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interesting issues about the interface between the fundamental right to travel abroad and its curtailment under a judicial order as an incident to regulate conditions governing the grant of bail

interesting issues about the interface between the fundamental right to travel  abroad and its curtailment under a judicial order as an incident to regulate conditions governing the grant of bail

whether the appellant is likely to flee from justice if he were to be permitted to travel to the US, we find, on the basis of the previous record of the appellant, that there is no reason or justification to deny him the permission which has been sought to travel to the US for eight weeks. The appellant is an Indian citizen and holds an Indian passport. While it is true that an FIR has been lodged against the appellant, that, in our view, should not in itself prevent him from travelling to the US, where he is a resident since 1985, particularly when it has been drawn to the attention of the High Court and this Court that serious consequences would ensue in terms of the invalidation of the Green Card if the appellant were not permitted to travel. The record indicates the large amount of litigation between the family of the appellant and the complainant. Notwithstanding or perhaps because of this, the appellant has frequently travelled between the US and India even after the filing of the complaint and the FIR. We accordingly are of the view that the application for modification was incorrectly rejected by the High Court and the appellant ought to have been allowed to travel 13 Writ Petition Urgent 2 of 2020 19 to the US for a period of eight weeks. We accordingly permit the appellant to do so, subject to his furnishing an undertaking to this Court before the date of travel that he will return to India after the expiry of a period of eight weeks and that he shall be available on all dates of hearing before the court of criminal jurisdiction, unless specifically exempted from personal appearance. The undertaking shall be filed in this court before the appellant undertakes travel. On the return of the appellant after eight weeks and if it becomes necessary for him to travel to the US, the appellant shall apply to the concerned court for permission to travel and any such application shall be considered on its own merits by the competent court. The appellant shall travel only upon the grant of permission and subject to the terms imposed. The passport of the appellant shall be handed over to the appellant to facilitate his travel, subject to the condition that he shall deposit it with the investigating officer immediately on his return.


1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. 648 of 2020

(Arising out of SLP(Crl) No 3420 of 2020)

Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla ...Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Maharashtra & Anr. ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud

1 Leave granted.

2 This appeal arises from a judgment and order of a Single Judge of the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay1 dated 23 July 2020. The High Court, by its order which is in

appeal, declined to modify its earlier order dated 19 May 2020 so as to permit the

appellant to travel to the US for a period of eight weeks from 25 July 2020 to 6

September 2020. The appellant sought the leave of the High Court to do so since as

a Green Card holder, it was mandatory for him to return to the US within a stipulated

period of his departure from that country, failing which the conditions for

revalidation of the Green Card would not be fulfilled. The High Court declined to

relax the conditions imposed by it for the grant of interim bail on the ground that an

FIR has been registered against the appellant. Though the period during which the

appellant sought to travel abroad has lapsed, the cause survives. The appeal raises

interesting issues about the interface between the fundamental right to travel

1 “High Court”

2

abroad and its curtailment under a judicial order as an incident to regulate

conditions governing the grant of bail.

3. The genesis of the present case arises from a private complaint which was filed in

January 2014 by Mehraj Rajabali Merchant in the court of the JMFC Thane alleging

that the appellant has fabricated a Power of Attorney dated 19 December 2011 by

forging the signature of his brother, Shalin Lokhandawalla. On 10 April 2014, the

JMFC passed an order, by which he directed an investigation under Section 156(3)

of the Code of Criminal Procedure 19732

in terms of the following directions:

“1. The Kapurbavdi police station is directed to register the

crime and investigate into the matter.

2. Further it is hereby directed to submit the report before the

court for taking action, if any, u/s.340 of Cr.P.C.”

4 A First Information Report was registered against the appellant on 22 April 2014 in

which the appellant is alleged to be involved in offences punishable under Sections

420, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471 and 474 of the Indian Penal Code 18603

read with the

provisions of Section 34.

5 The appellant and the co-accused, Arun Fatehpuria, had preferred an application

for grant of anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court Thane, which granted interim

protection from arrest to both the accused on 17 February 2018. On 16 April 2018,

the Sessions Court at Thane confirmed the interim order and granted anticipatory

bail to the co-accused, Arun Fatehpuria, primarily on the basis that the allegations in

the complaint depend largely on documentary material, rendering custodial

interrogation unnecessary. However, the interim order protecting the appellant was

2

“CrPC”

3

“IPC”

3

cancelled because the counsel representing the appellant withdrew the

application on his behalf.

6 The appellant is an Indian citizen and holds an Indian passport. He holds a Green

Card, enabling him to reside in the US. He has resided in the US since 1985. However,

between 10 March 2015 and 10 January 2020, the appellant visited India on sixteen

occasions, details of which have been filed on an affidavit dated 7 August 2020 in

these proceedings. A tabulated chart (Annexure P-3 to the affidavit) contains

details of his travel history, and is extracted below:

“Sr.

No.

Arrival Date Departure Date

1. 10/3/2015 Mumbai Mumbai

2. 19/03/2015 Mumbai

3. 21/4/2015 Mumbai

4. 22/4/2015 Mumbai

5. 7/5/2015 Mumbai

6. 10/5/2015 New Delhi

7. 21/8/2015 Mumbai

8. 24/8/2015 Mumbai

9. 3/2/2016 New Delhi

10. 11/2/2016 New Delhi

11. 14/2/2016 New Delhi

12. 24/2/2016 New Delhi

13. 24/6/2016 Mumbai

14. 28/7/2016 Mumbai

15. 10/2/2017 New Delhi

16. 4/5/2017 Mumbai

17. 10/7/2017 Mumbai

18. 15/7/2017 Mumbai

19. 24/7/2017 Mumbai

20. 9/8/2017 Mumbai

21. 19/10/2017 Mumbai

4

22. 3/11/2017 Mumbai

23. 11/11/2017 India (City not

known)

24. 26/2/2018 Mumbai

25. 1/6/2018 Mumbai

26. 10/7/2018 India (City not

known)

27. 26/9/2018 Mumbai

28. 26/10/2018 Mumbai

29. 22/11/2018 Mumbai

30. 14/12/2018 Mumbai

31. 4/4/2019 Mumbai

32. 22/5/2019 Mumbai

33. 10/1/2020 Mumbai

7 The appellant arrived in India on 10 January 2020. He was arrested on 21 February

2020 at the point of departure in Mumbai in pursuance of a look-out notice which

appears to have been issued on the basis of the FIR dated 22 April 2014. An

application for bail was filed before the Sessions Court in the first week of March

2020 but was rejected on 4 May 2020. On 23 April 2020, the appellant filed an

application for bail before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The High Court,

by its order dated 19 May 2020, granted temporary bail to the appellant, subject to

the following conditions:

“a) The applicant be released on temporary bail for a period of

eight weeks in C.R. No.I-156 of 2014 registered with

Kapurbavadi Police Station, Thane on his furnishing P.R. Bond

of Rs.25,000/- with one or more sureties to make up the

amount.

b) Till the procedure for furnishing sureties is completed, the

applicant is permitted to furnish cash bail.

c) Before his actual release from jail, the Applicant is directed 

5

to surrender his Passport and/or Green Card issued by the

United States of America with the Investigating Agency, if

not earlier seized by it or other Government Authorities.

d) After his release from jail, the applicant is directed not to

leave jurisdiction of Thane Police Commissionerate without

prior permission of the trial Court.

e) Place the Application for regular bail before the regular

Court after normal functioning of the Court begins.”

8 On 10 June 2020, the appellant filed an IA before the High Court seeking permission

to visit the US for a period of eight weeks. The High Court was hearing only urgent

applications during the course of the lock down occasioned by the outbreak of

Covid-19. The Registry of the High Court informed him on 15 June 2020 that no

urgency was found in the praecipe for urgent listing. The appellant filed fresh

praecipes for urgent listing on 17 June 2020 and 19 June 2020. On 26 June 2020, a

Single Judge (Justice S. K. Shinde) expressed his inability to take up the IA for

relaxation of the conditions attached to the grant of interim bail since the order

dated 19 May 2020 had been passed by Justice A. S. Gadkari. The contention of

the appellant, it may be noted, has been that under the conditions prescribed by

the US Immigration and Nationality Act 1952, he has to return for a short period for

revalidating the Green Card. Among them are the following:

“(C) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in

the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an

admission into the United States for purposes of the

immigration laws unless the alien-

(i) has abandoned or relinquished that status,

(ii) has been absent from the United States for a

continuous period in excess of 180 days,

(iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having

departed the United States,

6

(iv) has departed from the United States while

under legal process seeking removal of the

alien from the United States, including removal

proceedings under this chapter and

extradition proceedings,

(v) has committed an offense identified in section

1182(a)(2) of this title, unless since such offense

the alien has been granted relief under section

1182(h) or 1229b(a) of this title, or is attempting

to enter at a time or place other than as

designated by immigration officers or has not

been admitted to the United States after

inspection and authorization by an immigration

officer.”

9 The High Court, by its order dated 26 June 2020, rejected the application for

considering his prayer for relaxing the conditions attaching to the grant of interim

bail following which the appellant moved this Court4

. By an order dated 13 July

2020, this Court requested the High Court to take up the IA filed by the appellant

seeking permission to travel to the US, at an early date. This Court, in its order dated

13 July 2020, noted the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant in

paragraph 2 of its order and then issued the following directions:

“2. Mr Subhash Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the petitioner, submitted that in the event that the

petitioner is unable to arrive in the US by 29 July 2020, he will

not be in a position to retain his Green Card as he is required

to return to the US within 180 days of his departure and his

status will then be that of an alien seeking entry into the US.

3. Since the interim application which has been filed by the

petitioner is pending before the High Court, we request the

High Court to take it up at an early date having regard to

the timeline which has been set out in the submissions which

have been recorded above. We clarify that since the interim

application is still pending before the High Court, we have

not expressed any view on the merits of the matter. The

observations contained in the order declining to entertain

the praecipe shall not come in the way of the disposal of

the interim application. The Special Leave Petition is

4 SLP (Crl) No 3034 of 2020

7

accordingly disposed of.

4. The Registry of the Bombay High Court may obtain, if

required, administrative directions of the Hon'ble Chief

Justice for the assignment of the interim application.”

10 In pursuance of the order of this Court, the High Court heard the IA and has

declined to grant permission to the appellant to visit the US for a period of eight

weeks, by its order dated 23 July 2020.

11 Mr. Subhash Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that:

(i) The appellant is a resident of the US since 1985; holds a Green Card since

2010 and has not violated any provision of law in the US;

(ii) The appellant and the members of his family have been involved in a long

drawn out litigation against the complainant, both of a civil and criminal

nature;

(iii) In the private complaint that was instituted by the complainant in January

2014, the co-accused was granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Judge,

Thane on the ground that the complaint essentially turns upon documents;

(iv) Between 2015 and 2020, the appellant has visited India on as many as sixteen

occasions;

(v) The family of the appellant, which includes him, his brother Shalin and two

sisters, jointly owns properties at Thane and Panvel worth more than Rs 100

crores and the appellant is the only member of the family who is looking after

the litigation;

8

(vi) Far from being a fugitive from justice, the appellant has consistently travelled

to India and the mere filing of the private complaint and the registration of

an FIR should not preclude him from travelling to the US, failing which he

would incur serious consequences of the invalidation of his Green Card;

(vii) While the court which grants bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure 1973 can impose conditions which ensure the presence of the

accused to face trial, the conditions must balance the liberty of the accused

and not result in the arbitrary deprivation of the right to livelihood; and

(viii) The order of the JMFC dated 10 April 2014 has been passed as a matter of

routine course without application of mind and has been misused by the

police machinery to harass and arrest the appellant at the behest of an

adversary.

12 Mr Jha further submitted that the appellant would undertake to come to India on

every hearing of the criminal cases before the concerned courts and he has no

intention to evade the process of law. Mr. Jha has stated that in pursuance of the

notice issued by this court, the complainant has been served.

13 On the other hand, Mr. Sachin Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

State of Maharashtra, who appeared in pursuance of the notice issued by this Court

on 29 July 2020, submitted that the conduct of the appellant has been improper. Mr.

Patil stated that, on the grant of anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court in 2018, the

appellant left for the US, without seeking permission, though as a matter of fact, he

returned subsequently to India on several occasions until 2020, when he was

arrested. It was urged that the appellant has not complied with the conditions on

which he was granted interim bail for eight weeks and he ought to have, but has 

9

not, surrendered after the period was over. Mr. Patil submitted that since the

appellant is facing a criminal trial, the Court may expedite the course of the trial, but

not permit him to leave for the US at this stage; there being no guarantee of his

return.

14 The language of Section 437(3) of the CrPC which uses the expression “any

condition… otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several

decisions of this court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its

discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437 (3) and

439 (1) (a) of the CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to

facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and

ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation,

overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this

Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be

imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.

15 In Kunal Kumar Tiwari v The State of Bihar5

, the appellant who was alleged to have

committed offences under Sections 498-A, 341, 323, 379 and 506, read with Section

34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 was denied

anticipatory bail by the High Court. However, the High Court directed that if the

appellant was willing to treat his wife with dignity and care but she refuses to live

with him or both parties prefer to obtain a divorce by mutual consent, the court

below would release the appellant on provisional bail. The trial court was permitted

to confirm the provisional bail after one year and was directed to monitor the

relationship between the parties, who would appear before it every three months.

This Court, while holding that the conditions imposed by the High Court on grant of

5

(2018) 16 SCC 74

10

bail were onerous and arbitrary, observed:

“9. …Sub-clause (c) of Section 437(3) allows Courts to

impose such conditions in the interest of justice. We

are aware that palpably such wordings are capable

of accepting broader meaning. But such conditions

cannot be arbitrary, fanciful or extend beyond the

ends of the provision. The phrase 'interest of justice' as

used under the Sub-clause (c) of Section 437(3)

means "good administration of justice" or "advancing

the trial process" and inclusion of broader meaning

should be shunned because of purposive

interpretation.

10. … from the perusal of the impugned order it is clear that

the court exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing such

arbitrary conditions. Some of the conditions imposed

are highly onerous and are absurd. Such onerous

anticipatory bail conditions are alien and cannot be

sustained in the eyes of law. The conditions imposed

appear to have no nexus with the good

administration of justice or advancing the trial process,

rather it is an over-zealous exercise in utter disregard

to the very purpose of the criminal justice system. In

view of the above, the impugned order passed by

the High Court is set aside and the interim protection

granted to the Petitioner by this Court… is made

absolute.”

16 In Dataram Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh6

, this Court observed that:

“7. ….The grant or refusal of bail is entirely within the discretion of

the judge hearing the matter and though that discretion is

unfettered, it must be exercised judiciously and in a humane

manner and compassionately. Also, conditions for the grant of bail

ought not to be so strict as to be incapable of compliance,

thereby making the grant of bail illusory.”

17 In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi)7

, in the context of conditions under Section

438 (2) of the CrPC, this Court observed that a balance has to be struck between

the rights of the accused and the enforcement of the criminal justice system while

6

(2018) 3 SCC 22

7

(2013) 15 SCC 570

11

imposing conditions on the grant of bail:

“11. While exercising power Under Section 438 of the Code, the

Court is duty bound to strike a balance between the individual's

right to personal freedom and the right of investigation of the

police. For the same, while granting relief under Section 438(1),

appropriate conditions can be imposed Under Section 438(2) so as

to ensure an uninterrupted investigation. The object of putting such

conditions should be to avoid the possibility of the person

hampering the investigation. Thus, any condition, which has no

reference to the fairness or propriety of the investigation or trial,

cannot be countenanced as permissible under the law. So, the

discretion of the Court while imposing conditions must be exercised

with utmost restraint.”

This Court also discussed the scope of the discretion of the court to impose “any condition”

on the grant of bail and observed:

“15. The words "any condition" used in the provision should not be

regarded as conferring absolute power on a Court of law to

impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has

to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the

facts permissible in the circumstance and effective in the

pragmatic sense and should not defeat the order of grant of bail.”

18 In Barun Chandra Thakur v. Ryan Augustine Pinto8

, this Court restored a condition

mandating that the respondent seek prior permission from a competent court for

travel abroad. The condition, which was originally imposed by the High Court while

granting anticipatory bail was subsequently deleted by it. This Court made the

following observations with respect to imposing restrictions on the accused’s right to

travel:

“9. ….There could be no gainsaying to that the right to travel

abroad is a valuable one and an integral part of the right to

personal liberty. Equally, however, the pre-condition of securing

prior permission before travelling abroad is a crucial ingredient

which undoubtedly was engrafted as a condition for the grant of

anticipatory-bail in this case. ……At best, the condition for seeking

8 Criminal Appeal No. 1618 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9873 of 2019), order dated 21 October 2019.

12

permission before travelling abroad could have been regulated,

not deleted altogether.”

19 This Court has passed multiple orders previously allowing an accused enlarged on

bail to travel abroad. In Ganpati Ramnath v State of Bihar9

, this Court allowed an

accused-applicant to travel abroad for medical treatment, modifying its earlier bail

order, noting that the applicant had travelled abroad on the ground of medical

necessity on six occasions with the permission of the court and had returned. In K.

Mohammed v The State of Kerala10, this Court allowed the accused-appellant to

travel abroad to meet in the exigencies of a family situation. In Tarun Trikha v State

of West Bengal11, this Court allowed the accused-petitioner to travel to Indonesia in

connection with his employment and to return once the work was completed. In

Pitam Pradhan v State of A P12,this Court while granting anticipatory bail, permitted

the petitioner to travel abroad noting that his job required him to travel abroad at

frequent intervals and may lose his employment if he were not permitted to travel

abroad.

20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and the

learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra, it is necessary for the Court to notice

at the outset that a large amount of litigation is pending between the appellant

and the complainant, Mehraj Rajabali Merchant. The appellant has furnished

details of the litigation between the parties as well as of the criminal prosecutions, in

his affidavit dated 7 August 2020. This has been summarised in a tabular statement:

9 Crlmp. Nos. 6304 & 6305/2017 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1187/2004, order dated 4 May 2017.

10 Criminal Appeal Nos. 547/2012, order dated 2 March 2020.

11 Special Leave to Appeal Crl. Nos. 4643/2015, order dated 29 May 2015.

12 Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No(s).9664/2013, order dated 26 February 2014.

13

“I. Cases initiated by Merchants

(Disposed)

Sr.No. Court & Case Parties Disposal

Date

1. Civil SD. Court,

Thane

RCS/200577/2005

Ms. Lokhandwala

Weigh Bridge Vs. M/s

Asam Transport

Disposed

2. 4th Civil Judge

JMFC, Thane

RCC/420380/2010

Firdaus Rajabali

Merchant Vs. Farida

Firoz Lokhandwala

08/10/2010

3. 1st C J Magistrate,

Thane

CR.MA/300998/2013

Firdaus Rajabali

Merchant Vs. Parvez

Noor Lokhandwala

03/01/2014

4. 4th Joint Civil Judge

Sr. Division, Thane

RCS/201541/2001

Firoz Pirbhai

Lokhandwala Vs

Nooruddin Pirbhai

Lokhandwala

16/09/2016

5. Add. Dist. Judge,

Thane

Civil MA/286/2019

Mehraj Rajabali

Merchant Vs.

1. Parvez Noor

Lokhandwala

2. Farida Noor

Lokhandwala

3. Faizmin Amin

Hussain

4. Dinaz Akbar

5. Shalin Noor

Lokhandwala

6. Arun Fathepuria

7. Firadaus Rajabali

Merchant

8. Municipal Comr.

of Thane

25/01/2020

II. Cases initiated by Lokhandwallas

(Disposed)

Sr.No. Court & Case Parties Disposal Date

1. 4th Civil Judge S D,

Thane

RCS/200143/2011

Parvez Noor.

Lokhandwala Vs

Firdaus Rajabali

Merchant

07/01/2013

2. Dist & Session

Court, Thane

Shalin Noor.

Lokhandwala Vs.

11/08/2015

14

Civil

MA/100012/2008

Hindustan Petroleum

3. 2nd Joint Civil

Judge SD, Thane

RCS/201901/2012

Farida Noor.

Lokhandwala Vs.

Farida Firoz

Lokhandwala

22/01/2019

4. 4th Joint Civil

Judge SD, Thane

Sp.

Case/200905/2012

Farida Noor.

Lokhandwala Vs.

Farida Firoz

Lokhandwala

13/09/2019

III. Cases initiated by Merchants (Active)

Sr.

No.

Court & Case Parties Stage Next date

1. 2nd Joint Judge, Sr.

Division, Thane

Sp.

Case/200393/2010

Firdaus Rajabali

Merchant Vs.

Farida Firoz

Lokhandwala

Argument 3.8.2020

2. 2nd Civil Judge,

JD, JMFC, Thane –

Misc. Cr.

Application

799/2017

Firdaus Rajabali

Merchant Vs.

1. Parvez N.

Lokhandwala

2. Farida N.

Lokhandwala

Order 10.8.2020

3. 8th Dist. Judge

MCA/10/2020

Mehraj Rajabali

Merchant Vs.

1. Parvez Noor.

Lokhandwala

2. Farida Noor.

Lokhandwala

3. Faizmin Amin

Husain

4. Dinaz Akbar

5. Shalin Noor.

Lokhandwala

6. Arun

Fatehpuria

7. Firdaus

Rajabali

Merchant

8. Thane

Municipal

Corp.

Commissioner

Notice

Unready

19.08.2020

4. 5th Court Joint

Civil Judge Sr.

Mehraj Rajabali

Merchant Vs.

File of Stay 19.8.2020

15

Div., Thane

Civil

MA/200687/2015

1. Parvez Noor.

Lokhandwala

2. Farida Noor.

Lokhandwala

3. Faizmin Amin

Husain

4. Dinaz Akbar

5. Shalin Noor.

Lokhandwala

6. Arun

Fatehpuria

7. Firdaus

Rajabali

Merchants

8. Thane

Municipal

Corp.

Commissioner

9. Ganesh

Hanuman

Autee

10. Sanjay Salvi

11. Amarjit

Singh Dhri

5. Civil Judge Senior

Division, Thane

Civil

MA/200404/2015

Farida Firoz

Lokhandwala

Vs. Farida Noor.

Lokhandwala

Notice 19.8.2020

6. 5th Court Joint

Civil Judge, Sr.

Div, Thane

RCS/200566/2013

Mehraj Rajabali

Merchant Vs.

Parvez

Nooruddin

Lokhandwala

Evidence 3.9.2020

7. 3rd Joint Civil

Judge Sr. Division,

Thane

Sp.

Case/424/2017

Mehraj Rajabali

Merchant Vs.

Parvez Noor

Lokhandwala

Summons 17/09/2020

IV.Cases initiated by Lokhandwallas (Active)

Sr.

No.

Court & Case Parties Stage Next date

1. 4th Joint Civil

Judge Sr. Division,

Thane

Farida Noor.

Lokhandwala

Vs. Farida

Argument 19/08/2020

16

Civil

MA/200315/2015

Firoz

Lokhandwala

2. 1st CJM, Thane

Cri M.A./91/2014

Farida N.

Lokhandwalla

Vs. Firdaus

Rajabali

Merchant &

Ors.

Arg on Exh.

Unready

24/09/2020

V. Misc Cases

Sr.

No.

Court & Case Parties Stage Next date

1. Supreme Court

SLP (CRL) No.

3420/2020

SLP (CRL)

No.3034/2020

Parvez N.

Lokhandwalla

Vs. State of

Maharashtra

Argument 12/08/2020

(tentative)

2. High Court

LD/VC/BA/24/2020

Parvez N.

Lokhandwalla

Vs. State of

Maharashtra

Argument Praecipe

circulated

06/08/2020

(tentative)

3. High Court

ASDB-LD-VC

No.102 of 2020

along with

WP/891/2018

Parvez N.

Lokhandwalla

Vs. State of

Maharashtra &

Ors

Amendment

carried out

Seeking

circulation

21 The private complaint which is the genesis of the present proceedings was instituted

in January 2014. The gravamen of the allegation is that the appellant has forged

and fabricated the Power of Attorney of 19 December 2011 of his brother Shalin. Mr.

Jha submits that, as a matter of fact, the Power of Attorney has not been used at

any point; his brother was present in India at the time when conveyance was

entered into; and that his brother has never raised any objection. However, we are

not inclined to go into these factual aspects at the present stage. It would suffice to

note that the co-accused was granted bail by the Sessions Judge Thane on 16 April 

17

2018. We are called upon to decide only whether the appellant should be

permitted to travel to the US for eight weeks. In evaluating this issue, we must have

regard to the nature of the allegations, the conduct of the appellant and above all,

the need to ensure that he does not pose a risk of evading the prosecution. The

details which have been furnished to the Court by the appellant, indicate that he

has regularly travelled between the US and India on as many as sixteen occasions

between 2015 and 2020. He has maintained a close contact with India. The view of

the High Court that he has no contact with India is contrary to the material on

record. The lodging of an FIR should not in the facts of the present case be a bar on

the travel of the appellant to the US for eight weeks to attend to the business of

revalidating his Green Card. The conditions which a court imposes for the grant of

bail – in this case temporary bail – have to balance the public interest in the

enforcement of criminal justice with the rights of the accused. The human right to

dignity and the protection of constitutional safeguards should not become illusory

by the imposition of conditions which are disproportionate to the need to secure the

presence of the accused, the proper course of investigation and eventually to

ensure a fair trial. The conditions which are imposed by the court must bear a

proportional relationship to the purpose of imposing the conditions. The nature of

the risk which is posed by the grant of permission as sought in this case must be

carefully evaluated in each case.

22 Mr. Sachin Patil submitted that the appellant was granted temporary bail for a

period of eight weeks by the High Court, by its order dated 19 May 2020, and the

appellant has neither furnished surety nor he has surrendered after the expiry of the

period of eight weeks. 

18

23 As far as the furnishing of sureties is concerned, Mr. Jha stated, on instructions, that

the directions of the High Court have been complied with. In regard to the

surrender of the appellant, the Court has been apprised of the fact that as a result

of the lock down occasioned by the outbreak of Covid-19, the High Court on the

judicial side passed successive orders13 on 26 March 2020, 15 April 2020 and 15 June

2020 extending its interim orders. In the meantime, to establish his bona fides, the

appellant states that he had moved the High Court in successive praecipes for early

hearing, while instituting an IA for modification of the conditions imposed on 19 May

2020 and, eventually, it was on the direction of this Court that the High Court passed

the impugned order.

24 Having regard to the genesis of the dispute as well as the issue as to whether the

appellant is likely to flee from justice if he were to be permitted to travel to the US,

we find, on the basis of the previous record of the appellant, that there is no reason

or justification to deny him the permission which has been sought to travel to the US

for eight weeks. The appellant is an Indian citizen and holds an Indian passport.

While it is true that an FIR has been lodged against the appellant, that, in our view,

should not in itself prevent him from travelling to the US, where he is a resident since

1985, particularly when it has been drawn to the attention of the High Court and this

Court that serious consequences would ensue in terms of the invalidation of the

Green Card if the appellant were not permitted to travel. The record indicates the

large amount of litigation between the family of the appellant and the complainant.

Notwithstanding or perhaps because of this, the appellant has frequently travelled

between the US and India even after the filing of the complaint and the FIR. We

accordingly are of the view that the application for modification was incorrectly

rejected by the High Court and the appellant ought to have been allowed to travel

13 Writ Petition Urgent 2 of 2020

19

to the US for a period of eight weeks. We accordingly permit the appellant to do so,

subject to his furnishing an undertaking to this Court before the date of travel that he

will return to India after the expiry of a period of eight weeks and that he shall be

available on all dates of hearing before the court of criminal jurisdiction, unless

specifically exempted from personal appearance. The undertaking shall be filed in

this court before the appellant undertakes travel. On the return of the appellant

after eight weeks and if it becomes necessary for him to travel to the US, the

appellant shall apply to the concerned court for permission to travel and any such

application shall be considered on its own merits by the competent court. The

appellant shall travel only upon the grant of permission and subject to the terms

imposed. The passport of the appellant shall be handed over to the appellant to

facilitate his travel, subject to the condition that he shall deposit it with the

investigating officer immediately on his return.

25 Accordingly, the order of the High Court dated 23 July 2020 shall stand set aside and

the appeal shall stand disposed of in terms of the above directions.

…………...…...….......………………........J.

 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.

 [Indira Banerjee]

New Delhi;

October 01, 2020

-S-