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Tuesday, July 12, 2011
whether the arbitrator can grant interest inspite of prohibition in the agreement - On 16.05.1988, the respondent was awarded with a contract for the work of Provision of Signaling Arrangements at "C" Class Stations on Igatpuri-Bhusawal Section and 2 "C" Stations on Bhusawal-Badnera Section of Bhusawal Division of Central Railway at the cost of Rs.18,10,400/-. On completion of the contract, the respondent raised certain disputes/claims by filing Suit No. 2822 of 1993 before the High Court and demanded for adjudication through arbitration. The High Court directed the General Manager of the Central Railway to appoint an arbitrator and refer the disputes for adjudication. Since the Arbitrator appointed could not deliberate the matter within the time limit, the respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the Umpire. The Umpire, by order dated 26.04.2005, gave award for Claim Nos. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13 and rejected Claim Nos. 2, 5, 7 & 14 and
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2005 OF 2007
Union of India .... Appellant (s)
Versus
M/s Krafters Engineering & Leasing
(P) Ltd. .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) This appeal by Union of India arises out of the final
judgment and order dated 24.04.2006 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 219 of 2006
in Arbitration Petition No. 274 of 2005 whereby the
Division Bench of the High Court dismissed their appeal.
1
2) Brief facts:
(a) On 16.05.1988, the respondent was awarded with a
contract for the work of Provision of Signaling
Arrangements at "C" Class Stations on Igatpuri-Bhusawal
Section and 2 "C" Stations on Bhusawal-Badnera Section
of Bhusawal Division of Central Railway at the cost of
Rs.18,10,400/-. On completion of the contract, the
respondent raised certain disputes/claims by filing Suit
No. 2822 of 1993 before the High Court and demanded for
adjudication through arbitration. The High Court directed
the General Manager of the Central Railway to appoint an
arbitrator and refer the disputes for adjudication. Since
the Arbitrator appointed could not deliberate the matter
within the time limit, the respondent invoked the
jurisdiction of the Umpire. The Umpire, by order dated
26.04.2005, gave award for Claim Nos. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12 & 13 and rejected Claim Nos. 2, 5, 7 & 14 and
2
mentioned that a bank guarantee towards security deposit
against claim No. 4 is to be returned.
(b) Challenging the award given by the Umpire for Claim
Nos. 11 & 13, the appellant herein filed Arbitration
Petition No. 274 of 2005 before the High Court. The
learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide order dated
06.12.2005 dismissed their petition.
(c) Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned single
Judge, the appellant herein filed an appeal being
Arbitration Appeal No. 219 of 2006 before the Division
Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench, by
impugned order dated 24.04.2006, dismissed the appeal.
Challenging the said order, the Union of India preferred
this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
3) Heard Mr. A. S. Chandhiok, learned Additional
Solicitor General for the Union of India and Mr. Ramesh
Babu M.R., learned counsel for the respondent.
3
4) Before the High Court as well as before us, the
appellant projected their case only with regard to interest
that was granted by the arbitrator and confirmed by the
High Court. Therefore, the only point for consideration in
this appeal is whether an arbitrator has jurisdiction to
grant interest despite the agreement prohibiting the same?
5) Though the appellant has challenged the award of the
Umpire in respect of Claim Nos. 11 and 13, they are
mainly concerned about grant of interest; hence there is
no need to traverse all the factual details except the
required one which we have adverted to. According to Mr.
A.S. Chandhiok, learned ASG, in view of clause 1.15 of the
General Conditions of the Contract between the parties,
the arbitrator does not have the power to award interest
pendente lite. The said clause reads as under:
"1.15 Interest on Amounts - No interest will be payable
upon the Earnest Money or the Security Deposit or
amounts payable to the Contractor under the Contract
but Government Securities deposited in terms of clause
1.14.4 will be repayable with interest accrued thereon."
4
According to the learned ASG, in view of the above-
mentioned clause, no interest is payable on the amount
payable to the Contractor under the contract. On the
other hand, Mr. Ramesh Babu M.R., learned counsel
appearing for the respondent submitted that irrespective
of the bar in the contract arbitrator has power to award
interest for which he strongly relied on the decision of this
Court in Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta vs.
Engineers-De-Space-Age, (1996) 1 SCC 516 and
Madnani Construction Corporation Private Limited vs.
Union of India and Others, (2010) 1 SCC 549.
6) We have already extracted the relevant clause
wherein the words "amounts payable to the Contractor
under the contract" are of paramount importance. If there
is no prohibition in the arbitration agreement to exclude
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to entertain a claim for
interest on the amount due under the contract, the
arbitrator is free to consider and award interest in respect
5
of the period. If there is a prohibition in the agreement to
pay the interest, in that event, the arbitrator cannot grant
the interest. Clause 1.15 prohibits payment of interest on
the amount payable to the contractor under the contract.
7) It is not in dispute that the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 alone are applicable to the case on
hand. Now, let us consider various decisions of this Court
dealing with similar prohibition in the agreement for grant
of interest. In Secretary, Irrigation Department,
Government of Orissa and Others vs. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1
SCC 508, the Constitution Bench had considered Section
29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which deals with interest
pendente lite. After analyzing the scheme of the Act and
various earlier decisions, the Constitution Bench
considered the very same issue, namely, whether an
arbitrator has power to award interest pendente lite and, if
so, on what principle. The relevant paragraphs are
extracted hereunder:-
6
"43. The question still remains whether arbitrator has the
power to award interest pendente lite, and if so on what
principle. We must reiterate that we are dealing with the
situation where the agreement does not provide for grant of
such interest nor does it prohibit such grant. In other words,
we are dealing with a case where the agreement is silent as
to award of interest. On a conspectus of aforementioned
decisions, the following principles emerge:
(i) A person deprived of the use of money to which he
is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the
deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest,
compensation or damages. This basic consideration is as
valid for the period the dispute is pending before the
arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator
entering upon the reference. This is the principle of Section
34, Civil Procedure Code and there is no reason or principle
to hold otherwise in the case of arbitrator.
(ii) An arbitrator is an alternative form (sic forum) for
resolution of disputes arising between the parties. If so, he
must have the power to decide all the disputes or differences
arising between the parties. If the arbitrator has no power to
award interest pendente lite, the party claiming it would
have to approach the court for that purpose, even though he
may have obtained satisfaction in respect of other claims
from the arbitrator. This would lead to multiplicity of
proceedings.
(iii) An arbitrator is the creature of an agreement. It is
open to the parties to confer upon him such powers and
prescribe such procedure for him to follow, as they think fit,
so long as they are not opposed to law. (The proviso to
Section 41 and Section 3 of Arbitration Act illustrate this
point). All the same, the agreement must be in conformity
with law. The arbitrator must also act and make his award
in accordance with the general law of the land and the
agreement.
(iv) Over the years, the English and Indian courts have
acted on the assumption that where the agreement does not
prohibit and a party to the reference makes a claim for
interest, the arbitrator must have the power to award
interest pendente lite. Thawardas has not been followed in
the later decisions of this Court. It has been explained and
distinguished on the basis that in that case there was no
claim for interest but only a claim for unliquidated damages.
It has been said repeatedly that observations in the said
judgment were not intended to lay down any such absolute
7
or universal rule as they appear to, on first impression. Until
Jena case almost all the courts in the country had upheld
the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente lite.
Continuity and certainty is a highly desirable feature of law.
(v) Interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive
law, like interest for the period anterior to reference (pre-
reference period). For doing complete justice between the
parties, such power has always been inferred.
44. Having regard to the above consideration, we think that
the following is the correct principle which should be
followed in this behalf:
Where the agreement between the parties does not
prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest
and that dispute (along with the claim for principal amount
or independently) is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have
the power to award interest pendente lite. This is for the
reason that in such a case it must be presumed that interest
was an implied term of the agreement between the parties
and therefore when the parties refer all their disputes -- or
refer the dispute as to interest as such -- to the arbitrator,
he shall have the power to award interest. This does not
mean that in every case the arbitrator should necessarily
award interest pendente lite. It is a matter within his
discretion to be exercised in the light of all the facts and
circumstances of the case, keeping the ends of justice in
view."
8) In Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor
Irrigation Division, Orissa and Others vs. N.C
Budharaj (deceased) by LRs and Others, (2001) 2 SCC
721, another Constitution Bench considered payment of
interest for pre-reference period in respect of cases arising
when Interest Act, 1839 was in force. The following
conclusion in para 26 is relevant which reads thus:
8
"26. For all the reasons stated above, we answer the
reference by holding that the arbitrator appointed with or
without the intervention of the court, has jurisdiction to
award interest, on the sums found due and payable, for the
pre-reference period, in the absence of any specific
stipulation or prohibition in the contract to claim or grant
any such interest. The decision in Jena case taking a contra
view does not lay down the correct position and stands
overruled, prospectively, which means that this decision
shall not entitle any party nor shall it empower any court to
reopen proceedings which have already become final, and
apply only to any pending proceedings. No costs."
(Emphasis supplied).
9) In the earlier paras, we have referred to the stand
taken by the learned counsel for the respondent and
reliance based on the decision reported in Board of
Trustees for the Port of Calcutta (supra). It is true
that in that decision, this Court has held that arbitrator
has jurisdiction to interpret the clauses of the contract
and to decide whether interest pendente lite could be
awarded by him. The short question that arose in that
case was that the arbitrator had awarded interest
pendente lite notwithstanding the prohibition contained in
the contract against the payment of interest on delayed
payments. Ultimately, the two-Judge Bench of this Court
has concluded that irrespective of the terms of the
9
contract, the arbitrator was well within his jurisdiction in
awarding interest pendente lite. It is useful to point out
that the ratio in that decision was considered by this
Court in Sayeed Ahmed and Company vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2009) 12 SCC 26. While
considering the very same issue, particularly, specific
clause in the agreement prohibiting interest pendente lite,
this Court considered the very same decision i.e. Board of
Trustees for the Port of Calcutta (supra). After
adverting to the clause in the Board of Trustees for the
Port of Calcutta (supra) and the Constitution Bench in
G.C. Roy's case (supra), this Court concluded as under:
"23. The observation in Engineers-De-Space-Age that the
term of the contract merely prohibits the
department/employer from paying interest to the contractor
for delayed payment but once the matter goes to the
arbitrator, the discretion of the arbitrator is not in any
manner stifled by the terms of the contract and the
arbitrator will be entitled to consider and grant the interest
pendente lite, cannot be used to support an outlandish
argument that bar on the Government or department paying
interest is not a bar on the arbitrator awarding interest.
Whether the provision in the contract bars the employer
from entertaining any claim for interest or bars the
contractor from making any claim for interest, it amounts to
a clear prohibition regarding interest. The provision need not
contain another bar prohibiting the arbitrator from awarding
10
interest. The observations made in the context of interest
pendente lite cannot be used out of contract.
24. The learned counsel for the appellant next contended on
the basis of the above observations in Engineers-De-Space-
Age, that even if Clause G1.09 is held to bar interest in the
pre-reference period, it should be held not to apply to the
pendente lite period, that is, from 14-3-1997 to 31-7-2001.
He contended that the award of interest during the pendency
of the reference was within the discretion of the arbitrator
and therefore, the award of interest for that period could not
have been interfered with by the High Court. In view of the
Constitution Bench decisions in G.C. Roy and N.C. Budharaj
rendered before and after the decision in Engineers-De-
Space-Age, it is doubtful whether the observation in
Engineers-De-Space-Age in a case arising under the
Arbitration Act, 1940 that the arbitrator could award interest
pendente lite, ignoring the express bar in the contract, is
good law. But that need not be considered further as this is
a case under the new Act where there is a specific provision
regarding award of interest by the arbitrator."
10) Considering the specific prohibition in the agreement
as discussed and interpreted by the Constitution Bench,
we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in
Sayeed Ahmed and Company (supra) and we cannot
possibly agree with the observation in Board of Trustees
for the Port of Calcutta (supra) in a case arising under
the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the arbitrator could award
interest pendente lite ignoring the express bar in the
contract.
11
11) In Union of India vs. Saraswat Trading Agency
and Others, (2009) 16 SCC 504, though it was under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court has
considered elaborately about the legal position in regard to
interest after adverting to all the earlier decisions and
basing reliance on clause 31 of the agreement held:
"33. In the case in hand Clause 31 of the agreement is
materially different. It bars payment of any interest or damage
to the contractor for any reason whatsoever. We are, therefore,
clearly of the view that no pre-reference or pendente lite interest
was payable to the respondent on the amount under Item 3 and
the arbitrator's award allowing pre-reference and pendente lite
interest on that amount was plainly in breach of the express
terms of the agreement. The order of the High Court insofar as
pre-reference and pendente lite interest on the amount under
Item 3 is concerned is, therefore, unsustainable."
12) At the end of the argument, learned counsel for the
respondent heavily relied on the recent decision of this
Court in Madnani Construction Corporation Private
Limited (supra) which arose under the Arbitration Act,
1940. There also, Clause 30 of SCC and Clause 52 of
GCC prohibits payment of interest. Though the Bench
relied on all the earlier decisions and considered the very
same clause as to which we are now discussing, upheld
12
the order awarding interest by the arbitrator de hors to
specific bar in the agreement. It is relevant to point out
that the decision of Madnani Construction Corporation
Private Limited (supra) was cited before another Bench
of this Court in Sree Kamatchi Amman Constructions
vs. Divisional Railway Manager (Works), Palghat and
Others, (2010) 8 SCC 767, wherein the decision in
Madnani Construction Corporation Private Limited
(supra) was very much discussed and considered. After
adverting to all the earlier decisions including the
Constitution Bench judgments, this Court has analyzed
the effect of Madnani Construction Corporation Private
Limited (supra). The following discussion and ultimate
conclusion are relevant:
"17. In Madnani the arbitrator had awarded interest
pendente lite, that is, from the date of appointment of
arbitrator to the date of award. The High Court had
interfered with the same on the ground that there was a
specific prohibition in the contract regarding awarding of
interest. This Court following the decision in Engineers-De-
Space-Age reversed the said rejection and held as follows:
(Madnani case, SCC pp. 560-61, para 39)
13
"39. In the instant case also the relevant clauses,
which have been quoted above, namely, Clause 16(2) of GCC
and Clause 30 of SCC do not contain any prohibition on the
arbitrator to grant interest. Therefore, the High Court was
not right in interfering with the arbitrator's award on the
matter of interest on the basis of the aforesaid clauses. We
therefore, on a strict construction of those clauses and
relying on the ratio in Engineers find that the said clauses do
not impose any bar on the arbitrator in granting interest."
18. At the outset it should be noticed that Engineers-De-
Space-Age and Madnani arose under the old Arbitration Act,
1940 which did not contain a provision similar to Section
31(7) of the new Act. This Court, in Sayeed Ahmed held that
the decisions rendered under the old Act may not be of
assistance to decide the validity of grant of interest under
the new Act. The logic in Engineers-De-Space-Age was that
while the contract governed the interest from the date of
cause of action to date of reference, the arbitrator had the
discretion to decide the rate of interest from the date of
reference to date of award and he was not bound by any
prohibition regarding interest contained in the contract,
insofar as pendente lite period is concerned. This Court in
Sayeed Ahmed held that the decision in Engineers-De-Space-
Age would not apply to cases arising under the new Act. We
extract below, the relevant portion from Sayeed Ahmed:
(SCC p. 36, paras 23-24)
"23. The observation in Engineers-De-Space-Age that
the term of the contract merely prohibits the
department/employer from paying interest to the contractor
for delayed payment but once the matter goes to the
arbitrator, the discretion of the arbitrator is not in any
manner stifled by the terms of the contract and the
arbitrator will be entitled to consider and grant the interest
pendente lite, cannot be used to support an outlandish
argument that bar on the Government or department paying
interest is not a bar on the arbitrator awarding interest.
Whether the provision in the contract bars the employer
from entertaining any claim for interest or bars the
contractor from making any claim for interest, it amounts to
a clear prohibition regarding interest. The provision need not
contain another bar prohibiting the arbitrator from awarding
interest. The observations made in the context of interest
pendente lite cannot be used out of contract.
14
24. The learned counsel for the appellant next
contended on the basis of the above observations in
Engineers-De-Space-Age, that even if Clause G 1.09 is held to
bar interest in the pre-reference period, it should be held not
to apply to the pendente lite period, that is, from 14-3-1997
to 31-7-2001. He contended that the award of interest
during the pendency of the reference was within the
discretion of the arbitrator and therefore, the award of
interest for that period could not have been interfered with
by the High Court. In view of the Constitution Bench
decisions in G.C. Roy and N.C. Budharaj rendered before and
after the decision in Engineers-De-Space-Age, it is doubtful
whether the observation in Engineers-De-Space-Age in a case
arising under the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the arbitrator
could award interest pendente lite, ignoring the express bar
in the contract, is good law. But that need not be considered
further as this is a case under the new Act where there is a
specific provision regarding award of interest by the
arbitrator."
The same reasoning applies to the decision in Madnani also
as that also relates to a case under the old Act and did not
independently consider the issue but merely relied upon the
decision in Engineers-De-Space-Age.
19. Section 37(1) of the new Act by using the words "unless
otherwise agreed by the parties" categorically clarifies that
the arbitrator is bound by the terms of the contract insofar
as the award of interest from the date of cause of action to the
date of award. Therefore, where the parties had agreed that
no interest shall be payable, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot
award interest between the date when the cause of action
arose to the date of award.
20. We are of the view that the decisions in Engineers-De-
Space-Age and Madnani are inapplicable for yet another
reason. In Engineers-De-Space-Age and Madnani the
arbitrator had awarded interest for the pendente lite period.
This Court upheld the award of such interest under the old
Act on the ground that the arbitrator had the discretion to
decide whether interest should be awarded or not during the
pendente lite period and he was not bound by the
contractual terms insofar as the interest for the pendente lite
period. But in the instant case the Arbitral Tribunal has
refused to award interest for the pendente lite period. Where
the Arbitral Tribunal has exercised its discretion and refused
15
award of interest for the period pendente lite, even if the
principles in those two cases were applicable, the award of
the arbitrator could not be interfered with. On this ground
also the decisions in Engineers-De-Space-Age and Madnani
are inapplicable..."
13) Inasmuch as we have already expressed similar view
as mentioned above and conveyed our inability to apply
the reasoning in Madnani Construction Corporation
Private Limited (supra), we fully endorse the view
expressed in Sree Kamatchi Amman Constructions
(supra).
14) In the light of the above discussion, following
conclusion emerge:
Reliance based on the ratio in Board of Trustees for
the Port of Calcutta (supra) is unacceptable since the
said view has been overruled in Sayeed Ahmed and
Company (supra) and insofar as the ratio in Madnani
Construction Corporation Private Limited (supra)
which is also unacceptable for the reasons mentioned in
the earlier paras, we reject the stand taken by the counsel
for the respondent. On the other hand, we fully accept the
16
stand of the Union of India as rightly projected by Mr. A.S.
Chandhiok, learned ASG. We reiterate that where the
parties had agreed that no interest shall be payable, the
arbitrator cannot award interest for the amounts payable
to the contractor under the contract. Where the
agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of
interest and where a party claims interest and the said
dispute is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the
power to award interest pendent elite. As observed by the
Constitution Bench in G.C. Roy's case (supra), in such a
case, it must be presumed that interest was an implied
term of the agreement between the parties. However, this
does not mean that in every case, the arbitrator should
necessarily award interest pendente lite. In the
subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench, i.e., N.C.
Budharaj's case (supra), it has been reiterated that in
the absence of any specific stipulation or prohibition in
the contract to claim or grant any such interest, the
17
arbitrator is free to award interest.
15) In the light of the above principle and in view of the
specific prohibition of contract contained in Clause 1.15,
the arbitrator ceases to have the power to grant interest.
We also clarify that the Arbitration Act, 1940 does not
contain any specific provision relating to the power of
arbitrator to award interest. However, in the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996, there is a specific provision with
regard to award of interest by the arbitrator. The bar
under clause 1.15 is absolute and interest cannot be
awarded without rewriting the contract.
16) For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the award of
the arbitrator granting interest in respect of the amount
payable to the contractor under the contract as well as the
order of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
of the High Court confirming the same.
17) Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent
pointed out above with no order as to costs.
18
..........................................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
..........................................J.
(A.K. PATNAIK)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 12, 2011.
19
in the Civil Services Examination, 2004 conducted by the Union Public Service Commission, Avinash Mohanty and Vikrama Varma amongst others were selected for appointment to the Indian Police Service (for short `the IPS') and were offered appointments to the IPS in 2005. By notification dated 19.01.2006 of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, the candidates who had been selected and appointed to the IPS on the basis of the results of the Civil Services Examination, 2004 were allocated to different State cadres. By this notification, Avinash Mohanty, who had secured the 45th rank in the Civil Services Examination, 2004 was allocated to the Chhattisgarh cadre, whereas Vikrama Varma, who had secured 201st rank in the Civil Services Examination, 2004 was allocated to the Andhra Pradesh cadre. Avinash Mohanty made representations to the authorities against his allotment to the Chhattisgarh cadre and claimed that he should have been allocated to the Andhra Pradesh cadre.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2550 OF 2010
C.M. Thri Vikrama Varma ... Appellant
Versus
Avinash Mohanty & Ors. ... Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2551 OF 2010
Union of India & Ors. ... Appellants
Versus
Avinash Mohanty & Anr. ... Respondents
J U D G M E N T
A. K. PATNAIK, J.
These two appeals by way of special leave under Article
136 of the Constitution are against the impugned judgment
of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
dated 22.03.2007 in Writ Petition No. 458 of 2007.
2
2. The facts very briefly are that in the Civil Services
Examination, 2004 conducted by the Union Public Service
Commission, Avinash Mohanty and Vikrama Varma
amongst others were selected for appointment to the Indian
Police Service (for short `the IPS') and were offered
appointments to the IPS in 2005. By notification dated
19.01.2006 of the Government of India, Ministry of Home
Affairs, the candidates who had been selected and
appointed to the IPS on the basis of the results of the Civil
Services Examination, 2004 were allocated to different State
cadres. By this notification, Avinash Mohanty, who had
secured the 45th rank in the Civil Services Examination,
2004 was allocated to the Chhattisgarh cadre, whereas
Vikrama Varma, who had secured 201st rank in the Civil
Services Examination, 2004 was allocated to the Andhra
Pradesh cadre. Avinash Mohanty made representations to
the authorities against his allotment to the Chhattisgarh
cadre and claimed that he should have been allocated to the
Andhra Pradesh cadre. When his representations did not
yield any results, Avinash Mohanty filed O.A. No. 286 of
2006 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad
3
Bench (for short `the Tribunal') on 03.05.2006 contending
that the guidelines and norms in the letter dated
31.05.1985 of the Secretary, Government of India, Ministry
of Personnel and Training (for short `the letter dated
31.05.1985') have not been followed while making the
allocations and the allocation of Vikrama Varma to the
Andhra Pradesh cadre was arbitrary and in his place he
should have been allocated to the Andhra Pradesh cadre.
After considering the pleadings of the parties and hearing
learned counsel for the parties, the Tribunal by its order
dated 24.11.2006 dismissed the O.A. Aggrieved, Avinash
Mohanty filed Writ Petition No. 458 of 2007 under Article
226 of the Constitution before the Andhra Pradesh High
Court and by the impugned judgment, the High Court
allowed the Writ Petition, quashed the allocation of the
Vikrama Varma to the Andhra Pradesh cadre and directed
the Union of India to reconsider the allocation of Avinash
Mohanty and Vikrama Varma in accordance with law.
3. Mr. M.S. Ganesh, learned counsel for Vikrama Varma,
the appellant in C.A. No. 2550 of 2010, submitted that this
Court in Union of India vs. Rajiv Yadav, IAS and Others
4
[(1994) 6 SCC 38] while considering the allocation of officers
appointed to the Indian Administrative Services (for short
`the IAS') has held that under Rule 5 of the Indian
Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, the Central
Government is under no obligation to have options or
preferences from the officers concerned and this Rule made
the Central Government the sole authority to allocate the
members of the service to various cadres and therefore a
person appointed to an All India Service, having various
State cadres, has no right to claim allocation to a State of
his choice or to his home State. He submitted that this
position of law has been reiterated by this Court in Union of
India vs. Mh
athung Kithan and Others,
etc. [(1996) 10 SCC
562]. He also relied upon the judgment of the Division
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in G. Srinivas Rao
vs. Union of India & Ors. (2005 (2) ALT 728 (D.B.) which,
while referring to the law laid down in Rajiv Yadav's case
(supra), has further observed that the Union of India was
required to operationalise a plurality of Government choices
in the matter of allocation of officers to different State
cadres and in the very nature of things, it is not always
5
possible to fulfill all the policy objectives of Union of India in
every factual circumstance and in every recruitment year.
He also referred to the observations made in the Division
Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the
case of G. Srinivas Rao (supra) that considering the
complexities of accommodating the multitude of federal
policy choices, allocation is a daunting task and there are
no ready solutions which can perfectly be tailored to fit such
complex problems. Considering all these multiple factors
which have to be kept in mind while making the allocations
of members of the IPS to different cadres, the High Court in
the present case should not have quashed the allocation of
Vikrama Varma to the Andhra Pradesh cadre. He
submitted that the main reason given by the High Court in
the impugned judgment is that in the current roster (3rd
Cycle) already nine OBC candidates had been allocated to
the Andhra Pradesh cadre before the allocation of Vikrama
Varma, who was an OBC candidate, and allocation of
Vikrama Varma to the Andhra Pradesh cadre would make a
total of ten OBC candidates in the 30 point roster which
was 6% excess over the 27% reservation in favour of OBC
6
candidates. He submitted that this Court has held in the
case of Rajiv Yadav (supra) that allocation is not to be tested
by the reservation provision under Article 16(4) of the
Constituion and therefore 27% reservation in favour of OBC
candidates was not relevant in the matter of allocation and
the reasoning given by the High Court in the impugned
judgment is erroneous.
4. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing for the Union of India, the appellant in
C.A. No. 2551 of 2010, submitted that the direct
recruitment in the IPS is done on an All India basis under
the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 (for
short `the Recruitment Rules') and hence reservation in
such direct recruitment is also on All India basis. He
submitted that after direct recruitment is over and the
selected general and reserved candidates are appointed to
the IPS under Rule 5 of the Indian Police Service (Cadre)
Rules, 1954, the Central Government makes allocation of
cadres to the members of the IPS and Rule 5 does not
provide for reservation. He submitted that this Court has,
therefore, held in the case of Rajiv Yadav while interpreting
7
Rule 5 of the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954,
which is similarly worded, that the principles of allocation
contained in the letter dated 31.05.1985 do not provide for
reservation on appointments or posts and the question of
testing the principles of allocation on the anvil of Article 16
(4) of the Constitution does not arise. Relying on Para 32 of
the counter affidavit filed by the Union of India before the
Tribunal in O.A. No. 286 of 2006, he submitted that at the
time of allocation of cadres to the candidates for
appointment to IPS on the basis of the Civil Services
Examination 2004, a total of 8 candidates were allocated to
the Andhra Pradesh cadre from the last five Civil Services
Examinations (1999-2003), out of which 2 (27%) were OBC
and hence there was neither any excess nor any shortfall in
respect of allocation of OBC candidates in the IPS cadre of
Andhra Pradesh. He submitted that from Civil Services
Examination 2004 a total number of 2 candidates were to
be allocated to the Andhra Pradesh cadre and as per
prescribed percentage, one vacancy each had to be filled up
from General category and OBC category and as per 30
point roster prepared as per the letter dated 31.05.1985, the
8
OBC vacancy was meant for an insider OBC candidate and
thus the same has been filled up by allocating Vikrama
Varma, an OBC candidate. He submitted that the High
Court in the impugned judgment has not correctly
appreciated the roster maintained by the Government and
has instead observed that there was clear arbitrariness in
the operation of the roster system. Mr. Parasaran finally
submitted that the directions of the High Court in the
impugned judgment for reconsideration of cadre allocation if
followed will have a cascading effect on the service.
5. Mr. Sunil Kumar, appearing for Avinash Mohanty, the
respondent no.1 in the two appeals, on the other hand,
submitted that in Rajiv Yadav's case (supra) this Court has
held that the roster system in the letter dated 31.05.1985
ensures equitable treatment to both the general candidates
and the reserved candidates. He submitted that the table
indicating the correct position of vacancies filled from Civil
Services Examination 1994 to 2003 furnished in Para 28 of
the counter affidavit dated 22.03.2007 of the Union of India
filed in the High Court has been extracted in the impugned
judgment of the High Court, which will go to show that four
9
vacancies had been assigned to insider OBCs and five
vacancies had been assigned to outsider OBCs and thus
nine OBC candidates had already been allocated in a total
of 29 vacancies in the Andhra Pradesh cadre and there was
already an excess over 27% reserved in favour of the OBC
candidates. He submitted that for this reason the High
Court took the view that the 10th vacancy in the Andhra
Pradesh cadre in the 30 point roster, if allocated to an OBC
candidate would be clearly a violation of the equitable
principle of allocation contained in the letter dated
31.05.1985 and would be arbitrary. He submitted that the
directions of the High Court for reconsideration of cadre
allocation of Avinash Mohanty and Vikrama Varma are
justified in the facts of the case and the directions are to be
followed in their cases only and will not have any cascading
effect on the service.
6. Rules 3 and 5 of the IPS (Cadre) Rules, 1954, are
quoted herein below:
"3. Constitution of Cadres- 3(1) There shall
be constituted for each State or group of States
an Indian Police Service Cadre.
10
3(2) The Cadres so constituted for a State or a
group of States are hereinafter referred to as a
`State Cadre' and a `Joint Cadre' respectively.
5. Allocation of members to various cadres-
5(1) The allocation of cadre officers to the
various cadres shall be made by the Central
Government in consultation with the State
Government or State Governments concerned.
5(2) The Central Government may, with the
concurrence of the State Governments
concerned, transfer a cadre officer from one
cadre to another cadre."
It will be clear from Rule 3 that each State and a group of
States will have a State cadre or Joint Cadre respectively of
the IPS and it will be further clear from Rule 5 that the
Central Government in consultation with the State
Government or State Governments concerned has the power
to make allocation of IPS officers to various cadres.
7. The broad principles, which are to be followed for
allocation, have been indicated in Para 3 of the letter dated
31.05.1985 and are extracted herein below:
"(1) The vacancies in every cadre will be
earmarked for 'outsiders' and 'insiders' in the
ratio of 2:1. In order to avoid problems relating
to fractions and to ensure that this ratio is
maintained, over a period of time, if not during
every allocation, the break-up of vacancies in a
cadre between 'outsiders' and 'insiders' will be
11
calculated following the cycle of 'outsider',
'insider', 'outsider'
(2) The vacancies for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes will be reserved in the various
cadres according to the prescribed percentage.
For purpose of this reservation, Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes will be grouped together
and the percentage will be added. Distribution of
reserved vacancies in each cadre between
'outsiders' and 'insiders' will be done in the ratio
2:1. This ratio will be operationalised by following
a cycle 'outsider, 'insider', 'outsider' as is done in
the case of general candidates.
(3) Allocation of 'insiders', both men and women,
will be strictly according to their ranks, subject to
their willingness to be allocated to their home
States
(4) Allocation of 'outsiders', whether they are
general candidates or reserved candidates,
whether they are men or women, will be
according to the roster system after placing
'insiders' at their proper places on the chart as
explained below:
(i) All the State Cadres/Joint Cadres should be
arranged in alphabetical order and divided into
groups which, on the basis of the average over a
period of time, are taking roughly equal number
of candidates each. On the basis of average
intake during the last 4 years, the group could be
as follows:
Group I : Andhra Pradesh, Assam-Meghalaya,
Bihar and Gujarat
Group II : Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu
& Kashmir Karnataka, Kerala and
12
Madhya Pradesh
Group III: Maharashtra, Manipur-Tripura,
Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan
and Sikkim
Group IV : Tamil Nadu, Union Territories, Uttar
Pradesh and West Bengal.
(ii) Since the number of Cadres/Joint Cadres is
21, the cycles will be 1-21, 22-42, 43-63 and so
on.
(iii) The 'insider' quota should then be distributed
among the States and assigned to different cycles
of allotment. For example, if a State gets 4
'insider' candidates, they should go to the share
of the State in their respective cycles and if there
are 2 'insider' candidates from the same cycle,
they should be treated as going to the State in
two successive and so on.
(iv) The 'outsider' candidates should be arranged
in order of merit and allotted to the State cadres
in cycles as described in (v) below
(v) In the first cycle, State Cadre/Joint Cadre
which have not received 'insider' candidates
should be given one candidate each in order of
merit of 'outsider' candidates. The process should
be repeated in successive cycles, each successive
cycle beginning with the next successive group of
States, e.g., the second cycle should begin from
Group II States, the third cycle with Group III
States and the fourth cycle with Group IV States
and the first cycle again with Group I States.
Occasionally it may happen that a candidate's
turn may come in such a way that he may get
allocated to his own home State. When that
13
happens, the candidate next below him should be
exchanged with him.
(vi) For the succeeding year, the State cadres
should be arranged again in alphabetical order
but with Group I of the previous year at the
bottom, i.e., the arrangement will begin with
Group II on top. In the third year, Group III will
come on top and so on
(vii) In the case of candidates belonging to the
reserved category, such of those candidates,
whose position in the merit list is such that they
could have been appointed to the service even in
the absence of any reservation, will be treated on
par with general candidates for purposes of
allotment though they will be counted against
reserved vacancies. In respect of other candidates
belonging to the reserved category a procedure
similar to the one adopted for general category
candidates would be adopted. In other words, a
separate chart should be prepared with similar
grouping of States and similar operational details
should be followed. If there is a shortfall in
general 'insiders' quota it could however be made
up by 'insider' reserved candidates."
8. It will be clear from a reading of clause (1) of the broad
principles of allocation in the letter dated 31.05.1985
quoted above, that vacancies in every cadre are required to
be earmarked for outsiders and insiders in the ratio of 2:1
and in order to avoid problems relating to fractions and to
ensure that this ratio is maintained, over a period of time, if
not during every allocation, the breakup of vacancies in a
14
cadre between outsiders and insiders will have to be
calculated following this cycle of `outsider', `insider',
`outsider'. Clause (2) of the broad principles of allocation in
the letter dated 31.05.1985 further provides that the
vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are to
be reserved in the various cadres according to the
prescribed percentage and for the purpose of this
reservation, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are to
be grouped together and the percentage to be added and
distribution of reserved vacancies in each cadre between
outsiders and insiders are to be done in the ratio of 2:1 and
this ratio is to be operationalised by following a cycle
outsider, insider, outsider as is done in the cases of general
candidates.
9. In Rajiv Yadav's case (supra), Rajiv Yadav appeared in
the Civil Services Examination held in 1988 and he was
selected for appointment to the IAS and he was placed at
Serial No.16 in the order of merit. Though he belongs to the
Union Territory of Delhi and he opted for the Union
Territory's cadre, he was allocated to the Manipur-Tripura
cadre. He challenged the order allocating him to the
15
Manipur-Tripura cadre before the Central Administrative
Tribunal, New Delhi, raising various contentions and the
Tribunal held that the power conferred by Article 16(4) of
the Constitution is only for making provision for reservation
of appointment or posts in favour of any backward class of
citizens not adequately represented in the services under
the State and cannot be extended to allocation of members
of the IAS to different cadres. The Tribunal further held
that clause (2) of the principles of allocation gave an added
benefit to IAS probationers belonging to Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes and this was not permissible under
Article 16(4) of the Constitution. This Court did not approve
of this reasoning of the Tribunal and held that the
principles of allocation as contained in clause (2) of the
letter dated 31.05.1985 do not provide for reservation for
appointments or posts and as such the question of testing
the principles of allocation on the anvil of Article 16(4) of the
Constitution does not arise. In Para 6 of the judgment in
Rajiv Yadav's case, the Court explained that in compliance
with the statutory requirements and in terms of Article 16(4)
of the Constitution, 22= % reserved category candidates are
16
recruited to the IAS and having done so, both the categories
are to be justly distributed amongst the States. The Court
also held that when a person is appointed to the All India
Service, having various State cadres, he has no right to
claim allocation to a State of his choice or to his home State
and the Central Government is under no legal obligation to
have options or even preferences from the officer concerned
and Rule 5 of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre)
Rules, 1954, made the Central Government the sole
authority to allocate the members of the service to various
cadres. This position of law was reiterated in Mhathung
Kithan and Others (supra). The Court, however, has not
held in Rajiv Yadav or in Mhathung Kithan and Others that
such authority of the Central Government can be exercised
arbitrarily or in a manner which is not equitable to the
general or reserved category candidates selected for
appointment to an All India Service. On the contrary, the
Court has held in Rajiv Yadav that the roster system as
contained in the letter dated 31.05.1985 ensures equitable
treatment to both the general candidates and the reserved
candidates.
17
10. In fact, the object of the principles of allocation
indicated in different clauses in the letter dated 31.05.1985
is not only to implement the policy having 2 outsiders and 1
insider in each cadre, but also to ensure that general and
reserved candidates selected and appointed to the All India
Service get a fair and just treatment in the matter of
allocation to different cadres. This will be clear from clause
(2) of the letter dated 31.05.1985 which states that the
vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the
various cadres should be according to the prescribed
percentage and from clause (3) which states that the
allocation of insiders, both men and women, will be strictly
according to their ranks, subject to their willingness to be
allocated to their home States. This will also be clear from
clause 4(vii) which explains how the candidates belonging to
the reserved category and the general category will be dealt
with. These principles have been laid down in the letter
dated 31.05.1985 because while making allocations of
different candidates appointed to the service to different
State cadres or Joint cadres, the Central Government has
also to discharge its constitutional obligations contained in
18
the equality principles in Articles 14 and 16(1) of the
Constitution. A member appointed to the All India Service
has no right to be allocated to a particular State cadre or
Joint cadre, but he has a right to a fair and equitable
treatment in the matter of allocation under Articles 14 and
16(1) of the Constitution.
11. Coming now to the facts of this case, we find that the
High Court has in the impugned judgment extracted the
table of vacancies filled up from Civil Services Examination
1994 - 2003, as furnished in Para 28 of the counter
affidavit dated 22.03.2007 filed by the Union of India before
the High Court, which is extracted hereunder :
Total
S.No. CSE Insider Outsider
Vacancies
GE GE
OBC SC/ST OBC SC/ST
N N
1
1. 7 - 1 1 3 1 1
994
1
2. 5 1 1 - 1 1 1
995
1
3. 6 2 - - 1 2 1
996
1
4. 2 - - - 2 - -
997
1
5. 1 - 1 - - - -
998
1
6. 1 - - - 1 - -
999
2
7. 1 - - - 1 - -
000
2
8. 1 - - 1 - - -
001
2
9. 1 - - - - 1 -
002
19
2
10. 4 - 1 - 2 - 1
003
Tota
29 3 4 2 11 5 4
l
After considering this table, the High Court has held in the
impugned judgment that even according to the Union of
India, as against a total of 29 vacancies 9 OBC candidates
(4 insiders + 5 outsiders) had been allocated to the Andhra
Pradesh cadre from amongst the successful candidates of
Civil Services Examinations from 1994-2003 and if Vikrama
Varma, an insider OBC candidate, was to be allocated to the
Andhra Pradesh cadre from the selected candidates of the
Civil Services Examination, 2004, a total of 10 OBC
candidates would be allocated to the Andhra Pradesh cadre
in the 30 point roster, making the percentage of OBC
candidates to 33 1/3, which was a variation of 6% in excess
and by any standard was not a marginal variation.
12. The Union of India, in para 32 of its counter affidavit
before the Tribunal in O.A.No.286 of 2006, has, however,
stated that from the five Civil Services Examinations (1999-
2003) a total of 8 candidates appointed to the IPS were
allotted to the Andhra Pradesh cadre, out of which 2 were
OBC candidates and 2 out of 8 does not exceed 27% and,
20
therefore, there was neither any excess nor any shortfall of
allocation of OBC candidates in the Andhra Pradesh IPS
cadre. We fail to appreciate this calculation of percentages
on reserved category candidates allotted to the Andhra
Pradesh cadre worked out on the basis of number of
candidates allotted to the Andhra Pradesh cadre from the
five Civil Services Examinations, from 1999 - 2003, when in
the very same counter affidavit of the Union of India filed
before the Tribunal in O.A. No. 286 of 2006, in para 21, it is
clearly stated that a 30 point roster in respect of Andhra
Pradesh was being maintained for allocation of insider and
outsider, as well as, reserved and general candidates in
accordance with clauses (1) and (2) of Para (3) of the letter
dated 31.05.1985. It appears to us that only with a view to
somehow justify the allocation of Vikrama Varma, an OBC
candidate, to the Andhra Pradesh cadre from the Civil
Services Examination, 2004, the Union of India has taken
the figures of allocation of candidates selected for the IPS in
the five Civil Services Examinations of 1999 to 2003 instead
of taking the figures of appointments to the vacancies in the
30 point roster starting from the 1994 Civil Services
21
Examination till 2003 Civil Services Examinations.
13. Admittedly, Avinash Mohanty had secured a higher
rank than Vikrama Varma in the Civil Services
Examination, 2004 and both Avinash Mohanty and Vikrama
Varma are insiders. Clause (3) of Para 3 of the letter dated
31.05.1985 states that allocation of insiders, both men and
women, will be strictly according to their ranks, subject to
their willingness to be allocated to their home States.
Hence, Avinash Mohanty was required to be considered for
allocation to the Andhra Pradesh cadre if he had given his
willingness for being allocated to his home State, Andhra
Pradesh, before Vikrama Varma could be considered for
such allocation. If, however, the vacancy for which
consideration was being made was a vacancy for an insider
OBC candidate in the 30 point roster, Vikrama Varma
would have preference over Avinash Mohanty. But the High
Court has come to a finding that the number of vacancies in
the 30 point roster filled up by OBC candidates from Civil
Services Examinations 1999-2003 were 9 and had exceeded
the 27% reservation for OBC candidates and hence there
could not be an insider OBC vacancy in which Vikrama
22
Varma could have been allocated. The High Court was,
therefore, right in coming to the conclusion that allocation
of Vikrama Varma to the Andhra Pradesh cadre was in
violation of the guidelines contained in the letter dated
31.05.1985 and was clearly arbitrary and not equitable.
14. In our view, complexity of a decision making process
cannot be a defence when a grievance is made before the
Court by a citizen that his fundamental right to equality has
been violated. When such a grievance is made before the
Court, the authorities have to justify their impugned
decision by placing the relevant material before the Court.
As has been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in
M. Nagaraj vs. Union of India [(2006) 8 SCC 212] at 277 in
Para 118:
"The constitutional principle of equality is
inherent in the rule of law. However, its reach is
limited because its primary concern is not with
the content of the law but with its enforcement
and application. The rule of law is satisfied
when laws are applied or enforced equally, that
is, even-handedly, free of bias and without
irrational distinction. The concept of equality
allows differential treatment but it prevents
distinctions that are not properly justified.
Justification needs each case to be decided on
case-to-case basis."
23
We are also of the considered opinion that the impugned
order of the High Court quashing the allocations of Vikrama
Varma and Avinash Mohanty and directing reconsideration
of their allocation will not have cascading effects on the
service because the High Court has only quashed the
allocation of only two members of the IPS, namely, Avinash
Mohanty and Vikrama Varma, and not of other members of
the IPS and directed reconsideration of their allocation.
15. We, therefore, do not find any merit in these appeals
and we dismiss the same and vacate the interim orders
staying the operation of the impugned judgment. No order
as to costs.
.............................J.
(R. V. Raveendran)
.............................J.
(A. K. Patnaik)
New Delhi,
July 12, 2011.
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