Title 18 U. S. C. §1464 bans the broadcast of “any obscene, indecent, orprofane language.” The Federal Communications Commission (Commission) began enforcing §1464 in the 1970’s. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, this Court found that the Commission’s order banning George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue passedFirst Amendment scrutiny, but did not decide whether “an occasional expletive . . . would justify any sanction,” id., at 750. In the ensuingyears, the Commission went from strictly observing the narrow circumstances of Pacifica to indicating that it would assess the full context of allegedly indecent broadcasts rather than limit its regulationto an index of indecent words or pictures. However, it continued to note the important difference between isolated and repeated broadcasts of indecent material. And in a 2001 policy statement, it evenincluded, as one of the factors significant to the determination ofwhat was patently offensive, “whether the material dwells on or repeats at length” the offending description or depiction. It was against this regulatory background that the three incidents at issue took place. Two concern isolated utterances of obscene words during two live broadcasts aired by respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc. The third occurred during an episode of a television showbroadcast by respondent ABC Television Network, when the nude buttocks of an adult female character were shown for approximatelyseven seconds and the side of her breast for a moment. After these incidents, but before the Commission issued Notices of Apparent Lia—————— *Together with Federal Communications Commission v. ABC, Inc., et al. (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court. 2 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC. Syllabus bility to Fox and ABC, the Commission issued its Golden Globes Order, declaring for the first time that fleeting expletives could be actionable. It then concluded that the Fox and ABC broadcasts violated this new standard. It found the Fox broadcasts indecent, but declined to propose forfeitures. The Second Circuit reversed, findingthe Commission’s decision to modify its indecency enforcement regime to regulate fleeting expletives arbitrary and capricious. This Court reversed and remanded for the Second Circuit to address respondents’ First Amendment challenges. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502. On remand, the Second Circuit found the policy unconstitutionally vague and invalidated it in its entirety. In the ABC case, the Commission found the display actionably indecent, and imposed a $27,500 forfeiture on each of the 45 ABC-affiliatedstations that aired the episode. The Second Circuit vacated the order in light of its Fox decision. Held: Because the Commission failed to give Fox or ABC fair noticeprior to the broadcasts in question that fleeting expletives and momentary nudity could be found actionably indecent, the Commission’s standards as applied to these broadcasts were vague. Pp. 11–18. (a) The fundamental principle that laws regulating persons or entities must give fair notice of what conduct is required or proscribed, see, e.g., Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391, is essential to the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, see United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304, which requires the invalidation of impermissibly vague laws. A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardlessthat it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Ibid. The void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: Regulated partiesshould know what is required of them so they may act accordingly;and precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. When speech isinvolved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary toensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech. Pp. 11–12. (b) These concerns are implicated here, where the broadcasters claim that the lengthy procedural history of their cases shows thatthey did not have fair notice of what was forbidden. Under the 2001 Guidelines in force when the broadcasts occurred, a key considerationwas “whether the material dwell[ed] on or repeat[ed] at length” theoffending description or depiction, but in the 2004 Golden Globes Order, issued after the broadcasts, the Commission changed course andheld that fleeting expletives could be a statutory violation. It then Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 Syllabus applied this new principle to these cases. Its lack of notice to Fox andABC of its changed interpretation failed to give them “fair notice ofwhat is prohibited.” Williams, supra, at 304. Pp. 12–13. (c) Neither of the Government’s contrary arguments is persuasive. It claims that Fox cannot establish unconstitutional vagueness because the Commission declined to impose a forfeiture on Fox and saidthat it would not consider the indecent broadcast in renewing stationlicenses or in other contexts. But the Commission has the statutorypower to take into account “any history of prior offenses” when setting a forfeiture penalty, 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(2)(E), and the due process protection against vague regulations “does not leave [regulatedparties] . . . at the mercy of noblesse oblige.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. ___, ___. The challenged orders could also have an adverse impact on Fox’s reputation with audiences and advertisers alike. The Government argues that ABC had notice that its broadcastwould be considered indecent. But an isolated statement in a 1960 Commission decision declaring that televising nudes might be contrary to §1464 does not suffice for the fair notice required when the Government intends to impose over a $1 million fine for allegedlyimpermissible speech. Moreover, previous Commission decisions haddeclined to find isolated and brief moments of nudity actionably indecent. In light of these agency decisions, and the absence of any notice in the 2001 Guidance that seven seconds of nude buttocks would be found indecent, ABC lacked constitutionally sufficient notice prior to being sanctioned. Pp. 13–17. (d) It is necessary to make three observations about this decision’s scope. First, because the Court resolves these cases on fair notice grounds under the Due Process Clause, it need not address the First Amendment implications of the Commission’s indecency policy or reconsider Pacifica at this time. Second, because the Court rules that Fox and ABC lacked notice at the time of their broadcasts that their material could be found actionably indecent under then-existing policies, the Court need not address the constitutionality of the current indecency policy as expressed in the Golden Globes Order and subsequent adjudications. Third, this opinion leaves the Commission freeto modify its current indecency policy in light of its determination ofthe public interest and applicable legal requirements and leavescourts free to review the current, or any modified, policy in light of itscontent and application. Pp. 17–18. 613 F. 3d 317 (first case) and 404 Fed. Appx. 530 (second case), vacatedand remanded. KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 4 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC. Syllabus GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SOTOMAYOR, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.

1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ET AL. v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 10–1293. Argued January 10, 2012—Decided June 21, 2012*
Title 18 U. S. C. §1464 bans the broadcast of “any obscene, indecent, orprofane language.” The Federal Communications Commission (Commission) began enforcing §1464 in the 1970’s. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, this Court found that the Commission’s order banning George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue passedFirst Amendment scrutiny, but did not decide whether “an occasional expletive . . . would justify any sanction,” id., at 750. In the ensuingyears, the Commission went from strictly observing the narrow circumstances of Pacifica to indicating that it would assess the full context of allegedly indecent broadcasts rather than limit its regulationto an index of indecent words or pictures. However, it continued to note the important difference between isolated and repeated broadcasts of indecent material. And in a 2001 policy statement, it evenincluded, as one of the factors significant to the determination ofwhat was patently offensive, “whether the material dwells on or repeats at length” the offending description or depiction. It was against this regulatory background that the three incidents at issue took place. Two concern isolated utterances of obscene words during two live broadcasts aired by respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc. The third occurred during an episode of a television showbroadcast by respondent ABC Television Network, when the nude buttocks of an adult female character were shown for approximatelyseven seconds and the side of her breast for a moment. After these incidents, but before the Commission issued Notices of Apparent Lia——————
*Together with Federal Communications Commission v. ABC, Inc., et al. (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court.
2 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.
Syllabus
bility to Fox and ABC, the Commission issued its Golden Globes Order, declaring for the first time that fleeting expletives could be actionable. It then concluded that the Fox and ABC broadcasts violated this new standard. It found the Fox broadcasts indecent, but declined to propose forfeitures. The Second Circuit reversed, findingthe Commission’s decision to modify its indecency enforcement regime to regulate fleeting expletives arbitrary and capricious. This Court reversed and remanded for the Second Circuit to address respondents’ First Amendment challenges. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502. On remand, the Second Circuit found the policy unconstitutionally vague and invalidated it in its entirety. In the ABC case, the Commission found the display actionably indecent, and imposed a $27,500 forfeiture on each of the 45 ABC-affiliatedstations that aired the episode. The Second Circuit vacated the order in light of its Fox decision.
Held: Because the Commission failed to give Fox or ABC fair noticeprior to the broadcasts in question that fleeting expletives and momentary nudity could be found actionably indecent, the Commission’s standards as applied to these broadcasts were vague. Pp. 11–18.
(a)
The fundamental principle that laws regulating persons or entities must give fair notice of what conduct is required or proscribed, see, e.g., Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391, is essential to the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, see United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304, which requires the invalidation of impermissibly vague laws. A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardlessthat it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Ibid. The void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: Regulated partiesshould know what is required of them so they may act accordingly;and precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. When speech isinvolved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary toensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech. Pp. 11–12.
(b)
These concerns are implicated here, where the broadcasters claim that the lengthy procedural history of their cases shows thatthey did not have fair notice of what was forbidden. Under the 2001 Guidelines in force when the broadcasts occurred, a key considerationwas “whether the material dwell[ed] on or repeat[ed] at length” theoffending description or depiction, but in the 2004 Golden Globes Order, issued after the broadcasts, the Commission changed course andheld that fleeting expletives could be a statutory violation. It then
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applied this new principle to these cases. Its lack of notice to Fox andABC of its changed interpretation failed to give them “fair notice ofwhat is prohibited.” Williams, supra, at 304. Pp. 12–13.
(c)
Neither of the Government’s contrary arguments is persuasive. It claims that Fox cannot establish unconstitutional vagueness because the Commission declined to impose a forfeiture on Fox and saidthat it would not consider the indecent broadcast in renewing stationlicenses or in other contexts. But the Commission has the statutorypower to take into account “any history of prior offenses” when setting a forfeiture penalty, 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(2)(E), and the due process protection against vague regulations “does not leave [regulatedparties] . . . at the mercy of noblesse oblige.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. ___, ___. The challenged orders could also have an adverse impact on Fox’s reputation with audiences and advertisers alike.
The Government argues that ABC had notice that its broadcastwould be considered indecent. But an isolated statement in a 1960 Commission decision declaring that televising nudes might be contrary to §1464 does not suffice for the fair notice required when the Government intends to impose over a $1 million fine for allegedlyimpermissible speech. Moreover, previous Commission decisions haddeclined to find isolated and brief moments of nudity actionably indecent. In light of these agency decisions, and the absence of any notice in the 2001 Guidance that seven seconds of nude buttocks would be found indecent, ABC lacked constitutionally sufficient notice prior to being sanctioned. Pp. 13–17.
(d)
It is necessary to make three observations about this decision’s scope. First, because the Court resolves these cases on fair notice grounds under the Due Process Clause, it need not address the First Amendment implications of the Commission’s indecency policy or reconsider Pacifica at this time. Second, because the Court rules that Fox and ABC lacked notice at the time of their broadcasts that their material could be found actionably indecent under then-existing policies, the Court need not address the constitutionality of the current indecency policy as expressed in the Golden Globes Order and subsequent adjudications. Third, this opinion leaves the Commission freeto modify its current indecency policy in light of its determination ofthe public interest and applicable legal requirements and leavescourts free to review the current, or any modified, policy in light of itscontent and application. Pp. 17–18.
613 F. 3d 317 (first case) and 404 Fed. Appx. 530 (second case), vacatedand remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
4
FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC. Syllabus GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SOTOMAYOR, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
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Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 10–1293
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.,
ET AL.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ABC, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 21, 2012]
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 529 (2009) (Fox I), the Court held that the Federal Communication Commission’s decision to modify its indecency enforcement regime to regulate so-called fleeting expletives was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Court then declined to address the constitutionality of the policy,however, because the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had yet to do so. On remand, the Court of Appeals found the policy was vague and, as a result, unconstitutional. 613 F. 3d 317 (2010). The case now returns to this Court for decision upon the constitutionalquestion.
I In Fox I, the Court described both the regulatoryframework through which the Commission regulatesbroadcast indecency and the long procedural history of
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this case. The Court need not repeat all that history, but some preliminary discussion is necessary to understand the constitutional issue the case now presents.
A Title 18 U. S. C. §1464 provides that “[w]hoever uttersany obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” The Federal Communications Commission (Commission) has been instructed by Congress to enforce §1464 between the hours of 6 a.m.and 10 p.m., see Public Telecommunications Act of 1992,§15(a), 106 Stat. 954, note following 47 U. S. C. §303,
p. 113 (Broadcasting of Indecent Programming). And the Commission has applied its regulations to radio and television broadcasters alike, see Fox I, supra, at 505–506; see also 47 CFR §73.3999 (2010) (Commission regulationprohibiting the broadcast of any obscene material or any indecent material between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.). Althoughthe Commission has had the authority to regulate indecent broadcasts under §1464 since 1948 (and its predecessor commission, the Federal Radio Commission, since 1927), it did not begin to enforce §1464 until the 1970’s. See Campbell, Pacifica Reconsidered: Implications for theCurrent Controversy over Broadcast Indecency, 63 Fed.Com. L. J. 195, 198 (2010).
This Court first reviewed the Commission’s indecencypolicy in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, the Commission determined that GeorgeCarlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue was indecent. It contained “‘language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standardsfor the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.’” Id., at 732 (quoting 56 F. C. C. 2d 94, 98 (1975)). This Court upheld
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the Commission’s ruling. The broadcaster’s statutorychallenge was rejected. The Court held the Commission was not engaged in impermissible censorship within themeaning of 47 U. S. C. §326 (1976 ed.), see 438 U. S., at 735–739, and that §1464’s definition of indecency was not confined to speech with an appeal to the prurient interest, see id., at 738–741. Finding no First Amendment violation, the decision explained the constitutional standardunder which regulations of broadcasters are assessed. It observed that “broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans,” id., at 748, and that “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read,” id., at 749. In lightof these considerations, “broadcasting . . . has received the most limited First Amendment protection.” Id., at 748. Under this standard the Commission’s order passed constitutional scrutiny. The Court did note the narrowness of its holding, explaining that it was not deciding whether “an occasional expletive . . . would justify any sanction.” Id., at 750; see also id., at 760–761 (Powell, J., concur- ring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[C]ertainly the Court’s holding . . . does not speak to cases involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word in the course ofa radio broadcast, as distinguished from the verbal shocktreatment administered by respondent here”).
From 1978 to 1987, the Commission did not go beyond the narrow circumstances of Pacifica and brought no indecency enforcement actions. See In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987); see also In re Application of WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F. C. C. 2d 1250, 1254 (1978) (Commission declaring it “intend[s] strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica holding”). Recognizing that Pacifica provided “no general prerogative tointervene in any case where words similar or identical tothose in Pacifica are broadcast over a licensed radio or television station,” the Commission distinguished between
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Opinion of the Court
the “repetitive occurrence of the ‘indecent’ words” (such asin the Carlin monologue) and an “isolated” or “occasional” expletive, that would not necessarily be actionable. 69
F. C. C. 2d, at 1254.
In 1987, the Commission determined it was applying the Pacifica standard in too narrow a way. It stated that in later cases its definition of indecent language would “appropriately includ[e] a broader range of material than the seven specific words at issue in [the Carlin monologue].” In re Pacifica Foundation Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699. Thus, the Commission indicated it would use the “generic definition of indecency” articulated in its 1975 Pacifica order, Infinity Order, 3 FCC Rcd., at 930, and assess the full context of allegedly indecent broadcasts rather thanlimiting its regulation to a “comprehensive index . . . of indecent words or pictorial depictions,” id., at 932.
Even under this context based approach, the Commission continued to note the important difference between isolated and repeated broadcasts of indecent material. See ibid. (considering variables in determining whether material is patently offensive including “whether allegedly offensive material is isolated or fleeting”). In the context of expletives, the Commission determined “deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.” Pacifica Order, 2 FCC Rcd., at 2699. For speech “involving the description or depiction of sexual or excretory functions . . . [t]he mere fact that specific words or phrases are not repeated does not mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patentlyoffensive . . . is not indecent.” Ibid.
In 2001, the Commission issued a policy statement intended “to provide guidance to the broadcast industryregarding [its] caselaw interpreting 18 U. S. C. §1464 and [its] enforcement policies with respect to broadcast indecency.” In re Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U. S. C. §1464 and Enforcement
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Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999. In that document the Commission restated that for material to be indecent it must depict sexual or excretoryorgans or activities and be patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium. Id., at 8002. Describing the framework of what it considered patently offensive, the Commission explained that three factors had proved significant:
“(1) [T]he explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of sexual or excretory organs oractivities; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (3) whether the material appears topander or is used to titillate, or whether the materialappears to have been presented for its shock value.” Id., at 8003 (emphasis deleted).
As regards the second of these factors, the Commission explained that “[r]epetition of and persistent focus onsexual or excretory material have been cited consistentlyas factors that exacerbate the potential offensiveness of broadcasts. In contrast, where sexual or excretory references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding of indecency.” Id., at 8008. The Commission then gave examples of material that was not found indecent because it was fleeting and isolated, id., at 8008–8009 (citing, e.g., L. M. Communications of South Carolina, Inc. (WYBB(FM)), 7 FCC Rcd. 1595 (MMB 1992) (finding “a fleeting and isolated utterance” in the context of live and spontaneous programming not actionable)), and contrasted it with fleeting references that were foundpatently offensive in light of other factors, 16 FCC Rcd., at8009 (citing, e.g., Tempe Radio, Inc. (KUPD–FM), 12 FCC Rcd. 21828 (MMB 1997) (finding fleeting language that clearly refers to sexual activity with a child to be patently
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Opinion of the Court
offensive)).
B It was against this regulatory background that the threeincidents of alleged indecency at issue here took place.First, in the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, broadcast by respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc., the singer Cherexclaimed during an unscripted acceptance speech: “I’vealso had my critics for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every year. Right. So f*** ‘em.” 613 F. 3d, at 323. Second, Fox broadcast the Billboard Music Awards again in 2003. There, a person named Nicole Richiemade the following unscripted remark while presenting an award: “Have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada purse? It’s not so f***ing simple.” Ibid. The third incident involved an episode of NYPD Blue, a regular television show broadcast by respondent ABC Television Network. The episode broadcast on February 25, 2003,showed the nude buttocks of an adult female character for approximately seven seconds and for a moment the sideof her breast. During the scene, in which the character was preparing to take a shower, a child portraying her boyfriend’s son entered the bathroom. A moment of awkwardness followed. 404 Fed. Appx. 530, 533–534 (CA2 2011). The Commission received indecency complaintsabout all three broadcasts. See Fox I, 556 U. S., at 510; 404 Fed. Appx., at 534.After these incidents, but before the Commission issued Notices of Apparent Liability to Fox and ABC, the Commission issued a decision sanctioning NBC for a comment made by the singer Bono during the 2003 Golden GlobeAwards. Upon winning the award for Best Original Song,Bono exclaimed: “‘This is really, really, f***ing brilliant.Really, really great.’” In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4976, n. 4
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(2004) (Golden Globes Order). Reversing a decision by its enforcement bureau, the Commission found the use of the F-word actionably indecent. Id., at 4975–4976. The Commission held that the word was “one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language,” and thus found “any use of thatword or a variation, in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation.” Id., at 4978–4979. Turning to the isolated nature of the expletive, the Commission reversed prior rulings that had found fleeting expletives not indecent.The Commission held “the mere fact that specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated does not mandate afinding that material that is otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast medium is not indecent.” Id., at 4980; see also id., at 4982 (“Just as the Court [in Pacifica] held that . . . the George Carlin routine ‘could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant,’ we believe that evenisolated broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ in situations such as that here could do so as well”).
C Even though the incidents at issue in these cases took place before the Golden Globes Order, the Commission applied its new policy regarding fleeting expletives and fleeting nudity. It found the broadcasts by respondentsFox and ABC to be in violation of this standard.
1 As to Fox, the Commission found the two Billboard Awards broadcasts indecent in In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002, and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664 (2006). Numerous parties petitioned for a review of the order in theUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Court of Appeals granted the Commission’s request for a voluntary remand so that it could respond to the
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Opinion of the Court
parties’ objections. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F. 3d 444, 453 (2007). In its remand order, the Commission applied its tripartite definition of patently offensive material from its 2001 Order and found that both broadcasts fell well within its scope. See In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002, and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13299 (2006) (Remand Order); see also Fox I, supra, at 511–513 (discussing in detail the Commission’s findings). As pertainsto the constitutional issue in these cases, the Commission noted that under the policy clarified in the Golden Globes Order, “categorically requiring repeated use of expletivesin order to find material indecent is inconsistent with our general approach to indecency enforcement.” Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd., at 13308; see also id., at 13325 (“[U]nder our Golden Globe precedent, the fact that Cherused the ‘F-word’ once does not remove her comment from the realm of actionable indecency”). Though the Commission deemed Fox should have known Nicole Richie’s comments were actionably indecent even prior to the Golden Globes Order, 21 FCC Rcd., at 13307, it declined to propose a forfeiture in light of the limited nature of the Second Circuit’s remand. Id., at 13321. The Commission acknowledged that “it was not apparent that Fox could bepenalized for Cher’s comment at the time it was broadcast.” And so, as in the Golden Globes case it imposed no penalty for that broadcast. Id., at 13324, 13326.
Fox and various intervenors returned to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, raising administrative, statutory, and constitutional challenges to the Commission’s indecency regulations. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F. 3d 444. In a 2-to-1 decision, with Judge Leval dissenting, the Court of Appealsfound the Remand Order arbitrary and capricious because “the FCC has made a 180-degree turn regarding its treatment of ‘fleeting expletives’ without providing a reasoned
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explanation justifying the about-face.” 489 F. 3d, at 455. While noting its skepticism as to whether the Commission’s fleeting expletive regime “would pass constitutional muster,” the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to address the issue. Id., at 462.
The case came here on certiorari. Citing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq., this Court noted that the Judiciary may set aside agency action that is arbitrary or capricious. In the context of a change inpolicy (such as the Commission’s determination that fleeting expletives could be indecent), the decision held an agency, in the ordinary course, should acknowledge that itis in fact changing its position and “show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” Fox I, 553 U. S., at 515. There is no need, however, for an agency to provide detailed justifications for every change or to show that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one. Ibid.
Judged under this standard, the Court in Fox I found the Commission’s new indecency enforcement policy neither arbitrary nor capricious. Id., at 517. The Court noted the Commission had acknowledged breaking new groundin ruling that fleeting and nonliteral expletives could beindecent under the controlling standards; the Court concluded the agency’s reasons for expanding the scope of its enforcement activity were rational. Ibid. Not only was it“certainly reasonable to determine that it made no senseto distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words,” ibid., but the Court agreed that the Commission’s decision to “look at the patent offensiveness of evenisolated uses of sexual and excretory words fits with thecontext-based approach [approved] . . . in Pacifica.” Ibid. Given that “[e]ven isolated utterances can . . . constitute harmful ‘first blow[s]’ to children,” the Court held thatthe Commission could “decide it needed to step away fromits old regime where nonrepetitive use of an expletive
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Opinion of the Court
was per se nonactionable.” Id., at 518. Having found theagency’s action to be neither arbitrary nor capricious, theCourt remanded for the Court of Appeals to address respondents’ First Amendment challenges. Id., at 529–530.
On remand from Fox I, the Court of Appeals held theCommission’s indecency policy unconstitutionally vague and invalidated it in its entirety. 613 F. 3d, at 327. The Court of Appeals found the policy, as expressed inthe 2001 Guidance and subsequent Commission decisions, failed to give broadcasters sufficient notice of what wouldbe considered indecent. Surveying a number of Commission adjudications, the court found the Commission wasinconsistent as to which words it deemed patently offensive. See id., at 330. It also determined that the Commission’s presumptive prohibition on the F-word and theS-word was plagued by vagueness because the Commissionhad on occasion found the fleeting use of those words notindecent provided they occurred during a bona fide news interview or were “demonstrably essential to the nature of an artistic or educational work.” Id., at 331 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission’s applicationof these exceptions, according to the Court of Appeals,left broadcasters guessing whether an expletive would be deemed artistically integral to a program or whether a particular broadcast would be considered a bona fide news interview. The Court of Appeals found the vagueness inherent in the policy had forced broadcasters to “choose between not airing . . . controversial programs [or] risking massive fines or possibly even loss of their licenses.” Id., at 334. And the court found that there was “ample evidence in the record” that this harsh choice had led to a chill of protected speech. Ibid.
2 The procedural history regarding ABC is more brief.On February 19, 2008, the Commission issued a forfeiture
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Opinion of the Court
order finding the display of the woman’s nude buttocksin NYPD Blue was actionably indecent. See In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their February 24, 2003 Broadcast of the Program “NYPD Blue”, 23 FCC Rcd. 3147 (2008). The Commission determined that, regardless of medical definitions, displays ofbuttocks fell within the category of displays of sexual orexcretory organs because the depiction was “widely associated with sexual arousal and closely associated by most people with excretory activities.” Id., at 3150. The scene was deemed patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, ibid.; and the Commission determined that “[t]he female actor’s nudity is presentedin a manner that clearly panders to and titillates the audience,” id., at 3153. Unlike in the Fox case, the Commission imposed a forfeiture of $27,500 on each of the 45 ABC-affiliated stations that aired the indecent episode. In a summary order the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, determining that it was bound by its Fox decision striking down the entirety of the Commission’s indecency policy. See 404 Fed. Appx., at 533.
The Government sought review of both judgments, seeBrief for Petitioners 1, and this Court granted certiorari,564 U. S. ____ (2011). These are the cases before us.
II A fundamental principle in our legal system is that lawswhich regulate persons or entities must give fair notice ofconduct that is forbidden or required. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statutewhich either forbids or requires the doing of an act interms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law”); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972)
12 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.
Opinion of the Court
(“Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions,one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939) (alteration in original))). This requirement of clarity inregulation is essential to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304 (2008). It requiresthe invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague. A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fairnotice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Ibid. As this Court has explained, a regulation is not vague because it may at times be difficult toprove an incriminating fact but rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved. See id., at 306.
Even when speech is not at issue, the void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should knowwhat is required of them so they may act accordingly;second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108–109 (1972). When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.
These concerns are implicated here because, at the outset, the broadcasters claim they did not have, and donot have, sufficient notice of what is proscribed. And leaving aside any concerns about facial invalidity, theycontend that the lengthy procedural history set forthabove shows that the broadcasters did not have fair notice of what was forbidden. Under the 2001 Guidelines in force when the broadcasts occurred, a key consideration
Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 13
Opinion of the Court
was “‘whether the material dwell[ed] on or repeat[ed] at length’” the offending description or depiction. 613 F. 3d, at 322. In the 2004 Golden Globes Order, issued after the broadcasts, the Commission changed course and held that fleeting expletives could be a statutory violation. Fox I, 556 U. S., at 512. In the challenged orders now underreview the Commission applied the new principle promulgated in the Golden Globes Order and determined fleetingexpletives and a brief moment of indecency were actionably indecent. This regulatory history, however, makes it apparent that the Commission policy in place at the time of the broadcasts gave no notice to Fox or ABC that a fleeting expletive or a brief shot of nudity could be actionably indecent; yet Fox and ABC were found to be in violation. The Commission’s lack of notice to Fox and ABC that its interpretation had changed so the fleeting moments of indecency contained in their broadcasts were a violation of §1464 as interpreted and enforced by the agency “fail[ed] to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.” Williams, supra, at 304. This would be true with respect to a regulatory change this abrupt onany subject, but it is surely the case when applied to theregulations in question, regulations that touch upon “sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,” Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 372 (1964); see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 870–871 (1997) (“The vagueness of [a content-based regulation of speech] raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect”).
The Government raises two arguments in response, but neither is persuasive. As for the two fleeting expletives, the Government concedes that “Fox did not have reasonable notice at the time of the broadcasts that the Commission would consider non-repeated expletives indecent.”Brief for Petitioners 28, n. 3. The Government argues,nonetheless, that Fox “cannot establish unconstitutional
14 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.
Opinion of the Court
vagueness on that basis . . . because the Commission did not impose a sanction where Fox lacked such notice.” Ibid. As the Court observed when the case was here three Terms ago, it is true that the Commission declined to impose any forfeiture on Fox, see 556 U. S., at 513, and in its order the Commission claimed that it would not consider the indecent broadcasts either when consideringwhether to renew stations’ licenses or “in any other context,” 21 FCC Rcd., at 13321, 13326. This “policy of forbearance,” as the Government calls it, does not suffice to make the issue moot. Brief for Petitioners 31. Though theCommission claims it will not consider the prior indecent broadcasts “in any context,” it has the statutory power to take into account “any history of prior offenses” whensetting the level of a forfeiture penalty. See 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(2)(E). Just as in the First Amendment context, the due process protection against vague regulations “does not leave [regulated parties] . . . at the mercy of noblesse oblige.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 18). Given that the Commission found it was “not inequitable to hold Fox responsible for [the 2003 broadcast],” 21 FCC Rcd., at 13314, and that it has the statutory authority to use its finding to increase any future penalties, the Government’s assurance it will elect not to do so is insufficient to remedy the constitutional violation.
In addition, when combined with the legal consequence described above, reputational injury provides further reason for granting relief to Fox. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424
U. S. 693, 708–709 (1976) (explaining that an “alteration of legal status . . . combined with the injury resultingfrom the defamation” justifies the invocation of procedural safeguards). As respondent CBS points out, findings ofwrongdoing can result in harm to a broadcaster’s “reputation with viewers and advertisers.” Brief for RespondentCBS Television Network Affiliates Assn. et al. 17. This
15 Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
Opinion of the Court
observation is hardly surprising given that the challenged orders, which are contained in the permanent Commission record, describe in strongly disapproving terms the indecent material broadcast by Fox, see, e.g., 21 FCC Rcd., at 13310–13311, ¶30 (noting the “explicit, graphic, vulgar, and shocking nature of Ms. Richie’s comments”), and Fox’sefforts to protect children from being exposed to it, see id., at 13311, ¶33 (finding Fox had failed to exercise “ ‘reasonable judgment, responsibility, and sensitivity to thepublic’s needs and tastes to avoid [a] patently offensivebroadcas[t]’”). Commission sanctions on broadcasters for indecent material are widely publicized. See, e.g., F. C. C. Fines Fox, N. Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2008, p. E2; F. C. C. Plans Record Fine for CBS, Washington Post, Sept. 24, 2004,
p. E1. The challenged orders could have an adverse impact on Fox’s reputation that audiences and advertisers alikeare entitled to take into account.
With respect to ABC, the Government with good reason does not argue no sanction was imposed. The fine againstABC and its network affiliates for the seven seconds of nudity was nearly $1.24 million. See Brief for Respondent ABC, Inc., et al. 7 (hereinafter ABC Brief). The Government argues instead that ABC had notice that the scene in NYPD Blue would be considered indecent in light of a1960 decision where the Commission declared that the “televising of nudes might well raise a serious question of programming contrary to 18 U. S. C. §1464.” Brief for Petitioners 32 (quoting Enbanc Programming Inquiry, 44 FCC 2303, 2307 (internal quotation marks omitted)). This argument does not prevail. An isolated and ambiguous statement from a 1960 Commission decision does not suffice for the fair notice required when the Governmentintends to impose over a $1 million fine for allegedly impermissible speech. The Commission, furthermore, had released decisions before sanctioning ABC that declined to find isolated and brief moments of nudity actionably inde16
FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.
Opinion of the Court
cent. See, e.g., In re Application of WGBH, 69 F. C. C. 2d, at 1251, 1255 (declining to find broadcasts contain- ing nudity to be indecent and emphasizing the difference between repeated and isolated expletives); In re WPBN/ WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd. 1838, 1840 (2000) (finding full frontal nudity in Schind-ler’s List not indecent). This is not to say, of course, thata graphic scene from Schindler’s List involving nude concentration camp prisoners is the same as the showerscene from NYPD Blue. It does show, however, that the Government can point to nothing that would have given ABC affirmative notice that its broadcast would be considered actionably indecent. It is likewise not sufficient for the Commission to assert, as it did in its order, that though “the depiction [of nudity] here is not as lengthy orrepeated” as in some cases, the shower scene nonetheless “does contain more shots or lengthier depictions of nudity”than in other broadcasts found not indecent. 23 FCC Rcd., at 3153. This broad language fails to demonstrate thatABC had fair notice that its broadcast could be found indecent. In fact, a Commission ruling prior to the airingof the NYPD Blue episode had deemed 30 seconds of nudebuttocks “very brief ” and not actionably indecent in thecontext of the broadcast. See Letter from Norman Goldstein to David Molina, FCC File No. 97110028 (May 26,1999), in App. to Brief for Respondent ABC Television Affiliates Assn. et al. 1a; see also Letter from Edythe Wise to Susan Cavin, FCC File No. 91100738 (Aug. 13, 1992), id., at 18a, 19a. In light of this record of agency decisions, and the absence of any notice in the 2001 Guidance that seven seconds of nude buttocks would be found indecent, ABC lacked constitutionally sufficient notice prior to being sanctioned.
The Commission failed to give Fox or ABC fair noticeprior to the broadcasts in question that fleeting expletives and momentary nudity could be found actionably indecent.
17 Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
Opinion of the Court
Therefore, the Commission’s standards as applied to these broadcasts were vague, and the Commission’s orders must be set aside.
III It is necessary to make three observations about the scope of this decision. First, because the Court resolves these cases on fair notice grounds under the Due Process Clause, it need not address the First Amendment implications of the Commission’s indecency policy. It is arguedthat this Court’s ruling in Pacifica (and the less rigorousstandard of scrutiny it provided for the regulation ofbroadcasters, see 438 U. S. 726) should be overruled because the rationale of that case has been overtaken bytechnological change and the wide availability of multipleother choices for listeners and viewers. See, e.g., ABC Brief 48–57; Brief for Respondent Fox Television Stations,Inc., et al. 15–26. The Government for its part maintainsthat when it licenses a conventional broadcast spectrum,the public may assume that the Government has its owninterest in setting certain standards. See Brief for Petitioners 40–53. These arguments need not be addressed here. In light of the Court’s holding that the Commission’spolicy failed to provide fair notice it is unnecessary to reconsider Pacifica at this time. This leads to a second observation. Here, the Court rules that Fox and ABC lacked notice at the time of their broadcasts that the material they were broadcasting could be found actionably indecent under then-existing policies. Given this disposition, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the constitutionality of the current indecencypolicy as expressed in the Golden Globes Order and subsequent adjudications. The Court adheres to its normal practice of declining to decide cases not before it. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 631 (1950) (“Broader issues have been urged for our consideration, but we
18 FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.
Opinion of the Court
adhere to the principle of deciding constitutional questions only in the context of the particular case before the Court”).
Third, this opinion leaves the Commission free to modify its current indecency policy in light of its determination of the public interest and applicable legal requirements. And it leaves the courts free to review the current policy or anymodified policy in light of its content and application.
* * *
The judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with the principles set forth in this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR took no part in the considerationor decision of these cases.
_________________
_________________
Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 1
GINSBURG, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 10–1293
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.,
ET AL.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ABC, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 21, 2012]
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in the judgment.
In my view, the Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978), was wrong when it issued. Time, technological advances, and the Commission’s untenable rulings in the cases now before the Court show why Pacifica bears reconsideration. Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 532–535 (2009) (THOMAS, J., concurring).

Criminal law — Offences — Disobeying order of court — Criminal charge laid for disobeying superior court order in civil matter — Criminal Code provision making it criminal offence to disobey court order unless "a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law" — Rules of Civil Procedure providing for contempt procedures — Whether exception to Criminal Code provision applies — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 127 — Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rules 60.11, 60.12 The appellant was charged under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code with disobeying a court order, granted in 1994, that enjoined her and others from displaying protest signs in the vicinity of specific abortion clinics. She brought a pre-trial motion to quash the information on the ground that the exception in s. 127(1) applied because Ontario Rules 60.11 and 60.12 precluded the application of s. 127(1). The courts below held that they did not. Held: (Fish J. dissenting) The appeal should be dismissed. Per The Chief Justice, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. The exception in s. 127 will be triggered where Parliament or a legislature has provided a legal foundation for the court’s power to issue contempt orders, defined the circumstances in which a person will be found in contempt, and provided a specific punishment or mode of proceeding. On the basis of R. v. Clement, neither the specificity of the punishment nor the comprehensiveness of the procedure is determinative of whether a law satisfies the conditions for ousting the application of s. 127 of the Cr. C. Rather, the determination must be based on a conclusion that Parliament or the legislature intended to limit the application of s. 127 by creating an express alternative statutory response to acts amounting to contempt of court. The fact that rules of court provide for punishment or a mode of proceeding is also not sufficient to trigger the exception if the order was issued pursuant to the court’s inherent common law power. The Ontario Rules do not define contempt or specify the circumstances in which a person will be found in contempt. A judge must thus rely on the “common law substratum” in issuing an order for contempt under Rule 60.11. Further, the Ontario Rules do not establish the legal foundation for a contempt proceeding, but simply circumscribe the judge’s power to make orders on finding a person in contempt. The common law must also be relied on in deciding on the offender’s punishment. As a result, while Rules 60.11 and 60.12 set out in considerable detail the procedure to be followed on a motion for a contempt order, in light of the Court’s reasoning in Clement, procedure alone is insufficient to trigger the exception in s. 127. Per Fish J. (dissenting): Rule 60.11(1), authorized by statute, provides a legislative foundation for the enforcement of court orders. It sets out in detail a complete procedural framework for the obtaining, the making and the enforcement of the orders it expressly contemplates. The power to make and enforce the order flows from the promulgation of the rule and not from the inherent common law powers of superior courts. The same is true of the sanctions: They are expressly set out in the relevant rules and neither is dependent on, nor circumscribed by, the common law relating to disobedience of court orders. Manifestly, this legislative scheme is not at all analogous to the rules considered in Clement. Rules 60.11 and 60.12 do not merely recognize or preserve the common law. On the contrary, they go beyond the common law and create an express mode of proceeding that carries with it express judicial powers. The exception in s. 127 of the Criminal Code does not require more.

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

CITATION: R. v. Gibbons, 2012 SCC 28

DATE: 20120608 DOCKET: 33813

BETWEEN:

Linda Dale Gibbons

Appellant

and

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

CORAM: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT: (paras. 1 to 16) DISSENTING REASONS: (paras. 17 to 39)

Deschamps J. (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. concurring) Fish J.

NOTE: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.

 

R. v. GIBBONS

Linda Dale Gibbons                                                                                         Appellant

v.

Her Majesty the Queen                                                                                Respondent

Indexed as:  R. v. Gibbons

2012 SCC 28

File No.:  33813.

2011:  December 14; 2012:  June 8.

Present:  McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

                    Criminal law — Offences — Disobeying order of court — Criminal charge laid for disobeying superior court order in civil matter — Criminal Code provision making it criminal offence to disobey court order unless "a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law" — Rules of Civil Procedure providing for contempt procedures — Whether exception to Criminal Code provision applies — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 127 — Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rules 60.11, 60.12

                    The appellant was charged under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code with disobeying a court order, granted in 1994, that enjoined her and others from displaying protest signs in the vicinity of specific abortion clinics.  She brought a pre-trial motion to quash the information on the ground that the exception in s. 127(1) applied because Ontario Rules 60.11 and 60.12 precluded the application of s. 127(1).  The courts below held that they did not.

                    Held:  (Fish J. dissenting) The appeal should be dismissed.

                    Per The Chief Justice, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.  The exception in s. 127 will be triggered where Parliament or a legislature has provided a legal foundation for the court’s power to issue contempt orders, defined the circumstances in which a person will be found in contempt, and provided a specific punishment or mode of proceeding.  On the basis of R. v. Clement, neither the specificity of the punishment nor the comprehensiveness of the procedure is determinative of whether a law satisfies the conditions for ousting the application of s. 127 of the Cr. C.  Rather, the determination must be based on a conclusion that Parliament or the legislature intended to limit the application of s. 127 by creating an express alternative statutory response to acts amounting to contempt of court.  The fact that rules of court provide for punishment or a mode of proceeding is also not sufficient to trigger the exception if the order was issued pursuant to the court’s inherent common law power.  The Ontario Rules do not define contempt or specify the circumstances in which a person will be found in contempt.  A judge must thus rely on the “common law substratum” in issuing an order for contempt under Rule 60.11.  Further, the Ontario Rules do not establish the legal foundation for a contempt proceeding, but simply circumscribe the judge’s power to make orders on finding a person in contempt.  The common law must also be relied on in deciding on the offender’s punishment.  As a result, while Rules 60.11 and 60.12 set out in considerable detail the procedure to be followed on a motion for a contempt order, in light of the Court’s reasoning in Clement, procedure alone is insufficient to trigger the exception in s. 127.

                    Per Fish J. (dissenting):  Rule 60.11(1), authorized by statute, provides a legislative foundation for the enforcement of court orders.  It sets out in detail a complete procedural framework for the obtaining, the making and the enforcement of the orders it expressly contemplates.  The power to make and enforce the order flows from the promulgation of the rule and not from the inherent common law powers of superior courts.  The same is true of the sanctions: They are expressly set out in the relevant rules and neither is dependent on, nor circumscribed by, the common law relating to disobedience of court orders.  Manifestly, this legislative scheme is not at all analogous to the rules considered in Clement.  Rules 60.11 and 60.12 do not merely recognize or preserve the common law.  On the contrary, they go beyond the common law and create an express mode of proceeding that carries with it express judicial powers.  The exception in s. 127 of the Criminal Code does not require more.

Cases Cited

By Deschamps J.

                    Applied:  R. v. Clement, 1981 CanLII 212 (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 468; referred to: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman reflex, (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 229; R. v. Traves 2000 CanLII 19596 (SK PC), (2000), 192 Sask. R. 128; R. v. Dawson 1995 CanLII 4253 (NS CA), (1995), 143 N.S.R. (2d) 1; R. v. Thompson, [1995] B.C.J. No. 2819 (QL); R. v. Creamer, 2001 ABPC 184, 297 A.R. 151; R. v. MacLean, 2002 NSSC 283 (CanLII), 2002 NSSC 283, 210 N.S.R. (2d) 150; R. v. Mulhall, [2001] O.J. No. 5237 (QL); R. v. Hinse, 1995 CanLII 54 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597; R. v. Gaudreault 1995 CanLII 5075 (QC CA), (1995), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 270.

By Fish J. (dissenting)

                    Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman reflex, (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 229; R. v. Clement, 1981 CanLII 212 (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 468.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C‑25, art. 49.

Constitution Act, 1967, s. 96.

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43.

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 127, 545, 686.

Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 139.

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, rr. 60.11, 60.12.

Authors Cited

Great Britain.  Criminal Code Bill Commission.  Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences:  With an Appendix Containing a Draft Code embodying the Suggestions of the Commissioners.  London:  The Commission, 1879.

                    APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Goudge, Feldman and Watt JJ.A.), 2010 ONCA 77 (CanLII), 2010 ONCA 77, 100 O.R. (3d) 248, 258 O.A.C. 182, 251 C.C.C. (3d) 460, 73 C.R. (6th) 23, [2010] O.J. No. 342 (QL), 2010 CarswellOnt 476, affirming a decision of Frank J., 2009 CanLII 31598 (ON SC), 2009 CanLII 31598, [2009] O.J. No. 2559 (QL), 2009 CarswellOnt 3525, setting aside the quashing of an information by Moore J.  Appeal dismissed, Fish J. dissenting.

                    Daniel C. Santoro and Nicolas M. Rouleau, for the appellant.

                    Susan Magotiaux and Matthew Asma, for the respondent.

            The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.was delivered by

                        DESCHAMPS J. —

[1]                              This appeal concerns the interpretation of s. 127 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (“Cr. C.”), in light of this Court’s decision inR. v. Clement, 1981 CanLII 212 (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 468. The question is whether the provisions of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (“Ontario Rules”), governing motions for contempt orders, preclude the application of s. 127 Cr. C., which makes it a criminal offence to disobey a court order.  On appeal, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and Ontario Court of Appeal, relying on Clement, held that they do not. I agree. In my view, the exception in s. 127 is meant to apply where there is an express alternative statutory response to failures to obey court orders. I would dismiss the appeal.

[2]                              The appellant was charged in 2008 under s. 127(1) with disobeying a court order. The court order in question was an interlocutory injunction granted in 1994 by Adams J. that was still in force when the charge was laid (sub nom. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman reflex, (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 229). It enjoined the appellant and others from displaying protest signs in the vicinity of specific abortion clinics. The appellant allegedly displayed a protest sign on October 8, 2008 within the prohibited distance from one of the clinics. The present proceedings result from a pre-trial motion brought by the appellant to quash the information on the ground that Ontario Rules 60.11 and 60.12 preclude the application of s. 127(1).

[3]                              Section 127 of the Cr. C. reads as follows:

127. (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give the order, other than an order for the payment of money, is, unless a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of

(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

[4]                              The offence established in s. 127(1) came into being as an indictable offence in s. 139 of the Criminal Code of 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29, which was based on s. 115 of the English Draft Code (Appendix to the Report of the Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences (1879)), at p. 88. In the Draft Code, the “penalty or other mode of proceeding” had not only to be “expressly provided by law”, but also to be “intended to be exclusive of all other punishment for such disobedience”:

Every one shall be guilty of an indictable offence, and shall be liable upon conviction thereof to one year's imprisonment, who without lawful excuse disobeys any lawful order made by any court of justice or by any person or body of persons authorised by any statute to make or give such order, unless some penalty or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law and is intended to be exclusive of all other punishment for such disobedience. [Emphasis added; p. 88.]

It is instructive that the exception in the Canadian provision is worded more broadly than its English predecessor. However, in amending this provision over time, Parliament has consistently required that the punishment or other mode of proceeding be “expressly provided by law”, thereby ensuring that the provision would have an important role.

[5]                              In Clement, this Court held that the term “lawful order” in s. 127 (then s. 116) refers to a court order that is either “criminal or civil in nature” (p. 472). It also held that the “law” referred to in that section is statute law. The Court was of the view that the inherent power of a court to conduct its business and punish for contempt cannot be said to be “expressly provided” within the meaning of s. 127: something “inherent”, almost by its nature, is not “express” (p. 476). The Court held that the provisions of the Rules of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba were insufficient to preclude the application of s. 127, because they did not provide the legal foundation for a proceeding for contempt of court. Instead, the common law continued to provide such a foundation. The Court added that, “[w]ithout that common law substratum, these rules alone cannot be a fulfilment of the exceptional requirement of s. [127(1)] that there be ‘some penalty or punishment or other mode of proceeding ... expressly provided by law...’” (p. 475).

[6]                              In Clement, the Court rejected the argument that, if the inherent power of superior courts to punish for contempt was not sufficient to trigger the exception, there would be no limitation on the availability of s. 127 for the enforcement of compliance with court orders. It noted that there are instances in which punishment or other modes of proceeding are expressly provided by law, such as in s. 545 (then s. 472) of the Cr. C. (p. 479).

[7]                              Clement has been interpreted in different ways by lower courts. In some cases, specific punishments and modes of proceeding, applicable to specific situations, have been held to fall within the exception in s. 127 (R. v. Traves 2000 CanLII 19596 (SK PC), (2000), 192 Sask. R. 128 (Prov. Ct.), at para. 14; R. v. Dawson 1995 CanLII 4253 (NS CA), (1995), 143 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.), at para. 27). Other courts have considered whether the particular procedure for obtaining a contempt order was comprehensive (R. v. Thompson, [1995] B.C.J. No. 2819 (QL), at paras. 38-40; R. v. Creamer, 2001 ABPC 184, 297 A.R. 151, at paras. 22, 24; R. v. MacLean, 2002 NSSC 283 (CanLII), 2002 NSSC 283, 20 N.S.R. (2d) 150, at para. 30; R. v. Mulhall, [2001] O.J. No. 5237 (QL) (Ct. J.), at paras. 10-11).

[8]                              On the basis of Clement, however, neither the specificity of the punishment nor the comprehensiveness of the procedure is determinative of whether a law satisfies the conditions for ousting the application of s. 127 of the Cr. C. Rather, the determination must be based on a conclusion that Parliament or the legislature intended to limit the application of s. 127 by creating an express alternative statutory response to acts amounting to contempt of court. The exception in s. 127 will be triggered where Parliament or a legislature has provided a legal foundation for the court’s power to issue contempt orders, defined the circumstances in which a person will be found in contempt, and provided a specific punishment or mode of proceeding.Section 545 of the Criminal Code, to which this Court referred in Clement, is one example of such a provision.

[9]                              The fact that rules of court provide for punishment or a mode of proceeding is not sufficient to trigger the exception if the order is issued pursuant to the court’s inherent common law power. With respect for the opinion of my colleague Fish J., this case cannot be distinguished from Clementon the ground that the Ontario Rules provide a more detailed procedural framework than the Manitoba Rules did and are, in his view, “expressly provided by law” within the meaning ascribed to s. 127 in that case.  I agree with the Court of Appeal 2010 ONCA 77 (CanLII), (2010 ONCA 77, 100 O.R. (3d) 248) in the case at bar that, while the Ontario Rules provide a much more detailed procedure than did the rules at issue in Clement, the former are as dependent on the common law for their legal foundation as the latter were (para. 41). The adoption of rules of procedure governing the exercise of a superior court’s inherent jurisdiction will not preclude the application of s. 127 unless Parliament or a legislature has explicitly authorized the court to sanction failures to obey the court order.

[10]                          The appellant asks this Court to reconsider the requirement from Clement  of an express legal foundation for contempt proceedings in a superior court. She contends that s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 already provides for such a legal foundation and that “[t]o require a provision to provide the legal foundation for the authority of a superior court to take contempt proceedings is an impossibility”. This argument cannot be accepted. The inherent powers of a superior court to conduct its business and punish for contempt are founded on its power to act as a court of general jurisdiction. The constitutional provision that enables superior courts to so act does not expressly confer on them a power to address the public wrong of disobeying a court order.

[11]                          Parliament and the legislatures may provide an express alternative response to the failure to obey a court order even where the court’s power to take contempt proceedings originates in the common law. An analogous issue was considered in R. v. Hinse, 1995 CanLII 54 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597, in which this Court noted that, while the power of an appellate court to enter a stay of proceedings derives from the inherent jurisdiction of a superior court, s. 686 of the Cr. C. gives the power “statutory form”. When a court of appeal stays proceedings for abuse of process, the source of its authority is thus statutory (para. 23).  Likewise, as the Quebec Court of Appeal found in R. v. Gaudreault 1995 CanLII 5075 (QC CA), (1995), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 270, at p. 276, the Quebec legislature has, in art. 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, anchored the Superior Court’s power to issue contempt orders in statute.  By further defining when a person will be found in contempt and providing for a specific punishment (arts. 50-51), it has enacted an express statutory response to the failure to obey a court order, thereby rendering s. 127 inoperative.

[12]                          The appellant invokes policy reasons to justify the proposition that s. 127 should apply only when there is “no other means of enforcement”. In her view, the court that issued the original order is in the best position to determine whether the order has been disobeyed. While I agree that this is a valid policy consideration, it cannot prevent the Crown from relying on s. 127 where the conditions that would trigger the exception are not met. 

[13]                          The appellant also suggests that provincial governments may be encouraged to relinquish their responsibility to administer provincial schemes. In response to this argument, I note that no evidence was adduced to demonstrate an overuse of s. 127 to sanction contempt of court.  Another point that bears mentioning is that, in the Court of Appeal, the appellant sought leave to argue that the prosecution should be stayed as an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal denied this leave and the appellant did not seek leave to argue the issue in this Court.

I.  Application

[14]                          The Ontario Rules do not define contempt or specify the circumstances in which a person will be found in contempt. A judge must thus rely on the “common law substratum” in issuing an order for contempt under Rule 60.11. Nor do the Ontario Rules establish the legal foundation for a contempt proceeding. They simply circumscribe, in the same way as the Manitoba Rules in Clement, the judge’s power to make orders on finding a person in contempt.

[15]                          The common law must also be relied on in deciding on the offender’s punishment. Rule 60.11(5) lays down no maximum terms of imprisonment, fines or costs, and it leaves the judge with a great deal of discretion. Rules 60.11 and 60.12 set out in considerable detail the procedure to be followed on a motion for a contempt order, but in light of the Court’s reasoning in Clement, procedure alone is insufficient to trigger the exception in s. 127.

[16]                          For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.

            The following are the reasons delivered by

                        FISH J. —

I

[17]                          Nearly 18 years ago, a judge of the Ontario Court (General Division) granted an interlocutory injunction ordering the appellant, Linda Dale Gibbons, not to display signs within 60 feet of certain abortion clinics.  Ms. Gibbons is alleged to have disobeyed that order some 14 years later, in 2008. For that, she stands charged with disobeying a court order contrary to s. 127 of the Criminal Code, which does not apply where “a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law”.

[18]                          It is undisputed that the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure (“the Rules”), are “law” within the meaning of s. 127 of the Code.  Accordingly, the sole issue on this appeal is whether they expressly provide “a punishment or other mode of proceeding” for disobedience of the court order that concerns us here.

[19]                          I am satisfied that they expressly provide both.

[20]                          As we shall see, Rules 60.11 and 60.12 provide in the plainest of terms for an “order to enforce an order requiring a person to do an act ... or to abstain from doing an act”.  They set out the governing procedural requirements in detail. And they set out the sanctions for non-compliance ― which include imprisonment, a fine, and the payment of costs.

[21]                          The common law origin or nomenclature of the disobedience order validly authorized by Rules 60.11 and 60.12 does not denude them of their true character as a “mode of proceeding ... expressly provided by law”.  As Estey J. explained in R. v. Clement, 1981 CanLII 212 (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 468, at p. 477:

... courts may adopt rules or procedures, but this is done … in all the provinces of our country, by exercising the sub-legislative power of enactment of rules granted by the provincial legislature, or by a court adopting rules in criminal procedure pursuant to the authority granted in s. 438 [now s. 482] of the Criminal Code, supra. In all such cases, the rules so adopted are legislative in nature and not a product generated within the common law. [Emphasis added.]

[22]                          There is no suggestion that Ms. Gibbons is not subject to an enforcement order or to the sanctions for non-compliance expressly provided by these rules.

[23]                          And there is no suggestion ― nor can there be ― that Ms. Gibbons is subject to prosecution under s. 127 of the Criminal Code for disobeying the court order made against her in 1994 if, as I believe, “a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by [Rules 60.11 and 60.12]”.

[24]                          Accordingly, with respect for those who are of a different view, I would allow the appeal and quash the information laid against Ms. Gibbons pursuant to s. 127 of the Criminal Code.

II

[25]                          Crown counsel submits that the outcome of this appeal is settled by R. v. Clement, but, in my respectful view, Clement is distinguishable.

[26]                          Clement was concerned with the old Rules of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba, which merely reaffirmed the inherent power of the superior court to enforce its own process.  Unlike the rules that concern us here, they did not expressly create another mode of proceeding to address disobeyed court orders.  For that, one looked to the common law.

[27]                          The relevant rules in this case do not share the same limitations. I agree in this regard with Watt J.A., speaking for the Court of Appeal.  As Justice Watt explained:

Rules 60.11 and 60.12 are much more detailed, specific and comprehensive provisions for litigants who seek a contempt order than those portions of the Rules of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba under consideration in Clement. [para. 41]

[28]                          The mode of proceeding in Rules 60.11 and 60.12 is express — an originating motion, complete with notice requirements, affidavit support, prescribed forms, and powers of the court in disposing of such motions — and, I repeat, it is expressly provided by law — more particularly, by the Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated under the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43.

[29]                          I do not read Clement or s. 127 of the Criminal Code as requiring anything more.

[30]                          Justice Deschamps, like Justice Watt in the Court of Appeal, finds that the Rules “do [not] establish the legal foundation for … contempt” and that a judge must rely on the “common law substratum” when issuing a contempt order (para. 14).  According to my colleague, Rules 60.11 and 60.12 merely circumscribe the judge’s inherent power to make orders pursuant to a finding of contempt, as the Manitoba Rules did in Clement.

[31]                          With respect, Rules 60.11 and 60.12 go further.

[32]                          Rule 60.11(1) expressly provides for an order “to enforce an order requiring a person to do an act, other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing an act”.  This rule, authorized by statute, provides a legislative foundation for the enforcement of court orders. 

[33]                          It sets out in detail a complete procedural framework for the obtaining, the making and the enforcement of the orders it expressly contemplates.  The power to make and enforce the order flows from the promulgation of the rule and not from the inherent common law powers of superior courts.  The same is true of the sanctions: They are expressly set out in the relevant rules and neither is dependent on, nor circumscribed by, the common law relating to disobedience of court orders. 

[34]                          That Rules 60.11 and 60.12 expressly provide by law a detailed, specific and comprehensive “mode of proceeding” with respect to the disobedience of a court order alleged against Ms. Gibbons is clear from the text of the provisions:

60.11  (1)  A contempt order to enforce an order requiring a person to do an act, other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing an act, may be obtained only on motion to a judge in the proceeding in which the order to be enforced was made.

(2)  The notice of motion shall be served personally on the person against whom a contempt order is sought, and not by an alternative to personal service, unless the court orders otherwise.

(3)  An affidavit in support of a motion for a contempt order may contain statements of the deponent’s information and belief only with respect to facts that are not contentious, and the source of the information and the fact of the belief shall be specified in the affidavit

(4)  A judge may issue a warrant (Form 60K) for the arrest of the person against whom a contempt order is sought where the judge is of the opinion that the person’s attendance at the hearing is necessary in the interest of justice and it appears that the person is not likely to attend voluntarily.

(5)  In disposing of a motion under subrule (1), the judge may make such order as is just, and where a finding of contempt is made, the judge may order that the person in contempt,

(a) be imprisoned for such period and on such terms as are just;

(b) be imprisoned if the person fails to comply with a term of the             

      order;

(c) pay a fine;

(d) do or refrain from doing an act;

(e) pay such costs as are just; and

(f) comply with any other order that the judge considers

     necessary,

and may grant leave to issue a writ of sequestration under rule 60.09 against the person’s property.

(6)  Where a corporation is in contempt, the judge may also make an order under subrule (5) against any officer or director of the corporation and may grant leave to issue a writ of sequestration under rule 60.09 against his or her property.

(7)  An order under subrule (5) for imprisonment may be enforced by the issue of a warrant of committal (Form 60L).

(8)  On motion, a judge may discharge, set aside, vary or give directions in respect of an order under subrule (5) or (6) and may grant such other relief and make such other order as is just.

(9)  Where a person fails to comply with an order requiring the doing of an act, other than the payment of money, a judge on motion may, instead of or in addition to making a contempt order, order the act to be done, at the expense of the disobedient person, by the party enforcing the order or any other person appointed by the judge.

(10)  The party enforcing the order and any person appointed by the judge are entitled to the costs of the motion under subrule (9) and the expenses incurred in doing the act ordered to be done, fixed by the judge or assessed by an assessment officer in accordance with Rule 58.

60.12  Where a party fails to comply with an interlocutory order, the court may, in addition to any other sanction provided by these rules,

(a) stay the party’s proceeding;

(b) dismiss the party’s proceeding or strike out the party’s

      defence; or

(c) make such other order as is just.

[35]                          Manifestly, this legislative scheme is not at all analogous to the rules considered in Clement.  Rules 60.11 and 60.12 do not merely recognize or preserve the common law.  On the contrary, they create an express mode of proceeding that carries with it express judicial powers.  The exception in s. 127 of the Criminal Code does not require more.

[36]                          Unlike the old Manitoba Rules, the Ontario Rules do provide a mode of procedure, legislative in nature.  And unlike the procedure under the old Manitoba Rules, the procedure under the Rules of Civil Procedure will not “vary from court to court, and ... from circumstance to circumstance” (Clement, at p. 476).  Rules 60.11 and 60.12 go beyond the common law: providing the parties and the court with an express procedural framework. 

[37]                          It follows that Rules 60.11 and 60.12 expressly provide by law another mode of proceeding. As the phrase “punishment or other mode of proceeding ... expressly provided by law” is disjunctive, this conclusion is sufficient to preclude prosecution under s. 127 in this case.

[38]                          Finally, it is undisputed that the Attorney General of Ontario could have proceeded under Rules 60.11 and 60.12 to enforce the interlocutory order made against Ms. Gibbons in 1994.  There is no doubt how these rules operate or what the court is empowered to do when they are engaged.

III

[39]                          For all of these reasons, as stated at the outset, I would allow the appeal and quash the information laid against Ms. Gibbons, leaving the Attorney General of Ontario free, if he thinks it appropriate, to apply to the Superior Court of Justice for a contempt order pursuant to Rule 60.11.

                    Appeal dismissed, FISH J. dissenting.

                    Solicitor for the appellant:  Daniel C. Santoro, Toronto.

                    Solicitor for the respondent:  Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.