REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO(s). 235-578/2011
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 6561/2009,6528/2009, 6531/2009, 6529/2009, 6552/2009,
6567/2009, 6535/2009, 6836/2009, 6560/2009, 6571/2009, 6530/2009,
6525/2009, 6527/2009, 6570/2009, 6546/2009, 6565/2009, 6548/2009,
6550/2009, 6563/2009, 6537/2009, 6532/2009, 6569/2009, 6534/2009,
6559/2009, 6572/2009, 6583/2009, 6580/2009, 6573/2009, 6584/2009,
6588/2009, 6590/2009, 6575/2009, 6823/2009, 6853/2009, 6855/2009,
6554/2009, 6566/2009, 6557/2009, 6533/2009, 6558/2009, 6541/2009,
6556/2009, 6562/2009, 6568/2009, 6564/2009, 6539/2009, 6538/2009,
6553/2009, 6540/2009, 6852/2009, 6576/2009, 6587/2009, 6582/2009,
6581/2009, 6577/2009, 6574/2009, 6585/2009, 6578/2009, 6579/2009,
6854/2009, 6666-6667/2009, 6757/2009, 6747-6755/2009, 6831/2009, 6756/2009,
6591/2009, 6651/2009, 6606/2009, 6592/2009, 6658/2009, 6594/2009,
6595/2009, 6650/2009, 6657/2009, 6655/2009, 6596/2009, 6597/2009,
6620/2009, 6621/2009, 6602/2009, 6603/2009, 6622/2009, 6598/2009,
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6644/2009, 6625/2009, 6639/2009, 6636/2009, 6637/2009, 6627/2009,
6631/2009, 6628/2009, 6638/2009, 6641/2009, 6629/2009, 6630/2009,
6619/2009, 6635/2009, 6640/2009, 6632/2009, 6633/2009, 6824- 6827/2009,
6664-6665/2009, 7724/2009, 7725/2009, 7723/2009, 6871-6875/2010, 6876-
6878/2010, 53/2010, 1370/2010, 2475/2010, 4212/2010, 4213/2010, 4214/2010,
4215/2010, 4218/2010, 4220/2010, 4221/2010, 4222/2010, 4224/2010,
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4230/2010, 4231/2010, 4232/2010, 4233/2010, 4234/2010, 6879/2010,
6880/2010, 6881/2010, 6882/2010, 6883/2010, 6884/2010, 6885-6888/2010,
6889/2010, 6890/2010, 6891/2010, 6892/2010, 6893/2010, 6894/2010,
6895/2010, 6896/ 2010, 6897/2010, 6898/2010, 6899/2010, 6900/2010,
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6907/2010, 6908/2010, 6909/2010, 6910/2010, 6911/2010, 6912/2010,
6913/2010, 6914/2010, 6915/2010, 6916/2010, 6917/2010, 6918/2010,
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6943/2010, 6944/2010, 6945/2010, 6946/2010, 6947/2010, 6948/2010,
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6955/2010, 6956/2010, 6957/2010, 6958/2010, 6959/2010, 6960/2010,
6961/2010, 6962/2010, 6963/2010, 6964/2010, 6965/2010, 6966/2010,
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6973/2010, 6974/2010, 6975/2010, 6976/2010, 6977/2010, 6978/2010,
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6992/2010, 6993/2010, 6994/2010, 6995/2010, 6996-6997/2010, 7002/2010,
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7033/2010, 7034/2010, 7035/2010, 7036/2010, 7037/2010, 7038/2010,
7039/2010, 7040/2010, 7041/2010, 7042/2010, 7043/2010, 7044/2010,
7045/2010, 7046/2010, 7047/2010, 7048/2010
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. Petitioner
VERSUS
MAWASI & ORS. ETC.ETC. Respondent(s)
With
I.A.Nos.2066-2067
With
Conmt.Pet.(C)No.51/2011 In C.A.No.6526/2009
Conmt.Pet.(C)No.52/2011 In C.A.No.6537/2009
Conmt.Pet.(C)No.89/2011 In C.A.No.6854/2009
J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.
1. Undeterred by the dismissal of two similar petitions, Haryana State
Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) has filed these petitions for
review of judgment dated 17.08.2010 passed in Civil Appeal No. 6515 of
2009 and batch whereby the appeals filed by it against the judgments of
the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court were
dismissed, those filed by the landowners were allowed and a direction was
given for payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 20 lakhs per acre
with all statutory benefits.
2. The facts necessary for deciding whether the petitioner has succeeded in
making out a case for review are encapsulated below:
2.1. For the
purpose of setting up an Industrial Model Township at Manesar, District
Gurgaon, the Government of Haryana acquired large chunks of land. By
Notification dated 30.4.1994 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’), the State Government
proposed the acquisition of 256 acres 3 kanals and 17 marlas land
situated in village Manesar. The declaration under Section 6(1) was
published on 30.3.1995. The Land Acquisition Collector passed award
dated 28.3.1997 and fixed market value of the acquired land at the rate
of Rs.3,67,400/- per acre. Additional District Judge, Gurgaon
(hereinafter described as ‘the Reference Court’) to whom the reference
was made under Section 18 considered the pleadings and evidence of the
parties and determined the amount of compensation by dividing the
acquired land into two blocks, i.e., ‘A’ and ‘B’. For the land comprised
in Block ‘A’ which fell within 500 yards of National Highway No.8, the
Reference Court fixed the amount of compensation at the rate of
Rs.6,57,994.13 per acre. The remaining land was included in Block ‘B’ and
the amount of compensation was fixed at Rs.3,91,196.97 per acre.
2.2. By another
Notification dated 15.11.1994 issued under Section 4(1), the State
Government proposed the acquisition of 1490 acres 3 kanals and 17 marlas
land situated in villages Manesar, Naharpur Kasan, Khoh and Kasan. The
declaration issued under Section 6(1) was published on 10.11.1995. By an
award dated 3.4.1997, the Land Acquisition Collector fixed market value
at the rate of Rs.4,13,600/- per acre. The Reference Court divided the
land into two Blocks. For the land comprised in Block ‘A’, the Reference
Court determined the amount of compensation at the rate of Rs.6,89,333/-
per acre. The remaining land was included in Block ‘B’ and no enhancement
was granted in the compensation determined by the Land Acquisition
Collector.
2.3. Before proceeding further, we may mention that in support of their
claim for award of higher compensation, the land owners had produced 13
sale deeds which were marked Exhibits P1 to P13. Of these, Exhibit P1 dated
16.9.1994 was in respect of 12 acres land situated in village Naharpur
Kasan, which was sold by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. Duracell
India Pvt. Ltd. and was proved by Shri Albel Singh, authorised signatory of
M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. The land owners also produced copy of
Massavi Chakbandi of Village Khoh (Exhibit P14) and Aks-shajras of the four
villages (Exhibits P15 to P18). On behalf of the State Government, Shri
Arun Kumar Pandey, Manager, HSIDC was examined as RW-1 and sale deeds
marked Exhibits R1 to R15 were produced along with other documents. The
Reference Court did consider Exhibit P1 but did not rely upon the same for
the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.
2.4. The appeals filed by the
landowners who were affected by Notification dated 15.11.1994 were
disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment
dated 19.5.2006 and market value of the entire acquired land was fixed at
Rs.15 lakhs per acre. The learned Single Judge referred to the sale deed
Exhibit P1 and opined that the same reflected market value which a willing
buyer would have paid to a willing seller. The reasons assigned by the
learned Single Judge for arriving at this conclusion are extracted below:
“The claimants have produced various sale instances to prove
their claim. Sale deed Ex.Pl is dated September 16, 1994 whereby
96 kanals and 13 marlas ( more than 12 acres ) of land in
village Naharpur Kasan was sold by the owner, M/s. Heritage
Furniture Private Limited to M/s .Dura Cell India Private
Limited for a sale consideration of Rs,.2,42,00,000/-,
reflecting the average price of Rs,20,03,103/- per acre. The
aforesaid sale instance has been proved by the statement of one
Albel Singh PWl, who at the relevant time was the authorised
signatory of the seller Company, M/s. Heritage Furniture Private
Limited. The aforesaid witness has clearly proved that the said
transaction was genuinely entered between the two companies and
the entire payment was made through bank drafts. The factum of
the payment having been made through bank drafts is also
reflected in the sale deed Ex.Pl. Some other sale instances
relied upon by the claimants are Ex.P2, P3, P4, P7 and P8. Vide
Ex.P2 land measuring 9 kanals was sold on June 4, 1994 for
consideration of Rs.7,87,500/-, reflecting an average price of
Rs.7 lacs per acre. Similarly Ex.P3 is also dated June 24, 1994
pertaining to sale of 10 kanals 10 marlas of land reflecting
average sale price of Rs,7,00,000/- Ex.P4 is dated October
25,1991 whereby land measuring 9 kanals 9 marlas in Manesar was
sold for Rs. 9,15,470/- reflecting an average price of
Rs,7,75,000/- per acre. Ex.P7 and Ex.P8 are also the sale
instances dated June 24, 1994 with regard land measuring 9
marlas each reflecting an average price of Rs,7,00,000/-per
acre. The remaining sale instances Ex.P9 and P13 are of the year
1996 i.e. more than two years after the date of notification
under section 4 of the Act. Similarly the sale instances Ex.Pl0,
P11 and PI2 pertain to the sale of land in village Noorangpur.
The said sale instances are, thus, not relevant.
On the other hand, the sale instances relied upon by the
State are Ex.Rl to Ex. R15 but they have rightly been rejected
by the reference court itself on the ground that the said sale
instance reflected an average price which is even less than the
one assessed by the Collector and, as such, in view of the
provisions of section 25 of the Act, the same were not relevant
and worth consideration.
As noticed above, the
land which was acquired in the present proceedings is
approximately 1500 acres. The sale instance Ex.Pl in my
considered view, reflects as near as possible, the market value
of the acquired land on the date of notification under section 4
of the Act. The said sale had taken place on September 16,1994.
The recitals in the sale deed reflect that there was a prior
agreement between the two companies on May 31, 1994 with regard
to the sale of the land. It is also recited in the sale deed
that the entire sale consideration was paid by the purchaser-
company to the seller company by bank drafts. The aforesaid fact
is also proved by Albel Singh, PWl. In this view of the matter,
since the aforesaid transaction was between two companies, then
obviously , there is no justification to doubt the authenticity
of the said sale transaction. Moreover, the land covered under
the aforesaid sale transaction is a big chunk of land i.e more
than 12 acres. The said land was situated in village Naharpur
Kasan i.e. one of the villages from which the present land was
also acquired. In these circumstances to my mind, the said sale
instance could not have been rejected by the reference Court, in
any manner. Although the other sale instances Ex. P2, P3, P7 and
P8 reflect the market price of Rs.7 lacs per acre but it is also
apparent that the aforesaid transactions pertain to small piece
of land and are between private persons. In these circumstances,
the possibility of the aforesaid sale deeds being undervalued,
with a view to save stamp duty and registration charges, can
also not be ruled out. However, there is no justification to
prefer the aforesaid sale deeds Ex.P2, P3, P7 and P8 over and
above the sale deed Ex.Pl which is a transaction between the two
cooperate bodies and wherein the entire sale consideration had
been paid through bank drafts. The aforesaid sale also pertains
to a big chunk of land i.e. more than 12 acres. It may also be
noticed that the acquired land was owned by approximately more
than 350 persons, thus each having a small holding. Therefore,
the sale-deed Ex.Pl duly reflects the market value, which a
willing buyer would have paid to a willing seller. “
(underlining is ours)
2.5. The appeals filed by the landowners affected by the first acquisition
were disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 5.9.2008.
He referred to judgment dated 19.5.2006 but applied the cut of 20% and
fixed market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs.12 lakhs per
acre.
2.6. The petitioner had challenged the judgments of the High Court on
several grounds but the only point argued by the learned senior counsel
appearing on its behalf was that the High Court committed serious error by
determining market value of the acquired land solely on the basis of
Exhibit P1 ignoring other sale deeds by which similar parcels of land were
sold at the rate of Rs.7 lakhs per acre or less. This is evinced from the
following extracts of the judgment under review:
“Shri Amarendera Sharan, learned Senior Counsel and Shri
Ravindra Bana, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation
argued that the High Court committed serious error by fixing
market value of the acquired land at Rs. 15 lakhs per acre in
one batch of appeals and Rs. 12 lakhs in the other batch of
appeals by relying upon the sale deed, Ext. P-1 excluding other
sale transactions, which were produced before the Reference
Court. The learned counsel submitted that the value of 12 acres
of land which was sold by Ext. P-1 was wholly disproportionate
to the prevailing market value and, therefore, the same could
not be made basis for fixing market value of the acquired land
measuring more than 1490 acres. Shri Amarendera Sharan
emphasised that actual market value of the acquired land was not
more than Rs. 7 lakhs and the High Court committed serious error
by discarding other sale transactions through which similar
parcels of land were sold for Rs. 7 lakhs or less. The learned
Senior Counsel submitted that if the High Court had given due
weightage to other sale transactions, market value of the
acquired land could not have been fixed at Rs. 15 lakhs or even
Rs. 12 lakhs per acre.”
2.7. This Court rejected the aforesaid argument and observed:
“In our view, the learned Single Judge did not commit any error
by relying upon sale transaction Exhibit P1 for the purpose of
fixing market value of the acquired land. Undisputedly, that
sale transaction was between two corporate entities and the
entire sale price was paid through bank drafts. It is also not
in dispute that the land which was subject matter of Exhibit P1
is situated at village Naharpur Kasan and is adjacent to the
acquired land. The Corporation and the State Government did not
adduce any evidence to prove that the land sold vide Exhibit P1
was over valued with an oblique motive of helping the land
owners to claim higher compensation. Therefore, we do not find
any justification to discard or ignore sale deed Exhibit P1. The
refusal of the learned Single Judge to rely upon other sale
transactions in which sale price of the land was shown as Rs.7
lakhs per acre also does not suffer from any legal infirmity
because it is well-known that transactions involving transfer of
properties are usually undervalued with a view to avoid payment
of the requisite stamp duty and registration charges.”
8. With a view to generate funds necessary for payment of additional
compensation to the landowners, the petitioner increased the cost of
land to be allotted to the prospective industrial entrepreneurs and
others. IMT Industrial Association, which claims to be a
representative body of the plot holders protested against this
decision of the petitioner and persuaded it to seek review of judgment
dated 17.8.2010.
9. In the review petitions filed on behalf of the petitioner, which were
registered as Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010, it was pleaded
that the determination of market value needs reconsideration because
the sale deed Exhibit P1 on which reliance was placed by the High
Court and this Court was not a genuine transaction. According to the
petitioner, M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell India
Pvt. Ltd. were controlled by the same management and this fact was
brought to the notice of the concerned officers only after disposal of
the appeals by this Court. IMT Industrial Association filed I.A.Nos.5
and 6 for impleadment as party to the review petitions. This Court
dismissed the review petitions and the impleadment applications vide
order dated 13.1.2011, paragraphs 4 to 8 of which are extracted below:
“4. In the review petitions, it has been averred that the sale
transaction dated 16.9.1994, upon which reliance was placed by
the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
and by this Court for grant of enhanced compensation was
motivated because parties to the transaction were under the
control and management of the common board of directors and this
fact came to the notice of the review petitioner only after
dismissal of the appeals by this Court.
5. In paragraph 'A' of the grounds of the review petitions,
the review petitioner has referred to the composition of M/s.
Dura Cell India Private Limited and Heritage Furniture Private
Limited to show that both the companies have common management.
6. The review petition is supported by an affidavit of Shri
Hamvir Singh, Deputy General Manager (I.A.), Haryana State
Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. In
paragraph 2 of his affidavit, the deponent has stated that
contents of the review petition (pages 25 to 43), list of dates
(pages B to P) and other applications are true to my knowledge
and the information derived from records of the case. However,
he has not enclosed any document on the basis of which this
assertion has been made.
7. We have carefully perused the entire
record and are convinced that the judgment of which
review has been sought does not suffer from any error apparent
warranting its reconsideration. The review petitioner has not
produced any material to substantiate its assertion that the
price mentioned in the sale deed relied upon by the courts was
manipulated with an oblique motive. Hence, the review petitions
are dismissed.
8. The application filed by IMT Industrial Association is
wholly misconceived. The members of the applicant are
beneficiaries of the acquisition of the land because plots have
been allotted to them out of the acquired land which belong to
the respondents and others. Therefore, they do not have the
locus standi to be heard in the proceedings relating to
determination of market value of the acquired land and that too
in a petition filed by the Corporation for review of the
judgment of this Court. It is not the pleaded case of the
applicant that its members were not aware of the fact that the
plots have been carved out of the land acquired by the State
Government for and on behalf of the Corporation and that the
price mentioned in the allotment letter was tentative
and further that in paragraph 5 of the allotment letter, it
was specifically mentioned that they will have to pay additional
price in the event of enhancement in the compensation. It is
quite surprising that members of the applicant-Association paid
price of the plots at the rate of Rs.2200/- per square yard and
they are objecting to the payment of compensation to the land
owners at the rate of less than Rs.500/- per square yard.
This shows that members of the applicant
want to take advantage of the measure taken by the State
Government for compulsory acquisition of the land of the
farmers and want to deprive them of just and reasonable
compensation. Consequently, the impleadment application is
dismissed.”
3. Soon thereafter, the petitioner filed these petitions by reiterating
that sale deed Exhibit P1 dated 16.9.1994 executed by M/s. Heritage
Furniture Pvt. Ltd. in favour of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. was not a
bona fide transaction and the High Court and this Court committed serious
error by relying upon the same for the purpose of determining the amount of
compensation. In paragraph A of the review petition, the petitioner has
set out the brief history of the two companies and pleaded that at the time
of the execution of sale deed both the entities were under the control of
the same set of persons. It has also been averred that the facts relating
to composition of the Board of Directors of two companies could not be
ascertained by exercising due diligence and the true nature of Exhibit P1
was revealed only after the judgment of this Court. According to the
petitioner, M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. had purchased different
parcels of land from the farmers by executing 10 different sale deeds
executed on 16th and 18th August, 1993 at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs
per acre and, as such, there was no occasion for M/s. Duracell India Pvt.
Ltd. to have purchased the same land just after one year at the rate of
Rs.20,03,103/- per acre. It is the petitioner’s case that exorbitant price
is shown to have been paid by the vendee to the vendor because its Indian
promoters were to be benefited by the proposed joint venture between the
Indian company and M/s. Duracell Inc. USA. Another ground taken by the
petitioner is that sale deeds Exhibits P-2, P-3, P-4, P-7 and P-8, three of
which were executed in June, 1994 and one in October, 1991 at an average
price of Rs.7 lakhs per acre reflected true market value of the acquired
land and in the absence of any cogent evidence, the High Court and this
Court could not have discarded the same by assuming that the same were
undervalued.
4. On 30.3.2011, this Court issued notice to the landowners and granted
stay subject to certain conditions which included a direction to the
Managing Director of the petitioner to file an affidavit and disclose the
names of the officers/officials responsible for not bringing the facts
relating to Exhibit P1 to the notice of the High Court and this Court. In
compliance of that order, Shri Rajiv Arora, the Managing Director of the
petitioner filed affidavit dated 27.7.2011 in which he did not disclose the
names of the concerned officers/officials but claimed that the
functionaries of the Corporation did not suspect the bona fides of the sale
deed executed between M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell
India Pvt. Ltd. because the same was a registered instrument and they did
not know that the two companies were controlled by the same set of persons.
Shri Arora further claimed that the facts relating to two companies were
brought to the notice of the concerned officers by the representatives of
the Manesar Industrial Welfare Association, who were given opportunity of
personal hearing in compliance of the order passed by the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Writ Petition No.6527/2010. According to Shri Arora,
the information made available by the Association was got verified from the
records of the Registrar of Companies and the same was found to be correct.
In support of the affidavit of its Managing Director, the petitioner has
placed on record the following documents:
i) Search Reports issued by M/s AKG and Co relating to M/s Heritage
Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Duracell India Pvt Ltd dt. 20.1.2011 and
21.2.2011;
ii) Certificate of Incorporation of Heritage;
iii) MoA and AoA of Heritage;
iv) Mutations showing the purchase of land by Heritage under sale deeds
dt. 16.8.1993 and 18.8.1993 at an average price of Rs 6 lac per acre;
v) Annual Return of Duracell dt. 14.6.2000 showing Saroj Kumar Poddar,
Gurbunder Singh Gill and Jyotsana Poddar as the Directors;
vi) True copy of sale deed dt. 16.9.1994;
vii) Statement of Albel Singh substantiating the statements of the
petitioners.
5. Some of the landowners have filed reply affidavits. Their stand is
that Exhibit P1 reflected true market value of the acquired land as on the
date of issue of notifications under Section 4(1) and that the petitioner’s
assertion that the transaction was not genuine is not correct. They have
denied that the vendor and vendees were under the control of the same
management and that exorbitantly high price was paid for 12 acres land in
anticipation of some collaboration between M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd.
and M/s. Duracell Inc. USA, which would have benefited the former. With a
view to avoid repetition, we may notice the averments contained in
paragraphs 4 to 9 of the reply affidavit filed in Review Petition
No.239/2011 and paragraph 5 of the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the
landowners who were respondents in Civil Appeal No.6561/2009. The same read
as under:
Paragraphs 4 to 9 of the reply affidavit filed in Review
Petition No.239/2011
“4. I state that vide 5 sale deeds all dt. 6.7.1992 land
measuring 49 kanals 2 marlas situated in Village Kherka Daula,
District Gurgaon was sold by some of the co-owners to one Sh. D.
C. Rastogi s/o Sh. L. P. Rastogi at the sale price of
Rs.1,35,000/- per acre. The said village is at the distance of
about 2 km from the land in question. Copies of 5 sale deeds all
dt. 6.7.1992 are collectively Annexure R-1 hereto. Thereafter
the vendee Sh. D. C. Rastogi sold the said land in terms of
agreement to sell dt.6.12.1993 vide sale deed dated 16.3.1994 at
the rate of about Rs.15,73,289/- per acre. This shows that
there was a jump in the price of the land in that area equal to
almost 11 times of the original price. It is also common
knowledge that the parties often undervalue the land price in
order to minimize stamp duty and the land might have been sold
at a higher price. Copy of sale deed dt. 16.3.1994 is Annexure
R-2 hereto. Thus if M/s Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. purchased
land, which is subject matter of sale deed dt.16.9.1994, Ex.P.1,
in the year 1993 at a price of about Rs.6 lakhs per acre as
alleged by the review petitioner even though there is no
evidence of purchase at such rate then its value increasing to
Rs.20 lakhs per acre in the year 1994 is commensurate with the
market trend. Moreover agreement to sell dt.31.5.1994 was
executed after first notification u/s 4 on 30.4.1994 and it is a
common knowledge that after publication of section 4
notification, the value of the land increases.
5. It is further submitted that vide sale deed dt.14.12.1993
(Ex.P.10) one M/s. DCN Internatinal Ltd. sold land measuring 62
kanals 7 marlas situated in Village Naurangpur District Gurgaon
for Rs.95,21,160/- i.e. at the rate of Rs.13,74,345/- per acre.
Copy of sale deed dt. 14.12.1993 is Annexure R.3 hereto.
6. I further state that sale deed dt. 16.9.1994 (Ex.P.1) was
executed pursuant to agreement to sell dt.31.5.1994 between M/s
Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. (vendor) and M/s Duracell (India)
Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) wherein the vendor agreed to sell the land in
question measuring about 12 acres to the vendee at a sale price
of Rs.2,42,00,000/- (Rs. Two crore forty lakhs only) as is clear
from the recital in the sale deed itself. Ultimately vide sale
deed dt.16.9.1994 the said land was sold at the same sale price
by the vendor to the vendee. Thus the sale price of the land
was agreed upon and fixed on 31.5.1994 as is clear from the
recitation of the sale deed itself.
7. I further state that as per assertion of the review
petitioner M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. (vendor) and M/s
Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) had common persons in their
Board of Directors namely Sh. Saroj Kumar Poddar, Ms. Jyotsana
Poddar and Sh. Gurvinder Singh Gill. The review petitioner has
filed search reports of both the said companies to show that the
abavoe said three persons were common directors of both the
companies. However, from the said search report of M/s.
Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. it is clear the two directors namely
Sh. Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were appointed as
Directors of this company on 9.6.1994 whereas Sh. Gurvinder
Singh gill was appointed as its Director on 9.2.1997. Thus all
the three alleged common Directors of the vendor and vendee
companies were not on the Board of Directors of M/s Duracell
(India) Pvt. Ltd. on or before 31.5.1994 on which date the
agreement to sell of the land in question was executed and the
sale price was fixed. The said three directors had no interest
in M/s. Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) as on 31.5.1994 when
the sale price of the land was fixed.
8. I further state that except for making a bald allegation
that the sale price of the said land was inflated intentionally
so that the vendee company would increase its share holding in a
Joint Venture it was going to enter into with one Duracell INC
USA, this assertion has not been substantiated by placing ay
cogent evidence on record. So much so that even it has not been
pleaded in the review petition as to whether Joint Venture
between M/s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell INC USA
did take place or not. To the knowledge of the deponent there
was no joint venture between M/s. Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. and
M/s. Duracell INC USA. This fact that there was no Joint
Venture between the said two companies also stands proved from
the fact that the land purchased vide said sale deed
dt.16.9.1994 was sold by M/s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. vide
sale deed dt.28.4.2004 to one M/s Lattu Finance & Investments
Ltd. at a sale consideration Rs.13,62,00,000/- i.e.
approximately at the rate of Rs.1,13,00,000/- (Rs.one crore
thirteen lakhs per acre approximately). At the time the name of
M/s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. had been changed to M/s Gillette
India Ltd. on account of its amalgamation with other company.
In this sale deed dt. 28.4.2004 entire history of purchase of
land by M/s. Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. from M/s. Heritage
Furniture Pvt. Ltd. in 1994 onwards has been recited, which
includes construction of industrial building over the said land,
its conversion of status from Pvt. Ltd. to Public Ltd. Company,
its amalgamation with Indian Shaving Products Ltd. in the year
2000 and its change of name from Indian Shaving Products Ltd. to
Gillette India Ltd. in December, 2000 and thereafter its sale to
M/s. Lattu Finance & Investments Ltd. However, in the entire
recitation there is no mention of any joint venture with M/s
Duracell INC USA.
9. It is submitted by the respondents/land owners that the
said sale deed (Ex.P.1) reflects true market price of the land
in the year 1994 when section 4 notifications for the acquired
land was issued. The allegation of the review petitioner that
the sale deed (Ex.P.1) reflects inflated price is false and
baseless. It is further submitted that another sale deed
dt.17.7.1996 which is on record as (Ex.P.9) reflects the market
value of the land in one of the acquired villages at
Rs.25,00,000/- (Rs. Twenty five lakhs) per acre. In this
transaction 1 kanal 11 marlas of land situated in Village
Naharpur Kasan, has been sold at a price of Rs.4,84,375/-. This
sale deed also proves that the market price of the acquired land
in the year 1994 was Rs.20 lakhs per acre. Copy of sale deed
dt.17.7.1996 is Annexure R-4 is hereto. It may be mentioned
here that the same purchaser purchased different pieces of land
at the same rate vide 15 different sale deeds and the total land
purchased was 18 kanals 5 marlas i.e. more than 2.25 acres.”
Paragraph 5 of the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the
landowners who were respondents in Civil Appeal No.6561/2009.
“5. That the present review petition is being filed only on the
ground that Ex. P-1, which has been relied upon by the Hon’ble
High Court as well as upheld by this Hon’ble Court was entered
by the corporate which were under the control and management of
common board of directors and hence it is not the correct market
value. In reply thereto the respondents humbly submits that:-
a) This fact for the first time is brought into the notice at
the level of this Hon’ble Court, therefore review petition are
estopped by their own conduct.
b) That merely the both the corporate have common board of
directors does not prove that the sale in between the corporate
was an escalated rates, rather it should be on other side i.e.
common board would have trying to get the sale as possible as on
lower rate. Therefore the ground for review is not legally
justifiable.
c) It is submitted that later on corporate Gillette India Ltd.
made a sale deed (land in issue of Ex.P-1) dated 28.4.2004 to
another corporate namely Laltu Finance and Investment Ltd. for a
sum of Rs. 13,62,00,000/- of land measuring 96 Kanalas and 13
Marlas. (i.e. one crore sixty lacs per acre). It is submitted
that this sale can not be said to be an escalated rate and
therefore the Ex. P-1 denotes the correct market value at the
relevant time. A copies of the relevant sale deeds are annexed
herewith and marked as ANNEXURE R-1.
d) It is also submitted that some other sale deeds at the
relevant time (20.9.1996) were executed in favour of Time Master
Pvt. Ltd. which came around 25 lakh per acre. Details of the
same are as follows-
Sr. No. Vasika No. Dt. Land sold Sale
consideration
1. 8725 20.9.1996 1K 1-1/2M 3,55,000/-
2. 8726 20.9.1996 1K 8M 3,59,375/-
3. 8727 20.9.1996 1K 1-1/2M 3,53,000/-
4. 8728 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/-
5. 8799 20.9.1996 1K 9M 3,75,000/-
6. 8807 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/-
7. 8815 20.9.1996 1K 6M 4,08,000/-
8. 8825 20.9.1996 1K 1M 3,53,000/-
9. 8832 20.9.1996 0K 17M 2,75,000/-
10. 8839 20.9.1996 1K 6M 4,08,000/-
11. 8846 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/-
12. 8854 20.9.1996 1K 1M 3,55,000/-
13. 8861 20.9.1996 0K 17M 2,75,000/-
Total land sale is 15 Kanals 3 Marlas total amount
4734375/- i.e. at rate of Rs.25 lakh per acre.
14. 5431 17.7.96 1K 11M 4,84,375/-
i.e. at the rate of Rs. 25 lakh per acre.
It is submitted at sale deed No.5431 (at sr. no. 14) was
already produced as Ex.P-9 before Reference Court in favour
of Time Master Pvt. Ltd. by Vinod Kumar vendor.
Thus time master India Pvt. Ltd. purchased total land
measuring 16 kanals 14 marlas at the rate of Rs. 25 lakhs
per acre.
e) It is also relevant to point out the following are the
sale transactions in December 2006 of the village
Naharpur/Kasan.
Land sold of Village Naharpur/Kasan
Sr. No.Vasika No. Dt . Land sold Sale
consideration Per acre
1. 18628 4.12.06 12K 16.5M
2,56,50,000/- 1,60,00000
2. 18742 5.12.06 5K 13M
1,13,00,000/- 1,60,00000
3. 18743 5.12.06 5K 14M
74,00,000/- 1,60,00000
4. 19350 14.12.06 5K 13M
1,13,00,000/- 1,60,00000
f) it is also submitted that the rate on which auction sale
of Tower side on acquired land is done on 30.6.2006.
Tower Site No. Area in meters Amount of
consideration per sq yard
J 6804
95.10 crores 116865/- per sq.
yd
K 5832
101.50 crores 145518/- per sq. yd
L 6804
93.00 crores 114284.50/- per sq. yd
g) It is also submitted the following details of auction by
HSIDC IMT Manesar.
Auction sales by HSIDC IMT Manesar
Allotment of SCO Sites for shopping booth in Sector-I, IMT
Manesar auction held on 18.8.2009.
Sr.No. Site No. Area in
Sq. Mts Price of Site
1. T-1
144 2,67,50,000/-
2. T-2
144 2,33,50,000/-
3. T-3
144 2,29,00,000/-
4. T-4
144 2,29,00,000/-
5. T-5
144 2,31,00,000/-
6. T-7
144 2,28,00,000/-
7. T-8
144 2,25,00,000/-
8. T-9
144 2,22,00,000/-
9. T-10
144 2,16,00,000/-
10. D-1
108 1,82,00,000/-
11. D-2
108 1,58,00,000/-
12. D-3
108 1,62,50,000/-
13. D-4
108 1,60,00,000/-
14. D-5
108 1,51,00,000/-
15. D-6
108 1,38,50,000/-
16. D-7
108 1,40,00,000/-
17. D-8
108 1,37,00,000/-
18. D-9
108 1,35,00,000/-
19. D-10
108 1,33,50,000/-
Total area 2376 square mts. total Rs.35,78,50,000/- i.e.
150610.26 per Mt.i.e. Rs.12,5928.58 per yard i.e.
Rs.60,94,94,327/- per acre.
Allotment of SCO Sites for shopping booth in Sector-1, IMT
Manesar auction held on 11.8.2010.
1. D-10
108 2,12,50,000/-
2. D-12
108 1,89,50,000/-
3. D-14
108 1,90,00,000/-
4. D-15
108 1,88,50,000/-
5. D-16 108
1,92,00,000/-
Allotment of Triple Storey SCO Sites for in Sector-1, IMT
Manesar, auction held on 11.8.2010 on following rates.
1. 11
144 3,03,00,000/-
1. 11
144 3,03,00,000/-
2. 12
144 3,00,00,000/-
3. 12-A
144 2,87,00,000/-
Total area 972 sq mts allotted for total amount of Rs.186250000/-
i.e Rs.191615.22 per Mt. i.e. Rs.160213.67 per square yard or
Rs. 77,54,34189/- per acre.”
6. S/Shri Gopal Subramanium and Altaf Ahmed, learned senior advocates
and other counsel who appeared for the petitioner relied upon reports dated
20.1.2011 and 21.1.2011 prepared by the Chartered Accountant M/s. AKG and
Company to show that at least two of the Directors, namely, Shri Saroj
Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were common to the management of the
two companies and submitted that land was shown to have been purchased by
M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. at a very high price because it was hoping to
reap benefit of the joint venture agreement with M/s. Duracell Inc. USA.
Learned counsel pointed out that the vendor, namely, M/s. Heritage
Furniture Pvt. Ltd. had purchased 12 acres land from different landowners
at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre and argued that even if the
benefit of 12% notional increase in the value of land was allowed to the
vendor, no person of ordinary prudence would have purchased the same land
after a period of 13 months at the rate of more than Rs.20 lakhs per acre.
Learned counsel also referred to the statement of the authorised signatory
of the vendor M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to drive home the point
that the Sale Deed Exhibit P1 was not a bona fide transaction. Learned
senior counsel then argued that dismissal of Review Petition Nos.2107-2108
of 2010 cannot operate as a bar to the maintainability of these petitions
because till 13.1.2011, the officers of the petitioner did not have any
inkling about the composition of the two companies and the fact that the
vendor had purchased the land in 1993 at the rate of Rs.6 lakhs per acre
only and the relevant facts came to their notice only in October, 2010 from
the representatives of IMT Industrial Association.
7. S/Shri J.L. Gupta, S.R. Singh, P.S. Patwalia and Paras Kuhad, senior
advocates and other counsel, who appeared for the landowners argued for
dismissal of the review petitions. They emphasized that the very premise
on which the review petitions have been filed, namely, discovery of the
facts relating to composition of the board of directors of the two
companies is incorrect because no-one from the Poddar group on the board of
directors of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. till 9.6.1994. Shri J. L. Gupta
and Shri Paras Kuhad pointed out that Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms.
Jyotsana Poddar were taken on the board of directors of M/s. Duracell India
Pvt. Ltd. after execution of the agreement for sale and no joint venture
agreement was executed between the vendee, i.e., M/s. Duracell India Pvt.
Ltd. and M/s. Duracell Inc. USA. Shri Paras Kuhad also referred to the
Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of M/s. Duracell
India Pvt. Ltd. to show that S/Shri Jyoti Sagar and Sajay Singh were the
only promoters of the company. Learned counsel then argued that the
petitioner cannot seek review of judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the pretext of
discovery of facts relating to composition of the two companies because no
evidence was adduced before the Reference Court to prove that the sale deed
Exhibit P1 was not a bona fide transaction or that vendee had paid
exorbitant price for extraneous reasons. Learned counsel further argued
that after dismissal of Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010, the
petitioner cannot revive its prayer because there was total absence of
diligence on the part of its officers.
8. We shall first consider whether the petitioner’s prayer for review
should be entertained by ignoring the dismissal of similar petitions by
this Court vide order dated 13.1.2011. A careful reading of that order
shows that in Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010, the petitioner had
sought reconsideration of judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the premise that the
vendor and the vendee had common management and that the price mentioned in
the sale deed had been manipulated with an oblique motive. The Court
declined to entertain this plea by observing that the petitioner had not
produced any material to substantiate its assertion. Along with the
present batch of review petitions, the petitioner has placed on record the
search reports prepared by M/s AKG and Company, Certificate of
Incorporation, Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of
M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd., mutations showing the purchase of land
by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. vide sale deeds dated 16.8.1993 and
18.8.1993, annual return of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. showing Shri
Saroj Kumar Poddar, Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar as
the Directors and the statement of Albel Singh, but these documents neither
singularly nor collectively support the petitioner’s plea that management
of the two companies, i.e., the vendor and the vendee, was under the
control of the same set of persons or that the vendee had paid unusually
high price with some oblique motive. As a matter of fact, Shri Saroj Kumar
Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were appointed as Directors of M/s. Duracell
India Pvt. Ltd. on 9.6.1994 and Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill was so appointed
on 9.2.1997 whereas the agreement for sale was executed on 31.5.1994. The
petitioner has not controverted the averments contained in paragraphs 4 and
5 of the reply affidavit filed in Review Petition No.239/2011, perusal of
which makes it clear that in 1993 similar parcels of land had been sold at
the rate of Rs.15,73,289/- and Rs.13,74,345/- per acre. Therefore, it
cannot be said that M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. had paid exorbitantly
high price to M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. for extraneous reasons and
we do not find any valid ground for indirect review of order dated
13.1.2011.
9. At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the power of review
is a creature of the statute and no Court or quasi-judicial body or
administrative authority can review its judgment or order or decision
unless it is legally empowered to do so. Article 137 empowers this Court
to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by
Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The
Rules framed by this Court under that Article lay down that in civil cases,
review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under:
“Order 47, Rule 1:
1. Application for review of judgment.—
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but
from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not
within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time
when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some
mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any
other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the
decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review
of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the
order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may
apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of
an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such
appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when,
being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case
of which he applies for the review.
Explanation- The fact that the decision on a question of law on
which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any
other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such
judgment.”
10. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We
shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka 1993 Supp
(4) SCC 595, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal
Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai AIR 1941 FC 1 and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai
Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 and observed:
“Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-
consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal
acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the
courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality
of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both
statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct
accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there
was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the
highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could
rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid
abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi
Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even
though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to
review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow
ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords.
The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council
in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order made
by the Court was final and could not be altered:
“... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the
judgments, by errors have been introduced, these Courts
possess, by Common law, the same power which the Courts of
record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which
have crept in .... The House of Lords exercises a similar
power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own
judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority.
The Lords have however gone a step further, and have
corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the
details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in
order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added
explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.”
Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision
as under:
“It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in
such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing
to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of
last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the
party has not been heard and an order has been
inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.”
Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental
principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove
the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution
was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order
passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of
the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical
wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly
conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order
by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article
145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions
subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In
exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this
Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds
analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The
expression, ‘for any other sufficient reason’ in the clause has
been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed
under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been
held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from
Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the
inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the
interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court.
The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its
own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for
sake of justice.”
11. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius
AIR 1954 SC 526, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the
Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1
CPC and observed:
“It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application
for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under
the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which
is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited
jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the
language used therein.
It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i)
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after
the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's
knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the
decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of
the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.
It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words “any
other sufficient reason” must mean “a reason sufficient on
grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. See
Chhajju Ram v. Neki AIR 1922 PC 12 (D). This conclusion was
reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi
v. Parath Nath AIR 1934 PC 213 (E) and was adopted by on Federal
Court in Hari Shankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter AIR 1949 FC 106
at pp. 110, 111 (F). Learned counsel appearing in support of
this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits
that his case comes within the ground of “mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record” or some ground analogous
thereto.”
12. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (1964) 5 SCR 174,
another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not
analogous to the appellate power and observed:
“A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for
patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable
occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any
great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where
without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and
say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the
face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained
about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the
record would be made out.”
13. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC 389,
this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can
review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded
to observe:
“But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power
of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery
of new and important matter or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the
person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the
time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some
mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it
may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not
be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on
merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power
of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may
enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors
committed by the subordinate court.”
14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) 1 SCC 170,
the Court considered as to what can be characterised as an error apparent
on the fact of the record and observed:
“…….it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face
of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere
looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn
process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be
two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this
Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v.
Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale AIR 1960 SC 137 wherein, K.C.
Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following
observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of
the record:
“An error which has to be established by a long-drawn
process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably
be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent
on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far
from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to
be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such
an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according
to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to
issue such a writ.”
15. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Court observed:
“An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected
by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an
error apparent on the face of the record justifying the
Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1
CPC…….. A review petition, it must be remembered has a
limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in
disguise”.”
16. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224, R.P. Sethi, J.,
who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the power
of review in the following words:
“Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute
dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated
like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on
the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition
is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained.
The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature
of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the
Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be
followed and practised.”
17. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4 SCC 78, the Court
observed:
“The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the
purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a
rehearing “on account of some mistake or error apparent on the
face of the records or for any other sufficient reason”. The
former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to
the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is
manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not
possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute
because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case
or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited
binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable
verdict.”
18. In State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612, the Court
considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to
Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed:
“At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is
sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence,
such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a
character that if the same had been produced, it might have
altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or
important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review
ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has
also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not
within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due
diligence, the same could not be produced before the court
earlier.
The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation
signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of
the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and
elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an
error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long
debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an
error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it
differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected
merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a
different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a
point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of
review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over
its judgment / decision.”
19. In the light of the propositions laid down in the aforementioned
judgments, we shall now examine whether the petitioner has succeeded in
making out a case for exercise of power by this Court under Article 137 of
the Constitution read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. This consideration needs
to be prefaced with an observation that the petitioner has not offered any
explanation as to why it did not lead any evidence before the Reference
Court to show that sale deed Exhibit P1 was not a bona fide transaction and
the vendee had paid unusually high price for extraneous reasons. The
parties had produced several sale deeds, majority of which revealed that
the price of similar parcels of land varied from Rs. 6 to 7 lakhs per acre.
A reading of the sale deeds would have prompted any person of ordinary
prudence to make an enquiry as to why M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd.
(vendee) had paid more than Rs.2,42,00,000/- for 12 acres land, which have
been purchased by the vendor only a year back at an average price of Rs.6
lakhs per acre. However, the fact of the matter is that neither the
advocate for the petitioner nor its officers/officials, who were dealing
with the cases made any attempt to lead such evidence. This may be because
they were aware of the fact that at least in two other cases such parcels
of land had been sold in 1993 for more than Rs.13 lakhs and Rs.15 lakhs per
acre and in 1996, a sale deed was executed in respect of the land of
village Naharpur Kasan at the rate of Rs.25 lakhs per acre. This omission
coupled with the fact that the petitioner’s assertion about commonality of
the management of two companies is ex-facie incorrect leads to an
irresistible inference that judgment dated 17.8.2010 does not suffer from
any error apparent on the face of the record warranting its review.
Surely, in guise of seeking review, the petitioner cannot ask for de novo
hearing of the appeals.
20. The petitioner’s plea that the documents produced along with the
review petitions could not be brought to the notice of the Reference Court
and the High Court despite exercise of due diligence by its officers does
not commend acceptance because it had not explained as to why the concerned
officers/officials, who were very much aware of other sale transactions
produced by themselves and the landowners did not try to find out the
reasons for wide difference in the price of land sold by Exhibit P1 and
other parcels of land sold by Exhibits P2 to P13 and Exhibits R1 to R15.
21. Before concluding, we would like to add that while deciding the
review petitions, this Court cannot make roving inquiries into the validity
of the transaction involving the sale of land by M/s. Heritage Furniture
Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. or declare the same to be
invalid by assuming that the vendee had paid higher price to take benefit
of an anticipated joint venture agreement with a foreign company. Of
course, the petitioner has not controverted the statement made by the
respondents that the vendee had sold the land to M/s. Lattu Finance and
Investments Ltd. in 2004 for a sum of Rs.13,62,00,000/- i.e. at the rate of
Rs.1,13,00,000/- per acre.
22. In the result, the review petitions are dismissed. The interim order
passed on 30.3.2011 stands automatically vacated. The petitioner shall pay
cost of Rs.25,000/- in each case. The amount of cost shall be deposited
with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a period of three
months.
23. However, it is made clear that the petitioner shall be free to
withdraw the amount which it had deposited in compliance of this Court’s
order dated 30.3.2011. In any case, the petitioner shall pay the balance
amount of compensation to the landowners and/or their legal representatives
along with other statutory benefits within three months from today.
24. In view of the dismissal of the review petitions and the direction
given for payment of the balance amount, the contempt petitions and all the
pending interlocutory applications are disposed of as infructuous.
……….....……..….………………….…J.
[G.S. Singhvi]
………..………..….………………….…J.
[Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya]
New Delhi,
July 02, 2012.
