Rash and negligent driving = "1. When automobiles have become death traps any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk of further escalation of road accidents. All those who are manning the steering of automobiles, particularly professional drivers, must be kept under constant reminders of their duty to adopt utmost care and also of the consequences befalling them in cases of dereliction. One of the most effective ways of keeping such drivers under mental vigil is to maintain a deterrent element in the sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and a frolic. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 47-48 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7872-7873 of 2010) State of Punjab .... Appellant(s) Versus Balwinder Singh and Ors. .... Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) Leave granted. 2) These appeals are filed against the common final judgment and order dated 04.11.2009 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 653 and 655 of 2000 for nature of offence and quantum of sentence whereby the High Court partly allowed the revision petition and reduced the quantum of sentence awarded by the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Amritsar as upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge, 1 Amritsar under Sections 304A, 337 and 279 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `IPC'). 3) Brief facts: (a) On 30.10.1992, one Dhian Singh-the Complainant (PW-3), after attending the last rites of one of his relatives at Village Mustabad, Amritsar was returning to Batala along with his family members in a Jhang Transport Bus bearing No. PB- 02-D-9485. The bus was being driven at a very high speed by the driver-Respondent No. 1 herein. When the aforesaid bus reached the bus stand at Mudhal, at that time, a truck bearing No. PB-02-C-9665 which was being driven by Respondent No. 2 herein was coming from the opposite side at a very high speed. Both the drivers were driving their vehicle at a very high speed and in rash and negligent manner, as a result of which, both the vehicles collided with each other and two passengers, namely, Darshan Singh s/o Bela Singh and Banso w/o Ajit Singh died at the spot. The other passengers, namely, Sonia, Dalbir Singh and Ramandeep were taken to the Civil Hospital but later on they succumbed to their injuries. 2 (b) On the basis of the complaint of Dhian Singh, FIR No. 125/92 was registered under Sections 304A, 279 and 337 of IPC and after formal investigation the case was forwarded to the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Amritsar. The Judicial Magistrate, by order dated 14.12.1998, convicted both the accused persons and directed them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years each for the offence under Section 304A and to pay fine of Rs. 200/- each, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months and to also undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months each for the offence punishable under Sections 337 and 279 IPC. (c) Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 14.12.1998, the accused persons preferred an appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar. Vide judgment dated 20.05.2000, the Additional Sessions Judge upheld the judgment and order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Amritsar. (d) Questioning the same, the respondents herein filed Criminal Revision Petition being Nos. 653 and 655 of 2000 qua nature of offence and quantum of sentence before the 3 High Court. The High Court, by order dated 04.11.2009, while confining to the question of quantum of sentence only, reduced the sentence of the accused persons to the period already undergone (15 days) and in addition thereto, enhanced the fine to an amount of Rs. 25,000/- each. (e) Against the order of the High Court, the State of Punjab has filed these appeals before this Court by way of special leave petitions. 4) Heard Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Sudhir Walia and Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned counsel for the respondents. 5) Before the High Court, the respondents, who preferred the revisions, did not dispute the finding relating to negligence rendered by the courts below and confined their submissions to the quantum of sentence only and prayed that the sentence be reduced to the period already undergone. In support of the above claim, they pointed out that they had suffered a protracted trial for about 17 years and had already undergone custody for 15 days, therefore, prayed for lenient view by modifying the sentence. On the other hand, on behalf of the 4 State, it was submitted that inasmuch as the negligence was proved beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, no leniency should be shown to the accused. The High Court, without taking note of the seriousness of the matter, namely, due to the negligence of the two drivers, five persons traveling in the bus died, merely because of protracted trial of about 17 years and both of them had served sentence for a period of 15 days, reduced the same to the period already undergone and enhanced the fine to an amount of Rs.25,000/- each. 6) It is not in dispute that the trial Court on appreciation of evidence and accepting the prosecution witnesses convicted the respondents for an offence under Section 304A. The said section reads as under: 304A. Causing death by negligence.- Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both." 7) Section 304A was inserted in the Penal Code by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act 27 of 1870 to cover those cases wherein a person cause the death of another by such acts as are rash or negligent but there is no intention to cause 5 death and no knowledge that the act will cause death. The case should not be covered by Sections 299 and 300 only then it will come under this section. The section provides punishment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or fine or both in case of homicide by rash or negligent act. To bring a case of homicide under Section 304A IPC, the following conditions must exist, namely, 1) There must be death of the person in question; 2) the accused must have caused such death; and 3) that such act of the accused was rash or negligent and that it did not amount to culpable homicide. 8) Even a decade ago, considering the galloping trend in road accidents in India and its devastating consequences, this Court in Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 held that, while considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver should not take a chance thinking that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with 6 leniently by the court. The following principles laid down in that decision are very relevant: "1. When automobiles have become death traps any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk of further escalation of road accidents. All those who are manning the steering of automobiles, particularly professional drivers, must be kept under constant reminders of their duty to adopt utmost care and also of the consequences befalling them in cases of dereliction. One of the most effective ways of keeping such drivers under mental vigil is to maintain a deterrent element in the sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and a frolic. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles." 7 9) The same principles have been reiterated in B. Nagabhushanam vs. State of Karnataka, 2008 (5) SCC 730. 10) It is settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, must have a better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh (supra). 11) While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death or injury by rash and negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. The persons driving motor vehicles cannot and should not take a chance thinking that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by 8 the Court. For lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to careless and callous driving of vehicles, the courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence if the prosecution is able to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 12) In the light of the above principles, we express our inability to accept the reasoning of the High Court in reducing the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone, that is, 15 days. Merely because the fine amount has been enhanced to Rs.25,000/- each, is also not a sufficient ground to drastically reduce the sentence, particularly, in a case where five persons died due to the negligent act of both the drivers of the bus and the truck. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each. The trial Court is directed to take appropriate steps for surrender of the accused in both the appeals to serve 9 the remaining period of sentence. The appeals are allowed to the extent mentioned above. ...........................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) ...........................................J. (J. CHELAMESWAR) NEW DELHI; JANUARY 6, 2012. 1

Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short, `the U.P Act') for eviction of the respondent/tenant on the ground =the hardship appellants would suffer by not occupying their own premises would be far grater than the hardship the respondent would suffer by having to move out to another place. We are mindful of the fact that whenever the tenant is asked to move out of the premises some hardship is inherent. We have noted that the respondent is in occupation of the premises for a long time. But in our opinion, in the facts of this case that circumstance cannot be the sole determinative factor. That hardship can be mitigated by granting him longer period to move out of the premises in his occupation so that in the meantime he can make alternative arrangement. 17. In the view that we have taken, the appeal succeeds. The impugned order is set aside to the extent it permits the respondent to retain possession of three rooms out of four rooms in his occupation. The respondent is directed to

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4495 OF 2006 MOHD. AYUB & ANR. ... APPELLANTS Versus MUKESH CHAND ... RESPONDENT JUDGMENT (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. This appeal, by grant of special leave, is directed against the judgment and order dated 12.9.2005 passed by the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital partly allowing the Writ Petition No. 296 of 2004 filed by the appellants. 2. The appellants/landlords filed an application under Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short, `the U.P Act') for eviction of the respondent/tenant on the ground 2 that they bona fide required the premises occupied by the respondent to start business for their sons. 3. According to the appellants when the house in question was purchased by them the respondent was occupying two shops facing the road and two rooms situate at the rear of the said shops as a tenant of the previous landlord at the rent of Rs.35/- per month. These rooms are situated on the ground floor of the said building. The respondent continued to occupy the said rooms as tenant at the same rent. It is the case of the appellants that the first appellant is carrying on business in three small stalls situated in a shop of the Cantonment Council, the rent of which keeps increasing. The three sons of the appellants aged 23, 28 and 19 years are unemployed. Two sons want to start general merchant business in one shop and the third son wants to start wholesale egg business in the other shop. The appellants' family consists of 13 members. Their one son is married and has three children and the two other sons are of a marriageable age. The married son wants to live in the 3 room behind the shop. Presently, the appellants' family is living in three rooms and a verandah with great difficulty. On these grounds the appellants filed the application for release of the rooms in occupation of the respondent. 4. In response, the respondent inter alia contended that he is conducting photography business from the said shops for many years; that he is enjoying goodwill in the area; that he will find it difficult to get premises in the same area; that appellants are financially well off as compared to him; that they own other properties and that greater hardship would be caused to the respondent if the decree of eviction is passed than that would be caused to the appellants if it is not passed. 5. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the application holding inter alia that the appellants are financially sound and other properties were available to them whereas except the suit shops the respondent does not have any place for residence and business and hence, if he is evicted from the 4 shops in his occupation, he will experience more difficulty. The appeal carried from the said judgment was dismissed by the District Court holding inter alia that financial position of the appellants is far better than that of the respondent. They could have purchased a vacant bungalow and started business for their sons. Learned District Judge held that the appellants have purchased the building to make profit and then filed the application for eviction. According to learned District Judge, the respondent was doing business from the said shops for many years and it would be difficult for him to find a place for business. Hardship caused to the respondent would be more. 6. While disposing of the petition filed by the appellants the High Court rightly held that the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant what business his sons should do and the observations made by the courts below to that effect and the findings reached by the courts below on bona fide requirement of the landlord are perverse. However, without going into the aspect of comparative hardship, the High 5 Court directed that only one room out of the four rooms should be handed over to the appellants by the respondent as from the affidavit it appears that the respondent was using it as a passage. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants have approached this Court. 7. Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellants submitted that having come to the conclusion that the need of the appellants was genuine, the High Court erred in directing the respondent to only handover one room to the appellants. The High Court has wrongly granted only partial relief to the appellants without going into the aspect of comparative hardship. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied on Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead) by Lrs. v. C haganlal Sundarji & Co. 1 , Bhimanagouda Basanagouda Patil v. Mohd. G udusaheb 2 , Ganga Devi v. District Judge, Nainital & Or s. 3 1 (1999) 8 SCC 1 2 (2003) 3 SCC 101 3 (2008) 7 SCC 770 6 8. Shri Achal Chabbra, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the High Court has balanced the interest of both sides and hence no interference is necessary with the impugned judgment. 9. There is no challenge to the High Court's finding that the appellants' requirement is bona fide. The respondent has not assailed the High Court's order. We concur with the High Court on this point. However, the High Court erroneously held that the view expressed by the courts below that greater comparative hardship would be caused to the respondent if decree of eviction is passed is correct so far as two rooms occupied by him for residence and one room in which he is running a shop is concerned. The High Court observed that no hardship will be caused to the respondent if one room is directed to be handed over to the appellants because it was used as a passage by the respondent. Surprisingly, the High Court has not given any reasons why only partial relief was being granted to the appellants. In fact, it has not discussed the issue of 7 comparative hardship at all. Since this issue is of utmost relevance and the application of the appellants is of the year 1998, we proceed to deal with it. 10. Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act provides for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord. The fourth proviso thereof states that the Prescribed Authority shall take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed. 11. Rule 16 (2) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 ( for short, `the said Rules') states which facts the Prescribed Authority has to consider while dealing with an application for release under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the U.P. Act. Rule 16 (2) refers to building let out for purpose of any business and the facts which have to be taken into 8 consideration are: (a) length of tenancy of the tenant; (b) availability of suitable accommodation for tenant; (c) whether the landlords existing business is more flourishing than that which is proposed to be set up by him in the leased premises and (d) need of self-employment of a son or married or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter or a male lineal descendant of the landlord who has completed his or her technical education and who is not employed in government service. 12. In Ganga Devi this Court held that comparative hardship indisputably is a relevant factor for determining the question as to whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide or not within the meaning of the provisions of the U.P. Act and the said Rules and it is essentially a question of fact. This Court observed that Rule 16 provides for some factors which are required to be taken into consideration. This Court clarified that the court would not determine the question only on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. This Court referred to its judgment in Bhagwan Das v. Jiley 9 Ku mar 4 where it is observed that the outweighing circumstance in favour of the landlord was that two of her sons after completing their education were unemployed and wanted to carry on business for self-employment. This Court further observed that there was an additional circumstance that the tenant had not brought on record any material to indicate that at any time during the pendency of this long drawn out litigation he had made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation and was unable to get it. This Court also referred to its judgment in Rishi Kumar Govil v. M aqsoodan 5 where it has particularly taken note of the fact that the landlady had no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed and there was nothing on record to indicate that the business of the father was huge or flourishing. This Court clarified that the length of the period of tenancy as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the said Rules is only one of the factors to be taken into account in context with other 4 (1991) supp. (2) SCC 300 5 (2007) 4 SCC 465 10 facts and circumstances of the case and cannot be a sole criterion or deciding factor to order or not the eviction. This Court held that in the circumstances of the case the balance tilted in favour of the unemployed son of the landlady whose need is certainly bona fide. After quoting the above judgment in Ganga Devi this Court gave six months time to the landlady to handover the premises to the landlord in the interest of justice. 13. In our opinion, Ganga Devi applies on all fours to the present case. The first appellant carries on his business from three small stalls of a shop of the Cantonment Council whose rent keeps on increasing. There is nothing on record to suggest that the appellants' present business is more flourishing than the business which they propose to start in the leased premises. All the three sons of the appellants are educated but unemployed. They want to start business in the premises in occupation of the respondent. One of them is married and has three children. The other three are of a marriageable age. In all there are thirteen members in the 11 appellants' family and they are living in three rooms and one verandah with great difficulty. As against that the respondent's family consists of four persons and there are four rooms in his possession. It is observed by the courts below that the appellants own other premises. However, details of those premises are not on record. The High Court has rightly noted that this bald assertion is based on conjectures. It is well settled the landlord's requirement need not be a dire necessity. The court cannot direct the landlord to do a particular business or imagine that he could profitably do a particular business rather than the business he proposes to start. It was wrong on the part of the District Court to hold that the appellants' case that their sons want to start the general merchant business is a pretence because they are dealing in eggs and it is not uncommon for a Muslim family to do the business of non- vegetarian food. It is for the landlord to decide which business he wants to do. The Court cannot advise him. Similarly, length of tenancy of the respondent in the 12 circumstances of the case ought not to have weighed with the courts below. 14. We also find that the courts below were swayed by the fact that the financial position of the appellants was better than the respondent. The District Court has erroneously gone on to observe that the appellants can buy another building and start business. It has also observed that the appellants had purchased the building to make profit. In this connection we may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court in Bhimanagouda Basanagouda Patil where the District Judge decided the issue of comparative hardship in favour of the tenant solely on the basis of affluence of the parties. This Court observed that if this is the correct approach then an affluent landlord can never get possession of his premises even if he proves all his bona fide requirements. This Court further observed that the fact that a person has the capacity to purchase the property cannot be the sole ground against him while deciding the question of comparative hardship. If the purchase is pursuant to a 13 genuine need of the landlord the said purchase has to be given due weightage unless, of course, the purchase is actuated by collateral consideration. This Court rejected the High Court's finding that the landlord had secured the premises apparently in a game of speculation. Somewhat similar observations are made in this case by the District Court which in our opinion are totally unsubstantiated. 15. It is also important to note that there is nothing on record to show that during the pendency of this litigation the respondent made any genuine efforts to find out any alternative accommodation. We specifically asked learned counsel for the respondent to point out any evidence to establish that the respondent made any such genuine efforts. He was unable to answer this query satisfactorily. 16. In the ultimate analysis, we are of the view that the perverse findings of the courts below on the aspect of comparative hardship must be set aside. The High Court has rightly found the need of the appellants to be bona fide. 14 It has however, fallen into an error in directing the respondent to handover only one room to the appellants. In our opinion, the hardship appellants would suffer by not occupying their own premises would be far grater than the hardship the respondent would suffer by having to move out to another place. We are mindful of the fact that whenever the tenant is asked to move out of the premises some hardship is inherent. We have noted that the respondent is in occupation of the premises for a long time. But in our opinion, in the facts of this case that circumstance cannot be the sole determinative factor. That hardship can be mitigated by granting him longer period to move out of the premises in his occupation so that in the meantime he can make alternative arrangement. 17. In the view that we have taken, the appeal succeeds. The impugned order is set aside to the extent it permits the respondent to retain possession of three rooms out of four rooms in his occupation. The respondent is directed to 15 handover possession of all the rooms in his occupation to the appellants. He is granted six months time to vacate the premises in question on the condition that he files usual undertaking before the Registry of this Court within eight weeks from today. 18. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. .....................................................J. (AFTAB ALAM) .....................................................J. (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI) NEW DELHI, JANUARY 05, 2012

= Group I service exams?= The writ petition is directed against the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short the ‘Tribunal’) dated 30-12-2011, in a batch of applications being O.A.No.9928 of 2011 and batch. By the order impugned, the Tribunal directed stay of all further proceedings including conduct of interviews relating to selection of candidates to the posts of Group-I services notified under Notification No. 39 of 2008 and the Supplementary Notification No.10 of 2009.=In order to provide a fair opportunity to all the candidates including candidates who appeared at the interviews to participate in the lis pendency before the Tribunal, we consider it appropriate to direct the State and the Commission to intimate in writing to each of the candidates who would appear at the interview, that the selection including the process of interviews will be subject to the result of original applications, pending adjudication before the Tribunal. The State Government shall also intimate that the selection is subject to the outcome of the original applications pending adjudication before the Tribunal by publicity in the daily press and electronic media. On the analysis and for the reasons above, the writ petition is allowed to the extent of permitting the Commission to proceed with the process of selection including the process of oral interviews, pursuant to the general recruitment Notification No. 39 of 2008 and Supplemental Notification No. 10 of 2009, subject however to the condition that no orders of appointment shall be issued without obtaining specific orders of the Tribunal in O.A.No. 9928 of 2011 and batch.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY W.P. No. 68 of 2012 Dated 02-01-2012 Between: The Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commision, Andhra Pradesh, Nampally, Hyderabad. …Petitioner Vs. P. Prasanna Kumar and others. …Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY W.P.No. 68 of 2012 Dated: 02-01-2012 ORAL ORDER: (Per: GR,J) Heard the learned Advocate General for the Government Pleader for General Administration Department -- the State; Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned senior advocate instructed by Sri K. R. Prabhakar; Sri A. Ramachandra Rao, and Sri M. Ram Gopal learned counsel for respondents in the writ petition. The writ petition is directed against the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short the ‘Tribunal’) dated 30-12-2011, in a batch of applications being O.A.No.9928 of 2011 and batch. By the order impugned, the Tribunal directed stay of all further proceedings including conduct of interviews relating to selection of candidates to the posts of Group-I services notified under Notification No. 39 of 2008 and the Supplementary Notification No.10 of 2009. Several allegations of inept and casual conduct of recruitment by the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (for short ‘Commission’) are leveled in the clutch of original applications. Inter alia, it was contended by the several applicants that some questions in the English and the Telugu languages to be answered in English or Telugu medium as the case may be, have incorporated either by accident or designe inaccuracies in the Telugu version of the comparable questions in the English medium paper which are inaccurate and wholly erroneous translations of the relevant English questions; that no key was furnished for evaluation of the answers furnished by the candidates who appeared in the Telugu medium; that there is lack of clarity as to whether marks obtained by the candidates in the written examination were considered in accordance with the notification and the methodology adopted for evaluation; and that the valuation was by persons not adequately conversant with the Telugu language, since the same evaluators had valued both the English and Telugu answer scripts. On the basis of an inconclusive affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the original applications, the Tribunal found prima facie material to infer errors in translation from English to the Telugu version of question papers. While directing the official respondents to file a comprehensive and responsive counter affidavit and observing that the matter requires a detailed analysis, the Tribunal directed stay of all further proceedings including conduct of interviews. In the considered view of this Court, having regard to the fact that the process of selection for the notifications of the year 2008 and 2009 are still in process, adversely affecting the interest of the candidates who applied and the administrative requirements of the State; and given the apparent incongruities in the selection process as prima facie identified by the Tribunal, we consider it appropriate that the process of selections need not be interdicted in its entirety. The integrity of the process of selection and the interests of applicants before the Tribunal would be adequately protected if the State and the Commission were directed not to finalize the selections by issuing orders of appointment pursuant to the selection initiated by the Commission, the other steps in the process of selection may however go on but subject to the decision in the original applications, by the Tribunal. In order to provide a fair opportunity to all the candidates including candidates who appeared at the interviews to participate in the lis pendency before the Tribunal, we consider it appropriate to direct the State and the Commission to intimate in writing to each of the candidates who would appear at the interview, that the selection including the process of interviews will be subject to the result of original applications, pending adjudication before the Tribunal. The State Government shall also intimate that the selection is subject to the outcome of the original applications pending adjudication before the Tribunal by publicity in the daily press and electronic media. On the analysis and for the reasons above, the writ petition is allowed to the extent of permitting the Commission to proceed with the process of selection including the process of oral interviews, pursuant to the general recruitment Notification No. 39 of 2008 and Supplemental Notification No. 10 of 2009, subject however to the condition that no orders of appointment shall be issued without obtaining specific orders of the Tribunal in O.A.No. 9928 of 2011 and batch. Having regard to the fact that the lis presented in O.A.No. 9928 of 2011 and batch pending before the Tribunal pertains to recruitment of posts to Group-I services of the State, of the year 2008 and 2009, we consider it appropriate to request the Tribunal to expeditiously dispose of the batch of Original Applications. The order of the Tribunal dated 30-12-2011 in O.A.No. 9928 of 2011 and batch impugned in this writ petition is modified as above. There shall however be no order as to costs. __________________________ JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM ___________________________________ JUSTICE G. KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY Dated: 02-01-2012 Pvks/*

“(ii) Levy of life tax on the CEVs in mining industry: Some CEVs are designed for digging, carrying, loading/unloading, drilling with or without special modification for use in mining industry. Section 10 of the Taxation Act exempts such CEVs used solely in mining and agricultural purposes from payment of MV Tax. The Section makes it conditional that all these vehicles should also be registered under the MV Act. Indeed any class of motor vehicles cannot be permitted to be driven in a public place without being registered in accordance with Chapter IV of the MV Act. As per Section 41, an application for registration shall be accompanied by such documents as may be prescribed by the Central Government by the Rules. As per Rule 47 of the Central Rules, an application for registration shall be made in Form 20 to the Registering Authority. There is no dispute that at the time of registration, Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963 (the A.P. Rules) requires the Registering Authority to make an entry regarding the amount of tax paid in the certificate of registration. Rule 6 of the A.P. Rules requires the owner to make the payment of tax at the time of registration of the vehicle. Therefore even when a motor vehicle is designed and used for mining purpose, first it has to obtain registration by paying tax so as to seek exemption under Section 10 of the Taxation Act. The grievance of the petitioners, though well founded, in view of the additional affidavit filed by the Principal Secretary the position is now clear that all those petitioners who use the CEVs for mining operations, can seek refund of the life tax after obtaining the exemption from the competent authority.”

THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MADAN B. LOKUR AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.51 OF 2012 DATED:3.1.2012 Between: SMS Infrastructure Ltd., Thummalapally, Uranium Mine Project Vemula Mandal, Y.S.R. Kadapa District Rep. by its Chief Vigilance and Administrative Officer S.M. Khaleel, S/o. Late S.M. Bazlullah R/o.D.No.4-8-205/6 Subhakar Reddy Colony Pulivendula Y.S.R. Kadapa District … Petitioner And The Government of Andhra Pradesh Rep. by its Principal Secretary Transport Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad and others … Respondents THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MADAN B. LOKUR AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.51 OF 2012 ORDER: (per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Shri Madan B. Lokur) The petitioner is the owner of construction equipment vehicles which are used in the mining industry. The question whether they are liable to life tax under the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (for short, ‘the Act’) came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Khader Basha v. The Regional Transport Officer, Chittoor, in W.P. NO.173 of 2010 and batch, decided on 28.9.2011. 2. While dealing with the issue, the Division Bench observed as follows: “(ii) Levy of life tax on the CEVs in mining industry: Some CEVs are designed for digging, carrying, loading/unloading, drilling with or without special modification for use in mining industry. Section 10 of the Taxation Act exempts such CEVs used solely in mining and agricultural purposes from payment of MV Tax. The Section makes it conditional that all these vehicles should also be registered under the MV Act. Indeed any class of motor vehicles cannot be permitted to be driven in a public place without being registered in accordance with Chapter IV of the MV Act. As per Section 41, an application for registration shall be accompanied by such documents as may be prescribed by the Central Government by the Rules. As per Rule 47 of the Central Rules, an application for registration shall be made in Form 20 to the Registering Authority. There is no dispute that at the time of registration, Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963 (the A.P. Rules) requires the Registering Authority to make an entry regarding the amount of tax paid in the certificate of registration. Rule 6 of the A.P. Rules requires the owner to make the payment of tax at the time of registration of the vehicle. Therefore even when a motor vehicle is designed and used for mining purpose, first it has to obtain registration by paying tax so as to seek exemption under Section 10 of the Taxation Act. The grievance of the petitioners, though well founded, in view of the additional affidavit filed by the Principal Secretary the position is now clear that all those petitioners who use the CEVs for mining operations, can seek refund of the life tax after obtaining the exemption from the competent authority.” 3. Giving a summary of its findings, the Division Bench observed: (zg). If any of the CEVs are designed for use solely in mining industry, or for agricultural operations, they have to pay life tax, and seek exemption under Section 10 of the Taxation Act. The owners of the vehicles, which are designed and are being used solely in mining and agricultural operations, are entitled for refund after obtaining exemption.” 4. The petitioner was issued twenty six show cause notices in respect of each of the vehicles and by virtue of the show cause notices, life tax was proposed to be imposed on the vehicles. 5. The petitioner contested the show causes notices and on a consideration of the material, the Regional Transport Officer passed an order dt.21.12.2011 in which it was held, following the decision of the Division Bench, that the petitioner is liable to pay life tax on the vehicles in question and thereafter claim a refund under Section 10 of the Act. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the order passed by the Regional Transport Officer. 6. It is first of all submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that he is seeking implementation of the judgment of this Court and is not questioning the correctness of the decision. 7. In our opinion, in the implementation of the judgment of this Court, the Regional Transport Officer has taken a correct decision that the life tax has to be first paid as held by this Court and thereafter if the petitioner is entitled to exemption, he can claim refund under Section 10 of the Act. 8. We do not find any error in the implementation of the judgment by the Regional Transport Officer. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that his case would be covered by the following summary of the findings given by the Division Bench: “(zd). Mere exclusive use of a motor vehicle within a factory or enclosed premises would not, by itself, exclude such vehicles from the levy of tax. It is only when such vehicles are specially adapted and specially designed, do those vehicles go out of the purview of the Taxation Act. Even if these vehicles are of “off highway” capabilities, as they are fitted with rubber tyres or pneumatic tyres or rubber padded, they are, “motor vehicles” liable to tax. In case of any doubt the RTA/Transport Commissioner has the power to determine this question.” 10. He also relies on the final conclusion which reads as follows: Conclusion In the result, for the above reasons, we pass the following orders which would cover all the cases. The writ petitions being W.P. Nos.1690, 9883, 9907, 9908, 9909, 10402, 10405, 11332 and 11398 of 2011 filed by the owners of Rocket Boomer L2Ds (electro hydraulic drilling machines) are disposed of, with liberty to them to approach the jurisdictional Regional Transport Authority for determination of the question whether or not the Rocket Boomers used for tunneling and drilling works are motor vehicles. On such application being made, the RTA shall, if necessary, consult the manufacturers of those vehicles or experts in the field of construction equipment and determine the question as to whether the owners of those vehicles are liable to pay life tax after getting their vehicles registered under the MV Act. All the other writ petitions, subject to the observations in this common order, shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” 11. In our opinion, neither the summary of findings nor the conclusion is applicable to the specific facts of this case since the summary of findings in paragraph (zg) is the one that we are really concerned. The admitted position is that the construction equipment vehicles of the petitioner are used solely in the mining industry. This is covered specifically by paragraph (zg) and not by paragraph (zd). 12. Insofar as the conclusion given in the judgment is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner has made it clear that this writ petition does not pertain to Rocket Boomers. 13. Under these circumstances, we are not able to accept any of the contentions urged by learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. There is no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. Miscellaneous petition is also dismissed. __________________ MADAN B. LOKUR, CJ _______________ SANJAY KUMAR, J 3-1-2012 bnr

promotions - ban ?= The only grievance of the petitioners is that the ban that was imposed by the Government is in respect of recruitment but not for promotions and the same has been clarified in Memo dated 22.08.2005, which reads as under: “Government after careful examination of the matter referred by the Director of School Education, AP, Hyderabad in the reference cited, hereby clarify that the prohibition imposed in Act-2 of 1994 and the ban orders in memo No.12080/COSE/A2/2004-4, dt.20.10.2004 will not apply in cases of promotion of the candidates from one cadre to another higher cadre. In view of the above, the Director of School Education, AP., is hereby permitted to consider the case of promotion of Smt.K.E.Snehalatha, Grade-II, Telugu Pandit to Grade-I, Telugu Pandits per the normal Procedure.”

IN THE HIGH COURT JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD TUESDAY, THE THIRD DAY OF JANUARY, TWO THOUSAND AND TWELFTH PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH W.P. No.18 and 97 of 2012 Between: W.P. No.18 of 2012: Peddu Vijaya Lakshmi … Petitioner and The Government of A.P., Rep.by its Secretary, School Education Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad and others. … Respondents W.P. No.97 of 2012: Maddala Suvarna Raju … Petitioner and The Government of A.P., Rep.by its Secretary, School Education Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad and others. … Respondents THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH W.P. No.18 and 97 of 2012 COMMON ORDER: The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the subject matter of both the writ petitions is one and the same, therefore, they may disposed of together. Hence, they are being disposed of by this common order. These writ petitions have been filed seeking for issuance of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in not approving the promotion of the petitioners to the post of Headmistress/Headmaster as per the clarification given by the Government in Memo No.8544/PS-1/2005-1, Education (SE-PS) Department, dated 22.08.2005, as wholly illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and consequently to declare that the petitioners are entitled to approval of their promotion to the post of Headmistress/Headmaster with all consequential benefits. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner in W.P. No.18 of 2012 is one Smt.Peddu Vijaya Lakshmi working as Headmistress in Gandhi Vidyalaya (EM) High School Balaramunipet, Machilipatnam, Krishna District and the petitioner in W.P. No.97 of 2012 is one Sri Maddala Suvarna Raju working as Headmaster in Noble High School, Machilipatnam, Krishna District. The first petitioner was appointed as School Assistant on 26.09.1989 in Gandhi Vidyalaya (EM) High School, Balaramunipet, Machilipatnam, Krishna District in a regular sanctioned aided vacancy and thereafter, she was promoted as Headmistress in a clear sanctioned vacancy on 01.08.2005 in the above said School and till then she has been working as such. The second petitioner was appointed as School Assistant on 17.11.1988 in Noble High School, Machilipatnam, Krishna District in a regular sanctioned aided vacancy and thereafter, he was promoted as Headmaster in a clear sanctioned vacancy on 01.08.2005 in the above said School and till then he has been working as such. While the things stood thus, the 5th respondent sent proposal to the 4th respondent for approval of promotion of the petitioners and the 4th respondent in turn sent the same to the 3rd respondent, who returned the proposal with the instructions to resubmit the same after lifting of ban on promotions as clarified in Government Memo No.8544/PS-1/2005-2, dated 13.09.2005. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed appeals before the respondents 1 and 2 on 09.06.2009 and the same are pending without passing any orders. Hence, the petitioners filed the present writ petitions. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the ban that was imposed by the Government was only in respect of the recruitment, at the relevant point of time, but not on the promotions, which has been clarified by the Government vide its Memo dated 22.08.2005. Therefore, the action of the 3rd respondent in rejecting the proposal sent by the 5th respondent seeking approval of the promotion of the petitioners as Headmistress/Headmasters in the 5th respondent’s schools is illegal and arbitrary. The learned Government Pleader would submit that it is a specific submission on the part of the petitioners that they have filed appeals before the respondents 1 and 2. Therefore, the respondents may be directed to consider the same and pass appropriate orders. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader and perused the material on record. The only grievance of the petitioners is that the ban that was imposed by the Government is in respect of recruitment but not for promotions and the same has been clarified in Memo dated 22.08.2005, which reads as under: “Government after careful examination of the matter referred by the Director of School Education, AP, Hyderabad in the reference cited, hereby clarify that the prohibition imposed in Act-2 of 1994 and the ban orders in memo No.12080/COSE/A2/2004-4, dt.20.10.2004 will not apply in cases of promotion of the candidates from one cadre to another higher cadre. In view of the above, the Director of School Education, AP., is hereby permitted to consider the case of promotion of Smt.K.E.Snehalatha, Grade-II, Telugu Pandit to Grade-I, Telugu Pandits per the normal Procedure.” From the above, it is clear that the Government clarified in the said memo that the prohibition and the ban orders imposed on 20.10.2004 will not apply in cases of promotion of the candidates from one cadre to another higher cadre. Though the said memo is in respect of one Smt.K.E.Snehalatha, but in the said memo it is clarified that the ban imposed by the Government in the matter of recruitment on 20.10.2004 has no application in the case of promotion. However, in these matters, aggrieved by the rejection proceedings dated 25.10.2005, passed by the 3rd respondent, the petitioners filed appeals before the respondents 1 and 2 and the same are pending. Further, both the counsel represented that the respondents may be directed to consider the appeals, stated to have been filed by the petitioners. In that view of the matter, without going into the merits of the case, these writ petitions are disposed of directing the respondents 1 and 2 to consider the appeals dated 09.06.2009, stated to have been filed by the petitioners before the respondents 1 and 2 on the aspect of approval of the promotion of the petitioners, and pass appropriate orders, in accordance with law, within a period two months, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. With the above direction, these writ petitions are disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. _________________________ JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH Date: 03.01.2012 Note: Furnish C.C. in two days. B/o. LSK