where an appeal is to be filed on acquittal of calendar case? =In view of the fact that the acquittal of the accused in Calendar Case No.975 of 2008 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Visakhapatnam, and in view of the amended provisions of Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which came into effect from 31.12.2009, the appeal has to be presented before the Sessions Court

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL (SR) No.2368 OF 2012 JUDGMENT:- In view of the fact that the acquittal of the accused in Calendar Case No.975 of 2008 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Visakhapatnam, and in view of the amended provisions of Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which came into effect from 31.12.2009, the appeal has to be presented before the Sessions Court, where the appeal lies against the conviction. Hence, the Registry is directed to return the papers for presentation and the appellant is permitted to present the appeal before the Sessions Court after two weeks of the return. The appellant will be entitled to benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act in case of any delay. ___________________________ JUSTICE N.R.L. NAGESWARA RAO Date:23-01-2012 INL

from the provisions of Sections 60 to 63 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the Court shall decide the confiscation or the release of the properties either in case of acquittal or in case of conviction. But, at the same time, the order of the Court should be specific. Evidently, in this case, except passing an order that unmarked case property shall be destroyed, there is no specific order with regard to the property i.e., six vehicles, which were already released in favour of the appellant herein by virtue of the orders of this Court. 5. Therefore, the lower Court shall pass necessary order keeping in view the provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act, with regard to six vehicles, which were already released in favour of the appellant herein. So far as the other property is concerned, there is no need to interfere with the order of the lower Court with regard to destruction.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L. NAGESWARA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL No.69 OF 2012 JUDGMENT:- The appeal is filed by the 2nd accused questioning the judgment of the I Additional Sessions Judge, Medak at Sangareddy in NDPS Sessions Case No.44 of 2011, where-under after acquitting the accused some of the properties were ordered to be destroyed. 2. According to the claim of the appellant, the excise police have seized six vehicles apart from toddy in several watts. So far as the release of those vehicles is concerned, by virtue of the interim orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.29073 of 2009, dated 31.12.2009 and also 02.02.2010, six vehicles were ordered to be released in favour of the petitioner therein, who is appellant herein, on furnishing security to a tune of Rs.5,00,000/-. 3. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the lower Court having acquitted the accused has not passed any specific order with regard to the six vehicles. It was also contended that having acquitted the accused, the order of destruction of the other property, which are wooden watts and plastic watts is not proper. 4. As can be seen from the provisions of Sections 60 to 63 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the Court shall decide the confiscation or the release of the properties either in case of acquittal or in case of conviction. But, at the same time, the order of the Court should be specific. Evidently, in this case, except passing an order that unmarked case property shall be destroyed, there is no specific order with regard to the property i.e., six vehicles, which were already released in favour of the appellant herein by virtue of the orders of this Court. 5. Therefore, the lower Court shall pass necessary order keeping in view the provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act, with regard to six vehicles, which were already released in favour of the appellant herein. So far as the other property is concerned, there is no need to interfere with the order of the lower Court with regard to destruction. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed at the stage of admission. ___________________________ JUSTICE N.R.L. NAGESWARA RAO Date: 18-01-2012 INL

in terms of Section 7(3) and Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), Gratuity is required to be paid within a period of thirty days from the date on which it becomes due and if it is not paid within that period, then interest is required to be paid at the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment on long term deposits. 9. In the present case, the Circular issued by the petitioners goes well beyond the statute and gives six months’ time for the petitioners to make payment. But, unfortunately, even this period has not been adhered to by the petitioners. The Tribunal was justified, on the facts of this case, to direct the petitioners to pay interest to the 1st respondent.

THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MADAN B. LOKUR AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR Writ Petition No. 1389 OF 2012 DATED:24-01-2012 Between: Union of India Represented by its Secretary, Railway Board, Ministry of Railways, New Delhi and others. … Petitioners And K. Radha Krishna and others. … Respondents THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MADAN B. LOKUR AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR Writ Petition No. 1389 OF 2012 ORDER: (per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Shri Madan B. Lokur) 1. The 1st respondent applied for voluntary retirement by making an application on 10.4.2008. The application was based on certain domestic grounds. 2. The request for voluntary retirement was accepted by the petitioners with effect from 1.8.2008 after completion of three months notice period. 3. The 1st respondent was thereafter entitled to post-retiral benefits including Gratuity amount of Rs.3,47,689/-. This amount was paid to the 1st respondent on 15.10.2009, after more than a year. 4. The 1st respondent was aggrieved by the delayed payment and approached the Central Administrative Tribunal for payment of interest on the delayed payment. 5. The Tribunal framed three issues that arose in the case. We are not concerned with the first two issues, which deal with the alleged harassment of the 1st respondent and his alleged unauthorized occupation of the quarters allotted to him. It may be mentioned that the first issue relating to harassment was decided against the 1st respondent. While the second issue was decided against the petitioners and it was held that the 1st respondent had not unauthorizedly occupied the quarters allotted to him. The third issue related to the entitlement of the 1st respondent for interest on the delayed payment of Gratuity. 6. The Tribunal referred to Circular dated 15.4.1991 relating to payment of interest on account of delayed payment of retirement-cum-death gratuity. In terms of the relevant part of the Circular, it has been laid down that where the payment of Gratuity is delayed in certain circumstances, beyond a period of six months from the date of retirement, interest should be paid for the period of delay beyond six months from the date of retirement. The Circular also deals with the concerned circumstances, that is, defaults on the part of the employee in not submitting his papers in time. 7. In so far as the present case is concerned, there is no allegation that the 1st respondent had not submitted his papers in time. Notwithstanding this, there was a delay of about one year in making the payment of the death-cum-retirement benefits to the 1st respondent. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal directed the petitioners to make payment of interest on the delayed payment of death-cum-retirement gratuity. 8. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners are now before us. We do not find any reason to disagree with the view expressed by the Tribunal. There is no justification given for the delayed payment. We may also mention that in terms of Section 7(3) and Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), Gratuity is required to be paid within a period of thirty days from the date on which it becomes due and if it is not paid within that period, then interest is required to be paid at the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment on long term deposits. 9. In the present case, the Circular issued by the petitioners goes well beyond the statute and gives six months’ time for the petitioners to make payment. But, unfortunately, even this period has not been adhered to by the petitioners. The Tribunal was justified, on the facts of this case, to direct the petitioners to pay interest to the 1st respondent. 10. The writ petition is dismissed. 11. The miscellaneous application is also dismissed. MADAN B. LOKUR, CJ SANJAY KUMAR, J 24-01-2012 pnb

cross-examination of a prosecution witness is a valuable right conferred on an accused, and that right cannot be curtailed. As seen from the deposition of PW.10, it is as if he was cross-examined by the counsel for both A1 and A2 simultaneously. It is stated that the petitioner and A2 engaged separate counsel for defending their case. When A1’s advocate was not present, there was no cross-examination on the part of A1, and therefore, the trial Court ought to have given an opportunity to A1 to cross-examine PW.10. Insofar recalling PW.9 is concerned, he was already cross-examined by the counsel for A1, as seen from the deposition. So, there are no grounds to recall PW.9. Hence, the trial Court is directed to fix a date for the presence of PW.10 for the purpose of cross-examination by the learned counsel for A1.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU CRIMINAL PETITION No. 715 of 2012 ORDER: 1. This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., challenging the order dated 22.12.2011, passed in Crl.M.P.No.1393 of 2011 in C.C.No.702 of 2007, on the file of the I-Additional Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Khammam. 2. The brief facts that are necessary for disposal of this petition are as follows: The petitioner is A1 in C.C.No.702 of 2007. Charge sheet was filed against the petitioner and the 2nd respondent herein/A2, for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468 and 471 IPC and Section 12 of the Passports Act, 1967. It is stated that the petitioner and A2 engaged separate advocates for contesting their case in the trial Court. It is alleged by the petitioner that when the C.C. was posted for examination, it was noticed that there is a variation in the signatures of PW.10-Panch Witness on Ex.P20 vis-à-vis his deposition; and there is a contradiction in the evidence of PW9-MDO in comparison to her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is further stated that on the date of cross-examination i.e. 16.11.2010, the petitioner’s counsel was not present, but however, it was typed on the deposition as “Cross by defence counsel for A1 & A2”. Seeking to recall PWs.9 and 10 for further cross-examination by his counsel, the petitioner filed Crl.M.P.No.1393 of 2011, but the same was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that they were already cross examined on all material aspects. Challenging the same, this petition is filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that, as the counsel appearing for petitioner was not present on the date of cross-examination of PWs.9 and 10, the petitioner filed Crl.MP.No.1393 of 2011 seeking to recall them for the purpose of cross-examination, but the same was dismissed. 4. There cannot be any dispute that the cross-examination of a prosecution witness is a valuable right conferred on an accused, and that right cannot be curtailed. As seen from the deposition of PW.10, it is as if he was cross-examined by the counsel for both A1 and A2 simultaneously. It is stated that the petitioner and A2 engaged separate counsel for defending their case. When A1’s advocate was not present, there was no cross-examination on the part of A1, and therefore, the trial Court ought to have given an opportunity to A1 to cross-examine PW.10. Insofar recalling PW.9 is concerned, he was already cross-examined by the counsel for A1, as seen from the deposition. So, there are no grounds to recall PW.9. Hence, the trial Court is directed to fix a date for the presence of PW.10 for the purpose of cross-examination by the learned counsel for A1. 5. Accordingly, the criminal petition is partly allowed. ____________________ JUSTICE K.C. BHANU 19th January, 2012 KSM

The Assessment order dated 17-11-2011 passed by the 2nd respondent for the period April, 2009 to January, 2011 under the provisions of the A.P. VAT Act, 2005 (for short ‘the 2005 Act’) is assailed in this writ petition, inter alia on the ground that a common Assessment Order for the period April, 2009 to January, 2011 cannot be passed, since Section 2 (36) of the 2005 Act defines tax period as a calendar month or any other period as may be prescribed, and no other period other than a calendar month has been prescribed by the Rules made under the Act; and on the ground that the Assessment Order is contrary to the provisions of Section 4 (9) (d) of the 2005 Act, which enjoins that ‘every dealer, other than those mentioned in clause (a) and (b) and whose annual total turnover is more than rupees five lakhs and less than rupees one crore and fifty lakhs (1.5 crore) shall pay tax at the rate of four percent (4%) of the taxable turnover of the sale or supply of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or drink served in restaurants, sweet-stalls, clubs, any other eating houses or anywhere whether indoor or outdoor or caterer.’ The contention is that the 2nd respondent erroneously interpreted this provision as restricted to the turnover comprising sales within the premises and erred in concluding that sales made outside the licenced premises are not to be computed under Section 4 (9) (d) of the 2005 Act.

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR WRIT PETITION No. 1322 of 2012 Dated: 23-1-2012 Between M/S Sri Balaji Ghee Sweets and Home Foods, Vijayawada, rep. by its Proprietor Mr.K.Srinivasa Rao …Petitioner And The Deputy Commissioner (CT), No.I Division, Vijayawada and others …Respondents Oral order: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Goda Raghuram) The Assessment order dated 17-11-2011 passed by the 2nd respondent for the period April, 2009 to January, 2011 under the provisions of the A.P. VAT Act, 2005 (for short ‘the 2005 Act’) is assailed in this writ petition, inter alia on the ground that a common Assessment Order for the period April, 2009 to January, 2011 cannot be passed, since Section 2 (36) of the 2005 Act defines tax period as a calendar month or any other period as may be prescribed, and no other period other than a calendar month has been prescribed by the Rules made under the Act; and on the ground that the Assessment Order is contrary to the provisions of Section 4 (9) (d) of the 2005 Act, which enjoins that ‘every dealer, other than those mentioned in clause (a) and (b) and whose annual total turnover is more than rupees five lakhs and less than rupees one crore and fifty lakhs (1.5 crore) shall pay tax at the rate of four percent (4%) of the taxable turnover of the sale or supply of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or drink served in restaurants, sweet-stalls, clubs, any other eating houses or anywhere whether indoor or outdoor or caterer.’ The contention is that the 2nd respondent erroneously interpreted this provision as restricted to the turnover comprising sales within the premises and erred in concluding that sales made outside the licenced premises are not to be computed under Section 4 (9) (d) of the 2005 Act. The petitioner has an appellate remedy before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of the Act. Hence this Court is not inclined to exercise jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission, granting liberty to the petitioner to pursue the appellate remedy. No costs. __________________________ GODA RAGHURAM, J 23rd January, 2012 __________________________ N. RAVI SHANKAR, J GRR