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Friday, August 12, 2011

Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter called `the Act 1964′).= Respondent no. 1 is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and manufactures Ayurvedic medicines including Chawanprash at Naini, Allahabad. For that purpose, the respondent no. 1 has obtained a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. For manufacturing Chawanprash the said respondent purchases certain agricultural produce e.g. Gur, Amala and Ghee etc. and use the same as raw material. B. The appellants served a notice dated 17.3.1999 calling upon the respondent no. 1 for taking a licence under section 9 of the Act 1964 as it was purchasing and processing the aforesaid agricultural produce in its ordinary course of business. Respondent no. 1 submitted reply to the said notice on 31.3.1999 pleading that it was not required to take licence as the said respondent was not doing any business in the sale or purchase of agricultural produce. The appellant found the explanation furnished by respondent no. 1 unsatisfactory and, thus, sent another notice dated 2.12.2000 calling upon respondent no.1 to take a licence failing which legal proceedings could be initiated against it. Similar notices were subsequently sent to respondent no. 1 on 3.12.2000 and

                                                                    REPORTABLE




                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8963 OF 2003

              




Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Allahabad                         ... Appellant 




                                              Versus




M/s Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan (Pvt.) Ltd. & Anr.   ...Respondents





                                       J U D G M E N T





Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.




1.        This   appeal   has   been   preferred   against   the  judgment  and  order 


dated 14.7.2003 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in 


C.M.W.P.   No.   12372   of   2003   by   which   the   High   Court   allowed   the 


writ   petition   holding   that   respondent   no.1   was   not   required     to   take 


licence   under   Section   9   of   the   Uttar   Pradesh   Krishi   Utpadan   Mandi 


Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter called `the Act 1964'). 

2.        Facts   and   circumstances   giving   rise   to   present   appeal   are   as 


under:


A.        Respondent   no.   1   is   a   company   registered   under   the   Indian 


Companies   Act,   1956   and   manufactures   Ayurvedic   medicines 


including   Chawanprash   at   Naini,   Allahabad.     For   that   purpose,   the 


respondent no. 1 has obtained a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics 


Act,   1940.   For   manufacturing   Chawanprash   the   said   respondent 


purchases certain agricultural  produce e.g. Gur, Amala  and Ghee etc. 


and use the same as raw material. 


B.        The appellants served a notice dated 17.3.1999 calling upon the 


respondent no. 1 for taking a licence under section   9 of the Act 1964 


as it was purchasing and processing the aforesaid agricultural produce 


in its ordinary course of business.  Respondent no. 1 submitted reply to 


the said notice on 31.3.1999 pleading   that it was not required to take 


licence as the said respondent was not doing any business in the sale or 


purchase of agricultural produce.  The appellant found the explanation 


furnished   by   respondent   no.   1   unsatisfactory   and,   thus,   sent   another 


notice dated 2.12.2000 calling upon respondent no.1 to take a licence 


failing  which  legal   proceedings  could  be  initiated  against   it.    Similar 


notices were subsequently  sent to respondent no. 1 on 3.12.2000 and 





                                                                                     2

16.12.2000   but   respondent   no.   1   did   not   pay   any   heed   to   the   said 


notices.  The appellant issued notice dated 14.2.2001 to respondent no. 


1 for personal appearance and furnishing the explanation as to why the 


licence   under   Section   9   of   the   Act   1964   was   not   required.   The 


respondent no. 1 did not comply with the said notice, thus the appellant 


filed   complaint Case No. 480 of 2002 in the court of Special Judicial 


Magistrate, Allahabad against the respondent no. 1, alleging violation 


of the statutory provisions of the Act 1964.  


C.      Being   aggrieved,   the   respondent   no.   1   approached   the   High 


Court   by   filing   Writ   Petition   No.   12372   of   2003   for   quashing   of  the 


complaint   Case   No.   480   of   2002.     The   High   Court   vide   impugned 


judgment and order dated 14.7.2003 allowed the writ petition holding 


that the said respondent had been using the agricultural produces after 


buying   for   internal   purpose   i.e.   for   consumption   in   its   factory   for 


manufacturing   the   end   product   and   not   for   further   transferring   the 


agricultural   produces   to   someone   else   and   thus,   the   respondent   no.   1 


was not required  to take licence under Section 9 of the Act 1964.  




         Hence, this appeal.  





                                                                                       3

3.     Smt.   Shobha   Dikshit,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the 


appellant,   has   submitted   that   respondent   no.   1   is   manufacturing 


Ayurvedic medicines and purchases Amla, Gur and Ghee etc. from the 


market   area   established   under   the   Act   1964,   which   are   admittedly 


agricultural produce.  Therefore, being a trader, the respondent no. 1 is 


required   to   take   a   licence   so   far   as   the     purchase   of   specified 


agricultural   produce   from   the   market   area   is   concerned   and   also   pay 


requisite market fee and any violation of the provisions of the Act 1964 


would attract penal consequences i.e. prosecution under Section 37 of 


the   Act   1964.     The   use   of   the   aforesaid   agricultural   produce   for 


manufacturing   of   the   medicines   cannot   be   termed   as   domestic 


consumption. The word `domestic' means required for  personal use of 


the family and this term cannot be interpreted in such wide terms as to 


include manufacturing of a different commodity at commercial level in 


an   industry.     The   High   Court   erred   in   defining   the   term   `domestic' 


giving   a   very   wide   interpretation   i.e.   meant   for   supplying   the   end 


product in the country and not for export.   Even otherwise, in view of 


the   fact   that   an   adequate   and   efficacious   remedy   provided   under   the 


Act 1964 was available to the respondent, the High Court ought not to 





                                                                                    4

have   entertained   the   Writ   Petition.   Thus,   the   appeal   deserves   to   be 


allowed. 




4.      Per contra, Shri Subramonium Prasad, learned counsel appearing 


for the respondents, has submitted that as per the statutory provisions 


of the Act 1964, the respondent no. 1 cannot be held to be the buyer or 


seller   of   the   agricultural   produce   nor   it   is   engaged   in   processing   of 


agricultural produce, therefore, the provisions of the Act 1964 are not 


applicable.   The   respondent-company   purchases     agricultural   produce 


only as  raw material for manufacturing of Chawanprash in its factory. 


Thus, in such a fact-situation, the respondent no. 1 is not   required to 


take a licence under Section 9(2) of the Act  1964 read with  Rule 70 of 


the   U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Niyamavali, 1965 (hereinafter called 


the `Rules 1965').  The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 




5.      We have considered the rival submissions made  by the learned 


counsel for the parties and perused the record.  




6.      In  Star   Paper   Mills   Ltd.   v.   State   of   U.P.   &  Ors.,  (2006)   10 


SCC 201, this Court while dealing with the same statutory provisions 


accepted the submissions made on behalf of the State that in view of 


the fact that adequate and efficacious statutory remedy was available to 




                                                                                        5

the person aggrieved, the High Court  ought not to have entertained the 


writ   petition   without   the   statutory   remedy   being   exhausted.   While 


deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance upon large number of 


earlier judgments of this Court under the Act 1964.




           Be that as it may, as the matter has been dealt by the High Court 


on   merit   and   a   period   of   more   than   8   years   has   elapsed,   it   is   not 


desirable to entertain the issue of availability of alternative remedy or 


exhaustion  of statutory   remedy.  The  matter  requires   to be  considered 


on merit.




7.      The appeal raises the following substantial question of law: 


        Whether   the   specified   agriculture   produce   purchased   by  

        the Respondent No. 1 within the market area and used in  

        manufacturing a commercial product could be held to be  

        for   domestic   consumption   and   thereby   would   exempt   it  

        from   obtaining   licence   under   Section   9(2)   as   also   from  

        levy and payment of market fee under Section 17(iii)(b) of  

        the Act 1964? 




8.      The  Act  1964 has  been  enacted  with  the object  to regulate   the 


sale and purchase of the specified agricultural produce in market area 


and to curb down the unfair trade practices prevalent in the old market 


system   within   the   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh.   The   object   of   the   Act   has 


been to reduce the multiple trade charges, levies and exactions charged 




                                                                                          6

from   the   producer-seller;   to   provide   for   the   verification   of   accurate 


weights and scales and to ensure that the producer-seller is not denied 


his legitimate dues.  Further to provide amenities to the producer-seller 


in   the   market   and   for   providing   better   storage   facilities,   to   stop 


inequalities   and   unauthorised   charges   and   levies   from   the   producer-


seller and to make adequate arrangements for market intelligence with 


a view to posting the agricultural  producer  with the latest position in 


respect of the markets dealing with a particular agricultural  produce. 




9.     For   adjudication   of   the   aforesaid   issue,   it   may   be   necessary   to 


refer to some of the statutory provisions of the Act 1964.


(a)    Section 2(a)  of the Act, 1964 defines "agricultural  produce" as 


under: 


           "Agricultural   produce"   means   such   items   of  

           produce   of   agriculture,   horticulture,   viticulture,  

           apiculture,   sericulture,   pisciculture,   animal  

           husbandry   or   forest   as   are   specified   in   the  

           Schedule, and includes admixture of two or more  

           of such items, and also includes any such item in  

           processed   form,   and   further   includes   gur,   rab,  

           shakkar, khandsari and jaggery." 




(b)    "Trader" is defined under Clause (y) of the Section 2 as under:


           "Trader"   means   a   person   who   in   the   ordinary  

           course of business is engaged in buying or selling  

           agricultural   produce   as   a   principal   or   as   a   duly  




                                                                                       7

          authorised   agent   of   one   or   more   principals   and  

          includes   a   person,   engaged   in   processing   of  

          agricultural produce." 




(c)    Section 9 of the Act 1964 excludes the application of the Act on 


purchase of agricultural produce for  "domestic consumption": 


          "(1) As from the date of declaration of an area as  

          Market Area no local body or other person shall,  

          within   the   Market   Area,   set   up,   establish   or  

          continue,   or   allow   to   be   set   up,   established   or  

          continued,   any   place   for   the   sale   purchase,  

          storage, weighment or processing of the specified  

          agricultural   produce,   except   under   and   in  

          accordance   with   the   conditions   of   a   licence  

          granted by the Committee concerned, anything to  

          the   contrary   contained   in   any   other   law,   custom  

          usage or agreement notwithstanding:

          Provided   that   the   provisions   of   this   sub-section  

          shall   not   apply   to   a   producer   in   respect   of  

          agricultural produce produced, reared, caught or  

          processed by him or to any person who purchases  

          or   stores   any   agricultural   produce   for   his  

          domestic consumption. 

          (2) No person shall, in a Principal market Yard or  

          any Sub-Market  Yard, carry  on business or  work  

          as   a   trader,   broker,   commission   agent,  

          warehouseman,   weighman,   palledar   or   in   such  

          other capacity as may be prescribed, in respect of  

          any   specified   agricultural   produce   except   under  

          and in accordance with the conditions of a licence  

          obtained   therefore   from   the   Committee  

          concerned." 





                                                                               8

(d)    Section   17  of the  Act   1964  empowers  the  Committee  to  issue, 


renew, suspend or cancel a licence, and to levy and collect market fee. 


However, the proviso thereto reads as under:


           "Provided that no market fee or development cess  

           shall   be   levied   or   collected   on   the  retail   sale   of  

           any   specified   agricultural   produce  where   such  

           sale   is   made   to   the  consumer   for   his   domestic  

           consumption only."                    (Emphasis added)




(e)    Section 37 of the Act, 1964 further empowers the Committee to 


impose   penalty   on   a   person   who   contravenes   any   of   the   provision 


contained in Section 9 of the Act 1964 or the Rules 1965. 




(f)    Rule 70 of the Rules 1965 reads as under:


           "Licensing   by   the   Market   Committee   (Section 

           17(i)   -   (1)   The   Market   Committee   shall   ......call 

           upon all Local Bodies and other persons wishing to 

           set up, establish or continue any place for the sale, 

           purchase, storage, weighment or processing of the 

           specified agricultural produce, in the Market Area, 

           and   shall   likewise   call   upon   all   Traders, 

           Commission   Agents,   Brokers,   Warehouseman, 

           Weighmen, Measures, Palledars and other persons 

           handling   or   dealing   in   specified   agricultural 

           produce,   in   the   Market   Yards,   to   apply   for   a 

           licence under sub Section (1) of Section 9 or Sub 

           Section (2) of Section 9 of the Act, as the case may 

           be, in such form as may be specified by the Market 

           Committee   in   its   bye-laws,   within   a   period   of 

           fifteen days from the date of publication of the said 

           notice.





                                                                                    9

           Provided  that the provisions  of this sub-rule shall 

           not   apply   to   a   producer   in   respect   of   agricultural 

           produce produced, reared, caught or processed by 

           him and to any person who purchases or stores any 

           agricultural          produce         for         his         domestic 

           consumption." 




10.    The   cumulative   effect   of   combined   reading   of   the   aforesaid 


statutory   provisions   comes   to   the   effect   that   sale   of   the   specified 


agricultural   produce   from   any   place   in   the   market   area   is   prohibited 


unless the person concerned has a licence. The statute provides for an 


exception of having a licence or from paying the market fee if the sale 


of  an agricultural  produce  is  made   to  a person  for  his  "domestic 


consumption" in "retail sale".




11.    Indisputably,   the   aforesaid   produce   purchased   by   respondent 


company   are   agricultural   produce.   In   view   of   the   circular   dated 


18.4.1988,   issued   by   the   appellant,   a   retail   trader   cannot   sell   any 


specified agricultural  produce to any person more than the prescribed 


limit   therein.   The   said   circular   fixed   the   maximum   quantity   of   an 


agricultural produce which the retail dealer can sell to an individual for 


domestic   consumption.   The   Circular   issued   under   the   Rules   1965 


prescribes   the   limit   of   sale   to   an   individual   and   storage   of   the 


agricultural produces, by the retailer:  




                                                                                      10

Retailer   could   sell   to   an  Retailer can purchase 

individual

                   Gur-   20 Kg.                      Gur-  10 Quintals 

                       Amla- 5 Kg.                    Amla-1 Quintal

                Ghee-  4 Kg.                           Ghee- 50  Kg.  





12.     In  G.   Giridhar   Prabhu   &   Ors.   v.   Agricultural   Produce 


Market Committee, AIR 2001 SC 1363,  this Court considered similar 


provisions   under   the   Karnataka   Agricultural   Produce   Marketing 


(Regulation)   Act,   1966,   wherein   the     Court   was   concerned   with   the 


term "trader" contained therein. After considering earlier judgments of 


this Court, particularly, in H.P. Marketing Board & Ors. v. Shankar 


Trading Co. Pvt.  Ltd. & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 496;  and Vijayalaxmi 


Cashew Co. & Ors. v. Dy. CTO & Anr., (1996) 1 SCC 468 etc., the 


Court   held   that     transaction   by   a   "trader"   includes   processing, 


manufacturing and selling.   Therefore, a trader who buys a particular 


agricultural  produce, subjects  it to selling or manufacturing     process 


and       brings         into   existence   a   different   agricultural   produce   would 


cease to be a trader. The Court held as under:


            ".........The definition of the term "trader" is not a  

            restrictive   definition.   It   is   not   restricted   to   a  

            person   who   only   buys.  If   a   person   buys   for  

            domestic   or   personal   consumption,   then   he  

            would   not   be   a   trader.  It   is   only   when   a   person  




                                                                                      11

                buys   for   the  purpose   of   selling   or   processing   or  

                manufacturing   that   he   would   become   a   trader.  

                Thus   a   person   may   buy,   process   or   manufacture  

                and then sell. When he processes or manufactures  

                notified   agricultural   produce   which   he   had  

                bought,   it   may   change   its   character   and   become  

                another   notified   agricultural   produce.   Thus,   by  

                way   of   examples,   a   person   may   buy   milk   and  

                through   processes   make   them   into   butter   and/or  

                cheese or a person may buy hides and skins and by  

                a   process   make   it   into   leather.  However,   merely  

                because   a   distinct   and   separate   notified  

                agricultural   produce   comes   into   existence   does  

                not mean that the person who bought, processed  

                and sold ceases to be a trader. The term "trader"  

                encumbrances   (sic             embraces)   not   just   the  

                purchase transaction but the entire transaction of  

                purchase, processing, manufacturing and selling."

                                                                     (Emphasis supplied)





 13.      In  The  State  of A.P.  v. M/s.  H. Abdul  Bakhi and Bros.,  AIR 


 1965 SC 531, while dealing with a similar issue, i.e. defining `Dealer' 


 under the provisions  of Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax  Act, 1950, 


 held   that   a   person   who   buys   goods   for   consumption   in   a   process   of 


 manufacturing   is   also   a   dealer.     The   Court   held   that   a   person   who 


 consumes a commodity purchased by him in the course of his trade, or 


 use in manufacturing another commodity for sale, could be regarded as a 


 `Dealer'.  





                                                                                            12

14.         In  Krishi   Upaj   Mandi   Samiti   &   Ors.   v.   Orient   Paper   & 


Industries   Ltd.,  (1995)   1   SCC   655,   the   similar   provisions   of   M.P. 


Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1973, were considered by this Court.  In 


the   said   case,   the   question   arose   as   to   whether   the   market   fee   can   be 


levied on agricultural produce brought for sale or sold in the market area 


in   case   the   mill   did   not   produce   the   agricultural   produce   for   sale   but 


produce   them   for   use   as   its   raw   material   for   manufacturing   the   end 


product.     That   was   a   case   where   the   bamboos   were   purchased   for 


manufacturing   of   paper.     The   Court   held   that   once   the   agricultural 


produce is brought in the market area and sold therein, it becomes liable 


to be levied with market fee, as no person can be permitted for sale or 


purchase   of   the   agricultural   produce   within   the   market   area   without   a 


licence even a raw material for manufacturing some other product.  The 


Court further held as under:


             ".....It is immaterial for this purpose whether the  

             bamboos  are  purchased  by   the   respondent-Mills  

             for selling  them or  for using them  as  their raw  

             material   in   the   manufacture   of   paper.   The  

             liability of the respondent-Mills to pay the market  

             fees is in no way negated on that account...." 

                                                  (Emphasis added)




15.        This   case   stands   squarely   covered   by   the   judgment   of 


Constitution Bench  of this Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & 



                                                                                           13

Co. & Ors. v. State of U.P.  & Anr., AIR 1980 SC 1124, wherein the 


provision   of   the   Act   1964,   which   is   involved   in   the   instant   case   was 


considered and the Court held as under:


               "If  paddy   is   purchased   in   a   particular   market  

             area   by   a   rice   miller   and   the   same   paddy   is  

             converted   into   rice   and   sold   then   the   rice   miller  

             will be liable to pay market fee on his purchase of  

             paddy from the agriculturist-producer under sub-

             clause   (2)   of   Section   17   (iii)   (b).   He   cannot   be  

             asked   to   pay   market   fee   over   again   under   sub-

             clause   (3)   in     relation   to   the   transaction   of   rice.  

             Nor   will   it   be   open   to   the   Market   Committee   to  

             choose   between   either   of   the   two   n   the   example  

             just   given.   Market   fee   has   to   be   levied   and  

             collected   in   relation   to   the   transaction   of   paddy  

             alone."




16.       In Virendra Kumar & Ors. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti 


& Ors., (1987) 4 SCC 454, this Court considered a case where it was 


claimed   that   petitioners   had   been   producers   in   respect   of   agricultural 


produce   (khandsari),   and   thus   they   were   not   required   to   take   out   any 


license   under   Section   9(1)   of   the   Act   1964.   This   court   rejected   the 


argument   observing   that   Section   9(1)   would   not   be   applicable   to   a 


producer   of   agricultural   produce   only   in   case   the   producer   processed, 


reared,   or   caught   for  domestic   consumption.   In   case   the   agricultural 


produce is not for domestic consumption,  but for sale  thereafter  in the 





                                                                                        14

market   area,   such   a   producer   will   not   come   within   the   exception   of 


Section 9(1) of the Act 1964. 




17.        In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that as 


the   retail   trader   cannot   sell   the   agricultural   produce   in   quantity   more 


than   prescribed   in   the   circular   and   also   such   retailer   himself   cannot 


purchase   and   store   more   than   prescribed   in   the   circular,   therefore,   the 


meaning   of   "domestic   consumption"   has   to   be   understood   in   such 


restricted sense. Thus, meaning thereby for personal use i.e. for the use 


of family members of the purchaser and not for any production activity, 


otherwise   prescribing   the   limits   of   purchase   and   storage   by   the   retail 


trader becomes  redundant. The parties could not bring to the notice of 


the   High   Court   the   relevant   provisions   of   the   Act   1964   which   were 


necessary to be considered to adjudicate upon the issue in controversy. 


Purchase of agricultural produce in bulk cannot be termed to have been 


made for "domestic consumption." The Court cannot travel beyond the 


pleadings. The meaning of "domestic trade" and "foreign trade", had not 


been in issue in the instant case. The "domestic consumption" under the 


Act 1964 has to be given a very restricted and limited meaning i.e. for 


personal use of the purchaser, i.e. for the consumption by the family and 


not for commercial and industrial activities. 




                                                                                       15

18.        Shri   Subramonium   Prasad,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the 


respondents, has placed very heavy reliance upon the judgment of this 


Court in M/s. Kesarwani Zarda Bhandar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & 


Ors.,  AIR  2008  SC   2733,  wherein   it  has  been  held  that  market  fee  is 


leviable   on  specified  agricultural   produce   and   not   on   agricultural 


produce   simplicitor.     Zarda,   the   end   product   of   the   manufacturing 


process is not a specified agricultural produce and it can be subjected to 


payment   of   market   fee   provided   it   is   held   to   be   "Tobacco".   Zafrani 


Zarda,   does   not   answer   the   description   of  specified   agricultural 


produce  as   defined   under   Section   2(a)   of   the   Act.     If   it   is   held   that 


Zafrani   Zarda   is   merely   a   processed   form   of   "Tobacco",   it   could   be 


subjected to levy of market fee, but if it is manufactured it would not. 


           The   aforesaid   judgment  has   no   application   in   the   instant   case 


for the reason that issue involved in this case is relating to requirement 


of having a license under Section 9(2) of the Act 1964 for the purchase 


of a specified agricultural produce from the market area.  The appellants 


have never asked the respondent company to pay market fee on the end 


product Chawanprash. 




19.     In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that as the 


respondent-company   buys   specified   agricultural   produce   from   the 




                                                                                           16

market area and it is not meant for domestic consumption, the company 


is required to take license under Section 9(2) of the Act 1964.




20.    In   such   a   fact-situation,   appeal   is   allowed.     The   impugned 


judgment   and   order   dated   14.7.2003   passed   by   the     High   Court   of 


Allahabad in Writ Petition No.12372 of 2003 is hereby set aside.   No 


costs.    




                                                      ...................................J.

                                                             (P. SATHASIVAM)


                   


                                                                 ....................................J.

                                                                 (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

  New Delhi,

  August  11, 2011





                                                                                       17

LAND REVENUE ACT = “Thus it is settled law that normally a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction, after adjudication on merits of the rights of the parties, operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceedings and binds the parties or the persons claiming right, title or interest from the parties. Its validity should be assailed only in an appeal or revision as the case may be. In subsequent proceedings its validity cannot be questioned. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject-matter or on other grounds which goes to the root of its exercise or jurisdiction, lacks inherent jurisdiction. It is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings.” “Bapi Patta” cannot be granted to the appellants therein inasmuch as the aforesaid land falls within the catchment area of feeder canal of Kaliberi and, therefore, the patta was cancelled on 19.07.1942. Inasmuch as the land in question was being utilized as catchment area of potable


                                                           REPORTABLE


                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


            CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 1585-1586  OF 2005





State of Rajasthan & Ors.                                .... Appellant (s)



            Versus



Jeev Raj & Ors.                                        .... Respondent(s)





                            J U D G M E N T




P. Sathasivam, J.


1)    These   appeals   arise   from   the   final   judgment   and   order



dated 14.10.2003 passed by the High Court of Judicature for



Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) No. 270



of  2002   and   D.B.   Cross   Objection   No.   1  of  2003  wherein   the



appeal   filed   by   the   appellants   herein   was   dismissed   and   the



cross   objection   filed   by   the   respondents   was   allowed   by   the



High Court.




                                                                           1


2)  Brief facts:



(a)    On   12.10.1941,   respondent   No.1   and   his   brother   Pusa



Ram   (since   expired)-his   legal   representatives   are   on   record,



were   granted     `Bapi   Patta'     No.   14   for   agricultural   land



measuring   about   603.16   bighas   in   Village   Gevan,   Tehsil



Jodhpur   by   the   then   Jodhpur   Government.     As   the   land   in



question was part of the catchment area of the feeder canal of



Kaliberi canal and stone slabs which were constructed by the



respondents   were   obstructing   the   flow   of   water,   on



19.07.1942,   at   the   request   of   the   Public   Health   and



Engineering   Department   (in   short   "the   PHED"),     Jodhpur



Government cancelled the patta and removed the stone slabs.



(b)    On   05.09.1945,   the   respondents   claimed   compensation



of Rs.37,826/- for the loss of their land and stone slabs.   On



14.06.1949,   the   State   Government   made   payment   of



Rs.9,377/- as compensation to the respondents.  



(c)    Thereafter,   in   the   year   1968,   after   a   gap   of   about   20



years,   the   respondents   again   claimed   compensation   of



Rs.73,885/-   as   price   of   the   aforesaid   land   and   stone   slabs




                                                                             2


from the PHED through a notice.   The PHED passed an order



dated   23.04.1969   to   restore   the   land   in   question   to   the



respondents   in   lieu   of   compensation   amount   sought   for   by



them.     In   compliance   of   the   said   order,   the   possession   of



460.15   Bighas   of   land   was   restored   to   them   on   27.05.1969



and the same was also mutated in their name.



(d)    On   some   complaints   being   made,   the   restoration   of   the



land   was   cancelled   by   the   State   Government   on   01.05.1973.



Challenging   the   same,   the   respondents   filed   writ   petition



before  the  High  Court.     The  learned  single  Judge  of the  High



Court,   by   order   dated   24.11.1976,     quashed   the   order   dated



01.05.1973   and   directed   that   in   case   the   State   wants   to



reopen   the   order   dated   23.04.1969,   it   can   do   so   by   giving



proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioners therein.   After



the aforesaid judgment, on 25.03.1978, a notice was served on



the respondents by the PHED stating that it wanted to get the



land   back   from   the   respondents   which   had   been   restored   to



them for its own use and order dated 23.04.1969 was sought



to   be   recalled.     It   was   also   stated   that   the   respondents   are



liable   to   be   evicted   from   the   land   in   question.     The




                                                                              3


respondents filed objections against the notice for recalling the



order dated 23.04.1969.



(e)    Since the notice for recalling the order dated 23.04.1969



has not been formally dropped, the respondents filed a suit in



the   Court   of   Munsif   and   Judicial   Magistrate,   Jodhpur   City,



Jodhpur.   The Munsif Magistrate, by order dated 30.06.1982,



decreed   the   suit   restraining   the   State   Government   from



making   any   alterations   in   the   contract   that   has   come   into



existence in pursuance of the order dated 23.04.1969.  Notices



were   sent   to   the   respondents   to   appear   before   the   Revenue



Minister   as   the   Revision   Petition   for   cancellation   of   the   plot



granted in the year 1969 was pending before him.  The parties



appeared   before   the   Revenue   Minister.     By   order   dated



15.12.1992,   the   Revenue   Minister   cancelled   the   order   dated



23.04.1969.



(f)    Challenging   the   order   of   the   Revenue   Minister,   the



respondents   filed   a   petition   being   W.P.   No.   1526   of   1993



before  the  High  Court.     The  learned  single  Judge  of the  High



Court, by order dated 19.03.2002, allowed the same.





                                                                             4


(g)    Against   the   said   judgment,   the   State   filed   D.B.   Civil



Special Appeal (W) No. 270 of 2002 and the respondents also



filed   cross   objections   before   the   High   Court.     The   Division



Bench   of   the   High   Court,   by   impugned   judgment   dated



14.10.2003,   dismissed   the   appeal   filed   by   the   State   and



allowed the cross objection filed by the respondents herein.



(h)    Aggrieved   by   the   said   order   of   the   Division   Bench,   the



State Government filed these appeals before this Court by way



of special leave petitions.



(3)    Heard   Dr.   Manish   Singhvi,   learned   counsel   for   the



appellants,   Mr.   Dipankar   Gupta,   learned   senior   counsel   for



respondent   Nos.   1-6   and   Ms.   Bhati,   learned   counsel   for   the



intervenor.  



(4)    The   main   issue   in   these   appeals   is   about   the   grant   of



460.15   bighas   of   land   on   23.04.1969   by   the  PHED  to   the



respondents   herein.     As   far   as   the   remaining   land   of   143



bighas   is   concerned,   even   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High



Court,   in   the   impugned   order,   remitted   the   matter   to   the



Revenue Minister.  Inasmuch as the issue of remaining land of



143   bighas   raised   by   the   respondents   is   pending   before   the




                                                                             5


Revenue   Minister,   the   same   is   not   relevant   for   our   present



consideration.



(5)    It   is   the   contention   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the   State



that   the   order   dated   23.04.1969   about   the   grant   of   603.16



bighas of land (including 460.15 bighas - the subject matter of



present proceedings) was ex facie without jurisdiction as it was



allotted   by   the  PHED  on  flimsy   and  fallacious   grounds  about



cancellation   of   patta   way   back   in   the   year   1942   and   the



compensation sought in the year 1968.   It is relevant to note



that the same was cancelled way back in 1973.   Inasmuch as



opportunity of hearing was not given, the learned single Judge



of the High Court, by order dated 24.11.1976, remanded back



to the State Government for     deciding the matter afresh after



giving due opportunity of hearing to the respondents herein.



(6)    On   behalf   of   the   State,   it   was   pointed   out   that   it   has



legitimate   grievance   with   the   allotment   dated   23.04.1969   by



the  PHED.     The cancellation was made way back in the year



1942   for   allotment   made   in   the   year   1941   on   the   ground   of



violation   of   lease   conditions.     The   respondents   have   claimed



huge   compensation   for   construction   said   to   have   been   made




                                                                                 6


during   subsistence   of   lease   in   the   year   1949   itself   and   filed



application for compensation with regard to the cancellation of



patta   in   the   year   1968.     According   to   the   State,   the   said



application   was   barred   by   limitation   and   it   was   also   filed



before wrong forum, i.e., the PHED, when it should have been



filed   before   the   Land   Revenue   Department,   which   is   the



appropriate Department.



(7)    It   is   also   the   grievance   of   the   State   that   the   allotment



dated 23.04.1969  was cancelled on 01.05.1973,  however, the



High   Court   set   aside   the   same   on   24.11.1976   on   the   limited



ground that there was violation of natural justice and directed



the   State   Government   to   decide   it   afresh   after   giving



opportunity   of   hearing.     In   those   circumstances,   the   State



wants to exercise its power under the Land Revenue Act read



with the orders passed by the learned single Judge of the High



Court   dated   24.11.1976   and   the   Revenue   Minister   dated



15.12.1992.



(8)    It   was   highlighted   that   the   judgment   of   the   trial   Court



dated 30.06.1982 is also nullity since there was no discussion



on   merits   with   regard   to   the   validity   of   allotment   dated




                                                                                7


23.04.1969. Though it was pointed out by the counsel for the



respondents that it was hit by the principle of  res judicata  as



clarified by the counsel for the appellants, the principle of  res



judicata shall only apply if there is discussion or finding on the



same   subject   matter.     A   perusal   of   the   decree   of   injunction



that   had   been   passed   on   23.04.1969   shows   that   it   did   not



advert to the merits of the case at all.  It is also not in dispute



that   the   subject   matter,   namely,   validity   of   allotment   dated



23.04.1969 has not been gone into.




(9)    It   is   also   relevant   to   point   out   that   by   virtue   of   Section



259   of   the   Land   Revenue   Act,   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Civil



Court is ousted and if any decree is passed by the Civil Court



contrary to the said provision, the same is a nullity in the eyes



of   law.     If   the   decree   is   passed  coram   non   judice,   as   in   the



present case, then it is a nullity in the eyes of law and it shall



not   operate   as  res   judicata.     This   proposition   has   been



enunciated  in  Sabitri  Dei  and  Others.    vs.  Sarat  Chandra


Rout and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 301, wherein this Court held


that   once   a   decree   is   held   to   be   a   nullity,   the   principle   of





                                                                                    8


constructive  res   judicata  will   have   no   application   and   its



invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or



is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of



execution or in any collateral proceeding.  This proposition has



been   reiterated   in    Sushil   Kumar   Mehta   vs.   Gobind   Ram


Bohra  (1990) 1 SCC 193.       It was held in the aforesaid case


that,


                "Thus it is settled law that normally a decree passed

      by   a   court   of   competent   jurisdiction,   after   adjudication   on

      merits of the rights of the parties, operates as res judicata in

      a   subsequent   suit   or   proceedings   and   binds   the   parties   or

      the persons claiming right, title or interest from the parties.

      Its validity  should be  assailed  only in an  appeal  or  revision

      as   the   case   may   be.   In   subsequent   proceedings   its   validity

      cannot   be   questioned.   A   decree   passed   by   a   court   without

      jurisdiction   over   the   subject-matter   or   on   other   grounds

      which   goes   to   the   root   of   its   exercise   or   jurisdiction,   lacks

      inherent   jurisdiction.   It   is   a  coram   non   judice.   A   decree

      passed   by   such   a   court   is   a   nullity   and   is   non   est.   Its

      invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced

      or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage

      of execution or in collateral proceedings."



It is also relevant to note that the order passed on 23.04.1969



was   by   the  PHED  whereas   it   was   the   Land   Revenue



Department   which   alone   had   the   power   under   the   Land



Revenue Act to grant land to any person.   Thus the allotment



of   land   was   also   without   jurisdiction   as   the  PHED  was   not





                                                                                            9


empowered to transfer such a huge chunk of 460.15 bighas of



land which is now an integral part of the city of Jodhpur.



10)     It   is   also   not   in   dispute   that   the   validity   of   the   order



dated   23.04.1969   has   not   been   adjudicated   by   any



appellate/revisional   forum   and   according   to   the   learned



counsel  for  the State,  it  wants to decide the  validity  of order



dated   23.04.1969   on   merits   and,   in   that   event,   the



respondents shall have full opportunity to put-forth their case



and   objections,   if   any,   available   under   the   law.     As   rightly



pointed   out   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   State,   the



respondents   cannot   be   conferred   with   such   huge   benefit   of



460.15   bighas   of   land   without   any   proper   adjudication   on



merits   about   the   grant   of   allotment   of   land.     As   pointed   out



earlier,   the   judgment   and   decree   dated   30.06.1982   does   not



dwell   upon   the   merits   of   the   validity   of   the   allotment   dated



23.04.1969   but   instead   proceeds   that   such   allotment   on



23.04.1969 would entail the order of injunction.   The learned



single   Judge,   on   24.11.1976,   set   aside   the   order   of



cancellation   passed   on   01.05.1973   and   referred   the   matter



back   to   the   State   Government   to   consider   it  on  merits.     The




                                                                                   10


learned  single Judge,  on 24.11.1976, has  again remitted  the



matter   to   the   State   Government   because   no   opportunity   of



hearing   was   given   with   regard   to   460.15   bighas   of   land.



However,   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   upheld   the



validity   of   order   dated   23.04.1969   on   the   principle   of  res



judicata.    As   discussed   and   observed   above,   the   principle   of



res  judicata  shall  not   apply   inasmuch  as  neither   the   subject



matter   of   validity   of   allotment   dated   23.04.1969   was



considered   on   merits   by   the   Munsif   Court   nor   the   decree



passed by the Civil Court was within its jurisdiction because



the   Land   Revenue   Act   prohibits   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Civil



Court.       This   has   led   to   the   validity   of   the   order   dated



23.04.1969   being   left   unexamined   by   the   State   Government



despite   orders  of  the   learned   single   Judge   of  the   High  Court



dated 24.11.1976.



(11)    In   view   of   the   same,   it   is   desirable   that   since   the   State



Government  is  going to decide the allotment  of 143 bighas of



land   in   pursuance   of   the   impugned   judgment,   we   are   of   the



view   that   let   the   State   Government   may   as   well   decide   the



grant   of   remaining   460.15   bighas   of   land   allotted   vide   order




                                                                                    11


dated  23.04.1969   in  accordance   with   law.   It  is   also  to  point



out   that   even   the   Division   Bench   in   its   judgment   dated



14.10.2003   has   clearly   recorded   the   fact   that   the   land   in



question   was   part   of  the   catchment   area   for   canal   and   stone



slabs which were obstructing the flow of water and, therefore,



"Bapi   Patta"   No.   14   granting   603.16   bighas   of   land   was



cancelled.   The Division Bench has also recorded the stand of



the   State   Government   that   soon   after   "Bapi   Patta"   was



granted,   it   was   realized   that   the   same   had   been   granted



wrongly   because   the   land   fell   under   the   catchment   area   of



Kailana   Lake  and it  was for  this  reason  that  subsequently  in



1942,   the   said   patta   was   cancelled   and   compensation   of



Rs.9,377/- was paid to the appellants therein for stone slabs



which   had   been   removed.     Further,   the   Revenue   Minister,   in



his order dated 15.12.1992, has clearly recorded that it came



to   the   knowledge   that   "Bapi   Patta"   cannot   be   granted   to   the



appellants therein inasmuch as the aforesaid land falls within



the  catchment   area  of  feeder  canal  of  Kaliberi  and,  therefore,



the patta was cancelled on 19.07.1942.  Inasmuch as the land



in   question   was   being   utilized   as   catchment   area   of   potable




                                                                            12


water, grant of "Bapi Patta" was void ab initio and, therefore, it



was   cancelled.     Even   the   learned   single   Judge,   in   his   order



dated 19.03.2002, has recorded  while narrating the facts that



on   09.03.1978,   the   Chief   Engineer   of   the  PHED  had   issued



notices to the  respondents along  with  others mentioning that



the   land   was   falling   in   the   feeder   canal   catchment   area   and,



therefore,   the  PHED  wanted   back   the   complete   land   of   603



bighas.



12)     We   also   accept   the   statement   of   Mangal   Singh,   the



intervenor,   that   in   the   larger   public   interest   no   land   can   be



allotted or granted if it obstructs the flow of water.  The above



principle   has   been   reiterated   by   this   Court   in   several   orders.



We have already noted the prohibition, i.e., entertaining a suit



by the Civil Court in the Land Revenue Act.  Further, the land



in question belongs to the Revenue Department of the State of



Rajasthan   and   the  PHED  had   no   jurisdiction   whatsoever   to



restore   460.15   bighas   of   land   in   favour   of   the   respondents



herein.    It   is   needless   to   mention   that   while   passing   fresh



orders   as   directed   above,   the   State   Government   has   to   issue





                                                                              13


notice   to   all   the   parties   concerned   and   decide   the   same   in



accordance with law.





                                                                            14


13)     In   view   of   the   above   discussion,   factual   materials,   legal



issues considering public interest, we set aside the impugned



order passed by the High Court on 14.10.2003 and direct the



Revenue   Department   of   the   State   of   Rajasthan   to   decide   the



matter afresh as discussed above and pass fresh orders within



a   period   of   four   months   from   the   date   of   the   receipt   of   this



judgment   after   affording   opportunity   to   all   the   parties



concerned.   Both the appeals are allowed on the above terms.



No order as to costs.  





                                           ..........................................J.

                                             (P. SATHASIVAM)




                                          ..........................................J.

                                            (H.L. GOKHALE)


NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 11, 2011.            

 


             





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