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Monday, May 9, 2011

`honour' killings have become commonplace in many parts of the country, particularly in Haryana, western U.P., and Rajasthan. Often young couples who fall in love have to seek shelter in the police lines or protection homes, to avoid the wrath of kangaroo courts. We have held in Lata Singh's case (supra) that there is nothing `honourable' in `honour' killings, and they are nothing but barbaric and brutal murders by bigoted, persons with feudal minds. In our opinion honour killings, for whatever reason, come within the category of rarest of rare cases deserving death punishment. It is time to stamp out these barbaric, feudal practices which are a slur on our nation. This is necessary as a deterrent for such outrageous, uncivilized behaviour. All persons who are planning to perpetrate `honour' killings should know that the gallows await them. "Hai maujazan ek kulzum-e-khoon kaash yahi ho Aataa hai abhi dekhiye kya kya mere aage" -- Mirza Ghalib honour killings


                                                                       1


                                                              REPORTABLE


              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


             CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1117  OF 2011

      @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.1208 OF 2011





Bhagwan Dass              ..                   Appellant


            -versus-


State (NCT) of Delhi   ..                    Respondent(s)





                           J U D G M E N T




Markandey Katju, J.





          "Hai maujazan ek kulzum-e-khoon kaash yahi ho

               Aataa hai abhi dekhiye kya kya mere aage"


     

    --  Mirza Ghalib


                                                                                2





1. This is yet another case of gruesome honour killing, this time


by the accused-appellant of his own daughter.


2.    Leave granted.




3.    Heard   learned   counsels   for   the   parties   and   perused   the


record.




4.    The prosecution case is that the appellant was very annoyed


with his daughter, who had left her husband Raju and was living


in   an   incestuous   relationship   with   her   uncle,   Sriniwas.     This


infuriated   the   appellant   as   he   thought   this   conduct   of   his


daughter   Seema   had   dishonoured   his   family,   and   hence   he


strangulated her with an electric wire.   The trial court convicted


the   appellant   and   this   judgment   was   upheld   by   the   High   Court.


Hence this appeal.




5.    This is a case of circumstantial evidence, but it is settled law


that   a   person   can   be   convicted   on   circumstantial   evidence


                                                                                   3


provided   the   links   in   the   chain   of   circumstances   connects   the


accused   with   the   crime   beyond   reasonable   doubt   vide  Vijay


Kumar   Arora    vs.    State   (NCT   of   Delhi),   (2010)   2   SCC   353


(para 16.5),  Aftab Ahmad Ansari   vs.   State of Uttaranchal,


(2010) 2 SCC 583 (vide paragraphs 13 and 14), etc.  In this case,


we are satisfied that  the prosecution has been able to prove its


case beyond reasonable doubt by establishing all the links in the


chain of circumstances.




6.    In cases of circumstantial evidence motive is very important,


unlike cases of direct evidence where it is not so important vide


Wakkar and Anr.   vs.   State of Uttar Pradesh  (2011) 3 SCC


306   (para   14).     In   the   present   case,   the   prosecution   case   was


that   the   motive   of  the   appellant   in   murdering   his   daughter   was


that   she   was   living   in   adultery   with   one   Sriniwas,   who   was   the


son   of   the   maternal   aunt   of   the   appellant.     The   appellant   felt


humiliated by this, and to avenge the family honour he murdered


his own daughter.


                                                                                 4


7.      We   have   carefully   gone   through   the   judgment   of   the   trial


court as well as the High Court and we are of the opinion that the


said judgments are correct.




8.      The  circumstances   which   connect   the  accused   to  the   crime


are:


i)      The motive of the crime which has already been mentioned


above.   In our country unfortunately `honour killing' has become


common   place,   as   has   been   referred   to   in   our   judgment   in


Arumugam Servai   vs.   State of Tamil Nadu  Criminal Appeal


No.958   of   2011   (@SLP(Crl)   No.8084   of   2009)   pronounced   on


19.4.2011.


        Many people feel that they are dishonoured by the behaviour


of the young man/woman, who is related to them or belonging to


their   caste   because   he/she   is   marrying   against   their   wish   or


having an affair with someone, and hence they take the law into


their   own   hands   and   kill   or   physically   assault   such   person   or


commit   some   other   atrocities   on   them.     We   have   held   in  Lata


                                                                                    5


Singh   vs.   State of U.P. & Anr. (2006) 5 SCC 475, that this is


wholly illegal.  If someone is not happy with the behaviour of his


daughter or other person, who is his relation or of his caste, the


maximum he can do is to cut off social relations with her/him, but


he cannot take the law into his own hands by committing violence


or giving threats of violence.




ii)    As   per   the   post   mortem   report   which   was   conducted   at


11.45 am on 16.5.2006 the likely time of death of Seema was 32


hours prior  to the post mortem.   Giving a margin of two hours,


plus   or   minus,   it   would   be   safe   to   conclude   that   Seema   died


sometime between 2.00 am to 6.00 am on 15.5.2006.  However,


the appellant, in whose house Seema was staying, did not inform


the   police   or   anybody   else   for   a   long   time.     It   was   only   some


unknown   person   who   telephonically   informed   the   police   at   2.00


pm   on   15.5.2006   that   the   appellant   had   murdered   his   own


daughter.     This   omission   by   the   appellant   in   not   informing   the


police about the death of his daughter for about 10 hours was a


                                                                                    6


totally unnatural conduct on his part.        




iii)    The   appellant   had   admitted   that   the   deceased   Seema   had


stayed   in   his   house   on   the   night   of   14.5.2006/15.5.2006.     The


appellant's mother was too old to commit the crime, and there is


not even a suggestion by the defence that his brother may have


committed   it.     Hence   we   can   safely   rule   out   the   possibility   that


someone else, other than the appellant, committed the crime.


        Seema had left her husband sometime back and was said to


be   living   in   an   adulterous   and   incestuous   relationship   with   her


uncle (her father's cousin), and this obviously made the appellant


very hostile to her.




        On   receiving   the   telephonic   information   at   about   2.00   pm


from some unknown person, the police reached the house of the


accused   and   found   the   dead  body   of  Seema  on  the   floor  in   the


back   side   room   of   the   house.     The   accused   and   his   family


members   and   some   neighbours   were   there   at   that   time.     The


accused  admitted  that  although  Seema had  been  married  about


                                                                                    7


three years ago, she had left her husband and was living in her


father's house for about one month.  Thus there was both motive


and opportunity for the appellant to commit the murder.


iv)     It has come in evidence that the accused appellant with his


family members were making preparation for her last rites when


the   police   arrived.     Had   the   police   not   arrived   they   would


probably have gone ahead and cremated Seema even without a


post mortem so as to destroy the evidence of strangulation.




v)     The   mother   of   the   accused,   Smt.   Dhillo   Devi   stated   before


the   police   that   her   son   (the   accused)   had   told   her   that   he   had


killed Seema.  No doubt a statement to the police is ordinarily not


admissible   in   evidence   in   view   of   Section   162(1)   Cr.PC,   but   as


mentioned in the proviso to Section 162(1) Cr.PC it can be used


to   contradict   the   testimony   of  a  witness.     Smt.   Dhillo   Devi   also


appeared   as   a   witness   before   the   trial   court,   and   in   her   cross


examination, she was confronted with her statement to the police


to whom she had stated that her son (the accused) had told her


                                                                                    8


that   he   had   killed   Seema.     On   being   so   confronted   with   her


statement   to   the   police   she   denied   that   she   had   made   such


statement.




      We are of the opinion that the statement of Smt. Dhillo Devi


to   the   police   can   be   taken   into   consideration   in   view   of   the


proviso   to   Section   162(1)   Cr.PC,   and   her   subsequent   denial   in


court   is   not   believable   because   she   obviously   had   afterthoughts


and wanted to save her son (the accused) from punishment.   In


fact in her statement to the police she had stated that the dead


body   of   Seema   was   removed   from   the   bed   and   placed   on   the


floor.   When she was confronted with this statement in the court


she denied that she had made such statement before the police.


We   are   of   the   opinion   that   her   statement   to   the   police   can   be


taken into consideration in view of the proviso of Section 162(1)


Cr.PC.


      In   our   opinion   the   statement   of  the   accused   to   his   mother


Smt. Dhillo Devi is an extra judicial confession.  In a very recent


                                                                                     9


case   this   Court   in  Kulvinder   Singh   &   Anr.    vs.  State   of


Haryana  Criminal Appeal No.916 of 2005 decided on 11.4.2011


referred   to   the   earlier   decision   of   this   Court   in  State   of


Rajasthan  vs.  Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180, where it was held


(vide para 10) :


     "An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and

     made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the

     court.   The   confession   will   have   to   be   proved   like   any

     other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession,

     like any other  evidence,  depends  upon  the veracity  of

     the   witness   to   whom   it   has   been   made.   The   value   of

     the evidence as to the confession depends on the relia-

     bility   of   the   witness   who   gives   the   evidence.   It   is   not

     open to any court to start with a presumption that ex-

     tra-judicial   confession   is   a   weak   type   of   evidence.   It

     would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the

     time when the confession was made and the credibility

     of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such

     a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be

     founded   thereon   if   the   evidence   about   the   confession

     comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be

     unbiased,   not   even   remotely   inimical   to   the   accused,

     and   in   respect   of   whom   nothing   is   brought   out   which

     may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of at-

     tributing   an   untruthful   statement   to   the   accused,   the

     words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous

     and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpe-

     trator  of the crime  and  nothing  is omitted  by the wit-

     ness which may militate against it. After subjecting the

     evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touch-

     stone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be


                                                                                 10


       accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it pass-

       es the test of credibility."


                           

       In the above decision it was also held that a conviction can


be based on circumstantial evidence.





       Similarly,   in  B.A.   Umesh    vs.    Registrar   General,   High

Court   of   Karnataka,   (2011)   3   SCC   85   the  Court   relied   on   the

extra judicial confession of the accused.

 

       No   doubt   Smt.   Dhillo   Devi   was   declared   hostile   by   the

prosecution   as   she   resiled   from   her   earlier   statement   to   the

police.  However, as observed in State  vs.  Ram Prasad Mishra

& Anr. :

            "The   evidence   of   a   hostile   witness   would   not   be

       totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or

       the accused, but can be subjected to close scrutiny and

       the portion of the evidence which is consistent with the

       case of the prosecution or defence may be accepted."

       



       Similarly in Sheikh Zakir  vs.  State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC

911 this Court held :

             "It   is   not   quite   strange   that   some   witnesses   do

       turn hostile but that by itself would not prevent a court

       from   finding   an   accused   guilty   if   there   is   otherwise

       acceptable evidence in support of the conviction."


                                                                                11





       In  Himanshu   alias   Chintu    vs.    State   (NCT   of   Delhi),


(2011) 2 SCC 36 this Court held that the dependable part of the


evidence of a hostile witness can be relied on.




       Thus it is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from


the chaff, and the maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no


application   in   India   vide  Nisar   Alli    vs.    The   State   of   Uttar


Pradesh  AIR  1957  SC  366.     In  the  present case  we  are  of the


opinion   that   Smt.   Dhillo   Devi   denied   her   earlier   statement   from


the police because she wanted to save her son.  Hence we accept


her   statement   to   the   police   and   reject   her   statement   in   court.


The defence has not shown that the police had any enmity with


the accused, or had some other reason to falsely implicate him.




       We are of the opinion that this was a clear case of murder


and the entire circumstances point to the guilt of the accused.





vi)    The cause of death was opined by Dr. Pravindra Singh-PW1


                                                                               12


in his post mortem report as death "due to asphyxia as a result of


ante-mortem strangulation by ligature."   It is evident that this is


a   case   of   murder,   and   not   suicide.     The   body   was   not   found


hanging but lying on the ground.




vii)    The   accused   made   a   statement   to   the   SDM,   Shri   S.S.


Parihar-PW8,   immediately   after   the   incident   and   has   signed   the


same.   No doubt he claimed in his statement under Section 313


Cr.PC that nothing was asked by the SDM but he did not clarify


how his signature appeared on the statement, nor did he say that


he   was   forced   to   sign   his   statement   nor   was   the   statement


challenged   in   the   cross   examination   of   the   SDM.     The   SDM


appeared   as  a  witness   before   the   trial   court  and   he   has   proved


the statement in his evidence.   There was no cross examination


by the accused although opportunity was given.


        In his statement under Section  313 Cr.PC the accused was

asked :

        "Q.8 It   is   in   evidence   against   you   that   you   were

        interrogated   and   arrested   vide   memo   Ex   PW11/C   and

        your   personal   search   was   conducted   vide   memo   Ex


                                                                                  13


      PW11/D and  you  made disclosure  statement EXPW7/A

      and in pursuance thereto you pointed out the site plan

      of   incident   and   got   recovered   an   electric   wire   Ex   P1

      which   was   seized   by   IO   after   sealing   the   same   vide

      memo ExPW7/B.  What do you have to say?


      The reply he gave was as follows :


      "Ans.   I was wrongly arrested and falsely implicated in

      this   case.    I   never   made   any   disclosure   statement.     I

      did   not   get   any   wire   recovered   nor   I   was   ever   taken

      again to my house."




      We see no reason to disbelieve the SDM as there is nothing


to show that he had any enmity against the accused or had any


other reason for making a false statement in Court.


viii) The accused had given a statement (Ex. PW7/A) to the SDM


in   the   presence   of   PW11   Inspector   Nand   Kumar   which   led   to


discovery of the electric wire by which the crime was committed.


We   are   of   the   opinion   that   this   disclosure   was   admissible   as


evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act vide Aftab Ahmad


Ansari  vs.  State, (2010) 2 SCC 583 (para 40), Manu Sharma


vs.    State,   (2010)   6   SCC   1   (paragraphs   234   to   238).     In   his


evidence   the   police   Inspector   Nand   Kumar   stated   that   at   the


                                                                                   14


pointing   out   of   the   accused   the   electric   wire   with   which   the


accused   is   alleged   to   have   strangulated   his   daughter   ws


recovered from under a bed in a room.


      It   has   been   contended   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the


appellant   that   there   was   no   independent   witness   in   the   case.


However, as held by this Court in State of Rajasthan  vs.  Teja


Ram and Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1776 :


      "The   over-insistence   on   witnesses   having   no   relation

      with   the   victims   often   results   in   criminal   justice   going

      awry. When any incident happens in a dwelling house,

      the   most   natural   witnesses   would   be   the   inmates   of

      that   house.   It   is   unpragmatic   to   ignore   such   natural

      witnesses  and   insist  on   outsiders   who   would   not   have

      even seen anything. If the court has discerned from the

      evidence   or   even   from   the   investigation   records   that

      some   other   independent   person   has   witnessed   any

      event connecting the incident in question, then there is

      a   justification   for   making   adverse   comments   against

      non-examination of such a person as a prosecution wit-

      ness.   Otherwise,   merely   on   surmises   the  court   should

      not   castigate   the   prosecution   for   not   examining   other

      persons   of   the   locality   as   prosecution   witnesses.   The

      prosecution can be expected to examine only those who

      have witnessed the events and not those who have not

      seen it though the neighbourhood may be replete with

      other residents also."


      Similarly,   in  Trimukh   Maroti   Kirkan    vs.    State   of


                                                                                15


Maharashtra (2006)1 SCC 681 this Court observed:


      "These crimes are generally committed in complete se-

      crecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for

      the   prosecution   to   lead   evidence.  No   member   of   the

      family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come

      forward to depose against another family member. The

      neighbours,   whose   evidence   may   be   of   some   assis-

      tance,   are   generally   reluctant   to   depose   in   court   as

      they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonize

      a   neighbourhood   family.   The   parents   or   other   family

      members   of   the   bride   being   away   from   the   scene   of

      commission of crime are not in a position to give direct

      evidence  which may inculpate the  real accused  except

      regarding the demand of money or dowry and harass-

      ment caused to the bride. But, it does not mean that a

      crime committed in secrecy or inside the house should

      go unpunished."
                                                  (emphasis supplied)




      In our opinion both the trial court and High Court have given


very cogent reasons for convicting the appellant, and we see no


reason   to   disagree   with   their   verdicts.     There   is   overwhelming


circumstantial evidence to show that the accused committed the


crime as he felt that he was dishonoured by his daughter.


      For  the reason given above we find  no force in this  appeal

and it is dismissed.




      Before   parting   with   this   case   we   would   like   to   state   that


                                                                             16


`honour' killings have become commonplace in many parts of the


country,   particularly   in   Haryana,   western   U.P.,   and   Rajasthan.


Often young couples who fall in love have to seek shelter in the


police lines or protection homes, to avoid the wrath of kangaroo


courts.  We have held in Lata Singh's case (supra) that there is


nothing `honourable' in `honour' killings, and they are nothing but


barbaric   and   brutal   murders   by   bigoted,   persons   with   feudal


minds.


      In   our   opinion   honour   killings,   for   whatever   reason,   come


within   the   category   of   rarest   of   rare   cases   deserving   death


punishment.     It   is   time   to   stamp   out   these   barbaric,   feudal


practices which are a slur on our nation.    This is necessary as a


deterrent for such outrageous, uncivilized behaviour.  All persons


who are planning to perpetrate `honour' killings should know that


the gallows await them.


      Let   a   copy   of   this   judgment   be   sent   to   the   Registrar


Generals/Registrars of all the High Courts who shall circulate the


same   to   all   Judges   of   the   Courts.               The   Registrar


                                                                                 17


General/Registrars of the High Courts will also circulate copies of


the same to all the Sessions Judges/Additional Sessions Judges in


the State/Union Territories.  Copies of the judgment shall also be


sent   to   all   the   Chief   Secretaries/Home   Secretaries/Director


Generals   of   Police   of   all   States/Union   Territories   in   the   country.


The   Home   Secretaries   and   Director   Generals   of   Police   will


circulate   the   same   to   all   S.S.Ps/S.Ps   in   the   States/Union


Territories for information.


                                                  ...................................J.

                                                  (Markandey Katju)`


                                                  ..................................J.

                                                  (Gyan Sudha Misra)

New Delhi;

May  09 , 2011


Thursday, May 5, 2011

The gift deed dated February 5, 1968 is a form of declaration by the donor and not an instrument of gift as contemplated under Section 17 of the Registration Act. As all the three essential requisites are satisfied by the gift deed dated February 5, 1968, the gift in favour of defendant 2 became complete and irrevocable.


                                                                        REPORTABLE
                                                                                               





                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                    CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 1714 OF 2005





Hafeeza Bibi & Ors.                                           .... Appellants


                                     Versus


Shaikh Farid (Dead) by LRs. & Ors.                              ....Respondents





                                 JUDGMENT




R.M. Lodha, J.





             This   appeal,   by   special   leave,   arises   from   the   judgment


of   the   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh   dated   September   13,   2004


whereby the Single Judge of that Court set aside the judgment and


decree   dated   April   27,   1988   passed   by   the   Principal,   Subordinate


Judge,   Vishakhapatnam   and   remitted   the   matter   back   to   the   trial





                                                                                    1


court   for   the   purpose   of   passing   a   preliminary   decree   after


determining the shares to which each party would be entitled.


2.             Shaik   Dawood   had   three   sons;   Shaik   Farid,     Mehboob


Subhani   and   Mohammed   Yakub.   He   also   had   five   daughters;


Sappoora Bibi,  Khairunnisa Begum, Noorajahan Begum,  Rabia Bibi


and   Alima   Bibi.   All   the   five   daughters   were   married.   His   wife


predeceased him. Shaik Dawood retired as Reserve Head Constable.


He was also a Unani Medical Practitioner.


3.             Shaik   Farid,   Sappoora   Bibi,   Khairunnisa   Begum,


Noorajahan Begum and Mohd. Iqbal (son of Alima Bibi) - hereinafter


referred   to   as   `plaintiffs'   -   filed   a   suit   for   partition   against     Mehboob


Subhani,   Mohammed   Yakub   and     Rabia   Bibi   (hereinafter   referred   to


as   `defendant   1',   `defendant   2'   and   `defendant   3'   respectively).   The


son  and  daughters   of  Syed  Ali,   who was  brother   of    Shaik  Dawood,


were   impleaded   as   other   defendants   (hereinafter   referred   to   as


`defendants 4 to 7').


4.             The   parties   are   governed   by   Sunni   Law.   The   plaintiffs


averred   in the plaint that Shaik Dawood died intestate on December


19, 1968 and the plaintiffs and defendants   1 to 3 became entitled to


`A' schedule properties and half share in `B' schedule properties. The




                                                                                             2


plaintiffs   stated   that   the   defendants   4   to   7   are   entitled   to   other   half


share in `B' schedule properties.


5.              Mohammed  Yakub  --  defendant    2  --  contested  the suit


for partition. He set up the defence that Shaik Dawood  executed hiba


(gift   deed)   on   February   5,   1968   and   gifted   his   properties     to   him.


Shaik  Dawood  put  him  in  possession  of  the  hiba  properties   on    that


day   itself.     The   hiba   became   complete   and   the   plaintiffs   were   fully


aware   of   that   fact.   The   defendant     2     in   his   written   statement   also


referred   to   a   previous   suit   for   partition   filed   by   some   of   the   parties


which was dismissed in default.


6.              Some   of   the   original   parties     have   died   during   the


pendency   of   the   suit.   Their   legal   representatives   have   been   brought


on record.


7.              The trial court framed four issues.   The issue   relevant for


the purpose of the present appeal is issue no.2 which is to the effect


whether hiba dated February 5, 1968 is true, valid and binding on the


plaintiffs. The trial court, after recording the evidence and on hearing


the   parties,   answered   issue   no.   2   in   the   affirmative   and,     held   that


plaintiffs   were   not   entitled   to   the   shares   claimed   in   the   plaint.





                                                                                            3


Consequently, vide judgment and decree dated April 27, 1988, the trial


court dismissed the plaintiffs'  suit.


8.             The   plaintiffs   challenged   the   judgment   and   decree   of   the


trial   court   before   the   High   Court.     Inter   alia,   one   of   the   arguments


raised  before the High Court on behalf of the appellants was that the


gift dated February 5, 1968 being  in writing was compulsorily required


to   be   registered   and   stamped   and   in   absence   thereof,   the   gift   deed


could   not   be   accepted   or   relied   upon   for   any   purpose   and   such


unregistered gift deed would not confer any title upon the defendant 2.


The   High   Court   was   persuaded   by   the   argument   and   held   that   the


unregistered gift deed would not pass any title to the defendant 2 as


pleaded   by   him.   The   High   Court,   as   indicated   above,   allowed   the


appeal; set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and sent


the matter back to that court for the purposes of passing a preliminary


decree.


9.             The   present   appellants   are   legal   heirs   of   the   deceased


defendant 2.


10.            As to whether or not the High Court is  right in its view that


the   unregistered   gift   deed   dated   February   5,   1968   is   not   a   valid   gift





                                                                                          4


and   conveyed   no   title   to   the   defendant   2   is   the   question   for


determination in  this appeal.


11.              There is divergence of opinion amongst High Courts on the


question presented before us.


12.              The Privy Council in the case of  Mohammad Abdul Ghani


(since   deceased)   &   Anr.v.  Fakhr   Jahan   Begam   &   Ors.1    referred   to


`Mohammadan Law'; by Syed Ameer Ali  and approved the statement


made therein that three conditions   are necessary for a valid gift by a


Muslim: (a) manifestation of the wish to give on the part of the donor;


(b) the acceptance of the donee, either impliedly or expressly; (c) the


taking     of   possession   of   the   subject-matter   of   the   gift   by  the   donee,


either actually or constructively.



13.              In  Mahboob Sahab  v.  Syed Ismail and others2, this Court


referred   to   the   Principles   of   Mahomedan   Law   by   Mulla,   19th  Edition


and in paragraph 5 (pp. 696-697) noticed the legal position, in relation


to a gift by Muslim incorporated therein, thus :



          "5.  Under   Section   147   of   the  Principles   of   Mahomedan

          Law  by   Mulla,   19th   Edn.,   edited   by   Chief   Justice   M.

          Hidayatullah, envisages that writing is not essential to the

          validity   of   a   gift   either   of   moveable   or   of   immovable

          property.   Section   148   requires   that   it   is   essential   to   the

          validity   of   a   gift   that   the   donor   should   divest   himself


1  1922 (49) IA 195

2 (1995) 3 SCC 693



                                                                                           5


        completely of all ownership and dominion over the subject

        of   the   gift.   Under   Section   149,   three   essentials   to   the

        validity of the gift should be, (i) a declaration of gift by the

        donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or

        on behalf of the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession of

        the   subject   of   the   gift   by   the   donor   to   the   donee   as

        mentioned in Section 150. If these conditions are complied

        with, the gift is complete. Section 150 specifically mentions

        that for a valid gift there should be delivery of possession of

        the subject of the gift and taking of possession of the gift by

        the  donee, actually or constructively.  Then only the gift is

        complete. Section 152 envisages that where the donor is in

        possession,   a   gift   of   immovable   property   of   which   the

        donor   is   in   actual   possession   is   not   complete   unless   the

        donor   physically   departs   from   the   premises   with   all   his

        goods   and   chattels,   and   the   donee   formally   enters   into

        possession.   It   would,   thus,   be   clear   that   though   gift   by   a

        Mohammedan   is   not   required   to   be   in   writing   and

        consequently need not be registered under the Registration

        Act; for a gift to be complete, there should be a declaration

        of the gift by the donor; acceptance of the gift, expressed

        or   implied,   by   or   on   behalf   of   the   donee,   and   delivery   of

        possession of the property, the subject-matter of the gift by

        the donor to the donee. The donee should take delivery of

        the   possession   of   that   property   either   actually   or

        constructively.   On  proof of  these  essential   conditions,  the

        gift   becomes   complete   and   valid.   In   case   of   immovable

        property   in   the   possession   of   the   donor,   he   should

        completely   divest   himself   physically   of   the   subject   of   the

        gift......."




14.           Section   123   of   the   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   1882   (for


short,   `T.P.   Act')   lays   down   the   manner   in   which   gift   of   immoveable


property may be effected. It reads thus :



        "S.123.   Transfer   how   effected.   --  For   the   purpose   of

        making a gift of immoveable property, the transfer must be

        effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf

        of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses.



                                                                                            6


                For   the   purpose   of   making   a   gift   of   moveable

        property,   the   transfer   may   be   effected   either   by   a

        registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery.

                Such   delivery   may   be   made   in   the   same   way   as

        goods sold may be delivered."





15.             However, an exception is carved out in Section 129 of the


T.P.   Act   with   regard   to   the   gifts   by   a   Mohammadan.   It   reads   as


follows:


        "S.129.   Saving   of   donations                          mortis   causa     and

        Muhammadan  Law.   --   Nothing   in   this   Chapter   relates   to

        gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death,

        or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Muhammadan law."




16.             At   this   stage,   we   may   also   refer   to   Section   17   of   the


Registration Act, 1908  which makes registration of certain documents


compulsory.   Section   17   of   the   Registration   Act,   to   the   extent   it   is


necessary, reads as follows :


        "S.17.  Documents   of   which   registration   is   compulsory.

        --(1)   The   following   documents   shall   be   registered,   if   the

        property to which they relate is situate in a district in which,

        and   if   they   have   been   executed   on   or   after   the   date   on

        which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act,

        1866,   or   the   Indian   Registration   Act,   1871,   or   the   Indian

        Registration   Act,   1877,     or   this   Act   came   or   comes   into

        force, namely:--

        (a) instruments of gift of immovable property;


        (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;

        (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;





                                                                                              7


        (d)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ;


        (e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . ."




17.             Section 49 of the Registration Act deals with the effect of


non-registration of documents required to be registered.  It reads thus:


           "S.49.  Effect   of   non-   registration   of   documents

           required   to   be   registered.-   No   document   required   by

           section   17     or   by   any   provision   of   the   Transfer   of

           Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882),  to be registered shall--


            (a)  affect any immovable property comprised therein or


            (b) confer any power to adopt, or


            (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting

           such   property   or   conferring   such   power,   unless   it   has

           been registered:


                Provided   that   an   unregistered   document   affecting

           immovable   property   and   required   by   this   Act   or   the

           Transfer   of   Property   Act,   1882   (4   of   1882   ),   to   be

           registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a

           suit   for   specific   performance   under   Chapter   II   of   the

           Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877 ), or as evidence of

           any collateral transaction not required  to be effected by

           registered instrument."




18.             Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act leaves no manner


of   doubt   that   an   instrument   of   gift   of   immoveable   property   requires


registration   irrespective   of   the   value   of   the   property.  The   question   is


about its applicability to a written gift executed by a Mohammadan in





                                                                                       8


the light of Section 129 of the T.P. Act and the rule of Mohammadan


Law relating to gifts.


19.             In the case of  Nasib Ali  v.  Wajed Ali3,  the contention was


raised  before  the  Division   Bench  of  the  Calcutta  High  Court   that  the


deed   of   gift,   not   being   registered   under   the   Registration   Act,   is   not


admissible in evidence. The Calcutta High Court held that a deed of


gift   by   a   Mohammadan   is   not   an   instrument   effecting,   creating   or


making   the   gift  but  a  mere   piece   of   evidence.   This  is   what  the   High


Court said :


         ".........The   position   under   the   Mahomedan   Law   is   this   :

         that a gift in order to be valid must be made in accordance

         with the forms stated above; and even if it is evidenced by

         writing, unless all the essential forms are observed, it is not

         valid   according   to   law.   That   being   so,   a   deed   of   gift

         executed by a Mahomedan is not the instrument effecting,

         creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence. It

         may so happen after a lapse of time that the evidence of

         the   observance   of   the   above   forms   might   not   be

         forthcoming, so it is sometimes thought prudent; to reduce

         the fact that a gift has been made into writing. Such writing

         is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence.


         3.   The   law   with   regard   to   the   gift   being   complete   by

         declaration and delivery of possession is so clear that in a

         case   before   their   Lordships   of   the   Judicial   Committee

         Kamarunnissa Bibi v. Hussaini Bibi [1880] 3 All. 266, where

         a gift was  said to have  been made  in lieu of dower,  their

         Lordships   held   that   the   requisite   forms   having   been

         observed   it   was   not   necessary   to   enquire   whether   there

         was any consideration for the gift or whether there was any

         dower   due.   The  case   of  Karam  Ilahi  v.  Sharfuddin  [1916]



3 AIR 1927 Cal 197



                                                                                        9


38 All. 212 is similar in principle to the present case. There

also a deed relating to the gift was executed. The learned

Judge held that if the gift was valid under the Mahomedan

Law it was none the less valid because there was a deed

of   gift   which,   owing   to   some   defect,   was   invalid   under

Section   123,   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   and   could   not   be

used in evidence.


4. The next, question that calls for consideration is whether

a document like the present one executed by a Mahomedan

donor after  he made a gift to show that  he had made it  in

favour   of   the   donee   is   compulsorily   registrable   under   the

Registration   Act.   Under   Section   17   of   the   Registration   Act

an instrument of gift must be registered. By the expression

'instrument   of   gift   of   immovable   property'   I   understand   an

instrument or deed which creates, makes or completes the

gift, thereby transferring the ownership of the property from

the executant to the person in whose favour it is executed.

In   order   to   affect   the   immovable   property,   the   document

must be a document of transfer; and if it is a document of

transfer   it   must   be   registered   under   the   provisions   of   the

Registration Act.


5.   The   present   document   does   not   affect   immovable

property.   It   does   not   transfer   the   immovable   property   from

the donor to the donee. It only affords evidence of the fact

that   the   donor   has   observed   the   formalities   under   the

Mahomedan   Law   in   making   the   gift   to   the   donee.   I   am

prepared   to   go   so   far   as   to   hold   that   a   document   like   the

present   one   is   not   compulsorily   registrable   under   the

Registration Act, or the Registration Act does not apply to a

so-called   deed   of   gift   executed   by   a   Mahomedan.   But   for

purposes of the present case it is not necessary to go so far

because   I   hold   that   this   document   is   only   a   piece   of

evidence,   and   conceding   that   it   should,   have   been

registered,   the   effect   of   its   non-registration   is   to   make   it

inadmissible   in   evidence   under   Section   49   of   the

Registration Act........."





                                                                                      10


20.                 In  Sankesula   Chinna   Budde   Saheb  v.  Raja   Subbamma4,


the Andhra Pradesh High Court, after noticing the three essentials of a


gift under the   Mohammadan Law, held that if a gift was   reduced to


writing,   it   required   registration     under   Section   17(1)(a)   of   the


Registration Act. It went on to hold that  even if by virtue of   Section


129 of the T.P. Act, a deed of gift executed by  Mohammadan was  not


required to comply with the provisions of Section 123 of the T.P. Act,


still it had   to be registered under Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration


Act when the gift related  to immoveable property.


21.                 A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case


of Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Govt.  of Hyderabad


v.  Smt. Tayyaba Begum5,  was called upon to decide on   a reference


made   by   the   Board   of   Revenue   under   Section   55   of   the   Hyderabad


Stamp Act whether the document  under consideration therein  was a


gift deed or it merely  evidenced    a past transaction.  The  High  Court


applied the test - whether the parties regarded  the instrument to be a


receptacle   and   appropriate   evidence   of   the   transaction;   was   it


intended to constitute the gift or was it to serve as a record of a past


event - and held as under :




4 1954 2 MLJ 113

5 AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 199



                                                                                 11


         "12.     We have to examine the document in question in the

         light   of   these   rules.   No   doubt,   there   was   recitals   therein

         which relate to past transaction. But that is not decisive of

         the matter. What is the purpose which it was  designed to

         serve?   That   the   executant   did   not   treat   it   as   a

         memorandum of a completed hiba is evident from some of

         the   sentences.     In   the   deed,   such   as   "I   deemed   it

         necessary to execute a deed also making a declaration in

         favour of my son...in accordance with the Muslim law", and

         the last portion of the document. The anxiety of the donor

         to free the title of the donee to the property from all doubts

         and to save him from future litigation is clearly exhibited in

         the last sentence.


                 "I   pray   that   no   one   may   have   any   kind   of   doubt

                 regarding   the   ownership   of   Syed   Ehasan   Hussain

                 and that if per chance any doubt at all should arise,

                 this deed of Ekrarnama may prove sufficient."


                  This   sentence   is   expressive   of   her   intention   to

         silence all doubts regarding the ownership of the property

         with the aid of this document. She did not want anyone to

         challenge   the   title   of   the   donee   to  the   house   in   question.

         This   object   could   be   attained   only   if   it   is   regarded   as   a

         conveyance, a document which effected the transfer by its

         own force. If, on the other hand, if it is a mere record of a

         past   transaction,   that   would   not   have   the   desired   effect.

         There is one circumstance which gives some indication as

         to   the   intention   of   the   executant   of   the   document.   The

         document   is   attested   by   two   witnesses   as   required   by

         Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. No doubt, this

         is   not   conclusive   of   the   matter.   But   it   is   indicative   of   the

         desire of the executant that it should serve as evidence of

         the gift and not as a memorandum of a past transaction."





22.              In Makku Rawther's Children: Assan Ravther and others v.


Manahapara   Charayil6,  V.R.   Krishna   Iyer,   J.   (as   His   Lordship   then


6 AIR 1972 Kerala 27



                                                                                                12


was) did not agree with the test applied   by the Full Bench of Andhra


Pradesh High Court  and the reasoning given in Tayyaba Begum5 . He


held in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report thus :




      "8.     I   regret   my   inability   to   agree   with   the   reasoning   in

      these decisions. In the context of Section 17, a document

      is the same as an instrument and to draw nice distinctions

      between the two only serves to baffle, not to ill mine. Mulla

      says:   "The   words   `document'   and   `instrument'   are   used

      interchangeable   in   the   Act".     An   instrument   of   gift   is   one

      whereby   a   gift   is   made.   Where   in   law   a   gift   cannot   be

      effected   by   a   registered   deed   as   such,   it   cannot   be   an

      instrument   of   gift.   The   legal   position   is   well-settled.   A

      Muslim   gift   may   be   valid   even   without   a   registered   deed

      and   may   be   invalid   even   with   a   registered   deed.

      Registration   being   irrelevant   to   its   legal   force,   a   deed

      setting  out  Muslim gift cannot be regarded  as constitutive

      of the gift and is not compulsorily registerable."



      9.   Against   this  argument  counsel   invoked  the   authority   of

      the   Andhra   Pradesh   Full   Bench.   One   may   respect   the

      ruling but still reiect the reasoning. The Calcutta Bench in

      AIR 1927 Cal 197 has discussed the issue from the angle I

      have presented. The logic of the law matters more than the

      judicial   numbers   behind   a   view.   The   Calcutta   Bench

      argued:




             "The essentials of a gift under the Mahomedan law

             are   .....   A   simple   gift   can   only   be   made   by   going

             through   the   above   formalities   and   no   written

             instrument   is   required.   In   fact   no   writing   is

             necessary to validate a gift; and if a gift is made by

             a written instrument without delivery of possession,

             it is invalid in law ..... That being so, a deed of gift

             executed   by   a   Mahomedan   is   not   the   instrument

             effecting,   creating   or   making   the   gift   but   a   mere

             piece   of   evidence   .....   Under   Section   17   of   the

             Registration   Act   an   instrument   of   gift   must   be



                                                                                         13


               registered. By the expression 'instrument of gift of

               immovable property' I understand an instrument or

               deed   which   creates,   makes   or   completes   the   gift

               thereby transferring the ownership of the property

               .....   The   present   document   does   not   affect

               immovable   property.   It   does   not   transfer   an

               immovable   property   from   the   donor   to   the   donee

               which   only   affords   evidence   of   the   fact   that   the

               donor   has   observed   the   formalities   under   the

               Mahomedan   law   in   making   the   gift   .....   I   am

               prepared  to go so far as to hold that a document

               like the present one is not compulsorily registrable

               under the Registration Act, or the Registration Act

               does not apply to a so-called deed of gift executed

               by a Mahomedan."



        These observations of Suhrawardy, J. have my respectful

        concurrence. So confining myself to this contention for the

        nonce,   I   am   inclined   to   hold   that   Ext.   B1   is   admissible

        notwithstanding   Ss.   17   and   49   of   the   Indian   Registration

        Act.   This   conclusion,   however,   is   little   premature   if   I   may

        anticipate my opinion on the operation of Section 129 of the

        Transfer of Property Act expressed later in this judgment.

        Indeed, in the light of my interpretation of Section 129, Ext.

        B1   needs   to   be   registered.   For   the   present   I   indicate   my

        conclusion,   if   the   law   of   gifts   for   Muslims   were   not   to   be

        governed by Section 129."




23.            The   Full   Bench   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir   High   Court   in


Ghulam   Ahmad   Sofi  v.  Mohd.   Sidiq   Dareel   and   others7    had   an


occasion  to consider the question whether in view of the provisions of


Sections   123   and   129   of   the   T.P.   Act,   the   rule   of   gifts   in


Mohammadan Law    stands superseded; and whether it is necessary


that there   should be a registered instrument as required by Sections



7 AIR 1974 Jammu & Kashmir 59



                                                                                             14


123 and 138 of the T.P. Act in the case of gifts made  under that Law.


The Full Bench noticed the statutory provisions and also decisions of


different High Courts including the decision of Calcutta High Court in


the case of Nasib Ali3. The Full Bench  held  as follows :



         "14.    The ratio of the above cited authorities is therefore in

         favour  of the  proposition  that  an  oral  gift made  under the

         Muslim   law   would   not   be   affected   by   Section   123   of   the

         Transfer of Property Act and the gift if it has otherwise all

         the attributes of a valid gift under the Muslim Law would not

         become   invalid   because   there   is   no   instrument   in   writing

         and   registered.   Therefore   the   answer   to   the   question

         formulated would be in the negative i.e. that Sections 123

         and 129 of the Transfer of Property Act do not supersede

         the Muslim law on matters relating to making of oral gifts,

         that   it   is   not   essential   that   there   should   be   a   registered

         instrument   as   required   by   Sections   123   and   138   of   the

         Transfer   of   Property   Act   in   such   cases.   But   if   there   is

         executed   an   instrument   and   its   execution   is

         contemporaneous   with   the   making   of   the   gift   then   in   that

         case the instrument must be registered as provided under

         Section           17          of         the          Registration          

         Act. If, however, the making of the gift is an antecedent act

         and a deed is executed afterwards as evidencing the said

         transaction   that   does   not   require   registration   as   it   is   an

         instrument   made   after   the   gift   is   made   and   does   not

         therefore   create,   make   or   complete   the   gift   thereby

         transferring   the   ownership   of   the   property   from   the

         executant to the person in whose  favour it is executed."




24.              The Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the


case of  Chota Uddandu Sahib  v.  Masthan Bi (died) and others8, was


concerned   with   the   question   about   the   gift   by    Mohammadan.     The




8 AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 271



                                                                                            15


Single Judge referred to some of the decisions noticed above and few


other decisions and held in paragraph 10 of the report thus :



         "10.   Under   Section  129  of   the   Transfer   of   Property   Act,

         nothing in Chapter VII relates to gifts of movable property

         made   in   contemplation   of   death   or   shall   be   deemed   to

         affect   any   rule   of   Mohammadan   Law.     According   to   the

         Mohammedan   Law,   there   can   be   a   valid   gift,   if   three

         essentials  of the gift are satisfied.  (1) a declaration of the

         gift by the donor, (2) the acceptance of the gift express or

         implied   by   or   on   behalf   of   the   donee   and   (3)   delivery   of

         possession of the subject of gift by the donor to the donee.

         If  these   conditions  are  complied  with  the   gift  is  complete.

         According   to   Muslim   law   it   is   not   necessary   that   there

         should be a deed of gift in order to make it a valid gift, but

         of course, if there is a deed it should be registered. But if

         the   deed   is   merely   a   memoranda   of   an   already   effected

         gift,   then   it   stands   on   a   separate   footing.   In   view   of   this

         specific provision of Muslim Law, which is saved by Section

         129, it cannot be held that the gifts amongst muslims also

         should satisfy the provisions of Chapter VII.   . . . . . . . . . . .

         Hence if all the formalities, as prescribed  by Muslim Law,

         regarding the making of gifts are satisfied, the gift is valid

         notwithstanding   the   fact   that   it   is   oral   and   without   any

         instrument.   If   there   is   a   contemporaneous   document   it

         should be registered.  But if the gift is antecedent  and the

         deed is subsequent merely evidencing the past transaction,

         it does not require registration, because it does not by itself

         make or complete the gift. . . . . . . . . ."




25.             In   the   case   of  Amirkhan  v.  Ghouse   Khan9,   one   of   the


questions that  arose for consideration  before the Madras High Court


was : whether the gift of the immoveable property by  Mohammadan, if


reduced   to   writing,     required   registration.  The   Single   Judge   of   the




9 (1985) 2 MLJ 136



                                                                                               16


Madras   High   Court   concluded   that   though   a  Mohammadan  could


create a valid gift orally,  if he should reduce the same in writing, the


gift will not be valid unless it is duly registered.



26.             In   the   case   of  Md.   Hesabuddin   and   others  v.  Md.


Hesaruddin   and   others10,   the   question   with   regard   to   gift   of


immoveable   property   written   on   ordinary   unstamped   paper   arose


before   the   Gauhati   High   Court.   That   was   a   case   where   a


Mohammadan mother made a gift of land in favour of her son by a gift


deed written on ordinary unstamped paper.   The Single Judge of the


High   Court   relying   upon   an   earlier   decision   of   that   Court   in  Jubeda


Khatoon v. Moksed Ali11 held as under:



         ".....   But   it   cannot   be   taken   as   sine   qua   non   in   all   cases

         that wherever there is a writing about a Mahomedan gift of

         immovable   property,   there   must   be   registration   thereof.

         The   facts   and   circumstances   of   each   case   have   to   be

         taken into consideration before finding whether the writing

         requires registration or not. The essential requirements, as

         said   before,   to   make   a   Mahomedan   gift   valid   are

         declaration   by   the   donor,   acceptance   by   the   donee   and

         delivery of possession to the donee. It was held in Jubeda

         Khatoon v. Moksed Ali, AIR 1973 Gau 105 (at p. 106)-


         "Under the Mahomedan Law three things are necessary for

         creation   of   a   gift.   They   are   (i)   declaration   of   gift   by   the

         donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift express or implied by or on

         behalf of the donee and (iii) delivery of possession of the

         subject of the gift by the donor to the donee. The deed of



10 AIR 1984 Gauhati 41

11 AIR 1973 Gauhati 105



                                                                                               17


gift is immaterial for creation of gift under the Mahomedan

Law.   A   gift   under   the   Mahomedan   Law   is   not   valid   if   the

above mentioned essentials  are  not  fulfilled,  even  if  there

be a deed of gift or even a registered deed of gift. In other

words  even if there be a declaration of acceptance of the

gift, there will be no valid gift under the Mahomedan Law if

there be no delivery of possession, even though there may

be registered deed of gift." In that case there was a deed of

gift which was not produced during trial. Still it was found in

that   case   that   had   the   defendants   produced   the   deed   of

gift, at best it would have proved a declaration of the gift by

the   donor   and   acceptance   thereof   by   the   donee.   It   was

further held that despite this the defendants would have to

lead   independent   oral   evidence   to   prove   delivery   of

possession in order to prove a valid gift. Therefore it was

found in that case that deed of gift under the Mahomedan

Law does not create a disposition of property. Relying  on

this it cannot be said that whenever there is a writing with

regard to a gift executed by the donor, it must be proved as

a   basic   instrument   of   gift   before   deciding   the   gift   to   be

valid. In the instant case a mere writing in the plain paper

as   aforesaid   containing   the   declaration   of   gift   cannot

tantamount to a formal instrument of gift. Ext. A (2) has in

the   circumstances   of   the   present   case   to   be   taken   as   a

form of declaration of the donor. In every case the intention

of   the   donor,   the   background   of   the   alleged   gift   and   the

relation of the donor and the donee as well as the purpose

or motive of the gift all have to be taken into consideration.

In the present case,  it is recited in the said writings that the

3rd defendant  has been maintaining and looking after the

donor   and   that   the   other   children   of   the   donor   were

neglecting her. The gift was from a mother to a son and it

was   based   on   love   and   affection   for   the   son   in   whose

favour the gift was made. Therefore, it cannot be held that

because a declaration is contained in the paper Ext. A (2)

the latter must have been registered in order to render the

gift   valid.   Admittedly,   the   3rd   defendant   has   been

possessing   the   land   and   got   his   name   mutated   in   the

revenue   records   with   respect   to   the   land.   It   is   therefore

implied that there was acceptance on behalf of the donee

and also that the possession of the property was delivered

to the donee by the donor. It should be remembered that

unless   there   was   possession   on   behalf   of   the   3rd


                                                                                  18


         defendant, no mutation would have taken place with regard

         to the property. It may be repeated that Ext. A (2) has to be

         taken   in   the   present   case   as   a   mere   declaration   of   the

         donor in presence  of the witnesses  who  are said to have

         attested the writing."


27.             The   position   is   well   settled,   which   has   been   stated   and


restated   time   and   again,   that   the   three   essentials   of   a   gift   under


Mohammadan  Law   are;   (i)   declaration   of   the   gift   by   the   donor;   (2)


acceptance   of   the   gift   by   the   donee   and   (3)   delivery   of   possession.


Though, the rules of  Mohammadan Law do not make writing essential


to the validity of a gift; an oral gift fulfilling all the three essentials make


the gift complete and irrevocable. However, the donor may record the


transaction   of   gift   in   writing.   Asaf   A.   A.   Fyzee   in   Outlines   of


Muhammadan  Law,   Fifth   Edition   (edited   and   revised   by   Tahir


Mahmood) at page 182 states in this regard that writing may be of two


kinds   :   (i)   it   may  merely   recite   the   fact   of   a   prior   gift;   such   a   writing


need   not   be   registered.   On   the   other   hand,   (ii)   it   may   itself   be   the


instrument   of   gift;   such   a   writing   in   certain   circumstances   requires


registration.  He further says that if there is a declaration, acceptance


and delivery of possession coupled with the formal instrument of a gift,


it must be registered.     Conversely, the author   says that registration,





                                                                                                   19


however,   by   itself   without   the   other   necessary   conditions,   is   not


sufficient.



28.             Mulla,   Principles   of   Mahomedan   Law   (19th  Edition),   Page


120, states the legal position in the following words :



        "Under the  Mahomedan  law the three essential  requisites

        to make a gift valid : (1) declaration of the gift by the donor:

        (2)   acceptance   of   the   gift   by   the   donee   expressly   or

        impliedly   and   (3)   delivery   of   possession   to   and   taking

        possession thereof by the donee actually or constructively.

        No   written   document   is   required   in   such   a   case.   Section

        129   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   excludes   the   rule   of

        Mahomedan   law   from   the   purview   of   Section   123   which

        mandates   that   the   gift   of   immovable   property   must   be

        effected by a registered instrument as stated therein. But it

        cannot   be   taken   as   a   sine   qua   non   in   all   cases   that

        whenever   there   is   a   writing   about   a   Mahomedan   gift   of

        immovable   property   there   must   be   registration   thereof.

        Whether the writing requires registration or not depends on

        the facts and circumstances of each case."




29.             In   our   opinion,   merely   because   the     gift     is   reduced   to


writing by a  Mohammadan instead of it having been made orally, such


writing   does   not   become     a   formal   document     or     instrument   of   gift.


When a gift   could be made by   Mohammadan  orally, its nature and


character is not changed because of it having been made by a written


document.  What is important for a valid gift under  Mohammadan Law


is   that   three   essential   requisites   must   be   fulfilled.   The   form   is


immaterial. If all the three essential requisites are satisfied constituting



                                                                                        20


valid gift, the transaction of gift would not be rendered invalid because


it has been written on a plain piece of paper.   The distinction that if a


written deed of gift recites the factum of prior gift then such deed is not


required   to   be   registered   but   when   the   writing   is   contemporaneous


with the making of the gift, it must be registered, is inappropriate and


does   not   seem   to   us   to   be     in   conformity   with   the   rule     of   gifts   in


Mohammadan Law.



30.            In   considering   what   is   the    Mohammadan  Law   on   the


subject   of   gifts   inter   vivos,   the   Privy   Council   in  Mohammad   Abdul


Ghani1  stated   that   when   the   old   and   authoritative   texts   of


Mohammadan Law were promulgated there were not in contemplation


of any one any Transfer of Property Acts, any Registration Acts, any


Revenue   Courts   to   record   transfers   of   possession   of   land,   and   that


could   not   have   been   intended   to   lay   down   for   all   time   what   should


alone be the evidence that titles to lands had passed.



 31.           Section   129   of   T.P.   Act   preserves   the   rule   of


Mohammadan  Law  and   excludes   the   applicability     of   Section  123   of


T.P. Act to a gift of an immovable property by a   Mohammadan.   We


find   ourselves   in   express   agreement   with   the   statement   of   law


reproduced   above   from   Mulla,   Principles   of   Mahomedan   Law   (19th



                                                                                              21


Edition), page 120.   In other words, it is not the requirement that in all


cases where the gift deed is contemporaneous   to the making of the


gift   then   such   deed   must   be   registered   under   Section   17   of   the


Registration Act.   Each case would depend on its own facts.



32.           We are unable to concur with the view of the Full Bench of


Andhra   Pradesh   High   Court   in   the   case   of  Tayyaba   Begum5.  We


approve the view of the Calcutta High Court in   Nasib Ali3 that a deed


of   gift   executed   by   a     Mohammadan   is   not   the   instrument   effecting,


creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence, such writing


is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence.



33.           We also approve the view of the Gauhati High Court in the


case of  Md. Hesabuddin10  .  The judgments to the contrary by Andhra


Pradesh   High   Court,   Jammu   and   Kashmir   High   Court   and   Madras


High Court do not lay down the correct law.



34.           Now, as regards the facts of the present case, the gift was


made by Shaik Dawood by a written deed dated February 5, 1968 in


favour   of   his   son  Mohammed  Yakub   in   respect   of   the   properties   `A'


schedule and `B' schedule appended thereto.   The gift - as is recited


in the deed - was based on love and affection for Mohammed Yakub





                                                                                    22


as   after   the   death   of   donor's   wife,   he   has   been   looking   after   and


helping him.   Can it be said that because a declaration is reduced to


writing, it must have been registered?   We think not. The acceptance


of the gift  by  Mohammed  Yakub   is also evidenced  as he signed  the


deed.   Mohammed  Yakub was   residing in the `B' schedule property


consisting   of   a   house   and   a   kitchen   room   appurtenant   thereto   and,


thus, was in physical possession of residential house with the donor.


The trial court on consideration of the entire evidence on record has


recorded   a   categorical   finding   that   Shaik   Dawood   (donor),   executed


the gift deed dated February 5, 1968 in favour of donee (Mohammed


Yakub),   the donee accepted the gift and the donor handed over the


properties   covered   by   the     gift   deed   to   the   donee.     The   trial   court


further   held   that   all   the   three   essentials   of   a   valid   gift   under   the


Mohammadan  Law   were   satisfied.     The   view   of   the   trial   court   is   in


accord with the legal position stated by us above.   The gift deed dated


February   5,   1968   is   a   form   of   declaration   by   the   donor   and   not   an


instrument of gift as contemplated under Section 17 of the Registration


Act. As all the three essential requisites are satisfied by the gift deed


dated   February   5,   1968,   the   gift   in   favour   of   defendant   2   became


complete and irrevocable.




                                                                                         23


35.           The High Court in the impugned judgment relied upon the


Full   Bench     decision   in   the   case   of  Tayyaba   Begum5    but   we     have


already held that the view of the Full Bench in Tayyaba Begum5 is not


a correct view and does not lay down the correct law.



36.           Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and


order dated September 13, 2004 passed by the High Court of Andhra


Pradesh is set aside. The judgment and decree dated April 27, 1988


passed   by   the   Principal,   Subordinate   Judge,   Vishakhapatnam   is


restored. The parties shall bear their own costs.





                                                             ........................ J.

                                                                  (R.M. Lodha)


                       


                                                           .......................... J.

                                                          (Surinder Singh Nijjar)




NEW DELHI.

MAY 5, 2011.    





                                                                                    24