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Friday, May 11, 2012

convicted under sec.326 of I.P.C. AS The prosecution has indeed failed to establish that the deceased eventually died on account of injuries sustained by him resulting in the acquittal of accused persons under Section 302 IPC, but that part of the order passed by the Courts below does not warrant rejection of the prosecution case in toto.




                                                           REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.    802  OF 2012
                 (Arising out S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2904 of 2011)


Para Seenaiah & Anr.                         …Appellants

      Versus

State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.               …Respondents

                                    With

                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.  804-806  OF 2012
              (Arising out S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos.5597-5599 of 2011)


Damineni Rathnamma                           …Appellant

      Versus

Para Veeraiah & Ors.                         …Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    This is yet another case in  which  degenerate  village  politics  has
turned violent to claim a valuable human life.   The  prosecution  story  is
that out of two factions in village  Nagulavellatur  one  was  led  by  Para
Braimaiah (A-3) while the other was championed by  Bodduluru  Rathanam.   In
the election for the  post  of  Sarpanch  of  Nagulavellatur  village,  Smt.
Mahalakshmamma mother of Bodduluru Rathanam contested  against  Smt.  Karnam
Lalithamma who was supported by the accused persons. Smt. Karnam  Lalithamma
won the said election in the process embittering  the  relationship  between
the two groups.  It is also the case of the prosecution that complaints  and
counter-complaints by the members  of  the  two  factions  were  being  made
against each other before the police and other authorities  in  relation  to
different  issues  to  wreak  revenge  against  each  other.   The  strained
relationship and enmity between the two  factions  led  to  an  incident  in
which  the deceased is alleged to have made an attempt on the  life  of  one
Para Yandaiah, son of accused No.3 on 6th  April,  1996;  resulting  in  the
registration of  FIR No.17/96 against the former.  As an act of  reappraisal
accused Nos. 1 to 6, 8 to 10  and  18  are  alleged  to  have  attacked  one
Bathala Hajarathaiah and one Thalluru Chinnaiah on 30th May, 1996  resulting
in the registration of Crime No.28/1996 against them.  On the same  date  at
about 12.00 noon  all  the  accused  persons  are  alleged  to  have  formed
themselves into an unlawful assembly armed with  deadly  weapons  like  cart
pegs  and  rods  with  the  common  object  of  killing  the  deceased  left
Nagulavellatur village in  a  tractor  and  trailor  belonging  to  A-1  for
Yerraballi village which is situate at some distance on  the  north  eastern
side of Nagulavellatur. The prosecution case is that the accused  found  the
deceased coming along the garden of one Pendem Venugopal, got down from  the
tractor and attacked him. The deceased is alleged to have run for  his  life
towards the  West  but  the  accused  persons  overpowered  him  and  caused
multiple  injuries  including  fractures  on  his  forearm  and  legs.   The
incident is alleged to have been seen by PWs 1 and 4  who  informed  PWs.  5
and 6 about the same.  PW6 rushed to the scene of occurrence where he  found
the deceased lying in an injured condition.  On inquiry  the  deceased  told
him about the incident and the  fact  that  the  accused  had  attacked  and
injured him using cart pegs and rods.  The deceased was shifted to  Chejarla
Police Station in a  tractor  where  his  statement  was  recorded  by  Sub-
Inspector of Police. The police then shifted the injured to the hospital  at
Nellore and registered Crime No.27 of 1996 for offences under Sections  147,
148,  324,  307,  341  read  with  Section  149  IPC.  In  the   course   of
investigation the police claimed to have  seized  nine  cart  pegs  and  one
‘Bitchuva’ on the disclosure made by the accused.  The  deceased  eventually
died on 7th June, 1996 that resulted in the addition  of  Sections  148  and
302 read with Section 149 IPC to the case already registered. The  Court  of
Judicial First  Class  Magistrate,  committed  the  case  to  the  Court  of
Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court at  Nellore  where  the  accused
pleaded not guilty and claimed a trial.

3.    In support of  its  case  the  prosecution  examined  as  many  as  23
witnesses while the accused led no evidence in  defence.   The  Trial  Court
eventually came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed  to  prove
the charge of murder against the accused persons and  accordingly  acquitted
all the accused persons of the said charges. The Court,  however,  convicted
A-1, A-2  and  A-4  for  offences  punishable  under  Section  326  IPC  and
sentenced them to undergo RI for a period of  three  years  and  a  fine  of
Rs.500/- each, in default to further  undergo  SI  for  a  period  of  three
months each.

4.    Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed  by  the  Trial  Court  the
appellants filed Criminal Appeal No.2241 of 2004 while the State  of  Andhra
Pradesh filed Criminal  Appeal  No.839  of  2007  against  all  the  accused
persons questioning their  acquittal  for  offences  with  which  they  were
charged at the trial.  Criminal Revision No.138 of 2005  was  filed  by  the
complainant against the order of acquittal of accused persons.

5.    By the judgment and order under challenge in  this  appeal,  the  High
Court has, while dismissing the acquittal Appeal and the  criminal  revision
mentioned above, affirmed the conviction of A-2  and  A-4  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 326 IPC and the  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  a
period of three years awarded to them.  In so far as A-1 is  concerned,  the
High Court has set aside the conviction of  the  said  accused  and  instead
convicted him for an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC and  sentenced
him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and a fine  of
Rs.1,000/- and in default to undergo further imprisonment for  a  period  of
three months.

6.    We have heard  Mr.  K.T.S.  Tulsi,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant and Mr. V. Sridhar Reddy, counsel  for  the  respondent-State  who
have taken us through the relevant portions of  the  two  judgments  of  the
Courts below and the evidence adduced at the trial.

7.    The prosecution case rests primarily on the depositions of  PWs  1  to
3, 4, 6, 11 and 12, apart from the statement of Dr.  Krishnaiah  (PW18)  who
happened to be the Civil Surgeon posted at the relevant time  at  Government
Hospital at Nellore and Dr. C. Manohar (PW19) who conducted the  post-mortem
examination of the dead-body of the deceased.

8.    The Trial Court has upon appreciation of the depositions of PWs  1  to
4 observed:

             “As seen from the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 who  claimed
         themselves as eye witnesses to the incident it is clear  that  even
         though  they  depose  that  they  actually  witnessed  all  accused
         attacking the deceased it is clear from their evidence itself  that
         when once the attack on the deceased by accused commences all these
         4 (four) witnesses left that place out of fear.

             P.W.1 at para 2 made it clear that after  seeing  the  accused
         making an attempt to attack the deceased he was frightened  and  on
         hearing the cries of Chowdary, P.W.2, P.W.3 and  P.W.4  came  there
         and he started running P.W.3  and  P.W.2  started  running  towards
         southern side and P.W.4 ran towards northern side of the main road.

             In the evidence of P.W.2 (1st page last line and 2nd page  5th
         line) it is said that P.W.2 out of fear ran away from the place.

             In the evidence of P.W.3 (page 2 to 15 lines) he deposed  that
         due to fear of accused he did not go to  rescue  Demineni  Chowdary
         and out of fear he (P.W. 3),  P.W.1,  P.W.3  went  to  the  village
         Yerraballi and informed about the  incident  to  the  villagers  of
         Yerraballi.

             In the evidence of P.W.4 (page 2, 15 to 19 lines) she  deposed
         that due to fear she ran towards main road running from Chejerla to
         Kambampadu and in the village she found K. Penchalaiah (P.W.9)  and
         narrated the incident to him.”




9.    After discussing the evidence, the trial court concluded  that  PWs  1
to 4 were witnesses only to the initial attack  made  on  the  deceased  and
that the prosecution case mainly rested on the  dying  declaration  made  by
the deceased before the Investigating Officer. The Court observed:

             “It is said in the earlier part of the judgment that when  the
         eye witnesses, P.W.1 to 4 are treated as the persons who had only a
         chance to witnessing the initial attack made  on  the  deceased  by
         accused and immediately thereafter all  these  4  (four)  witnesses
         leaving that place out of fear.  The case  of  prosecution  depends
         upon the statement of the deceased given to P.W. 22  under  Ex.P.25
         and since Chowdary is no more, the said statement can be used as  a
         dying declaration given to P.W.22.”




10.   The Court also recorded a finding that since the  accused  had  caused
injury only on the non-vital part of body of  the  deceased,  there  was  no
intention to do away with his life.  The  Court  accordingly  acquitted  the
accused of  the  charge  of  murder  but  convicted  them  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 326 IPC while  acquitting  them  of  other  charges
framed against them.

11.   The High Court has, upon reappraisal of  the  evidence,  affirmed  the
above finding and observed:

         “It is true that learned Sessions Judge found that the evidence  of
         P.Ws. 1 to 4 as to the actual attack  on  the  deceased  cannot  be
         considered for the reasons from their own evidence.  They have left
         the scene after seeing the accused chasing the  deceased  and  they
         came only after the attack on the deceased.  The positive  evidence
         of the witnesses P.Ws. 1 to 4 is that they have enquired  with  the
         deceased and the deceased has given a statement to them as  to  the
         assailants on him.  So far as the  over  tacts  attributed  by  the
         deceased in Ex.P25 is concerned,  there  is  no  variation  in  the
         statements of P.Ws. 1 to 4 about the attack on him by  A1,  A2  and
         A4.  Therefore, if Ex.P25 is to be considered as a document pressed
         into service, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4,  who  have  immediately
         gone to the scene after the injured received the  injuries  in  the
         attack, have clearly stated that they have made  enquiries.   Apart
         from it even if their evidence as to actual attack is not  believed
         by the lower court, the fact remains that they were near the  scene
         before attack cannot be excluded because all of  them  have  stated
         that they have seen the  accused  going  in  the  tractor  and  the
         deceased being present near  the  scene.   In  a  factious  village
         naturally when such an attack is likely to take place most  of  the
         persons who are disinterested will be withdrawing  from  the  scene
         and going away for their own safety  and  therefore,  there  is  no
         unnaturality in P.Ws. 1 to 4 withdrawing from the scene  and  going
         to the village and thereafter returning only after  the  attack  on
         the deceased.  The conduct of P.Ws. 1 to 4 cannot  be  said  to  be
         unnatural and there is no reason to discard  their  evidence  about
         the information given by the deceased to them immediately after the
         attack and  within  a  short  time  and  without  there  being  any
         influence on the deceased to  implicate  the  accused.   Therefore,
         though there are some shortcomings in recording of Ex.P25 since  we
         find corroboration from the evidence of P.Ws.  1  to  4  about  the
         truthfulness over the overtacts attributed to A1, A2 and  A4  which
         are relied on by the lower court from the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4,
         we find that no appreciation of evidence  was  done  by  the  lower
         court and the lower court has rightly accepted the statement of the
         deceased Ex.P.25, which is corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws.  1
         to 4.”



12.   We do not see any infirmity or irregularity in the view taken  by  the
High Court in adopting the above line  of  reasoning.   The  fact  that  the
witnesses had seen the initial attack on the deceased and  returned  to  the
scene of occurrence after  the  accused  had  made  their  escape  good,  to
enquire from him as to what had happened is not unnatural in the  facts  and
circumstances of the case. In the absence of any compelling  reason  to  the
contrary we do not see any reason to interfere with  the  findings  recorded
by the High Court, as to  the  genesis  of  the  incident  and  the  persons
responsible for the same. The prosecution has  indeed  failed  to  establish
that the deceased eventually died on account of injuries  sustained  by  him
resulting in the acquittal of accused persons under  Section  302  IPC,  but
that part of  the  order  passed  by  the  Courts  below  does  not  warrant
rejection of the prosecution case in  toto.   There  is  sufficient  medical
evidence on record, especially in the form of depositions of Dr.  Krishnaiah
(PW18) who noticed and certified the following injuries  on  the  person  of
the deceased when he was brought to the hospital on 13th May, 1996  at  6.45
p.m.:

             “1. Patient semi  conscious.   Responding  to  deep  stimulaus
                 only.

             2.  Deformity and generalized tenderness of left fore  arm  at
                 its middle.

             3.  2” long x 1” wide muscle deep  lacerated  wound  on  lower
                 1/3rd of the left leg.  Bleeding present.

             4.  1” diameter punctured wound x ½” deep on  middle  of  left
                 leg.  Bleeding present.

             5.  Diffused swelling of both ankle joints.

             6.  Semi lunar lacerated injury on sole of left big toe.  2 ½”
                 long x ½” wide muscle deep.  Bleeding present.

             7.  3” long x ½” wide muscle deep lacerated wound in  the  web
                 between right thumb and index finger.  Bleeding present.

             8.  3” long x 2” wide reddish contusion over left buttock.




13.   Even Dr. C. Manohar (PW19) who conducted the autopsy  over  the  dead-
body of the deceased has noticed the fracture of lower  end  of  both  tibia
and fibula on both sides with bruising in the surrounding  soft  tissue  and
fracture of lower end of left fore arm bones with bruising in the left  soft
tissue. There is, thus, ample medical evidence to  support  the  prosecution
case that the deceased had sustained injuries no matter  the  same  had  not
been proved to be the cause of his death a week later.

14.   Even on the question of sentence awarded to the appellants, we see  no
reason, much less a cogent one to interfere.  In our view the conviction  of
A2 and A4 under Section 326 with a sentence of three years and fine  with  a
default sentence awarded by the Trial Court as also  the  conviction  of  A1
under Section 324 and sentence of one year with a fine of Rs.1,000/- and  in
default imprisonment for three months in the circumstances of  the  case  is
perfectly justified.

15.   In the circumstances these appeals  fail  and  are  hereby  dismissed.






                                                          ……………………….……..……J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)





                                                          ………………………….…..……J.
                                                          (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
May 10, 2012

whether the deceased knew or did not know swimming. But that issue may have assumed importance if the deceased was not disabled by the assault on a vital part of his body. In the case at hand he was assaulted with a sharp edged weapon on the head and was bleeding. His ability to swim, assuming he knew how to swim, was not, therefore, of any use to him. The injury on the head and the push into the sea have, therefore, to be construed as one single act which the appellant ought to have known was likely to cause death of the deceased. Even so exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC would come to the rescue of appellant inasmuch as the act of the appellant even when tantamount to commission of culpable homicide will not amount to murder as the same was committed without any pre-meditation and in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, in the course of a sudden quarrel without the offender taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner. The prosecution evidence sufficiently suggests that a scuffle had indeed taken place on the dinghy where the appellant and his companions were trying to recover the dinghy while the deceased was preventing them from doing so. In the course of this sudden fight and in the heat of passion the appellant assaulted the deceased and pushed him into the sea eventually resulting in his death. The act of the appellant is more appropriately punishable under Section 304 (I) of the IPC instead of Section 302 of the Code invoked by the Courts below. The appeal must to that extent succeed. 17. In the result, we allow this appeal in part and to the extent that while setting aside the conviction of the appellant for the offence of murder under Section 302 of the IPC, we convict him for culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (I) of the IPC and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for a period of eight years. Sentence of fine and imprisonment in default of payment of fine is, however, affirmed.




                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  801  OF 2012
                (Arising out S.L.P. (Crl.) No.10394 of 2010)


Abdul Nawaz                                  …Appellant

      Versus

State of West Bengal                         …Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    This appeal by special leave arises out of a judgment and order  dated
30th August, 2010 passed by the High  Court  of  Calcutta  whereby  Criminal
Appeal No.5 of 2010 filed by the appellant assailing  his  conviction  under
Section 302 of the IPC and sentence of life  imprisonment  with  a  fine  of
Rs.50,000/- and a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment  for  two  years
has been dismissed.

3.    Two policemen deployed on patrol duty examined at the trial as  PWs  1
& 3 reached Chatham Jetty at about 23.50 hrs. on the 19th  of  March,  2008.
While at the Jetty they started smelling diesel odour  and  suspecting  that
something fishy was going on, parked their motor cycle to  take  a  walk  in
the surrounding area.  Soon they noticed that  two  dinghies  were  tied  to
M.V. Pillokunji, a vehicle ferry boat stationed at  the  jetty.  In  one  of
these dinghies there were 20 drums besides  a  man  present  on  the  dinghy
while in the other there were three to four men and  14  drums,  which  were
being filled with diesel using a plastic  pipeline  drawn  from  the  vessel
mentioned above.  The suspects jumped in to one  of  the  two  dinghies  and
escaped,  when  they  saw  the  approaching  policemen  that  included  Head
Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-2) and Constable K.Vijay Rao (PW-5).   The  police
party, it appears, tried to contact police station Chatham and  the  Control
Room. While they were doing so the Engineer, Master and the  Laskar  of  the
said vessel attempted to snatch the VHF set from them.   The  police  party,
therefore, caught hold of these persons as they appeared  to  be  in  league
with the miscreants, who had  escaped.  Soon  thereafter  arrived  Constable
Amit Talukdar (PW-4) and the deceased Head Constable Shri Shaji from  Police
Station, Chatham.  After hearing the version from the patrolling  constables
and the PCR van personnel who too had  arrived  on  the  spot  the  deceased
informed the SHO, Chatham police station and  requested  him  to  reach  the
spot.  In the meantime, the deceased and PW-1 boarded the  dinghy  that  had
been left behind by the miscreants leaving the three  crew  members  of  the
vessel under the vigil of the remaining members of the police  party.   PW-1
who accompanied the deceased on to the dinghy firmly tied the  rope  of  the
dinghy but while both of them were still in the  dinghy,  the  other  dinghy
that had earlier fled away returned to the spot with four persons on  board.
 The prosecution case is that the appellant and one Abdul Gaffar were  among
those who entered the dinghy and got into a scuffle  with  the  deceased  to
secure the release  of  the  dinghy.  In  the  course  of  the  scuffle  the
appellant is alleged to have picked up a dao (sharp edged  weapon  lying  in
the dinghy) and inflicted an  injury  on  the  head  of  the  deceased.  The
appellant is then alleged to have pushed the  deceased  into  the  sea.  The
rope of the dinghy was cut  by  the  miscreants  to  escape  in  the  dinghy
towards Bambooflat.
4.    A search for the deceased was launched by the SHO after he arrived  on
the spot which proved futile.  His dead body was eventually  recovered  from
the sea by the Coast Guard Divers on 20th March, 2008 at about  6.15  hours.
The inquest was followed by the post-mortem examination  of  the  dead  body
conducted by Dr. Subrata Saha.  Statements of  witnesses  were  recorded  in
the course of investigation and the dao recovered culminating in the  filing
of a  charge-sheet  against  as  many  as  seventeen  persons  for  offences
punishable under Sections 302/392/411/201/120B/341/109 IPC.  The  case  was,
in due course, committed for trial to the court of Sessions  Judge,  Andaman
& Nicobar Islands at Port Blair before whom the accused pleaded  not  guilty
and claimed a trial.
5.    At the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 66  witnesses  apart
from placing reliance upon an equal number of documents marked at the  trial
apart from material exhibits. The accused did not examine any witnesses  but
produced a few documents in support of their defence.
6.    The Trial Court eventually convicted the appellant for an  offence  of
murder punishable under Section  302,  IPC  and  sentenced  him  to  undergo
imprisonment for life.  A-1 to A-3 were also similarly  convicted  but  only
for offences punishable under Sections 332/34  of  the  IPC.  The  remaining
accused  persons  charged  with  commission  of  offences  punishable  under
Sections 392/409/411 of the IPC were, however, acquitted.
7.    Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded to them, A-1  to  A-3
and the  appellant  herein  preferred  appeals  before  the  High  Court  of
Calcutta, Circuit Bench at Port  Blair.   By  the  impugned  judgment  under
appeal before us, the High Court has while allowing  three  of  the  appeals
filed by the other convicts, dismissed that filed by  the  appellant  herein
thereby upholding his conviction  and  the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment
awarded to him.
8.    We have heard  Mr.  Jaspal  Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant and Mr. Ashok Bhan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
respondent-State who have taken us through the judgments  under  appeal  and
the relevant portions  of  the  evidence  adduced  at  the  trial.   It  was
contended by Mr. Jaspal Singh that the prosecution case rests  primarily  on
the depositions of PWs  1  &  2  as  the  remaining  police  witnesses  were
admittedly at some distance from the  place  of  occurrence.  Out  of  these
witnesses PW-1, according to Mr. Jaspal Singh, was not worthy of credit  and
could not, therefore, be relied upon. A draft  FIR  was,  according  to  the
learned counsel, prepared by PW65-the investigating  officer  which  PW1  is
said to have signed without even reading the same.  This  implied  that  the
version given in the FIR was not that of the witness, but of the person  who
had drafted the same. It was further contended that  although  the  FIR  was
recorded at 1:30 a.m., the body of the deceased was recovered only at  about
5:40 a.m. In the intervening period it was not known  whether  the  deceased
was alive or dead. The FIR purportedly registered at  about  1:30  a.m.  all
the same alleged the commission of an offence under Section 302  IPC.  This,
according to Mr. Singh, indicated that the FIR was actually registered  much
after the recovery of the body.  Mr. Jaspal Singh, further,  contended  that
PW-2 was not an eye-witness and had not corroborated the  version  given  by
PW-1. He had instead improved his own version given in the  statement  under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. He further contended that the name of the appellant  had
been introduced subsequently as the contemporaneous  documents  showed  that
the name of the assailant was not known.
9.    The Trial Court has viewed the occurrence in two  distinct  sequences.
The first sequence comprises the police party’s  arrival  on  the  spot  and
discovering the process of removal of diesel from  the  bigger  vessel  into
the dinghies carrying drums with the help of a  pipe  and  a  pump  and  the
escape of the four persons from the place after the  police  went  near  the
spot. The second sequence comprises three crew members of the  vessel  being
detained by the police party, the arrival of  the  deceased  head  Constable
Shaji from police station-Chatham, the deceased entering the  second  dinghy
left behind by the miscreants, the return of the four persons including  the
appellant to the place  of  occurrence,  a  scuffle  ensuing  in  which  the
deceased was hit on the head and pushed  into  the  sea.   The  Trial  Court
considered the evidence on record carefully in the context of the above  two
sequences and came to the conclusion that the return  of  the  appellant  to
recover the second dinghy, a scuffle taking place between the appellant  and
the deceased Head Constable-Shaji  on  board  the  second  dinghy,  and  the
deceased being hit with a dao by the appellant and  being  pushed  into  the
sea was proved by the evidence on record.
10.   In appeal, the High Court re-appraised the  evidence  adduced  by  the
prosecution and affirmed  the  findings  recorded  by  the  Trial  Court  as
regards the presence and return of  Nawaz to recover the second dinghy  left
behind by the miscreants, the assault on the deceased with a  dao   and  his
being pushed into the sea.  The High Court found  that  the  depositions  of
PWs1 and 2 to the  extent  they  proved  the  above  facts  was  cogent  and
consistent hence acceptable.  The High Court observed:


         “From the above versions of the prosecution witnesses, it seems  to
         be clear that the victim had been  assaulted  by  a  dao  and  then
         pushed into the sea water and it  was  thereafter  that  PW-2,  for
         sending message, left for the PCR van. It is in the evidence of PWs
         1 and 2 that they noticed Nawaz to be the assailant of the  victim.
         While PW-1 was categorical that Nawaz pushed the  victim  into  the
         sea water, PW-2 did not specifically say who pushed the victim into
         the sea water but having regard to the sequence of  events  sighted
         by him  which  support  the  version  of  PW-1,  it  would  not  be
         unreasonable to conclude based on the version of PW-1 that  it  was
         Nawaz who had also pushed the victim into the sea water.
         Number of similarities appear from  a  reading  of  the  respective
         versions of PWs 1 and 2, viz. that PW-2 and other staff who were on
         the vehicle approaching the jetty were stopped by PW-1; that  there
         were 20 drums on one dinghy and 14 drums on the other; that through
         green coloured pipe, diesel was being supplied to  the  drums  from
         the said vessel; that the victim picked up the mobile  phone  lying
         in the detained dinghy; that PW-1 had come over to the said  vessel
         for tying the dinghy; that both recognized Nawaz as the person  who
         picked up the dao from the dinghy and hit  the  victim.  These  are
         some evidence tendered by PWs 1 and 2 which are absolutely mutually
         consistent. That apart, the other witnesses  present  at  the  spot
         (though had  not  recognized  Nawaz  or  been  informed  about  the
         identity of the assailant), had heard that the victim was assaulted
         with a dao.”


11.   Relying upon  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Bharwada  Bhoginbhai
Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat,  (1983) 3 SCC 217, the High Court  held  that
minor discrepancies in the depositions of witnesses which did not go to  the
root of the matter cannot  result  in  the  entire  prosecution  case  being
thrown out.
12.   We do not see any palpable error in the approach adopted by  the  High
Court  in  appreciating  the  evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution.   The
deposition of PWs 1 & 2 regarding the  presence  of  the  appellant  at  the
place of occurrence, his getting into a scuffle  with  the  deceased  in  an
attempt to recover the dinghy and the assault on the deceased, who was  then
pushed into  the  sea  is,  in  our  opinion,  satisfactorily  proved.   The
discrepancies indicated by Mr. Jaspal Singh in the recording of the FIR,  or
the offence under which it was registered are not of much  significance  and
do not, in our view, affect the  substratum  of  the  prosecution  case.  We
accordingly affirm the findings of the two Courts below to the  extent  that
the appellant was indeed one of the four persons who returned to  the  place
of occurrence to recover the second dinghy that  had  been  left  behind  by
them and  finding  the  deceased-Head  Constable  Shaji  inside  the  dinghy
assaulted him in the course of  a  scuffle  and  eventually  took  away  the
dinghy with the help of his companions, after  the  deceased  was  assaulted
and pushed into the sea.
13.    That brings us to the second limb of Mr.  Jaspal  Singh’s  contention
in support of the appeal.  It was contended by  him  that  the  evidence  on
record established that the appellant had not come armed  to  the  place  of
occurrence.  The dao allegedly used by him for assaulting the  deceased  was
even according to  the  prosecution  lying  within  the  dinghy.   That  the
appellant had not repeated the act and the intensity of  the  dao  blow  was
not severe enough inasmuch as it had not caused any fracture  on  the  skull
of the deceased.
14.     It was  further  argued  that  there  was  no  evidence  medical  or
otherwise to prove that the injury inflicted by the  appellant  was  in  the
ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause death. As a  matter  of  fact,
the injury had not itself caused  the  death,  as  according  to  the  trial
Court, the victim had died of drowning.  It was urged that  while  according
to PW-1 the deceased was pushed into the sea  that  version   had  not  been
supported by PW2. To top it all the prosecution case itself  suggested  that
there was a sudden fight between the deceased  and  the  appellant  and  his
companions and it was in the course of the said fight  that  an  injury  was
sustained causing the death of the deceased thereby bringing the case  under
exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC. Relying upon the  decisions  of  this
Court in Chinnathaman v. State [2007 (14) SCC 690],  Muthu  v.  State  [2009
(17) SCC 433], Arumugam v. State [2008 (15)  SCC  590]  and  Ajit  Singh  v.
State of Punjab [2011 (9) SCC 462] and judgment of this Court in  Elavarasan
v. State [2011 (7) SCC 110] it was  contended that  the  conviction  of  the
appellant under Section 302 of the  IPC  was  erroneous  in  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case and that the evidence at  best  made  out  a  case
punishable under Section 304 Part II  of the IPC,  and  in  the  worst  case
scenario, one punishable under Section 304 Part I.


15.    The contention urged by Mr. Jaspal Singh is not wholly without  merit
to be lightly brushed aside.  The  prosecution  case  clearly  is  that  the
appellant and his companions had returned to the place  of  occurrence  only
to recover the second dinghy which they  had  left  behind  while  they  had
escaped from the spot in the other  dinghy.  It  is  not  the  case  of  the
prosecution that there was any pre-mediation to commit  the  murder  of  the
deceased.   It is also common ground that the appellant was not  armed  with
any weapon. The weapon allegedly used by him to  assault  the  deceased  was
even according to the prosecution  case  lying  in  the  said  dinghy.   The
nature of the injury inflicted upon the victim has not  been  proved  to  be
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.  The blow  given
by the appellant to the deceased had not caused any fracture on  the  skull.
The two courts below have, all the  same,  accepted  the  prosecution  story
that after the deceased was given a dao blow, the appellant pushed him  into
the sea.  That finding has been affirmed by us in the earlier part  of  this
judgment.  The question,  however,  is  whether  this  act  of  pushing  the
deceased into the sea after he was given a blow on the head, no  matter  the
blow was not proved to be severe enough to cause death by itself,  would  be
suggestive of an intention to kill.   According  to  Mr.  Jaspal  Singh  the
answer is in the negative.  That is so because,  the  main  purpose  of  the
appellant returning to the place of occurrence was not to kill any one,  but
only to have the dinghy back. The obstruction caused in  the  accomplishment
of that object could be removed by pushing the deceased  who  was  resisting
the attempt made by the appellant into the sea. The fact that  the  deceased
was pushed into the sea, should not, therefore, be seen as indication of  an
intention to kill the deceased.

16.   The appellant was interested only in having  the  dinghy  back.   That
could be done only by removing the obstruction caused by  the  deceased  who
was resisting the attempt.  Pushing the deceased into the sea could  be  one
way of removing the obstruction not necessarily  by  killing  the  deceased.
Having said that we cannot ignore the fact that the deceased  had  sustained
a head injury and was bleeding. Pushing  a  person  into  the  sea,  with  a
bleeding head injury may not have been with the intention to  kill,  but  it
would certainly show the “intention  of  causing  a  bodily  injury  as  was
likely to cause death”, within the meaning of Sections 300  &  secondly  304
Part I of the IPC.


The appellant having assaulted the deceased with a dao  and  having  thereby
disabled him sufficiently ought to have known that pushing him into the  sea
was likely to cause his death.  Pushing the deceased into  the  sea  was  in
the circumstances itself  tantamount  to  inflicting  an  injury  which  was
likely to cause the death of the deceased.  The High  Court  has  gone  into
the question whether the deceased knew or did not know swimming.   But  that
issue may have assumed importance if the deceased was not  disabled  by  the
assault on a vital part of his body.  In the case at hand he  was  assaulted
with a sharp edged weapon on the head and  was  bleeding.   His  ability  to
swim, assuming he knew how to swim, was not, therefore, of any use  to  him.
The injury on the head and the push into the  sea  have,  therefore,  to  be
construed as one single act which the appellant  ought  to  have  known  was
likely to cause death of the deceased.  Even so exception 4 to  Section  300
of the IPC would come to the rescue of appellant inasmuch as the act of  the
appellant even when tantamount to commission of culpable homicide  will  not
amount to murder as the same was committed without  any  pre-meditation  and
in a sudden fight, in the heat  of  passion,  in  the  course  of  a  sudden
quarrel without the offender taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel  or
unusual manner.  The  prosecution  evidence  sufficiently  suggests  that  a
scuffle had indeed taken place on the dinghy where  the  appellant  and  his
companions were  trying  to  recover  the  dinghy  while  the  deceased  was
preventing them from doing so. In the course of this  sudden  fight  and  in
the heat of passion the appellant assaulted  the  deceased  and  pushed  him
into the sea eventually resulting in his death.  The act  of  the  appellant
is more appropriately punishable under Section 304 (I) of  the  IPC  instead
of Section 302 of the Code invoked by the Courts below. The appeal  must  to
that extent succeed.

17.    In the result, we allow this appeal in part and to  the  extent  that
while setting aside the conviction of  the  appellant  for  the  offence  of
murder under Section 302 of the IPC, we convict him  for  culpable  homicide
not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304  (I)  of  the  IPC  and
sentence him to undergo imprisonment for a period of eight years.   Sentence
of fine and  imprisonment  in  default  of  payment  of  fine  is,  however,
affirmed.




                                                          ……………………….……..……J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)





                                                          ………………………….…..……J.
                                                          (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
May 10, 2012

The demand of dowry raised by the accused persons later for television and cooler could not be satisfied by the family of the deceased for financial limitations upon the death of father of the deceased. As a result, the deceased was treated with cruelty and physical assault. In fact, it ultimately led to her brutal murder at the hands of the husband and his family members. Not only this, the conduct of the accused prior to and immediately after the occurrence clearly shows that they were not innocent. Otherwise, there was no occasion for them to abscond after the body of the deceased was handed over to her relations. These circumstances, along with the circumstances stated by the Trial Court, are inconsistent with their innocence and consistent only with hypothesis that they had killed the deceased by setting her on fire. No explanation, much less a satisfactory explanation, has been rendered by the accused persons in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. On the contrary, the trend of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and explanations given by the defence for accused Mukesh having suffered injuries on his body are patently false and not worthy of credence.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.851 OF 2010
Rajesh Bhatnagar                                   … Appellant
                                   Versus
State of Uttarakhand                               … Respondent
                                    WITH
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.850 OF 2010

Mukesh Bhatnagar                                   … Appellant
                                   Versus
State of Uttarakhand                               … Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1.    Learned Second Additional District Judge, Haridwar, vide its  judgment
dated 2nd  December,  1996  held  all  the  three  accused,  namely,  Mukesh
Bhatnagar, Rajesh Bhatnagar and Smt. Kailasho @ Kailashwati,  guilty  of  an
offence punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code,  1860  (IPC)
for causing the death  of  Smt.  Renu  motivated  by  non-payment  of  dowry
demands and sentenced all of them to  undergo  life  imprisonment.   Against
this judgment, the appellants preferred an appeal  before  the  High  Court.
The High Court vide its judgment dated  14th  October,  2009  dismissed  the
appeal of all the accused confirming the conviction and  order  of  sentence
passed by the learned Trial Court.  Aggrieved therefrom, two of the  accused
have preferred separate appeals.  Criminal Appeal No.851 of  2010  has  been
preferred by the accused Rajesh Bhatnagar while Criminal  Appeal  No.850  of
2010 has been preferred by Mukesh Bhatnagar.  As both  these  appeals  arise
from a common judgment, we shall dispose of these  appeals  by  this  common
judgment.  The prosecution filed a charge sheet in terms of Section  173  of
the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (Cr.P.C.).   After  completing  the
investigation  and  examining  the  witnesses,  the  investigating   officer
presented  the  charge  sheet  stating  that  these  three  appellants   had
committed an offence punishable under Section 304B IPC as together they  had
burnt, by pouring kerosene, Renu, the deceased wife of  the  accused  Mukesh
Bhatnagar, as she and her parents failed to satisfy their demands of  dowry.


2.    The facts, as they appear from the record of the case,  are  that  Ms.
Renu (deceased)  was  daughter  of  Smt.  Vimla  Devi  Bhatnagar,  widow  of
Rajbahadur, resident of Mohalla  Kayasthwada,  Sikandrabad,  Police  Station
Bulandshahar.  Vimla Devi had sought a marriage alliance  for  her  daughter
Ms. Renu.  Finally, the mother of Ms. Renu and Mukesh’s  family  had  agreed
to alliance of marriage  between  Mukesh  and  Renu.   When  the  engagement
(sagai) ceremony was to be performed at the house of Mukesh, family  of  Ms.
Renu along with their relations,  Sanjay  Bhatnagar,  Shailendera  Bhatnagar
and others had gone to the house of Mukesh.  At that  time  itself,  Mukesh,
his brother Rajesh and his mother Kailasho  (all  the  accused)  demanded  a
refrigerator as dowry.  The mother and relations of the  deceased  expressed
their inability to buy a refrigerator but their request brought  no  results
and the accused family pressurized them to pay  Rs.10,000/-  for  purchasing
the refrigerator then and there.  Upon persuasion by  their  own  relations,
the family of Ms. Renu paid a sum of Rs.10,000/-  to  Rajesh  Bhatnagar  for
purchasing the refrigerator, whereafter  the  ceremony  was  performed.   On
26th May, 1994, the marriage between  the  parties  was  solemnized  as  per
Hindu rites at Roorkee.  The family of Ms. Renu had  come  to  Roorkee  from
Sikandrabad to perform the marriage at Roorkee to  the  convenience  of  the
boy’s  family.   After  performing  the  marriage,  Ms.  Renu  went  to  her
matrimonial home while her other family members came back to their house  at
Sikandrabad (Bulandshahar).  Not even one and a half months of the  marriage
had elapsed but Mukesh is stated to have brought Renu to her parental  home,
where he informed her family that a television and a  cooler  had  not  been
given  as  dowry  in  the  marriage  and  these  articles  should  be  given
immediately.  If this was not done, he would  not  take  Renu  back  to  her
matrimonial home.  The members  of  Renu’s  family  tried  to  impress  upon
Mukesh not to pressurize  them  so  much,  but  Mukesh  persisted  with  his
demands.  At that time, Ms Renu also informed her family  members  that  all
the accused persons were beating her frequently for not bringing  television
and cooler as part of the dowry.  However, left  with  no  alternative,  the
mother and uncle of  Ms.  Renu  assured  Mukesh  that  everything  would  be
settled and he need not worry.  However, the television and cooler were  not
given at that time.  The behavior of the accused towards Ms.  Renu  did  not
change and whenever she came to her parental home, she complained about  the
behavior of her in-laws and demands of dowry  from  them.   She  even  wrote
letters to her family from time to time complaining  of  cruel  behavior  of
the accused towards her.  In May 1995, Ms. Renu gave birth to a male  child.
 On 18th October, 1995, unfortunately, the father of Ms.  Renu  expired  and
thereafter the family was not able to meet the dowry demands raised  by  the
accused persons.  Sometime in the second week of  November  1995,  Ms.  Renu
came to her parental home at 11.00 p.m. in the night.   She  was  alone  and
had not even brought her child with her.  Being surprised,  her  mother  had
asked her what had happened.  She started crying  and  informed  her  mother
and uncle that the accused persons were very unhappy, as the television  and
cooler had not been given and they had turned her  out  of  the  matrimonial
home, refusing to even give her, her child.  The mother and the uncle  tried
to pacify Ms. Renu and told her that with the passage of time, things  would
get settled and she should go back to her  matrimonial  home.   After  20-25
days, Mukesh came to his in-laws’ house.  During their meeting,  the  mother
and uncle of Ms. Renu told Mukesh to treat her properly and  said  that  the
child should not be kept away from Ms. Renu.  They also assured him that  as
soon as they could make some arrangement, they  would  give  the  television
and cooler to Mukesh.  After this assurance, Mukesh took Renu  with  him  to
the matrimonial home.  While leaving, Renu told her mother that though  they
were sending her to her matrimonial home, her in-laws  would  kill  her  and
she may not come back at all.

3.    On 17th February, 1996, the uncle of Renu received a  call  from  PW3,
Anoop Sharma, resident of Roorkee, informing  him  that  some  accident  had
taken place and Renu was not  well.   He  asked  them  to  come  to  Roorkee
immediately.  Mother and uncle of Renu came to Roorkee,  where  they  learnt
and believed that for failing to give television and cooler, Renu’s  mother-
in-law, brother-in-law and husband had sprinkled kerosene and  set  Renu  on
fire.  Before setting her on fire, accused Mukesh  had  also  beat  her  and
when Renu attempted to defend herself, even Mukesh received some bruises  on
his person.  On 17th February, 1996  itself,  the  mother  of  the  deceased
lodged a complaint with the  Police  Station  Gangnahar,  Roorkee  and  case
No.32 of 1996 under Section 304B IPC was registered on that very day.

4.    PW5, Sub-Inspector R.P. Purohit  and  PW7,  Deputy  S.P.,  M.L.  Ghai,
along with other police officers, reached the place  of  occurrence,  filled
the panchayatnama, Ext.Ka-7, prepared the sketch of the place of  occurrence
and took the body of the deceased into  custody  vide  Exts.Ka-8  and  Ka-1.
The dead body was sent for post mortem and  photographs  of  the  dead  body
were taken vide  Exts.  1,  3  and  3.   The  articles  found  at  place  of
occurrence, like container containing kerosene, empty  container  which  was
having smell of kerosene, the stove pin, burnt  ash,  cloth  rope,  bangles,
cloths of the deceased, one match box, etc. were  recovered  from  the  site
and were taken into custody vide Exts. 18 to 27.  The post mortem report  of
the deceased was Ext. Ka-6 whereafter the dead body was handed over  to  her
family members.  Injuries were also found  on  the  person  of  the  accused
Mukesh and he was subjected to medical examination on  17th  February,  1996
at about 12.30  p.m.  vide  Ext.  Ka-22.   When  M.L.  Ghai,  PW7,  on  17th
February, 1996 before the arrest  of  the  accused  persons  went  to  their
house, he found the house open and the  accused  were  absconding.   He  had
directed that a lock be put on the  door  of  the  house,  which  was  later
opened and the site map Ext.Ka-9 was prepared.

5.    All the accused faced the trial and were convicted.  Their  conviction
and the sentence awarded by the Trial  Court  were  confirmed  by  the  High
Court, as already noticed above.  This is how the present  appeals  come  up
for consideration of this Court.

6.    First and foremost, it has been contended on behalf of the  appellants
that in the present case, the ingredients of  Section  304  B  IPC  are  not
satisfied and as such, they cannot be  convicted  for  that  offence.   This
contention is sought to be buttressed by the counsel while relying upon  the
letters Exts. Ka-2 to Ka-5 (four letters).  The argument is  that  since  no
complaint of dowry has been  made  in  these  letters,  therefore,  it  must
follow that there was no demand of dowry made by the  accused  persons.   In
absence of such demand, the rigours of Section 304B do not come  into  play.
Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of this Court in  the  cases  of
Meka Ramaswamy v. Dasari Mohan & Ors. [AIR 1998 SC 774]  and  Rajesh  Tandon
v. State of Punjab [1994 (1) SCALE 816].

7.    Before we examine the merit or otherwise of this contention,  it  will
be useful  to  state  the  basic  ingredients  of  Section  304B  IPC.   The
requirement of Section 304B is that the  death  of  a  woman  be  caused  by
burns, bodily injury or  otherwise  than  in  normal  circumstances,  within
seven years of her marriage.  Further, it should be shown that  soon  before
her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or  her
husband’s family or relatives and thirdly, that such  harassment  should  be
in relation to a  demand  for  dowry.   Once  these  three  ingredients  are
satisfied, her death shall be treated as a ‘dowry death’ and once  a  ‘dowry
death’ occurs, such husband or relative shall be  presumed  to  have  caused
her death.  Thus, by fiction of  law,  the  husband  or  relative  would  be
presumed to have committed the offence of dowry death rendering them  liable
for punishment unless the  presumption  is  rebutted.   It  is  not  only  a
presumption of law in relation to  a  death  but  also  a  deemed  liability
fastened upon the husband/relative by operation of law.  This Court, in  the
case of Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana [(2011) 11 SCC 359],  while  analyzing
the provisions of Section 304B of the Act, held as under :

           “18. In such a fact situation, the provisions of  Section  113-B
           of the Evidence Act, 1872 providing  for  presumption  that  the
           accused is responsible for dowry death, have to  be  pressed  in
           service. The said provisions read as under:

                 “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is
                 whether a person has committed the dowry death of  a  woman
                 and it is shown that soon before her death such  woman  had
                 been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for,
                 or in connection with, any  demand  for  dowry,  the  court
                 shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

           19. It may be mentioned  herein  that  the  legislature  in  its
           wisdom has used  the  word  “shall”  thus,  making  a  mandatory
           application on the part of the court to presume that  death  had
           been committed by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or
           harassment in connection with any demand of dowry. It is  unlike
           the provisions of Section 113-A of  the  Evidence  Act  where  a
           discretion has been conferred upon the court wherein it had been
           provided that court may presume abetment of suicide by a married
           woman. Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused
           to rebut the presumption and in case of Section 113-B  relatable
           to Section 304-B IPC, the onus to prove shifts  exclusively  and
           heavily on the accused. The only requirements are that death  of
           a woman  has  been  caused  by  means  other  than  any  natural
           circumstances; that death has been caused or occurred  within  7
           years of her marriage; and such  woman  had  been  subjected  to
           cruelty or harassment by [pic]her husband or any relative of her
           husband in connection with any demand of dowry.

           20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of  such  death
           have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of  the
           court to raise a presumption that the  accused  has  caused  the
           dowry death. It may also be pertinent to mention herein that the
           expression “soon before her  death”  has  not  been  defined  in
           either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case, the  Court  has
           to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to the  death  of
           the victim and decide  if  there  is  any  proximate  connection
           between the demand of dowry and act of cruelty or harassment and
           the death. (Vide T. Aruntperunjothi v. State; Devi Lal v.  State
           of Rajasthan; State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu  Ram,  SCC  p.     56,
           para 13; Anand Kumar v. State of M.P. and Undavalli Narayana Rao
           v. State of A.P.)”



8.    Similar view was also taken by this Court  in  the  case  of  Biswajit
Halder alias Babu Halder & Anr. v. State of West Bengal [(2008) 1 SCC 202].

9.    In light of the enunciated principles, now we will revert back to  the
facts of the present case.  Immediately upon death  of  the  deceased,  PW2,
Smt. Vimla Devi, mother of the deceased  had  lodged  the  report  with  the
police where she had given in writing the complete facts, as we have  stated
above, and it is not necessary for us to repeat her  complaint  here.   When
her deposition was recorded in the Court, she, again,  on  oath,  reiterated
the complete facts.  According to her, the demand of dowry  in  relation  to
various items persisted right from the date of engagement, uptil  the  death
of the deceased.  Firstly, demand was raised in relation to  purchase  of  a
refrigerator, for which a sum of Rs.10,000/-  was  given  and  it  was  only
thereafter that the engagement ceremony  could  be  completed.   Thereafter,
television and cooler were also demanded, for which they had thrown out  the
deceased Ms. Renu from her  matrimonial  home  and  it  was  only  upon  the
assurance given by the mother and the uncle of the deceased that Mukesh  and
his family had agreed to take her back to the matrimonial home.  It must  be
noticed that on 18th October, 1995, the father of  the  deceased  had  died,
but despite such death, the demands of  dowry  persisted  from  the  accused
persons.  Not only this, while Ms. Renu was leaving her home  for  the  last
time along with Mukesh, after Mukesh was assured that in future  they  would
arrange for television and cooler, she had  categorically  stated  that  she
apprehends danger to her life and she may not come back to her home.   These
circumstances clearly show the kind of  threat  and  fear  under  which  the
deceased was living.  PW1 is the uncle  of  the  deceased,  who  also  fully
corroborated the statement of PW2.  According to this  witness,  Mukesh  had
climbed up to the roof and said that he would not come down  and  would  not
permit the  engagement  ceremony  to  be  completed,  unless  a  fridge  was
brought.  Then Rs.10,000/-  was  given  to  his  brother  Rajesh  Bhatnagar,
whereafter the  ceremony  was  completed.   There  is  no  contradiction  or
variation in the statements of PW1 and PW2.

10.   One Anoop Sharma had informed them on 17th  February,  1996  that  Ms.
Renu  had  met  with  an  accident.   Anoop  Sharma  was  examined  by   the
prosecution as PW3, and this witness admitted that he had got  the  marriage
arranged between Renu and Mukesh and when he had gone to meet his aunt,  who
lived in Roorkee, while passing by the place  situated  near  the  house  of
Mukesh, then he saw the gathering of people there and had made the  call  to
Ms. Renu’s family from the  STD  booth  to  Sikandrabad.   This  is  another
circumstance  which  shows   that   the   accused   persons   were   totally
irresponsible and did not even care to inform the family  of  the  deceased,
about her death.  Dr. Vipin Kumar Premi, PW4, along  with  Dr.  R.K.  Pande,
had performed the post mortem  on  the  dead  body  of  the  deceased  Renu.
According to the doctor, the whole of the body was burnt up to the stage  of
first and second degree burns and the  deceased  had  expired  due  to  ante
mortem injuries and shock.  Sub Inspector R.P.  Purohit,  the  Investigating
Officer, (PW5) has testified  with  regard  to  the  inquest  investigation,
recovery  of  articles  from  the  place  of  occurrence  and  recording  of
statements of witnesses.  In his examination, he  specifically  denied  that
the body of the deceased was handed over to Mukesh  and  Rajesh  after  post
mortem.  Deputy Superintendent of Police M.L. Ghai, PW-7  had  also  visited
the spot after complainant Smt. Vimla Devi was examined.   He  prepared  the
site plan and conducted the inquest.  This witness clearly stated that  when
at 8.00 p.m. on 17th February, 1996, he went to  the  house  of  Mukesh,  to
make inquiries upon the formal registration of the case,  he  did  not  find
the accused persons on the spot and, in fact, they had left the  house  open
and fled.  Therefore, he had got the house locked by a  Havaldar  of  Chowki
Tehsil.

11.   From the above evidence, it is clear that there was persistent  demand
of dowry by the accused persons  and  they  had  killed  her  by  sprinkling
kerosene on her and putting her on fire.  There can be no dispute  that  the
deceased died an unnatural death within seven years of her marriage.   Thus,
the ingredients of Section 304B are fully satisfied  in  the  present  case.
We are least satisfied with the contention of the learned counsel  appearing
for the appellants, that  merely  because  the  letters  on  record  do  not
specifically mention the dowry demands, such letters have  to  be  construed
by  themselves  without  reference  to  other  evidence  and  rebutting  the
presumption of a dowry death, giving the benefit of doubt  to  the  accused.
These letters have to be read in conjunction with the statements of PW1  and
PW2.  It is difficult for one to imagine  that  these  letters  should  have
been worded by the deceased as submitted on  behalf  of  the  accused.   She
never knew with certainty that she was going to die  shortly.   The  letters
clearly spell out the beatings given to her, the cruelties inflicted on  her
and reference to the  conduct  of  the  family.   The  evidence  has  to  be
appreciated in its entirety.  Neither the letters can  be  ignored  nor  the
statements of PW1 and  PW2.   If  the  letters  had  made  no  reference  to
beatings, cruelty and ill-treatment  meted  out  to  the  deceased  and  not
demonstrating  the  grievance,  apprehensions  and   fear   that   she   was
entertaining in her mind, but were letters simpliciter mentioning about  her
well being and  that  she  and  her  in-laws  were  living  happily  without
complaint against each other, the matter would have been different.  In  the
judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for  the  accused,  it
has specifically been recorded that the letters produced in those cases  had
clearly stated that relations between the parties  were  cordial  and  there
was no reference to any alleged cruelty  or  harassment  meted  out  to  the
deceased by any of the accused in  that  case.   On  the  contrary,  in  the
letters, it was specifically recorded that the deceased was happy  with  all
the members of the family.  The  oral  and  documentary  evidence  in  those
cases had clearly shown  that  the  deceased  was  never  subjected  to  any
cruelty or harassment.  In those cases, there was no evidence of  demand  of
dowry and cruelty to the deceased, which certainly is  not  the  case  here.
In the case before us, there is  definite  ocular,  expert  and  documentary
evidence to show  that  the  deceased  died  an  unnatural  death,  she  was
subjected to cruelty  and  ill-treatment,  there  was  demand  of  dowry  of
specific items like refrigerator, television and cooler and she died  within
seven years of her marriage.

12.   Then the learned counsel appearing for the  appellant  contended  that
the accused Mukesh had suffered 12 injuries on his  person  in  attempts  to
rescue the deceased and  there  was  no  proximity  between  the  demand  of
refrigerator and the occurrence.  Therefore,  the  accused  cannot  be  held
guilty of the offence charged.  According to him, in any  case,  the  courts
ought not to have  awarded  the  punishment  of  life  imprisonment  to  the
accused persons keeping in view the entire facts of the case  and  the  fact
that both the accused were young persons while  their  mother  was  an  aged
lady.  He placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court  in  the  case  of
Hemchand v. State of Haryana [(1994) 6 SCC 727].   These  contentions  again
are without any substance.  No doubt, as per the statement  of  the  doctor,
there were nearly 12 injuries found on  the  body  of  the  accused  Mukesh.
Question is, how did he suffer these injuries?  No  doubt  the  accused  had
suffered number of injuries.  PW8, Dr. D.D. Lumbahas explained the  injuries
on the body of the accused Mukesh as follows :

           “(1)  Abraded swelling 2.0 cm x 1.5 cm, right upper eyelid.

           (2)   Abraded swelling 3.0 cm x 1.5 cm, right  side  face,  just
                 below right eye.

           (3)   Abrasion 1.0 cm x 0.2 cm, left  side  neck,  front  middle
                 past.

           (4)   Three abrasions in an area  of  6.0  cm  x  3.5  cm,  each
                 measuring 0.8 cm x 0.2 cm, 0.6 cm x 0.4 cm, and  0.8  cm  x
                 0.2 cm, right upper arm inner side lower past.

           (5)   Two faint contusions 2.0 cm apast, each measuring 1.5 cm x
                 0.5 cm and 2.0 cm x 0.8 cm right chest, front, upper past.

           (6)   Faint contusion 2.5 cm x 0.4 cm, left  side  chest,  front
                 upper past.

           (7)   Abrasion 1.4 cm x 0.3 cm, left side chest outer  side  9.0
                 cm below armpit.

           (8)   Two abrasion 1.5 cm apast, each measuring 5.0 x 0.5 cm and
                 6.0 x 0.5 cm, left upper arm outer side, middle past.

           (9)   Abrasion 0.8 x 0.2 cm, left upper arm, back, lower past.

           (10)  Abrasion 0.7 cm x 0.4 cm, right back upper past.

           (11)  Two abrasion 2.0 cm apast, each measuring 3.0 cm x 0.3  cm
                 and 6.0 cm x 0.5 cm, right back outer site/at to the  right
                 armpit.

           (12)  Abrasion 13.0 cm x 0.5 cm,  right  upper  arm  back  outer
                 upper 2/3.”



13.   The question that arises for consideration of this Court is as to  how
and when the  accused  Mukesh  suffered  the  injuries.   According  to  the
accused, he had suffered these injuries when he was  trying  to  break  open
the door of the kitchen with the intention to save the deceased, because  it
was projected by the defence that  the  deceased  had  died  because  of  an
accident of stove fire  while  cooking  the  food.   This  entire  gamut  of
projections by the defence counsel are not only afterthoughts but, in  fact,
nothing but falsehood.  This aspect has been well considered  by  the  Trial
Court, which recorded  the  following  reasons  for  rejecting  this  theory
propounded on behalf of the defence :

           “(1)  On the spot, a pin of stove was opened, however, the stove
                 was not burning.  The switch of heater was also off and  it
                 was also not found on.

           (2)   There was no cooked food.

           (3)   On the spot the empty container was found which  contained
                 kerosene  oil  smell.   Besides  this,  the  one  container
                 containing kerosene oil was found.

                    XXX              XXX              XXX

           (5)   From the body of deceased and  from  earth,  kerosene  oil
                 smell was coming.

           (6)   The deceased was not wearing synthetic clothes.   No  half
                 burnt cloth was found.

           (7)   About 12 injuries were found  on  the  person  of  accused
                 Mukesh on different parts of the body.  On  the  spot,  the
                 broken bangles of deceased were found.  All these things go
                 to prove that deceased  was  fighting  for  her  life.   No
                 explanation was given by Mukesh for his injuries.

           (8)   The entrance of kitchen was not having any  door  and  the
                 statement given by defence that the door of the kitchen was
                 closed and he had to open the door by pushing it  from  his
                 hands and chest, is a false statement.

           (9)   Before the death, deceased has  discharged  faecal  matter
                 and  there  was  rigor  mortis  on  her  dead  body,  which
                 indicates that deceased was afraid of her death.  This fact
                 goes to prove that occurrence had not taken  place  as  has
                 been said by accused persons.

           (10)  The dead body was having first degree  and  second  degree
                 burn injuries and it goes to prove that  kerosene  oil  was
                 sprinkled on the body.  It completely rules out  the  death
                 of accident.”



14.   The above reasoning given by the Trial Court  deserves  acceptance  by
us.  Furthermore, the entire conduct of the accused is such as  to  lead  to
only one plausible conclusion, i.e., all the  accused  together  had  caused
the death of the  deceased.   The  arguments  of  the  defence  are  strange
because if the accused had attempted to save the  deceased,  then  he  would
have suffered  some  burn  injuries.   But  as  per  the  above  details  of
injuries, there was not even a single burn injury found on the body  of  the
accused Mukesh.  These injuries were such that one could suffer only  if  he
was struggling or fighting with another  person,  as  then  alone  could  he
suffer such bruises or minor cuts.  Absence of any cooking material  in  the
kitchen is another very important circumstance which would belie  the  stand
of this accused.  An accused who raises a false plea before the Court  would
normally earn the criticism of  the  Court  leading  to  adverse  inference.
This Court in the case of Asraf Ali v. State of Assam [(2008)  16  SCC  328]
has held as follows :

           “21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put in
           an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose  of
           enabling him to explain any of the  circumstances  appearing  in
           the evidence against him.  It follows as a  necessary  corollary
           therefrom that  each  material  circumstance  appearing  in  the
           evidence against the accused  is  required  to  be  put  to  him
           specifically, distinctly and separately and  failure  to  do  so
           amounts to a serious irregularity  vitiating  trial,  if  it  is
           shown that the accused was prejudiced.

           22.   The object of Section 313 of the Code is  to  establish  a
           direct dialogue between the court and the accused.  If  a  point
           in the evidence  is  important  against  the  accused,  and  the
           conviction is intended to be based upon  it,  it  is  right  and
           proper that the accused should be questioned  about  the  matter
           and be given an opportunity of explaining it.  Where no specific
           question has been put by  the  trial  court  on  an  inculpatory
           material in the  prosecution  evidence,  it  would  vitiate  the
           trial.  Of course, all evidence, it would vitiate the trial.  Of
           course, all these are subject to rider whether they have  caused
           miscarriage of justice or prejudice.  This Court also  expressed
           a similar view in S. Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi  Admn.)  while
           dealing with Section 342 of the Criminal  procedure  Code,  1898
           (corresponding to Section 313 of the Code).   Non-indication  of
           inculpatory material in its relevant facts by the trial court to
           the accused adds to the vulnerability of the  prosecution  case.
           Recording of a statement of the accused under Section 313 is not
           a purposeless exercise.”



15.   As far as the contention of the accused that there  was  no  proximity
or nexus between the alleged demand of refrigerator and  the  death  of  the
deceased and the accused is, thus,  entitled  to  benefit  of  acquittal  is
concerned, it requires to be noticed only for being  rejected.   The  demand
for refrigerator was the first demand of dowry, that too,  at  the  time  of
engagement.  This demand was instantaneously fulfilled by the family of  the
deceased under compulsion and threat that the engagement ceremony would  not
be performed if the refrigerator or money was  not  given.   The  demand  of
dowry raised by the accused persons later for television  and  cooler  could
not be satisfied by the family of the  deceased  for  financial  limitations
upon the death of father of the deceased.  As a  result,  the  deceased  was
treated with cruelty and physical assault.  In fact, it  ultimately  led  to
her brutal murder at the hands of the husband and his family  members.   Not
only this, the conduct of the accused prior to  and  immediately  after  the
occurrence clearly shows that they were not innocent.  Otherwise, there  was
no occasion for them to abscond after the body of the  deceased  was  handed
over to her relations.  These circumstances, along  with  the  circumstances
stated by the  Trial  Court,  are  inconsistent  with  their  innocence  and
consistent only with  hypothesis  that  they  had  killed  the  deceased  by
setting her on fire.  No explanation, much less a satisfactory  explanation,
has been rendered by the accused persons in their statements  under  Section
313 Cr.P.C.   On  the  contrary,  the  trend  of  cross-examination  of  the
prosecution witnesses and explanations given  by  the  defence  for  accused
Mukesh having suffered injuries on his  body  are  patently  false  and  not
worthy of credence.

16.   In these circumstances, we have no  hesitation  in  holding  that  the
accused are not entitled to any benefit,  much  less  acquittal,  from  this
Court.  We may also refer to the judgment of  this  Court  in  the  case  of
Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh  [(1993)  2  SCC
684] where, under somewhat similar circumstances,  the  Court  rejected  the
plea of the innocence of the accused taking into consideration  the  conduct
of the accused and his failure to furnish a satisfactory explanation.

17.   Now we are left with the  last  contention  of  the  counsel  for  the
appellant that this is a case where the Court may not  uphold  the  sentence
of life imprisonment imposed by the courts  below.   We  see  no  mitigating
circumstances in favour of the accused which will persuade us  to  take  any
view other than the view taken  by  the  Trial  Court  on  the  question  of
quantum of sentence.  Even in the case of Hemchand (supra), relied  upon  by
the appellant, this Court had said that it is only in rare  cases  that  the
Court should impose punishment of life imprisonment.  When  the  offence  of
Section 304B is proved, the manner in which the offence has  been  committed
is found to be brutal, it had  been  committed  for  satisfaction  of  dowry
demands, particularly, for material goods  like  television  or  cooler  and
furthermore the accused takes up a false defence before the Court  to  claim
that it was a case of an accidental death and not that of dowry death,  then
the Court normally would not exercise its judicial discretion in  favour  of
the accused by awarding lesser sentence than life imprisonment.

18.   For the reasons afore-recorded, we  find  no  merit  in  the  appeals.
Both the appeals are dismissed accordingly.



                                        .…................................J.
                                                           [Swatanter Kumar]



                                        .…................................J.
                                                       [Ranjan Gogoi]
New Delhi
May 10, 2012

« The custody of female child aged 9 years, likes to remain with her father , on the petition of the mother the Apex court after interviewing the child fixed 3 days day time custody on three different days as observation period to know the changes of the child when she is with her mother under special circumstances of the case and directed the High court mediation center to report the matter.



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                      1


                2 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.8160 OF 2011




Meenakshi Khandelwal                          ....  Petitioner (s)

            Versus

Shailesh Khandelwal                                   .... Respondent(s)





                                  O R D E R



P. Sathasivam, J.
1)    By consent of both the parties, the  Principal  Judge,  Family  Court,
Raipur, vide order dated 01.02.2008, in Case No.  170-A/2007  dissolved  the
marriage of the petitioner and respondent herein, solemnized on  11.12.1999,
by a decree of divorce.

2)    On the application of the petitioner-mother, the Family Court  granted
her the  custody  of  the  daughter-Shrestha.   The  father  of  the  child-
respondent herein challenged the said order before  the  Division  Bench  of
the High Court  of  Chhattisgarh  at  Bilaspur.   The  High  Court,  by  the
impugned order dated 09.11.2010 in  F.A.  (M)  No.79  of  2010  allowed  the
appeal filed by the father of the child and  permitted  him  to  retain  the
custody of the child.  In the same order, the High Court granted  visitation
rights to the mother of the child.  The said order  is  under  challenge  in
this special leave petition.

3)    Considering the interest and welfare of the child,  who  is  presently
aged about nine years and being a daughter, we  directed  both  the  parties
including their daughter to appear before us in our Chambers on  23.04.2012.
 All three of them appeared on that day.  Initially, we interacted with  the
child separately and ascertained her views.   She  expressed  her  grievance
against her mother and prefers to stay with her father.  She  also  informed
us that she is comfortable with her father and would like  to  continue  her
education under his guidance  only.   Thereafter,  we  interacted  with  the
petitioner and the respondent separately.


4)    Taking note of the welfare of the child, which is paramount  and  also
the right and entitlement of the petitioner-mother which is  to  be  decided
in this SLP, as an interim measure, we pass the following order:
a)    The father-respondent herein is directed to  take  the  child-Shrestha
      to the Nagpur Bench Mediation Centre on 19.05.2012 at 10 a.m.
b)    The petitioner-mother is permitted to take  the  child-Shrestha  alone
      in the presence of mediators at 10 a.m. and bring her back at  6  p.m.
      to the Mediation Centre and hand over the  child  to  the  respondent-
      father.
c)    In the same way, the respondent-father has to take the  child-Shrestha
      to the Nagpur Bench  Mediation  Centre  on  02.06.2012  and  again  on
      09.06.2012.
d)    On all these dates, the respondent-father has to hand over the  child-
      Shrestha to her mother at 10 a.m. in the presence of mediators and the
      petitioner-mother has to return the child at 6 p.m. to the father.

e)    During these days, mediators are directed to observe the behavior  and
      relationship of the child Shrestha with  her  mother  and  father  and
      submit a report directly to this Court before 30.06.2012.

5)    List on 09.07.2012 as Item No. 201 for consideration of the report  of
the mediators and for passing appropriate orders.


                             ...…………….…………………………J.


                                 (P. SATHASIVAM)






                              .…....…………………………………J.


                              (J. CHELAMESWAR)


NEW DELHI;
MAY 4, 2012.






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