        attachment of the disputed land, i.e. the suit land, was passed  on
        29.11.1988.  However, as  the  defendant  continued  to  remain  in
        possession of the suit land despite the order of  attachment,  Suit
        No.72/1989 was instituted by  the  plaintiff  seeking  the  reliefs
        already noticed.

     4. The defendant contested the suit by contending that  no  partition,
        formal or otherwise, of the land covered by Khasra No.877 had taken
        place between Murari Lal  and  Jagdish  &  others.   The  defendant
        specifically contended that Jagdish was not in  possession  of  the
        suit land.  According to the  defendant,  in  the  absence  of  any
        formal partition  between  the  co-sharers,  i.e.  Murari  Lal  and
        Jagdish & others, and also in the absence of any  mutual  agreement
        between the parties with regard to possession of any specific share
        of the  land, no exclusive right in the suit  land  had  vested  in
        Jagdish & others so as to confer legitimacy to the sale deed  dated
        03.01.1986 executed by Jagdish & others in favour of the plaintiff.
          The defendant also contended that on the date of execution of the
        aforesaid sale deed, there was a pre-existing agreement executed by
        Jagdish & others to sell the same land to the defendant and in fact
        a suit for specific performance of the  said  agreement  (Suit  No.
        238/1983) was pending in the competent court.  The  defendant  also
        contended that pursuant to  the  aforesaid  agreement  between  the
        defendant and Jagdish & others, possession of the land  was  handed
        over  to  the  defendant  way  back  in  1976.  Consequently,   the
        possession sought for in Suit No. 238/84 filed by the defendant was
        not physical but proprietary possession.
     5. In the written statement filed, the  defendant,  had  also  claimed
        that it was in possession of the entire  of  the  land  covered  by
        Khasra No. 877, i.e.  both  the  northern  and  southern  portions.
        According to the defendant,  by  a  lease  deed  dated  01.04.1976,
        Jagdish & others had leased their half share of the land of  Khasra
        No. 877 in favour of an officer of the defendant-Company acting for
        and on behalf of the said  Company.   The  said  deed  was  for  an
        initial period of six months which period was  subject  to  further
        extension(s).  The defendant also claimed that  on  19.09.1976,  an
        agreement to sell was entered into by and  between  the  defendant-
        Company and Jagdish & others for sale of the half  portion  of  the
        land and further that on 28.9.1978, an agreement  was  executed  by
        and  between   Jagdish  &  others  and  Murari  Lal  by  which  the
        possession  of  the  defendant  on  the  entire  suit  land  w.e.f.
        01.04.1976 was admitted by both co-sharers.


        Furthermore, according to the defendant,  Murari  Lal  had  entered
        into a separate agreement dated 01.10.1976 for  sale  of  his  half
        share to the defendant wherein, once again,  he  had  admitted  the
        possession of the defendant over the entire land.   Thereafter,  on
        21.08.1982, Murari Lal executed the sale deed  conveying  his  half
        share of the suit property in favour of the  defendant.   According
        to the defendant, by the said sale deed dated 21.08.1982, the share
        of Murari Lal  that  was  transferred  to  the  defendant  was  the
        southern portion i.e. the suit  land.   In  the  written  statement
        filed, it was also averred that before execution of the  sale  deed
        dated 21.08.1982, Murari Lal had executed two other documents  both
        dated  03.03.1982  admitting  the  execution  of  the  unregistered
        agreement dated 01.10.1976 in favour  of  the  defendant  and  also
        admitting the delivery of possession of the half share belonging to
        him to the defendant in furtherance of the  aforesaid  unregistered
        agreement dated 01.10.1976.  The defendant contended that the  sale
        dated 03.01.1986 purported to be executed by Jagdish  &  others  in
        favour of the plaintiff was a void document and  also  hit  by  the
        principle of lis pendens.


     6. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 under which provision  of
        law the suit in question was filed by the  plaintiff-respondent  is
        pari-materia with Section 9 of the Act of 1877.   A bare reading of
        the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 1963  would  go
        to show that a person who has been illegally  dispossessed  of  his
        immovable property may  himself  or  through  any  person  claiming
        through him recover such possession by filing a suit.   In  such  a
        suit, the entitlement of the plaintiff  to  recover  possession  of
        property from which he claims to have been  illegally  dispossessed
        has to be adjudicated independently of the question of  title  that
        may be set up by the defendant in such a suit.  In fact, in a  suit
        under Section 6, the only question that has to be determined by the
        Court is whether the plaintiff was in possession  of  the  disputed
        property and he had been illegally dispossessed  therefrom  on  any
        date within six months prior to the filing of the  suit.   This  is
        because Section 6 (2) prescribes a period of six  months  from  the
        date of dispossession as the outer limit for filing of a suit.   As
        the question of possession and illegal dispossession  therefrom  is
        the only issue germane to a suit  under  Section  6,  a  proceeding
        thereunder, naturally, would partake the  character  of  a  summary
        proceeding against which the remedy by way of appeal or review  has
        been specifically excluded by sub-Section 3  of  Section  6.   Sub-
        Section 4 also makes it clear that an unsuccessful  litigant  in  a
        suit under Section 6 would have the option of filing a  fresh  suit
        for recovery of possession on the basis of title, if any.  In fact,
        the above view has found expression in  several  pronouncements  of
        this Court of which reference may be made to the decisions in Lallu
        Yashwant Singh (dead) by his LRs. Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh &  Ors.[1],
        Krishna Ram Mahale (D) by LRs  Vs.  Mrs.Shobha  Venkat  Rao[2]  and
        Sanjay Kumar Pandey & Ors. V. Gulabahar  Sheikh  &  Ors.[3]  .   In
        fact, para 4 of this Court’s judgment passed in Sanjay Kumar Pandey
        (supra) may be a useful reiteration of the law in this regard.  The
        same is, therefore, extracted hereinbelow:-
          “4.     “A suit under Section 6 of  the  Act  is  often  called  a
          summary suit inasmuch as the enquiry in the suit under  Section  6
          is confined to finding out the possession and dispossession within
          a period of six months from the date of  the  institution  of  the
          suit ignoring the question of title.  Sub-Section (3) of Section 6
          provides that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree  passed
          in any suit instituted under this section.  No review of any  such
          order or decree is permitted.  The remedy of a person unsuccessful
          in a suit under Section 6 of the Act is to  file  a  regular  suit
          establishing his title to the suit property and in  the  event  of
          his succeeding he will be entitled to recover  possession  of  the
          property notwithstanding the adverse decision under Section  6  of
          the Act.  Thus, as against a decision under Section 6 of the  Act,
          the remedy of unsuccessful party is to file a suit based on title.
           The remedy of filing a revision is available but that is only  by
          way of an exception; for the High Court would not interfere with a
          decree or order under Section 6 of the Act except on  a  case  for
          interference being made out within the well-settled parameters  of
          the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115  of  the
          Code.”


     7. It is indeed sad, if not unfortunate, that what was intended by the
        legislature to be a summary proceeding to enable a person illegally
        dispossessed  to  effect  quick  recovery  of  possession  of   the
        immovable property has, in the present case, erupted into  an  over
        two decades  old  litigation.  The  sheer  number  of  pending  lis
        permitted the learned Trial Court to  return  its  findings,  after
        almost a decade, that it is,  indeed,  the  plaintiff  who  was  in
        possession of the disputed property on the relevant  date  and  was
        dispossessed therefrom in  an  illegal  manner  by  the  defendant.
        Though Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1963 bars the remedy  of  appeal
        and review, a small window, by way of a revision, was kept open  by
        the legislature possibly to enable the High Court to have a  second
        look in the matter in an exceptional situation.   However,  section
        115 of the CPC was amended in its application to the State of Uttar
        Pradesh and the forum for exercise of the  revisional  jurisdiction
        came  to  be  recognized  as  the  next  Superior  Court  and   not
        necessarily by the  High  Court.   That  is  how  the  unsuccessful
        defendant moved the learned District Judge. Though  the  Revisional
        Court reiterated the findings of the learned Trial  Court,  another
        half a decade rolled by. Next in the hierarchical system of courts,
        i.e. the High Court was thereafter approached by  way  of  a  Civil
        Miscellaneous  Writ  Petition  filed  under  Article  277  of   the
        Constitution.  The High Court answered the question, again, against
        the defendant.  The  manner  and  content  of  the  same  has  been
        challenged before this Court in the present Appeal,  primarily,  on
        the ground that when formal partition of the  land  had  not  taken
        place the issue of possession of specific shares by the  co-sharers
        could not have been determined so as to vest  jurisdiction  in  the
        trial Court to pass a decree under Section 6 of the Act of 1963.
     8. A reading of the judgment of the learned Trial Court indicates that
        in coming to the findings recorded, the learned  Trial  Court  took
        into account the pleaded case of  the  defendant  that  it  was  in
        possession of the entire land comprised in Khasra No. 877  and  not
        only  the  southern  portion  in  respect  of  which  recovery   of
        possession was prayed for by the plaintiff.   The learned Court, at
        the outset, noticed  that  the  relevant  revenue  records  on  the
        crucial  date,  i.e.  date  of  filing  of  the  Suit,  showed  the
        possession of both parties to the Suit  over  the  land  comprising
        Khasra No. 877. According to the plaintiff,  the  southern  portion
        which is the suit property was sold  to  it  by  Jagdish  &  others
        whereas according to the defendant, the said  suit  property,  i.e.
        southern portion was sold to it by Murari Lal.  The  difference  in
        the identity of the property,  as  claimed,  would  hardly  make  a
        difference to the core issue in the case inasmuch as  according  to
        the defendant it was in possession  of  the  entire  property,  the
        northern portion by way of a  lease  deed  executed  by  Jagdish  &
        others and the southern portion by way of a sale deed  executed  by
        Murari Lal.   The  police  report  dated  21.11.1988  submitted  in
        connection with the proceeding under Section 145 CPC recorded  that
        in the northern portion of the  land  comprising  Khasra  No.  877,
        possession of the defendant was established  and  the  dispute  was
        with regard to the southern portion of the land.   From  the  above
        report, the conclusion recorded by the learned Trial Court that the
        plaintiff was in possession of the southern portion is  a  possible
        conclusion that could be reasonably reached in  view  of  what  was
        disclosed by the police  report  dated  21.11.1988  read  with  the
        relevant revenue records.  The reluctance of the  first  revisional
        court as well  as  the  High  Court  to  interfere  with  the  said
        conclusion is but natural and the same cannot be understood  to  be
        unreasonable so as to warrant interference by  us  in  the  present
        appeal.
     9. That apart, the learned Trial Court also took note of the fact that
        lease deed dated 01.04.1976 purported to be executed by  Jagdish  &
        others, on the basis of which the defendant claimed to have entered
        possession of the share of the land belonging to Jagdish  &  others
        have not been proved by the defendant.   Similarly,  the  agreement
        dated 28.9.1978, executed by Jagdish & others and Murari Lal on the
        basis of which the defendant claimed possession of the entire  land
        had also not been proved.  The reason for which the  learned  Trial
        Court came to the aforesaid conclusion, i.e., that the  lease  deed
        dated 01.04.1976 and the agreement dated 28.9.1978  have  not  been
        proved is that the signatures of the executors  and  the  witnesses
        thereon have not been proved as required by law.  Such a conclusion
        cannot be faulted. In fact, a  further  conclusion  which  has  the
        effect of casting a serious doubt with regard to the claims of  the
        defendant reasonably follows from the above.   The  fact  that  the
        defendant had instituted Suit No. 238 of 1983 and Suit No.  765  of
        1984 claiming possession and injunction  in  respect  of  the  suit
        property was rightly understood by the learned Trial Court to be  a
        reasonable indication of the fact that the defendant, on the  dates
        of filing of the said suits, was not  in  possession  of  the  suit
        property.   In  such  a  situation,  the  dispossession  which  the
        plaintiff claimed to have taken place in the intervening  night  of
        19th/20th of November, 1988, has to  be  understood  to  have  been
        proved and established.  The issues raised by  the  defendant  with
        regard to the validity of the Sale deed dated  03.01.1986  executed
        by Jagdish & others in favour of the plaintiff on  account  of  the
        pendency of Suit No. 238 of 1983 and the validity of the entries in
        the revenue records are questions surrounding  title  and  are  not
        strictly relevant for deciding the issue that was  required  to  be
        decided in the suit in question namely, who was  in  possession  of
        the suit property on the relevant date.
    10. The argument raised on behalf of the  petitioner  (defendant)  that
        highly contentious issue having arisen in the  present  proceeding,
        the same ought not to have been adjudicated in a suit under Section
        6 would hardly merit acceptance, inasmuch, the foregoing discussion
        would enable us to come to  the  conclusion  that  the  issue  with
        regard to possession was capable of being decided on the  materials
        on  record  and  was,   accordingly,   so   decided.     A   mutual
        understanding  amongst  the  original  co-sharers  with  regard  to
        possession of specific areas of the  entire  land  is  fairly  well
        established.
    11. Another argument has been raised on behalf of the  petitioner  that
        in the present case the courts below  have  decided  the  issue  of
        possession by holding the defendant not to be in possession of  the
        suit land instead of recording a finding that it was the  plaintiff
        who was in possession. The said argument, again,  would  not  merit
        acceptance by us.  In a civil proceeding, the issues that may arise
        are required to be decided by balancing  the  claims  and  counter-
        claims of the parties before the  Court  and  on  the  basis  of  a
        preponderance of probabilities.  The conclusion that the  defendant
        could not have been in possession, as claimed, was necessary to  be
        reached in order to answer the question that was before  the  Court
        in the present case.
    12. The discussion that have preceded leads us  to  conclude  that  the
        findings recorded by the learned Trial Court and  affirmed  by  the
        revisional Court as well as  by  the  High  Court  are  essentially
        findings on question of fact which have  been  arrived  at  on  the
        basis of the evidence and materials adduced by  the  parties.   We,
        therefore, find no reason whatsoever, to disturb the said  findings
        and the same are hereby affirmed.   Consequently,  we  dismiss  the
        appeal and affirm the decree passed by the learned Courts below.




                                        ...……………………J.
                                          [P SATHASIVAM]



                                        ………………………J.
                                          [RANJAN GOGOI]

      New Delhi,
      27th  August, 2012.
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[1]    AIR 1968 SC 620
[2]    AIR 1989 SC 2097
[3]    SCC 2004 (4) 664

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