Specific performance of sale agreement = The question as to whether the grant of relief for specific performance will cause hardship to the defendant within the meaning of Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, being a question of fact, the first appellate court without framing such an issue ought not to have reversed the finding of the trial court while concurring with it on all other issues with regard to the appellant’s entitlement to relief for specific performance of contract.

                                             REPORABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8102  OF 2011
                   (arising out of SLP(C)No.21139 of 2007)






    PRAKASH CHANDRA                     … APPELLANT


                                   Versus


    NARAYAN                          … RESPONDENT






                               J U D G M E N T


    SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.


            Leave was granted on 22.9.2011.
    2.      This appeal  has  been  preferred  by  the  appellant-plaintiff
    against the judgment and order dated 6th  March,  2007  passed  by  the
    learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature of Mumbai,  Nagpur
    Bench in Second Appeal No.198 of  2006, whereby the judgment and decree
    passed by the District Court, Pandharkawada (Kelapur) in Regular  Civil
    Appeal No.129 of 2002 came to be confirmed.
    3.      The first appellate court by the aforesaid judgment and  decree
    reversed the judgment and decree dated 23rd  September,  1998  and  3rd
    October, 1998 in Special Civil Suit No.175 of 1997 which was  preferred
    by the appellant-plaintiff for specific performance.
    4.      The suit in question was filed by  the  appellant  against  the
    respondent for specific performance of agreement for  sale  dated  18th
    April, 1996 in respect of agricultural land admeasuring 1 H. 61Are.  at
    a price of Rs.51,000/-. It was the case of the appellant  that  he  had
    paid the earnest money of Rs.39,000/-  while the balance amount was  to
    be paid on the date of execution of the sale deed which was  fixed  for
    18th March, 2007, but despite  the  appellant  being  present  for  the
    purpose of completion of the formalities of  agreement  for  sale,  the
    respondent did not turn up. Consequently,  the  appellant  purchased  a
    stamp paper of Rs.100/-  on 18th March, 1997 and issued a notice to the
    respondent on 2nd April, 1997 and called upon him to execute  the  sale
    deed dated 21st April,  1997  but  a  false  reply  was  given  by  the
    respondent on 15th April, 1997. As the respondent  refused  to  perform
    his part of the contract, the appellant filed Special Civil Suit No.175
    of 1997 for specific performance  of  contract,  and  alternatively  to
    refund the earnest money.
    5.      The respondent contested the case claiming that his  signatures
    were obtained on a blank stamp  paper  for  the  outstanding  money  of
    Rs.12,000/- for the purchase of fertilizers and clothes etc.  The trial
    court by its judgment dated 23rd September, 1998 and decree  dated  3rd
    October, 1998 decreed the suit for specific performance.
    6.      On appreciation of the material on record, the trial court held
    that the appellant had proved that the respondent agreed  to  sell  the
    suit land for consideration of Rs.51,000/- by  executing  an  agreement
    for sale on 18th April, 1996 and that he  had  paid  earnest  money  of
    Rs.39,000/- to the respondent. The respondent failed to prove  that  he
    had signed on a blank Stamp paper in the  presence  of  Vithal  Sitaram
    Thaori. On the other hand there is sufficient  material  on  record  to
    show that the appellant was ready and willing to perform  his  part  of
    the contract and,  therefore, the appellant is entitled to  the  decree
    for specific performance of contract while the alternative prayer needs
    no consideration. The respondent is not entitled to compensatory  cost.
    All the six issues were decided in favour of the appellant and  against
    the respondent with a direction to the respondent to execute  the  sale
    deed on or before 31st August, 1998 in respect of the  suit  land  i.e.
    southern portion of the land admeasuring 1 H 61Are  having  Gat  No.1/2
    situated at village Khadki on payment of the balance  consideration  of
    Rs.12,000/-. The Court also directed  the  respondent  to  deliver  the
    possession of the suit land to the appellant with the  clear  condition
    that in the event of the respondent failing to execute the sale deed on
    or before the fixed date, the appellant will deposit the balance amount
    in the Court to get the sale deed executed.
    7.      The respondent took up the matter vide first appeal before  the
    District Court. The following questions were framed for determination:
    1)      Whether the defendant has agreed to sell and the plaintiff  has
           agreed to  purchase  the  suit  property  for  consideration  of
           Rs.51,000/- on 18.4.1996?


     2)      Whether the defendant has signed Ex.25  blank  Stamp  paper  in
           lieu of the credit amount of the plaintiff towards  the  clothes
           and fertilizers?


    3)      Whether the plaintiff was and is ready and willing  to  perform
           his part of the contract?


    4) Whether the  defendant  has  failed  to  perform  his  part  of  the
       contract?


    5) Whether it is necessary to interfere with the impugned judgment  and
       decree?


    6) What order and relief?”


    8.       The first appellate  court  on  hearing  the  parties  and  on
    appreciation of the material on  record  answered  all  the  issues  in
    favour of the appellant but reversed the judgment  and  decree  thereby
    allowing discretion in favour of the respondent by directing him to pay
    the earnest money with interest.


            Referring Clause  (b)  of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  20  of
      Specific Relief Act, the First Appellate Court held as follows:
          “20.    Having regard to the facts on the record,  it  is  evident
          from the evidence of the defendant and also an admitted fact  that
          the defendant was having the  only  suit  land  and  he  would  be
          landless if the decree would be granted for specific  performance.
          On the other hand, the plaintiff is having landed  properties  and
          all the riches including the business of clothes and  fertilizers.
          Therefore these aspects are not considered by  the  learned  lower
          court, while exercising the discretion, in granting the decree for
          specific performance.  The amount of Rs.12,000/- were not paid  or
          deposited to the defendant’s favour since the agreement  for  sale
          till the date of decree. Therefore  having  regard  to  all  these
          circumstances and facts on  the  record,  this  Court  is  of  the
          opinion  that  this  Court  should  interfere  in  the  discretion
          exercised by the learned lower court while granting the decree for
          specific performance. The hardship would be, in all  probabilities
          and facts and circumstances  caused  to  the  defendant  than  the
          plaintiff.  In the result,  the  court  is  of  the  opinion  that
          alternative relief for refund of the earnest amount of Rs.39,000/-
          to the plaintiff by the defendant, would meet the ends of justice.
          The same can be utilized and exercised by awarding the damages  by
          way of an interest on the earnest amount……..”


    9.      When the matter was taken up in the second appeal, the  learned
    Single Judge vide impugned judgment dated 6th March, 2007 dismissed the
    second appeal  on  the  ground  that  the  first  appellate  court  has
    factually found that the  respondent would be landless as  against  the
    appellant who is having various businesses as well.
    10.     According to the learned counsel for the appellant,  there  was
    no  impediment  in  according  a   relief   of   specific   performance
    particularly when all the issues have been decided  in  favour  of  the
    appellant and against the respondent.  He further submitted  that,   in
    the absence of any defence taken by the respondent that he would become
    landless if the relief for  specific  performance  is  granted  and  in
    absence of any material on record, the finding of the  first  appellate
    court cannot be sustained.
    11.     Learned counsel for  the  appellant  referring  to  the  cross-
    examination of the respondent contended that the respondent  would  not
    become landless  as is evident from the fact that after  the  agreement
    reached with the appellant, he sold  4  acres  of  land  to  one  Dilip
    Karekar. Even thereafter the respondent is having 2.25 H of  cultivable
    land apart from 0.88 H uncultivable land.
    12.     According  to  the  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent,  as
    hardship would be  caused  to  the  respondent,   the  appellate  court
    rightly held that it would sub-serve the ends of justice if the  entire
    amount of earnest money received by the respondent is  directed  to  be
    paid back to appellant along with interest.
     13.    We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The  learned
    counsel appearing on  either  side  elaborately  took  us  through  the
    findings of the trial court, the first appellate court as well  as  the
    High Court in second appeal. From  the  materials  on  record  and  the
    agreement dated 18th April, 1996 and from the  judgment  of  the  trial
    court and the first appellate court,   it  is  evident  that  no  issue
    relating to the hardship of the respondent was framed.  In  a  case  of
    Specific performance, hardship is a good defence provided such  defence
    is taken by the defendant and evidence in support of  such  defence  is
    brought on record,  while in this case no such defence was taken by the
    respondent and no evidence was brought on record in its support.
    14.     The appellant has  specifically  pleaded  that  the  respondent
    possessed agricultural land admeasuring 5 H. 76.R. in Gat No. ½,  which
    has not been denied by the respondent. The  appellant  proved  that  an
    agreement was reached between the parties on 18th April, 1996  to  sell
    southern portion of land admeasuring 1.61 H.  by  making  an  east-west
    boundary for the consideration of Rs. 51,000/- for which appellant  had
    paid Rs.39,000/- to the respondent as  earnest  money.   The  appellant
    also proved that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of
    the contract. These issues were decided in  favour  of  the  appellant.
    During cross-examination the respondent stated  that  he  sold  only  4
    acres of land during the pendency of the case, thereby remaining 2.25 H
    cultivable and 0.88 H uncultivable land is  still  available  with  the
    respondent.
    15.     The question as to whether the grant  of  relief  for  specific
    performance will cause hardship to the defendant within the meaning  of
    Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act,
    1963, being a question of  fact,  the  first  appellate  court  without
    framing such an issue ought not to have reversed  the  finding  of  the
    trial court while concurring with it on all other issues with regard to
    the appellant’s entitlement  to  relief  for  specific  performance  of
    contract.


            The High Court in the second appeal failed to notice  that  the
    respondent had not taken any defence of hardship and  no such issue was
    framed and in absence  of  any  such  evidence  on  record,  the  first
    appellate court held that he would be landless should  the  decree  for
    specific performance be granted.


    16.     For the reasons stated above, we  are  of  the  view  that  the
    appellant is entitled to the  specific  performance  of  agreement  for
    sale, as ordered  and  decreed  by  the  trial  court.  The  appeal  is
    accordingly allowed.  The order passed by  the High Court in the second
    appeal and the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate  court
    are set aside.  The judgment and decree passed by the  Trial  Court  is
    affirmed. The appellant is  allowed  two  months  to  pay  the  balance
    consideration to the respondents. If the respondent  fails  to  execute
    the sale deed, such amount will be deposited in the trial  court  which
    will ensure the execution of the sale deed  as  per  its  judgment  and
    decree.




                                                       ……………………………………………….J.
                                        ( G.S. SINGHVI )








                                                       ……………………………………………….J.
                              ( SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


    NEW DELHI,
    APRIL 23, 2012.













































































-----------------------
12

when the deceased earning only Rs.1500/- per month, his personal expenditure should be counted only at 1/10th of his income. even though the sons may be majors, in absence of income to them, they can be treated as dependents. Future prospects of income may be considered as 30% eventhough the deceased is not govt. employee. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment as also the award of the Tribunal are set aside and it is declared that the claimants shall be entitled to compensation of Rs.2,94,840 [Rs.1,500 + 30% of Rs.1,500 = Rs.1,950 less 1/10th towards personal expenses = Rs.1,755 x 12 x 14 =Rs.2,94,840]. The claimants shall also be entitled to Rs.5,000/- for transportation of the body, Rs.10,000/- as funeral expenses and Rs.10,000/- in lieu of loss of consortium. Thus, the total amount payable to the claimants will be Rs.3,19,840/-. The enhanced amount of compensation i.e. Rs.1,42,340/- (Rs.3,19,840 - Rs.1,77,500) shall carry interest of 7 per cent from the date of application till realisation. 18. Respondent No.1 – Insurance Company is directed to pay to the appellant the total amount of compensation within a period of three months by getting prepared a demand draft in her name which shall be delivered to her at the address given in the claim petition filed before the Tribunal. While doing so, respondent No.1 shall be free to deduct the amount already paid to the appellant..

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.3723 OF 2012
                 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 24489 of 2010)

Santosh Devi                                             … Appellant
                                   Versus

National Insurance Company Ltd. and others                    … Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T
G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    Feeling dissatisfied with the enhancement granted by  the  Punjab  and
Haryana High Court  in  the  amount  of  compensation  determined  by  Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, Gurdaspur (for  short,  ‘the  Tribunal’)  in  MACT
Case No. 97 of 1995, the appellant has filed this appeal.

3.    Shri Swaran Singh (the appellant’s husband) died in  a  road  accident
when the Maruti car in which he was travelling with Varinder Singh  (husband
of respondent No. 2 and the father of respondent Nos. 3 and 4) went  out  of
control. Varinder Singh, who was driving the vehicle also suffered  multiple
injuries and died on the spot.

4.    The appellant and other legal representatives of Swaran Singh filed  a
petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short,  ‘the
Act’) for award of compensation to the tune of Rs.  4  lacs.   They  pleaded
that the accident was caused due  to  rash  and  negligent  driving  of  the
Maruti car by Varinder Singh; that at the time of his death, the age of  the
deceased was about 45 years and that he was earning Rs.  5,000/-  per  month
by running a milk dairy and doing agriculture.   The  legal  representatives
of Varinder Singh denied that the accident had  occurred  due  to  rash  and
negligent driving of the Maruti car.  In  the  written  statement  filed  on
behalf of respondent No. 1, it was pleaded that the claim petition  was  not
maintainable because the deceased, who was travelling in the car  cannot  be
treated as a third party and that the person driving  the  vehicle  did  not
have  valid  driving  licence.  Respondent  No.1   also   controverted   the
claimant’s assertion about the income of Swaran Singh.

5.    On the pleadings of the parties  the  Tribunal  framed  the  following
issues:

      “1)  Whether the death of  Swaran  Singh  not  amounting  to  culpable
      homicide took place on account of the rash and  negligent  driving  of
      Maruti Car No. PB-035A-0090 driven by Varinder Singh?

      2)    To what amount of compensation the applicants are  entitled?  If
      so, from whom?

      3)    Relief.”


6.    In support of the claim petition, the appellant examined  herself  and
two other witnesses, namely, Bakhshish Singh and  Surain  Singh.  Respondent
No.1 examined Milap Chand, Clerk, in the office of  the  District  Transport
Officer, Gurdaspur. On behalf  of  the  legal  representatives  of  Varinder
Singh  copies  of  driving  licence,  insurance  policy   and   registration
certificate were produced and marked as Exhibits R1 to R3.

7.    After analysing the evidence produced by  the  parties,  the  Tribunal
decided issue No.1 in the affirmative and held that the accident was  caused
due to rash and negligent driving of Maruti car  by  Varinder  Singh.  While
dealing with issue No.2, the Tribunal adverted to the statement made by  the
appellant in her  cross-examination  that  the  deceased  did  not  own  any
agricultural land and that he  was  cultivating  land  on  lease  basis  and
proceeded to determine the amount of compensation by assuming his income  as
Rs. 1,500/- per month. The Tribunal was also of the view that  two  sons  of
the appellant, namely, Sulakhan Singh and Surjit Singh cannot be treated  as
dependants of the deceased because their age  was  26  years  and  23  years
respectively.  The Tribunal deducted Rs. 500/- towards personal expenses  of
the deceased and held that dependency of  the  appellant  and  other  family
members  would  Rs.1,000/-  per  month.  The  Tribunal  then   applied   the
multiplier  of  11  and  declared  that  the  claimants  are   entitled   to
compensation of Rs. 1,32,000/- with interest at the rate of 12 per cent  per
annum from the date of application.

8.    The High Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in  Sarla  Verma
v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121, applied the  multiplier  of
14 and held that  the  claimants  are  entitled  to  total  compensation  of
Rs.1,77,500/-  with interest at the rate of 7 per  cent  per  annum  on  the
enhanced amount from the date of appeal till realisation.

9.    Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the  judgment  in  Sarla
Verma’s case and argued that the  Tribunal  and  the  High  Court  committed
serious error by not giving the benefit of  30  per  cent  increase  in  the
income of the deceased which he would have earned for  the  next  25  years.
Learned counsel further  argued  that  the  deduction  of  Rs.500/-  towards
personal expenses of the deceased was totally disproportionate  to  size  of
his family and the Tribunal and the  High  Court  overlooked  stark  reality
that it is impossible for a person having meagre earning of Rs. 1,500/-  per
month to spend 1/3rd on himself and leave  2/3rd  of  his  income  for  five
dependants including three children.  He criticised  the  observations  made
by the Tribunal that Sulakhan Singh and Surjit Singh could  not  be  treated
as dependant of the deceased because they were major and argued that in  the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, there was no reason to discard  the
testimony of the appellant that in all five family  members  were  dependant
on the deceased.

10.   Learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the rule of 30  per
cent addition in the income of the deceased as laid down  in  Sarla  Verma’s
case cannot be applied to a case like the present one because  the  deceased
was neither in Government service nor he  was  a  permanent  employee  of  a
corporation or company which may have ensured increase in  his  income  from
time to time.  He argued that those employed in unorganized  sectors  cannot
be  placed  at  par  with  Government  employees  and  those   employed   in
agencies/instrumentalities of the State or  private  corporations/companies.


11.   We have considered  the  respective  arguments.  Although,  the  legal
jurisprudence developed in the country in  last  five  decades  is  somewhat
precedent-centric,  the  judgments  which  have  bearing  on  socio-economic
conditions of the citizens and issues relating to  compensation  payable  to
the victims of motor accidents, those who are deprived  of  their  land  and
similar matters needs to be frequently revisited keeping in  view  the  fast
changing societal values, the effect of globalisation on the economy of  the
nation and their impact on the life of the people.

12.   In R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal (2009) 14 SCC 1, the two Judge Bench  while
dealing with the case involving claim of compensation  under  Section  163-A
of the Act, noticed the judgments in M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand  Sood  (2001)
8 SCC 151, Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC 197,  Kerala  SRTC  v.
Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176, Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav (1996)  3  SCC
179  and  made  some  of  the  following  observations,  which  are  largely
reflective of the philosophy that  victims  of  the  road  accidents  and/or
their family members should be awarded just compensation:

      “In  cases  of  motor  accidents  the  endeavour   is   to   put   the
      dependants/claimants in the pre-accidental position.  Compensation  in
      cases of motor accidents, as in other matters, is paid for  reparation
      of damages. The damages so awarded should be  adequate  sum  of  money
      that would put the party, who has suffered, in the same position if he
      had not suffered on account of the wrong.  Compensation  is  therefore
      required to be paid for prospective pecuniary loss i.e. future loss of
      income/dependency suffered on account of the wrongful act. However, no
      amount of compensation can restore the lost limb or the experience  of
      pain and suffering due to loss of life. Loss of a  child,  life  or  a
      limb can never be eliminated or ameliorated completely.

      To put it simply—pecuniary damages cannot replace a human life or limb
      lost.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  the  pecuniary  losses,  the  law
      recognises that payment should also be made for  non-pecuniary  losses
      on account of, loss of happiness, pain, suffering  and  expectancy  of
      life, etc. The Act provides for payment of  “just  compensation”  vide
      Sections 166 and 168. It is left to the courts to decide what would be
      “just compensation” in the facts of a case.”



13.   In Sarla Verma’s case (supra),  another  two  Judge  Bench  considered
various factors relevant for determining the compensation payable  in  cases
involving  motor  accidents,  noticed  apparent  divergence  in  the   views
expressed by this Court in different cases,  referred  to  large  number  of
precedents including the judgments in U.P. SRTC v. Trilok Chandra  (1996)  4
SCC 362, Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd.  1951  AC  601,
Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. 1942 AC 601 and made  an
attempt to limit the exercise of discretion by the Tribunals  and  the  High
Courts in the matter of award of compensation by laying down  straightjacket
formula under different headings, some of which are enumerated below:

      “(i) Addition to income for future prospects

      In Susamma Thomas this Court increased the income by nearly  100%,  in
      Sarla Dixit the  income  was  increased  only  by  50%  and  in  Abati
      Bezbaruah the income was increased by  a  mere  7%.  In  view  of  the
      imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour  of  adopting  as  a
      rule of thumb, an addition of 50%  of  actual  salary  to  the  actual
      salary income of the deceased  towards  future  prospects,  where  the
      deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where the annual
      income is in the taxable range, the words “actual  salary”  should  be
      read as “actual salary less tax”). The addition should be only 30%  if
      the age of the deceased was  40  to  50  years.  There  should  be  no
      addition, where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years.  Though
      the evidence may indicate a different percentage of  increase,  it  is
      necessary to standardise the addition to  avoid  different  yardsticks
      being applied or different methods of calculation being adopted. Where
      the deceased was self-employed or  was  on  a  fixed  salary  (without
      provision for annual increments, etc.), the courts will  usually  take
      only the actual income at the time of  death.  A  departure  therefrom
      should be made only in rare and exceptional  cases  involving  special
      circumstances.

      (ii) Deduction for personal and living expenses

      Though in some cases the deduction to be  made  towards  personal  and
      living expenses is calculated on  the  basis  of  units  indicated  in
      Trilok  Chandra,  the  general  practice  is  to  apply   standardised
      deductions. Having considered several  subsequent  decisions  of  this
      Court, we are of the view that where the  deceased  was  married,  the
      deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should
      be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2
      to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family  members
      is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent  family
      members exceeds six.

      (iii) Selection of multiplier

      We therefore hold  that  the  multiplier  to  be  used  should  be  as
      mentioned in Column (4) of  the  table  above  (prepared  by  applying
      Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and  Charlie),  which  starts  with  an
      operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and  21  to
      25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17  for
      26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14
      for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced  by  two
      units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9  for
      56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”



14.   We find it  extremely  difficult  to  fathom  any  rationale  for  the
observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in Sarla Verma’s case  that
where the deceased was self-employed  or  was  on  a  fixed  salary  without
provision for annual increment, etc., the Courts will usually take only  the
actual income at the time of death and a departure from this rule should  be
made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances.  In
our view, it will be naïve to say that the wages or total  emoluments/income
of a person who is self-employed or  who  is  employed  on  a  fixed  salary
without  provision  for  annual  increment,  etc.,  would  remain  the  same
throughout his life.  The rise  in  the  cost  of  living  affects  everyone
across the board. It does not make any distinction between  rich  and  poor.
As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in  prices  which  directly  impacts
the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on those who are self-
employed or who get fixed income/emoluments.  They are  the  worst  affected
people.  Therefore, they put extra efforts  to  generate  additional  income
necessary for sustaining their families.  The  salaries  of  those  employed
under    the     Central     and     State     Governments     and     their
agencies/instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to provide  a
cushion against  the  rising  prices  and  provisions  have  been  made  for
providing security to the families of the deceased employees.  The  salaries
of those employed in private sectors  have  also  increased  manifold.  Till
about two decades ago, nobody could have imagined that salary  of  Class  IV
employee of the Government would be in five figures and total emoluments  of
those in higher echelons of service will cross  the  figure  of  rupees  one
lac.  Although, the wages/income of those employed  in  unorganized  sectors
has not registered a corresponding increase and has not kept pace  with  the
increase in the salaries of the Government employees and those  employed  in
private sectors but it cannot be denied  that  there  has  been  incremental
enhancement in the income of those who  are  self-employed  and  even  those
engaged on daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal basis.  We  can  take
judicial notice of the fact that with a view to meet  the  challenges  posed
by high  cost  of  living,  the  persons  falling  in  the  latter  category
periodically increase the cost of their labour.  In this context, it may  be
useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by  stitching
cloths. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go  up,
it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his  labour.  So  will  be
the  cases  of  ordinary  skilled  and  unskilled  labour,   like,   barber,
blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc.  Therefore,  we  do  not  think  that  while
making the observations in the last three lines of  paragraph  24  of  Sarla
Verma’s judgment, the Court had intended to lay down an absolute  rule  that
there will be no addition in the income of a person who is self-employed  or
who is paid fixed wages.  Rather, it would  be  reasonable  to  say  that  a
person who is self-employed or is engaged on fixed wages will  also  get  30
per cent increase in his total income over a period of time and if he /  she
becomes victim of accident then the same formula deserves to be applied  for
calculating the amount of compensation.

15.   It is also not possible to approve the  view  taken  by  the  Tribunal
which has been  reiterated  by  the  High  Court  albeit  without  assigning
reasons that the deceased would have  spent  1/3rd  of  his  total  earning,
i.e., Rs. 500/-, towards personal expenses.  It  seems  that  the  Presiding
Officer of the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge of the High Court  were
totally oblivious of the hard realities of the life.  It will be  impossible
for a person whose monthly income is Rs.1,500/- to spend  1/3rd  on  himself
leaving 2/3rd for the family consisting of five persons. Ordinarily, such  a
person would, at best, spend 1/10th of his income on  himself  or  use  that
amount as personal expenses and leave the rest for his family.

16.   The Tribunal’s observation that the two sons of the  appellant  cannot
be treated dependant on their father because they were not minor is  neither
here nor there.  In the cross-examination of the appellant, no question  was
put to her about the source of sustenance of her two sons. Therefore,  there
was no reason for the Tribunal to assume that the sons who had become  major
can no longer be regarded dependant on the deceased.

17.   In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned  judgment  as  also
the award of the Tribunal  are  set  aside  and  it  is  declared  that  the
claimants shall be entitled to compensation of Rs.2,94,840 [Rs.1,500  +  30%
of Rs.1,500 =  Rs.1,950 less 1/10th towards personal expenses =  Rs.1,755  x
12 x 14 =Rs.2,94,840].  The claimants shall also be entitled  to  Rs.5,000/-
for  transportation  of  the  body,  Rs.10,000/-  as  funeral  expenses  and
Rs.10,000/- in lieu of loss of consortium.  Thus, the total  amount  payable
to  the  claimants  will  be  Rs.3,19,840/-.    The   enhanced   amount   of
compensation i.e. Rs.1,42,340/-  (Rs.3,19,840  -  Rs.1,77,500)  shall  carry
interest of 7 per cent from the date of application till realisation.

18.   Respondent No.1  –  Insurance  Company  is  directed  to  pay  to  the
appellant the total amount of compensation within a period of  three  months
by getting prepared a demand draft in her name which shall be  delivered  to
her at the address given in the claim petition filed  before  the  Tribunal.
While doing so, respondent No.1 shall be free to deduct the  amount  already
paid to the appellant.
                                                …..……….....……..….………………….…J.
                                     [G.S. SINGHVI]

                                                    …………..………..….………………….…J.
                                               [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
New Delhi,
April  23,  2012.
-----------------------
12

Whether the Doctrine of Double Jeopardy is applicable for prosecuting the accused under sec.406 and 420 I.P.C. when the accused was already prosecuted under sec.138 of N.I. ACT on the same set of facts.? APEX COURT HELD NO =

                                                                  REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 645 of 2012




    Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel                        …Appellant




                                   Versus


    State of Gujarat & Anr.
    …Respondents




                               J U D G M E N T




    Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.




    1.      This appeal has been preferred against  the  impugned  judgment
    and order dated 18.8.2011 passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Gujarat  at
    Ahmedabad in Criminal Misc. Application No. 7807 of 2006, by which  the
    High Court has dismissed the application filed by the present appellant
    under  Section  482  of  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973  (hereinafter
    referred as `Cr.P.C.’) for  quashing  the  I.CR  No.  18  of  2004  and
    Criminal  Case  No.  5  of  2004  pending  before  the  Chief  Judicial
    Magistrate, Patan,  on the plea of double jeopardy for the reason  that
    the  appellant  has  already  been  tried  and  dealt  with  under  the
    provisions  of  Section  138  of  Negotiable  Instruments   Act,   1881
    (hereinafter referred as `N.I. Act’) for the same offence.


    2.      Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:
    A.      Respondent No. 2   filed  a  complaint  dated  22.10.2003  i.e.
    Criminal Case No. 1334 of 2003 under Section 138 of  N.I.  Act  on  the
    ground that the appellant had taken hypothecation loan of Rs. 20  lakhs
    and had not repaid the same.  In order to meet the said liability,  the
    appellant issued cheque bearing no. 59447 and on being  presented,  the
    cheque has been dishonoured.
    B.      Subsequent thereto on 6.2.2004, the respondent no. 2  filed  an
    FIR being I.C.R. No. 18 of 2004    under  Sections  406/420  read  with
    Section 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred as  `IPC’)
    with the Sidhpur Police Station for committing the offence of  criminal
    breach of trust, cheating and abetment etc.
    C.      In the criminal case No.1334 of 2003 filed under Section 138 of
    N.I.  Act,  the  trial  court  convicted  the  appellant.    Aggrieved,
    appellant preferred Appeal No. 12 of 2006, before  the  District  Judge
    wherein, he has  been  acquitted.   Against  the  order  of  acquittal,
    respondent no. 2 has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1997 of 2008  before
    the High Court of Gujarat which is still pending consideration.
    D.      Appellant filed  an  application  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.,
    seeking quashing of ICR No. 18 of 2004 and Criminal Case No. 5 of 2004,
    pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patan,  on  the  grounds,
    inter-alia,  that it amounts to abuse of process of law. The  appellant
    stood acquitted in criminal case under Section 138 of N.I. Act.   Thus,
    he cannot be tried again for the same offence.  In  the  facts  of  the
    case, doctrine  of  double  jeopardy  is  attracted.   The  High  Court
    dismissed the said application.
            Hence, this appeal.


    3.       Shri  Abhishek  Singh,  learned  counsel  appearing  for   the
    appellant, has submitted that the ICR as  well  as  the  criminal  case
    pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patan,  is barred by  the
    provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C. and Section 26 of the General Clauses
    Act, 1897 (hereinafter called ‘General Clauses Act’) as  the  appellant
    has already been dealt with/tried under Section 138 of N.I. Act for the
    same offence.  Thus, the High Court committed an error in not  quashing
    the said ICR and the criminal case. It amounts to double jeopardy  and,
    therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed.


    4.       On  the  contrary,  Shri  Rakesh  Upadhyay,  learned   counsel
    appearing for the respondent no. 2 and Mr. S.  Panda,  learned  counsel
    appearing for the State of Gujarat, have vehemently opposed the  appeal
    contending that the provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C. i.e. `Doctrine of
    Double Jeopardy’ are not attracted in the facts  and  circumstances  of
    the case,  for the reason, that the ingredients of the  offences  under
    Sections  406/420 read with Section 114 IPC are entirely distinct  from
    the case  under  Section  138  of  N.I.  Act,  and  therefore,  do  not
    constitute the same offence.   The appeal is devoid of  any  merit  and
    liable to be dismissed.


    5.      We have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned
    counsel for the parties and perused the record.
            The sole issue raised in this appeal is regarding the scope and
    application of doctrine of double jeopardy.  The  rule  against  double
    jeopardy provides foundation for the  pleas  of  autrefois  acquit  and
    autrefois convict. The manifestation  of  this  rule  is  to  be  found
    contained in Section 300 Cr.P.C; Section 26 of the General Clauses Act;
    and Section 71 I.P.C.
            Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. reads:
             “A person who has once been  tried  by  a  Court  of  competent
             jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of  such
             offence shall, while such conviction or  acquittal  remains  in
             force, not be liable to be tried again for  the  same  offence,
             nor on the same  facts  for  any  other  offence  for  which  a
             different charge from the one made against him might have  been
             made under sub-section (1) of Section  221,  or  for  which  he
             might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.”


            Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads:


             “Provision  as  to  offences  punishable  under  two  or   more
             enactments. – Where an act or omission constitutes  an  offence
             under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable
             to be prosecuted and punished under  either  or  any  of  those
             enactments, but shall not be liable to be  punished  twice  for
             the same offence.”


            Section 71 of I.P.C. reads:

1 “Limit of punishment of offence made  up  of  several  offences.  -  Where
             anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of  which
             parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be  punished
             with the punishment of more than  one  of  such  his  offences,
             unless it be so expressly provided.

             …………………………..”

    ?6.      In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR  1953  SC  325,  the
    Constitution Bench of this Court  dealt  with  the  issue  wherein  the
    central issue arose in the context of the fact that a  person  who  had
    arrived at an Indian airport from abroad on being searched was found in
    possession of gold  in  contravention  of  the  relevant  notification,
    prohibiting the import of gold. Action was taken  against  him  by  the
    customs authorities  and  the  gold  seized  from  his  possession  was
    confiscated. Later on, a prosecution was launched against  him  in  the
    criminal court at Bombay charging him with having committed the offence
    under  Section  8  of  the  Foreign  Exchange  Regulation   Act,   1947
    (hereinafter called `FERA’) read with the relevant notification. In the
    background of these facts, the plea of “autrefois  acquit”  was  raised
    seeking protection under Article 20(2) of the  Constitution  of  India,
    1950 (hereinafter called the ‘Constitution’). This court held that  the
    fundamental right which is guaranteed under Article 20  (2)  enunciates
    the principle of “autrefois convict" or "double jeopardy" i.e. a person
    must not be put in peril twice for the same offence.  The  doctrine  is
    based on the ancient maxim "nemo debet bis  punire  pro  uno  delicto",
    that is to say that no one ought to be twice punished for one  offence.
    The plea of “autrefois convict” or "autrefois acquit"  avers  that  the
    person has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge  for  the
    same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. The  test  is
    whether the former offence and the offence now charged  have  the  same
    ingredients in the sense  that  the  facts  constituting  the  one  are
    sufficient to justify a conviction of the other and not that the  facts
    relied on by the prosecution are the same in the two trials. A plea  of
    "autrefois acquit" is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of
    acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an  acquittal  of
    the latter.


    7.      The Constitution Bench of this  Court  in  S.A.Venkataraman  v.
    Union of India & Anr.,  AIR  1954  SC  375,   explained  the  scope  of
    doctrine of double jeopardy, observing that in  order  to  attract  the
    provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution, there must have  been
    both prosecution and punishment in respect of  the  same  offence.  The
    words ‘prosecuted’ and ‘punished’ are to be taken not distributively so
    as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors  must  co-exist  in
    order that the operation of the clause may be attractive.


    8.      In Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P.,  AIR  1957  SC  458;  and
    State of Madhya Pradesh v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri, AIR 1957  SC  592,
    this Court has held that prosecution and conviction or acquittal  under
    Section 409  IPC do not debar trial of the accused on  a  charge  under
    Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 because the  two
    offences are not identical in sense, import and content.


    9.      In Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, District  Jail,  Amritsar  &
    Anr., AIR 1958 SC 119, proceedings were taken against  certain  persons
    in the first instance before  the  Customs  Authorities  under  Section
    167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and heavy personal penalties were imposed
    on them. Thereafter, they were charged for an offence under Section 120-
    B IPC. This Court held that an offence under Section 120-B is  not  the
    same offence as that under the Sea Customs Act:
             “The offence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is  a  different
             offence from the crime that is the  object  of  the  conspiracy
             because the conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and
             is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally
             the crime attempted or completed does not require  the  element
             of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. They  are,  therefore,
             quite separate offences.”
                                                                   (Emphasis
             added)

    10.     In The State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte and Anr. AIR 1961  SC  578,
    the Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with  the  issue  of
    double jeopardy under Article 20(2), held:
             “To  operate  as  a  bar  the  second   prosecution   and   the
             consequential punishment thereunder,  must  be  for  “the  same
             offence”. The crucial requirement therefore for attracting  the
             Article is that the offences are the same i.e. they  should  be
             identical. If, however, the two  offences  are  distinct,  then
             notwithstanding that  the  allegations  of  facts  in  the  two
             complaints might be substantially similar, the benefit  of  the
             ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary  to  analyse
             and compare not the allegations in the two complaints  but  the
             ingredients of the two offences and see whether their  identity
             is made out.


                 xx        xx        xx          xx          xx           xx
              xx


                 The next point to be considered is as regards the scope  of
             Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. Though Section 26 in its
             opening words refers to “the act or  omission  constituting  an
             offence under two or more enactments”, the emphasis is  not  on
             the facts alleged in the  two  complaints  but  rather  on  the
             ingredients which constitute the  two  offences  with  which  a
             person is charged. This is made clear by the concluding portion
             of the section which refers to  “shall  not  be  liable  to  be
             punished twice for the same offence”. If the offences  are  not
             the same but are distinct, the ban imposed  by  this  provision
             also cannot be invoked.”     (Emphasis added)




    11.     In Roshan Lal & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1413,  the
    accused had caused disappearance of the evidence of two offences  under
    sections 330 and 348  IPC  and,  therefore,  he  was  alleged  to  have
    committed two separate offences  under section 201  IPC.  It  was  held
    that neither  section 71 IPC nor section 26 of the General Clauses  Act
    came to the rescue of the accused and the  accused  was  liable  to  be
    convicted for two sets of offences under section  201  IPC,  though  it
    would be appropriate not to pass two separate sentences.
            A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in  Kharkan  &
    Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 83.


    12.     In Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. The State  of  Maharashtra,
    AIR 1965 SC 682, while dealing with the issue, held:
             “The previous case in which this accused was convicted  was  in
             regard to a conspiracy to commit criminal breach  of  trust  in
             respect of the funds of the Jupiter and that case  was  finally
             disposed of by this Court in Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of
             Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 747. Therein it was  found  that  Caveeshar
             was a  party  to  the  conspiracy  and  also  a  party  to  the
             fraudulent transactions entered into  by  the  Jupiter  in  his
             favour. The present case  relates  to  a  different  conspiracy
             altogether. The conspiracy in question was to lift the funds of
             the Empire, though  its  object  was  to  cover  up  the  fraud
             committed in respect of the Jupiter. Therefore, it may be  that
             the defalcations made in Jupiter may afford a  motive  for  the
             new conspiracy, but the two offences are  distinct  ones.  Some
             accused may be common to both of them, some of the facts proved
             to establish the Jupiter conspiracy may also have to be  proved
             to support the motive for the second conspiracy.  The  question
             is whether that in itself would be sufficient to make  the  two
             conspiracies the one and the same offence….


                 The two conspiracies are distinct offences. It cannot  even
             be said that some of the ingredients of both  the  conspiracies
             are the same. The facts constituting the Jupiter conspiracy are
             not the ingredients of the offence of  the  Empire  conspiracy,
             but only afford a motive for the latter offence. Motive is  not
             an ingredient of an offence. The proof of motive helps a  court
             in coming to a correct  conclusion  when  there  is  no  direct
             evidence. Where there is direct  evidence  for  implicating  an
             accused in an offence, the absence of proof of  motive  is  not
             material. The ingredients of  both  the  offences  are  totally
             different and they do not form  the  same  offence  within  the
             meaning of Article 20(2) of the  Constitution  and,  therefore,
             that Article has no relevance to the present case.”
               (Emphasis added)


    13.     In The State of A.P. v. Kokkiligada Meeraiah & Anr.,  AIR  1970
    SC 771, this Court while having regard to Section  403  Cr.P.C.,  1898,
    held:
             “The following important rules emerge from the terms of Section
             403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
                  (1)  An order of conviction or acquittal in respect of any
             offence constituted by any act against or in favour of a person
             does not prohibit a trial for any other offence constituted  by
             the same act which he may have committed, if the  court  trying
             the first offence was incompetent to try that other offence.
                  (2)  If in the course of a  transaction  several  offences
             are committed for which separate charges could have been  made,
             but if a person is tried in respect of some of  those  charges,
             and not all, and is acquitted or convicted, he may be tried for
             any distinct offence for which at the former trial  a  separate
             charge may have been, but was not, made.
                  (3)  If a person is convicted of any  offence  constituted
             by any act, and that act together with the  consequences  which
             resulted therefrom constituted  a  different  offence,  he  may
             again be tried for that different offence arising  out  of  the
             consequences, if the consequences had not happened or were  not
             known to the court to have happened, at the time  when  he  was
             convicted.
                  (4)  A person who has  once  been  tried  by  a  Court  of
             competent jurisdiction for  an  offence  and  has  been  either
             convicted or acquitted shall not be tried for the same  offence
             or for any other offence arising out of  the  same  facts,  for
             which a different charge from the one made  against  him  might
             have been made or for which he might have been convicted  under
             the Code of Criminal Procedure.”  (Emphasis added)


    14.     The Constitution Bench of this Court in The Assistant Collector
    of the Customs, Bombay & Anr. v. L. R. Melwani & Anr. AIR 1970 SC  962,
    repelled the contention of the respondents therein that their  criminal
    prosecution for alleged smuggling was barred because  proceedings  were
    earlier instituted against them before Collector  of  Customs.  It  was
    observed that neither the adjudication before the Collector of  Customs
    was a prosecution, nor the Collector of Customs was a Court. Therefore,
    neither the rule of autrefois acquit can  be  invoked,  nor  the  issue
    estoppel rule was attracted. The issue estoppel  rule  is  a  facet  of
    doctrine of autrefois acquit.


    15.     This Court has time and again explained the principle of  issue
    estoppel in a criminal trial observing that where an issue of fact  has
    been tried by a competent court on an earlier occasion  and  a  finding
    has been recorded in favour  of  the  accused,  such  a  finding  would
    constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not  as
    a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused  for  a  different  or
    distinct offence,  but   as   precluding  the  acceptance/reception  of
    evidence to disturb the finding of  fact  when  the  accused  is  tried
    subsequently for a different offence.  This rule is distinct  from  the
    doctrine of double jeopardy as it does not prevent  the  trial  of  any
    offence but only precludes the evidence being led to prove  a  fact  in
    issue as regards which evidence has already been  led  and  a  specific
    finding has been recorded at an earlier criminal trial.  Thus, the rule
    relates only to the admissibility of  evidence  which  is  designed  to
    upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent  court  in  a  previous
    trial on a factual issue.  (Vide: Pritam Singh & Anr. v. The  State  of
    Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 415;  Manipur  Administration, Manipur v.  Thokchom
    Bira Singh, AIR 1965 SC 87; Workmen of the Gujarat  Electricity  Board,
    Baroda v. Gujarat Electricity Board, Baroda, AIR 1970 SC  87; and Bhanu
    Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar & Anr.,  AIR 2005 SC 626).


    16.     In V.K. Agarwal  v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia & Ors., AIR 1988
    SC 1106, wherein the accused were prosecuted under  Customs  Act,  1962
    (hereinafter referred to as `Customs Act’) and subsequently under  Gold
    (Control) Act, 1968, (hereinafter called as `Gold  (Control)  Act’)  it
    was held that the ingredients of the  two  offences  are  different  in
    scope and content. The facts constituting the offence under the Customs
    Act are different and are not  sufficient  to  justify  the  conviction
    under the Gold (Control) Act. It was held that what was necessary is to
    analyse the ingredients of the two offences  and  not  the  allegations
    made in the two complaints.

    17.     In M/s. P.V. Mohammad Barmay Sons v. Director  of   Enforcement
    AIR 1993 SC 1188, it was held:
             “The further contention that under the Sea Custom Act  for  the
             self same contravention, the penalty proceedings terminated  in
             favour of the appellant, is of little avail  to  the  appellant
             for the reasons that two Acts operate in different fields,  one
             for contravention of FERA and the second for evasion of  excise
             duty. The mere fact that the penalty proceedings for evasion of
             the excise duty had ended in favour of the appellant, does  not
             take away the jurisdiction of the enforcement authorities under
             the Act to impose the penalty  in  question.  The  doctrine  of
             double jeopardy has no application.”

    (See also:  State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Ors.,  AIR  1989  SC  1;
    Union of India etc. etc. v.  K.V. Jankiraman etc.  etc.,  AIR  1991  SC
    2010;  State of Tamil Nadu v.  Thiru  K.S.  Murugesan & Ors., (1995)  3
    SCC 273; and State of Punjab & Anr.  v.   Dalbir Singh & Ors., (2001) 9
    SCC 212).


    18.     In A.A. Mulla & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.,  AIR  1997
    SC 1441, the appellants were charged under Section 409 IPC and  Section
    5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for making false  panchnama
    disclosing recovery of 90 gold biscuits on 21-9-1969 although according
    to the prosecution case the appellants had recovered 99 gold  biscuits.
    The appellants were tried for the same and  acquitted.  The  appellants
    were also tried for offence under Section 120-B IPC, Sections  135  and
    136 of the Customs Act, Section  85  of  the  Gold  (Control)  Act  and
    Section 23(1-A) of FERA and Section 5 of Import  and  Export  (Control)
    Act, 1947. The appellants filed  an  application  before  the  Judicial
    Magistrate contending that on the selfsame  facts  they  could  not  be
    tried for the second time in  view  of  Section  403  of  the  Code  of
    Criminal Procedure, 1898 (corresponding to Section 300  Cr.P.C.).  This
    Court held:
             “After giving  our  careful  consideration  to  the  facts  and
             circumstances of the case  and  the  submissions  made  by  the
             learned counsel for the respective parties, it  appears  to  us
             that the ingredients of the offences for which  the  appellants
             were charged in the first trial  are  entirely  different.  The
             second trial with  which  we  are  concerned  in  this  appeal,
             envisages  a  different  fact-situation  and  the  enquiry  for
             finding out facts constituting offences under the  Customs  Act
             and the Gold  (Control)  Act  in  the  second  trial  is  of  a
             different nature……. Not only the ingredients of offences in the
             previous and  the  second  trial  are  different,  the  factual
             foundation of the first  trial  and  such  foundation  for  the
             second trial is  also  not  indented  (sic).  Accordingly,  the
             second trial was not barred under Section 403 CrPC of  1898  as
             alleged by the appellants.”   (Emphasis added)

    19.     In Union of India & Ors. v. Sunil Kumar  Sarkar,  AIR  2001  SC
    1092, this Court considered the argument that  if  the  punishment  had
    already been imposed for Court  Martial  proceedings,  the  proceedings
    under the Central Rules dealing with disciplinary aspect and misconduct
    cannot be held as it would amount  to  double  jeopardy  violating  the
    provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. The  Court  explained
    that the Court Martial  proceedings  deal  with  penal  aspect  of  the
    misconduct while the proceedings under the Central Rules deal with  the
    disciplinary aspect of the misconduct. The two proceedings do not over-
    lap at all and, therefore, there was  no  question  of  attracting  the
    doctrine of double jeopardy. While deciding the said  case,  the  court
    placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in R. Viswan & Ors. v.  Union
    of India & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 658.


    20.     In Union of India & Anr. v. P.D. Yadav, (2002) 1 SCC 405,  this
    Court dealt with the issue of double  jeopardy  in  a  case  where  the
    pension of the official, who stood convicted by  a  Court-Martial,  had
    been forfeited.  The Court held:
             "This principle is embodied in the well-known maxim nemo  debet
             bis vexari si constat curiae quod sit pro una et  eadem  causa,
             meaning no one ought to be vexed twice if  it  appears  to  the
             court that it is for one and the same cause. Doctrine of double
             jeopardy is a protection against prosecution twice for the same
             offence. Under  Articles  20-22  of  the  Indian  Constitution,
             provisions are made relating to personal  liberty  of  citizens
             and others…..  Offences  such  as  criminal  breach  of  trust,
             misappropriation, cheating, defamation etc., may give  rise  to
             prosecution on criminal side  and  also  for  action  in  civil
             court/ other forum for recovery of  money  by  way  of  damages
             etc., unless there is a bar created by law.  In the proceedings
             before General Court Martial, a person is tried for an  offence
             of misconduct and whereas in passing order under Regulation  16
              (a) for forfeiting pension, a person is not tried for the same
             offence of misconduct after the punishment  is  imposed  for  a
             proven misconduct by the General  Court  Martial  resulting  in
             cashiering, dismissing or removing from service.  Only  further
             action  is  taken  under  Regulation  16  (a)  in  relation  to
             forfeiture of pension. Thus, punishing a person  under  Section
             71 of the Army Act and making order under Regulation 16 (a) are
             entirely different. Hence, there is  no  question  of  applying
             principle of double jeopardy to the present cases."





    21.     In State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh & Ors. AIR 2003 SC 791, this
    Court held that as the offence of glorification of Sati under Section 5
    of the Rajasthan Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987,  is  different  from  the
    offence of violation  of  prohibitory  order  issued  under  Section  6
    thereof, the doctrine of double jeopardy  was  not  attracted  for  the
    reason that even if prohibitory  order  is  promulgated,  a  subsequent
    criminal act even if falls under Section 5 could not be  covered  under
    Section 6(3)  of  the  said  Act.    Doctrine  of  double  jeopardy  is
    enshrined in Section 300 Cr.P.C. and Section 26 of the General  Clauses
    Act.  Both the provisions employ the expression “same offence”.


    22.     Similar view has been reiterated by  this  Court  in  State  of
    Haryana v. Balwant Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1253, observing that there may be
    cases of misappropriation, cheating, defamation  etc.  which  may  give
    rise to prosecution on criminal side  and  also  for  action  in  civil
    court/other forum  for  recovery  of  money  by  way  of  damages  etc.
    Therefore, it is not always necessary  that  in  every  such  case  the
    provision of Article 20(2) of the Constitution may be attracted.


    23.     In Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. C.B.I., New Delhi, AIR 2003 SC
    2545, this Court while considering the case for quashing  the  criminal
    prosecution for evading  the  customs  duty,  where  the  matter  stood
    settled under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme 1988,  observed  that  once
    the tax matter was settled under the said  Scheme,  the  offence  stood
    compounded,  and  prosecution  for  evasion  of   duty,   in   such   a
    circumstance, would amount to double jeopardy.


    24.     In view of the above, the law is well settled that in order  to
    attract the provisions  of  Article  20(2)  of  the  Constitution  i.e.
    doctrine of  autrefois acquit or Section 300 Cr.P.C. or Section 71  IPC
    or Section 26 of General Clauses Act, ingredients of  the  offences  in
    the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not
    different.  The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same
    is not identity of the allegations but the identity of the  ingredients
    of the offence. Motive for  committing  offence  cannot  be  termed  as
    ingredients of offences  to determine the issue. The plea of  autrefois
    acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the judgment of  acquittal
    in the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the  latter
    charge.


    25.     In Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal & Anr., (2011) 3
    SCC 581, while dealing with the proceedings  under  the  provisions  of
    Foreign  Exchange  Regulation  Act,  1973,  this  Court   quashed   the
    proceedings (by a majority of 2:1) under Section 56  of  the  said  Act
    because adjudication under Section 51 stood finalised. The Court held :


               “The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions  can
             broadly be stated as follows:
               (i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be
             launched simultaneously;
               (ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is  not  necessary
             before initiating criminal prosecution;
               (iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings  are
             independent in nature to each other;
               (iv) The finding against the person  facing  prosecution  in
             the adjudication proceedings is not binding on  the  proceeding
             for criminal prosecution;
               (v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement  Directorate
             is not prosecution by a competent court of law to  attract  the
             provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section  300
             of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
               (vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings  in  favour
             of the person facing trial for identical violation will  depend
             upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in  adjudication
             proceedings  is  on  technical  ground  and   not   on   merit,
             prosecution may continue; and
               (vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits  where  the
             allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person
             held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same  set  of  facts
             and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying
             principle being  the  higher  standard  of  proof  in  criminal
             cases.”




            The ratio of the aforesaid judgment is not applicable  in  this
    case for the reason that proceedings under Section 138 of N.I. Act  are
    still sub judice as the appeal  is  pending  and  the  matter  has  not
    attained finality.


    26.     Learned counsel for the appellant has further  placed  reliance
    on the judgment in G. Sagar Suri &  Anr.  v.  State  of  U.P.  &  Ors.,
    (2000) 2 SCC 636, wherein during the pendency of the proceedings  under
    Section 138 N.I. Act, prosecution under Sections 406/420 IPC  had  been
    launched. This Court quashed the criminal  proceedings  under  Sections
    406/420 IPC, observing that it would amount to abuse of process of law.
     In fact, the issue as to whether the ingredients of both the  offences
    were same, had neither been raised nor decided. Therefore, the ratio of
    that judgment does not have application on the facts of this case.
                Same remained the position so far as the judgment in  Kolla
    Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao & Anr., (2011) 2 SCC 703,
    is concerned.  It has been held therein that once the conviction  under
    Section 138 of N.I. Act has been recorded, the  question  of  trying  a
    same person under Section 420 IPC or any other provision of IPC or  any
    other statute is not permissible being hit  by  Article  20(2)  of  the
    Constitution and Section 300(1)  Cr.P.C.


    27.     Admittedly, the  appellant  had  been  tried  earlier  for  the
    offences punishable under the provisions of  Section 138 N.I.  Act  and
    the case is sub judice before the High Court. In the instant  case,  he
    is involved under Sections 406/420 read with Section 114 IPC.   In  the
    prosecution under Section 138 N.I. Act, the mens rea   i.e.  fraudulent
    or dishonest intention at  the  time  of  issuance  of  cheque  is  not
    required to be proved. However, in the case under IPC involved  herein,
    the issue of mens rea may be relevant.  The  offence  punishable  under
    Section 420 IPC is a serious one as the sentence  of  7  years  can  be
    imposed.  In the case under N.I. Act, there is a legal presumption that
    the cheque had been issued for discharging the antecedent liability and
    that presumption can be rebutted only  by  the  person  who  draws  the
    cheque. Such a requirement is not there in the offences under  IPC.  In
    the case under N.I. Act, if a fine is imposed, it is to be adjusted  to
    meet the  legally  enforceable  liability.   There  cannot  be  such  a
    requirement in the offences under IPC.  The case  under  N.I.  Act  can
    only be initiated by filing a complaint. However, in a case  under  the
    IPC such a condition is not necessary.
    28.   There may be some overlapping of facts  in  both  the  cases  but
    ingredients of offences are entirely different.  Thus,  the  subsequent
    case is not barred by any of the aforesaid statutory provisions.
          The appeal is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.


                                          ….....…….……………………..J.
                                      (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)






                                                   .......……………………………J.
                                                   (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
    New Delhi,
    April 23, 2012


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