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Friday, July 20, 2012

‘last seen’ theory - First, we shall advert to the reliability and credibility of the ‘last seen’ theory as propounded by the prosecution. The testimony of PWs-8, 10 and 17 are relevant to be seen for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion whether the circumstance of ‘last seen’ has been established. PW-8 is the father of the deceased. He has stated that Jagsir Singh, who was residing with Jagroop Singh, his maternal uncle, came to his house and asked Jagjit Singh to accompany him to pluck Genda (marigold) flowers in the field. Jagjit accompanied him.= extra- judicial confession- it is the settled position of law that extra judicial confession, if true and voluntary, can be relied upon by the court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extra- judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and his evidence is credible. The evidence in the form of extra- judicial confession made by the accused before the witness cannot be always termed to be tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that it was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone = The accused have not given explanation how human blood could be found on the spade used for agriculture which was recovered at their instance. when the attention of the accused is drawn to such circumstances that inculpated him in the crime and he fails to offer appropriate explanation or gives a false answer, the same can be counted as providing a missing link for completing the chain of circumstances. We may hasten to add that we have referred to the said decision only to highlight that the accused has not given any explanation whatsoever as regards the circumstances put to him under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 67 OF 2008

Jagroop Singh                                        .....……..Appellant
                                   Versus
State of Punjab                                    ………Respondent





                               j u d g m e n t

Dipak Misra, J.


      This appeal preferred by  special  leave  under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution of India calls in  question  the  judgment  of  conviction  and
order of sentence passed by the Division Bench of the High Court  of  Punjab
and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. 199/DB of 1997  whereby  the  High  Court
has affirmed the  conviction  and  confirmed  the  sentence  passed  by  the
learned Sessions Judge, Faridkot, in Sessions Trial No. 31 of  1992  wherein
he had found that the appellant along with one Bikkar  Singh was  guilty  of
the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 and  201  of
the Indian Penal Code 1860 (for short ‘the IPC’) and sentenced  the  accused
persons to suffer rigorous imprisonment for  life  and  to  pay  a  fine  of
Rs.500/-, in default  of  payment  of  fine,  to  undergo  further  rigorous
imprisonment  for  two  months  each  on  the  first  count   and   rigorous
imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.200/-, in  default,  to
suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one month each on the second  score
with  the  stipulation  that  both  the  substantive  sentences   shall   be
concurrent.

2.    The factual matrix giving rise to the trial is that  about  3.15  p.m.
on 2.4.1991, when Sukhdev Singh, PW-8, was feeding fodder to his  cattle  at
his house, accused Jagsir Singh came to his house and asked his son,  Jagjit
Singh @ Jagga, to  accompany  him  for  plucking  flowers  from  the  field.
Jagjit Singh, a 10 year old boy,  accompanied  him.   As  the  boy  did  not
return home till evening, the complainant  went  to  the  house  of  Jagroop
Singh, Uncle of Jagsir Singh, to enquire about his son. As  the  doors  were
not opened and there was no response he searched for his son in the  village
but could not find him.  On the next day, in the morning he  proceeded  with
the co-villagers to search for the boy in the fields.  After he reached  the
fields of Santosh Singh, he found some freshly dug  earth  near  a  heap  of
sticks. Being suspicious, all of them dug out the earth and found  the  dead
body of Jagjit Singh lying buried over there  having  injury  marks  on  the
head.  Sukhdev Singh left his brother Gurmail Singh there for  guarding  the
body and proceeded towards the police station.  On  the  way  near  the  bus
stand he met ASI Surjit Singh who recorded  his  statement  and  accompanied
him to the fields of Jagroop Singh. The investigating officer  prepared  the
inquest report, recovered the blood stained weapon of offence and sample  of
earth smeared with blood, prepared  two  distinct  sealed  parcels  thereof,
Exhibits P-1 and P-2, and sent the dead body for post mortem.  In  the  FIR,
it was stated that the deceased had been murdered by Jagsir Singh  with  the
aid and assistance of other persons and they had buried the dead body.

3.    As the factual narration would reveal,  on  21.4.1992,  Jagroop  Singh
and Jagsir Singh made an extra judicial confession before  Natha  Singh,  PW
14, and accused Bikkar Singh made an extra-judicial confession  before  Zora
Singh, PW-2, and both Natha  Singh  and  Zora  Singh  produced  the  accused
persons before the police.  After being arrested, they led to the  discovery
of one `Kassi’ (spade) which was buried under  the  ground  near  the  place
wherefrom the dead body was recovered.   The  seized  weapon  was  sent  for
chemical analysis examination in the forensic science laboratory  and  after
completing the investigation, the investigating officer placed  the  charge-
sheet before the concerned Magistrate,  who  committed  the  matter  to  the
Court of Session for trial of offences under Section 302 read  with  Section
34 and 201 of IPC.  Be it noted, in the  course  of  investigation,  it  was
found that  Jagsir  Singh  was  a  juvenile  and  was  produced  before  the
appropriate forum at Bhatinda.

4.     Both  the  accused  persons  denied  the  charge  and  pleaded  false
implication due to animosity.

5.    The prosecution, to prove its case, examined Dr. Devinder Mittal,  the
autopsy surgeon as PW-1, Zora  Singh,  PW-2,  Sukhdev  Singh,  PW-8,  Gurdev
Singh, PW-10, Natha Singh, PW-14, Balwinder  Singh,  PW-17  and  ASI  Surjit
Singh, PW-18, as principal witnesses.  The rest of the witnesses are  formal
witnesses.  The reports of the Forensic Science Laboratory  and  many  other
documents were brought on record and marked as exhibits.

6.    The defence chose not to adduce any evidence.

7.    The learned trial Judge, on appreciation of the  evidence  brought  on
record, came to hold that  the  death  of  the  deceased  Jagjit  Singh  was
homicidal in nature; that the  deceased  was  last  seen  with  the  accused
persons; that the accused had made extra-judicial confessions admitting  the
guilt; that the dead body of the deceased was recovered from  the  field  of
the father of accused Jagroop Singh; that the weapon used in the  crime  was
recovered on the basis of the disclosure statement made by  accused  Jagroop
Singh; that as per the report of Forensic  Science  Laboratory,  the  weapon
used, spade, was found stained with human blood; and  that  the  doctor  who
had conducted the post mortem had clearly stated that the injuries found  on
the body of the deceased could be caused  by  the  seized  weapon.   On  the
aforesaid basis, he came to hold that  the  prosecution  had  been  able  to
prove the case against the  accused  persons  beyond  reasonable  doubt  and
accordingly recorded the conviction and imposed the sentence.

8.    On an  appeal  being  preferred,  the  High  Court  reappreciated  the
evidence and  came  to  hold  that  the  circumstantial  evidence  from  all
spectrums led to the only conclusion that the accused persons had  committed
the crime and concurred with the view expressed by the learned trial Judge.

9.    We have heard Mr. Nikhil Goel, learned counsel for the appellant,  and
Mr. Jayant K. Sood, learned Additional Advocate General for the  respondent-
State.

10.   The learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has  raised  the  following
contentions: -

(a)   The learned trial Judge as well as the High Court has not  appreciated
      the evidence brought on record in proper perspective keeping  in  view
      the parameters laid down by this Court in various authorities relating
      to restriction of  conviction on circumstantial  evidence  and  hence,
      the judgments are unsustainable in law.

(b)   The circumstances which have weighed with  the  Courts,  namely,  last
      seen with the deceased, the  extra-judicial  confession  made  by  the
      accused before Zora Singh, PW-2, and Natha Singh, PW-14, and  recovery
      of spade and body of the deceased near the field of the father of  the
      accused-appellant at his instance are  unacceptable  inasmuch  as  the
      testimony of witnesses are replete with improvement, embellishment and
      contradiction.

(c)   The time gap between the point of time when the accused was last  seen
      with the deceased and when the deceased was  found  dead  is  of  long
      duration and, therefore, the said circumstance is to be ignored.

(d)   The reliance on extra-judicial confession before Zora Singh, PW-2  and
      Natha Singh, PW-14 is unacceptable inasmuch as the confession was made
      after 18 days which makes it absolutely dented.  There is  no  earthly
      reason that the appellant would confess before Zora Singh, PW-2, since
      there was prior enmity between the informant  and  the  appellant  and
      Zora Singh, PW-2, is a close relation of the father of  the  deceased.
      That apart, there are improvements in the  course  of  examination  in
      court and the same makes the extra-judicial confession, a  weak  piece
      of evidence, wholly unreliable.

(e)   The circumstance pertaining to recovery of the weapon  is  not  to  be
      given any credence.  There is incurable discrepancy with regard to the
      place of recovery.  Further, though the seized earth  and  the  weapon
      were sent for  examination,  the  report  is  silent  as  regards  the
      matching of blood group with that of the deceased  and  such  lack  of
      corroboration makes the said circumstance hollowed and that makes  the
      judgment of conviction  sensitively vulnerable.

11.    The  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  combated  the  aforesaid
proponements.  The learned counsel has advanced the following submissions:-

(i)   The attack on the last seen circumstance on the foundation that  there
      is a long duration between the last seen and when the  dead  body  was
      found is totally untenable inasmuch as the opinion in the post  mortem
      report is that the death had occurred within twenty four hours.   That
      apart, the testimony of PW 10 and 17 is unimpeachable since they  have
      stood embedded in their stand.

(ii)  The circumstance of extra-judicial confession  cannot  be  disregarded
      despite some improvements in the version of Natha  Singh,  PW  14,  as
      there is no suggestion that his version is tainted.  Quite apart  from
      that, after abscondance of the  accused  Bikkar  Singh,  he  came  and
      confessed before Zora Singh  and  the  present  appellant  along  with
      Jagsir Singh before Natha Singh who produced them  before  the  Police
      and there is nothing on record to state that either Zora Singh,  PW-2,
      or Natha Singh, PW-14, applied any force.

(iii) There is no reason to doubt the disclosure statement  and  leading  to
      recovery on the ground that the weapon was  recovered  in  the  nearby
      field but not in the field of the appellant  and  there  has  been  no
      matching of blood stains with that of the appellant’s blood.

(iv)  Both the High Court and the trial court have kept themselves alive  to
      the parameters of circumstances and there can be  no  trace  of  doubt
      that all the circumstances cumulatively prove the guilt of the accused
      beyond reasonable doubt, for there  are  no  such  flaws  which  would
      compel a  court  of  law  to  disregard  the  vital  circumstance  and
      entertain pleas artificially grafted by imagination.

12.   As is evincible, the entire case  rests  on  circumstantial  evidence.
Before we analyse and appreciate the circumstances that  have  weighed  with
the trial Court and the High  Court,  we  think  it  apposite  to  refer  to
certain authorities  pertaining  to  delineation  of  cases  that  hinge  on
circumstantial evidence.

13.   In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra[1], a  three-Judge
Bench  has  laid  down  five  golden   principles   which   constitute   the
“panchsheel”  in  respect  of  a  case  based  on  circumstantial  evidence.
Referring  to  the  decision  in  Shivaji  Sahebrao  Bobade  v.   State   of
Maharashtra[2], it was opined that  it  is  a  primary  principle  that  the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict  and
the mental distance between `may be’ and  `must  be’  is  long  and  divides
vague conjectures from sure conclusions. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded  to
lay down that the facts so established should be consistent  only  with  the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should  not  be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;  that
the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;  that  they
should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to  be  proved;  and
that there must be a chain of evidence so  complete  as  not  to  leave  any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the  innocence  of  the
accused and must show that in all human probability the act must  have  been
done by the accused.”

14.   In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and  others[3],  this
Court held  that  when  a  case  rests  upon  circumstantial  evidence,  the
following tests must be satisfied:  (SCC pp. 710-11, para 10)

           “(1)  the circumstances from which  an  inference  of  guilt  is
           sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;

           (2)   those circumstances  should  be  of  a  definite  tendency
           unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;

           (3)   the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain
           so complete that there is no escape from   the  conclusion  that
           within all human probability the  crime  was  committed  by  the
           accused and none else; and

           (4)   the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction
           must be complete and  incapable  of  explanation  of  any  other
           hypothesis than that of  the  guilt  of  the  accused  and  such
           evidence should not only be consistent with  the  guilt  of  the
           accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.”

The similar view has been reiterated in Ramreddy  Rajesh  Khanna  Reddy  and
another v. State of A.P.[4].

15.   In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab[5], it has been laid  down  that
the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be  drawn  should
be fully proved and those circumstances must  be  conclusive  in  nature  to
connect the accused with the crime.  All the links in the  chain  of  events
must  be  established  beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   the   established
circumstances should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt  of
the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.  In  a  case  based
on circumstantial evidence, the Court has to be on its guard  to  avoid  the
danger of allowing suspicion to take the place of legal proof and has to  be
watchful to avoid the danger of being swayed  by  emotional  considerations,
however strong they may be, to take the place of proof.

16.   In Harishchandra Ladaku  Thange  v.  State  of  Maharashtra[6],  while
dealing with the validity of inferences  to  be  drawn  from  circumstantial
evidence, it has been  emphasised  that  where  a  case  rests  squarely  on
circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified  only  when
all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to  be  incompatible
with the innocence of the accused or the  guilt  of  any  other  person  and
further the circumstances from which an inference as to  the  guilt  of  the
accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and  have  to  be
shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be  inferred
from those circumstances.

17.   In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava[7], emphasis has been  laid
that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Court  to  take  care   while   evaluating
circumstantial evidence.  If the evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution  is
reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused  must
be accepted.  That apart, the circumstances relied upon must be  established
and the cumulative effect of the established facts must lead to  a  singular
hypothesis that the accused is guilty.

18.   In Ram Singh v. Sonia and Ors.[8],  while  referring  to  the  settled
proof pertaining to  circumstantial  evidence,  this  Court  reiterated  the
principles about the caution to be kept in  mind  by  Court.   It  has  been
stated  therein  that  in  a  case  depending  largely  upon  circumstantial
evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture  or  suspicion  may  take
the place of legal proof.   The  Court  must  satisfy  itself  that  various
circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and  such
completed chain of  events  must  be  such  as  to  rule  out  a  reasonable
likelihood of the innocence of the accused.   It  has  also  been  indicated
that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances  gets  snapped
and the other circumstances cannot in any manner,  establish  the  guilt  of
the accused beyond all reasonable doubts.

19.   In Ujagar  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab[9],  after  referring  to  the
aforesaid  principles  pertaining  to  the  evaluation   of   circumstantial
evidence, this Court stated that it  must  nonetheless  be  emphasised  that
whether a chain is complete or not would depend on the facts  of  each  case
emanating from the evidence  and  no  universal  yardstick  should  ever  be
attempted.

20.   Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, we shall  presently  proceed
to scrutinize and evaluate the circumstances whether the said  circumstances
establish the guilt of the  accused  beyond  reasonable  doubt.   First,  we
shall advert to the reliability and credibility of the  ‘last  seen’  theory
as propounded by the prosecution.  The testimony of PWs-8,  10  and  17  are
relevant to be seen for the purpose of arriving at  the  conclusion  whether
the circumstance of ‘last seen’ has been established.  PW-8  is  the  father
of the deceased.  He has stated that Jagsir Singh,  who  was  residing  with
Jagroop Singh, his maternal uncle, came to his house and asked Jagjit  Singh
to accompany him to pluck Genda (marigold) flowers  in  the  field.   Jagjit
accompanied him.  PW-10, Gurdev Singh, has  deposed  that  about  4.00  p.m.
when he was going from village Jita Singh Wala to village  Mari  Mustafa  to
see his daughter, near a turning outside village Jita Singh Wala,  he  found
that Roop Singh, Bikkar Singh and Jagsir Singh along  with  deceased  Jagjit
Singh were proceeding towards the fields.  In the cross-examination, he  has
stated that the road by which the three accused  were  taking  the  deceased
was known to him as he had earlier gone on that passage and at that time  he
did not suspect  anything.   The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has
submitted that there is a material contradiction in the statement of  Gurdev
Singh, PW-10, and that of Sukhdev Singh, PW-8, inasmuch as Gurdev Singh  had
stated that for the first  time  he  made  a  disclosure  about  seeing  the
deceased in the company of the accused persons  whereas  Sukhdev  Singh  had
stated that while he was searching for Jagjit Singh, Gurdev Singh  told  him
that he had seen the accused going together with the deceased.  Keeping  the
appreciation and analysis of this evidence in abeyance, it is  apt  to  scan
the testimony of PW-17.  Balwinder  Singh,  PW-17,  has  testified  that  on
2.4.1991, about 4.00 p.m., he was going to the bus-stand  of  village  Kotla
Raika.  When he reached the house of Jagroop Singh, he  saw  all  the  three
accused along with the deceased going towards the  field  of  Jagroop  Singh
who was carrying a spade with him.  He had enquired from  Jagjit  Singh  why
he was accompanying the accused with whom they were not on  good  terms,  to
which he replied that he had no hostility with his  companions  and  he  was
going to pluck the flowers.  Thereafter,  Jagroop  Singh  told  why  he  was
talking ill of them.  The learned counsel for the appellant  has  criticised
the evidence of this witness on the ground that he  has  been  convicted  of
murder of the appellant’s brother and he had made two  improvements  in  his
statement recorded under  Section  161  Cr.P.C.  inasmuch  as  when  he  has
deposed, he had stated before the police that the accused and deceased  were
going towards the field of Jagroop Singh and further he  has  stated  before
the police that the accused had told him why he was talking ill.

21.   The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant  basically  is
that there are omissions and improvements in the versions of  the  witnesses
and of such magnitude that they affect the prosecution case.  In State  Rep.
by Inspector of Police v. Saravanan and anr.[10], it has  been  stated  that
the contradictions/omissions must be of such nature which materially  affect
the  trial.   Minor  contradictions,  inconsistencies,   embellishments   or
improvements which do not affect the core of  the  prosecution  case  should
not be made a ground to reject the evidence of the witness in entirety.   In
Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and others v. State of  Maharashtra[11],
it has been laid down that the omissions which amount to  contradictions  in
material particulars, i.e., go to the root  of  the  case/materially  affect
the trial or core of the prosecution  case,  render  the  testimony  of  the
witness  liable  to  be  discredited.   Keeping  in   view   the   aforesaid
principles, when the evidence of these three witnesses are  scrutinized,  we
find that PW 8, the father of the deceased, has  categorically  stated  that
his son had accompanied the accused Jagsir.  There is nothing on  record  to
disbelieve the said testimony.  As  regards  the  testimony  of  PW-17,  the
omissions and the improvements which have been  highlighted  are  absolutely
minor.  In fact, to appreciate the  same,  we  have  anxiously  perused  the
statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. and  the  deposition  in
Court.  We find that this witness has clearly stated that all of  them  were
going towards the field.   The only omission is that he had not stated  that
they were going to the field of Jagroop.   As  regards  the  improvement  he
has made that the accused persons had told him why he was  speaking  ill  of
them, in our considered view, these aspects do not affect the  core  of  the
prosecution case. The evidence of PW-10, Gurdev Singh, is criticised on  the
base that he had stated before the police  that  he  had  seen  the  accused
persons and not before anyone else whereas the complainant  had  stated  the
he had said so before him.  The aforesaid discrepancy cannot be regarded  to
have created any dent in the prosecution story.

22.   Quite apart from the above, what is argued is that  there  is  a  long
gap between the last seen and recovery of the dead  body  of  the  deceased.
As per the material on record, the informant searched for  his  son  in  the
village in the late evening and next day in the  morning,  he  went  to  the
fields and the dead body was found.  The post-mortem report  indicates  that
the death had occurred within 24 hours.  Thus, the duration is not  so  long
as to defeat or frustrate the version of the prosecution.  Therefore,  there
can be no trace of doubt that the deceased was last seen in the  company  of
the accused persons.

23.   The second circumstance pertains to extra- judicial  confession.   Mr.
Goel, learned counsel for  the  appellant,  has  vehemently  criticized  the
extra-judicial confession on the ground that such confession was made  after
18 days of the occurrence.  That apart,  it is submitted that the father  of
Natha Singh  and  grand-father  of  the  deceased  are  real  brothers  and,
therefore, he is an interested witness and to  overcome  the  same,  he  has
deposed in Court that he  has  strained  relationship  with  the  informant,
though he had not stated so in the statement recorded under Section  161  of
Cr.PC.

24.   The issue that emanates for appreciation is whether such  confessional
statement should be  given  any  credence  or  thrown  overboard.   In  this
context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Gura  Singh  v.  State
of Rajasthan[12] wherein, after referring to  the  decisions  in   Rao  Shiv
Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh[13],  Maghar  Singh  v.  State  of
Punjab[14], Narayan Siingh V. State of M.P.[15],  Kishore Chand v. State  of
H.P.[16] and Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana[17], it has been opined that  it
is the settled position of law that extra judicial confession, if  true  and
voluntary, can be relied upon by the court to convict the  accused  for  the
commission of the  crime  alleged.   Despite  inherent  weakness  of  extra-
judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when  shown
that such confession was made before a person who has  no  reason  to  state
falsely and his evidence is credible.  The evidence in the  form  of  extra-
judicial confession made by the accused before the witness cannot be  always
termed to be tainted evidence.  Corroboration of such evidence  is  required
only by way of abundant caution.  If the court believes the  witness  before
whom the  confession  is  made  and  is  satisfied  that  it  was  true  and
voluntarily made, then the  conviction  can  be  founded  on  such  evidence
alone.  The aspects which have to be taken care of are  the  nature  of  the
circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the  credibility  of
the witnesses who speak for such a confession.  That apart,  before  relying
on the confession, the court has to be satisfied that it  is  voluntary  and
it is not the result of inducement, threat or  promise  as  envisaged  under
Section 24 of the Act  or  brought  about  in  suspicious  circumstances  to
circumvent Sections 25 and 26.

25.   Recently, in Sahadevan & Another v. State  of  Tamil  Nadu[18],  after
referring to the rulings in Sk. Yusuf v. State of  W.B.[19]  and  Pancho  v.
State of Haryana[20],  a two-Judge Bench  has  laid  down  that  the  extra-
judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself and it has to  be  examined
by the court  with  greater  care  and  caution;  that  it  should  be  made
voluntarily and should be truthful;  that  it  should   inspire  confidence;
that  an  extra-judicial  confession   attains   greater   credibility   and
evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances  and
is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence; that  for  an  extra-
judicial confession to be the basis of conviction,  it  should   not  suffer
from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities; and that  such
statement  essentially  has  to  be  proved  like  any  other  fact  and  in
accordance with law.

26.   Keeping in view  the  aforesaid  parameters,  the  criticism  advanced
against the evidence of Natha Singh, PW-14, and acceptance thereof  have  to
appreciated.  There is no dispute that the confession was made before  Natha
Singh after 18 days.  The fact remains that  Natha  Singh  was  not  in  the
village and three days after his arrival in the village, the confession  was
made before him. He has clearly deposed that Jagsir  Singh  and  Roop  Singh
alias Jagroop Singh had confessed before him.  The appellant  Jagroop  Singh
had confessed about the crime and he  had  produced  them  before  the  ASI.
True it is, he has improved his version in  the  cross-examination  that  he
has strained relationship with the complainant which he had  not  stated  in
his statement under  Section  161  Cr.P.C  but  the  same  cannot  make  the
testimony  tainted.    Barring  that,  there  is  nothing  in   the   cross-
examination to discredit his testimony.  That apart, there is no  suggestion
that he had not produced the appellant before  the  police.   There  may  be
some relationship between the informant and this witness  but  the  evidence
is totally clear and the confessional statement  is  voluntary  and,  in  no
way, appears to be induced and gets further strengthened by  the  fact  that
he produced them before the police.  There is no suggestion whatsoever  that
he had applied any kind of force.  It is borne out  from  that  record  that
Bikkar Singh, another accused,  had  absconded  and  the  present  appellant
along with Jagsir Singh came to Natha Singh and confessed and  Bikkar  Singh
confessed before Gurdev Singh, PW-10.  In  the  confessional  statement,  he
has stated about the place where  the  spade  was  hidden  and  led  to  the
recovery to which Natha Singh is a witness.  Appreciated from these  angles,
we are of the  considered  opinion  that  the  said  confessional  statement
inspires confidence as the  same  is  totally  voluntary  and  by  no  means
tainted.

27.   The next circumstance is leading to recovery of the weapon as is  seen
from the evidence.   The accused led to  recovery  of  the  spade  from  the
wheat field near the heap of sticks.   The  disclosure  statement  has  been
signed  by  Natha  Singh  and  another  witness,  namely,  Lal  Chand.   The
procedure followed for discovery is absolutely in accord with  law  and  has
not been challenged.  The learned counsel for the  appellant  has  submitted
that the recovery of the weapon does not  aid  and  assist  the  prosecution
version.  It is urged that though human blood is found  on  the  spade,  yet
the blood group was not matched.  In support  of  the  said  stand,  he  has
commended us to the decision in Sattatiya Alias Satish Rajanna  Kartalla  v.
State of Maharashtra[21].  In the said case, the occurrence had taken  place
on 1.10.1994 and the accused was arrested  on  3.10.1994.   He  had  led  to
recovery of his blood stained clothes and  that  of  the  deceased  and  the
weapon used in the crime  and  all  the  articles  were  sent  for  chemical
examination.  The clothes of the deceased were found having human  blood  of
‘O’ group.  It was contended that the blood group  was  not  matched.   This
Court did not believe the recovery of the weapon  due  to  various  reasons.
Further, it opined that though blood stains were found on  the  clothes  and
the weapon used, yet the same could not be linked  with  the  blood  of  the
deceased, and, therefore, there was serious  lacuna  that  the  human  blood
stains present on the clothes of the accused and the weapon were  sufficient
to link the accused with the murder.

28.    In the case at hand, the accused persons were arrested after 18  days
and recovery was made at that time.  The blood stain  found  on  the  weapon
has been found in the serological report as human blood.   In  the  case  of
Sattatiya (supra), the recovery was doubted and  additionally,  non-matching
of blood group was treated to be a lacuna.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the
clothes and the weapon  were  sent  immediately  for  chemical  examination.
Here the weapon was sent after 18 days as the recovery was made  after  that
period.  The accused have not given explanation how  human  blood  could  be
found on the spade  used  for  agriculture  which  was  recovered  at  their
instance.  In this context, we may profitably reproduce a passage from  John
Pandian v. State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu [22]  :-

           “The discovery appears to be credible.  It has been accepted  by
           both the courts below and we find no reason to discard it.  This
           is apart from the fact that this weapon was sent to the forensic
           science laboratory (FSL) and it  has  been  found  stained  with
           human blood. Though the blood group could not be ascertained, as
           the results were inconclusive, the  accused  had  to  give  some
           explanation as to how the human blood came on this  weapon.   He
           gave none.  This discovery would  very  positively  further  the
           prosecution case.”


29.   Thus viewed, we do not find any substantial reason to  disbelieve  the
disclosure statement and the recovery of the weapon  used.   It  is  apt  to
mention here that the  doctor,  who  has  conducted  the  post  mortem,  has
clearly opined that the injuries on the person  of  the  deceased  could  be
caused by the weapon (blade of such spade) and the  said  opinion  has  gone
unrebutted.

30.   Another aspect is to be  taken  note  of.   Though  the  incriminating
circumstances which point to the guilt of the accused had been  put  to  the
accused, yet he could not give any explanation  under  Section  313  of  the
Code of Criminal Procedure except choosing the mode of denial.  In State  of
Maharashtra v. Suresh[23], it has been held that when the attention  of  the
accused is drawn to such circumstances that inculpated him in the crime  and
he fails to offer appropriate explanation or gives a false answer, the  same
can be counted as providing a missing  link  for  completing  the  chain  of
circumstances.  We may hasten to add that  we  have  referred  to  the  said
decision only to highlight that the accused has not  given  any  explanation
whatsoever as regards the circumstances put to him under Section 313 of  the
Code of Criminal Procedure.

31.   From the aforesaid analysis, we are of the convinced opinion that  all
the three circumstances which  have  been  established  by  the  prosecution
complete the chain.  There can be no trace of doubt that  the  circumstances
have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.  It is worthy to remember that  in
Sucha Singh and another v. State of Punjab[24], it has been stated that  the
prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward  by
the accused.  A reasonable doubt is not  an  imaginary,  trivial  or  merely
possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason  and  common  sense.   It
must grow out of the evidence in the case.  If a case is  proved  perfectly,
it is argued that it is artificial; if a  case  has  some  inevitable  flaws
because human beings are  prone  to  err,  it  is  argued  that  it  is  too
imperfect.  The present case is one where there is no trace  of  doubt  that
all circumstances complete the chain and singularly lead  to  the  guilt  of
the accused persons.

32.   In view of  the  aforesaid  premised  reasons,  we  do  not  find  any
infirmity in the judgment of conviction and order of  sentence  recorded  by
the learned trial Judge which has been  affirmed  by  the  High  Court  and,
accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of substance, stands dismissed.



                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]



                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
July 20, 2012.
-----------------------
[1]    AIR 1984 SC 1622
[2]    AIR 1973 SC 2622 = (1973) 2 SCC 793
[3]     1989 Supp (2) SCC 706 : 1991 SCC (CRI) 407

[4]    (2006) 10 SCC 172
[5]    AIR 1996 SC 607

[6]    AIR 2007 SC 2957
[7]    AIR 1992 SCW 640 = AIR 1992 SC 840
[8]    AIR 2007 SC 1218
[9]    (2007) 13 SCC 90

[10]   AIR 2009 SC 152
[11]   (2010) 13 SCC 657
[12]   (2001 ) 2 SCC 205
[13]   AIR 1954 SC 322
[14]   AIR 1975 SC 1320
[15]   AIR 1985 SC 1678
[16]   AIR 1990 SC 2140
[17]   AIR 1991 SC 37

[18]    2012 AIR SCW 3206
[19]   (2011) 11 SCC 754
[20]    (2011) 10 SCC 165 : AIR 2012 SC 523
[21]   (2008) 3 SCC 210

[22]   (2010) 14 SCC 129

[23]   (2000) 1 SCC 471
[24]   (2003) 7 SCC 643


Quashing of FIR - Inasmuch as the matter has not reached the stage of trial, we are of the view that the High Court, by exercising the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code even in offences which are not compoundable under Section 320, may quash the prosecution. However, as observed in Shiji (supra), the power under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. In other words, the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                      1


               2 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1040            OF 2012


                3 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8783 of 2011




Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana                      .... Appellant(s)

            Versus

State of Gujarat & Anr.                                 .... Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T

P. Sathasivam, J.
1)    Leave granted.
2)    This appeal is filed  against  the  impugned  order  dated  18.07.2011
passed by  the  High  Court  of  Gujarat  at  Ahmedabad  in  Criminal  Misc.
Application  No.  3999  of  2011  whereby  the  High  Court  dismissed   the
application filed by the appellant herein (original  Accused  No.  3)  under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in  short  ‘the  Code’)
to quash and set aside the impugned FIR No.  45  of  2011  dated  12.03.2011
lodged by Vipulbhai Harshadbhai Raja, Respondent No. 2  herein  with  Sanand
Police Station, Ahmedabad for the offences punishable  under  Sections  467,
468, 471, 420 and 120-B of the  Indian  Penal  Code,  1860  (in  short  ‘the
IPC’).
3)    Brief facts:
(i)   Respondent No. 2 herein is the President of Shri  Supan  Plot  Owners’
Association situated at Village Nidhrad, Sanand, Ahmedabad.   Certain  plots
of the said Association were disposed of illegally by creating  false/forged
documents by one Pravinbhai Gangashankar Raval (original  Accused  No.1)  in
favour of one Janakben Pravinchandra Raval (original Accused No.2)  who,  in
turn, sold the same to  one  Jayrajsinh  Digvijaysinh  Rana,  the  appellant
herein (original Accused No. 3).
(ii)  Pursuant to the same, Respondent No. 2 herein lodged  FIR  No.  45  of
2011 dated 12.03.2011 alleging about the sheer collusion of  all  the  three
above named accused persons in disposing of the plots.
(iii) Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the same, the  appellant  herein
(Accused No.3) preferred an  application  under  Section  482  of  the  Code
before the High Court to quash and set aside the said FIR.  The High  Court,
by impugned order dated 18.07.2011, dismissed the same.
(iv)  Challenging the said order of the High Court, the appellant has  filed
the above appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
4)    Heard Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned senior counsel for the  appellant,
Mrs. Hemantika Wahi, learned counsel for respondent  No.1-State  of  Gujarat
and Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, learned senior counsel  for  Respondent  No.2  –  the
Complainant.
5)    In view of the subsequent development,  as  narrated  in  the  counter
affidavit filed by Respondent No.2 in  this  Court,  there  is  no  need  to
traverse all the factual details about  the  allegations  and  the  ultimate
order passed by the High Court  dismissing  the  application  filed  by  the
appellant herein under Section 482 of the Code.  The following averments  in
the counter affidavit are relevant for disposal of the  above  appeal  which
reads as under:
      “5. That after the filing of the present special leave  petition,  the
      petitioner to show his bona fides and to prove that he  himself  is  a
      victim  has  approached  the  answering  respondent.   The   answering
      respondent was informed by the petitioner that the petitioner  himself
      got  cheated   by   Pravinbhai   Gangashanker   Raval   and   Janakben
      Pravinchandra Raval (accused Nos. 1 & 2 in the instant  case  FIR  No.
      45/2011).  The petitioner further informed  the  answering  respondent
      that he shall not claim any right, title, interest  over  the  various
      plots belonging to the association and accordingly he has no right  or
      title over the same.


      6. The petitioner further submitted that he was also  cheated  by  the
      other accused persons who sold the properties being subject the matter
      of dispute to whom on the basis of forged and fabricated documents, by
      which no rights can be transferred legally.


      7.  That the petitioner  further  informed  the  answering  respondent
      that he has also filed a police complaint  against  the  said  accused
      Pravinbhai  Gangashanker  Raval  and  Janakben   Pravinchandra   Raval
      (accused Nos. 1 & 2 in the instant case FIR No.  45/2011)  before  the
      Special Investigation Team, Ahmedabad, Gujarat.


      8.  That the petitioner further assured and has given an affidavit  to
      the answering respondent that he will withdraw the Civil Suit  bearing
      No. 300/2011, titled as Jayarajsingh Digvijaysingh Rana vs. Supan Plot
      Owners Association & Ors. filed before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad
      for  specific  performance  and  declaration,   accepting   that   the
      petitioner did not have any legal right, possession,  title  or  claim
      over the various plots in issue as they were sold to him by Pravinbhai
      Gangashanker Raval and Janakben Pravinchandra Raval (accused Nos. 1  &
      2 in the instant case) on the basis of forged documents.   He  further
      accepted the answering respondent to be the genuine owner of the plots
      in existence and with them.


      9.    That after considering the bona fide intention of the petitioner
      the answering respondent hereby has no objection if  the  present  FIR
      No. 45/2011 is quashed qua the petitioner.  However, this requires  to
      be clarified that the properties allegedly transferred  in  favour  of
      the petitioner shall be considered as the property of the  Association
      and this transaction which had taken place between the accused persons
      is a null and void transaction  through  which  no  title,  right  and
      interest has ever been transferred and the possession of the  property
      was and is with the Association.


      10.   That in view of  the  above  and  since  the  right,  title  and
      interest of the association is now protected as the documents  showing
      transfer of the property in favour of the petitioner stand declared as
      incompetent documents, therefore,  the  answering  respondent  has  no
      objection if the present special leave petition is allowed and the FIR
      in question is quashed qua the petitioner.”

The above information in the form of counter affidavit filed  by  Respondent
No. 2 herein before  this  Court  shows  that  by  bona  fide  efforts,  the
appellant, who himself being the victim at the hands of Accused Nos.  1  and
2, assured Respondent No. 2 that he will not  claim  any  right,  title  and
interest over various plots belonging to the  Association.   It  is  further
seen that the appellant has also executed an affidavit to Respondent  No.  2
stating that he will withdraw the Civil  Suit  bearing  No.  300/2011  filed
before  the  City  Civil  Court,  Ahmedabad  for  specific  performance  and
declaration, accepting that he did not have  any  legal  right,  possession,
title or claim over the various plots in issue as they were sold to  him  by
Accused Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of  forged  documents.   Respondent  No.2,
after satisfying the bona fide intention of  the  appellant,  informed  this
Court, by way of counter affidavit, that he has no objection if the  present
FIR  No.  45/2011  is  quashed  qua  the  appellant.   Respondent  No.2,  in
categorical terms, informed this Court that in view of the  stand  taken  by
the appellant and since the right, title and interest of the said  plots  of
the Association is now protected as the documents showing  transfer  of  the
property in favour of the appellant stand declared as invalid documents,  he
has no objection if the present appeal is allowed and the  FIR  in  question
is quashed insofar as the appellant is  concerned.   Apart  from  the  above
stand of Respondent No. 2 in the form of counter affidavit,  learned  senior
counsel appearing for him also reiterated the same.
6)    It is also relevant to  point  out  that  the  averments  in  the  FIR
disclosed the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-
B of IPC.
7)    The only question for consideration before this Court  at  this  stage
is that inasmuch as all those offences are not compoundable  offences  under
Section 320 of the Code (except  Section  420  of  IPC  that  too  with  the
permission of the Court before which any prosecution  for  such  offence  is
pending), whether it would be possible to quash the FIR by  the  High  Court
under Section 482 of the Code  or  by  this  Court  exercising  jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?
8)    The above question was recently considered by this Court  in  Shiji  @
Pappu & Ors. vs. Radhika & Anr. (2011) 10 SCC 705.  The  question  posed  in
that case was  “Whether  the  criminal  proceedings  in  question  could  be
quashed in the facts and circumstances of the  case  having  regard  to  the
settlement that the parties had arrived at.”   After  adverting  to  Section
482 of the Code and various decisions, this Court concluded as under:
      “17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable
      under Section 320 CrPC is by itself no reason for the  High  Court  to
      refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC. That power can in
      our opinion be  exercised  in  cases  where  there  is  no  chance  of
      recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise  of
      a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is  a  subtle
      distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before  the
      trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power  by
      the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 CrPC on  the
      other. While a court trying an accused or hearing  an  appeal  against
      conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of  an  offence
      based on a settlement arrived at between the parties  in  cases  where
      the offences are not compoundable under Section 320,  the  High  Court
      may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with  which
      the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of
      the High Court under  Section  482  CrPC  are  not  for  that  purpose
      controlled by Section 320 CrPC.


      18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the  plenitude  of  the
      power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it  obligatory  for  the
      High Court to exercise the same with  utmost  care  and  caution.  The
      width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise  is
      sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons  to  be
      recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution  would
      be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary
      nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of
      power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to  say  is
      that the exercise of power must be for securing the  ends  of  justice
      and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may  result  in
      the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may  be  justified  in
      declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for
      it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing  with  a
      petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject  to
      the above, the  High  Court  will  have  to  consider  the  facts  and
      circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a  fit  case  in
      which the inherent powers may be invoked.”

9)    On going  through  the  factual  details,  earlier  decision,  various
offences under Section 320 of the Code and invocation of Section 482 of  the
Code, we fully concur with the  said  conclusion.   In  the  case  on  hand,
irrespective  of  the  earlier  dispute  between  Respondent  No.   2-   the
complainant and the appellant being Accused No. 3 as well as Accused Nos.  1
and 2 subsequently and after getting all  the  materials,  relevant  details
etc., the present appellant (Accused No. 3) sworn  an  affidavit  with  bona
fide  intention  securing  the  right,  title  and  interest  in  favour  of
Respondent No.2 herein-the Complainant.  In such  bona  fide  circumstances,
the power under Section 482 may be  exercised.   Further,  in  view  of  the
settlement arrived at between  Respondent  No.  2-the  complainant  and  the
appellant (Accused No. 3), there is no  chance  of  recording  a  conviction
insofar as the present appellant is concerned and  the  entire  exercise  of
trial is destined to be an exercise in futility.   Inasmuch  as  the  matter
has not reached the stage of trial, we are of the view that the High  Court,
by exercising the inherent power under Section  482  of  the  Code  even  in
offences which are  not  compoundable  under  Section  320,  may  quash  the
prosecution.  However,  as  observed  in  Shiji  (supra),  the  power  under
Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where  the  High
Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance  of
the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the  process  of  law.   In
other words, the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of  justice
and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power  may  result  in  the
abuse of the process of law.
10)    In  the  light  of  the  principles  mentioned  above,  inasmuch   as
Respondent No. 2-the Complainant has filed  an  affidavit  highlighting  the
stand taken by the appellant (Accused No. 3)  during  the  pendency  of  the
appeal before this Court and the terms of settlement as stated in  the  said
affidavit, by applying the same analogy and in order to do complete  justice
under Article 142 of the Constitution, we accept  the  terms  of  settlement
insofar as the appellant herein (Accused No. 3) is concerned.
11)   In view of the same, we quash and  set  aside  the  impugned  FIR  No.
45/2011 registered  with  Sanand  Police  Station,  Ahmedabad  for  offences
punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B  of  IPC  insofar  as
the appellant (Accused No. 3) is concerned.  The appeal is  allowed  to  the
extent mentioned above.


                             ...…………….…………………………J.


                                 (P. SATHASIVAM)






                             ..…....…………………………………J.


                              (RANJAN GOGOI)


NEW DELHI;
JULY 20, 2012.
-----------------------
10


Rejection of plaint when ? while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court has to examine the averments in the plaint and the pleas taken by the defendants in its written statements would be irrelevant.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                      1


                 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO.   5343          OF 2012


                 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 36006 of 2010




Bhau Ram                                      .... Appellant (s)

            Versus

Janak Singh & Ors.                                    .... Respondent(s)





                               J U D G M E N T

P. Sathasivam, J.
1)    Leave granted.
2)    This appeal is directed against the final  judgment  and  order  dated
20.09.2010 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in  R.S.A.
No. 501 of 2009 whereby the High Court dismissed the  appeal  filed  by  the
appellant herein.
3)    Brief facts:
(a)   One Shanker Lal owned and possessed several lands in  District  Shimla
including the land in question.  Originally the land in question  was  owned
by Smt. Lari Mohansingh @ Madna Wati and was in occupation  of  Shankar  Lal
as a tenant.  After coming into force of the Himachal Pradesh  Abolition  of
Big Landed Estates and  Land  Reforms  Act,  1953,  Shanker  Lal,  moved  an
application on 21.01.1957, for proprietary rights under Section  11  of  the
said Act before the Compensation Officer, Mahesu.  In  the  meantime,  Madna
Wati sold the  suit  land  to  Panu  Ram  (defendant  No.2)  on  22.10.1960.
Defendant No.2 purchased the said land as benami in the  name  of  his  wife
Kamla Devi (defendant No.1), who was a minor at that time.  After  the  sale
of suit land, defendant No.1  through  defendant  No.2  was  substituted  as
respondents in place of Madna Wati in the  application  pending  before  the
Compensation Officer.  During the pendency of the application,  Shanker  Lal
died  on  07.06.1960  and  after  his  death,  his  wife  Reshmoo  Devi  was
substituted as his legal representative.  Vide his order  dated  31.08.1964,
the Compensation Officer allowed the  application  and  granted  proprietary
rights to Reshmoo Devi.
(b)   Against the said order,  Kamla  Devi  (defendant  No.1)  preferred  an
appeal  before  the  District  Judge,  Mahesu,  who,  by  his  order   dated
14.12.1966, dismissed the same.
(c)   During  the  pendency  of  the  proceedings  before  the  Compensation
Officer, one Raghunath Singh Thakur of Marina Hotel, Shimla  filed  a  Civil
Suit No. 80/1 of 1962 in the Court of Sub-Judge, Mahesu against  Madna  Wati
and Kamla Devi alleging that the suit land along with  other  land  property
was mortgaged with him by Madna Wati and, therefore, she had  no  rights  to
sell or transfer the suit land.  The said suit  was  decreed  in  favour  of
Raghunath Singh.  Aggrieved by the said order, they filed an  appeal  before
the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh at Shimla and Reshmoo Devi  also
preferred an appeal before the  Judicial  Commissioner,  Shimla.   Both  the
appeals were transferred to the High Court of Himachal  Pradesh.   The  High
Court allowed the appeal preferred by Reshmoo Devi and set aside  the  order
of the sub-Judge Mahesu to the extent it affected  her  rights  and  further
directed her to seek remedy against Kamla Devi by a separate suit.
(d)   During the pendency of the appeal before the  High  Court,  since  the
possession was forcibly taken from  Reshmoo  Devi,  she  filed  a  suit  for
recovery of possession being Suit No. 61/1  of  1976  before  the  Sub-Judge
(I), Shima which was decreed in her favour on 25.03.1985.
(e)   Aggrieved by that judgment, Kamla Devi filed an appeal before the sub-
Judge, Ist Class, Shimla.  During the pendency of the appeal,  Reshmoo  Devi
died on 25.09.1985.  An application under Order XXII Rule 4 of the  Code  of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”) was filed by the  sister  of  Reshmoo
Devi for bringing her on record as legal  representative  (L.R.).   However,
another application was filed by Hira Singh and Attar Singh  that  they  may
be brought on record as L.Rs of Reshmoo Devi on the basis of a Will.
(f)   Challenging the said Will, Bhau Ram, the  appellant  herein,  who  was
the nephew of Reshmoo Devi, filed an application to implead himself as  L.R.
of Reshmoo Devi.  By order dated  29.11.1986,  sub-Judge Ist  Class,  Shimla
held that Bhau Ram, the appellant herein, being the son of real  brother  of
Shankar Lal, husband of Reshmoo Devi is the only legal representative.
(g)   The appeal filed by Kamla Devi & Ors. was registered as  Civil  Appeal
No. 118-S/13 of 1987. By order dated  02.12.1987,  the  Additional  District
Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit filed by  Reshmoo  Devi  for
possession  as  barred  by  limitation.   The  appellant  herein,  who   was
substituted as L.R., filed second appeal being R.S.A. No.113 of 1988  before
the High Court which was allowed by the High Court on 25.05.2000.
(h)   Against that order, Kamla Devi & Ors.  filed  special  leave  petition
before this Court which was dismissed.
(i)   Involving the same issue, Attar Singh filed  a  Suit  being  Suit  No.
424/1 of 99/97 in the Court of sub-Judge-IV, Shimla which was dismissed  for
default  on  23.02.2001  but  the  same  was  restored  vide   order   dated
14.08.2002.  He again filed a Civil Suit No. 10/1 of 2004 before  the  Civil
Judge (Jr. Division-II) Rohru,  Shimla  for  possession  of  the  suit  land
belonging to Reshmoo Devi.  During the course of proceedings, the  appellant
herein filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 read  with  Section  151
of CPC for rejection of the plaint  on  certain  grounds.   By  order  dated
17.11.2004, the Civil Judge allowed the application and dismissed  the  suit
filed by Attar Singh.
(j)   Against the said order, Attar Singh filed F.A.  No.  90-S/13  of  2005
before the District Judge  (Forest),  Shimla.   After  the  death  of  Attar
Singh, Kamla Devi was brought on record as his legal  representative.   Vide
order dated 31.07.2009, the District  Judge  (Forest)  allowed  the  appeal.
Challenging the said order, the  appellant  herein  and  his  sister,  Kular
Mani, filed R.S.A. No. 501 of 2009 before the High Court.  By  the  impugned
order dated 20.09.2010, the High Court dismissed the  appeal.   Against  the
said order, the appellant herein filed an appeal by  way  of  special  leave
petition before this Court.
4)    Heard Ms. Radhika Gautam, learned counsel for the  appellant  and  Mr.
Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1  and  Mr.  T.  V.
Ratnam, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

5)    The only point for consideration in this appeal is  whether  the  High
Court is justified in confirming the decision of the lower  appellate  Court
and remitting the matter to trial Court for fresh consideration of  all  the
issues.
6)    In order to ascertain an answer for the above  question,  we  have  to
consider whether the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC  filed  by  the
defendant can be decided merely on the basis of the plaint and  whether  the
other materials filed by the defendant in support  of  the  application  can
also be looked into.   The  trial  Court  allowed  the  application  of  the
appellant/defendant No.1 filed under Order VII Rule 11  CPC  on  the  ground
that the plaint was barred under the provisions of Order IX Rules 8 & 9  CPC
and Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) & 4 (b) of CPC.  The  said  order  of  the  trial
Court was set aside by the first appellate Court  on  the  ground  that  the
trial Court had taken the pleas from the written statement of the  defendant
which is not permissible under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and the High  Court  in
the second appeal confirmed the judgment of the first appellate Court.
7)    It  is  relevant  to  point  out  the  findings  of  the  trial  Court
particularly with reference to  the  Suit  No.  424/1  of  99/97  which  was
dismissed for default had been restored by the trial Court even at the  time
of filing of the application by the defendant under Order VII  Rule  11  CPC
and it is also brought to our notice that the  said  proceedings  are  going
on.  In view of the same, the provisions of Order IX Rules 8 and 9  CPC  are
not applicable to the said suit.  Even otherwise, the relief sought  in  the
suit (which was earlier dismissed for default) and in the present  suit  are
with regard to different properties.  For the same reasons,  the  provisions
of Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) & 4 (b) of CPC are not applicable.
8)    The law has been settled by  this  Court  in  various  decisions  that
while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court  has
to examine  the  averments  in  the  plaint  and  the  pleas  taken  by  the
defendants  in  its  written  statements  would  be  irrelevant.   [vide  C.
Natrajan vs. Ashim Bai and Another, (2007) 14 SCC  183,  Ram  Prakash  Gupta
vs. Rajiv Kumar Gupta and Others, (2007) 10 SCC 59, Hardesh  Ores  (P)  Ltd.
vs. Hede and Company, (2007) 5 SCC 614, Mayar (H.K.)  Ltd.  and  Others  vs.
Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and others, (2006) 3 SCC  100,
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable  and  Others  vs.  Assistant  Charity  Commissioner  and
Others, (2004) 3 SCC 137, Saleem Bhai and Others vs.  State  of  Maharashtra
and Others, (2003)  1  SCC  557].   The  above  view  has  been  once  again
reiterated in the recent decision of this Court  in  The  Church  of  Christ
Charitable Trust  &  Educational  Charitable  Society,  represented  by  its
Chairman  vs.  M/s  Ponniamman  Educational   Trust   represented   by   its
Chairperson/Managing Trustee, 2012 (6) JT 149.
9)    As rightly pointed out by learned counsel  for  the  respondents,  the
questions of law, as raised in the second appeal, before the High Court  are
no longer needed to be decided in view of the  settled  law  that  only  the
averments in the plaint can be looked into while  deciding  the  application
under Order VII Rule 11.  This aspect has been rightly  dealt  with  by  the
High Court.

10)   In the light of the above discussion and in view of the settled  legal
position, as mentioned above, we are of the view  that  the  High  Court  is
fully justified in confirming the decision of the appellate Court  remitting
the matter to the trial Court for consideration of all the issues.  In  view
of the fact that the suit is pending from 2002, we direct  the  trial  Court
to decide the suit  in  its  entirety  considering  all  the  issues,  after
affording adequate opportunity to both the parties, and dispose of the  same
within a period of six months from the date  of  receipt  of  copy  of  this
judgment.
11)   Consequently, the civil appeal is dismissed with the above  direction.
 No order as to costs.



                             ...…………….…………………………J.


                                 (P. SATHASIVAM)






                              .…....…………………………………J.


                              (RANJAN GOGOI)


NEW DELHI;
JULY 20, 2012.
-----------------------
9


Today the original applicant is not available and his wife is pursuing this litigation. By a Government Resolution dated 04.07.1995, after making references to various other earlier resolutions of the Government of Maharashtra relating to grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension, the criteria for grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension was specified under two different categories, namely, one under “Prisoners Freedom Fighter” and the other under the category of “Underground Freedom Fighter”. A perusal of the documents enclosed by the appellant’s husband along with his application disclose that the appellant’s husband made out a case for grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension under the category “Underground Freedom Fighter”. Applying the broad principles laid down in the decision of this Court in Gurdial Singh (supra), it will have to be held that there was nothing more for the State to examine to honour the claim of the appellant’s husband for grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension. The claim of the appellant’s husband cannot be held to be a fraudulent one or without any supporting material.-The respondent State is directed to grant Freedom Fighters’ Pension in favour of the appellant’s husband and since he is no more, grant the same with all arrears to the appellant by passing appropriate orders expeditiously preferably within four weeks from the date of communication of copy of this order. We hope and trust that the State Government will not indulge in any further delay in the matter of grant of pension so as to enable the appellant to avail the benefits at least during her life time. The appeal stands allowed with the above directions to the respondent State. No costs.



                                                                  Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.    5344  OF 2012
                        (@ SLP (C) NO. 8899 OF 2010)



 Kamalbai Sinkar                        ….Appellant

                                   VERSUS
State of Maharashtra & Ors.                     .…Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T



Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    This appeal arises out of the order passed by the High  Court  in  the
Writ Petition in which the claim of the appellant’s  husband  for  grant  of
Freedom  Fighters’  Pension  came  to  be  rejected.   Today  the   original
applicant is not available and his wife is pursuing this litigation.   By  a
Government Resolution dated 04.07.1995, after making references  to  various
other earlier resolutions of  the  Government  of  Maharashtra  relating  to
grant of Freedom Fighters’  Pension,  the  criteria  for  grant  of  Freedom
Fighters’ Pension was specified under two different categories, namely,  one
under “Prisoners Freedom Fighter”  and  the  other  under  the  category  of
“Underground Freedom Fighter”.  The claim of  the  appellant’s  husband  was
under the second category, namely, “Underground Freedom Fighter”.

3.    For grant of pension under  the  said  category  following  requisites
were stipulated:

            “ E) Underground Freedom Fighter:-


            Those freedom fighters who were under ground and doing a work in
      a movement of Quit India 1942-44 and Hydrabad Mukti  Sangram  1947-48.
      They submit the following necessary certificates:


           1)Required to quit house and stay outside.


           2)Required  to  leave  education  or  removed  from  Educational
           Institutions.


           3) Was so beaten by the police that     caused disability.


      2)    The Certificates of two Freedom Fighters who were convicted  for
      minimum two years or who were  declared  absconding  or  who  remained
      absconded for at least two years and along with such certificates, the
      Proclamation of conviction or absconding or  supporting  affidavit  of
      person issuing such certificate alongwith the orders of Government.


      4) The certified copy, if any, Government document  of  that  time  is
      available regarding the underground.


      5)    If any information about the name published in  newspapers,  the
      original newspaper.


      6) At the time of remark, District Gaurao Committee shall submit their
      opinion.”



4.    The said Resolution  was  issued  with  the  consent  of  the  Finance
Department  bearing  reference  No.   C.R-1183/94/VY-4   dated   10.11.1994.
Pursuant to the  said  resolution  dated  04.07.1995,  the  husband  of  the
appellant forwarded his application dated 05.08.1995 through  the  Collector
of Amravati.  Along with the said  application,  he  also  enclosed  certain
Annexures (viz) a certificate of renowned freedom fighter  dated  24.04.1984
by name Shankar Pandurangji Choudhari, a certificate issued by Mr.  Maganlal
Bagdi, Ex-MP, Hoshangabad along with his own certificate, a  certificate  of
Patwari Kasba, Warud Division, Taluk Warud dated 29.09.1981,  a  certificate
dated 08.06.1981 of freedom fighter S.P.Choudhary of Warud  Taluk,  Amravati
District, a certificate  issued  by  the  office  of  Naib  Tehsildar,  M.K.
Puranik dated 05.08.1961 in favour of Shankar Pandurang Choudhary about  the
imprisonments suffered by him and a  medical  certificate  dated  15.08.1981
issued  by  Dr.  S.G.  Choudhari  in  favour  of  the  applicant  about  his
participation in Satyagraha Morcha on 13.08.1942, the injuries  suffered  by
him in the Lathi Charge and the treatment given to  him  between  13.08.1942
to 15.08.1942.

5.    Based on an earlier order passed by  the  Nagpur  Bench  of  the  High
Court in Writ Petition No.424 of 2007, the  Collector  of  Amravati  in  his
letter dated 29.10.2009 informed the appellant that her husband’s claim  for
grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension was submitted  to  the  Government  along
with recommendation of the Gaurav Samiti dated  20.12.1996.   The  appellant
was advised to contact the Government.  However, in the order of  the  State
Government dated 22.01.2008 communicated to the Collector  of  Amravati,  it
was  stated  that  there  was  no  concrete  evidence  in   proof   of   the
participation of the freedom fight movement by the husband of the  appellant
and his claim  for  grant  of  Freedom  Fighters’  Pension  was,  therefore,
rejected.  The Collector  was  directed  to  communicate  the  same  to  the
appellant.

6.    Having perused the above materials on record, at the very  outset,  we
wish to refer to the observations made by this Court in regard to the  grant
of Freedom Fighter’s Pension in the decision reported in  Gurdial  Singh  v.
Union of India & Ors. [2001 (8) SCC 8].  In paragraph  7  of  the  judgment,
this Court has highlighted the  manner  in  which  such  claims  are  to  be
considered for grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension.  It  will  be  worthwhile
to make a reference to the said passage  before  expressing  our  conclusion
with regard to the claim of the appellant’s husband in  the  case  on  hand.
Paragraph 7 reads as under:

            “7.The standard of proof required in  such  cases  is  not  such
          standard which is required  in  a  criminal  case  or  in  a  case
          adjudicated upon rival contentions or evidence of the parties.  As
          the object of  the  Scheme  is  to  honour  and  to  mitigate  the
          sufferings of those who had given their all  for  the  country,  a
          liberal and not a technical approach is required  to  be  followed
          while determining the merits of  the  case  of  a  person  seeking
          pension under the Scheme.  It should not  be  forgotten  that  the
          persons intended to be covered by the Scheme had suffered for  the
          country about half-a-century back  and  had  not  expected  to  be
          rewarded for the imprisonment suffered by them.  Once the  country
          has decided to  honour  such  freedom  fighters,  the  bureaucrats
          entrusted with the job of examining  the  cases  of  such  freedom
          fighters are expected to keep in mind the purpose  and  object  of
          the Scheme.  The case  of  the  claimants  under  this  Scheme  is
          required to be determined on the basis of  the  probabilities  and
          not on the touchstone of the test of  “beyond  reasonable  doubt”.
          Once on the basis of the evidence  it  is  probabilised  that  the
          claimant had suffered imprisonment for the cause  of  the  country
          and during the freedom struggle, a presumption is required  to  be
          drawn in his  favour  unless  the  same  is  rebutted  by  cogent,
          reasonable and reliable evidence.”

                                                            [emphasis added]




7.    Keeping the above broad principles in mind, when we analyse the  claim
of the appellant’s husband, we find that the appellant’s husband  had  filed
along with his application dated 05.08.1995, a host of documents in  support
of his claim.  They were shown as  Annexures  to  his  application  and  the
details of which have been referred to by us in the  earlier  part  of  this
order.  In fact after the order of the Nagpur Bench passed in WP  No.424  of
2007, the Government in its communication dated 23.11.2007 addressed to  the
Collector of Amravati stated that the claim of the appellant’s  husband  was
not  traceable  and,  therefore,  all  related  documents  were  once  again
required  to  be  collected  and  submitted  to  the  Government   including
recommendations of Gaurav  Samiti  as  well  as  the  Collector’s  comments.
Apparently, pursuant to the said communication, the Collector in his  letter
dated 29.10.2009 informed the appellant  that  the  case  submitted  by  her
husband for getting pension as Underground Freedom Fighter was submitted  to
the Government along with office letter  bearing  No.KL/SS/PP/KV/3216  dated
20.12.1996 and the recommendations of Gaurav Samiti.

8.    In the said circumstances, we only state that the appellant’s  husband
made a genuine effort to collect all those credentials  in  his  support  as
required under the Resolution of the State Government dated 04.07.1995,  and
forwarded them to the State Government  along  with  his  application  dated
05.08.1995.   When  the  Collector,  Amrawati  forwarded  his  letter  dated
20.12.1996   and   reiterated   his   recommendation   in   his   subsequent
communications dated 14.10.2007 and 30.11.2007 there was no reason  for  the
State Government to simply reject  the  application  without  assigning  any
reason.  A perusal of the documents  enclosed  by  the  appellant’s  husband
along with his application disclose that the appellant’s husband made out  a
case for grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension under the category  “Underground
Freedom Fighter”.  Applying the broad principles laid down in  the  decision
of this Court in Gurdial Singh (supra), it will have to be held  that  there
was nothing more for the State  to  examine  to  honour  the  claim  of  the
appellant’s husband for grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension.   The  claim  of
the appellant’s husband cannot be held to be a  fraudulent  one  or  without
any supporting material.

9.    In our considered view, the High Court  ought  to  have  examined  the
grievance of the appellant before confirming the order of rejection  of  the
respondent State.  In the circumstances, the appeal deserves to be  allowed.
 The impugned orders are set aside. The  respondent  State  is  directed  to
grant Freedom Fighters’ Pension in favour of  the  appellant’s  husband  and
since he is no more, grant the same with all arrears  to  the  appellant  by
passing appropriate orders expeditiously preferably within four  weeks  from
the date of communication of copy of this order.  We  hope  and  trust  that
the State Government will not indulge in any further delay in the matter  of
grant of pension so as to enable the appellant  to  avail  the  benefits  at
least during her life time.   The  appeal  stands  allowed  with  the  above
directions to the respondent State.  No costs.








                                                      …..……….…………………………...J.
                                                               [T.S. Thakur]




                                           ...................………………………………J.
                              [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]


New Delhi;
July 20, 2012

-----------------------
9


a new truck/trolla was stolen. The FIR was lodged.The truck/trolla of the respondents was of 2001 Model. Its value as per the insurance policy for the period from 31.5.2003 to 30.5.2004 was Rs. 7 lacs. The theft had taken place on the night of 9.2.2004 i.e. after the expiry of about 8 months from the starting date of the insurance policy. Therefore, depreciation @10% would be justified. Therefore, the appellant is held entitled to the insurance claim for an amount of Rs.6,30,000/- (Rs.7,00,000/- - 10% i.e. Rs.70,000/-= Rs.6,30,000/-). However, the learned District Forum had applied the depreciation @40% which appears to be unjustified. 20. The interest awarded by the learned District Forum @9% p.a. from 12.5.2004 upto the furnishing of the indemnity bond by the appellant is upheld. The indemnity bond was to be furnished by the respondents as per the order of the learned District Forum within a period of 1 ½ months after the receipt of a copy of this order. Since the appellant had filed the appeal in this Commission after obtaining a copy of the impugned order dated 12.5.2004 on 9.8.2005, therefore, the interest is limited upto 30.9.2005. 21. The costs of Rs.1000/- are upheld.”- After obtaining the insurance policy the petitioner had used the abovesaid vehicle for about 9 months. The vehicle was purchased in the year 2001. The passage of nine months must have further depreciated the value of the said vehicle. Consequently, depreciation at the rate of 10% appears to be quite reasonable. The revision petition is therefore dismissed.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI

 REVISION PETITION NO.  1928 OF  2011

 (Against the order dated 01.03.2011 in  First Appeal No. 1025 of 2005 of the Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh)

Inderjit Singh
S/o Narinder Singh
R/o House No. 17490,
Gali Khadar Bhandar Wali,
Bibi Wala Road,
Bathinda                                                                   ... Petitioner
Versus
National Insurance Company Limited
The Mall, Bathinda through
its Divisional Manager,                                              ... Respondent


BEFORE:
  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER
  HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER

       

For the Petitioner         :  Mr. Mukand Gupta, Advocate

 

For the Respondent    :  Ms. Nanita Sharma, Advocate                         

 

Pronounced on :  19th July, 2012


ORDER


JUSTICE J. M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER
1.      In the year 2001, Inderjeet Singh purchased a new truck/trolla.  He obtained insurance policies from the respondent-National Insurance Company on 31.5.2003, which was valid from 31.5.2003 to 30.5.2004.  The value declared by the petitioner was Rs.7 lakhs.  On 9.2.2004, the above said vehicle of the petitioner was stolen.  The FIR was lodged.  The petitioner intimated the insurance company on 11.2.2004.  The insurance company did not pay the insurance amount.  Consequently, the complainant filed a complaint before the District Consumer Forum.  The District Consumer Forum partly allowed the complaint and directed the respondent-insurance company to pay Rs.4.20 lakh to the petitioner alongwith cost of Rs.1,000/- and interest @9% per annum w.e.f. 12.5.2004. The insurance company complied with the above said order. 
2.      However, the petitioner filed an appeal before the State Commission for enhancement of compensation.   The State Commission partly allowed the said appeal and enhanced the amount of compensation from Rs.4.20 lakh to Rs.6.30 lakh. 
3.      It is alleged that the State Commission has wrongly applied 10% depreciation, which is not permissible under the provisions of Insurance Act.  The petitioner is entitled to insurance amount.  Again, no interest was awarded.
4.      We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.  The State Commission was pleased to hold:-
“19.The truck/trolla of the respondents was of 2001 Model.  Its value as per the insurance policy for the period from 31.5.2003 to 30.5.2004 was Rs. 7 lacs.  The theft had taken place on the night of 9.2.2004 i.e. after the expiry of about 8 months from the starting date of the insurance policy.  Therefore, depreciation @10% would be justified.  Therefore, the appellant is held entitled to the insurance claim for an amount of Rs.6,30,000/- (Rs.7,00,000/- - 10% i.e. Rs.70,000/-= Rs.6,30,000/-).  However, the learned District Forum had applied the depreciation @40% which appears to be unjustified.
20.     The interest awarded by the learned District Forum @9% p.a. from 12.5.2004 upto the furnishing of the indemnity bond by the appellant is upheld.   The indemnity bond was to be furnished by the respondents as per the order of the learned District Forum within a period of 1 ½ months after the receipt of a copy of this order. Since the appellant had filed the appeal in this Commission after obtaining a copy of the impugned order dated 12.5.2004 on 9.8.2005, therefore, the interest is limited upto 30.9.2005.
                                       21.     The costs of Rs.1000/- are upheld.”

          We have perused the order of the State Commission.   It is quite reasonable and fair.  It hardly calls for interference.  After obtaining the insurance policy the petitioner had used the abovesaid vehicle for about 9 months.  The vehicle was purchased in the year 2001.  The passage of nine months must have further depreciated the value of the said vehicle.  Consequently, depreciation at the rate of 10% appears to be quite reasonable.  The revision petition is therefore dismissed.


………………Sd/-…..………..
     (J. M. MALIK, J)
   PRESIDING MEMBER

……………Sd/-.……………
                                                        (VINAY KUMAR)
                                                                           MEMBER
Naresh/12