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Showing posts with label 2020 [1] Advocatemmmohan Apex Court Cases 19. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2020 [1] Advocatemmmohan Apex Court Cases 19. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 22, 2020

. In the present case, it is not the case of the appellant that the goods in question were being exported. Since the goods are to be consumed on the board of the foreign going ship and the same would be consumed before reaching a destination, it does not fall under the definition of ‘export’. The sale cannot qualify as a sale occasioning export unless the goods reach a destination which is a place outside India. Further, since the goods have been sold from the bonded warehouse and had crossed the customs port/land customs station prior to their sale, it cannot qualify as a sale in course of export within the meaning of Section 5(1) read with Section 2(ab) of the CST Act.

whether the subject   sales   (of   goods   imported   from   foreign   country   and   after unloading the same on the land­mass of the State of West Bengal, kept in the bonded warehouse without payment of customs duty) to foreign bound ships as “ship stores” can be regarded as sale within the territory of the State and amenable to sales tax under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 (for short, ‘the 1954 Act’) or the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994 (for short, ‘the 1994 Act’).  ?
The admitted factual position in the present cases is that after importing foreign made cigarettes, the appellants stored the same in the customs bonded warehouse within the land­mass of the State of
West Bengal and some of those articles were sold to the Master of a foreign­going ship as ship stores, without payment of customs duty. Those goods were escorted to the stated ship under the supervision of the officials of the Customs authority.
These appeals take exception to the judgment and order of the High Court at Calcutta (for short, ‘the High Court’), dated 16.8.2007 in W.P.T.T. Nos. 5/2007 and 6/2007 respectively, whereby it had
upheld the decision of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) that the stated sales were within the territory of the State of West Bengal and amenable to sales tax.
.Apex court held that
In the present case, it is not the case of the appellant that the goods in question were being exported. Since the goods are to be consumed on the board of the foreign going ship and the same would
be consumed before reaching a destination, it does not fall under the definition of ‘export’.   The sale cannot qualify as a sale occasioning export unless the goods reach a destination which is a place outside India.   Further,   since   the   goods   have   been   sold   from   the   bonded
warehouse and had crossed the customs port/land customs station prior to their sale, it cannot qualify as a sale in course of export within the meaning of Section 5(1) read with Section 2(ab) of the CST
Act.
it must be held that the stated sales or appropriation of goods kept in bonded warehouse within the land­mass/territory of the State of West Bengal are neither in the course of import or export
and more so, were effected beyond the customs port/land customs station area.  Therefore, in law, it was a sale amenable to levy of sales tax under the 1954 Act and the 1994 Act, as the case may be, read with Section 4 of the CST Act.  As a result, these appeals must fail, as we find no infirmity in the view taken by the authorities below and which had justly commended to the High Court.


1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7863 OF 2009
Nirmal Kumar Parsan      … Appellant
Versus
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors.     …Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7864 OF 2009
Parsan Brothers and Anr.      ... Appellants
Versus
Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors.   ... Respondents
J U D G M E N T
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
1. The principal question involved in these appeals is whether the
subject   sales   (of   goods   imported   from   foreign   country   and   after
unloading the same on the land­mass of the State of West Bengal,
kept in the bonded warehouse without payment of customs duty) to
2
foreign bound ships as “ship stores” can be regarded as sale within
the territory of the State and amenable to sales tax under the West
Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 (for short, ‘the 1954 Act’) or the West
Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994 (for short, ‘the 1994 Act’).  
2. The admitted factual position in the present cases is that after
importing foreign made cigarettes, the appellants stored the same in
the customs bonded warehouse within the land­mass of the State of
West Bengal and some of those articles were sold to the Master of a
foreign­going ship as ship stores, without payment of customs duty.
Those goods were escorted to the stated ship under the supervision of
the officials of the Customs authority.
3. These appeals take exception to the judgment and order of the
High Court at Calcutta (for short, ‘the High Court’), dated 16.8.2007
in W.P.T.T. Nos. 5/2007 and 6/2007 respectively, whereby it had
upheld the decision of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal (for short,
‘the Tribunal’) that the stated sales were within the territory of the
State of West Bengal and amenable to sales tax.
4. Civil   Appeal   No.   7863/2009   emanates   from   the   assessment
order  passed   by   the   Commercial  Tax   Officer,   West  Bengal,   dated
13.3.1985 pertaining to assessment period – 1.4.1980 to 31.3.1981.
3
The assessing officer rejected the claim for exemption from payment
of sales tax in respect of the stated sales of imported cigarettes from
the stock, as the cigarettes were sold to outgoing vessels from the
bonded warehouse within the land­mass of the State of West Bengal
following the decision of the High Court in M/s. Ranjit Shipping Pvt.
Ltd. & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.1
.  The authority found
that it was not a sale in the course of import as claimed by the
assessees   (appellants).     The   appellants   unsuccessfully   carried   the
matter in appeal and finally in revision before the Tribunal, which
came to be rejected on 30.3.2007.  Before the revisional authority, the
only contention pursued was that there was no sale within the State
of West Bengal or even in India because the buyer had no right to
consume the goods before the ship crossed the territorial Waters of
India.  It was urged by the appellants before the revisional authority
that the process of import was not complete at the time of sale to the
foreign­going ship and the transaction was a sale in the course of
import.     Resultantly,   the   sold   goods   were   not   taxable   under   the
concerned   West   Bengal   Sales   Tax   laws   because   the   goods   never
entered   the   local   area   of   the   State   of   West   Bengal,   crossing   the
customs frontiers of India as defined in Section 2(ab) of the Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the CST Act’).  The Tribunal, however,
1 1980 SCC Online Cal 141 : (1980) 2 CHN 192
4
held that the sale had taken place on the land­mass of the State of
West Bengal and the sale was neither for import nor for export.  The
Tribunal essentially relied upon the exposition in  Madras  Marine
and   Co.   vs.   State   of   Madras2
  to reject the revision filed by the
appellants being devoid of merits.  Feeling aggrieved, the appellants
carried the matter to the High Court by way of a writ petition being
W.P.T.T.   No.   5/2007,   which   came   to   be   rejected   by   the   Division
Bench of the High Court whilst upholding the view taken by the
Tribunal as just and proper.
5. Civil   Appeal   No.   7864/2009   emanates   from   the   order   dated
22.10.2003 passed by the Assistant  Commissioner of  Commercial
Taxes under Section 65 of the 1994 Act pertaining to assessment
periods – 1.4.1999 to 31.3.2000, 1.4.2000 to 31.3.2001, 1.4.2001 to
31.3.2002 and 1.4.2002 to 31.3.2003.   The claim of the appellants
that the sales in question were in the course of import on high seas
and no sales tax was payable thereon came to be rejected.   The
authority answered the claim as follows:­
“….. 
All the judicial edicts relevant and referred to were perused
and the documents produced by the dealer were examined.
His   Lordship   Hon’ble   West   Bengal   Taxation   Tribunal
passed   the   judgment   after   considering   all   the   grounds
taken by the dealer including the one for the position of the
2 (1986) 3 SCC 552
5
law after introduction of the section 2(ab) in Central Sales
Tax Act.  His Lordship Honourable High Court of Kolkata
did not express even a mite of doubt in the correctness of
the impugned order of the Hon’ble Tribunal.  The order was
remanded for quantification of sales in dispute.   It was
observed that, of the total goods imported and stored only a
portion was taken out for sale to master of a particular
ship.   From the same warehouse goods for sales to local
persons also were taken.  So the sold goods could not have
been ascertained and appropriate before those were taken
out of the bonded warehouse.  The risk in the goods was
transferred at that time and at that place only.   It might
have so happened that the Customs authority took custody
of the goods for preventing loss of its own revenue.    No
such sale could have been one in the course of import
because the sale did not occasion the import.  None of
those was export because the goods were not supposed
to   enter   into   the   territory   of   another   country   in   the
form those were dispatched.  The analogy of sales from
duty­free shops was irrelevant.   For, it always remains
on  the  other  side  customs  frontier  and  so  the  risk   is
transferred before crossing of the frontier.
Thus there was no gainsay that sales of goods to masters of
ships were sales in the state and were taxable.  The dealer
was asked to pay tax on such sales and revise the return
for the years yet to be assessed.  The assessing authority
was   requested   to   revise   if   necessary,   assessments   not
impugned.   The appellate and revisional authorities were
requested to treat the tax payable on such sale as admitted
one.
…..”
(emphasis supplied)
6. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants resorted to revision before the
Tribunal, which came to be rejected following the decision of the
Tribunal   passed   on   the   same   date   i.e.   30.3.2007   in   case   of   the
companion appeal.  The appellant carried the matter by way of a writ
petition being W.P.T.T. No. 6/2007  before the  High Court,  which
came to be dismissed by the High Court, upholding the decision of
6
the authority, which had held that the sales in question would be
amenable to sales tax under the 1994 Act.
7. The thrust of the argument of the appellants in these appeals is
that the process of import was not complete at the time of sale of the
goods in question to the foreign­going ship and the transaction of sale
was “in the course of import”, for which reason it was not amenable to
sales tax and in fact, the State would have no authority to levy such
tax.  To buttress this submission, reliance was placed on Article 286
of the Constitution of India providing for restrictions as to imposition
of tax on the sale or purchase of goods and on Section 5 of the CST
Act, in particular sub­Section (2) thereof, to contend that the sales in
question shall be deemed to have taken place in the course of import
of   goods   in   the   territory   of   India.     Reliance   was   placed   on   the
Constitution   Bench   decision   of   this   Court   in  J.V.   Gokal   &   Co.
(Private) Ltd. vs. Assistant Collector of Sales­Tax (Inspection) &
Ors.3
, which had followed the exposition in  State   of   TravancoreCochin & Ors. vs. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory, Quilon
&   Ors.4
.     Relying   on   the   definition   of   expression   “crossing   the
customs   frontiers   of   India”   in   Section   2(ab)   of   the   CST   Act,   of
“customs area” in Section 2(11) and of “customs station” in Section
3 (1960) 2 SCR 852 : AIR 1960 SC 595
4 (1954) SCR 53 : AIR 1953 SC 333
7
2(13) of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short, ‘the Customs Act’), it was
urged that crossing the customs frontiers means crossing the limits of
the customs station including crossing the area in which imported
goods or exported goods are ordinarily kept before the clearance by
the Customs authorities.  Reliance was also placed on the decision in
Minerals & Metals Trading  Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Sales
Tax Officer & Ors.5
, which has had occasion to construe Section 5 of
the CST Act.  It was then urged that the goods in question were kept
for warehousing and a declaration was given by the appellants that
the said goods would be exported to foreign­going vessels as ship
stores in terms of Section 88 of the Customs Act.   The appellants
have  adverted to  Sections 69, 85 and  88 of  the Customs Act  to
contend that the stated goods could be exported to a place outside
India without payment of import duty and until import duty was paid,
the import thereof cannot be said to be complete.  Reliance was then
placed on the decision in Indian Tourist Development Corporation
Limited   vs.   Assistant   Commissioner   of   Commercial   Taxes   &
Anr.6
, which according to the appellants, applied on all fours, as even
in that case, the goods were kept in the bonded warehouses and then
supplied to duty­free shops, which transaction has been extricated
5 (1998) 7 SCC 19
6 (2012) 3 SCC 204
8
from the applicability of sales tax payable to the State on the ground
that the goods had not crossed the customs frontiers and the sale was
deemed to have taken place in the course of import of goods into the
territory of India.  According to the appellants, the finding recorded by
the   authorities   below   which   commended   to   the   High   Court,   was
completely in the teeth of the aforesaid decision.  The appellants have
distinguished the decision in Madras Marine (supra) on the premise
that in that case the goods were intended for re­export only and in
that context, it was held that there was a necessity of a destination in
a foreign country.  Moreover, the said decision has not considered the
efficacy of Section 2(ab) of the CST Act nor noticed the dictum in J.V.
Gokal (supra), which dealt with the case of import/‘in the course of
import’.   It was urged that the decision in  J.V.  Gokal  (supra) had
been followed in a recent decision in State of Kerala & Ors. vs. Fr.
William Fernandez & Ors.7
.  It was further urged that the dictum in
Coffee   Board,   Bangalore   vs.   Joint   Commercial   Tax   Officer,
Madras   &   Anr.8
  is   distinguishable   and   inapplicable   to   the   fact
situation of the present case and more so, may have no bearing after
the amendment of 1976 to Section 5 by insertion of sub­Section (3)
therein, which opens with non­obstante clause and provides that the
7 2017 SCC Online SC 1291 : (2017) 12 SCALE 463
8 (1969) 3 SCC 349
9
last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase
occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India,
shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last
sale   or   purchase   took   place   after   and   was   for   the   purpose   of
complying with the agreement or order for or in relation to such
export.   Emphasis was placed on the objects and reasons of the
Amendment Act.   In substance, it was urged that the stated sales
were in the course of import and could not be subjected to levy of
sales tax by the State under the State legislation.
8. Per contra, the respondents would urge that the authorities had
considered all aspects of the matter and after due evaluation of the
evidence before it, justly concluded that the stated sales were neither
in the course of import nor export and had taken place on the landmass of the State of West Bengal and thus, amenable to sales tax
under the 1954 Act and the 1994 Act, as the case may be.  It was
urged that it is an admitted position that the goods were kept in
bonded warehouses on the land­mass of the State of West Bengal and
were sold to the Master of a foreign­going ship as ship stores thereat.
It was urged that the expression “crossing the customs frontiers of
India”   has   already   been   defined   in   the   CST   Act   and   limits   its
application to area of a “customs station”, as defined in the Customs
10
Act to mean any customs port, customs airport or land customs
station.     In   other   words,   the   expression   “crossing   the   customs
frontiers of India” is exhaustive and would not include the bonded
warehouses,  where  the  stated  goods  were  kept  to  be  sold to  the
Master of a foreign­going ship as ship stores.  It was urged that being
a   taxation   statute,   strict   interpretation   should   be   offered   to   this
definition   as   expounded   in  Commissioner   of   Customs   (Import),
Mumbai vs. Dileep Kumar and Company & Ors.9
.  It was further
urged that the stated sales of goods by no stretch of imagination can
qualify the expression “in the course of import of goods into the
territory of India”, as is contended by the appellants.  For that, the
goods must actually be imported into the territory of India and sale
must be a single sale, which itself causes the import or is in the
progress or process of import.  It was urged that the authorities had
rightly opined that there was sale within the State of West Bengal;
whilst  rejecting  the  claim of  the  appellant(s) that  merely because
buyer had no right to consume the goods in question before the ship
had   crossed   the   territorial   Waters   of   India,   that   would   make   no
difference because the  sale was complete by appropriation of the
goods   in   the   bonded   warehouse   itself.     Similarly,   the   fact   that
customs  duty  was  not  paid  on   the  stated  goods  would  be  of  no
9 (2018) 9 SCC 1
11
consequence.  It was urged that the appellants have, for the first time,
raised a new plea that they had filed declaration.  No such plea was
taken before the concerned authority nor any document or evidence
was   produced   in   support   thereof   for   the   relevant   assessment
period(s).   The appellants, therefore, cannot be permitted to pursue
this contention.   Thus, the appeals be confined to the plea taken
before the authorities below that the stated sales were not effected
within the territory of the State of West Bengal or in India.   The
respondents have placed reliance on the decisions in Burmah Shell
Oil   Storage   and   Distributing   Co.   of   India   Ltd.   &   Anr.   vs.
Commercial   Tax   Officer   &   Ors.10
,  Coffee   Board  (supra)   and
Madras Marine (supra) to contend that the issue is answered against
the   appellants.     The  respondents   have  distinguished  the   decision
relied   upon   by   the   appellants   in  Indian   Tourist   Development
Corporation  (supra).   It was urged that the doctrine of Unbroken
Package evolved by American Courts has no application in India, as
expounded in  Fr.  William  Fernandez  (supra).   It was thus urged
that the taxable event had occurred on the appropriation of goods at
the bonded warehouse itself, which was within the territory of the
State of West Bengal.   To buttress this submission, reliance was
10 (1961) 1 SCR 902 : AIR 1961 SC 315
12
placed on Kiran Spinning Mills vs. Collector of Customs11, wherein
it has been held that the taxable event would be the day of crossing of
customs barrier and not the date when the goods landed in India or
had entered the territorial Waters.  The respondents would urge that
the appeals are devoid of merits and be accordingly dismissed.
9. We have heard Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel
and   Mr.   Joydeep   Mazumdar,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
appellants   and   Ms.   Madhumita   Bhattacharjee,   learned   counsel
appearing for the respondents. 
10. As noticed from the finding of fact recorded by the authorities, it
is not in dispute that after importing the stated goods, the appellants
stored the same in the bonded warehouse within the land­mass of the
State of West Bengal and some of the articles were then sold to the
Master of a foreign­going ship as ship stores, without payment of
customs duty thereon.  The question is: whether the sales in question
would qualify the expression “sale in the course of import”?   The
phrase “sale in the course of import” would constitute three essential
features – (i) that there must be a sale; (ii) that goods must actually be
imported and (iii) that the sale must be part and parcel of the import.
The factual matrix in the present case clearly depicts that the sales in
11 (2000) 10 SCC 228
13
question would not cause import of the stated goods.   Instead, it
would result in taking away the goods (after being unloaded on the
land­mass of the State of West Bengal) on the ongoing ship as ship
stores outside the territory of Indian Waters for being consumed on
the ship and not for export to another destination as such.   The
appellants have advisedly not pursued the argument that the stated
sales would result in an export or would be in the course of export.
For,   such   argument   has   been   rejected   by   this   Court   in  Madras
Marine (supra). 
11. Concededly, the principle underlying the exposition in the above
referred reported decision would apply proprio vigore for considering
the argument as to whether the stated sales can be regarded as sale
in the course of import as such.  The two­Judge Bench in  Madras
Marine (supra) had considered the decision of Constitution Bench in
Burmah   Shell  (supra).     The   Court   noted   the   dictum   of   the
Constitution Bench to the effect that in order to exclude the taxation
by the State, the appellants had to prove that there was some other
State, where the goods could be said to have been delivered as a
direct result of the sale for the purpose of consumption in that other
State and as they failed to do so, the goods loaded on board of an
14
aircraft for consumption though taken out of India, was not export
since   it   had   no   destination,   where   it   can   be   said   to   have   been
imported and so long as it did not satisfy that test, it could not be
said that the sale was in the course of export.  Besides noticing this
dictum of the Constitution Bench, the Court also adverted to the
decision  in  State   of   Kerala  &   Ors.   vs.   Cochin   Coal   Company
Ltd.12, wherein it was held that the concept of export in Article 286(1)
(b) of the Constitution postulates the existence of two termini as those
between which the goods were intended to move or between which
they were intended to be transported and not a mere movement of
goods out of the country without any intention of their being landed
in specie in some foreign port.  Additionally, the Court also extensively
adverted   to   the   decision   of   the   Andhra   Pradesh   High   Court   in
Fairmacs   Trading   Co.   vs.   The   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh13  and
approved the same dealing with the similar argument.  The Court also
noted   and   approved   the   decision   of   the   Madras   High   Court   in
Fairmacs Trading Co. vs. The State of Tamil Nadu14.  The Court
in paragraphs 19 to 21 and 25 to 28 observed as under:­
“19.  The correct position, so far as the facts of the present
case are  concerned,  in  our opinion,  has  been laid  in the
decision of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of
12 (1961) 2 SCR 219 : AIR 1961 SC 408
13 (!975) 36 STC 260 (AP)
14 (1978) 41 STC 157 (Mad)
15
India   Ltd.   v.   C.T.O.   This   Court   observed   at   page   781   as
follows:
“While   all   exports   involved   a   taking   out   of   the
country, all goods taken out of the country cannot
be   said  to  be  exported.  The  test   is  that  the  goods
must have  a  foreign  destination  where they can be
said   to   be   imported. It matters not that there is no
valuable   consideration   from   the   receiver   at   the
destination end. If the goods are exported and there
is sale or purchase in the course of that export and
the   sale   or   purchase   occasions   the   export   to   a
foreign   destination,   the   exemption   is   earned.
Purchases   made   by   philanthropists   of   goods   in   the
course of export to foreign countries to alleviate distress
there, may still be exempted, even though the sending of
the   goods   was   not   a   commercial   venture   but   a
charitable one. The crucial fact is the sending of the
goods to a foreign destination where they would be
received as imports.”
20.   The   appellants   in   that   case   dealt   in   petroleum   and
petroleum   products   and   carried   on   business   at   Calcutta.
They had maintained supply depots at Dum Dum Airport
from which aviation spirit was sold and delivered to aircraft
proceeding abroad for their consumption. The question was
whether these supplies to the aircraft which proceeded to
foreign countries were liable to sales tax under the Bengal
Motor Spirit Sales Taxation Act, 1941. The contention of the
appellants in that case was that such sales were made in the
course of export of such aviation spirit out of the territory of
India, that they took place outside the State of West Bengal,
that   inasmuch   as   aviation   spirit   was   delivered   for
consumption outside West Bengal, the sales could not fall
within the Explanation to clause (1)(a) of Article 286 as it
then stood. It was held by this Court that in order to exclude
the taxation by the State of West Bengal, the appellants had
to prove that there was some other State where the goods
could be said to have been delivered as a direct result of the
sale for the purpose of consumption in that other State and
that as they failed to do so, the aviation spirit loaded on
board an aircraft for consumption though taken out of India,
was not exported since it had no destination, where it could
be said to be imported and so long as it did not satisfy that
test, it could not be said that the sale was in the course of
export. It was further held that aviation spirit was sold for the
use of aircraft and the sale was not even for the purpose of
export and all the elements of sale including delivery and
payment of price took place within the State of West Bengal
and the sales were complete within the territory of that State.
16
The   customs   barrier   did   not   set   a   terminal   limit   to   the
territory   of   West   Bengal   for   sales   tax   purpose.   The   sale
beyond the customs barrier was still a sale in fact in the State
of West Bengal.
21.     The ratio of this decision would be applicable to the
facts and circumstances of this case. It was rightly urged that
the appropriation of goods took place in the State of Tamil
Nadu   when   the   goods   were   segregated   in   the   bonded
warehouse to be delivered to the foreign going vessels. It was
not a case of export as there was no destination for the goods
to   a   foreign   country.   The   sale   was   for   the   purpose   of
consumption on board the ship. It was not as if only on
delivery on board the vessel that the sale took place. The
mere fact that shipping bill was prepared for sending it for
custom formalities which were designed to effectively control
smuggling activities could not determine the nature of the
transaction   for   the   purpose   of   sales   tax   nor   does   the
circumstances that delivery was to the captain on board the
ship within the territorial waters make it a sale outside the
State of Tamil Nadu.
xxx xxx xxx
25.     In the case before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Fairmacs Trading Company v. State of A.P., the petitioner
imported ship­stores from foreign countries, kept these in
bonded warehouses of the customs department without the
levy of customs duty and later on sold and delivered to ships'
masters for consumption abroad the ship after crossing the
port   boundaries.  On the  question  whether  the  sales were
outside the State or in the course of export and therefore not
liable to tax under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax
Act, 1957, it was observed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court
that the goods were specific and ascertained and were within
the State when the contract of sale took place and therefore
the requirements of Section 4(2)(a) of the Central Sales Tax
Act, 1956 were fully satisfied and the sales must be said to
have taken place inside the State; but as the goods sold were
meant   for   consumption   during   voyage   and   they   had   no
destination   in   any   foreign   country   where   they   could   be
received as imports, the sales were not sales in the course of
exports. It was further held that mere movement of goods out
of the country following a sale would not render the sale, one
in   the   course   of   export   within   Article   286(1)(b)   of   the
Constitution of India. Before a sale can be said to be a sale in
the course of export, the existence of two termini between
which the goods are intended to move or to be transported is
necessary.
26.   The Madras High Court in the case of Fairmacs Trading
Co. v. State of T.N. was dealing with an assessee, who was a
17
dealer in ship's stores and was also doing business as ship
chandlers and who imported goods from abroad for the purpose of supplying them either to foreign­going vessels or to
diplomatic personnel. These goods were received and kept in
the customs bonded warehouse and were cleared under the
supervision of the customs authorities whenever these were
sold by the assessee. In respect of supplies of specific goods
made to certain ships located in the Madras harbour, pursuant to orders placed by the Master of the ship or other officers working in the ship, the transportation of the goods to
the ship was effected in such a manner as to ensure that the
bonded goods, which had not paid any duty, did not enter the
local market. The delivery receipt sent along with the goods
by the assessee was signed by an officer of the ship in token
of having received the goods in good condition. The question
that arose for consideration was whether the sale took place
within the State of Tamil Nadu and liable to be taxed under
the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. It was held (i)
that there was nothing to show in the communications from
the ship that the goods had necessarily to be supplied only in
the ship. It was open to the officers working in the ship to
come and take delivery of the goods in which event the sale
would be a local sale. Therefore, assuming that the territorial
waters did not form part of the State of Tamil Nadu, as there
was nothing in the contemplation of the contracting parties
that the goods were to be moved from one State to another, it
was held that it was not possible to take the view that the
sales were inter­State sales; and (ii) that the assessee was not
selling   specific   or   ascertained   goods,   because   the   goods
formed part of a larger stock within the bonded warehouse
and had, therefore to be separated and appropriated to the
contract as and when orders were placed by the officers of the
ship by description. Therefore, the sales were local sales in
view of the specific provision of Section 4(2)(b) of the Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956, read with Section 2(n), Explanation 3 of
the Act (Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959), and were
accordingly taxable under the Act. The court did not find it
necessary to consider the question whether the territory covered by the territorial waters formed part of the State of Tamil
Nadu or not.
27.    Attention of the Madras High Court was drawn to the
decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Fairmacs Trading
Co. v. State of A.P.  The Madras High Court did not examine
the question in detail in the view it took.
28. In so far as the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and
Madras in the said two decisions held that sales took place
within the State, we are in agreement.”
(emphasis supplied)
18
The Court finally concluded in paragraphs 36 and 37 as follows:­
“36. The short question, therefore, that arises in all these
matters is whether sale of the goods in question took place
within the territory of Tamil Nadu. In these cases sale took
place   by   appropriation   of   goods.   Such   appropriation   took
place in bonded warehouse. Such bonded warehouses were
within the territory of State of Tamil Nadu. Therefore, under
sub­section (2), sub­clauses (a) and (b) of section 4 of the
Central Sales­Tax Act, 1956, the sale of goods in question
shall be deemed to have taken place inside the State because
the contract of sale of ascertained goods was made within the
territory of Tamil Nadu and furthermore in case of unascertained goods appropriation had taken place in that State in
terms of clause (b) of sub­section (2) of section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. There is no question of sale taking place in course of export or import under section 5 in
this case. From that point of view the amendment introduced by Act 103 of 1976 by incorporating in clause (ab)
of section 2 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 does not
affect   the   position.   In  this   connection   reference   may  be
made from the observations of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil
Storage Ltd., where it has been held that customs barrier
does not set a terminal limit to the territory of the State for
sales­tax purposes. Sale, therefore, beyond the customs barrier is still a sale within the State.  The  amendment  introduced in section 2 by the Act 103 of 1976 does not affect
the   position   because   the   custom   station   is   within   the
State of Tamil Nadu. That question might have been relevant if we were considering the case of sale by the transfer  of  documents  of  title  to  the  goods  as  contemplated
by section 5 of the Central Sales­Tax Act. In the premises
we are unable to accept the contentions urged on behalf of
the appellants in the civil appeals and also the contentions
urged in the writ petition.
37. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary to express our opinion on the arguments whether introduction of
clause (ab) of section 2 of Central Sales Tax Act by Act 103 of
1976 is prospective or not. We have, however, noted the submissions. That question, in the light of our aforesaid views, is
not material for the present controversy.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Applying the principle underlying the said decision, it is clear
that the sale to be in the course of import, must be a sale of goods
19
and   as   a   consequence   of   such   sale,   the   goods   must   actually   be
imported within the territory of India and further, the sale must be
part   and   parcel   of   the   import   so   as   to   occasion   import   thereof.
Indeed,   for   the   purposes   of   Customs   Act,   only   upon   payment   of
customs   duty   the   goods   are   cleared   by   the   Customs   authorities
whence import thereof can be regarded as complete.  However, that
would be no impediment for levy of sales tax by the State concerned
in whose territory the goods had already landed/unloaded and kept in
the bonded warehouse.  For seeking exemption, it is necessary that
the goods must be in the process of being imported when the sale
occurs   or   the   sale   must   occasion   the   import   thereof   within   the
territory of India.  The word “occasion” is used to mean “to cause” or
“to be the immediate cause of”.  In the present case, the stated sales
in no way occasioned import of the goods into the territory of India.
For, the goods were taken away by the foreign­going ship as ship
stores for being consumed after the goods had crossed the customs
frontiers/Indian Waters. 
13. Indubitably, the sale which is to be regarded as exempt from
payment of sales tax, is a sale which causes the import to take place
or is the immediate cause of the import of goods.   The appellants
having failed to establish that the stated goods would be actually
20
imported   within   the   territory   of   India   and   had   not   crossed   the
customs station, cannot contend that the sale was in the course of
import as such within the meaning of Section 5 read with Section
2(ab) of the CST Act.  Moreover, there is no direct linkage between the
import of the goods and the sale in question to qualify as having been
made in the process or progress of import.  We may usefully advert to
Section 5 of the CST Act, which reads thus: ­
“5. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to
take place in the course of import or export.­(1)  A
sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take
place in the course of the export of the goods out of
the territory of India only if the sale or purchase
either   occasions   such   export   or   is   effected   by   a
transfer of documents of title to the goods after the
goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.
(2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed
to take  place  in  the  course  of  the  import of the
goods into the territory of India only if the sale or
purchase   either   occasions   such   import   or   is
effected by a transfer of documents of title to the
goods before the goods have crossed the customs
frontiers of India.
(3) Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   subsection (1), the last sale or purchase of any goods
preceding   the   sale   or   purchase   occasioning   the
export of those goods out of the territory of India
shall also be deemed to be in the course of such
export, if such last sale or purchase took place after,
and   was   for   the   purpose   of   complying   with,   the
agreement or order for or in relation to such export.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. The crucial question is whether the stated sales can be deemed
to have taken place in the course of import of the goods into the
territory of India before the goods had crossed the customs frontiers
21
of India, which is the core requirement of Section 5(2) of the CST Act.
The expression “crossing the customs frontiers of India” has been
defined in Section 2(ab) of the CST Act, which reads thus:­
“2. Definitions.­   In   this   Act,   unless   the   context   otherwise
requires,­
xxx xxx xxx
(ab) “crossing   the   customs   frontiers   of   India”   means
crossing the limits of the area of a customs station in
which imported goods or export goods are ordinarily
kept before clearance by customs authorities.
Explanation.­     For   the   purposes   of   this   clause,
“customs station” and “customs authorities” shall have
the same meanings as in the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of
1962).”
This definition refers to the expression “customs station”, which in
turn, refers to “customs port”, “customs airport” and “land customs
station”, as defined in the Customs Act.   We may usefully refer to
Sections 2(10), 2(11), 2(12), 2(13) and 2(29) of the Customs Act, as
applicable for the present cases, which read thus:­
“2. Definitions.­   In   this   Act,   unless   the   context   otherwise
requires.­
(10) “customs   airport”   means   any   airport   appointed
under clause (a) of section 7 to be a customs airport;
(11) “customs area” means the area of a customs station
and  includes  any  area   in which  imported  goods  or  export
goods   are   ordinarily   kept   before   clearance   by   Customs
Authorities;
(12) “customs   port”   means   any   port   appointed   under
clause (a) of section 7 to be a customs port 15[, and includes a
15 Inserted by Act 11 of 1983, sec. 46 (w.e.f. 13-5-1983) – applicable to C.A. No. 7864/2009
22
place appointed under clause (aa) of that section to be an
inland container depot];
(13) “customs station” means any customs port, customs
airport or land customs station;
xxx xxx xxx
(29) “land customs station” means any place appointed
under clause (b) of section 7 to be a land customs station;”
In addition, we may also refer to Section 7 of the Customs Act, which
postulates appointment of customs ports, airports etc.   The same
reads thus:­
“7. Appointment   of   customs   ports,   airports,   etc.­   The
Central   Government   may,   by   notification   in   the   Official
Gazette, appoint­
(a) the ports  and  airports  which  alone shall be
customs   ports   or   customs   airports   for   the
unloading of imported goods and the loading of
export goods or any class of such goods;
16[(aa) the   places   which   alone   shall   be   inland
container depots for the unloading of imported
goods and the loading of export goods or any
class of such goods];
(b) the places which alone shall be land customs
stations for the clearance of goods imported or
to be exported by land or inland water or any
class of such goods;
(c) the routes by which alone goods or any class of
goods specified in the notification may pass by
land or inland water into or out of India, or to
or from any land customs station from or to
any land frontier;
(d) the ports which alone shall be coastal ports for
the carrying on of trade in coastal goods or any
class of such goods with all or any specified
ports in India.”
16 Inserted by Act 11 of 1983, sec. 47 (w.e.f. 13-5-1983) – applicable to C.A. No. 7864/2009
23
We have no hesitation in accepting the argument of the respondents
that being a taxation statute, strict interpretation of these provisions
is inevitable.   Going  by  the definition  of “customs port”  or “land
customs station” as applicable in the present cases, it is customs port
or land customs station area appointed by the Central Government in
terms   of   notification   under   Section   7.     It   is   not   the   case   of   the
appellants that the bonded warehouses, where the goods were kept
and the stated sales took place by appropriation of the goods thereat,
were within the area notified as customs port and/or land customs
station under Section 7 of the Customs Act.  As the stated goods had
travelled   beyond   the   customs   port/land   customs   station   at   the
relevant time, in law, it would mean that the goods had crossed the
customs   frontiers   of   India   for   the   purposes   of   the   CST   Act.
Resultantly, the legal fiction created in Section 5(2) of the CST Act will
have no application. 
15. Notably, the expressions “warehouse” and “warehoused goods”
have been defined in the Customs Act in Sections 2(43) and 2(44)
respectively.   As per the applicable provisions at the relevant time,
“Warehouse” means a public warehouse appointed under Section 57
or a private  warehouse licensed under Section  58.   “Warehoused
goods” means goods deposited in a warehouse.  As aforesaid, there is
24
nothing to indicate that the bonded warehouse, where the stated
goods were kept by the appellants and eventually sold, formed part of
the customs port/land customs station.  If so, the legal fiction of sale
being deemed to have taken place in the course of import of the goods
into the territory of India would have no bearing and applicability to
the present cases.
16. To get over this position, emphasis was placed by the appellant
on the exposition in the Indian Tourist Development Corporation
(supra), which had considered the situation where the goods were
kept in the bonded warehouse and were made available in the dutyfree shops for sale.   This Court opined that since the goods were
supplied to the duty­free shops situated at the International Airport,
Bengaluru for sale, it cannot be said that the said goods had crossed
the customs frontiers of India.  We fail to understand as to how this
decision will be of any avail to the appellants.  For, the Court was not
dealing with a situation as in the present cases, in which the goods
had crossed the customs port/land customs station area and kept in
the bonded warehouse, where the sale by appropriation of the goods
was effected.  Indeed, in paragraph 17 of the reported decision, the
Court in the facts of that case, has observed that when the goods are
kept in the bonded warehouse, it cannot be said that the said goods
25
had crossed customs frontiers of India.   However, the Court finally
answered the claim of the appellants therein on the finding that the
liquor, cigarettes, perfumes and food articles were sold “at the dutyfree shops” at the International Airport, Bengaluru, for which no tax
was payable by the appellants as the goods sold at the duty­free
shops were sold directly to the passengers and even the delivery of
goods took place at the duty­free shops before importing the goods or
before the goods had crossed the customs frontiers of India.   The
issue considered in the said decision, therefore, was whether the sale
at the duty­free shops situated at the Bengaluru International Airport
would attract levy of sales tax.   As noticed earlier, the definition of
“customs   station”   clearly   refers   to   customs   airport   as   defined   in
Section 2(10) of the Customs Act.  As the duty­free shop is situated in
airport area, it would mean that the sale of goods at the duty­free
shops was deemed to have taken place in the course of import of the
goods  into  the  territory  of  India.    Thus  understood,  the  reported
decision under consideration is of no avail to the appellants. 
17. Even the exposition of the Constitution Bench in  J.V.  Gokal
(supra) that a sale by an importer of goods after the property of the
goods passed to him, either after the receipt of the documents of title
against payment or otherwise, to a third party by a similar process is
26
also a sale in the course of import, would equally have no bearing on
the present cases.  Inasmuch as, the sale of goods must take place
before the goods had crossed the customs frontiers of India, which
means it was within the customs port/land customs station area.
Nothing is shown by the appellants herein to substantiate that the
subject   bonded   warehouse   came   within   the   customs   port/land
customs station area and moreso the stated sales occasioned import
of the goods within the territory of India.  If so, the finding of fact and
conclusion recorded by the authorities below, which commended to
the High Court, is unexceptionable.
18. This   Court   in  K.   Gopinathan   Nair   and   Ors.   vs.   State   of
Kerala17 has expounded the factors to be reckoned for determining
whether the concerned sale or purchase of goods can be deemed to
have taken place in the course of import. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid judgment reads thus:
“14. In   the   light   of   the   aforesaid   settled   legal   position
emerging from the Constitution Bench decisions of this Court
the following propositions clearly get projected for deciding
whether  the  concerned   sale  or  purchase   of  goods  can  be
deemed to take place in the course of import as laid down by
Section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act:
(1)  The sale or the purchase, as the case may be, must
actually take place.
(2)  Such sale or purchase in India must itself occasion
such import, and not vice versa i.e. import should not
occasion such sale.
17 (1997) 10 SCC 1
27
(3) The goods must have entered the import stream
when they are subjected to sale or purchase.
(4)  The import of the concerned goods must be effected
as a direct result of the sale or purchase transaction
concerned.
(5)  The   course   of   import   can   be   taken   to   have
continued till the imported goods reach the local users
only   if   the   import   has   commenced   through   the
agreement   between   foreign   exporter   and   an
intermediary   who   does   not   act   on   his   own   in   the
transaction with the foreign exporter and who in his
turn does not sell as principal the imported goods to the
local users.
(6)  There   must   be   either   a   single   sale   which   itself
causes the import or is in the progress or process of
import   or   though   there   may   appear   to   be   two   sale
transactions they are so integrally inter­connected that
they   almost   resemble   one   transaction   so   that   the
movement of goods from a foreign country to India can
be   ascribed   to   such   a   composite   well   integrated
transaction   consisting   of   two   transactions   dovetailing
into each other.
(7)  A   sale  or  purchase   can  be   treated  to  be   in  the
course of import if there is a direct privity of contract
between the Indian importer and the foreign exporter
and   the   intermediary   through   which   such   import   is
effected merely acts as an agent or a contractor for and
on behalf of Indian importer.
(8)  The transaction in substance must be such that
the   canalizing   agency   or   the   intermediary   agency
through which the imports are effected into India so as
to reach the ultimate local users appears only as a mere
name lender through whom it is the local importer­cumlocal user who masquerades.”
19. It will also be useful to advert to paragraph 6 of Kiran Spinning
Mills (supra), which reads thus:
“6.   Attractive, as the argument is, we are afraid that we do
not find any merit in the same. It has now been held by this
Court in Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Union of India that for
the purpose of levy of additional duty Section 3 of the Tariff
Act is a charging section. Section 3 sub­section (6) makes the
provisions of the Customs Act applicable. This would bring
into play the provisions of Section 15 of the Customs Act
which, inter alia, provides that the rate of duty which will be
28
payable would be (sic the rate in force) on the day when the
goods are removed from the bonded warehouse. That apart,
this Court has held in Sea Customs Act, SCR at p. 803 that
in the case of duty of customs the taxable event is the import
of goods within the customs barriers. In other words, the
taxable event occurs when the customs barrier is crossed. In
the case of goods which are in the warehouse the customs
barriers would be crossed when they are sought to be taken
out of the customs and brought to the mass of goods in the
country. Admittedly this was done after 4­10­1978. As on
that day when the goods were so removed additional duty of
excise   under   the   said   Ordinance   was   payable   on   goods
manufactured after 4­10­1978. We are unable to accept the
contention of Mr Ramachandran that what has to be seen is
whether additional duty of excise was payable at the time
when   the   goods   landed   in   India   or,   as   he   strenuously
contended,   they   had   crossed   into   the   territorial   waters.
Import being complete when the goods entered the territorial
waters is the contention which has already been rejected by
this Court in Union of India v. Apar (P) Ltd. decided on 22­7­
1999.  The   import   would   be   completed   only   when   the
goods  are  to  cross  the  customs  barriers  and that  is  the
time when the import duty has to be paid and that is what
has been termed by this Court in Sea Customs case (SCR at
p.   823)   as   being   the   taxable   event.  The   taxable   event,
therefore,  being  the  day  of  crossing  of  customs  barrier,
and not on the date when the goods had landed in India
or had entered the territorial waters, we find that on the
date of the taxable event the additional duty of excise was
leviable under the said Ordinance and, therefore, additional
duty under Section 3 of the Tariff Act was rightly demanded
from the appellants.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. A priori, for a sale or purchase to qualify as a sale or purchase in
course of import, the essential conditions are that such sale shall
occur before the goods had crossed the customs frontiers of India and
the import of the goods must be effected or the import is occasioned
due to such sale or purchase.   In the present case, the sales in
question did not occasion import.
29
21. Arguendo, for sale or purchase of goods to be regarded as sale or
purchase in course of export, Section 5(1) of the CST Act provides for
the following conditions: (i) the sale or purchase shall occasion such
export or (ii) the sale or purchase shall be effected by a transfer of
documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed the
customs frontiers of India.
22. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Md. Serajuddin and Ors.
vs. State of Orissa18 has held that expression 'in the course' implies
not only a period of time during which the movement is in progress
but  postulates  a connected relation.   The relevant  portion  of the
judgment is extracted as under:
“18. …..   A   sale   in   the   course   of   export   predicates   a
connection between the sale and export. No single test can be
laid   as   decisive   for   determining   that   question.   Each   case
must   depend   upon   its   facts.   But   it   does   not   mean   that
distinction between transactions which may be called sales
for export and sales in the course of export is not real. Where
the   sale   is   effected   by   the   seller   and   the   seller   is  not
connected with the export which actually takes place, it
is a sale for export. Where the export is the result of sale,
the export being inextricably linked up with sale so that
the  bond  cannot  be  dissociated  without  a  breach  of  the
obligations   arising   by   statute,   contract,   or   mutual
understanding   between   the   parties   arising   from   the
nature   of   the   transaction   the   sale   is   in   the   course   of
export.  In   the   Nilgiri   Plantations   case   (supra)   this   Court
found that the sales by the appellants were intended to be
complete without the export and as such it could not be said
18 (1975) 2 SCC 47
30
that the sales occasioned export. The sales were for export
and not in the course of export.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. It is relevant to advert to the definition of export here. Section
2(18) of the Customs Act defines export as follows:
“2.   Definitions.­   In  this   Act,   unless   the   context   otherwise
requires,­
xxx xxx xxx
(18) ­ “export”, with its grammatical variations and cognate
expressions, means taking out of India  to  a  place  outside
India.”
 (emphasis supplied)
24. In the present case, it is not the case of the appellant that the
goods in question were being exported. Since the goods are to be
consumed on the board of the foreign going ship and the same would
be consumed before reaching a destination, it does not fall under the
definition of ‘export’.   The sale cannot qualify as a sale occasioning
export unless the goods reach a destination which is a place outside
India.   Further,   since   the   goods   have   been   sold   from   the   bonded
warehouse and had crossed the customs port/land customs station
prior to their sale, it cannot qualify as a sale in course of export
within the meaning of Section 5(1) read with Section 2(ab) of the CST
Act.
25. In regard to the contention that declaration under Section 69 of
the Customs Act was made by the appellant, there is nothing on
31
record to show that such declaration was made in respect of the
goods   pertaining   to   subject   sale(s).     Even   otherwise,   the   benefit
extended under the Customs Act of waiver of customs duty cannot be
taken as waiver of sales tax under the relevant state and central laws.
Similarly, insertion of sub­Section (3) in Section 5 of the CST Act in
1976  does   not   affect   these  cases   because   the  bonded  warehouse
where  the  stated   sales   or  appropriation   of  the   goods  occurred   is
within the land­mass of the State of West Bengal and not shown to be
within the customs station area.
26. A priori, it must be held that the stated sales or appropriation of
goods kept in bonded warehouse within the land­mass/territory of
the State of West Bengal are neither in the course of import or export
and more so, were effected beyond the customs port/land customs
station area.  Therefore, in law, it was a sale amenable to levy of sales
tax under the 1954 Act and the 1994 Act, as the case may be, read
with Section 4 of the CST Act.  As a result, these appeals must fail, as
we find no infirmity in the view taken by the authorities below and
which had justly commended to the High Court.
32
27. In view of the above, these appeals are dismissed with no order
as to costs.   Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of.
................................., J.
     (A.M. Khanwilkar)     
................................., J.
      (Dinesh Maheshwari) 
New Delhi;
January 21, 2020.

Saturday, January 18, 2020

Whether High Court of Judicature pass orders constituting a Heterogeneous Committee of named persons to give its recommendations on the reforms that can be brought into practice for reformation, rehabilitation and re-integration of the convict/accused person to society and best practices for improving the quality of investigation. The Committee was mandated to submit report within eight weeks and that the State was directed to furnish data for each District. The Committee was to scrutinize the same and submit the final data separately along with the report. The State was directed to provide office room for the Committee to conduct its meetings and to keep the documents and other materials in safe custody in a matter pertaining to grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731 ? The High Court had admitted the accused to bail on 18th February, 2019 subject to certain conditions but passed an order to call for the details of the cases registered by the Police, final report filed, trial conducted and the result of such cases. The details were to bring to light the manner in which the entire criminal justice system is operating in the State. In pursuance of the directions so issued and the data provided, the impugned order was p The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 439 of the Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial. Even 11 though the object of the Hon’ble Judge was laudable but the jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort made by the Hon’ble Judge may be academically proper to be presented at an appropriate forum but such directions could not be issued under the colour of office of the Court. In view of the above, we find that the order passed by the High Court on 24th April, 2019 is not sustainable in law and the same is set aside. Consequently, the appeal is allowed.

Whether High Court of Judicature pass orders constituting a Heterogeneous Committee of named persons to give its recommendations on the reforms that can be brought into practice for reformation, rehabilitation and re-integration of the convict/accused person to society and best practices for improving the quality of investigation. The Committee was mandated to submit report within eight weeks and that the State was directed to furnish data for each District. The Committee was to scrutinize the same and submit the final data separately along with the report. The State was directed to provide office room for the Committee to conduct its meetings and to keep the documents and other materials in safe custody in a matter pertaining to grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731 ?

The High Court had admitted the accused to bail on 18th February, 2019 subject to certain conditions but passed an order to call for the details of the cases registered by the Police, final report filed, trial conducted and the result of such cases. The details were to bring to light the manner in which the entire criminal justice system is operating in the State. In pursuance of the directions so issued and the data provided, the impugned order was p
The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 439 of the Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial. Even 11 though the object of the Hon’ble Judge was laudable but the jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort made by the Hon’ble Judge may be academically proper to be presented at an appropriate forum but such directions could not be issued under the colour of office of the Court. In view of the above, we find that the order passed by the High Court on 24th April, 2019 is not sustainable in law and the same is set aside. Consequently, the appeal is allowed.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2020
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 4977 OF 2019)
STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M. MURUGESAN & ANR. .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The State is aggrieved against an order passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Madras on 24th April, 2019 constituting a
Heterogeneous Committee of named persons to give its
recommendations on the reforms that can be brought into practice
for reformation, rehabilitation and re-integration of the
convict/accused person to society and best practices for improving
the quality of investigation. The Committee was mandated to
submit report within eight weeks and that the State was directed to
furnish data for each District. The Committee was to scrutinize the
same and submit the final data separately along with the report.
The State was directed to provide office room for the Committee to
conduct its meetings and to keep the documents and other
1
materials in safe custody.
2. Such directions came to be passed in a matter pertaining to grant
of bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731
.
The High Court had admitted the accused to bail on 18th February,
2019 subject to certain conditions but passed an order to call for
the details of the cases registered by the Police, final report filed,
trial conducted and the result of such cases. The details were to
bring to light the manner in which the entire criminal justice
system is operating in the State. In pursuance of the directions so
issued and the data provided, the impugned order was passed by
the learned Single Bench.
3. The High Court after collecting the data in respect of the criminal
cases registered, convictions and acquittals in each District
proceeded to write a thesis on how the criminal justice system
should function in the State. It was observed that the central aim
of the criminal law is to reform the offender and to rehabilitate him
in a bid to render him useful to society. The Court held as under:
“16. The situation calls for a thorough revamping of the
Criminal Justice system in this State. It looks like the
police are caught into this Vicious cycle. That shows on
the poor record of convictions in serious crimes.
Instead of finding a complete cure for the disease,
police seem to be looking for temporary solutions
without curing the disease. Unless we agree that there
is a serious problem, there is no scope for
change/improvement.
17. “Once a Criminal Always a Criminal” is the result of
the present system prevailing in this state. We have
forgotten the fundamental purpose of Criminal Justice
1 for short, ‘Code’
2
system which is reformation, rehabilitation and reintegration of the convict into society. If an accused is
pushed to the extremes by this system where he finds
that even if he wants to turn a new leaf in his life, this
system will not allow him, he will rather surrender to his
fate and turn out to be a hardened criminal. A welfare
state can never stoop down to such a level.
xx xx xx
20. It goes without saying that the quality of
investigation has come down drastically and the data
provided by the police, referred supra, makes it evident.
The alacrity shown by the police in registering FIR and
effecting arrest, is not seen in investigating the case,
laying final report and taking the case to its logical end.
The recent circular dated March 20 issued by DGP
states that all the police stations will henceforth have
exclusive investigation wing. As per the directions, the
investigation wing will be responsible for investigation
and prosecution of all cases registered in the station,
including cases identified by the law and order wing.
Further, the police officers attached to the investigation
wing shall not be diverted to any bandobust work
except with the prior approval of the zonal IG or
commissioner of police. This is a step on the right
direction. A conscious effort should be made by the
investigating wing in every police station with the
active coordination of the directorate of prosecution to
take every criminal case to its logical end. The police
should not be under the impression that their work gets
over with registering FIR and effecting arrest. One of
the main challenges for the prosecution in Serious
crimes is the witness turning hostile due to various
reasons. Witness protection scheme, 2018, which has
now become the law of the land in view of the
judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahender
Chawla case (2019 (1) MWN Crl 340 (SC)), must be
implemented effectively. The investigation officers
must be updated on a regular basis on the March of law.
Cyber crimes have reached monumental proportions
and criminals committing these offences are clearly
having an upper hand since these criminals are
intelligent crooks and police officers require regular
training and exposure to tackle these crimes. A
complete overhaul is required to enhance the quality of
investigation.”
3
4. The matter before the High Court was as to whether the accused
are entitled to be admitted to bail, that is the jurisdiction conferred
on the Court in terms of Section 439 of the Code. Before granting
bail, the High Court is enjoined upon an obligation to issue notice of
an application for bail to the Public Prosecutor if a person is
accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of
Session or which, though not so triable, for punishment of
imprisonment for life.
5. We find that the Hon’ble Single Bench has committed grave
illegality in retaining the file after grant of bail to the accused on
18th February, 2019. The jurisdiction of the High Court came to an
end when an application for grant of bail under Section 439 of the
Code was finally decided.
6. In State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Ors.
2
, the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana after deciding a criminal appeal
continued to pass order in respect of offenders in other cases not
connected with the matter which was dealt with by the High Court.
This Court deprecated the invocation of jurisdiction in a matter not
connected with the appeal and that too after passing of the final
order. The Court held as under:
“86. In view of the law referred to hereinabove, the
Bench was not competent to entertain the said
applications and even if the same had been filed in the
disposed of appeal, the court could have directed to
place the said applications before the Bench dealing
with similar petitions.
2 (2011) 14 SCC 770
4
xx xx xx
91. There could be no justification for the Bench
concerned to entertain the applications filed under
Section 482 CrPC as miscellaneous applications in a
disposed of appeal. The law requires that the Bench
could have passed an appropriate order to place those
applications before the Bench hearing Section 482 CrPC
petitions or place the matters before the Chief Justice
for appropriate orders.”
7. This Court in Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar referred to a case
reported as Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi
Mukherjee & Anr.
3
 wherein the Court observed that inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be exercised to do
something which is expressly barred under the Code. It was held
that inherent powers cannot be exercised assuming that the
statute conferred an unfettered and arbitrary jurisdiction, nor can
the High Court act at its whim or caprice. The Code does not
confer unlimited/unfettered jurisdiction on the High Court as the
“ends of justice” and “abuse of the process of the court” have to be
dealt with in accordance with law and not otherwise. The High
Court has not been given nor does it possess any inherent power to
make any order, which in the opinion of the court, could be in the
interest of justice as the statutory provision is not intended to bypass the procedure prescribed. It was also held that the High Court
can always issue appropriate direction in exercise of its power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the behest of an
aggrieved person, if the court is convinced that the power of
3 (1990) 2 SCC 437
5
investigation has been exercised by an investigating officer mala
fide or the matter is not investigated at all, but even in such a case,
the High Court cannot direct the police as to how the investigation
is to be conducted but can insist only for the observance of due
process as provided in the Code. The Court held as under:
“51. The inherent power of the court under Section 482
CrPC is saved only where an order has been passed by
the criminal court which is required to be set aside to
secure the ends of justice or where the proceeding
pending before a court, amounts to abuse of the
process of court. Therefore, such powers can be
exercised by the High Court in relation to a matter
pending before a criminal court or where a power is
exercised by the court under CrPC. Inherent powers
cannot be exercised assuming that the statute
conferred an unfettered and arbitrary jurisdiction, nor
can the High Court act at its whim or caprice. The
statutory power has to be exercised sparingly with
circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases.
(Vide Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana [(1977)
4 SCC 451 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 613 : AIR 1977 SC 2229]
and State of W.B. v. Sujit Kumar Rana [(2004) 4 SCC 129
: 2004 SCC (Cri) 984] .)
52. The power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be
resorted to if there is a specific provision in CrPC for the
redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party or
where alternative remedy is available. Such powers
cannot be exercised as against the express bar of the
law and engrafted in any other provision of CrPC. Such
powers can be exercised to secure the ends of justice
and to prevent the abuse of the process of court.
However, such expressions do not confer
unlimited/unfettered jurisdiction on the High Court as
the “ends of justice” and “abuse of the process of the
court” have to be dealt with in accordance with law
including the procedural law and not otherwise. Such
powers can be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real
and substantial justice as the courts have been
conferred such inherent jurisdiction, in absence of any
express provision, as inherent in their constitution, or
such powers as are necessary to do the right and to
undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice
6
as provided in the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui
concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse
non potest. However, the High Court has not been given
nor does it possess any inherent power to make any
order, which in the opinion of the court, could be in the
interest of justice as the statutory provision is not
intended to by-pass the procedure prescribed.
(Vide Lalit Mohan Mondal v. Benoyendra Nath
Chatterjee [(1982) 3 SCC 219 : 1982 SCC (Cri)
697] , Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of
Gujarat [(2006) 1 SCC 732 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri)
481] , CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava [(2006) 7 SCC 188
: (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 233] , Inder Mohan
Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal [(2007) 12 SCC 1 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259] and Pankaj Kumar v. State of
Maharashtra [(2008) 16 SCC 117 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri)
217] .)
53. The High Court can always issue appropriate
direction in exercise of its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution at the behest of an aggrieved person, if
the court is convinced that the power of investigation
has been exercised by an investigating officer mala fide
or the matter is not investigated at all. Even in such a
case, the High Court cannot direct the police as to how
the investigation is to be conducted but can insist only
for the observance of process as provided for in CrPC.
Another remedy available to such an aggrieved person
may be to file a complaint under Section 200 CrPC and
the court concerned will proceed as provided in Chapter
XV CrPC. (See Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of
Maharashtra [(2004) 7 SCC 768 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 404]
and Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala [(2008) 3
SCC 542 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 9] .)
xx xx xx
64. An inherent power is not an omnibus for opening a
Pandora's box, that too for issues that are foreign to the
main context. The invoking of the power has to be for a
purpose that is connected to a proceeding and not for
sprouting an altogether new issue. A power cannot
exceed its own authority beyond its own creation. It is
not that a person is remediless. On the contrary, the
constitutional remedy of writs is available. Here, the
High Court enjoys wide powers of prerogative writs as
compared to that under Section 482 CrPC. To secure the
corpus of an individual, remedy by way of habeas
7
corpus is available. For that the High Court should not
resort to inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC as
the legislature has conferred separate powers for the
same. Needless to mention that Section 97 CrPC
empowers the Magistrates to order the search of a
person wrongfully confined. It is something different
that the same court exercising authority can, in relation
to the same subject-matter, invoke its writ jurisdiction
as well. Nevertheless, the inherent powers are not to
provide universal remedies. The power cannot be and
should not be used to belittle its own existence. One
cannot concede anarchy to an inherent power for that
was never the wisdom of the legislature. To confer
unbridled inherent power would itself be trenching upon
the authority of the legislature.”
8. This Court in a judgment reported as Sangitaben Shaileshbhai
Datanta v. State of Gujarat
4
 was examining a question where a
court after grant of bail to an accused ordered the accused and
their relatives to undergo scientific test viz. lie detector, brain
mapping and Narco-Analysis. This Court held that direction of the
court to carry out such tests is not only in contravention to the first
principles of criminal law jurisprudence but also violates statutory
requirements. The Court held as under:
“7. Having heard the counsels for the parties, it is
surprising to note the present approach adopted by the
High Court while considering the bail application. The
High Court ordering the abovementioned tests is not
only in contravention to the first principles of criminal
law jurisprudence but also violates statutory
requirements. While adjudicating a bail application,
Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is
the guiding principle wherein Court takes into
consideration, inter alia, the gravity of the crime, the
character of the evidence, position and status of the
accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the
likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and
repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering
with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice
4 2018 SCC OnLine SC 2300
8
and such other grounds. Each criminal case presents its
own peculiar factual matrix, and therefore, certain
grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be
taken into account by the court. However, the court has
to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case
against the accused. The court must not undertake
meticulous examination of the evidence collected by
the police, or rather order specific tests as done in the
present case.
8. In the instant case, by ordering the abovementioned
tests and venturing into the reports of the same with
meticulous details, the High Court has converted the
adjudication of a bail matter to that of a mini-trial
indeed. This assumption of function of a trial court by
the High Court is deprecated.”
9. In another judgment reported as Reserve Bank of India v.
General Manager, Cooperative Bank Deposit A/C HR. Sha &
Ors.
5
, Reserve Bank of India challenged an order passed on an
application under Section 439 of the Code, wherein an argument
was raised that the poor depositors are not paid by the Bank out of
the amount which has been received by the Bank. The Court
issued directions that the Bank should start distributing the amount
which is so far recovered by them from the accused. The Bank was
directed to furnish details of the money paid to the poor depositors.
The accused as well as the Investigating Officer and the
Administrator of the Bank were directed to remain present in the
Court. This Court found that such directions are beyond the scope
of an application for bail filed by the accused under Section 439 of
the Code. The Court held as under:
“6. We are of the opinion that the far-reaching
consequences of the directions of the High Court are in
5 (2010) 15 SCC 85
9
a way beyond the scope of an application for bail filed
by an accused under Section 439 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the High Court, as much as
anyone else, must stay confined to the issues relevant
to the matter before it. It was thus not open to the High
Court to pass orders which could affect the working of
banks all over the country.”
10. In Santosh Singh v. Union of India & Anr.
6
 while dealing with a
public interest litigation petition filed by a petitioner who was
deeply distressed with the rapidly degrading moral values in the
society touching every aspect of life where making money has
become the sole motto of society, this Court held as under:
“18. While there can be no dispute about the need of
providing value-based education, what form this should
take and the manner in which values should be
inculcated ought not to be ordained by the court. The
court singularly lacks the expertise to do so. The
petitioner has a grouse about what she describes as the
pervading culture of materialism in our society. The
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 is not a
panacea for all ills but a remedy for the violation of
fundamental rights. The remedies for such perceived
grievances as the petitioner has about the dominant
presence of materialism must lie elsewhere and it is for
those who have the competence and the constitutional
duty to lay down and implement educational policies to
deal with such problems.
19. There is a tendency on the part of public interest
petitioners to assume that every good thing which
society should aspire to achieve can be achieved
through the instrumentality of the court. The judicial
process provides remedies for constitutional or legal
infractions. Public interest litigation allows a relaxation
of the strict rules of locus standi. However, the court
must necessarily abide by the parameters which govern
a nuanced exercise of judicial power. Hence, where an
effort is made to bring issues of governance before the
court, the basic touchstone on which the invocation of
jurisdiction must rest is whether the issue can be
addressed within the framework of law or the
6 (2016) 8 SCC 253
10
Constitution. Matters of policy are entrusted to the
executive arm of the State. The court is concerned with
the preservation of the rule of law.
xx xx xx
23. It is unrealistic for the court to assume that it can
provide solutions to vexed issues which involve drawing
balances between conflicting dimensions that travel
beyond the legal plane. Courts are concerned with
issues of constitutionality and legality. It is difficult to
perceive how matters to which solutions may traverse
the fields of ideology, social theory, policy-making and
experimentation can be regulated by this Court such as
by issuing a mandamus to enforce a scheme of
instruction in a particular subject in school education.
Should a subject be taught at all? Should a set of values
or a line of enquiry and knowledge be incorporated as a
separate subject of discourse in an educational system?
Would a horizontal integration of a given set of values
across existing subjects better achieve a desirable
result? Is it at all desirable to impose another subject of
study upon the already burdened school curriculum?
24. These are vexed issues to which more than one
solution may appear just. That is exactly the reason
why a resolution of such matters must rest with those
who have the responsibility to teach and govern over
matters of education. Every good that is perceived to
be in the interest of society cannot be mandated by the
court. Nor is the judicial process an answer to every
social ill which a public interest petitioner perceives. A
matter such as the present to which a solution does not
rest in a legal or constitutional framework is incapable
of being dealt with in terms of judicially manageable
standards.”
11. We find that learned Single Judge has collated data from the State
and made it part of the order after the decision of the bail
application as if the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to pass any
order under the guise of improving the criminal justice system in
the State. The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 439 of the
Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial. Even
11
though the object of the Hon’ble Judge was laudable but the
jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort made by
the Hon’ble Judge may be academically proper to be presented at
an appropriate forum but such directions could not be issued under
the colour of office of the Court.
12. In view of the above, we find that the order passed by the High
Court on 24th April, 2019 is not sustainable in law and the same is
set aside. Consequently, the appeal is allowed.
.............................................J.
(L. NAGESWARA RAO)
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 15, 2020.
12