Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. There is a difference between an agreement to sell and a sale. An agreement to sell is not a sale. An agreement to sell becomes a sale after both the parties signed the sale deed. What is relevant in fact is the actual valuation of the property at the time of the sale. The crucial expression used in Section 17 of the Stamp Act, 1899 is "at the time of execution". Therefore, stamp duty on a sale has to be assessed on the market value of the property at the time of execution of sale deed, and not at the time of the prior agreement to sell, nor at the time of filing of the suit. [Para 10] [115-E; 116-D, E] 1.2. The Stamp Act, 1899 is in the nature of a taxing statute, and it has to be construed strictly; and considerations of hardship or equity have no role to play in its construction. It is true that no one should suffer on account of the pendency of the matter in court but this consideration does not affect the principles of interpretation of a taxing statute. A taxing statute has to be construed as it is. The contingencies that the matter was under litigation and the value of the property by that time shot up cannot be taken into account for interpreting the provisions of a taxing statute. [Para 10 and 14] [116-E; 118-D, E] Sub Registrat, Kodad Town and Mandal v. Amaranaini China Venkat Rao and Ors., AIR (1998) Andhra Pradesh 252, disapproved. 1.3. Literal rule of interpretation applies to the taxing statute. Construing section 17 read with section 2(12) of the Stamp Act in this back-ground, there is no manner of doubt that the registering authority is under an obligation to ascertain the correct market value at that time of registration and should not go by the value mentioned in the instrument. It is true that as per Section 3, which is the charging section, the instrument is to be registered on the basis of the valuation disclosed therein. But Section 3 cannot be read in isolation and has to be read along with Section 17 of the Act. From a composite reading of Sections 3, 17 and 27, it becomes abundantly clear that the valuation given in an instrument is not conclusive. If any doubt arises in the mind of the registering authority that the instrument is under-valued then as per Section 47-A as inserted by Rajasthan Act 10 of 1982 in Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952, the instrument can be sent to the Collector for determination of the correct market value. Under Section 47-A read with Sections 3, 17 and 27, it becomes clear that the registering authority has to ascertain the correct valuation given in the instrument regarding market value of the property at the time of the sale. [Para 11, 12 and 13] [117-E, F, G, H; 118-A, B] A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala, AIR (1957) SC 657, relied on. 1.4. The view taken by the single Judge as well as by the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. The Collector shall determine the valuation of the property mentioned in the instrument on the basis of its market value on the date when the document was tendered by the respondent for registration, and the respondent shall pay the stamp duty charges and surcharge, if any, as assessed by the Collector as per the provisions of the Act. [Para 16] [119-B, C] V. Madhukar, Sumit Ghosh and Aruneshwar Gupta for the Appellants. Dr. Manish Singhvi and P.V. Yogeswaran for the Respondents.

CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  5273 of 2007


PETITIONER:
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS


RESPONDENT:
M/S KHANDAKA JAIN JEWELLERS


DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/11/2007


BENCH:
A.K. MATHUR & MARKANDEY KATJU


JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T 


CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5273         OF 2007
[Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.19439 of 2006]


A.K. MATHUR, J.


1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.11.2005 
passed by the  Division Bench of the High Court  of Judicature for 
Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur  in  SBCWP No. 133/1997 and DBCSA 
No. 427/2002 whereby the  division bench has affirmed the order of the 
learned Single Judge.  
3. Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal 
are as under:
The S.B. Civil writ petition No. 133/97  was filed by M/s 
Khandaka Jain Jewellers,  petitioner (respondent herein) in the High 
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur  who  prayed  
that a direction may be issued to the respondent Nos. 2&3    to 
register the sale deeds  sent  by the  Court of additional district 
Judge No. 1, Jaipur city in execution  application No. 15/94 and 16/94 
and to  send back the same to the Court immediately after 
registration.   It was also prayed that the respondents may be 
directed to register the sale deeds on the stamps  on  which it is 
executed by the executing court and  not to charge more stamp duty 
from  respondent (herein).  It was  further prayed to quash and set 
aside the  proceedings  taken under Section 47A(2) of the Stamps Act, 
1952 in case No. 442/95 and 443/95 on 4th March, 1997 for determination 
of the valuation of the  sale deed for registration.
The respondent is a registered firm and it entered into two 
agreements  for purchase of properties with Shri Prem Chand Ajmera, 
resident of 2148, Haldiyon Ka Rasta Jaipur by one agreement dated 20th 
October, 1983.  The property was agreed to be purchased for a sum of 
Rs. 1,41,000/- out of which Rs. 20,000/- were paid at the time  of the 
agreement.  As the vendor failed to comply  with the terms of the 
agreement,  the  respondent vendee filed a suit for specific 
performance of the contract in the Court of district Judge, Jaipur 
city which was later on transferred to  the Court of additional 
district Judge No.1, Jaipur city under registration No. 216/86.    The 
suit was decreed by  the Judgment and decree dated 2nd February,1994.   
In pursuance of the said decree, the respondent firm deposited an 
amount of Rs. 1,21,000/- in the Court on 9th May, 1994.   Since  the 
vendor did not execute the sale deed,  therefore, the respondent firm 
filed the execution application No. 16/90 before the Court of 
additional district Judge No. 1, Jaipur city.

In another agreement  dated 20TH October, 1983 the  vendor 
Premchand agreed to sell a portion of property  for a sum of Rs. 
50,000/- out of which Rs. 10,000/- was paid  at the time of agreement.  
The respondent firm purchased the stamp papers and got  the sale deed 
typed.  In this case also the vendor failed to fulfill the condition 
of  agreement and  to execute the sale deed.  Consequently,  the 
respondent firm filed another suit for specific performance of the 
contract in the Court of district Judge, Jaipur city. It was also 
transferred to the court of additional district Judge No. 1, Jaipur 
city  under registration No. 151/91.   The suit was decreed vide 
judgment and decree dated 2nd February, 1994  and the respondent firm 
was directed to  deposit the remaining amount of Rs. 40,000/-  and  
the judgment debtor would execute the  sale deed.  If the  judgment 
debtor fails  to comply with the decree,  the decree holder would be 
entitled to get the sale deed registered and to get the possession. In 
compliance of the judgment and decree passed by the Court,  the 
respondent firm deposited an amount of Rs. 40,000/- in the court but 
the judgment debtor   did not execute the sale deed.   The execution 
application No. 15/94 was filed before   the Court of additional 
district Judge No. 1, Jaipur city.     Both these applications No. 
15/94 and 16/94 were taken up by the  executing court and the 
respondent firm was directed to submit the stamp papers for the 
execution of  the two sale deeds.   The stamp papers for a sum of 
Rs.14,100/- and Rs. 5,000/-   for execution of the sale deeds in 
respect of  properties purchased for  a sum of Rs. 1,41,000/- and   
Rs. 50,000/- respectively, were  submitted by the respondent firm. 
The learned executing court executed the  sale deeds and sent the 
same  on 17th March, 1995   for registration before  the Sub- 
registrar, Registration Department, Collectorate Bani Park, Jaipur.   
The Sub-Registrar exercising its powers under Section 47A(1) of the 
Stamp Act sent these two sale deeds to  Collector (Stamps) Jaipur for  
determining the market value and  to assess the charge of the stamp 
duty.      The Collector (stamps)   registered  these two cases No. 
442/95 and 443/95 of the respondent firm  and passed the  order dated 
5th March, 1997.   In case No. 442/95  he assessed value of the 
property as Rs. 5,60,000/-   and deficient stamp duty was raised to 
the extent of  Rs. 41,900/- and deficient registration fees as Rs 
1500/- and  he also levied the penalty  of Rs. 1000/-.  Thus, the 
total amount against the respondent firm  raised was Rs. 44,400/-. In 
the  second  case No. 443/95  he  assessed value of the  property as 
Rs. 3,87,580/-  and deficient  stamp duty to the extent of Rs. 
33,758/- and  deficient registration fees as Rs. 1500/- and the 
penalty of Rs. 1000/-. Thus the total amount directed to be recovered  
from the respondent firm was Rs. 36,258/-.   The respondent firm  
filed  writ petition  challenging  both these orders and the 
contention of the respondent firm was that the  valuation of the 
property should be taken when  the agreement of sale deed was 
executed, and not at the time of the registration of the sale deed.  
The learned  Single Judge relying on the judgment in the case of Sub 
Registrat, Kodad Town and Mandal v. Amaranaini China Venkat Rao and 
Others   reported in AIR 1998 Andhra Pradesh 252 allowed the writ 
petition and observed that  since the vendor backed out  and did not 
execute the sale deed of the property in pursuance of the  agreement 
on 20th October, 1983 therefore, the respondent firm  filed  a  suit 
for specific performance of contract in 1986  and the suit was 
decreed.  The respondent firm was ready and willing to pay the amount, 
and therefore, it was not his fault. The same was the position 
regarding the second suit  which was filed in 1991.  The learned Judge 
after considering the  matter directed to set aside both the orders 
and held that for the purpose  of charging   stamp duty, etc, the  
relevant date for assessment of the market value shall be the date on 
which the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sale was 
filed. Consequently the order dated 4th March, 1997  (Annexure 5 & 6)  
was quashed and the authorities  were directed to  pass a fresh order 
regarding the market value of the property in question for the purpose 
of levy of the stamp duty as on the date of filing of the suit and 
also directed to undertake this exercise keeping in view the 
observation of the judgment within a period of one month from the date 
of receipt of the certified copy of the order after notice to 
respondent firm.
4. Aggrieved against this order, an  appeal was preferred before the 
Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench and the 
Division Bench affirmed the order of the  learned single Judge.  
Aggrieved against the order of the Division  Bench, the present appeal 
was  preferred by  the State of Rajasthan & Ors., appellants herein.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the  
records.
6. The question is whether the valuation should be assessed on the 
market rate prevailing at the time of registration of the sale deed or  
when the parties entered into  agreement  to sell. 
7. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that the Stamp Act is 
a taxing statute and a taxing statute has to be  construed  strictly. 
Whatsoever may have been the consideration  for the vendor not to get 
the sale deed executed   is a matter  between both  the parties, but 
when the matter is before the  registering Authority the registering 
Authority has to  see the valuation of the property at the market rate 
at the time of  the registration as per Section 17 of the Act.  
Therefore,  a notice under Section  47A of the (Rajasthan Amendment) 
Stamp Duty Act was given and proper valuation was determined for 
registration.  As against  this, the  learned counsel for the 
respondent submitted that  Section 3  of the Act  is a charging 
section.   The registering authority has to see the instrument and the 
consideration mentioned therein for payment of duty as per Section 27 
of the Act.  If he finds it undervalued then  he can hold an inquiry 
with regard to market  value which was  prevailing at the time of 
agreement to sell.
8. In order to appreciate the  controversy involved in the matter, 
it is necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Stamp Act 
which are as under:
Section 2(12) of the Act reads as under:
"(12) "Executed", and "execution", used with reference 
to instruments, mean "signed" and "signature"."


Section 3 of the Act reads as under:
"3. Instruments chargeable with duty -  Subject to the 
provisions of this Act and the  exemptions contained 
in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be 
chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in that 
Schedule as the proper duty therefore, respectively, 
that is to say 
(a) every instrument mentioned in that Schedule which, 
not having been previously executed by any person, 
is executed in (India) on or after the first day of 
July, 1899;
(b) every bill of exchange payable  otherwise than on 
demand  or promissory note drawn or made out of 
India on or after that  day and accepted or paid, 
or presented for acceptance or payment, or 
endorsed, transferred or otherwise negotiated, in 
India; and
(c) every instrument (other than a bill exchange or 
promissory note) mentioned in that Schedule, which, 
not having been previously executed by any person, 
is executed out of India  on or after that day 
relates to any property  situate, or to any matter 
or thing done or to be done, in India and is 
received in India:


Provided that no duty shall be chargeable in respect 
of-
(1) any instrument executed by, or on behalf of, or in 
favour of, the Government in cases where, but for 
this exemption, the Government would be liable to 
pay the duty chargeable in respect of such 
instrument;
(2) any instrument for the sale, transfer or other 
disposition, either absolutely or by way of 
mortgage or otherwise, of any ship or vessel, or 
any part, interest, share or property of or in any 
ship or vessel, registered under the Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1894, or under Act 19 of 1938,  or 
the  Indian Registration of Ships Act, 1841 (10 of 
1841) as amended by subsequent Acts.
(3) Any instrument executed, by or on behalf of, or in 
favour of the Developer, or Unit or in connection 
with the carrying out of purposes of the Special 
Economic Zone.

"


Section 17 of the Act reads as under:


"17. Instruments executed in India  All instrument 
chargeable with duty and executed by any person in 
India shall be stamped before or at the time of 
execution."


Section 27 of the Act reads as under:


"27.Facts affecting duty to be set forth in 
instrument.-  The consideration (if any) and all 
other facts and circumstances affecting the 
chargeability of any instrument with duty,  or  the 
amount of the duty with which it is chargeable, 
shall be fully and truly set forth therein."


    Section 47-A inserted by  Rajasthan(Amendment)  
State Stamp Act reads as under:


"S.47-A Instruments under-valued, how to be valued 
 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the 
Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act XVI of 1908) 
and the rules made thereunder as in force in 
Rajasthan where in the case of any instrument 
relating to an immovable property chargeable with 
an ad valorem duty on the market value of the 
property as set forth in the instrument, the  
registering officer has, while registering the 
instruments, reason to believe that the market 
value of the property has not been truly set forth 
in the instrument, he may either before or after 
registering the instrument, send it in original to 
the Collector for determination of the market-value 
and  to assess and charge the duty in conformity 
with such determination together with a penalty not 
exceeding ten-times the deficient stamp duty 
chargeable and surcharge, if any, payable on such 
instrument.


(2) On receipt of the instrument  under sub-
section(1), the Collector shall, after giving the 
parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard and 
after holding an enquiry in the prescribed manner 
determine the market-value and the duty including 
penalty and surcharge, if any, payable thereon; and  
if the amount of duty  including penalty and 
surcharge, if any, already paid, is deficient, the 
deficient amount shall be payable by the person 
liable to pay the duty including penalty and 
surcharge, if any.


(2-A) Where it appears to a person having by law or 
consent of parties authority to receive evidence or 
a person in charge of a public office, during the 
course of inspection or otherwise, except an 
officer of a police, that an instrument is 
undervalued, such person shall forthwith make a 
reference to the Collector in that matter.


(3)The Collector may, suo motu, or on a reference 
made under sub-section (2-A) call for and examine 
any instrument not referred to him under sub-
section (1), from any person referred to in sub-
section (2-A)  or the executant or any other person 
for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the 
correctness of the market-value of such property 
has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he 
may determine in accordance with the procedure 
provided in sub-section(2), the market-value and 
the amount of stamp duty together with a penalty 
not exceeding ten times the deficient stamp duty 
chargeable on it, which shall be payable by the 
person liable to pay the stamp duty and penalty.


(4)Where for any reason the original document 
called for by the Collector under sub-section(3)  
is not produced or cannot be produced, the 
Collector may after recording the reasons for its 
non-production call for a certified copy of the 
entries of the document from the registering 
officer concerned and exercise the powers conferred 
on him under sub-section (3).


(5)For the purpose of enquiries under this section, 
the Collector shall have power to summon and 
enforce the attendance of witnesses including the 
parties to the instrument or any of them, and to 
complete the production of documents by the same 
means, and so far as may be in the same manner, as 
is provided in the case of Civil Court under Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908)"


9. The contention of the learned counsel for the State  that as per 
Section 17 of the Act, the market value has to be taken into 
consideration because Section 17 stipulates that all the instruments 
chargeable with duty and  executed by person of India  shall be 
stamped before or "at the time of execution".  The word "execution" 
has been defined in Section 2(12) of the Act which says that 
"Execution"  used with reference to the instruments, mean "signed" and 
"signature".    Therefore, it shows that the document which is sought 
to be registered has to be signed by both the parties.  Till that time 
the document does not become an instrument for registration.   A 
reading of Section  2(12)  with Section 17 clearly contemplates that 
the document should be complete in  all respects when both the parties 
should have signed it with regard to the transfer of the immovable 
property.  It is irrelevant  whether the matter had gone in for  
litigation.  
10. It may  be mentioned that there is a difference between an 
agreement to sell and a sale.  Stamp duty on a sale has to be assessed 
on the  market value of the property at the time of the sale, and not  
at the time of the prior agreement to sell, nor at the time of  filing 
of the suit.  This is evident from section 17 of the Act.   It is true 
that as per Section 3,  the instrument is to be registered on the 
basis of the valuation disclosed therein.     But Section 47-A  of the 
Rajasthan(Amendment) Stamp Duty Act  contemplates that in case it is 
found that properties are under valued then it is open for the 
Collector (Stamps)  to assess  the correct market value.    Therefore, 
in the present case when the  registering  authority found that  
valuation of the property was not correct as mentioned in the 
instrument, it sent the document to the Collector for  ascertaining 
the correct market value of the property.  The expression "execution"  
read with Section 17 leaves no manner of  doubt that  the  current 
valuation is to be seen when the instrument is sought to be 
registered.  The Stamp Act is in the  nature of a taxing statute,  and  
a taxing statute is not dependant  on any contingency.  Since the word 
"execution"  read with Section 17 clearly says that  the instrument 
has to be seen at the time when it is sought to be  registered and in 
that if it is found that the instrument has  been undervalued then it 
is  open  for the registering authority to enquire into its  correct 
market value.    The learned single Judge as well as the Division 
Bench in the present case had  taken into consideration that the 
agreement to sell was entered into but  it was not executed.  
Therefore, the incumbent  had to file a suit for  seeking a  decree 
for execution of the agreement and that took a long time.  Therefore, 
the Courts below concluded that the valuation which was in the 
instrument should be taken into account.  In our opinion this is not a 
correct approach.  Even the valuation at the time of the decree is 
also not relevant.  What is relevant  in fact is the actual valuation 
of the property at the time of the sale.   The crucial expression used  
in Section 17 is "at the time of execution".     Therefore, the market  
value of the  instrument has to be seen at the time of the execution 
of the sale deed, and   not at the time  when agreement to sale was 
entered into.  An agreement to sell is not a sale. An agreement to 
sell becomes  a sale after both the parties signed the sale deed.  A 
taxing  statute is not  contingent on the inconvenience of the 
parties.   It is needless to emphasize  that a taxing statute has to 
be construed  strictly and  considerations of  hardship or equity  
have no role to play in its construction.   VISCOUNT SIMON quoted with 
approval a passage from ROWLATT, J. expressing the  principle in the 
following words
" In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what  
is clearly said.  There is no  room for any 
intendment.  There is no equity about a tax.   
There is no  presumption as to tax.   Nothing is 
to be read in, nothing is to be implied.  One can 
only look fairly at the language used."

11.      The same view was expressed by Hon'ble  Bhagwati J. in the 
case of A.V. Fernandez v. State of  Kerala   reported in AIR 1957 SC 
657.  The principle is as follows:  
"In construing fiscal statutes and in determining 
the liability of a subject to tax one must have 
regard to the strict letter of the law.   If the 
revenue satisfies the court that the case falls 
strictly  within the provisions of the law,  the 
subject can be taxed.  If on the other hand, the 
case is not covered within the four corners of the 
provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be 
imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to 
probe into the intention of the Legislature and by  
considering what was the substance of the matter."


Hon'ble Shah J has formulated the principle thus: 
"In interpreting a taxing statute,  equitable 
considerations are entirely out of place.  Nor  can 
taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions 
or assumptions. The court must look squarely at the  
words of the statute and interpret them.   It must 
interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is 
clearly expressed;  it cannot imply anything which 
is not expressed;  it cannot import provisions in 
the statute so as to supply any assumed 
deficiency."




Therefore, a taxing statute has to be read as it is.  In other 
words,  the literal rule of interpretation applies to it.
12.    In this back-ground, if we construe Section 17 read with 
Section 2(12) then there is no manner of doubt  that  at the time of 
registration, the Registering Authority is under an obligation  to 
ascertain the correct market value at that time, and should not go by 
the value mentioned in the instrument.  


 13.   Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that if we 
construe Section 3 read with Section 27 of the Act then the 
Registering Authority is under an obligation to  only see the  value 
mentioned in the instrument.  In our opinion  Section 3 which is the 
charging section cannot be read  in isolation but has  to be read 
along with Section 17 of the Act.  From a composite reading of  
Sections 3,17 and 27,  it becomes abundantly clear that the valuation 
given in an instrument is not conclusive.  If any doubt arises in the 
mind of the  Registering Authority that the instrument is under-
valued then as per Section 47-A of the Rajasthan (Amendment) the 
instrument can be sent to the Collector for determination  of the  
correct market value.  Under Section 47-A read with Sections 3,17 and 
27, it becomes clear  that the  Registering Authority has to 
ascertain the correct valuation given  in the instrument regarding 
market value of the  property at the time of the sale.
14.  Learned Counsel for the respondent strenuously urged before us 
that in fact when the agreement to sell was not executed by the  
vendor,  the respondent  had no option  but  to file a suit  and  a 
long time was taken  for obtaining a decree for execution of  the 
agreement. He was not at fault and as such the valuation given in the 
instrument should be taken into consideration because during the 
litigation the valuation of the property has shot up.  In this 
connection, learned counsel  has invited our attention to the 
principle "Actus curie neminem gravabit" meaning thereby that no 
person shall suffer on account of litigation. Hence learned counsel 
submitted that  since the  matter had been in the litigation for a 
long time, the respondent cannot be made to suffer.  He invited our 
attention to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  Sub-
Registrar, Kodad Town and Mandal (supra).   It is true that no one 
should suffer on account of the pendency of the  matter but this 
consideration does  not affect the Principles of  interpretation of a  
taxing statute. A taxing statute has to be construed as it is  all 
these contingencies  that  the matter was under litigation and the  
value of  the propeprty by that time shot up cannot  be taken into 
account for  interpreting the provisions of a taxing statute.  As 
already mentioned above a taxing statute has to be construed strictly 
and if  it is construed strictly then the plea that the incumbent 
took a long time to get a decree for execution against the vendor  
that consideration cannot  weigh with the Court for interpreting the 
provisions of the taxing statutes.  Therefore,  simply because the 
matter have been  in the litigation for a long time  that cannot  be 
a consideration to accept the market value of  the instrument when 
the agreement to sale was entered. As per Section 17, it clearly says   
at the time  when registration is made, the  valuation is to be seen 
on that basis.
15.   In the case of Sub-Registrar, Kodad Town and Mandal (Supra),  
the learned single Judge of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court felt  
persuaded  on account of 30 years' long litigation and therefore, 
declined to send the papers back to the Collector for valuation at 
the market value. With great respect, the view taken by the learned 
single Judge is against the principles of interpretation of a  taxing 
statute.  Therefore, we are of  the opinion that the view taken by 
the learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is not 
correct.
16.   Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the 
learned single Judge  as well as by the Division Bench  cannot be 
sustained and the same is set aside.    The Collector shall determine 
was the  valuation of  the instrument on the basis of the market 
value of the property at the date when the  document was tendered by 
the  respondent for registration,   and the respondent shall pay the 
stamp duty charges and surcharge,  if any, as assessed by the 
Collector as per the provisions of the Act.  The appeal of  the State 
is allowed.  No order as to costs.

LATEST POST APEX COURT GUIDE LINES WHILE EXECUTING NON-BAILABLE WARRANTS =Justice Cardozo puts it “on the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice.”“We therefore, find that there was no justification for issuance of non-bailable warrant on 7 th August, 2002 merely because the petitioner had remained absent in Criminal Case No. 163/P/2000 (sic) by the Metropolitan Magistrate. The Magistrate could have issued either a notice or a bailable warrant depending upon the 3facts revealed from the records. Once the warrant was cancelled on 12 th August, 2002, it was necessary for the Court to immediately communicate the same to the concerned Police authority so that no inconvenience could have been caused to the person against whom the warrant was initially issued. Once the warrant was sought to be executed on holiday and the concerned police officer was categorically informed that the warrant had already been cancelled and the police officer being fully aware of the circumstances and nature of the case in which warrant had been issued, it was necessary for the police officer to ascertain and to find out whether the warrant which was sought to be executed was still enforceable or had already been cancelled and not to rush to execute the warrant in those circumstances and that too on a holiday. Having produced the necessary documents confirming the cancellation of the warrant much prior to the date on which it was sought to be (sic) enforced, it was the duty of the police officer to tender the necessary apology to the petitioner for executing such warrant on the holiday, and the concerned officer having failed to tender the apology it apparently shows that he had not performed his duty in the manner he was required to perform as a responsible police officer. Even the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 2 nowhere discloses any repentance for having executed the warrant which was already cancelled. It is a clear case of unnecessary interference with the liberty of a citizen.”

      REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1758              OF 2011

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5412 of 2008)

RAGHUVANSH DEWANCHAND BHASIN — APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. — RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.:

Leave granted.

2. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment and

order dated 26

th

November 2007, rendered by the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay, in CRL. W.P.

No.1086/2002. By the impugned judgment, while allowing the writ

petition filed by the appellant, alleging harassment on account of his

arrest on the strength of a non-bailable warrant, which had been

cancelled, the High Court has directed the delinquent police officer topay by way of costs to the appellant an amount of `2,000/- from his

own account.

3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts material for adjudication of the

present case, may be stated thus:

Some time in the year 2000, one, Mr. Prem Harchandrai filed a

complaint, being C.C. No. 163/P/2000, against the appellant, a practicing

Advocate, under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short

“the IPC”), in relation to some incident alleged to have taken place in the

‘Radio Club’ at Mumbai, considered to be a club for the elite. When at a

preliminary stage, the case came up for hearing before the Additional

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 7

th

August, 2002, finding the appellant

to be absent, the Court issued a non-bailable warrant against him

returnable on 31

st

October, 2002. The warrant was forwarded to the

Colaba Police Station for execution. However, on 12

th

August, 2002, on

appellant’s putting in an appearance before the Court, the warrant was

cancelled.

4. On 15

th

August, 2002, the complainant approached the Colaba Police

Station and insisted on the arrest of the appellant in pursuance of the

said non-bailable warrant. Thereupon, respondent No. 2, who at that

point of time was posted as an Inspector of Police at the Colaba Police

Station, directed a constable to accompany the complainant, and

2execute the warrant. When the appellant was sought to be arrested, he

informed the constable that the said warrant had already been

cancelled. However, as he could not produce any documentary

evidence relating to cancellation of warrant, the appellant was arrested

before a public gathering which had assembled at the Radio Club, in

connection with the Independence day celebrations. He was produced

before the duty Magistrate at about 2 P.M., the same day. The

Magistrate directed the release of the appellant. It appears that the

appellant obtained the necessary confirmation about cancellation of

the warrant on the next day i.e. 16

th

August 2002 and produced the

same before respondent No. 2 on the same day. Alleging malafides

and humiliation at the hands of respondent No. 2, in collusion with the

complainant, the appellant approached the High Court, inter-alia,

praying for suitable disciplinary action against respondent No.2;

adequate compensation; damages and costs by the said respondent

from his own pocket.

5. As aforesaid, the High Court, vide impugned judgment has allowed

the writ petition, inter alia, observing thus :

“We therefore, find that there was no justification for issuance of

non-bailable warrant on 7

th

August, 2002 merely because the

petitioner had remained absent in Criminal Case No. 163/P/2000

(sic) by the Metropolitan Magistrate. The Magistrate could have

issued either a notice or a bailable warrant depending upon the

3facts revealed from the records. Once the warrant was cancelled

on 12

th

August, 2002, it was necessary for the Court to

immediately communicate the same to the concerned Police

authority so that no inconvenience could have been caused to the

person against whom the warrant was initially issued. Once the

warrant was sought to be executed on holiday and the concerned

police officer was categorically informed that the warrant had

already been cancelled and the police officer being fully aware of

the circumstances and nature of the case in which warrant had

been issued, it was necessary for the police officer to ascertain

and to find out whether the warrant which was sought to be

executed was still enforceable or had already been cancelled and

not to rush to execute the warrant in those circumstances and that

too on a holiday. Having produced the necessary documents

confirming the cancellation of the warrant much prior to the date

on which it was sought to be (sic) enforced, it was the duty of the

police officer to tender the necessary apology to the petitioner

for executing such warrant on the holiday, and the concerned

officer having failed to tender the apology it apparently shows

that he had not performed his duty in the manner he was required

to perform as a responsible police officer. Even the affidavit

filed by the respondent No. 2 nowhere discloses any repentance

for having executed the warrant which was already cancelled. It

is a clear case of unnecessary interference with the liberty of a

citizen.”

6. Thus, having failed to get the desired relief from the High Court, the

appellant is before us in this appeal.

7. Arguing the case in person, it was strenuously urged by the appellant

that having regard to the nature of offence alleged against him, in the

first place, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erred in law

in issuing non-bailable warrant in a routine manner, without

application of mind, merely because the appellant had failed to appear

in court on 7

th

August 2002. It was asserted that since neither Section

470 nor Section 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short

“the Code”) uses the expression “non-bailable” a Magistrate is not

authorised to issue non-bailable warrant of arrest even when an

accused fails to appear in the court. It was submitted that having held

that the respondent No.2 was guilty of misconduct, the High Court

failed to punish the said respondent under Sections 342 and 345 of the

IPC. It was argued that the misconduct of respondent No.2 was so

high that he should have been forthwith suspended from his job and

ordered to be tried in a competent criminal court. According to the

appellant, the direction of the High Court asking respondent No.2 to

pay an amount of `2,000/- by way of cost to the appellant was no

justice at all and if a strict action is not taken against such delinquent

officers, they will continue to disregard the orders of the courts with

impunity.  

8. Per contra, Mr. Jay Savla, learned counsel appearing for respondent

No.2 submitted that since the appellant was unable to furnish any

document or order to establish that non-bailable warrant issued against

him by the court had been cancelled, the police authorities were left

with no option and in fact were duty bound to execute the same. It

was also urged that, as per the prevalent practice, whenever any nonbailable warrant is cancelled by the court, either memo or order

5addressed to the Senior Inspector of Police of the concerned police

station is issued and forwarded directly to the concerned police station

with a direction to return the said warrant to the court. But in the

present case no such memo or order in writing had been received at

the police station on or before 15

th

August 2002, when it was

executed. Learned counsel submitted that the said respondent having

performed his duty bona fide and in good faith, in pursuance of order

issued by the court having jurisdiction, the said respondent had not

committed any illegal act warranting any action against him.

9. It needs little emphasis that since the execution of a non-bailable

warrant directly involves curtailment of liberty of a person, warrant of

arrest cannot be issued mechanically, but only after recording

satisfaction that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is

warranted. The Courts have to be extra-cautious and careful while

directing issue of non-bailable warrant, else a wrongful detention

would amount to denial of constitutional mandate envisaged in Article

21 of the Constitution of India. At the same time, there is no

gainsaying that the welfare of an individual must yield to that of the

community. Therefore, in order to maintain rule of law and to keep

the society in functional harmony, it is necessary to strike a balance

between an individual’s rights, liberties and privileges on the one

6hand, and the State on the other. Indeed, it is a complex exercise. As

Justice Cardozo puts it “on the one side is the social need that crime

shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be

flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice.”

Be that as it may, it is for the court, which is clothed with the

discretion to determine whether the presence of an accused can be

secured by a bailable or non-bailable warrant, to strike the balance

between the need of law enforcement on the one hand and the

protection of the citizen from highhandedness at the hands of the law

enforcement agencies on the other. The power and jurisdiction of the

court to issue appropriate warrant against an accused on his failure to

attend the court on the date of hearing of the matter cannot be

disputed. Nevertheless, such power has to be exercised judiciously

and not arbitrarily, having regard, inter-alia, to the nature and

seriousness of the offence involved; the past conduct of the accused;

his age and the possibility of his absconding. (Also See: State of U.P.

Vs. Poosu & Anr.

1

). 

10. In Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors.

2

,

a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court cautioned that before

issuing non-bailable warrants, the Courts should strike a balance

1

 (1976) 3 SCC 1

2

 (2007) 12 SCC 1 

7between societal interests and personal liberty and exercise its

discretion cautiously. Enumerating some of the circumstances which

the Court should bear in mind while issuing non-bailable warrant, it

was observed:

“53. Non-bailable warrant should be issued to bring a person

to court when summons or bailable warrants would be

unlikely to have the desired result. This could be when:

• it is reasonable to believe that the person will not

voluntarily appear in court; or

• the police authorities are unable to find the person to

serve him with a summon; or

• it is considered that the person could harm someone if

not placed into custody immediately.

54. As far as possible, if the court is of the opinion that a

summon will suffice in getting the appearance of the accused

in the court, the summon or the bailable warrants should be

preferred.  The   warrants   either

bailable or non-bailable should never be issued without

proper scrutiny of facts and complete application of mind,

due to the extremely serious consequences and ramifications

which ensue on issuance of warrants. The court must very

carefully examine whether the criminal complaint or FIR has

not been filed with an oblique motive.

55. In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court should

direct serving of the summons along with the copy of the

complaint. If the accused seem to be avoiding the summons,

the court, in the second instance should issue bailable

warrant. In the third instance, when the court is fully

satisfied that the accused is avoiding the court’s proceeding

intentionally, the process of issuance of the non-bailable

warrant should be resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount,

therefore, we caution courts at the first and second instance

to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants.”

811.We deferentially concur with these directions, and emphasize that

since these directions flow from the right to life and personal liberty,

enshrined in Articles 21 and 22(1) of our Constitution, they need to be

strictly complied with. However, we may hasten to add that these are

only broad guidelines and not rigid rules of universal application when

facts and behavioral patterns are bound to differ from case to case.

Since discretion in this behalf is entrusted with the court, it is not

advisable to lay down immutable formulae on the basis whereof

discretion could be exercised. As aforesaid, it is for the court

concerned to assess the situation and exercise discretion judiciously,

dispassionately and without prejudice.

12.Viewed in this perspective, we regret to note that in the present case,

having regard to nature of the complaint against the appellant and his

stature in the community and the fact that admittedly the appellant was

regularly attending the court proceedings, it was not a fit case where

non-bailable warrant should have been issued by the Additional Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate. In our opinion, the attendance of the

appellant could have been secured by issuing summons or at best by a

bailable warrant. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the

High Court that in the facts and circumstances of the case, issuance of

non-bailable warrant was manifestly unjustified.

913. We shall now advert to a more anxious point, viz. the conduct of

respondent No.2, at whose direction the warrant was executed. It

needs no emphasis that any form of degrading treatment would fall

within the inhibition of Article 21 of the Constitution. In the present

case, respondent No.2 was aware that the non-bailable warrant issued

on account of failure on the part of the appellant to attend the court

proceedings on 7

th

August 2002, was returnable only on 31

st

October

2002. Undoubtedly, respondent No.2 was duty bound to execute the

warrant as expeditiously as possible but we are unable to fathom any

justifiable reason for the urgency in executing the warrant on a

National holiday, more so when it had been issued more than a week

ago and even the complaint against the appellant was in relation to the

offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC. The complaint

related to the year 2000. At the relevant time, the offence punishable

under Section 324 of the IPC was a bailable offence. It is apparent

from the record that the warrant was executed at the behest of the

complainant in order to denigrate and humiliate the appellant at a

public place, in public view, during the course of Independence day

celebrations at Radio Club. We are convinced that respondent No.2, in

collusion with the complainant, played with the personal liberty of the

appellant in a high handed manner. The unfortunate sequel of an

unmindful action on the part of respondent No.2 was that the

1appellant, a practicing Advocate, with no criminal history, remained in

police custody for quite some time without any justification

whatsoever and suffered unwarranted humiliation and degradation in

front of his fellow members of the Club. Regrettably, he lost his

freedom though for a short while, on the Independence day. Here

also, we agree with the High Court that respondent No.2 did not

perform his duty in the manner expected of a responsible police

officer. As a matter of fact, being the guardian of the liberty of a

person, a heavy responsibility devolved on him to ensure that his

office was not misused by the complainant to settle personal scores.

The so-called urgency or promptness in execution led to undesirable

interference with the liberty of the appellant. Such a conduct cannot

receive a judicial imprimatur.

14. That takes us to the core issue, namely, whether the appellant is

entitled to any compensation for the humiliation and harassment

suffered by him on account of the wrong perpetrated by respondent

No.2, in addition to what has been awarded by the High Court. As

aforesaid, the grievance of the appellant is that imposition of a fine of

`2,000/- on respondent No.2 is grossly inadequate. His prayer is that

in addition to an adequate amount of compensation, respondent No.2

1should also be prosecuted and proceeded against departmentally for

his wrongful confinement.  

15.It is trite principle of law that in matters involving infringement or

deprivation of a fundamental right; abuse of process of law,

harassment etc., the courts have ample power to award adequate

compensation to an aggrieved person not only to remedy the wrong

done to him but also to serve as a deterrent for the wrong doer.  

16. In Rudul Sah Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.

3

, Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ,

speaking for a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had

observed thus:

“One of the telling ways in which the violation of that

right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance

with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its

violators in the payment of monetary compensation.

Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements

of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other

method open to the judiciary to adopt.”

17. In Bhim Singh, MLA Vs. State of J & K & Ors.

4

, holding illegal

detention in police custody of the petitioner Bhim Singh to be

violative of his rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution,

this Court, in exercise of its power to award compensation under

Article 32, directed the State to pay monetary compensation to the

3

  (1983) 4 SCC 141

4

 (1985) 4 SCC 677

1petitioner. Relying on Rudal Sah (supra), O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.

echoed the following views:

“When a person comes to us with the complaint that he

has been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous or

malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal

rights were invaded, the mischief or malice and the

invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his

being set free. In appropriate cases we have the

jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding

suitable monetary compensation”.

18. In Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera Vs. State of Orissa &

Ors.

5

, clearing the doubt and indicating the precise nature of the

constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to

award compensation for contravention of fundamental rights, which

had arisen because of the observation that “the petitioner could have

been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to

compensation was factually controversial” in Rudul Sah (supra), J.S.

Verma, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated as under:

“It follows that 'a claim in public law for

compensation' for contravention of human rights and

fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is

guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged

remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights,

and such a claim based on strict liability made by

resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the

enforcement of a fundamental right is 'distinct from,

and in addition to, the remedy in private law for

damages for the tort' resulting from the contravention

of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign

5

 (1993) 2 SCC 746

1immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept

of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no

question of such a defence being available in the

constitutional remedy. It is this principle which

justifies award of monetary compensation for

contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the

Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode

of redress available for the contravention made by the

State or its servants in the purported exercise of their

powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is

claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under

the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of

the Constitution. This is what was indicated in Rudul

Sah and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in

which compensation was awarded under Articles 32

and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of

fundamental rights.”

In the same decision, in his concurring judgment, Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as

His Lordship then was), explaining the scope and purpose of public law

proceedings and private law proceedings stated as under:

“The public law proceedings serve a different purpose

than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary

compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings

under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the

High Courts, for established infringement of the

indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the

Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is

based on the strict liability for contravention of the

guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen.

The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public

power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a

legal system which aims to protect their interests and

preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds

the relief by granting "compensation" in proceedings

under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking

enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does

so under the public law by way of penalising the

1wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong

on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect

the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of

compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it

is generally understood in a civil action for damages

under the private law but in the broader sense of

providing relief by an order of making 'monetary amends'

under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of

public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of

the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of

'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer for

the breach of its public law duty and is independent of

the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim

compensation under the private law in an action based on

tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent

jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal

law.”

19.The power and jurisdiction of this Court and the High Courts to grant

monetary compensation in exercise of its jurisdiction respectively

under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India to a victim

whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution are

violated are thus, well-established. However, the question now is

whether on facts in hand, the appellant is entitled to monetary

compensation in addition to what has already been awarded to him by

the High Court. Having considered the case in the light of the factsituation stated above, we are of the opinion that the appellant does

not deserve further monetary compensation.

20. It is true that the appellant not only suffered humiliation in the public

gathering, and remained in judicial custody for some time but we feel

1that for what he had undergone on 15

th

August 2002, some blame lies

at his door as well. Being a practicing Advocate himself, the appellant

was fully conversant with the court procedure and, therefore, should

have procured a copy of memo/order dated 12

th

August 2002, whereby

the non-bailable warrant was cancelled by the court. As noticed

above, admittedly, the appellant applied and obtained a copy of such

order only on 16

th

August 2002. Though the conduct of respondent

No.2 in arresting the appellant, ignoring his plea that the non-bailable

warrant issued by the court in a bailable offence had been cancelled,

deserves to be deplored, yet, strictly speaking the action of respondent

No.2 in detaining the appellant on the strength of the warrant in his

possession, perhaps motivated, cannot be said to be per se without the

authority of law. In that view of the matter, in our opinion, no other

action against respondent No.2 is warranted. He has been sufficiently

reprimanded.

21.The last issue raised that remains to be considered is whether the

Courts can at all issue a warrant, called a “non-bailable” warrant

because no such terminology is found in the Code as well as in Form 2

of the Second Schedule to the Code. It is true that neither Section 70

nor Section 71, appearing in Chapter VI of the Code, enumerating the

processes to compel appearance, as also Form 2 uses the expression

1like “non-bailable”. Section 70 merely speaks of form of warrant of

arrest, and ordains that it will remain in force until it is cancelled.

Similarly Section 71 talks of discretionary power of Court to specify

about the security to be taken in case the person is to be released on

his arrest pursuant to the execution of the warrant issued under Section

70 of the Code. Sub-section (2) of Section 71 of the Code specifies

the endorsements which can be made on a warrant. Nevertheless, we

feel that the endorsement of the expression “non-bailable” on a

warrant is to facilitate the executing authority as well as the person

against whom the warrant is sought to be executed to make them

aware as to the nature of the warrant that has been issued. In our

view, merely because Form No.2, issued under Section 476 of the

Code, and set forth in the Second schedule, nowhere uses the

expression bailable or non-bailable warrant, that does not prohibit the

Courts from using the said word or expression while issuing the

warrant or even to make endorsement to that effect on the warrant so

issued. Any endorsement/variation, which is made on such warrant for

the benefit of the person against whom the warrant is issued or the

persons who are required to execute the warrant, would not render the

warrant to be bad in law. What is material is that there is a power

vested in the Court to issue a warrant and that power is to be exercised

judiciously depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

1Being so, merely because the warrant uses the expression like “nonbailable” and that such terminology is not to be found in either Section

70 or Section 71 of the Code that by itself cannot render the warrant

bad in law. The argument is devoid of substance and is rejected

accordingly. 

22.In view of the aforegoing discussion, no ground is made out

warranting our interference with the impugned judgment of the High

Court. We confirm the judgment and dismiss the appeal accordingly,

but with no order as to costs.

23.However, before parting with the judgment, we feel that in order to

prevent such a paradoxical situation, we are faced with in the instant

case, and to check or obviate the possibility of misuse of an arrest

warrant, in addition to the statutory and constitutional requirements to

which reference has been made above, it would be appropriate to issue

the following guidelines to be adopted in all cases where non-bailable

warrants are issued by the Courts:- 

(a) All the High Court shall ensure that the Subordinate

Courts use printed and machine numbered Form No.2

for issuing warrant of arrest and each such form is duly

accounted for;

(b) Before authenticating, the court must ensure that

complete particulars of the case are mentioned on the

warrant;

1(c) The presiding Judge of the court (or responsible officer

specially authorized for the purpose in case of High

Courts) issuing the warrant should put his full and

legible signatures on the process, also ensuring that

Court seal bearing complete particulars of the Court is

prominently endorsed thereon;

(d) The Court must ensure that warrant is directed to a

particular police officer (or authority) and, unless

intended to be open-ended, it must be returnable

whether executed or unexecuted, on or before the date

specified therein;

(e) Every Court must maintain a register (in the format

given below), in which each warrant of arrest issued

must be entered chronologically and the serial number

of such entry reflected on the top right hand of the

process;

(f) No warrant of arrest shall be issued without being

entered in the register mentioned above and the

concerned court shall periodically check/monitor the

same to confirm that every such process is always

returned to the court with due report and placed on the

record of the concerned case;

(g) A register similar to the one in clause (e) supra shall be

maintained at the concerned police station. The Station

House Officer of the concerned Police Station shall

ensure that each warrant of arrest issued by the Court,

when received is duly entered in the said register and is

formally entrusted to a responsible officer for

execution;

(h) Ordinarily, the Courts should not give a long time for

return or execution of warrants, as experience has

shown that warrants are prone to misuse if they remain

in control of executing agencies for long;

(i) On the date fixed for the return of the warrant, the

Court must insist upon a compliance report on the

action taken thereon by the Station House Officer of the

1concerned Police Station or the Officer In-charge of the

concerned agency;

(j) The report on such warrants must be clear, cogent and

legible and duly forwarded by a superior police officer,

so as to facilitate fixing of responsibility in case of

misuse;

(k) In the event of warrant for execution beyond

jurisdiction of the Court issuing it, procedure laid down

in Sections 78 and 79 of the Code must be strictly and

scrupulously followed; and

(l) In the event of cancellation of the arrest warrant by the

Court, the order cancelling warrant shall be recorded in

the case file and the register maintained. A copy

thereof shall be sent to the concerned authority,

requiring the process to be returned unexecuted

forthwith. The date of receipt of the unexecuted warrant

will be entered in the aforesaid registers. A copy of

such order shall also be supplied to the accused.

Format of the Register

S.

No. 

The

number

printed on

the form

used

Case title and

particulars

Name &

particulars of

the person

against whom

warrant of

arrest is

issued

(accused/

witness)

The officer/

person to

whom

directed

Date of

judicial

order

directing

Arrest

Warrant to

be issued

Date

of

issue

Date of

cancellat

ion, if

any

Due

date of

return 

Report

returned

on

The action

taken as

reported

Remarks

24.We expect and hope that all the High Courts will issue appropriate

directions in this behalf to the Subordinate Courts, which shall

endeavour to put into practice the aforesaid directions at the earliest,

preferably within six months from today.

2.……………………………………

                   (D.K. JAIN, J.) 

                              .…………………………………….

                   (H.L. DATTU, J.)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 9, 2011.

RS

2