* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 48 : 2024 INSC 258
Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another
v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh
(Criminal Appeal No. 1167 of 2018)
02 April 2024
[B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
High Court whether justified in reversing the acquittal of the
appellant Nos.1 and 2 and convicting them u/ss.302 and 201/34
and ss.302/34 and 201, Penal Code, 1860 respectively and
sentencing accordingly; whether the prosecution proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt and whether the appellants were guilty
of committing the crime.
Headnotes
Appeal against acquittal – Interference – When not sustainable:
Held: Prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence – Trial
Judge gave sound and cogent reasons for discarding the testimony
of the IO and the other witnesses and by elaborately discussing
the evidence found that the appellants were not guilty – Findings of
the trial Judge were based on correct appreciation of the material
placed on record – This elaborate exercise of the trial Judge was
washed away by the Division Bench of the High Court in a totally
cursory manner – Though the High Court referred to the law laid
down by this Court with regard to the scope of interference in
an appeal against acquittal, it totally misapplied the same and a
very well-reasoned judgment based upon the correct appreciation
of evidence by the trial Court was reversed only on the basis of
conjectures and surmises – High Court could have interfered
in the criminal appeal only if it came to the conclusion that the
findings of the trial Judge were either perverse or impossible – No
perversity or impossibility could be found in the approach adopted
by the trial Judge – Furthermore, in any case, even if two views
were possible and the trial Judge found the other view to be
more probable, an interference would not have been warranted
by the High Court, unless the view taken by the trial Judge was
a perverse or impossible view – Prosecution failed to prove any
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 49
Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh
of the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and
in no case, the chain of circumstances, which was so interlinked
to each other that led to no other conclusion, than the guilt of the
accused persons – Judgment passed by the High Court being
unsustainable is quashed and set aside – Appellants acquitted.
[Paras 6, 12-14, 16, 19-23]
Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Law as regards
conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence – Discussed.
Case Law Cited
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
[1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 – relied on.
Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. [2016] 1 SCR
913 : (2016) 4 SCC 397; Harljan Bhala Teja v. State
of Gujarat [2016] 2 SCR 203 : (2016) 12 SCC 665 –
referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence
Act, 1872.
List of Keywords
Appeal against acquittal; Circumstantial evidence; Chain of
circumstances not interlinked; Case not proved beyond reasonable
doubt; Conjectures and surmises; Findings perverse or impossible;
Two possible views; Perverse or impossible view.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1167
of 2018
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.04.2018 of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Cr. A. No.261 of 1995
Appearances for Parties
Varun Thakur, Ramkaran, Ms. Shraddha Saran, Brajesh Pandey,
Varinder Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellants.
Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Vikas Bansal, Mirza Kayesh Begg, Ms.
Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Astik Gupta, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, Argha Roy,
Ms. Ojaswini Gupta, Ms. Ruby, Advs. for the Respondent.
50 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, J.
1. The present appeal challenges the judgment dated 6th April 2018
passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal
Appeal No. 261 of 1995, thereby allowing the appeal of the respondentState which was filed challenging the judgment dated 26th March 1994
passed in S.T. No. 160 of 1992, vide which the learned 2nd Class
Sessions Judge, Damoh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned trial
Judge’) had acquitted the appellants of the charges under Sections
302, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘IPC’). The High Court, reversing the judgment of the learned
trial Judge, had convicted the appellant No. 1 (Ballu Chaurasiya @
Balram @ Balmukund) under Sections 302 and 201/34 of IPC and
appellant No. 2 (Halki Bahu @ Jamna Bai @ Jamuna Bai) under
Sections 302/34 and 201 of IPC and awarded rigorous imprisonment
for life under Sections 302 and 302/34 with fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default
of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three
months. Insofar as Sections 201 and 201/34 of IPC are concerned,
the High Court further awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment
for seven years with a fine of Rs. 3000/-, in default of payment of fine
to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 months.
2. The prosecution story in brief is as under:
2.1 The deceased-Mahesh Sahu was in a love relation with Anita,
who is the daughter of respondent No.2-Jamna Bai (appellant
No.2 herein) and sister of Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund
(appellant No.1 herein). Anita and deceased Mahesh Sahu
resided at Agra for about eight months and then returned to
Damoh. Thereafter, the marriage of Anita was solemnized with
another person. Even then, they were in contact with each other.
Due to this enmity, on 7th June, 1992 at about 11:00 P.M., the
appellants caused death of the deceased in furtherance of their
common intention. The prosecution relies on the evidence of
Govind (PW-7), who saw that appellant No. 1 was dragging
a dead body from his house. He had also seen his mother,
appellant No. 2, who was washing the blood stains at the door
of their house.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 51
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2.2 After Beni Prasad @ Beri Prasad (PW-1) and Sumitra Bai (PW6), who are the father and mother of the deceased, came to
know about the incident, they came to the spot of the incident.
On the basis of the oral report of PW-1, an FIR (Exh. P-1) came
to be registered at Police Station, Damoh.
2.3 Upon completion of the investigation, the chargesheet came
to be filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class. Since
the case was exclusively triable by the learned trial Judge, it
was committed to the learned trial Judge.
2.4 At the conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge has acquitted
the accused persons since the prosecution has failed to prove
the case beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent-State
preferred an appeal before the High Court.
2.5 The High Court, by the impugned judgment, reversed the finding
of the learned trial Judge, as aforesaid.
2.6 Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
3. We have heard Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants and Shri Pashupathi Nath Razdan, learned
counsel for the respondent-State.
4. Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel, submits that the High Court
has grossly erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of
acquittal. He submits that the learned trial Judge by giving elaborate
reasonings, found that the prosecution has failed to prove the
case beyond reasonable doubt. He submits that the High Court
in a cursory manner interfered with the said finding. He submits
that the present case is a case of circumstantial evidence and
unless the prosecution is able to prove the chain of circumstances
beyond reasonable doubt it is not permissible to interfere with the
findings of the trial Judge and to record the finding of conviction.
He further submits that, in an appeal arising from acquittal, the
scope is limited. Unless the finding is shown to be perverse or
impossible, it will not be permissible for the Appellate Court to
interfere with the same.
5. Shri Pashupathi Nath Razdan, learned counsel for the respondentState, on the contrary, submits that the learned trial Judge has
totally misread the evidence. He submits that the evidence of Beni
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Prasad (PW-1) and Sumitra Bai (PW-6), coupled with the medical
evidence, would show that the prosecution has proved the case
beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence.
The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial
evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment of this Court
in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1
,
wherein this Court held thus:
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High
Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,
character and essential proof required in a criminal case
which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most
fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant
v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952
SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case
has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in
a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance,
the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
[(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.
State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC
656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid
down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC
343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
“It is well to remember that in cases where
the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
be fully established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,
the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency and they should be such
as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there
must be a chain of evidence so far complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
1 [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121
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conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and it must be such as to show that
within all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where
the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
(Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is
long and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
54 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the
accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based
on circumstantial evidence.”
7. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution
that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary
principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved
guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that
there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may
be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that
the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of
the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been
held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every
possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that
there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act
must have been done by the accused.
8. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot
take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot
be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is.
An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.
9. Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case
of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the
Appellate Court is very well crystallized. Unless the finding of acquittal
is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same
would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena of judgments
on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High
Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment, which are
as reproduced below:
“13. In case of Sadhu Saran Singh vs. State of U.P.
(2016) 4 SCC 397, the Supreme Court has held that:-
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 55
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“In an appeal against acquittal where the
presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would
interfere with the order of acquittal only when
there is perversity of fact and !aw. However,
we believe that the paramount consideration
of the Court is to do substantial justice and
avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise
by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an
offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur
by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from
the conviction of an innocent. Appellate Court,
while enunciating the principles with regard to
the scope of powers of the appellate Court in
an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute
restriction in law to review and relook the entire
evidence on which the order of acquittal is
founded.”
14. Similar, In case of Harljan Bhala Teja vs. State of
Gujarat (2016) 12 SCC 665, the Supreme Court has
held that:-
“No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence
on record, two views are possible, and the
trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the
appellate court should not interfere with the
same. However, this does not mean that in all
the cases where the trial court has recorded
acquittal, the same should not be interfered
with, even if the view is perverse. Where the
view taken by the trial court is against the
weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is
always open far the appellate court to express
the right conclusion after re-appreciating the
evidence If the charge is proved beyond
reasonable doubt on record, and convict the
accused.”
10. In view of the above settled principles of law, we will have to examine
the present case.
56 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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11. It is not in dispute that the death of the deceased is a homicidal death
and as such, it will not be necessary to refer to the medical evidence.
The only question that remains is as to whether the prosecution has
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and as to whether the
appellants are guilty of committing the crime.
12. Learned trial Judge, by elaborately discussing the evidence, had
found that the appellants were not guilty. We crystallize the findings
of the learned trial Judge, as under:
12.1 Beni Prasad (PW-1), who is the father of the deceased, had
deposed that when he went to call his son Mahesh Sahu for
dinner then Mahesh Sahu was standing at the Chowk with
Pappu Tamrakar and two boys. Mahesh Sahu told him that he
would come later, then Beni Prasad (PW-1) went to his house
and fell asleep and later at night around 11:45 P.M., one boy
came to him and told him that Ballu Chaurasiya (appellant
No. 1), Santosh Chaurasiya and other persons were beating
Mahesh Sahu. On hearing this, he ran towards the house of
Ballu Chaurasiya wearing chaddhi and baniyan. He saw that
Ballu Charuasiya, Santosh Chaurasiya and his two brothers
were dragging Mahesh Sahu in dead condition and put his body
10 feet away from their house. After that the accused Ballu
Chaurasiya went inside his house. Beni Prasad (PW-1) went
near the place where Mahesh Sahu’s body was lying and he
found him to be dead. At that point of time, Sumitra Bai (PW6), the mother of the deceased also came there and she saw
that Jamuna Bai (appellant No. 2), who is the mother of the
accused Ballu Chaurasiya, was cleaning the blood on the door.
12.2 Beni Prasad deposed that in the last month of the year 1991
(December 1991) his son Mahesh Sahu went to Bhopal for
an interview and there was no news about him for about eight
months. Thereafter, a letter came to him from his son in the
fourth month of the year 1992 (April 1992) informing him that
he was working at Agra and that he had married a girl named
Anita, who is the sister of the accused/appellant No. 1 Ballu
Chaurasiya. Thereafter, the deceased Mahesh Sahu and Anita
returned to Damoh (in the fourth month of the year 1992 i.e.,
April 1992), and Anita started living in her house and thereafter
Anita was married to another person in Ujjain by her brother
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 57
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Ballu Chaurasiya (appellant No. 1). Thereafter, Anita left for
her in-laws house and thereafter correspondence of letters
started between Mahesh Sahu and Anita. He stated that this
correspondence of letters was not liked by Ballu Chaurasiya
(appellant No. 1) and he started to give death threats to
Mahesh Sahu.
12.3 The learned trial Judge found that the statement given by Beni
Prasad (PW-1), before the trial Judge was totally contrary to his
statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Exh. D/1). It was found that Beni Prasad
(PW-1) had totally improved his story in his deposition before
the Court. Learned trial Judge also found the behaviour of
Beni Prasad (PW-1) to be abnormal. In his cross-examination,
Beni Prasad (PW-1) admitted that when he saw four persons
dragging the dead body, he said nothing because he was alone.
However, he admitted that the dead body of Mahesh Sahu
was lying in a dense basti and people have houses around
the said place and there was also a dispensary of the (Nagar
Palika) Municipality situated at Gauri Shankar Temple, about
9 feet away from his house. Learned trial Judge also found
that within the same dispensary itself, the Police Chowki was
situated, manned by hawaldar and constables. The learned
trial Judge found that the conduct of the Beni Prasad (PW-1)
in not informing about the dead body of the deceased being
dragged away to anyone and particularly at the Police Chowki
which was hardly any distance from the place of occurrence
to be absolutely unnatural. The learned trial judge found
that when a panchnama of the dead body (Exh. P-2) was
being conducted, he did not give the name of the killers. The
explanation given by Beni Prasad (PW-1) was that the police
did not ask him. The learned trial Judge also found that Beni
Prasad (PW-1) admitted in his evidence that at the time of
panchnama of dead body (Exh. P-2), there was a crowd of
around 150 people.
12.4 Ms. Sumitra Bai (PW-6), mother of the deceased, also stated
about the relationship between the deceased Mahesh Sahu
and Anita. She stated that the accused/appellant No. 1 Ballu
Chaurasiya was threatening the deceased Mahesh Sahu on a
day prior to the date of the incident. She also informed about
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one boy coming at about 11:45 P.M./12 A.M. and informing
her that a fight was going on between Mahesh Sahu and Ballu
Chaurasiya. When she went to the house of the accused,
she saw accused Ballu Chaurasiya, his elder brother, his
manjhla brother and accused Jamuna Bai dragging her son
and leaving her son in front of bade father’s house. Learned
trial Judge found that the evidence of this witness was also
totally improvised. Learned trial Judge also found that there
was extreme exaggeration in the depositions given by this
witness in the Court as compared to the statements under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Exh. D-2). The learned trial Judge, as a
result, disbelieved the evidence of these two witnesses, i.e.,
the father and mother of the deceased.
12.5 Learned trial Judge also found that the prosecution had relied
on the evidence of Raju (PW-4), Dharmendra Singh (PW-5)
and Govind (PW-7) to establish the circumstances regarding
the accused being last seen with the deceased Mahesh Sahu.
Further all these three witnesses had turned hostile and not
supported the prosecution case.
12.6 Learned trial Judge also discarded the circumstances relied
on by the prosecution regarding cutting the nails of both the
hands of the accused Ballu Chaurasiya and the said nails
containing the blood of the deceased Mahesh Sahu. Learned
trial Judge also found that the nails were cut after a period of
six days from the date of the incident. The prosecution has also
relied on the circumstances of recovery of the blood stained
clothes and the knife. Learned trial Judge found that the said
circumstances were also of no assistance in the case of the
prosecution, inasmuch as there were no evidence to show that
the blood found on these articles was a human blood.
12.7 Insofar as the circumstances with regard to the mother of the
appellant No. 1, Jamuna Bai (appellant No. 2), are concerned,
the learned trial Judge found that the independent witnesses
had turned hostile, and the only evidence in that regard was
that of S.K. Banerjee @ S.K. Banerji @ Sukant Banerjee/
Investigating Officer (PW-15).
12.8 Learned trial Judge found that Rajesh Kumar (PW-14), who
was a panch witness, in his evidence, had stated that the
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deceased was his cousin brother and he has signed the
documents on the directions of the S.K. Banerjee/Investigating
Officer (PW-15). As such, the learned trial Judge found that
the circumstances with regard to the memorandum under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and subsequent recovery
was also not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Learned trial
Judge further found that though from the panchnama, it was
shown that the blood was found at various places, he had not
made any attempt to seize the samples nor had he provided
an explanation as to why he had not seized the samples of
the said blood.
12.9 Learned trial Judge found that the knife was seized on
a memorandum of the accused (Exh. P-14) on 14th June
1992 from an open place in the same room as mentioned in
panchnama (Exh. P-11). Learned trial Judge also found that
if immediately on the next day of incident, the Investigating
Officer had visited and searched the room but he did not see
the knife, then the subsequent recovery of knife from the very
same room appears to be planted.
12.10 Learned trial Judge also found that though the incident was of
7th June 1992 at around 12:00 A.M. and it had been reported
to the Investigating Officer at 12:40 A.M., the arrest of the
accused persons had been made only on 15th June 1992, which
creates a doubt on the prosecution version. This is more so
when the distance between the place of occurrence and the
police station is hardly 1 to 1 ½ kms.
13. The above points, that we have culled out from the judgment of
the learned trial Judge, make it clear that the learned trial Judge
has done a very elaborate exercise of discussing the evidence in
great detail. We therefore would not like to burden our judgment
with more details. The aforesaid points are more than sufficient to
come to a conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove any
of the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and in
no case, the chain of circumstances, which was so interlinked to
each other that leads to no other conclusion, than the guilt of the
accused persons. We have no hesitation to hold that the findings
of the learned trial Judge are based on correct appreciation of the
material placed on record.
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14. This elaborate exercise of the learned trial Judge, has been washed
away by the learned Division Bench of the High Court in a totally
cursory manner. Insofar as the testimony of Beni Prasad (PW-1) and
Sumitra Bai (PW-6) is concerned, the Division Bench of the High
Court observed thus:
“8.…...After considering the entire testimony of Beni
Prasad (PW-1) and Sumitra Bai (PW-6) we come to the
conclusion that there are improvements and exaggerations
in their court statement. But on this ground their whole
testimony cannot be brushed out as the principle “Falsus
in uno, Falsus in Omnibus” is not applicable in criminal
trial. Sometimes, the witnesses are in fear that if their
testimony cannot be relied upon by the Court, the main
culprit may be acquitted. Therefore, naturally they improve
their statement to some extent.”
15. The testimony of S.K. Banerjee/Investigating Officer (PW-15), which
has been disbelieved by the learned trial Judge, giving sound reasons,
has been believed by the learned Division Bench of the High Court,
by placing it in paragraph 12 as under:
“12. We do not find any reason to disbelieve the testimony
of Investigation Officer who impartially performed his duty
with sincerity. He had no enmity with the respondents or
relationship with the deceased. Therefore, we are inclined
to rely upon his testimony. It cannot be brushed aside
simply on the basis of conjectures and surmises in favour
of the respondents.”
16. We find that the learned trial Judge had given sound and cogent
reasons for discarding the testimony of the IO and the other witnesses.
We are of the view that the High Court has totally erred in observing
that the trial Judge had brushed aside the evidence of the IO simply
on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Rather, it is the judgment
of the High Court which is based on conjectures and surmises.
17. After reproducing the aforementioned two judgments of this Court,
discussing the settled law on the scope of an appeal against acquittal,
the Division Bench of the High Court observed thus:
“15. As discussed above, we find that there is sufficient
ground to reverse the impugned the judgment. Dr.
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J.P.Parsai (PW-8) examined respondent No. 1 Ballu. He
found some injuries on the body of respondent no. 1 which
also indicate that before the death, the deceased struggled
to save himself from the respondents. Dr. J.P.Parsai took
sample of nails of both the hands of the deceased and
sent them for FSL examination.”
18. After discussing this, the High Court noted that the articles which
were seized by S.K. Banerjee/Investigating Officer (PW-15) contained
blood stains as per the FSL report. The High Court observed that the
accused failed to offer any explanation with regard to the presence
of blood on these articles. The High Court observed thus:
“18...Respondent No. 1 did not offer any explanation with
regard to presence of blood on these articles. This is a
strong link along with the blood marks of dragging found
from the house of the respondent to the spot where the
body of the deceased was lying. This establishes that the
respondents committed murder of the deceased Mahesh
because he had love relation with Anita. After his death,
six love letters of Anita were found in the pocket of the
deceased which indicates that Anita also wanted to reside
with the deceased against the will and consent of her
family members.”
19. At the cost of repetition, we are compelled to say that the findings
of the High Court are totally based on conjectures and surmises.
Though the High Court has referred to the law laid down by this
Court with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against
acquittal, the High Court has totally misapplied the same and a
very well-reasoned judgment based upon the correct appreciation
of evidence by the trial Court has been reversed by the High Court,
only on the basis of conjectures and surmises.
20. The High Court could have interfered in the criminal appeal only if
it came to the conclusion that the findings of the trial Judge were
either perverse or impossible. As already discussed hereinbefore, no
perversity or impossibility could be found in the approach adopted
by the learned trial Judge.
21. In any case, even if two views are possible and the trial Judge found
the other view to be more probable, an interference would not have
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been warranted by the High Court, unless the view taken by the
learned trial Judge was a perverse or impossible view.
22. In that view of the matter, we find that the judgment passed by the
High Court is totally unsustainable in law.
23. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeal is allowed;
(ii) The impugned judgment dated 6th April 2018 passed by the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal
No. 261 of 1995 is quashed and set aside; and
(iii) The accused persons (appellants herein) are acquitted of all the
charges they were charged with. The appellants are already on
bail. Hence, their bail bonds shall stand discharged.
24. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:
Appeal allowed.
