when the coordinate Bench on earlier occasion, that is, on 09.06.2006, based on the acceptable materials prima facie concluded that charges have to be framed, it is but proper by the present Bench to arrive and take a final decision in the light of the materials formulated by the earlier Bench.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 158 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 72 of 2009) C. Shakunthala & Ors. .... Appellant(s) Versus H.P. Udayakumar & Anr. .... Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 18.06.2008 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal CCC No. 32 of 2005 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition of the appellants herein. 1 3) Brief facts: (a) The appellants herein are the children and legal representatives of late M. Channappa, who was the original complainant/landlord before the High Court. Late M. Channappa was the owner of the property bearing Old Survey No. 39/2A, Yediur Village, Bangalore South Taluk. He let out the eastern half portion of the said property to one Kachu Krishna Achari and western portion to one P.V. Lingaiah on rent. In view of the extension of the City, the property fell into the Bangalore City limits and is presently situated on the K.R. Road and bears No. 2038/A. b) Late M. Channappa initiated eviction proceedings against both the said tenants and Kachu Krishna Achari came to be evicted pursuant to the decree granted by the competent court. The order of eviction was challenged by P.V. Lingaiah in HRRP No. 559 of 1996 before the High Court of Karnataka which came to be dismissed on 29.02.2000 granting two years time to vacate the tenanted premises subject to filing an undertaking by him. 2 c) Pursuant to the said order, Lingaiah filed an undertaking to vacate the tenanted premises and deliver vacant possession to late M. Channappa. In the meantime, Lingaiah approached this Court by way of a special leave petition which also came to be dismissed. d) Mr. Lingaiah failed to adhere to the undertaking given by him to vacate the premises within two years, instead in collusion with his son L. Suresh and H.P. Udayakumar, respondent No.1 herein, he created a sale deed dated 22.02.2001 whereby respondent No.1 is purported to have acquired a portion of the tenanted premises. Significantly, respondent No.1 is the business partner of L. Suresh, son of Lingaiah. e) Thereafter, late M. Channappa initiated contempt proceedings against Lingaiah, his son Suresh and H.P. Udayakumar, respondent No.1 herein. Since respondent No.1 and Suresh were not parties to the earlier petition, contempt proceedings were dropped against them and the High Court by its order dated 06.02.2004 convicted and sentenced Mr. Lingaiah to undergo simple imprisonment for three days. 3 Being aggrieved with the order of the High Court, late Channappa filed an appeal before this Court for enhancement of the sentence awarded to Mr. Lingaiah which is still pending. f) As Mr. Lingaiah failed to vacate the tenanted premises, late Channappa also filed execution proceedings before the Court of Small Causes, Bangalore under Order 21 of CPC. The Court of Small Causes issued delivery warrant for delivery of possession of the tenanted premises. g) While the matter was pending, on 18.12.2004, the respondent No.1 herein filed an application under Order 21 Rule 97 to 101 read with Section 151 CPC in Execution Petition No. 2658 of 2004 seeking adjudication of his right, title and interest in respect of the property in question contending that he was the absolute owner of the said property in terms of the sale deed dated 22.02.2001 and that late M. Channappa had no interest in the said property. He also contended that as late M. Channappa attempted to interfere with the property, he filed O.S.No. 15265 of 2002 before the Civil Court for permanent injunction wherein the court had granted an ad interim order of status quo. 4 h) It is evident that respondent No.1 is the business partner of the son of Lingaiah and he has been set up to file application to protract the proceedings. i) In the light of the stand taken by respondent No.1, Channappa filed O.S. No. 3814 of 2005 against respondent No.1 for delivery of the vacant possession of the property. j) The Executing Court vide judgment dated 08.06.2005 dismissed the application filed by respondent No.1 after adverting to the material on record. Respondent No.1 questioned the said order before the High Court by filing HRRP No. 285 of 2005. k) The High Court by judgment dated 30.06.2005 dismissed the said petition on the ground that eviction order having passed in the year 1996, respondent No.1 who was obstructing the execution of the decree having purchased the property subsequently in the year 2001 interfered with the order of the Executing Court which is not warranted. l) On 26.09.2005, respondent No.1 and his brother H.P. Ashok Kumar, respondent No.2 filed another application in the said Execution Petition opposing the same. 5 m) In the circumstances, late M. Channappa filed a petition under Section 11(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 before the High Court. After hearing both the parties, the High Court by its order dated 09.06.2006 held that there was a prima facie case against the respondents to proceed further and frame charge and try them for criminal contempt for abuse of the process of the law. On 17.01.2008 M. Channappa passed away and the High Court permitted the petitioners therein to come on record. n) The High Court, by final impugned judgment dated 18.06.2008 dismissed Crl. CCC No. 32 of 2005 and acquitted the respondents by holding that the grounds made out in the second application is under different circumstances, the identity of the property is disputed and that the respondents cannot be attributed with unlawful intention for abuse of the process of the court. o) Being aggrieved, the appellants herein preferred this appeal by way of special leave. 6 4) Heard Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and none appeared for the respondents. 5) The point for consideration is whether the impugned judgment of the High Court dismissing Crl. CCC No. 32 of 2005 after recording that prima facie case was made against the respondents, thereafter framing charges and recording evidence of the parties, without adverting to the plea of the parties and evidence on record, by concluding that the second application was under different circumstance being contrary to Rule 13 of the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules 1981 (in short `the Rules') read with Section 264 occurring in Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short `the Code) is legally sustainable. 6) Since we have already narrated the facts of the case, there is no need to refer the same once again. Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil. learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that even as early as on 09.06.2006, the Division Bench of the High Court based on the materials placed concluded that a prima facie case against the respondents/accused have been made out for proceeding 7 further and directed framing of charge to try them for criminal contempt for abuse of process of law, another coordinate Bench while passing the impugned order dated 18.06.2008, without reference to any of the materials, simply dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners therein-appellants herein. Perusal of the initial order dated 09.06.2006 shows that the Division Bench considered the contempt petition filed against the accused after obtaining the consent of the learned Advocate General in writing under Section 15-1(a) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Pursuant to service of notice on the respondents, they submitted their objections along with certain documents in support of their defence. It was contended that the action complained of do not constitute abuse of process of the Court for taking cognizance in the matter and to proceed further for framing the charge. 7) As rightly pointed out by the Division Bench in the order dated 09.06.2006 in terms of Rule 8(ii)(a) of Contempt of Courts Rules, 1981, the matter was heard initially to find out whether there is a prima facie case to frame the charge against the accused persons. The complainant placed strong reliance 8 on the allegations made in the complaint and also the order passed by the trial Court in the earlier application filed by the first accused-Udaya Kumar in respect of property against which a decree is sought to be executed by the complainant in the execution proceedings. In the preliminary order, the Court had also referred to the observation of the Executing Court dated 08.01.2005. Ultimately, the Executing Court has convicted the judgment debtor and others. The matter is still pending before this Court. The complainant has also alleged that after the order passed on the application filed by the first accused became final, a decree was sought to be executed to take the possession of the premises. At this juncture, the second accused has filed another application taking another plea and according to his counsel, the subject matter covered in the application is different from the earlier one and that the identity covered in the eviction petition and the claim made in the application filed by the first accused before the Executing Court is entirely different. In other words, it is the defence that the order passed on the earlier application filed by the first accused does not come in the way of Executing Court to 9 independently consider the application of the second accused in order to determine the rights of the parties. In the preliminary order, the Division Bench rejected the said contention and prima facie found that it is untenable in law in view of the earlier application filed under Order XXI Rule 9 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 by the first accused and concluded that the earlier application and the present application have to be treated as one and the same. After adverting to the respective stand of the parties, various decisions of this Court, in the preliminary order dated 09.06.2006, the Division Bench has concluded thus: "10. We have carefully perused the record and the documents produced by the complainant and also the accused persons. After careful perusal of the averments made in the complaint and the statement of objections and the orders passed by this court in the eviction proceedings and also the order passed in the proceedings and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to supra, upon which strong reliance is rightly placed by the complainant, we feel that there is prima facie case against the accused to proceed further, frame charge and to try them for criminal contempt for abuse of the process of law. 11. Call after two weeks for framing charges against the accused." 10 That was the position on 09.06.2006. Meanwhile, Mr. M. Channappa, who was the complainant in CCC No. 32 of 2005 passed away and his children were brought on record as his legal representatives. Inasmuch as the impugned order does not contain adequate reasons and materials as found in the preliminary order by another coordinate Bench dated 09.06.2006, it is useful to extract the exact impugned order of the Division Bench which is as follows: "Without reference to merit of the contents taken in the second application, we hold to suffice that the grounds made out in the second application is under different circumstances. The identity of the property is disputed. Factually, we find that the accused cannot be attributed with unlawful intention of abuse of process of the court. In the view of the matter we do not find any good ground to hold the contempt u/s 2(e) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Accordingly, petition is dismissed and the accused is acquitted." 8) We have already referred to the stand of the complainant, his specific assertion with reference to earlier orders and the defence of the respondents/accused as well as the prima facie conclusion by the Division Bench that the complainant has made out a case against the accused to proceed further and adjourned the matter for two weeks for framing charges. When such is the position, it is not understandable how 11 another coordinate Bench after two years without any discussion and adverting to the relevant materials relied on by earlier coordinate Bench passed a cryptic order by dismissing the contempt petition. We are satisfied that when the coordinate Bench on earlier occasion, that is, on 09.06.2006, based on the acceptable materials prima facie concluded that charges have to be framed, it is but proper by the present Bench to arrive and take a final decision in the light of the materials formulated by the earlier Bench. We are not saying that the complainant has made out a case for guilty of contempt of courts but the prima facie conclusion arrived by the earlier Bench in the year 2006, based on the acceptable materials, cannot be ignored by another Bench at the time of the passing the final order as if it is an Appellate Court. In view of the same, we have no other option except setting aside the impugned order and remitting the matter to the High Court for passing fresh order. 12 9) In the light of what is stated above, the impugned order of the High Court dated 18.06.2008 made in Crl. CCC No. 32 of 2005 is set aside and the matter is remitted to it for fresh disposal. We request the High Court to restore Crl. CCC No. 32 of 2005 on its file and dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law by passing a speaking order after affording opportunity to both the parties. The appeal is allowed to this extent. ...........................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) ...........................................J. (J. CHELAMESWAR) NEW DELHI; JANUARY 16, 2012. 13

cancellation of bail not necessary as the high court properly imposed conditions on bail-Taking note of all these aspects, particularly, the fact that the second respondent was in jail since 24.08.2009, the trial has commenced by examining the two witnesses on the side of the prosecution and the assurance by the State that trial will not be prolonged and conclude within a reasonable time and also of the fact that the High Court while granting bail has imposed several conditions for strict adherence during the period of bail, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the High Court. In fact, in the impugned order itself, the High Court has made it clear that in case of breach of any of the conditions, the trial Court will have liberty to take steps to send the applicant therein (respondent No.2 herein) to jail again. In addition to the same, it is further made clear that if the appellant receives any fresh threat from the second respondent or from his supporters, he is free to inform the trial Court and in such event the trial Court is free to take appropriate steps as observed by the High Court. We also direct the Trial Court to complete the trial within a period of four months from the date of the receipt of copy of this order without unnecessary adjournments.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 159 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 10244 of 2010) Maulana Mohd. Amir Rashadi .... Appellant(s) Versus State of U.P. & Anr. .... Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 06.08.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 28420 of 2009 whereby the High Court has granted bail to Mr. Ramakant Yadav - respondent No.2/accused in Case Crime No. 622 of 2009, FIR No. 63 of 2009 under Sections 302 1 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `IPC'), Police Station Phoolpur, District Azamgarh, U.P. 3) Brief facts: (a) According to the appellant, he is the President of a political party, namely, Rashtriya Ulema Council. On 12.08.2009, a meeting of the Party was to be held at Phoolpur, District Azamgarh, U.P. from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. and he was to attend the said meeting in the capacity of Chief Guest. b) At about 1.45 p.m., the appellant started towards the venue of the meeting and his convoy was being led by 10 to 15 supporters who were riding on motorcycles. At that moment, the second respondent/accused came from behind in the convoy of cars and immediately after crossing the appellant's car and his supporters, the convoy of cars belonging to the second respondent/accused suddenly stopped on the road without giving any signal and the second respondent/accused came out of his vehicle armed with a gun along with his supporters who were also carrying guns and they started giving kick blows to one of the motorcycle riders who fell down and the pillion riders of the said motorcycles were fired upon 2 by the second respondent and his supporters from their respective guns and thereafter, they ran away from the place. Adbul Rehman-the pillion rider sustained serious fire arm injuries. When he was taken to the hospital at Varanasi, he succumbed to his injuries. c) On the basis of a written complaint in the Police Station, Phoolpur, FIR No. 63 of 2009 under Sections 302 and 307 IPC was registered. The second respondent was arrested only on 24.08.2009. It was further stated by the appellant that the accused is a habitual criminal and has a criminal background having more than three dozen cases involving serious offences against him. The second respondent filed a Criminal Bail Application being No. 28420 of 2009 before the High Court praying for his release. The appellant filed his objection. He also highlighted that from 14.08.2009, the appellant started receiving threatening calls from the second respondent warning him not to pursue the case otherwise he shall be eliminated. d) On completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed on 15.07.2010 against respondent No.2 and three other 3 persons under Sections 302, 307 and 325 read with 34 IPC and the trial of the case has been started by examining the injured witness - Farhan as PW-1 on 29.04.2010 and 15.07.2010. e) Pending proceeding of the trial, the High Court, by impugned order dated 06.08.2010, granted conditional bail to the second respondent. Questioning the same and of the fact that the appellant had received several threat calls, he filed the present appeal for setting aside the same. 4) Heard Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel for the contesting second respondent. 5) The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the High Court was justified in enlarging the second respondent on bail after imposing certain conditions. 6) It is not in dispute and highlighted that the second respondent is a sitting Member of Parliament facing several criminal cases. It is also not in dispute that most of the cases ended in acquittal for want of proper witnesses or pending trial. As observed by the High Court, merely on the basis of 4 criminal antecedents, the claim of the second respondent cannot be rejected. In other words, it is the duty of the Court to find out the role of the accused in the case in which he has been charged and other circumstances such as possibility of fleeing away from the jurisdiction of the Court etc. 7) In the case relating to FIR No. 63 of 2009, he was arrested and in jail since 24.08.2009. Another important aspect is that after filing of charge-sheet on 15.07.2010, prosecution examined two important witnesses as PWs 1 and 2. This was the position prevailing on 26.07.2010. Even thereafter, now more than a year has rolled. Counsel appearing for the State assured that the trial will not be prolonged at the instance of the prosecution and ready to complete the evidence within a period to be directed by this Court. The other objection of the appellant for grant of bail is that he had received threats from the second respondent and his supporters warning him not to pursue the case against him. It is brought to our notice that based on the representations of the appellant, adequate protection had already been provided to him. 5 8) Taking note of all these aspects, particularly, the fact that the second respondent was in jail since 24.08.2009, the trial has commenced by examining the two witnesses on the side of the prosecution and the assurance by the State that trial will not be prolonged and conclude within a reasonable time and also of the fact that the High Court while granting bail has imposed several conditions for strict adherence during the period of bail, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the High Court. In fact, in the impugned order itself, the High Court has made it clear that in case of breach of any of the conditions, the trial Court will have liberty to take steps to send the applicant therein (respondent No.2 herein) to jail again. In addition to the same, it is further made clear that if the appellant receives any fresh threat from the second respondent or from his supporters, he is free to inform the trial Court and in such event the trial Court is free to take appropriate steps as observed by the High Court. We also direct the Trial Court to complete the trial within a period of four months from the date of the receipt of copy of this order without unnecessary adjournments. 6 9) With the above observation, finding no merit for interference with the order of the High Court, the appeal is dismissed. ...........................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) ...........................................J. (J. CHELAMESWAR) NEW DELHI; JANUARY 16, 2012. 7

amendment of plaint rejected , high court order set aside, lower court order upheld as correct= upheld the power that in deserving cases, the Court can allow delayed amendment by compensating the other side by awarding costsThe entire object of the amendment to Order VI Rule 17 as introduced in 2002 is to stall filing of application for amending a pleading subsequent to the commencement of trial, to avoid surprises and that the parties had sufficient knowledge of other’s case. It also helps checking the delays in filing the applications.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 561 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8985 of 2011 J. Samuel and Others .... Appellant (s) Versus Gattu Mahesh and Others .... Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 08.02.2011 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Civil Revision Petition No. 5162 of 2010 whereby the High Court while setting aside the order dated 20.10.2010 passed by the II Additional District Judge, Karimnagar at Jagtial, allowed the revision petition filed by the respondents herein. 1 3) Brief Facts: a) The Diocese at Karimnagar was incorporated on 12.03.1978 from its parent Diocese of Dornakal. On 22.08.1985, the Retired Diocesan Treasurer and Property Secretary, Karimnagar, issued a publication in the paper to auction the land bearing Survey No. 43, admeasuring Ac. 3.31 gts. situated at Mission Compound, Dharmapuri Road, Jagtial and the last date to receive the tenders was fixed as 05.09.1985. On 13.09.1985, the sealed tenders were opened and Gattu Mahesh-Respondent No. 1 herein and Kotha Mohan-Respondent No. 2 herein, Managing Partners in M/s Jagath Swapna & Co. put tenders for an amount of Rs. 24,55,569/- along with a DD for an amount of Rs.2,45,556/- which is 10% of the EMD. They being the highest bidders, their tenders were accepted. b) The contract for sale of property was entered into between the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein with Karimnagar Diocese on 27.09.1985. It was mentioned in the contract that Karimnagar Diocese agreed to receive Rs. 2,50,000/- on or before 08.11.1985 because the land under sale was under 2 dispute and the balance amount was to the paid by the respondents herein only after getting final dropping of the land acquisition proposal by the Municipality, Jagtial and sanction of layout by the Municipality, Jagtial. On 03.04.2003, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein issued a legal notice to Karimnagar Diocese informing that the land acquisition proceedings were dropped on 05.05.1986 and the sanction of layout by the Municipality, Jagtial was completed on 28.12.1989 and to execute and register the sale deed in their favour as per the agreement dated 27.09.1985. c) In the absence of adequate response from Karimnagar Diocese, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed O.S. No. 9 of 2004 in the Court of II Additional District Judge, Karimnagar at Jagtial for specific performance of the contract of sale and for perpetual injunction. During the pendency of the suit, Karimnagar Diocese filed written statement pointing out the inherent defects, namely, absence of mandatory requirements of Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act and Form 47, Appendix `A' of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. On 24.09.2010, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein filed I.A. No. 1078 of 2010 in 3 O.S. No. 9 of 2004 under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code seeking amendment of the plaint to incorporate specific pleading in compliance of the above section of the Specific Relief Act and the Code on the ground that the same was missed due to typographical error. On 04.10.2010, Karimnagar Diocese filed counter affidavit resisting the application. d) By order dated 20.10.2010, the II Additional District Judge dismissed the application for amendment filed by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein. Aggrieved by the order, the Respondents herein approached the High Court by filing Civil Revision Petition being No. 5162 of 2010. The High Court, by impugned order dated 08.02.2011, allowed the amendment sought for by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein. e) Aggrieved by the said decision, the respondents have preferred this appeal by way of special leave petition before this Court. 4) Heard Mr. A. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. K. Swami, learned counsel for the respondents. 4 5) The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the High Court is right in allowing the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC for amendment of the plaint which was filed after conclusion of trial and reserving the matter for orders. 6) Based on the agreement dated 27.07.1985 which relates to sale of 3 acres and 31 gunthas of land in Survey No. 43 situate in Mission Compound, Dharmapuri Road at Jagtial for a consideration of Rs.24,55,569/-, the respondents/plaintiffs filed the said suit for specific performance. Since we have already mentioned factual details, there is no need to refer the same excepting the details relating to the petition filed under Order VI Rule 17. After filing written statement by the contesting defendants, the trial of the suit commenced and admittedly both parties adduced the evidence on their behalf and arguments on behalf of both the sides were heard and completed on 22.09.2010. On that day, the Court reserved the matter for orders. Meanwhile, on 24.09.2010, the respondents herein filed a petition praying for amendment of the plaint. In support of the said application, plaintiff No.2 5 has filed an affidavit stating that in para 11of the plaint he has stated about the legal notice issued on 03.04.2003 to defendant Nos. 1 to 7 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 27.09.1985 and there was no reply for it. In para 3 of the affidavit, the deponent has stated that by type mistake, the following sentences have missed. After para 11 of the plaint, the following para 12 may be added. "We are and has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement of sale dated 27.09.1985 on our part of which the defendants have, had noticed. I am ready with the balance amount as per agreement of sale dated 27.09.1985. I submit the para nos. 12-18 of the plaint may be changed as 13 to 19." The only reason given by the plaintiffs praying for amendment and inclusion of the above averment in the plaint is "type mistake". It is also stated that it happened in spite of their due diligence. 7) The above claim was resisted by the appellants herein by filing detailed counter affidavit. Apart from disputing the merits of the claim of the plaintiffs, with regard to the petition under Order VI Rule 17 they specifically stated that after 6 passing several stages in the protracted trial, the final arguments of the plaintiff in the suit were heard on 20.09.2010. The defendants have also filed their written arguments on 22.09.2010 wherein the inherent defect of plaintiff i.e. absence of averments of mandatory requirements of Section 16(c) Explanation (ii) and Form 47 Appendix A of CPC was pointed out. Even after this, further argument was made by both the parties and the counsel for the plaintiff informed the court that no further time is required and the matter may be posted for judgment. In view of the same, the learned trial Judge posted the matter to 04.10.2010 for judgment. Only at this juncture i.e. on 24.09.2010, plaintiffs came up with the present petition seeking amendment to incorporate specific pleading in compliance with Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act and Form 47 of Appendix A CPC on the ground that the same was missed due to "type mistake" in spite of due diligence. Though the said claim was not acceptable by the trial Court, the High Court allowed the plaintiff to amend the plaint as prayed for. 7 8) Before considering the acceptability or otherwise of the reasoning of the High Court, it is useful to refer Order VI Rule 17 CPC. "17. Amendment of pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial." The said provision was omitted by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. Section 16 of the Amendment Act reads as under: "16. Amendment of Order 6 - In the First Schedule, in Order 6,-- *** (iii) Rules 17 and 18 shall be omitted." After stiff resistance by the litigants and the members of the bar, again Order VI Rule 17 was re-introduced with proviso appended therein. As per the said proviso, no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced. However, there is an exception to the said rule, i.e., if the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the 8 party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial, such application for amendment may be allowed. 9) Before proceeding further, it is also useful to refer Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act which reads as under: "16. Personal bars to relief.- Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person- (a) xxx (b) xxx (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation.- For the purposes of clause (c),- (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court; (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction." It is clear that in a suit for specific performance of a contract, unless there is a specific averment that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract, the suit filed by him is liable to be dismissed. In other words, in the absence of the above said 9 claim that he is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the decree for specific performance cannot be granted by the Court. 10) In this legal background, we have to once again recapitulate the factual details. In the case on hand, Suit O.S. No. 9 of 2004 after prolonged trial came to an end in September, 2010. The application for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was filed on 24.09.2010 that is after the arguments were concluded on 22.09.2010 and the matter was posted for judgment on 04.10.2010. We have already mentioned that Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act contemplates that specific averments have to be made in the plaint that he has performed and has always been willing to perform the essential terms of the Act which have to be performed by him. This is an essential ingredient of Section 16(c) and the form prescribes for the due performance. The proviso inserted in Rule 17 clearly states that no amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced except when the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due 10 diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. 11) As stated earlier, in the present case, the amendment application itself was filed only on 24.09.2010 after the arguments were completed and the matter was posted for judgment on 04.10.2010. On proper interpretation of proviso to Rule 17 of Order VI, the party has to satisfy the Court that he could not have discovered that ground which was pleaded by amendment, in spite of due diligence. No doubt, Rule 17 confers power on the court to amend the pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. However, proviso restricts that power once the trial has commenced. Unless the Court satisfies that there is a reasonable cause for allowing the amendment normally the court has to reject such request. An argument was advanced that since in the legal notice sent before filing of the suit, there is reference to readiness and willingness and the plaintiff has also led in evidence, nothing precluded the court from entertaining the said application with which we are unable to accept in the light of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act as well as proviso to Order VI Rule 17. 11 The only reason stated so in the form of an affidavit is omission by "type mistake". Admittedly, it is not an omission to mention a word or an arithmetical number. The omission is with reference to specific plea which is mandated in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 12) The primary aim of the court is to try the case on its merits and ensure that the rule of justice prevails. For this the need is for the true facts of the case to be placed before the court so that the court has access to all the relevant information in coming to its decision. Therefore, at times it is required to permit parties to amend their plaints. The Court's discretion to grant permission for a party to amend his pleading lies on two conditions, firstly, no injustice must be done to the other side and secondly, the amendment must be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. However to balance the interests of the parties in pursuit of doing justice, the proviso has been added which clearly states that: no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due 12 diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. 13) Due diligence is the idea that reasonable investigation is necessary before certain kinds of relief are requested. Duly diligent efforts are a requirement for a party seeking to use the adjudicatory mechanism to attain an anticipated relief. An advocate representing someone must engage in due diligence to determine that the representations made are factually accurate and sufficient. The term `Due diligence' is specifically used in the Code so as to provide a test for determining whether to exercise the discretion in situations of requested amendment after the commencement of trial. 14) A party requesting a relief stemming out of a claim is required to exercise due diligence and is a requirement which cannot be dispensed with. The term "due diligence" determines the scope of a party's constructive knowledge, claim and is very critical to the outcome of the suit. 15) In the given facts, there is a clear lack of `due diligence' and the mistake committed certainly does not come within the preview of a typographical error. The term typographical error 13 is defined as a mistake made in the printed/typed material during a printing/typing process. The term includes errors due to mechanical failure or slips of the hand or finger, but usually excludes errors of ignorance. Therefore the act of neglecting to perform an action which one has an obligation to do cannot be called as a typographical error. As a consequence the plea of typographical error cannot be entertained in this regard since the situation is of lack of due diligence wherein such amendment is impliedly barred under the Code. 16) The claim of typographical error/mistake is baseless and cannot be accepted. In fact, had the person who prepared the plaint, signed and verified the plaint showed some attention, this omission could have been noticed and rectified there itself. In such circumstances, it cannot be construed that due diligence was adhered to and in any event, omission of mandatory requirement running into 3 to 4 sentences cannot be a typographical error as claimed by the plaintiffs. All these aspects have been rightly considered and concluded by the trial court and the High Court has committed an error in accepting the explanation that it was a typographical error to 14 mention and it was an accidental slip. Though the counsel for the appellants have cited many decisions, on perusal, we are of the view that some of those cases have been decided prior to the insertion of Order VI Rule 17 with proviso or on the peculiar facts of that case. This Court in various decisions upheld the power that in deserving cases, the Court can allow delayed amendment by compensating the other side by awarding costs. The entire object of the amendment to Order VI Rule 17 as introduced in 2002 is to stall filing of application for amending a pleading subsequent to the commencement of trial, to avoid surprises and that the parties had sufficient knowledge of other's case. It also helps checking the delays in filing the applications. [vide Aniglase Yohannan vs. Ramlatha and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 534, Ajendraprasadji N. Pandey and Another vs. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N. and Others, Chander Kanta Bansal vs. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117, Rajkumar Guraward (dead) through LRS. vs. S.K.Sarwagi and Company Private Limited and Another, (2008) 14 SCC 364, Vidyabai and Others vs. Padmalatha and Another, (2009) 2 SCC 409, 15 Man Kaur (dead) By LRS vs. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512. 17) In the light of the above discussion, we are in entire agreement with the conclusion arrived by the Trial Court and unable to accept the reasoning of the High Court. Accordingly, the order dated 08.02.2011 passed in Civil Revision Petition No. 5162 is set aside. 18) The civil appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. .................................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) ...............................................J. (J. CHELAMESWAR) NEW DELHI; JANUARY 16, 2012. 16

escape of four dreaded criminals from the police =Ram Prakash Singh filed a Writ Petition (being Writ Petition No. 747 of 2001) in the nature of Public Interest Litigation before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior. 3. In that Writ Petition, it was alleged that after escape of four dacoits noted above from police custody, the police has started torturing the persons from Baghel community in the Gwalior district.

Criminal Appeal NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRININAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) STATE OF M.P. & ANR. Appellant (s) VERSUS RAM PRAKASH SINGH & ANR. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T R.M. Lodha, J. Leave granted. 2. On March 23, 2001, a gang of four criminals comprising of Rambabu Gadariya, Dayaram, Pratap and Gopal, while returning from Dabra to Gwalior after attending court, escaped from the police custody. Allegedly, these four criminals escaped with the help and connivance of the police officers and/or negligence/inaction of the guards escorting them. After escaping from the police custody, these four criminals murdered 14 persons in village Bhanwarpura. This led to harassment and torture of persons from gadariya Criminal Appeal NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) 2 (Baghel) caste by the police. They initially filed complaint with the District Judge, but later on the first respondent-Ram Prakash Singh filed a Writ Petition (being Writ Petition No. 747 of 2001) in the nature of Public Interest Litigation before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior. 3. In that Writ Petition, it was alleged that after escape of four dacoits noted above from police custody, the police has started torturing the persons from Baghel community in the Gwalior district. Accordingly, it was prayed that the State of Madhya Pradesh and its functionaries (respondents therein) be directed to refrain from causing torture to the people of Baghel Samaj in the district of Gwalior and directions be issued for protection of their life and liberty. 4. The matter came up for consideration before the High Court on various dates. As the matter was in the nature of public interest litigation and the grievance was raised that the above criminals after their escape were causing havoc and they have not been taken into custody by the police which has caused huge fear in the minds of the people of the area, the High Court issued various directions from time to time. The High Court asked the State Government to hold an enquiry into the escape of above Criminal Appeal NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) 3 criminals from the police custody and submit the report regarding action taken against the officers responsible for the lapse. Despite numerous opportunities, the State Government failed to respond to the directions given by the High Court satisfactorily which constrained the High Court to direct the Director General of Police, Madhya Pradesh, to remain present in the Court. It appears that the Advocate General of the State of Madhya Pradesh made a statement before the High Court that the enquiry into the episode shall be conducted by a very senior office of the State and report submitted to the Court. However, nothing happened in the matter. The High Court then called the Principal Secretary (Home) in the Court. The Principal Secretary (Home) appeared and made a statement that the enquiry into the matter shall be conducted within a period of two months from March 9, 2004. On June 30, 2004, on behalf of the State Government, time was sought for submission of the enquiry report, but no enquiry report was submitted. In the backdrop of consistent inaction on the part of the State Government in the matter, on November 8, 2004, the High Court asked the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to hold enquiry into the matter of escape of the above criminals from the police custody and the role of the officers posted at Gwalior, particularly the role of Criminal Appeal NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) 4 Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, Inspector General of Police, Gwalior, Superintendent, Central Jail, Gwalior, Jailor, Central Jail, Gwalior, District Magistrate, Gwalior, Town Inspector, Gwalior and Sub-Divisional Officer posted at Dabra. It is this order which has been challenged by the State of Madhya Pradesh and Superintendent of Police in this Appeal, by special leave. 5. On December 17, 2004, this Court issued notice to the respondents and stayed operation of the order of the High Court impugned in the Appeal. 6. On November 28, 2007, this Court directed the Chief Secretary, State of Madhya Pradesh, to appoint the Additional Chief Secretary to conclude the enquiry into the matter as expeditiously as possible and in any event within three months from the date of the order and submit a report to this Court. 7. In pursuance of the order dated November 28, 2007, an enquiry has been conducted by Shri Rakesh Bansal, IAS, President Board of Revenue, Gwalior. 8. In his report dated May 29, 2008, the President Board of Revenue, Gwalior, recorded his conclusions thus :- "10. ..., I reach to the conclusion that the then S.P. Shri Anvesh Manglam, can not be held responsible for the incident of escape of dacoits from police custody. Criminal Appeal NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) 5 13. ...., I reach to the conclusion that Shri Yogesh Choudhary and Shri K.P. Sharma the then Deputy Superintendent of Police (Headquarters) can not be held responsible for this incident of escape of Gadaria gang from police custody. 14. ... For the whole chain of events, most responsible person is Reserve Inspector Ajay Tripathi only. 15. It is worth to mention here that Government has already dismissed/compulsorily retired from service two Head Constables and four constables deployed in the escort duty of dacoits for carrying them for appearance before court at the time of their escape." 9. It appears that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the Reserve Inspector Ajay Tripathi have not been taken to logical conclusion in view of the stay order obtained by him in a judicial proceeding. 10. In his report, Shri Rakesh Bansal, IAS, President Board of Revenue, Gwalior has also made certain suggestions in order to prevent repetition of such incident. These suggestions are :- "16(1) It should be provided in the Rules that dangerous prisoners must not be taken out of jail for journey by public transport vehicles or private vehicles, under any circumstances. (2) Keeping in view the possibility of escape during transport of prisoners, it Criminal Appeal NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) 6 appear to be prudent that one regular court room be constructed in proximity to the central Jails. The suggestion of the same intent has also been mentioned by the then Commissioner of Gwalior Division in his enquiry report on the page 27. (3) It must be provided in the Jail Manual, that whenever any dangerous or sensitive prisoner is to be transferred from one jail to another jail, for court appearance or on administrative grounds, the jail superintendent should inform the concerned Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate vide a demi-official letter and by meeting them personally." 11. No affidavit has been filed by the present appellants indicating whether the above suggestions of the President, Board of Revenue, have been accepted by the State Government or not. However, Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel for the appellants, submited that the State Government did not have any reservation in accepting the suggestions made by the President, Board of Revenue, in his report as noted above. 12. As regards the arrest of the above criminals who escaped from police custody on March 23, 2001, in the additional affidavit filed by U.R. Netam, I.G. of Police, Police Headquarters, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, dated April 01, 2007, it has been stated that 4 out of 5 dacoits of the gang Criminal Appeal NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) 7 have been killed in police encounters and only Rambabu Gadaria is believed to be alive. It has also been stated that all the weapons snatched by the above criminals while escaping from police custody have been recovered. 13. Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel for the appellants, stated that Criminal Writ Petition No. 747 of 2001 was still pending before the High Court. 14. Having regard to the fact that the order dated November 8, 2004 whereby the High Court directed the matter to be referred to CBI for holding enquiry into the matter of escape of above criminals from the police custody and the role of various officers posted at Gwalior has been stayed by this Court way back in the year 2004, and in 2007 the direction was given to the Chief Secretary, Madhya Pradesh to appoint the Additional Chief Secretary to conduct the enquiry into the above matter and pursuant thereto Shri Rakesh Bansal, IAS, President Board of Revenue, Gwalior, was nominated by the Chief Secretary to hold the enquiry and he has already held the enquiry and submitted his report dated May 29, 2008, we are satisfied that the direction given by the High Court to refer the matter to CBI to hold an enquiry into the matter has lost its relevance. We, accordingly, set aside the said direction. 15. The escape of four dreaded criminals from the police Criminal Appeal NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) 8 custody and the murder of 14 innocent persons by these criminals after their escape are extremely serious matters. In the matter as grave as this, the State Government was expected to act promptly by taking action against the erring police officials but it failed to act, necessitating drastic order by the High Court. Though we have set aside the order of the High Court impugned in this Appeal for the reasons noted above, but the handling of the matter by the State Government and its functionaries has been far from satisfactory. We would like the State Government to take appropriate action against the erring official/s without any further delay and also take all remedial measures to ensure that such things do not happen in future. 16. We direct the first appellant-State of Madhya Pradesh, as suggested in the report submitted by Shri Rakesh Bansal; (i) to make amendment in the existing rules and provide that dangerous prisoners shall not be taken out of jail for journey by public transport vehicles or private vehicles under any circumstances, and (ii) provide in the Jail Manual that whenever any dangerous or sensitive prisoner is to be transferred from one jail to another jail, for court appearance or on administrative grounds, the Jail Superintendent should inform the concerned Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate by a written communication as Criminal Appeal NO. 104 OF 2012 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5877 of 2004) 9 well as by meeting them. We also direct that the State Government shall, in consultation with the High Court, take a decision about construction of single court room complexes for holding trial of dreaded criminals/dangerous prisoners in proximity to the Central Jails. 17. The Action Taken Report about compliance of the above directions shall be submitted by the first appellant before the High Court. 18. With the above directions, Appeal stands disposed of. 19. It shall be open to the High Court to issue further directions, if necessary, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 747 of 2001, which is said to be still pending before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior. ........................J. (R.M. LODHA) NEW DELHI; ........................J. JANUARY 10, 2012 (H.L. GOKHALE)

At this juncture, it would be profitable to refer to the decision of this Court in H.P. Gupta and Anr. (supra), which is on all fours to the fact situation in the present appeal. In the said case, grant of two advance increments to Telecom Officers who acquired Engineering degree while in service and not to those who possessed such degree at the time of joining the service was held to be constitutionally valid. Dealing with a similar controversy, the Court observed as follows: "The object of giving two advance increments to those officials who did not possess degree in Engineering before joining the service, is only to encourage them to get such a degree so that they could improve themselves while in service. When that object is satisfied, the contentions that there should be equality in the matter of payment of salary or other emoluments or that there should be parity in the matter of giving increments, cannot be accepted. It is true that in such a situation, certain anomalies may arise in specific cases when the official who has acquired degree in Engineering subsequent to joining of service may get higher salary though junior to those who possessed the qualification of degree in Engineering even at the time of joining the service. There cannot be perfect equality in any matter on an absolute scientific basis and there may be certain inequities here and there. If the classification is correct and serves a particular purpose, the same is not to be judicially interfered with." We deferentially concur with the observations in the afore-extracted passage.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7268 OF 2002 FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS. -- APPELLANTS VERSUS BHARTIYA KHADYA NIGAM KARMCHARI -- RESPONDENTS SANGH & ANR. WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6878 OF 2003 JUDGMENT D.K. JAIN, J.: 1. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment dated 23rd May, 2002, rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu in S.W.P No. 1470 of 1994. By the impugned judgment, while declaring Circular No.40 of 1985, dated 29th July, 1985, which accorded monetary incentives to in-service employees of the Food Corporation of India (for short "the FCI") for acquiring higher qualifications, as discriminatory, the High Court has directed 1 that if any benefit under the said Circular has been given to any employee, it shall be withdrawn. 2. Since both the appeals, one by the FCI and the other by the Bhartiya Khadya Nigam Karamchari Sangh (for short "the Karamchari Sangh"), arise out of the same judgment, the same are being disposed of by this common judgment. We may however, note that the FCI is aggrieved by the impugned judgment as a whole, whereas the Karamchari Sangh impugns the direction relating to the denial of the incentives to other employees, possessing same qualifications. 3. The material facts, giving rise to the appeal are as follows:- The FCI was set up with the objective of safeguarding the interest of the farmers, distribution of food grains throughout the country and to maintain a satisfactory level of food grain stocks to ensure national food security. The Food Corporation of India Act, 1964, became effective w.e.f. 17th December 1964. Section 45 of the said Act empowers the FCI to make regulations for regulating the appointment, conditions of service and scales of pay of its officers and employees. Resultantly, the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971, were made and came into effect from the year 1971. 2 4. With a view to ensure a desired degree of efficiency and mobility in the administration and management of its affairs, the FCI, vide Circular No.40 of 1985, dated 29th July, 1985, introduced a scheme providing for incentives to its employees on acquiring additional qualifications during their service in the FCI. The Circular provided for grant of two increments to employees in their respective pay scales on acquiring such professional degrees and diplomas as were mentioned in the Circular. Subsequently, another Circular No. 72 of 1986, dated 14th November, 1986, was issued, extending the benefit of one special increment to in-service employees who acquire one year diploma course in any professional subject as mentioned in the Circular. 5. The afore-mentioned Circulars were complimented by Circular No. 58 of 1987, dated 24th August, 1987, which clarified that the increments shall only be in the form of a personal pay to an official till his promotion to the next higher grade, which shall be subsequently absorbed in the basic pay at the time of pay fixation for the promoted post. 6. The Circular of 1985 was challenged by one Shri. V.K. Tandon, vide S.W.P. No. 1146 of 1986, on the ground that it resulted in 3 discrimination between in-service employees acquiring additional qualification and the persons recruited by the FCI already possessing the prescribed additional qualification. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, vide order, dated, 13th October, 1992, while allowing the intervention application of the Karamchari Sangh, allowed the petition and directed that the writ petitioner be granted two additional increments under the said Circular. Letters Patent Appeal against the said judgment came to be dismissed on the ground of delay. Nonetheless, the Zonal Office of the FCI, vide letter dated 19th May, 1994, notified that the aforesaid judgment was a judgment in personam. 7. Probably, the said clarification prompted the Karamchari Sangh to file the writ petition (W.P. No.1470 of 1994) in which the impugned judgment has been delivered. As aforestated, the High Court has held that, the said Circular is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (for short "the Constitution") and has directed the FCI not to give effect to the Circular and to withdraw any incentives, if already given to the employees in furtherance of the said Circular. Hence, the appeal by the FCI. The nub of the grievance of the Karamchari Sangh in their appeal (C.A. 4 No.6878/2003) is that having held the said Circular to be discriminatory, the High Court ought to have directed grant of similar incentives to other employees as well. 8. Mr. Ajit Pudussery, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the FCI, vehemently urged that the said Circular was constitutionally valid and in consonance with the established principles of law, inasmuch as the employees already working in the FCI, with lower professional qualifications as compared to those who already had higher qualification at the time of initial recruitment are a class by themselves and therefore, there was no question of any discrimination between the two differently placed set of employees. It was submitted that the objective sought to be achieved by providing incentive to the already recruited employees with lower qualifications was to motivate them to acquire higher qualifications in various fields while in service, which would not only benefit the employee concerned but also the FCI in the long run. It was thus, stressed that the classification adopted by the FCI had a rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved and therefore, was not discriminatory, offending Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of the proposition that the beneficiaries of the said incentive being a 5 class by themselves; there being no parity between grant of incentives to in-service employees, who acquire the prescribed qualifications and denial of the same to the employees recruited with higher qualification; the Circular does not result in discrimination, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in State of M.P. and Anr. Vs. Shakri Khan1; United Bank of India Vs. Meenakshi Sundaram and Ors.2, and H.P. Gupta and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors3. 9. Per Contra, Mr. Ashok Mathur, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, argued that the said Circular was clearly discriminatory, inasmuch as the incentive under the said Circular was denied to one set of employees and granted to another set of employees, governed by the same service conditions and possessing such prescribed additional qualifications. Commending us to the decisions of this Court in Food Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Ashis Kumar Ganguly & Ors.4 and B. Manmad Reddy & Ors. Vs. Chandra Prakash Reddy & Ors.5, learned counsel urged that, irrespective of the educational qualifications, all employees in a particular grade got 1 (1996) 8 SCC 648 2 (1998) 2 SCC 609 3 (2002) 10 SCC 658 4 (2009) 7 SCC 734 5 (2010) 3 SCC 314 6 integrated into one class and therefore, there could be no discrimination amongst them in the matter of grant of incentives. 10. The short question that falls for consideration is, whether grant of incentives only to the in-service employees of the FCI, who acquire professional qualifications after entering in service and denial of the same to those who had acquired the same professional qualifications before entering the service is invalid in law, being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution? 11. It is trite law that Article 14 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of equality, is of wide import. It guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. It implies right to equal treatment in similar circumstances, except in cases where the two persons form a separate and distinct class and such classification is a reasonable one based on intelligible differentia having nexus with the object sought to be achieved. (See: State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar6 and John Vallamattom & Anr. Vs. Union of India7). 12. Before examining the issue at hand on the touchstone of the aforesaid principle envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution, it 6 (1952) SCR 284 7 (2003) 6 SCC 611 7 would be apposite to refer to the relevant portions of the Circular dated 29th July, 1985. These read as follows: "The Food Corporation of India, since its inception, has been pursuing the policy of Management Development by providing suitable training facilities both within the Corporation as well as by nominating its employees to short- term professional courses, work-shops, seminars, conferences etc. organized by leading management institutions in India and abroad. 2. These efforts can get an uplift and possibly be supplemented to a great extent by the involvement of its employees in acquiring professional management qualifications on their own. In order, therefore, to fill the basic gaps to acquire knowledge, the matter has been under consideration for introducing suitable incentive scheme for motivating the employees of the Corporation to encourage them to acquire professional qualifications for rapid career advancement and enabling the Corporation to build a reserve of qualified professionals from within to back up key positions and to improve the overall performance and efficiency of the organization. This will further create an atmosphere of "professionalism" in the working of the Corporation. With this end in view it has been decided with the approval of the Board of Directors to introduce the following incentive scheme with effect from 1st April, 1984. 3. The following courses of study have been approved for grant of the two increments as indicated in subsequent pages. (A) ......... ......... ......... ......... (B) High professional qualifications viz. MBA, ACA, AMIE, LLB, BL, ACS etc. All the above courses (Diplomas/Degrees) should be at least of two years duration. 4. The following are the details of the scheme for grant of incentive:- 8 ELIGIBILITY: All regular employees of the Corporation would be eligible for benefit under the Scheme subject to the following terms and conditions:- (i) The scheme would apply to all regular employees of the Corporation except deputationists/those employed on contract basis/ casual or on tenure basis. (ii) Employees covered under (i) above should have acquired or may acquire higher professional qualifications from recognised institutions/Universities during the course of their service in the FCI with prior permission from the competent authority of the Corporation. The acquisition of said qualification should be useful to the Corporation in its operations. (iii) ......... ......... ......... ......... (iv) ......... ......... ......... ......... (v) ......... ......... ......... ......... (vi) ......... ......... ......... ......... (vii) ......... ......... ......... ......... (viii) ......... ......... ......... ......... (ix) In cases where the employees, who join the higher post under direct recruitment and where for such higher post the prescribed minimum qualification is the same as acquired by the employee while in the lower post, the incentive already granted to him/her in the lower post would not be allowed to continue on his/her appointment to the higher post. INCENTIVE ADMISSIBLE: Employees fulfilling the eligibility conditions referred to above would only be entitled to the benefits under the scheme. The incentives offered under this Scheme would be in the form of two special increments as `personal pay', to be 9 merged in pay at the time of promotion to the next higher grade. This incentive would be admissible only on written orders by the competent authority on merit of each case. The incentive in the form of two increments would be granted starting from first day of the following month when the employee concerned has been declared to have passed the listed Courses or the date of enforcement of this scheme whichever is later. ENTITLEMENT : In order to overcome the administrative difficulties and financial implications in implementation of the Scheme with retrospective effect covering all the cases of eligible employees who might have acquired such higher management or professional qualifications prescribed in this Scheme once or more than once in the past and might be holding higher post on promotion or direct recruitment within the Corporation, the employees would be entitled to the incentive under this scheme with effect from 1.4.1984 only. Eligible employees would be entitled to draw incentive increments at the rates applicable to their present pay scales. Arrears of incentive increments shall be payable. In the case of past cases, eligible employees should apply within six months from the date of the Scheme is circulated. In case of employees who may acquire any of the above qualifications hereafter, they may apply as and when they acquire the higher qualifications in the prescribed Proforma enclosed. ......... ......... ......... ........." 13. It is manifest from a bare reading of the above-mentioned portions of Circular that the fundamental objective of the Circular is to provide an incentive to the in-service employees in order to motivate and encourage them to acquire professional qualifications in various 1 courses, spelt out in the Circular, for their career progression and at the same time enable the FCI to build a reserve of qualified professionals from within the organisation to back up key positions. Evidently, the incentive will not only improve their overall performance and efficiency in the organisation, but also, in the final analysis would strengthen the management with the advent of an atmosphere of professionalism in the FCI. 14. Our attention was also drawn to Circular No. 27 of 2000, dated 11th September, 2000, empowering the competent authorities to grant higher start/advance increments to newly recruited employees at par with the pay drawn in their previous employment before joining the FCI. It is therefore, plain that the provision to grant extra benefit to a new recruit possessing higher qualifications was already in existence. It is also pertinent to note that the said Circular and the benefit which is sought to be given under any of the Circulars, referred to above, is not assailed by the respondents. Their only grievance is that there is no justification in depriving the persons, who already possess the higher qualifications from the benefit of extra incentives, which are being granted to the in-house employees. 1 15. We are of the opinion that bearing in mind the aforesaid fact situation and the objective sought to be achieved by issuance of the said Circular, there is substantial merit in the stand of the FCI. The classification adopted by the FCI is between an employee obtaining a higher qualification after joining service and an employee who already possessed such qualification before joining the service. As aforesaid, the main purpose of this classification is to grant an incentive to the employees already in service in the FCI to motivate them to acquire higher qualifications for their own benefit as well as of their employer viz. the FCI. We are convinced that the classification sought to be made by the FCI between the two sets of employees bears a just and rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by introducing the said incentive scheme. Judged from this point of view, in our opinion, grant of the incentive in relation to the in-service employees, in no way amounts to discrimination between the in-service employees and the employees recruited with higher qualification, offending either Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution, particularly when the incentive is in the form of a special increment as `personal pay' to be merged in pay at the time of promotion to the next higher grade and thus, having no bearing on the inter-se seniority and/or to the future promotion to the next higher grade. 1 16. The decisions of this Court in B. Manmad Reddy & Ors. Vs. Chandra Prakash Reddy & Ors. (supra) and Food Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Ashis Kumar Ganguly & Ors. (supra), on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for respondents are clearly distinguishable on facts inasmuch as these decisions deal with cases relating to employees being classified into separate categories for the purpose of promotion on the basis of the source from which they were drawn and increments being given only to the Central Government employees on being absorbed into the corporation respectively, which is not the case here. However, it is important to note that in both these cases, it was observed that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine. Article 14 of the Constitution permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who are left out. Courts should interfere with the administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity only when they find such a decision to be unreasonable, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and taken in ignorance of material and relevant factors. 1 17. At this juncture, it would be profitable to refer to the decision of this Court in H.P. Gupta and Anr. (supra), which is on all fours to the fact situation in the present appeal. In the said case, grant of two advance increments to Telecom Officers who acquired Engineering degree while in service and not to those who possessed such degree at the time of joining the service was held to be constitutionally valid. Dealing with a similar controversy, the Court observed as follows: "The object of giving two advance increments to those officials who did not possess degree in Engineering before joining the service, is only to encourage them to get such a degree so that they could improve themselves while in service. When that object is satisfied, the contentions that there should be equality in the matter of payment of salary or other emoluments or that there should be parity in the matter of giving increments, cannot be accepted. It is true that in such a situation, certain anomalies may arise in specific cases when the official who has acquired degree in Engineering subsequent to joining of service may get higher salary though junior to those who possessed the qualification of degree in Engineering even at the time of joining the service. There cannot be perfect equality in any matter on an absolute scientific basis and there may be certain inequities here and there. If the classification is correct and serves a particular purpose, the same is not to be judicially interfered with." We deferentially concur with the observations in the afore-extracted passage. 1 18. For the view we have taken above, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the contentions urged on behalf of the parties in C.A. No. 6878 of 2003, praying for extension of the said incentive to the employees recruited with higher qualifications. 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the decision of the High Court, holding the said Circular to be discriminatory and in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot be sustained. Consequently, C.A. No. 7268 of 2002, filed by the FCI is allowed and C.A. No.6878 of 2003 preferred by the Karamchari Sangh is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. ........................................... (D.K. JAIN, J.) ............................................ (ANIL R. DAVE, J.) NEW DELHI; JANUARY 13, 2012. RS 1