WHAT IS ARRIVED SHIP, WHAT IS LAY TIME. WHEN DAMAGE ARISE = the Charterers had accepted the responsibility for the failure of the vessel to discharge her cargo at Vadinar and had agreed to bear all the expenses for the delay in diversion of the vessel from Vadinar to Mumbai, including the time spent at 51 Vadinar port and the expenses incurred towards pilotage, tugs and other port expenses. 49. Apart from the above, Clause 4(1) of Part II of the Charter Party specifically provides that extra expenses incurred on account of any change in loading or discharging ports, has to be paid by the Charterers, and any time thereby lost to the vessel shall count as used lay time. We are not inclined to accept Mr. Gupta's submission that the aforesaid clause has to be read in the context of Clauses 4(a) and 4(b) which refer to ports other than Indian Ports in a different context.

                                               REPORTABLE





              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



      SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.19461 of 2006





SHIPPING CORPORATION       OF INDIA LTD. ... PETITIONER(s)





           VS.





MARE SHIPPING INC.                         ... RESPONDENT(s)





                      J U D G M E N T





ALTAMAS KABIR, J.




1.    The   Special   Leave   Petition   arises   out   of   the



Judgment   and   Order   dated   24.10.2005   passed   by   the



learned   Single   Judge   of   the   Bombay   High   Court   in


                                               2





A.P.No.531   of   2003   affirming   the   Award   of   the



Arbitral   Tribunal   dated   8.9.2005,   and   the   judgment



and   order   dated   20.1.2006   passed   by   the   Division



Bench   dismissing   A.N.No.1158   of   2005   filed   by   the



Petitioners herein.





2.    On         9.11.1999              the          Petitioners             and          the



Respondent(s)   entered   into   a   Charter   Party   in



respect          of         the         Respondents'                 vessel,         "m.t.



Prestige",   for   carriage   of   minimum   8150   metric



tonnes of crude oil from the Egyptian Red Sea port



of          Ras             Sukheir                  to         one/two                   safe



anchorage(s)/lighterage   points/SBM(s)/one/two   safe



port(s)one/two   safe   berth(s)   anywhere   in   India.



The   vessel   was   described   in   Clause   41   of   the



Charter  Party  as  being  fitted  with  "AK  Tongue  Type



Bow Chain Stopper of min SWL 2000 Mts."





3.    Clause   9   of   the   Charter   Party   provided   for



settlement   of   all   disputes   arising   out   of   the


                                3





Charter   Party   by   arbitration   under   the   Arbitration



&   Conciliation   Act,   1996,   and   the   Maritime



Arbitration   Rules   of   the   Indian   Council   of



Arbitration (ICA).





4.    The vessel arrived at Ras Sukheir at 4.00 a.m.



on   19.11.1999   and   tendered   Notice   of   Readiness



(NOR).   The   loading   commenced   at   10   p.m.   on



20.11.1999   and   was   completed   by   3.15   p.m.   on



21.11.1999.        The   total   lay   time   provided   for



loading   and   discharge   of   cargo   was   72   running



hours.     Out   of   the   said   lay   time   hours,   the   lay



time   used   at   Ras   Sukheir   was   37   hours   and   30



minutes.     On   account   of   a   mishap   involving   the



vessel's   anchor   and   the   submarine   pipe-lines,   the



vessel was delayed at Ras Sukheir for fourteen days



and   could   leave   the   port   only   on   4.12.1999.     On



6.12.1999   while   the   vessel   was   sailing,   the



Respondents   nominated   Vadinar   Single   Berth   Mooring



(SBM)   for   discharge   of   the   cargo.            Port   of


                                4





discharge   had   not   been   nominated   earlier.     The



vessel   arrived   at   Vadinar   and   the   Master   tendered



NOR at 8 p.m. on 15.12.1999.   Since the vessel had



only   one   chain   stopper/Bow   Panama   Chock,   which   had



been   specified   in   the   Charter   Party,   the   vessel



could   not   be   safely   moored   at   the   SBM   and   the



Master   was   asked   by   the   Receiver,   Indian   Oil



Corporation   on   21.12.1999   to   take   away   the   vessel



from the Vadinar SBM.





5.    On   21.12.1999   a   message   was   sent   to   the



Petitioners'   Agents,   M/s.   J.M.   Baxi   &   Co.   by   the



Manager of the Respondents drawing attention to the



fact   that   the   vessel   could   not   be   berthed   at   the



SBM and requesting that immediate steps be taken to



berth   the   vessel.     In   the   absence   of   any   positive



response   to   the   said   letter,   the   Respondents'



lawyer, Mr. Prashant Pratap, sent a legal notice to



the   Petitioners   on   24.12.1999   indicating   that   the



vessel   continued   to   await   discharge   incurring


                                           5





demurrage   for   which   the   Petitioners   were   held



responsible.     The   Petitioners   were   also   informed



that   on   account   of   the   detention   of   the   vessel   at



Vadinar,   there   was   a   serious   possibility   of   the



vessel missing its next engagement.





6.     Finally a decision was arrived at on 28.12.1999



and   Addendum   No.1   to   the   Charter   Party   dated



9.11.1999 was drawn up and signed by the Owners and



the   Charterers   containing   the   following   further



conditions agreed upon, namely,





      a)    m.t.   Prestige   will   be   diverted   by   the



      Charterers   from   Vadinar   to   L.P.O.   Mumbai   for



      discharge.





      b)    Charterers   will   pay   freight   basis   Ras



      Sukheir/LPO   Mumbai   where   cargo   will   be



      discharged         into         a         daughter         vessel         and



      Charterers   will   pay   all   the   expenses   of   the



      daughter vessel, M.T. Maharaja Agrasen.


                                   6





      (c)  Charterers will bear the cost of deviation



      of   m.t.   Prestige   basis   Ras   Sukheir/LPO   Mumbai



      v/s   Ras   Sukheir/Vadinar/LOP   Mumbai   which



      included time at the demurrage rate.





      d)     The   extra   cost   of   bunkers   incurred   as   a



      result of the deviation will be on Charterers'



      account,   subject   to   the   Owners   submitting



      documentary evidence.





      (e)    All direct expenses incurred by the Owners



      at   Vadinar   towards   pilotage,   tugs   and   other



      port expenses and Agency fees, will be settled



      by the Charterers.





      (f)    Demurrage   to   be   settled   as   per   Charter



      Party terms.





7.     Pursuant   to   the   above   arrangement,   m.t.



Prestige   sailed   from   Vadinar   at   1   a.m.   on



29.12.1999   and   arrived   at   Mumbai   Lighterage   point


                                                 7





on 30.12.1999 at 2 p.m.  The vessel tendered Notice



of  Readiness  at  2  p.m.  on  30.12.1999  and  completed



discharge              at         3.30          p.m.         on         1.1.2000.            The



Respondents/Owners submitted their demurrage claims



along   with   supporting   documents   to   the   Charterers



on   3.2.2000.     As   the   said   claim   was   disputed,



arbitration   was   invoked   by   the   parties   under   the



provisions   of   the   Arbitration   &   Conciliation   Act,



1996,   hereinafter   referred   to   as   "the   1996   Act".



Both   the   parties   appointed   their   Arbitrators   and



the   two   Arbitrators   appointed   a   third   as   the



Presiding   Arbitrator.     The   Arbitrators   made   and



published their Award dated 26.8.2003 by which they



allowed   the   Respondents'   demurrage   claim   in   full.



Certain   other   amounts   payable   under   the   Addendum



dated 28.12.1999 were also awarded in favour of the



Claimants/Respondents.





8.    The         said            Award         was          challenged           by         the



Petitioners/Charterers   in   the   Bombay   High   Court   on


                              8





the ground that the Respondents had not proved that



the   Notice   of   Readiness   had   been   tendered   at



Vadinar   and   consequently   the   Respondents   were   not



entitled   to   demurrage   for   the   period   that   m.t.



Prestige   was   detained   at   Vadinar.     The   learned



Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   accepted   the



submission   made   on   the   Petitioners'   behalf   and   by



his   order   dated   25.4.2005   remitted   the   matter   to



the   Arbitration   for   a   proper   finding   in   this



regard,   with   leave   to   the   Respondents/owners   to



lead   evidence   to   prove   tender   of   the   Notice   of



Readiness to the Petitioners/Charterers.





9.    After   remand,   the   Arbitrators   passed   another



Award   on   8.9.2005   after   admitting   fresh   evidence,



including   documentary   evidence,   holding   that   the



service of the Notice of Readiness by the Master of



the   vessel   on   the   Agents   of   the   Petitioners   at



Jamnagar   had   been   duly   proved   in   view   of   the



evidence   of   the   Petitioners'   witness,   Mr.   Sunil


                                            9





D'Souza  that  he  had  asked  Captain  Jude  D'Souza  for



a   copy   of   the   Notice   of   Readiness   sent   by   the



Master to the Petitioners' Agents at Jamnagar.  The



said   fact   was   also   confirmed   by   Mr.   S.J.   Joshi



during   his   evidence   before   the   Tribunal.                                The



Arbitrators   also   noted   that   no   attempt   had   been



made by the Charterers to rebut Mr. Sunil D'Souza's



evidence by producing Captain Jude D'Souza.





10.    The         Tribunal         accordingly           held          that         the



Respondents/Owners                  were         entitled         to         receive



demurrage   in   the   amount   of   U.S.   $220376.48,



together with interest and costs, as awarded in the



earlier Award of 26.8.2003.





11.    On   receiving   a   copy   of   the   Award   of   the



Tribunal   dated   8.9.2005,   the   Petitioners   applied



for   amendment   of   the   Petition   under   Section   34   of



the   1996   Act.     However,   by   order   dated   24.10.2005



the   learned   Single   Judge   dismissed   the   Arbitration


                                               10





Petition  No.531  of  2003.    An  appeal,  being  No.1158



of   2005,   was   filed   by   the   Petitioners   before   the



Division   Bench   of   the   Bombay   High   Court   which



dismissed the same on 20.1.2006.





12.    The   present   Special   Leave   Petition   has   been



filed   against   the   said   Award   of   the   Arbitration



dated 8.9.2005, as well as the judgments and orders



dated   24.10.2005   and   20.1.2006   passed   by   the



learned  Single  Judge  and  the  Division  Bench  of  the



Bombay High Court confirming the Award.





13.    Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, who



appeared         for          the         Petitioners,         focused            his



submissions             on         the          sustainability         of         the



Respondents'   claim   for   demurrage.     Urging   that   a



claim for demurrage can only arise after the expiry



of   the   "lay   days",   namely,   the   time   specified   for



loading   or   discharging   the   cargo   from   the   vessel,



Mr. Gupta submitted that the all-important question


                                  11





in respect of such a claim is when do the lay days



commence   and   when   are   they   used   up.     Mr.   Gupta



submitted that the commencement of lay days depends



on three factors :-





       a)    Firstly,   the   ship   must   be   an   "arrived



             ship"   in   order   to   give   Notice   of



             Readiness.



       b)    Secondly,   she   must   have   given   the



             prescribed         notice         to         load         or



             discharge, as the case may be.



       c)    Thirdly,   she   must   be   ready   to   load   or



             discharge, as the case may be.





14.    Mr. Gupta submitted that whether the ship is an



"arrived   ship"   or   not   depends   on   the   point



designated   as   the   destination   in   the   mutual



understanding   of   the   parties   in   the   Charter   Party



itself   or   the   terms   thereof   -   the   degree   of



precision   being   a   matter   of   agreement   between   the


                                12





parties.     Mr.   Gupta   urged   that   in   practice,   the



destination   is   usually   a   part   or   a   specified   area



within the port such as a basin, a dock, or a buoy



at a certain distance from the shore or a river.  A



still more precise point would be where the loading



or   discharge   is   to   take   place,   e.g.,   a   particular



quay,  pier,  wharf  or  mooring.    Mr.  Gupta  submitted



that   a   ship   is   said   to   be   an   "arrived   ship"   only



when   she   has   reached   the   particular   point   and   has



moored   there.        Mr.   Gupta   urged   that   the   said



propositions   are   well-established   and   have   been



laid  down  in  (1)  Leonis  Steamship  Company  Ltd.  Vs.



Rank  Limited  (1908)  1  K.B.  499;  (2)  Armament  Adolf



Deppe  Vs.  John   Robinson   &   Company   Ltd.  [1917]  2



K.B.   204;   and   (3)  Owners   of   S.S.   Plata  Vs.  Ford   &



Co.  (1917)   2   K.B.   593.     We   shall   have   recourse   to



refer   to   the   aforesaid   decisions   later   in   this



judgment.


                                         13





15.    Mr.   Gupta   submitted   that   Clause   `D'   of   the



Charter          Party          dated                  9.11.1999,         specifies



"discharging               port"                  as           one/two               safe



anchorage(s)/lighterage   point(s)/SBM(s),   1/2   safe



Ports, 1/2 safe Berth(s) and full India.  Mr. Gupta



also submitted that the Charter Party provides that



on  arrival  of  the  vessel  for  discharge  at  Vadinar,



the vessel was to maintain 70% of her deadweight on



board for safe mooring at a SBM.





16.    Mr.   Gupta   urged   that   by   a   communication   dated



6.12.1999,   the   Petitioners/Charterers   designated



Vadinar   SBM   as   the   destination   and   not   a   `Port'.



The   destination   was,   therefore,   a   specific   point



and   not   a   large   area   like   a   Port.     Vadinar   SBM,



therefore,            became          the              destination             as         if



incorporated   in   the   Charter   Party   itself.     Mr.



Gupta submitted that inspite of the best efforts of



the   Terminal   Authorities,   IOC,   who   were   also   the



receivers of the cargo, m.t. Prestige was unable to


                                 14





moor   at   the   Vadinar   Single   Berth   Mooring   (SBM)   on



account of the fact that it had only one bow chain.



It   may   be   of   interest   to   note   that   Vadinar   is   the



only   SBM   in   the   whole   of   India.     Mr.   Gupta   urged



that   inspite   of   the   various   attempts   of   the   Port



Authorities, the vessel could not be berthed at the



Vadinar SBM and was asked to move away.   Mr. Gupta



contended that since the vessel could not be moored



at Vadinar, it was not an "arrived vessel' and "lay



time"   could   not   be   said   to   have   commenced   running



on   15.12.1999.     The   Notice   of   Readiness   given   by



the Petitioners could not, therefore, be treated as



valid and the period spent at Vadinar could not be



taken into consideration while computing the number



of lay days utilized.





17.    In   support   of   his   aforesaid   contention,   Mr.



Gupta referred to and relied on the decision of the



House   of   Lords   in   the   case   of  Johanna   Oldendorff,



(1973)  11  LLR  285,  in  which  Viscount  Dilhorne  laid


                                         15





down   ten   tests   for   determining   when   a   ship   is   an



arrived ship.   Mr. Gupta referred to the first and



fifth   tests   as   being   relevant   in   the   context   of



this case and the same are extracted hereinbelow :





     (i)     That   under   a   port   Charter   Party   to



             be an "arrived ship", that is to say



             a   ship   at   a   place   where   a   valid



             Notice   of   Readiness   to   load   or



             discharge   can   be   given,   she   must



             have   ended   her   voyage   at   the   port



             named; and





     (ii)    A vessel has not reached her port of



             destination   until   it   has   ended   its



             voyage within the port, either in its



             legal,   or   if   it   differs,   in   its



             commercial   sense.     If   it   is   refused



             permission            and              ordered                to         wait



             outside         the         port              by         the             Port


                               16





            Authority,   it   is   not   an   "arrived



            ship".





18.    Mr. Gupta submitted that the mere fact that the



vessel   had   arrived   near   the   SBM   and   had   anchored



there  would  not  make  the  vessel  an  "arrived  ship",



because   the   destination   was   the   SBM   and   not   the



port and the vessel could end her voyage only when



she   was   moored   at   the   SBM,   which   the   vessel   was



unable   to   do.        Mr.   Gupta   submitted   that   the



decision   in     Johanna   Oldendorff's   case   was   an



affirmation of the Kings Bench decision in the case



of  Leonis   Steamship   Company   Ltd.  Vs.  Rank   Limited



(1908) 1 K.B. 499.  Mr. Gupta urged that not having



been allowed to berth at the SBM, the vessel could



not   be   categorized   as   an   "arrived   ship"   for   the



purpose   of   issuing   Notice   of   Readiness,   which   Mr.



Gupta   submitted   had   not   been   served   on   the



Petitioners in the first place.


                                17





19.    By   way   of   an   alternative   argument,   Mr.   Gupta



submitted   that   under   Clause   6   Part   II   of   the



Charter   Party,   the   delay   at   Vadinar   could   not   be



counted   as   lay   time,   because   it   was   the   receivers



(I.O.C.)   and   not   the   Charterers   who   declared   that



safe   berthing   of   the   vessel   at   Vadinar   was   not



possible   because   of   infra-structural   deficiencies



and   not   because   of   any   fault   on   behalf   of   the



Petitioners   since   the   Petitioners   had   no   control



over   the   situation.     Accordingly,   the   entire   time



from   the   tender   of   the   Notice   of   Readiness   on



15.12.1999,   if   at   all   tendered,   till   the   vessel



started  discharge  in  Bombay,  had  to  be  excluded  in



calculating lay time.





20.    Mr. Gupta submitted that service of the Notice



of Readiness had not been proved even after remand,



as   the   only   evidence   tendered   was   that   of   Sunil



D'Souza which, in any event, did not prove anything



beyond   the   fact   that   he   had   been   asked   to   get   a


                                     18





copy   of   the   Notice   of   Readiness   from   the   Agent.



Furthermore,   the   entire   evidence   of   Sunil   D'Souza



was hearsay.





21.    On   the   question   of   Safe   Port   Warranty,   Mr.



Gupta   contended   that   only   after   all   attempts   had



been   made   to   berth   the   vessel   at   the   SBM   that   it



was   asked   to   move   away   from   the   mooring.



Consequently,          even         if         the         finding         of         the



Arbitrators   that   the   Petitioners   had   failed   to



designate   a   safe   port   was   accepted,   at   best   the



ship   owners   could   be   entitled   to   damages   and   not



demurrage   and   would   be   subject   to   the   ordinary



rules   as   to   remoteness,   mitigation   etc.,   as



available   under   Section   73   of   the   Contract   Act.



Mr.   Gupta   submitted   that   the   Respondents   had



claimed damages before the learned Arbitrators who,



however,   allowed   demurrage   in   their   Award   on   the



ground   that   demurrage   is   a   genuine   pre-estimate   of



damages.     Mr.   Gupta   submitted   that   even   if   there


                               19





was  a  breach  of  warranty  on  the  Petitioners'  part,



the same would give rise to a claim for damages and



not   demurrage   within   the   scope   of   Sections   73   and



74 of the Contract Act.





22.    Mr. Gupta submitted that in the Addendum dated



28.12.1999   to   the   Charter   Party   dated   9.11.1999



since the Charterers had agreed to bear the cost of



deviation   basis     Ras   Sukheir/LPO   Mumbai   vs   Ras



Sukheir/Vadinar/LPO   Mumbai,   which   included   time   at



the   demurrage   rate,   there   could   not   be   a   separate



claim  for  demurrage  as  that  would  amount  to  double



jeopardy.   Mr. Gupta submitted that it is the said



provision   contained   in   Clause   (f)   of   the   aforesaid



Addendum   which   has   given   rise   to   this   arbitration.



Mr.   Gupta   submitted   that   although   the   Award   has



relied   on   Clause   4(1)   of   Part   II   of   the   Charter



Party,   which   provides   that   extra   expenses   incurred



in   connection   with   any   change   in   loading   or



discharging   ports,   has   to   be   paid   by   the


                                20





Charterers, and any time thereby lost to the vessel



shall count as used lay time, the said clause would



have to be read in the context of Clauses 4(a) and



4(b)   where   certain   ports,   other   than   any   Indian



Port, have been named.





23.    On   the   question   of   mitigation   of   damages,   Mr.



Gupta   urged   that   the   Petitioners/Owners   had   done



everything  in  its  power  to  safely  berth  the  vessel



at the SBM Vadinar, which was perhaps the only SBM



in operation in India at the relevant point of time



and   would   otherwise   have   been   ideal   for   discharge



of   the   cargo   of   crude   oil.     Mr.   Gupta   contended



that it was IOC, the receiver, who had taken almost



two   weeks   to   decide   to   redirect   the   vessel   from



Vadinar to Mumbai. Mr. Gupta submitted that it was,



in   effect,   the   Respondents   who   did   not   take   any



steps to mitigate the damages.


                               21





24.    On   the   quantum   of   demurrage   or   damages,   Mr.



Gupta   submitted   that   since   the   demurrage   rate   was



fixed at US $16000 per day and the same has really



a   genuine   pre-estimate   of   damages,   the   Tribunal



should   have   awarded   damages   at   a   reasonable   rate,



instead of making its Award on the consideration of



damage   as   fixed   in   the   Charter   Party.     Mr.   Gupta



urged   that   the   Tribunal   had   gone   completely   wrong



in giving a go-bye to the provisions of Sections 73



and 74 of the Contract Act in awarding compensation



in   keeping   with   the   provisions   for   fixed   demurrage



in the Charter Party, particularly when all the lay



days had not been used up.





25.    Mr.   Gupta   submitted   that   the   scope   of   a



petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act had been



considered by this Court in detail in Oil & Natural



Gas   Corporation   Ltd.  Vs.  Saw   Pipes   Ltd.  [(2003)   5



SCC 705], and it was indicated therein that if the



Award   passed   by   the   Arbitral   Tribunal   was   contrary


                                22





to   any   of   the   provisions   of   the   Act   or   the



substantive   law   governing   the   parties   or   was



against   the   terms   of   the   contract,   the   same   could



be   set   aside.     Mr.   Gupta   urged   that   even   in   the



instant   case,   the   law   had   been   misapplied   by   the



Arbitrators   who   had   missed   considering   the   all-



important   issue   that   no   valid   Notice   of   Readiness



could have been tendered by a ship which was not an



"arrived   ship".          In   such   circumstances,   the



petition   under   Section   34   of   the   1996   Act   was



clearly not maintainable.





26.    In conclusion, Mr. Gupta drew our attention to



the wording of Clause 6 of the Charter Party which



deals   with   Notice   of   Readiness   and   in   particular,



to the last sentence thereof where delay in getting



a   berth   for   a   vessel   after   giving   Notice   of



Readiness,   for   any   reason   over   which   the   Charterer



has   no   control,   shall   not   count   as   used   lay   time.



Mr.   Gupta   submitted   that   the   facts   of   the   case


                                  23





would   clearly   indicate   that   the   Arbitral   Tribunal



failed   to   take   into   consideration   the   facts   in



their true sequence and ended up in a "cart before



the   horse"   situation,   since   no   demurrage,   which   is



the consequence of using up all the lay time, could



have   been   awarded   without   a   correct   computation   of



the used "lay time".  





27.    Going to the heart of the matter, Mr. Prashant



Pratap,   learned   Advocate,   submitted   that   the   case



of   the   Petitioners/Charterers   of   the   vessel



depended   primarily   on   the   terms   and   conditions   of



the Charter Party on the basis whereof the Arbitral



Tribunal         had         awarded         demurrage         to         the



Respondents/Owners of the vessel.  As was also done



by   Mr.   Gupta,   special   emphasis   was   laid   by   Mr.



Prashant   Pratap   on   Clause   6   of   the   Charter   Party



relating   to   Notice   of   Readiness.     Learned   counsel



emphasized   the   fact   that   in   terms   of   the   said



clause, the Master of the vessel or his Agent would


                                24





give   the   Charterer   or   his   Agent   notice   by   letter,



telegraph, wireless or telephone that the vessel is



ready   to   load   or   discharge   cargo,   berth   or   no



berth,   and   lay   time   would   commence   upon   the



expiration of six hours from receipt of such notice



or  upon  the  vessel's  arrival  in  berth,  which  would



mean   finished   mooring   when   at   a   sea   loading   or



discharging   terminal   and   all   fast   when   loading   or



discharging   alongside   a   wharf          whichever   first



occurs.     Then   follows   the   rider   that,   however,



where   the   delay   is   caused   to   the   vessel   getting



into berth after giving Notice of Readiness for any



reason over which the Charterer has no control, the



delay caused could not be counted as used lay time.





28.    Mr. Prashant Pratap referred to Clauses 8 and 9



of   the   Charter   Party   dealing   with   Demurrage   and



Safe Berthing Shifting.  Clause 8 provides that the



Charterer   shall   pay   demurrage   per   running   hour   and



pro   rata   for   a   part   thereof   at   the   rate   specified


                                25





in   Part   I   for   all   the   time   taken   for   loading   and



discharging when the time taken for discharging the



cargo  exceeds  the  allowed  lay  time  specified.    If,



however,  delay  in  discharge  of  the  cargo  is  caused



at   the   port   of   loading   and/or   discharge   by   reason



of   fire   or   other   unavoidable   circumstances,   the



rate   of   demurrage   would   be   reduced   to   one-half   of



the amount stated in Part I per running hour or pro



rata for part of an hour for demurrage so incurred.



It was also stipulated that the Charterer would not



be liable for demurrage for delay caused by strike,



lockout,   stoppage   or   restraint   of   labour   for



master,  officers  and  crew  of  the  vessel  or  tugboat



or   pilots.     Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   also   pointed   out



that   Clause   9   of   the   Charter   Party   which   provides



for   Safe   Berthing   Shifting   indicates   that   the



vessel   shall   load   and   discharge   at   any   safe   place



or   wharf,   or   alongside   vessels   or   lighterage   point



reachable on her arrival, which shall be designated


                               26





and   procured   by   the   Charterer,   provided   the   vessel



could   proceed   thereto,   lie   at   and   depart   therefrom



always   safely   afloat.     Clause   9   also   enables   the



Charterer   to   shift   the   vessel   at   ports   of   loading



and/or  discharge  from  one  safe  berth  to  another  on



payment  of  towage  and  pilotage  for  shifting  to  the



next berth and other expenses and the time consumed



on account of such shifting would count as used lay



time, except as otherwise provided in Clause 15.





29.    Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   then   contended   that   the



question   as   to   whether   M/s.   m.t.   Prestige   was   an



"arrived   ship"   or   not   at   port   Vadinar,   had   never



been   raised   either   before   the   learned   Single   Judge



or the Division Bench of the High Court, nor was it



taken   as   a   ground   in   the   Special   Leave   Petition.



Learned   counsel   submitted   that   even   the   ground



taken  with  regard  to  the  Notice  of  Readiness  being



invalid,   as   the   vessel   was   allegedly   not   ready   in



all   respects   to   discharge   its   cargo,   was   neither


                                 27





argued   before   the   learned   Single   Judge   or   the



Division   Bench   nor   was   the   ground   taken   in   the



Special Leave Petition before this Court.





30.    Coming   to   the   question   as   to   what   constitutes



an   "arrived   ship",   Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   submitted



that   the   said   question   was   extensively   considered



by   the   House   of   Lords   in   the   case   of  Johanna



Oldendorff  (supra),   which   was   also   relied   upon   by



Mr. Gupta, where the House of Lords was of the view



that   the   vessel   should   have   reached   a   position   in



the   port   where   she   is   at   the   immediate   and



effective   disposition   of   the   Charterers   and   for



practical   purposes   it   is   so   much   easier   to



establish that if the ship is at the usual waiting



place   within   the   port   where   waiting   vessels   would



normally   lie   before   proceeding   to   the   berth



nominated by the Charterers for discharge of cargo.



If   the   vessel   is   at   such   a   place,   then   the   vessel



is considered to be an "arrived ship".   It is only


                                         28





thereafter   that   the   vessel   can   tender   Notice   of



Readiness.           Furthermore,   if   the   Charter   Party



provides   for   the   location   where   the   vessel   should



arrive  and  tender  Notice  of  Readiness,  then  if  the



vessel   has   reached   that   location,   the   vessel   is



considered   to   be   an   "arrived   ship".     Mr.   Prashant



Pratap submitted that in the present Charter Party,



the   parties   have   expressly   agreed   in   Clause   6   for



the   vessel   to   arrive   at                   customary   anchorage



(emphasis   supplied)   at   the   port   of   loading   or



discharge          and         tender          Notice         of         Readiness.



Accordingly,   once   the   vessel   arrived   at   anchorage



at   Vadinar,   it   became   an   arrived   ship   in   terms   of



Clause   6   of   the   Charter   Party   and   was   entitled   to



tender Notice of Readiness.





31.    Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   submitted   that   it   was   not



disputed   that   M/s.   m.t.   Presitge   was   at   customary



anchorage   at   Vadinar   Port   when   Notice   of   Readiness



was   tendered.     Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   also   placed


                                 29





emphasis   on   the   expression   "berth   or   no   berth",



included   in   Clause   6   of   the   Charter   Party   which



meant that even if a berth was not available or the



vessel   had   not   reached   the   berth,   the   vessel   is



entitled   to   tender   Notice   of   Readiness.                       Mr.



Prashant   Pratap   submitted   that   the   term   had   been



explained   in   the   case   of   the   NOTOs   where   dealing



with a clause identical to Clause 6 of the Charter



Party,   it   was   held   that   the   meaning   of   the   said



words   indicated   that   the   Notice   of   Readiness   could



be   given   upon   arrival   at   the   customary   anchorage



and   could   take   effect   whether   or   not   a   berth   was



then available or not for the vessel.





32.    Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   then   argued   that   the



submission          made         on         behalf         of          the



Petitioners/Charterers   that   since   the   destination



in   the   Charter   Party   had   been   shown   as   "SBM"   and



the   vessel   had   failed   to   be   moored   at   the   SBM,   no



demurrage could be claimed, was wholly erroneous on


                                           30





account   of   the   fact   that   such   notice   could   be



tendered   on   the   arrival   of   the   vessel   at   the



customary anchorage.  The vessel is not, therefore,



required   to   be   at   the   destination   within   the   port



for   the   purpose   of   becoming   an   "arrived   ship"   and



for tendering of Notice of Readiness.





33.        Referring   to   Mr.   Gupta's   submissions   that   for



the   purpose   of   tendering   Notice   of   Readiness,   the



vessel must be an arrived ship, Mr. Prashant Pratap



submitted   that   the   vessel,   therefore,   must   be   at



the   effective   disposal   of   the   Charterers   who   would



have   unrestricted   access   to   the   vessel's   cargo



tanks and the vessel pumps must be in working order



to   pump   out   the   cargo   upon   the   hoses   being



connected,   provided   that   the   Charterers   were   ready



to receive the cargo.  In this regard, Mr. Prashant



Pratap   referred   to   the   decision   in   the                            Leonis



Steamship   Co.   Ltd.  (supra),   where   it   was   observed



by         Lord         Justice         Kennedy         that         "the         ship's


                                31





obligations,   therefore,   under   such   a   Charter   Party



the   performance   of   which   much   precede   the



commencement  of  the  lay  days  (as  the  fixed  loading



period is commonly termed) are three : Firstly, the



ship must have arrived at her destination and so be



within   the   designation   of   an   arrived   ship.     Till



then   she   is   not   entitled   to   give   a   Notice   of



Readiness   to   load.     Secondly,   she   must   have   given



the   prescribed   Notice   of   Readiness   to   load.



Thirdly,   she   must,   in   fact,   be   so   far   as   she   is



concerned,   ready   to   load.     The   ship   owner   cannot



claim against the Charterer that the lay days begin



to count until the ship is an arrived ship; ..............."



Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   submitted   that   the   aforesaid



passage   made   it   clear   that   the   vessel   has   to   be



ready   to   load   or   discharge,   as   the   case   may   be.



The   Tribunal's   findings   are   that   the   vessel   was



ready, but the terminal was not.  The Tribunal held



that  the  vessel  was  at  the  immediate  and  effective


                                32





disposition   of   the   Charterers   when   Notice   of



Readiness was given.





34.    Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   then   urged   that   from   the



Charter   Party   it   is   quite   clear   that   the



responsibility   of   providing   a   berth   where   the



vessel could moor safely was that of the Charterers



and   the   same   would   be   clear   from   the   use   of   the



word   "safe"   in   Clause   D   of   Part   I   of   the   Charter



Party           which         precedes          the          words



"Ahchorage/Lighterage   Points/SBM".     Even   in   terms



of   Clause   9   of   the   Charter   Party,   the   place   of



discharge must be safe and has to be designated and



procured   by   the   Charterers.     Mr.   Prashant   Pratap



referred to various other judgments such as the Sea



Queen  [(1988)   Vol.1   KKR   500]   and  Fjordaas  [(1988)



Vol.1   LLR   336].     In   the   later   case,   it   has   been



indicated   that   "reachable"   or   "arrival"   are   well-



known   expressions   and   mean   precisely   what   they



say.     It   was   further   observed   that   if   the   berth


                                    33





cannot   be   reached   on   arrival,   the   warranty   is



broken,   unless   there   is   some   relevant   protecting



exception.  Such berth, in its term, is required to



have two characteristics: it has to be safe and it



also has to be reachable on arrival.  By nominating



SBM at Vadinar as the destination of the vessel and



also   the   place   for   discharge   of   the   cargo,   it   was



the   responsibility   of   the   Charterers   to   ascertain



as   to   whether   the   vessel   could   be   moored   there



safely and be in a position to discharge the cargo



safely.





35.    Apart   from   the   aforesaid   questions   regarding



the   vessel   being   an   arrived   ship,   Mr.   Prashant



Pratap   urged   that   service   of   the   Notice   of



Readiness   by   the   Master   on   the   Agents   of   the



Charterers   have   been   duly   proved   and   is   a   finding



based         on         appreciation         of         evidence         by         the



Arbitrators,   which   has   been   upheld   by   the   learned


                                    34





Single   Judge   and   the   Division   Bench,   whose   orders



were under challenge in the Special Leave Petition.





36.    Mr. Prashant Pratap urged that if the Notice of



Readiness was valid, as had been found not only by



the   Arbitral   Tribunal   but   also   by   the   learned



Single   Judge   and   the   Division   Bench   of   the   Bombay



High Court, then lay time commenced six hours after



the   tender   of   Notice   of   Readiness.     Accordingly,



lay   time   expired   on   17.12.1999,   and,   thereafter,



the   vessel   was   on   demurrage   all   throughout,   till



discharge   of   the   cargo   was   completed.       Since   in



the   instant   case,   the   Charterers   had   failed   to



nominate   a   safe   berth   at   which   the   vessel   could



safely   lie   and   discharge   the   cargo   and   failing   to



provide a berth which was reachable upon arrival of



the   vessel   at   Vadinar,   the   consequent   delay   in



berthing   and   discharge   of   the   cargo,   was   the



responsibility         of         the         Charterers         for         which



demurrage was payable by them.  Mr. Prashant Pratap


                               35





pointed   out   that   at   no   stage   did   the   Charterers



question   the   validity   of   the   Notice   of   Readiness



tendered   at   Vadinar   either   on   the   ground   that   the



vessel   was   not   an   arrived   ship,   or   on   the   ground



that   the   vessel   was   not   ready   to   discharge   the



cargo.    On  the  contrary,  the  Charterers  signed  the



Addendum   dated   28.12.1999   by   which   they   agreed   to



bear   all   the   expenses   incurred   by   the   vessel   at



Vadinar   and   also   agreed   to   pay   additional   freight



charges   for   discharge   of   cargo   at   Mumbai.



Significantly,   the   Charterers   also   agreed   that   the



time   taken   for   the   vessel   to   proceed   from   Vadinar



to   Mumbai   would   count   as   demurrage   time.     Mr.



Prashant Pratap urged that the Charterers would not



have   agreed   to   the   terms   and   conditions   of   the



Addendum if it was their contention that the vessel



was   not   an   arrived   ship   or   that   the   Notice   of



Readiness was invalid.


                                36





37.    Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   then   submitted   that   the



only requirement as far as the vessel was concerned



was that it had to maintain 70% of the dead weight



on board for safe mooring at the SBM at Vadinar and



it is nobody's case that the vessel did not conform



to such condition.





38.    On   the   question   of   designation   of   the   SBM   as



the   destination   point   within   Vadinar   Port   by   the



Charterers,   Mr.   Prashant   Pratap   contended   that   the



Charterers   had   been   put   on   notice   regarding   the



berthing   arrangement   both   in   the   Charter   Party   as



well   as   in   the   questionnaire   setting   out   the



vessel's   mooring   arrangements   provided   to   the



Charterers.     Learned   counsel   submitted   that   it   was



for   the   Charterers   to   check   the   vessel   equipment



vis-`-vis   facilities   available   at   the   Port   of



loading   and   discharge,   before   nominating   the   same.



Since   the   Charterers   had   failed   to   undertake   such



an exercise, there was a resultant problem faced at


                               37





Vadinar   whereby   the   vessel   could   not   discharge   its



cargo at Vadinar but had to be diverted to Mumbai.



Mr. Prashant Pratap also pointed out that while the



entire   Indian   coastline   was   available   to   the



Charterers to nominate a safe port for discharge of



the cargo, it made a conscious decision to nominate



the   SBM   at   Vadinar   which   ultimately   turned   out   to



be   unsafe   for   mooring   of   the   vessel,   given   the



equipment available on board the ship.





39.    Mr. Prashant Pratap submitted that it had been



agreed   on   behalf   of   the   Charterers   that   demurrage



is   a   genuine   pre-estimate   of   damages   and   even   if



the Charterers' argument is to be accepted that the



owners   are   entitled   to   damages   and   not   demurrage,



the   calculation   of   such   damages   would   have   to   be



the   demurrage   rate   in   the   facts   and   circumstances



of the case.


                                  38





40.    Mr.   Prashant   Pratap,   accordingly,     submitted



that  the  award  of  the  Arbitral  Tribunal,  as  upheld



both   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   the   Division



Bench of the Bombay High Court, did not warrant any



interference   and   the   Special   Leave   Petition   was



liable to be dismissed with appropriate costs.





41.    Having   gone   through   the   submissions   made   on



behalf   of   the   respective   parties   in   the   background



of the facts as disclosed, it is clear that we are



required   to   consider   two   basic   questions   for   the



purpose   of   deciding   the   present   Special   Leave



Petition, namely :-





(a)    Whether on arriving at anchorage point at Port



       Vadinar,   despite   the   destination   point   being



       the   SBM   mooring,   it   could   be   said   that   it   was



       an   arrived   ship   which   was   competent   under   the



       Charter   Party   dated   9.11.1999,   to   issue   Notice



       of Readiness of discharge of its cargo?


                                    39





(b)    If   the   finding   of   the   Arbitral   Tribunal   that



       the vessel was an arrived ship at Port Vadinar,



       as   upheld   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   the



       Division   Bench   of   the   Bombay   High   Court   is



       accepted,   would   the   Respondents/Owners   of   the



       vessel be entitled to damages or demurrage?





42.    Various   ancillary   questions   connected   with   the



aforesaid   two   questions   also   crop   up,   which   we



shall consider shortly.





43.    From   the   undisputed   facts,   the   position   that



emerges is as follows :-





(i)      The   Charter   Party   dated   9.11.1999   was   in



         respect   of   a   transaction   which   provided   for



         carriage   of   crude   oil   from   Ras   Sukheir   to   a



         safe   port   on   the   Indian   coastline.       The



         Charterers         were         given         the         choice         of


                                       40





         nominating   such   port   for   discharge   of   the



         aforesaid cargo of crude oil.





(ii)     In   the   absence   of   any   named   port   of



         destination   in   the   Charter   Party   itself,   it



         was   only   after   the   vessel   left   Ras   Sukheir



         that   an   intimation   was   given   by   the



         Charterers for discharge of the cargo at the



         SBM at Port Vadinar in Gujarat.





(iii)    That         the         aforesaid         nomination         was         a



         conscious   decision   on   the   part   of   the



         Charterers,   despite   having   knowledge   of   the



         equipment   available   on   board   the   vessel   for



         mooring   at   a   SBM,   and   in   keeping   with   such



         decision   m.t.   Prestige   set   its   course   from



         Ras Sukheir to Vadinar.





(iv)     The   fiasco   at   Vadinar   was   occasioned   by   the



         fact that no prior checking had been done to



         see   whether   with   the   mooring   equipment   on


                                           41





         board,   the   vessel   would   be   able   to   safely



         berth at the SBM for discharge of its cargo.





(v)      Who was responsible for the detention of the



         vessel   at   Vadinar   since   its   arrival   at   the



         anchorage point and its final departure from



         the         said         Port?               Whether         there         was



         contributory   negligence   on   the   part   of   both



         the parties in the cause of such delay?





44.    The   concept   of   an   arrived   ship   in   shipping



terminology   requires   that   a   vessel   should   reach   a



destination   in   a   port   where   she   could   be   safely



berthed   and   thereupon   be   ready   to   either   discharge



or load cargo from and on to the vessel.  That is a



general   concept,   but   the   Charterers   and   the   Owners



of the vessel could in the Charter Party agree to a



specific destination point within the port area for



discharging   or   loading   of   cargo.     Once   the   vessel



arrived at the said spot and was ready to discharge


                                42





its   cargo,   it   could   be   described   as   an   "arrived



ship" with the authority to issue and tender Notice



of   Readiness.   In   the   instant   case,   the   nominated



port   for   the   arrival   of   the   vessel   was   Vadinar



Port,   but   the   destination   point   was   the   SBM   where



the   vessel   was   to   be   moored   and   was   to   discharge



its   cargo   of   crude   oil.   In   fact,   in   the   Charter



Party   dated   9.11.1999,   Clause   6   specifically



provided   for   arrival   of   the   vessel   at   the   port   of



loading   or   discharge   and   cast   an   obligation   upon



the   Master   or   his   Agent   to   give   the   Charterer   or



his   Agent   Notice   of   Readiness   in   relation   to



discharge of the cargo.  Since the decision in this



case   will   to   a   large   extent   depend   on   the



interpretation   of   Clause   6,   the   same   is   extracted



hereinbelow :





     "Clause 6 Notice of Readiness :



     Upon   arrival   at   customary   anchorage   at

     each   port   of   loading   or   discharge,   the

     Master   or   his   Agent   shall   give   the


                                 43





       charterer   or   his   Agent   notice   by   letter,

       telegraph,   wireless   or   telephone   that   the

       vessel is ready to load or discharge cargo

       berth   or   no   berth   and   lay   time   as

       hereinafter   provided   shall   commence   upon

       the   expiration   of   six   (6)   hours   after

       receipt   of   such   notice   or   upon   the   vessel

       arrival   in   berth   -   finished   mooring   when

       at   a   sea   loading   or   discharging   terminal

       and   all   fast   when   loading   or   discharging

       alongside a wharf which ever first occurs.

       However,   where   delay   is   caused   to   vessel

       getting   -   berth   after   giving   notice   of

       readiness   for   any   reason   over   which

       charterer has no control, such delay shall

       not count as used lay time."  



45.    As   will   be   evident   from   the   above   clause,   the



Master   of   the   vessel   was   under   an   obligation   to



give   Notice   of   Readiness   on   arrival   at   the



customary   anchorage   at   the   port   of   discharge.     It



is a possibility that since no specific port in the



Indian   coastline   had   been   mentioned   in   the   Charter



Party,   the   Master   of   the   vessel   or   his   Agent   was



required   to   give   Notice   of   Readiness   upon   the



vessel arriving at customary anchorage.  It is only



after   the   vessel   sailed   from   Ras   Sukheir   that   the



receiver,  IOC,  nominated  Vadinar  to  be  the  port  of


                              44





discharge with the specific destination point being



the SBM within the port.   In giving such Notice of



Readiness   upon   arrival   at   the   customary   anchorage



at  Vadinar,  the  Master  of  the  Vessel  duly  complied



with   the   conditions   of   Clause   6   of   the   Charter



Party   and   in   terms   of   the   aforesaid   clause



irrespective   of   whether   a   berth   was   available   or



not,   lay   time   commenced   upon   the   expiry   of   six



hours   after   receipt   of   such   notice.     That   the



vessel   could   not   be   moored   at   the   SBM   is   a



different   facet   of   the   story.     The   Charterers   had



full   knowledge   of   the   equipment   on   board   m.t.



Prestige   through   the   questionnaire   provided   by   the



Respondents/Owners   to   the   Petitioners/Charterers.



It   could   not   be   denied   that   despite   having   such



knowledge   the   IOC   nominated   the   SBM   as   the



destination   point   for   discharge   of   the   cargo.



Obviously, the parties to the Charter Party had not



made   any   attempt   to   verify   as   to   whether   the


                                45





equipment   on   board   the   vessel   was   sufficient   for



her to be safely moored at the SBM and to discharge



her   cargo   safely.     As   it   turned   out   later   on,   the



vessel   was   not   so   equipped   and   could   not,



therefore,   be   moored   at   the   SBM   and   had   to   be



requested   to   move   away   therefrom.     Although,   an



attempt   has   been   made   on   behalf   of   the   Charterers



to   convince   us   that   it   was   really   the   duty   and



responsibility  of  the  Owner  of  the  vessel  to  check



whether   the   vessel   could   be   safely   moored   at   the



SBM in Vadinar, we are unable to convince ourselves



that   such   a   duty   was   that   of   the   Owners   of   the



vessel and not the Charterers which had a choice of



all the ports in India for discharge of the cargo,



as   was   subsequently   done   in   Mumbai   port.     As   has



been held by the Arbitral Tribunal and subsequently



affirmed   both   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   the



Division   Bench   of   the   Bombay   High   Court,   the



responsibility  for  the  failure  of  the  ship  to  moor


                                46





at   the   SBM   in   Vadinar   must   lie   squarely   with   the



Charterers and the receiver as it was they who had



nominated   the   SBM   for   the   safe   mooring   of   the



vessel.     The   lay   time   must,   therefore,   be   held   to



have recommenced after the expiry of six hours from



the   tendering   of   the   Notice   of   Readiness   upon   the



vessel's   arrival   at   the   customary   anchorage   at



Vadinar   on   15.12.1999   in   keeping   with   the



provisions of Clause 6 of the Charter Party. It was



not the case of the Charterers that the failure of



the   vessel   to   discharge   its   cargo   at   the   SBM   at



Vadinar   was   for   reasons   beyond   their   control.     It



cannot   also   be   said   that   the   owners   of   the   vessel



contributed   in   any   way   to   such   failure   since   the



equipment   on   board   the   vessel   had   been   made   known



to   the   Charterers   when   the   Charter   Party   was



signed.





46.    In   the   face   of   the   specific   conditions



indicated   in   Clause   6   of   the   Charter   Party,   the


                               47





theoretical   and/or   academic   exercise   of   what



constitutes   an   "arrived   ship"   loses   much   of   its



relevance.   The   terms   of   the   Charter   Party   were



agreed   upon   by   the   parties   with   their   eyes   wide



open.     What   is   also   significant   and   cuts   at   the



root   of   the   submissions   advanced   on   behalf   of   the



Charterers is that even after the vessel was denied



mooring   at   the   SBM   for   safety   reasons   on



21.12.1999,   no   steps   were   taken   on   behalf   of   the



Petitioners to either arrange for an alternate safe



berthing   in   Vadinar   or   to   give   instructions   as   to



where the cargo was to be discharged.   In fact, on



behalf of the Respondents/Owners a legal notice was



addressed to the Petitioners on 24.12.1999 pointing



out   that   the   vessel   continued   to   await   discharge



incurring   demurrage.     It   is   only   thereafter   that



Addendum No.I to the Charter Party was drawn up and



signed   on   28.12.1999   by   the   Owners   and   the



Charterers,   whereby   m.t.   Prestige   was   diverted   by


                                     48





the   Charterers   from   Vadinar   to   a   Lighterage   point



at      Mumbai      port      for      discharge      and      it      was



specifically   agreed   that   the   Charterers   would   bear



all   the   costs   of   discharge,   including   freight



charges   and   the   expenses   of   the   daughter   vessel,



m.t.   Maharaja   Agrasen.     It   was   also   agreed   that



demurrage would be settled as per the terms of the



Charter  Party.    In  our  view,  the  various  decisions



cited   on   behalf   of   the   Petitioners/Charterers   do



not   help   them   in   the   facts   of   this   case.     We   do



not,   therefore,   think   it   necessary   to   consider   all



the   decisions   cited   on   behalf   of   the   respective



parties   and   those   referred   to   hereinbefore   are



sufficient   for   our   purpose.   The   decisions   relied



upon   by   the   parties   lay   down   certain   propositions



of   law   which   are   well-established   and   with   which



there   cannot   be   any   disagreement,   but   for   the



purposes of this case they are basically academic.


                               49





47.    Once   we   have   affirmed   the   finding   that   m.t.



Prestige   was   an   arrived   ship   on   reaching   the



customary   anchorage   at   Vadinar   port   and   once   we



have   also   held   that   it   was   the   Charterers   who



having the choice of a safe port, had selected the



SBM   at   Vadinar   as   the   discharge   point,   the



suggestion made on behalf of the Charterers that it



was  the  responsibility  of  the  Owners  of  the  vessel



to check whether the ship could be safely moored at



the   SBM,   is   untenable.     The   responsibility   of   the



Owners  of  the  vessel  ended  with  the  declaration  of



the   equipment   available   on   board   for   mooring   and



berthing for the purpose of discharge of its cargo.



Consequently,   all   the   other   ancillary   issues   which



arise   have   to   be   answered   in   favour   of   the



Respondents herein.  As indicated hereinbefore, the



fiasco   at   Vadinar   was   occasioned   by   the   fact   that



no   prior   checking   had   been   done   by   the   Charterers



to   ascertain   as   to   whether   with   the   mooring


                                 50





equipment on board the vessel she would be able to



moor safely at the SBM for discharge of her cargo.



Even   the   subsequent   deviation   of   the   vessel   from



Vadinar to Mumbai was not on account of any laches



on   the   part   of   the   Owners   of   the   vessel   who   were



awaiting   instructions   once   the   vessel   had   been



asked to move away from the SBM.   In fact, it took



a   notice   from   the   Owners   of   the   vessel   and   a   week



for   the   Charterers   to   galvanize   themselves   into



action,   which   ultimately   resulted   in   the   Addendum



No.1 dated 28.12.1999.





48.    Read   with   Clause   6   of   the   Charter   Party,   the



Addendum dated 28.12.1999 makes it abundantly clear



that the Charterers had accepted the responsibility



for   the   failure   of   the   vessel   to   discharge   her



cargo   at   Vadinar   and   had   agreed   to   bear   all   the



expenses   for   the   delay   in   diversion   of   the   vessel



from Vadinar to Mumbai, including the time spent at


                                51





Vadinar   port   and   the   expenses   incurred   towards



pilotage, tugs and other port expenses.





49.    Apart from the above, Clause 4(1) of Part II of



the   Charter   Party   specifically   provides   that   extra



expenses   incurred   on   account   of   any   change   in



loading or discharging ports, has to be paid by the



Charterers, and any time thereby lost to the vessel



shall   count   as   used   lay   time.   We   are   not   inclined



to accept Mr. Gupta's submission that the aforesaid



clause   has   to   be   read   in   the   context   of   Clauses



4(a)   and   4(b)   which   refer   to   ports   other   than



Indian Ports in a different context.





50.    We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with



the   Award   of   the   Arbitral   Tribunal   and   the



decisions, both of the learned Single Judge and the



Division   Bench,   confirming   the   Award   of   the



Arbitral   Tribunal   and,   accordingly,   dismiss   the



Special Leave Petition.   In the facts of the case,


                               52





the   parties   shall   bear   their   own   costs   as   far   as



these proceedings are concerned.            



     





                                          ................................................J.

                                              (ALTAMAS KABIR)





                                          ................................................J.

                                               (A.K. PATNAIK)

NEW DELHI

DATED:JULY 13, 2011

Whenever the case is based on circumstantial evidence following features are required to be complied with. It would be beneficial to repeat the same salient features once again which are as under:- "(i) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must or should be and not merely 'may be' fully established, (ii) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of

Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                1




                                                                REPORTABLE


                             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                            CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1327 OF 2008




     Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen                             ....Appellant



                                         Versus



     State of Rajasthan                                     ....Respondent



                      WITH



     Criminal Appeal No.1369/2008; and

     Criminal Appeal No.1370/2008





                                    J U D G M E N T



     Deepak Verma, J.


     


     1.    This   judgment   and   order   shall   govern   disposal   of



           Crl.   A.   No.   1369   of   2008  Nandu   Singh   @   Vikram



           Singh   Vs.   State   of   Rajasthan  and   Crl.   A.No.   1370



           of   2008  Arun   Joseph   Vs.   State   of   Rajasthan  as



           they   arise   out   of   the   common   judgment   and   order



           recorded   by   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of



           Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur in D.B.


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                      2




         Criminal   Appeal   No.   125/2005,   210/2005   and



         1176/2005   decided   on   03.12.2007,   arising   out   of



         judgment   and   order   of   conviction   recorded   by



         Special Judge SC/ST (PA Cases) Jaipur in Sessions



         Case No. 02/2004 decided on 10.02.2005.




     2. The   trial   court   vide   its   judgment   and   order   held



         the   Appellants   guilty   for   commission   of   offence



         under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (in



         short   'IPC')   and   awarded   life   imprisonment   with



         fine   of   Rs.   1000/-   and   in   default   of   payment   of



         fine further three months simple imprisonment and



         under   Section   4/25   of   the   Arms   Act   one   year   R.I.



         and   fine   of   Rs.   500/-   and   in   default   of   payment



         of fine to further suffer one month imprisonment.



         The sentences were directed to run concurrently.





     3. Feeling                  aggrieved         by         the         said         judgment,



         Appellants   had   preferred   three   appeals   as



         mentioned   hereinabove   before   the   Division   Bench



         of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008          3




         Jaipur   Bench.   The   High   Court,   after   considering



         the   matter   from   all   angles   also   came   to   the



         conclusion   that   no   interference   was   called   for



         against the said judgment of the trial Court and



         dismissed   the   appeals.   In   all,   there   were   five



         accused   out   of   which   one     Abrar   was   declared



         absconder   and   Abdul   Wahid   was   acquitted   by   the



         Trial   Court.   Thus   these   appeals   by   the   three



         convicted accused.





     4. We   have,   accordingly,   heard   learned   Counsel   Mr.



         R.K. Kapoor, Ms. Shweta Kapoor, Mrs. Mansi Dhiman



         for   the   Appellants   and   Mr.   Milind   Kumar,   Mr.



         Imtiaz Ahmeda and Ms. Archana Pathak Dave for the



         Respondent State and perused the record.





     5. Facts   giving   rise   to   the   prosecution   story,



         ultimately   resulting   in   conviction   of   the



         Appellants, are as under:-


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                          4




             On   24.07.2003   at   5.45   p.m.   Diwakar   Chaturvedi



     SHO   Police   Station   Vidhan   Sabha,   Jaipur   received



     telephonic   information   about   murder   of   a   person   in



     Kathputli                   Colony.         After         recording         the         said



     information   in   Rojnamcha,   SHO   rushed   to   the   spot



     with police squad and found a person lying dead in



     a pool of blood.





     6. On   inquiries   being   made   P.W.3   -   Ashok   Kumar,



           present   at   the   place   of   occurrence   informed



           Diwakar that the name of the deceased was Ram Pal



           Yadav. He further informed that the murder of Ram



           Pal Yadav has been caused by Mustkeem, Nandu and



           one   other   person   by   inflicting   injuries   on   his



           person   with   sword   and   knife.     The   third   person



           was later identified as Arun Joseph. On receiving



           the   said   information   SHO   recorded   the   Parcha



           Bayan   of   P.W.3   -   Ashok   Kumar   and   registered   a



           case under Section 302/120B of the IPC. Thus the



           investigation machinery was set into motion. Dead


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008           5




         body   was   sent   for   autopsy,   necessary   memos   were



         drawn,   statements   of   witnesses   were   recorded,



         accused   were   arrested   and   on   completion   of



         investigation charge sheet was filed.





     7. Charges   under   Section   302/149   IPC   and   Section



         4/25   of   the   Arms   Act   were   framed   against   the



         accused.   They   denied   the   charges   and   prayed   for



         being   tried.   The   prosecution   in   support   of   its



         case examined 19 witnesses. The statements of the



         Appellants   under   Section   313   of   Cr.   P.C.   were



         recorded,   who   claimed   innocence   and   prayed   for



         their acquittal.





     8. As per the post mortem report Ex. P.34, deceased



         Ram   Pal   Yadav   had   received   38   ante   mortem



         injuries   and   from   the   evidence   of   P.W.13   -   Dr.



         Sumant Dutta, cause of death was stated to be due



         to   hemorrhagic   shock   as   a   result   of   injuries   to



         chest,   lungs   and   skull   and   on   account   of



         excessive   bleeding.   In   the   light   of   the   Post


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                      6




         Mortem   Report   and   the   evidence   of   P.W.13   -   Dr.



         Sumant Dutta, it cannot be disputed nor has been



         disputed   before   us   that   deceased   had   met   with



         homicidal death.





     9. Now           the         question              that         arises         for         our



         consideration   in   this   and   the   connected   appeals



         is   as   to   who   were   the   perpetrators   of   the   crime



         and   whether   the   trial   Court   and   High   Court   were



         justified   in   holding   the   appellants   guilty   for



         commission of the said offences.





     10.Before   we   proceed   to   do   so   it   is   necessary   to



         point   out   that   the   solitary   star   witness   of   the



         prosecution   P.W.3   -   Ashok   Kumar   had   turned



         hostile and was declared as such.





     11.In   fact,   it   is   pertinent   to   mention   here   that



         the   main   material   witnesses   were   declared



         hostile. The Trial Court observed in this context



         that   P.W.1   Mohd.   Ayub   (recovery   witness),   P.W.3


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008           7




         Ashok   Kumar   and   P.W.2   Prakash   (both   eye-



         witnesses)   had   retracted   their   statements   made



         under   Section   161   Cr.P.C.   during   examination.



         Furthermore,   it   has   also   refused   to   attach   much



         credence   to   the   deposition   of   P.W.19   Yogesh



         Kumar,   owing   to   the   clear   contradictions   in   his



         statement   and   aforesaid   deposition   regarding   his



         presence   at   the   scene   of   crime.   Thus,   in   a



         nutshell,   Trial   Court   had   also   found   them



         unreliable   and   has   not   based   the   Appellants



         conviction   on   the   basis   of   their   statements.



         Similarly High Court has not taken their evidence



         into   consideration.   Thus,   it   is   neither   required



         nor   is   necessary   to   deal   with   their   evidence.



         Trial Court had recorded a finding that the case



         is   without   any   eye   witness   and   is   based   on



         circumstantial evidence.





     12.It   is   therefore   necessary   to   discuss   the



         evidence   of   P.W.8   -   Smt.   Supyar   Kanwar,   P.W.9   -


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008             8




         Lali  Devi  and  P.W.10  -  Chittar  so  as  to  find  out



         the   element   of   truth   in   the   same   and   to   discern



         any motive behind the commission of the offence.





     13.It   is   fully   established   that   the   prosecution



         case is based on circumstantial evidence. In this



         view   of   the   matter,   we   have   to   see   if   the   chain



         of   circumstances   was   so   complete   so   as   to



         unerringly   point   the   finger   only   at   the



         Appellants   as   perpetrators   of   crime.     Before



         delving   into   the   legal   analysis,   however,   we



         would like to examine the statements of P.W.8 and



         P.W.10 in brief.





     14.As   per   the   prosecution   story,   Appellants



         Mustkeem and Arun had met P.W.10 - Chittar a day



         before   the   occurrence,   in   whose   house   deceased



         Ram   Pal   Yadav,   was   residing   as   a   tenant,     for



         last 5 to 6 years and he deposed that Appellants



         Mustkeem   and   Arun   had   told   him   that,     that   day



         it     would   be   the   last   visit   of   Ram   Pal   and   he


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008             9




         will not come to his house again. Similar is the



         evidence   of   P.W.9   -   Lali   Devi,   wife   of   P.W.10.



         She   has   repeated   the   same   version   as   had   been



         deposed by P.W.10- Chittar.





     15. P.W.8 - Smt. Supyar deposed that Mustkeem, Arun



         and   Nandu   used   to   visit   Ram   Pal   Yadav   regularly



         as   all   of   them   were   dealing   in   illicit   liquor



         trade.   On   coming   to   know   from   Lali   Devi   that



         Arun,   Mustkeem   and   Nandu   were   keen   to   eliminate



         Ram   Pal   Yadav,   she   had   telephonically   asked   him



         to   meet   her   at   the   earliest.   When   deceased   Ram



         Pal Yadav met Smt. Supyar, she informed him about



         the intentions of the accused. She also told him



         that   Arun   and   Mustkeem   both   had   said   that   it



         would   be   the   last   visit   of   Ram   Pal   Yadav   to   her



         house as they were planning to eliminate him.





     16.Thus,   from   an   appraisal   of   the   evidence   of



         P.W.8, P.W.9 and P.W.10, the Trial Court and the



         Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   ruled   that


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008           10




         prosecution   has   been   able   to   establish   that



         deceased   Ram   Pal   Yadav   and   Appellants   were   all



         involved   in   illegal   trade   of   liquor   and   a   day



         prior to the date of incident, Arun and Mustkeem



         had   expressed   their   intentions   to   eliminate   Ram



         Pal to P.W.9 and P.W.10.





     17.High   Court   while   considering   the   Appellants'



         appeal   found   this   factor   as   one   of   the



         incriminating   circumstances   to   eventually   hold



         the Appellants guilty for the aforesaid offence.





     18. The       other   circumstance   found   against   the



         Appellants   by   High   Court   was   that,   on   the   basis



         of   the   disclosure   statements   of   the   Appellants,



         weapons   alleged   to   be   used   in   the   commission   of



         offence   and   clothes   stained   with   human   blood



         were   recovered.   In   its   Judgment,   the   High   Court



         has   discussed  in  extenso  the   effect   of   Section



         27 of the Indian Evidence Act (hereinafter shall


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008          11




         be   referred   to   as   'Act')   and   subsequent



         discovery of the material objects thereafter.





     19.On the basis of the report of the serologist, it



         has come on record that traces of AB blood group



         were   found   on   the   pants   and   baniyan   of   the



         deceased.   The   prosecution   has   also   averred   that



         Sword   and  clothes   stained  with   human  blood   group



         AB   were   also   recovered   at   the   instance   of



         Appellants,   from   the   places   shown   by   them   and



         known only to them and none others. On account of



         aforesaid   circumstances,   the   High   Court   was   of



         the   opinion   that   the   chain   of   circumstances   was



         complete and the completed chain of circumstances



         pointed   the   finger   for   commission   of   the   said



         offence only by the Appellants.





     20.  As   regards   the   motive   (if   any)   behind   the



         homicide,   on   review   of   the   relevant   deposition



         of the witnesses, we are of the opinion that one



         of   the   circumstances   found   against   the   present


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                      12




         Appellants,             that         deceased                and         Appellants



         indulged   in   illegal   trade   of   liquor   and   thus



         were having enmity with each other, is not based



         on any cogent and reliable evidence much less on



         the   evidence   of   P.W.8,   P.W.9   and   P.W.10.   This



         could   not   have   been   the   motive   of   killing   Ram



         Pal.





     21.In fact, the omissions on the part of all three



         witnesses   namely,   P.W.8,   P.W.9   and   P.W.   10   to



         state   certain   material   facts   in   the   course   of



         making   their   statements   before   the   police,   which



         they   have   categorically   admitted   in   their



         depositions             may          even         be              considered         as



         "contradictions"   as   per   the   Explanation   to



         Section 162 of the Cr.P.C.





     22.     Their evidence, that they had intimated P.W.8 a



     day prior to the date of incident, that they would



     eliminate   Ram   Pal   is   also   not   trustworthy.   On



     account of several discrepancies appearing in their


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008           13




     evidence,   P.W.8   is   absolutely   an   hearsay   witness



     which   is   borne   out   from   their   evidence.   Similarly



     the evidence of P.W.9 and P.W.10 does not establish



     the intention on the part of the accused to murder



     Ram Prasad. Since no enmity could be established on



     record   between   them   there   was   nothing   which



     warranted to eliminate Ram Pal.





     23.     The   AB   blood   group   which   was   found   on   the



     clothes   of   the   deceased   does   not   by   itself



     establish   the   guilt   of   the   Appellant   unless   the



     same   was   connected   with   the   murder   of   deceased   by



     the   Appellants.   None   of   the   witnesses   examined   by



     the   prosecution   could   establish   that   fact.   The



     blood  found  on  the  sword  recovered  at  the  instance



     of the Mustkeem was not sufficient for test as the



     same had already disintegrated.   At any rate,   due



     to   the   reasons   elaborated   in   the   following



     paragraphs, the fact that the traces of blood found



     on   the   deceased   matched   those   found   on   the


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008          14




     recovered   weapons   cannot  ipso   facto  enable   us   to



     arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  the  latter  were  used



     for the murder.





     24.     In   fact,   the   recovery   of   the   weapons   on



     disclosure   of   the   Appellants   itself   becomes



     doubtful.   The   witness   of   Recovery   Memo   P.W.1   -



     Mohd.   Ayub   Khan   was   declared   hostile   and   another



     witness   P.W.10   -   Chittar   admitted   that   signatures



     were   obtained   on   the   memos   and   annexures   at   the



     Police   Station   itself.   It   is   also   pertinent   to



     mention   here   that   P.W.1   -   Mohd.   Ayub   Khan   was



     residing 4 Kms. away from the place of recovery and



     P.W.10 - Chittar was residing 8 Kms. away from the



     place   of   recovery   and   were   also   declared   hostile.



     Prosecution   failed   to   establish   as   to   why   none   of



     the  local  persons  were  called  to  be  the  witnesses.



     The   conduct   of   the   prosecution   appears   to   be



     extremely   doubtful   and   renders   the   case   as



     concocted,   to   falsely   implicate   the   Appellants.


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                          15




     Recovery   Memos   also   reflect   that   there   were



     overwriting   on   the   same   which   has   not   been



     explained                   by          P.W.16          -         Diwakar              Chaturvedi



     (Investigating Officer). He admitted that memos and



     annexures   were   prepared   in   his   own   handwriting   but



     also   admitted   in   his   cross   examination   that   the



     same   were   in   a   different   handwriting.   This   lacuna



     should   have   been   explained   by   the   prosecution   more



     so         when             the         whole           case           rested          only         on



     circumstantial evidence. Thus looking to the matter



     from   all   angles   we   are   of   the   considered   opinion



     that   it   would   not   be   safe   and   proper   to   hold   the



     Appellants guilty for commission of offence.





     25.     It is too well settled in law that where the



     case   rests   squarely   on   circumstantial   evidence   the



     inference   of guilt can be justified only when all



     the incriminating facts and circumstances are found



     to   be   incompatible   with   the   innocence   of   the



     accused or the guilt of any other person. No doubt,


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008               16




     it   is   true   that   conviction   can   be   based   solely   on



     circumstantial evidence but it should be decided on



     the   touchstone   of   law   relating   to   circumstantial



     evidence,   which   has   been   well   settled   by   law   by



     this Court.





     26.     In   a   most   celebrated   case   of   this   Court



     reported   in   1984   (4)   SCC   116  Sharad   Birdhichand



     Sarda  Vs.  State   of   Maharashtra  in   para   153,   some



     cardinal   principles   regarding   the   appreciation   of



     circumstantial   evidence   have   been   postulated.



     Whenever   the   case   is   based   on   circumstantial



     evidence   following   features   are   required   to   be



     complied with. It would be beneficial to repeat the



     same   salient   features   once   again   which   are   as



     under:-





                  "(i) The   circumstances   from   which   the

                  conclusion   of   guilt   is   to   be   drawn   must

                  or   should   be   and   not   merely   'may   be'

                  fully established,


                  (ii) The   facts   so   established   should   be

                  consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                17




                  the guilt of the accused, that is to say,

                  they   should   not   be   explainable   on   any

                  other   hypothesis   except   that   the   accused

                  is guilty,


                  (iii)         The circumstances should be of a

                  conclusive nature and tendency,


                  (iv)   They should exclude every possible

                  hypothesis   except   the   one   to   be   proved,

                  and


                  (v)       There must be a chain of  evidence   so

                  complete   as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable

                  ground for the conclusion consistent with

                  the   innocence   of   the   accused   and   must

                  show   that   in   all   human   probability   the

                  act must have been done         by              the

                  accused".





     27.     With   regard   to   Section   27   of   the   Act,   what   is



     important   is   discovery   of   the   material   object   at



     the   disclosure   of   the   accused   but   such   disclosure



     alone   would   not   automatically   lead   to   the



     conclusion   that   the   offence   was   also   committed   by



     the   accused.   In   fact,   thereafter,   burden   lies   on



     the   prosecution   to   establish   a   close   link   between



     discovery   of   the   material   objects   and   its   use   in



     the   commission   of   the   offence.   What   is   admissible


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                       18




     under   Section   27   of   the   Act   is   the   information



     leading  to  discovery  and  not  any  opinion  formed  on



     it by the prosecution.





     28.     If   the   recovery   memos   were   prepared   at   the



     Police  Station  itself  then  the  same  would  lose  its



     sanctity   as   held   by   this   Court   in  Varun   Chaudhary



     Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2011 SCC 72.





     29.     The   scope   and   ambit   of   Section   27   were   also



     illuminatingly   stated   in   AIR   1947   PC   67  Pulukuri



     Kotayya                &         Ors.     Vs.     Emperor     reproduced



     hereinbelow:-





                      "...it   is   fallacious   to   treat   the   'fact

             discovered' within the section as equivalent

             to   the   object   produced;   the   fact   discovered

             embraces   the   place   from   which   the   object   is

             produced and the knowledge of the accused as

             to   this,   and   the   information   given   must

             relate   distinctly   to   this   fact.   Information

             as to past user, or the past history, of the

             object   produced   is   not   related   to   its

             discovery   in   the   setting   in   which   it   is

             discovered. Information supplied by a person

             in   custody   that   'I   will   produce   a   knife

             concealed  in  the  roof  of  my  house'  does  not

             lead   to   the   discovery   of   a   knife;   knives


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                19




             were   discovered   many   years   ago.   It   leads   to

             the   discovery   of   the   fact   that   a   knife   is

             concealed   in   the   house   of   the   informant   to

             his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to

             have   been   used   in   the   commission   of   the

             offence,   the   fact   discovered   is   very

             relevant.   But   if   to   the   statement   the   words

             be   added   'with   which   I   stabbed   A'   these

             words   are   inadmissible   since   they   do   not

             relate  to  the  discovery  of  the  knife  in  the

             house of the informant."





                            The   same   were   thereafter   restated   in



     another   judgment   of   this   Court   reported   in   2004



     (10) SCC 657 Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan.





     30.       The   doctrine   of   circumstantial   evidence   was



     once again discussed and summarised in 2008 (3) SCC



     210 Sattatiya @Satish Rajanna Kartalla Vs. State of



     Maharashtra in the following terms:                        





                 "10.   ..It   is   settled   law   that   an   offence

                 can be proved not only by direct evidence

                 but also by circumstantial evidence where

                 there   is   no   direct   evidence.   The   court

                 can   draw   an   inference   of   guilt   when   all

                 the   incriminating   facts   and   circumstances

                 are found to be totally incompatible with

                 the   innocence   of   the   accused.   Of   course,

                 the   circumstance   from   which   an   inference

                 as   to   the   guilt   is   drawn   have   to   be


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008                           20




                 proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   have

                 to   be   shown   to   be   closely   connected   with

                 the   principal   fact   sought   to   be   inferred

                 from those circumstances".





    31.          As   regards   scope   of   interference   against



    concurrent   findings   of   fact,   powers   under   Article



    136   of   the   Constitution   can   be   exercised,   in   the



    manner   described   in     para   14   of   the   aforesaid



    judgment reproduced hereinbelow:-  





                 "14.     At   this   stage,   we   also   deem   it

                 proper   to   observe   that   in   exercise   of

                 power           under            Article                136                  of          the

                 Constitution,                    this             Court                     will          be

                 extremely loath to upset the judgment of

                 conviction which is confirmed in appeal.

                 However,   if   it   is   found   that   the

                 appreciation   of   evidence   in   a   case,

                 which            is              entirely                    based                        on

                 circumstantial   evidence,   is   vitiated   by

                 serious   errors   and   on   that   account

                 miscarriage                 of          justice                   has                    been

                 occasioned,                 then             the             Court                       will

                 certainly              interfere                  even                 with              the

                 concurrent   findings   recorded   by   the

                 trial   court   and   the   High   Court.   [Bharat

                 Vs. State of M.P. 2003 (3) SCC 106]


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008           21




    32.     After   having   discussed   the   entire   evidence,   we



    have no doubt in our mind that the same is vitiated



    by   serious   errors   and   if   Appellant's   conviction   is



    upheld   then   it   would   amount   to   miscarriage   of



    justice.





    33.     In   the   light   of   the   aforesaid   well   settled



    principles   of   law   by   several   authorities   of   this



    Court,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   judgment   and



    order   of   conviction   as   recorded   by   Trial   Court   and



    confirmed   by   High   Court   in   Appellants   appeals



    cannot   be   sustained   in   law.   The   same   are,



    therefore,   hereby   set   aside   and   quashed.   Appeals



    are   allowed.   Appellants   are   acquitted   of   the



    charges   levelled   against   them.   The   Appellants   be



    set   at   liberty,   if   not   required   in   any   other



    criminal cases.





                                         .....................J.

                                             [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY]

     


Crl. A. No. 1327 of 2008         22




                                          ....................J.

                                            [DEEPAK VERMA]

     New Delhi

     July 13, 2011