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Saturday, April 15, 2017

this being a simple suit for grant of permanent injunction between the two private parties in relation to the land which was subject matter of the State Ceiling Laws, was liable to be dismissed on the short ground apart from many others as detailed above that any order that may be passed by the Civil Court would adversely affect and interfere in the rights of the State under the Act, which had not been impleaded as party defendant. = It is a settled principle of law that in order to claim prohibitory (temporary or permanent) injunction, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prima facie prove apart from establishing other two ingredients, namely, irreparable loss and injury that his possession over the suit land is "legal". In this case, it was not so and nor it could be for the simple reason that as far back on 21.08.1976, the Tribunal had already declared the land held by the plaintiff to be in excess of the ceiling limits prescribed under the Act. In these circumstances, the plaintiff was neither holding the land nor could he be held to be in its lawful possession so as to enable him to exercise any ownership rights against any other private party over the suit land. The appellant had then very limited rights left to exercise under the Act in relation to the suit land and such rights were available to him only against the State= in order to limit filing of such frivolous suits by the private parties in relation to agricultural land which are subjected to the State ceiling laws, the State of M.P. amended the Code of Civil Procedure by Act No. 29 of 1984 w.e.f. 14.8.84. By this State amendment, Rule 3-B was added in Order 1 Rule 10 making it obligatory upon the plaintiff to implead the State as party defendant along with private party defendant in every such suit. The amendment further provides that so long as the plaintiff does not implead the State as party defendant in the suit, the Court will not proceed with the trial of the Suit. The object behind introducing such amendment was to give notice to the State of filing of such suit by the holder of the agricultural land which would enable the State to defend their rights, which had accrued in State's favour in the land under the Act. In the absence of any such rule in operation in the State of A.P., the State remained unnoticed of the suit proceedings, which continued in Courts for last more than two decades. Before parting, we consider it apposite to state that the appellant and the respondents made frantic efforts to somehow retain the suit land to them and keep the land away from the clutches of The Act. With this aim in view, they got the suit land involved in this litigation since 1976. All this was done without notice to the State Authorities. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to take up the case of the appellant on its Board and pass appropriate consequential order, if necessary under the Act keeping in view the order dated 21.08.1976 of the Tribunal passed in CC No. 2311/VKD/75 and take all remedial steps as are necessary in relation to the land held by the appellant including the suit land.

           REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No.5817 OF 2012


      Agnigundala Venkata Ranga
      Rao                                    ….Appellant(s)

                                   VERSUS

      Indukuru Ramachandra Reddy
      (Dead) by LRs. & Ors.            .…Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T
     Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
      1)    This appeal by certificate is filed by the plaintiff against the
      final judgment and  order  dated  28.10.2011  of  the  High  Court  of
      Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No.4141 of 2003
      whereby  the  High  Court  allowed  the  appeal   preferred   by   the
      defendants(respondents herein) and reversed  the  final  judgment  and
      decree  dated  22.09.2003  of  the  Additional  Senior  Civil   Judge,
      Narasaraopet in Original Suit No. 98 of 1998.
      2)    In order to appreciate the issue involved in the  appeal,  which
      lies in a narrow compass, it is necessary to state few relevant  facts
      taken from the appeal paper books.
      3)    The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the respondents  are  the
      defendants in the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.
      4)    The subject  matter  of  this  appeal  is  an  agriculture  land
      measuring Ac.13.38 cents in Survey No.  436  and  Ac.  9.38  cents  in
      Survey No. 826 (total land-22 acres 76 cents) situated in -Agnigundala
      Village of Ipur Mandal, District Guntur  Andhra  Pradesh  (hereinafter
      referred to as the "suit land”).
      5)    The appellant owned several acres of  agriculture  lands,  which
      also included the suit land. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms  (Ceiling
      on Agricultural Holdings) Act,  1973   (for  short,   “the  Act”)  was
      enacted on  01.01.1973.   It  came  into  force  on  01.01.1975.   The
      appellant being a  "person" as defined under Section 3(o) of  the  Act
      and was holding the land in excess of the limits prescribed under  the
      Act filed a declaration in respect of his holding before the  Tribunal
      as required under Section 7 of the Act. During  the  pendency  of  his
      case before the Tribunal, the appellant sold the suit land  vide  sale
      deed dated 16.07.1975 to the respondents. The sale deed,  inter  alia,
      recited that the appellant has also delivered possession of  the  suit
      land to the respondents. Respondent No. 1 then mortgaged the suit land
      along with his other lands to the State Bank  of  India  and  obtained
      loan wherein the appellant had stood as the guarantor.
      6)     The  Tribunal,  on  21.08.1976,   passed   an   order   in   CC
      No.2311/VKD/75 under Section 7 of the Act and held inter alia that the
      appellant was holding the land in excess of the limits  prescribed  in
      the Act. It was further held that so far as the transfer of  the  suit
      land made by the appellant in favour of the respondents vide sale deed
      dated 16.07.1975 is concerned,  the  same  was  void  because  it  was
      effected by the appellant after the Act had come into force which  was
      prohibited under Section 7(2) read with Section 17  of  the  Act.  The
      appellant was, therefore, directed to surrender the excess  land  held
      by him in favour of the State as provided in the Act.
      7)    In 1995-1998, i.e., almost after 2 decades from the date of  the
      order of the Tribunal (21.08.1976), another litigation  began  between
      the appellant and the respondents in relation to the suit  land.  This
      was under the provisions of the Andhra  Pradesh  Rights  in  Land  and
      Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (for short, "the Act of 1971 ")  wherein
      the issue was whose name - the appellant or the respondents be entered
      in the Pass Book in relation  to  the  suit  land  as  Pattadar.  This
      litigation  ended  in  appellant's  favour  by  the  orders   of   the
      revisionary Court.
      8)    On 29.10.1998, i.e., almost after 22 years from the date of  the
      Tribunal’s  order  (21.08.1976)  the  appellant  filed  a  civil  suit
      (O.S.No. 98/1998) against the respondents before the Additional Senior
      Civil Judge, Narsaraopet out of which this appeal arises. The suit was
      for permanent injunction in relation to  the  suit  land  against  the
      respondents. It was essentially founded on the  allegations  that  the
      appellant is the owner of the  suit  land  to  the  exclusion  of  all
      persons including the respondents, who have no right to  interfere  in
      the appellant's possession over the suit land. It was averred that the
      appellant has been and continues to remain in possession of  the  suit
      land and since  the  respondents  are  threatening  the  appellant  to
      dispossess him from the suit land, hence he was  constrained  to  file
      the civil suit seeking permanent injunction  against  the  respondents
      restraining them from interfering in appellant’s  peaceful  possession
      over the suit land.
      9)    The respondents  filed   written  statement.   They  denied  the
      appellant's claim and set up a title in themselves over the suit land.
       It was contended that the respondents purchased the  suit  land  from
      the appellant vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 and since then they have
      been in its possession. It  was  contended  that  the  respondents  on
      purchase of the suit land obtained the loan from S.B.I  and  mortgaged
      it with the Bank by way of security for the loan taken.  It  was  also
      contended that the appellant is estopped from raising  any  contention
      once he sold the suit land to the respondents and stake any claim over
      the suit land.
      10)   The Trial Court, on the basis of pleadings,  framed  two  issues
      viz., (1) whether the plaintiff (appellant) is in lawful possession of
      the suit land; and (2) whether the plaintiff (appellant)  is  entitled
      for injunction as prayed for?
      11)   The Trial Court vide judgment/decree  dated  22.09.2003  decreed
      the plaintiff's suit. It was held that the sale made by the  appellant
      to the respondent of the suit land vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 (Ex-
      B-1) is null and void being in contravention of Section 17 of the Act.
      It was held that such sale, even if made, did not  convey  any  right,
      title and interest in respondents’ favour. It was  further  held  that
      the plaintiff is in lawful possession of the suit land as he was  able
      to prove his actual possession on the basis of evidence adduced by him
      and hence was  entitled  to  seek  permanent  injunction  against  the
      respondents  restraining  the  respondents  not  to   dispossess   the
      appellant from the suit land.
      12)   Felt aggrieved, the defendants (respondents) filed first  appeal
      before the High Court. By impugned  judgment  and  order,  the  Single
      Judge of the High Court allowed the appeal and while setting aside the
      judgment/decree of the Trial Court dismissed the suit.  The  plaintiff
      (respondent before the High Court) then orally prayed  to  the  Single
      Judge to grant leave to file appeal to this Court (Supreme  Court)  as
      provided under Article 134-A(b)  of  the  Constitution.   The   Single
      Judge granted "leave" to the plaintiff as prayed.  This  is  how  this
      appeal is brought before this Court on the strength of the certificate
       granted by the High Court.
      13)   Heard Mr. V.V.S.Rao, learned senior counsel  for  the  appellant
      and  Mr.  B.  Adinarayana  Rao,  learned  senior   counsel   for   the
      respondents.  We also perused the written  submissions  filed  by  the
      parties.
      14)   Learned senior counsel  for  the  appellant  (plaintiff),  while
      assailing the legality  and  correctness  of  the  impugned  judgment,
      contended that the High Court (Single Judge) erred  in  reversing  the
      judgment/decree passed by the  Trial  Court.  The  submission  of  the
      learned counsel, in substance, was that  the  judgment  of  the  Trial
      Court, which had rightly  decreed  the  appellant’s  suit,  should  be
      restored. It is this submission, which learned counsel  elaborated  by
      pointing out various provisions of the two Acts and the  exhibits  and
      findings of the two courts below.
      15)   In reply, learned senior counsel for the  respondents  supported
      the impugned judgment and contended  that  no  case  is  made  out  to
      interfere in the impugned  order  and  hence  appeal  deserves  to  be
      dismissed.
      16)   Before we consider the merits of the case,  it  is  apposite  to
      deal with one question which though arises, was not argued by pointing
      out the relevant provisions governing the question.
      17)   As mentioned above,  this  appeal  is  filed  on  a  certificate
      granted by the High Court (Single Judge) on the oral application  made
      by the appellant immediately after the pronouncement of  the  impugned
      judgment as provided under Article 134-A of  the  Constitution.    The
      order granting certificate is a part of the impugned judgment  in  its
      concluding Para which reads thus:
           “Learned counsel for the respondent seeks leave of this Court to
           prefer an appeal against this judgment.
                 Accordingly, leave is granted.”


      18)   What is the true interpretation of Articles 133 and 134-A of the
      Constitution and who can grant the certificate of fitness to appeal to
      the Supreme Court remains no more res integra. It is  settled  by  the
      decision of this Court in  State Bank  of  India  &  Anr.  Vs.  S.B.I.
      Employees’ Union & Anr., 1987 (4) SCC 370.
      19)   The facts of this case and the one  involved  in  the  SBI  case
      (supra) are somewhat similar  wherein  Their  Lordships  examined  the
      issue as to whether the certificate granted by the High Court  (Single
      Judge) satisfied the requirements contained in Articles 133 and 134-A.
      Justice Venkataramiah (as His Lordship then was and later became  CJI)
      speaking for the Bench held thus:
           2. The certificate  contemplated  under  Article  134-A  of  the
           Constitution can only be a certificate which is referred  to  in
           clause (1) of Article 132 or in clause (1) of Article 133 or  in
           sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 134 of the Constitution.
           This is quite obvious from the language of Article 134-A of  the
           Constitution. This case  does  not  fall  either  under  Article
           132(1) or under sub-clause (c) of Article 134(1) as  it  neither
           involves a substantial question of law as to the  interpretation
           of the Constitution nor it is a criminal proceeding. It can only
           fall, if at all,  under  Article  133(1)  of  the  Constitution.
           Article 133 of the Constitution reads thus:
                 “133. (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any
                 judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of  a
                 High Court in the territory of  India  if  the  High  Court
                 certifies under Article 134-A—
                 (a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of
                 general importance; and
                 (b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question
                 needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.
                 (2) Notwithstanding anything  in  Article  132,  any  party
                 appealing to the Supreme Court under clause (1) may urge as
                 one of the  grounds  in  such  appeal  that  a  substantial
                 question  of  law  as  to  the   interpretation   of   this
                 Constitution has been wrongly decided.
                 (3) Notwithstanding anything in  this  article,  no  appeal
                 shall, unless Parliament by law otherwise provides, lie  to
                 the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final  order
                 of one judge of a High Court.”
           3. Clause (3) of Article 133 says that notwithstanding  anything
           in that article  no  appeal  shall,  unless  Parliament  by  law
           otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the  judgment,
           decree or final order of one judge of the High Court. Before the
           introduction of Article 134-A of the Constitution by the  Forty-
           fourth Amendment  of  the  Constitution  there  was  no  express
           provision in Articles 132,  133  and  134  of  the  Constitution
           regarding the time and manner in  which  an  application  for  a
           certificate under any of those articles could be made before the
           High Court. There was also a doubt as to the power of  the  High
           Court to issue  a  certificate  suo  motu  under  any  of  those
           articles. Article 134-A  was  enacted  to  make  good  the  said
           deficiencies. Article 134-A does not constitute  an  independent
           provision under  which  a  certificate  can  be  issued.  It  is
           ancillary  to  Article  132(1),  Article  133(1)   and   Article
           134(1)(c) of the Constitution. That is the reason for the use of
           words “if the High  Court  certifies  under  Article  134-A”  in
           Article 132(1) and Article 133(1) and for the use of  the  words
           certifies under Article 134-A in  Article  134(1)(c).  The  High
           Court can issue a certificate only when it is satisfied that the
           conditions in Article 132 or Article 133 or Article 134  of  the
           Constitution as the case may be are satisfied.  In  the  instant
           case such a certificate could not have been issued by reason  of
           clause (3) of Article 133 of the  Constitution  by  the  learned
           Single Judge.


           4. The fact that in a similar case a certificate had been issued
           by a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of  two  judges
           in a case decided by the Division  Bench  did  not  empower  the
           Single Judge to issue the certificate under  Article  133(1)  of
           the Constitution in a  case  decided  by  him.  The  restriction
           placed by clause (3) of Article 133 of  the  Constitution  could
           not be got over by relying upon the order of the Division Bench.


           5. We, therefore,  revoke  the  certificate.  This  petition  of
           appeal may, however, be treated  as  a  special  leave  petition
           under Article 136 of the Constitution and posted for preliminary
           hearing.”




      20)   In our considered opinion, the  law  laid  down  in  S.B.I  case
      (supra) would squarely apply to  the  case  at  hand  because  in  the
      instant case also,  the  impugned  judgment  and  the  certificate  of
      fitness to file an appeal was passed by the  Single Judge of the  High
      Court.
      21)   As held in S.B.I. case, such certificate/leave  could  not  have
      been issued/granted by the  Single Judge by reason of  clause  (3)  of
      Article 133 of the Constitution. In other words, the Single  Judge  of
      the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant certificate in  the  light
      of restrictions  contained  in  clause  (3)  of  Article  133  of  the
      Constitution.
      22)   We, therefore, revoke the certificate  granted  by  the   Single
      Judge of the High Court.  However, this appeal is treated as a special
      leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution as  was  done  by
      this Court in S.B.I case (supra).  Leave is accordingly granted.
      23)    Coming now to the merits of the case, the short question, which
      arises for consideration in this appeal and  which  was  also  debated
      before the two Courts below, is who was in possession of the suit land-
       the appellant or the respondents on the date of filing  of  the  suit
      and whether the appellant (plaintiff) was entitled to claim  permanent
      injunction against the respondents(defendants) in relation to the suit
      land.
      24)   The  Trial  Court  held  the  appellant  (plaintiff)  to  be  in
      possession  of  the  suit  land  and  accordingly  granted   permanent
      injunction restraining the respondents (defendants)  from  interfering
      in the appellant's possession over the  suit  land  whereas  the  High
      Court in an appeal filed by the respondents reversed  the  finding  of
      the Trial Court and dismissed the suit giving rise to filing  of  this
      appeal by the plaintiff on certificate.
      25)   One cannot dispute the legal proposition being well settled that
      the question as to who is  in  possession  of  the  suit  property  is
      essentially a question of  fact.  Such  question  is  required  to  be
      decided on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in  support
      of their respective  contentions.  Once  the  Trial  Court  renders  a
      finding either way and the same  is  then  appreciated  by  the  first
      appellate Court  in  exercise  of  its  appellate  jurisdiction,  such
      finding is usually held binding on the second appellate Court and this
      Court.
      26)   It is only when such finding of fact is found to be against  the
      pleading or evidence or any provision of law or when it is found to be
      so perverse or/and arbitrary to the extent that no judicial person  of
      an average capacity can ever record, the same would not be binding  on
      the higher Courts and may in appropriate case call for interference.
      27)   Coming to the facts of  the  case,  we  are  of  the  considered
      opinion, that the appellant (plaintiff) simply abused the  process  of
      law in filing the suit for permanent injunction  in  relation  to  the
      suit land against the respondents.  The  suit,  in  our  opinion,  was
      misconceived and deserved  dismissal  on  facts  and  in  law  on  the
      grounds, which are indeed apparent on the face of the  record  of  the
      case as mentioned below.
      28)   Firstly, the legal effect of the coming into force  of  the  Act
      was that on and after 01.01.1975 (notified date), the appellant  being
      the holder of agriculture lands had no right to sell  or/and  transfer
      the suit land whether for consideration or otherwise. In other  words,
      the sale/transfer of agriculture land by the holder of  the  land  was
      prohibited on and after -01.01.1975 by virtue of the provisions of the
      Act. In this view of the matter, the sale made by the  appellant  vide
      sale deed dated 16.07.1975 in favour of the respondents in relation to
      the suit land was null and void.
      29)    Secondly, the Tribunal having rightly held in the  order  dated
      21.08.1976 that  the  sale  deed  dated  16.07.1975  executed  by  the
      appellant in favour of the respondents was null and  void  because  it
      was made in contravention of the provisions of the Act  and  secondly,
      having held that the appellant's total holding was in  excess  of  the
      ceiling limits prescribed in the Act, the suit land was not  available
      to the appellant for its disposal. Indeed its disposal could  be  done
      only  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Act   with   the
      intervention of the State.
      30)   That apart, one of the legal effects that ensued consequent upon
      passing of the order by the Tribunal dated  21.08.1976  was  that  the
      character of the suit land had changed. It was then in the  nature  of
      "surrendered" or  "deemed surrendered" land in favour of the State  as
      prescribed under Sections 10 and 11 and other  related  provisions  of
      the Act.
      31)   Thirdly, the litigation, which had ensued during 1995-98 between
      the appellant and the respondents under  "The Act of 1971" in relation
      to the entries of their  names  in  the  revenue  record  (Pass  Book)
      pertaining to the suit land was neither of any consequence and nor was
      of any significance and nor had any impact on the present  litigation.
      It was for the reason that Section 28 of the Act that gives overriding
      effect to the provisions of the Act  on  all  those  laws,  which  are
      inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, had applied to this case.
      The Act of 1971 is one such law and, therefore, any order passed under
      the Act of 1971 in relation to the suit land was of no  avail  to  any
      party and nor it could have been made basis for determining the  issue
      of possession of any party over the suit land  while  considering  the
      grant of injunction.
      32)   In other words, no benefit of  the  order(s),  even  if  passed,
      under  the Act 1971 could be taken by the parties either  way  against
      each other in these proceedings by virtue of Section 28  of  the  Act.
      Moreover, in our considered view, no proceedings under  the  Act  1971
      could either be initiated or be pursued by  the  appellant/respondents
      in relation to the suit  land  after  the  Act  had  come  into  force
      (01.01.1975). Even the proceedings under the Act of 1971 were  subject
      to the final outcome of the proceedings under the Act.
      33)   Fourthly, the appellant did not come to  the  Civil  Court  with
      clean hands inasmuch as he suppressed the material fact  that  he  had
      already sold the suit land much prior to filing of  the  Suit  to  the
      respondents and, therefore, had no subsisting  interest  in  the  suit
      land. Indeed filing of the civil suit by  the  appellant  (29.10.1998)
      almost after 22 years from the date of passing of  the  order  by  the
      Tribunal (21.08.1976) was totally uncalled for.  In  fact,  it  was  a
      collusive suit filed to frustrate the rights of the  State  which  had
      accrued in State’s favour in the suit land  by  virtue  of  the  order
      dated 21.08.1976 read with the provisions of the Act.  Such  frivolous
      suit, in our considered opinion, deserved rejection at its threshold.
      34)   Fifthly, the Trial Court and the High Court having held  on  the
      strength of Tribunal's finding recorded in the order 21.08.1976  which
      has attained finality that the appellant was not the owner of the suit
      land, the respondents  too  did  not  acquire  any  right,  title  and
      interest in the suit land through sale deed dated 16.07.1975. It being
      a settled principle of law that  a  person  can  transfer  only  those
      rights, which he has in the property and cannot transfer  any  rights,
      which he does not have would apply to this case.
      35)   In other words, when the appellant was  prohibited  to  transfer
      any of his rights, title and interest in the suit land  by  virtue  of
      the provisions of the Act to any person - a fortiori, the  respondents
      too could not acquire any rights, title and interest in the suit  land
      through sale deed dated 16.07.1975 from the appellant and he too  was,
      therefore, in the same position like that of the appellant.
      36)   Seventhly, once the appellant's rights in the  suit  land  stood
      determined by the Tribunal vide its order dated 21.08.1976  under  the
      Act, there did not arise any occasion to hold the appellant to  be  in
      “lawful possession" of the suit land on the date of filing of the suit
      (29.10.98) for considering grant of  injunction  over  the  suit  land
      against the respondents.
      37)    It is a settled  principle  of  law  that  in  order  to  claim
      prohibitory (temporary or permanent) injunction, it is  necessary  for
      the plaintiff to prima facie prove apart from establishing  other  two
      ingredients, namely, irreparable loss and injury that  his  possession
      over the suit land is "legal".  In this case, it was not so and nor it
      could be for the simple reason that as far  back  on  21.08.1976,  the
      Tribunal had already declared the land held by the plaintiff to be  in
      excess of the ceiling  limits  prescribed  under  the  Act.  In  these
      circumstances, the plaintiff was neither holding the land nor could he
      be held to be in its lawful possession so as to enable him to exercise
      any ownership rights against any other private  party  over  the  suit
      land. The appellant had then very  limited  rights  left  to  exercise
      under the Act in relation to  the  suit  land  and  such  rights  were
      available to him only against the State. Such is not the case here.
      38)   Lastly,  this  being  a  simple  suit  for  grant  of  permanent
      injunction between the two private parties in  relation  to  the  land
      which was subject matter of the State Ceiling Laws, was liable  to  be
      dismissed on the short ground apart from many others as detailed above
      that any order that may be passed by the Civil Court  would  adversely
      affect and interfere in the rights of the State under the  Act,  which
      had not been impleaded as party defendant.
      39)   Learned counsel  for  the  appellant  took  us  to  the  various
      documents including orders of the Revenue authorities to show that  it
      was the plaintiff who was in possession of the suit land on  the  date
      of filing of the suit as was rightly held  by  the  Trial  Court  and,
      therefore, this Court should restore the finding of the Trial Court.
      40)    We are afraid we cannot re-appreciate  the  documentary  or/and
      oral evidence again in our appellate jurisdiction. Firstly,  it is not
      permissible for want of any case made out to that effect and secondly,
      it is not considered necessary in the  light  of  what  we  have  held
      above.
      41)   Learned counsel for the appellant  placed  reliance  on  several
      decisions in support of his submission such as Nagubai  Ammal  &  Ors.
      vs. B. Shama Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593,  Bhagwati  Prasad  vs.  Shri
      Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735, Pinninti Kishtamma &  Ors.  vs.  Duvvada
      Parasuram Chowdary & Ors. 2010 (2) SCC 452, State of  Tamil  Nadu  vs.
      Ramalinga Samigal Madam, 1985 (4) SCC 10, Annamreddi  Bodayya  &  Anr.
      vs. Lokanarapu Ramaswamy(Dead) by L.Rs. 1984 Suppl SCC  391,  Anathula
      Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy(D) by L.Rs., 2008 (4)  SCC  594,  Rajendra
      Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (1998) 7 SCC  654  and  Karnail
      Singh vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1995) Suppl(3) SCC  376.  We  have
      perused  these  decisions  and  find  no  quarrel  with  the   general
      proposition of law laid down therein. In our view, all  the  decisions
      cited are distinguishable on facts and hence have  no  application  to
      the facts of this case.
      42)   It is pertinent to mention that in order to limit filing of such
      frivolous suits by the private parties  in  relation  to  agricultural
      land which are subjected to the State ceiling laws, the State of  M.P.
      amended the Code of Civil Procedure by  Act  No.  29  of  1984  w.e.f.
      14.8.84. By this State amendment, Rule 3-B was added in Order  1  Rule
      10 making it obligatory upon the plaintiff to  implead  the  State  as
      party defendant along with private party defendant in every such suit.
      The amendment further provides that so long as the plaintiff does  not
      implead the State as party defendant in the suit, the Court  will  not
      proceed with the trial of the Suit. The object behind introducing such
      amendment was to give notice to the State of filing of  such  suit  by
      the holder of the agricultural land which would enable  the  State  to
      defend their rights, which had accrued in State's favour in  the  land
      under the Act.
      43)   In the absence of any such rule in operation  in  the  State  of
      A.P., the State remained unnoticed  of  the  suit  proceedings,  which
      continued in Courts for last more than two decades.
      44)   In view  of  foregoing  discussion,  we  uphold  the  conclusion
      arrived at by the High Court  on  our  reasoning  given  supra.  As  a
      consequence, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
      45)   Before parting, we  consider  it  apposite  to  state  that  the
      appellant and the respondents made frantic efforts to  somehow  retain
      the suit land to them and keep the land away from the clutches of  The
      Act.  With this aim in view, they got the suit land involved  in  this
      litigation since 1976. All this was done without notice to  the  State
      Authorities.
      46)   We, therefore,  direct the Tribunal to take up the case  of  the
      appellant on its Board and pass appropriate  consequential  order,  if
      necessary under the Act keeping in view the order dated 21.08.1976  of
      the Tribunal passed in  CC No. 2311/VKD/75 and take all remedial steps
      as are necessary in  relation  to  the  land  held  by  the  appellant
      including the suit land.
      47)   Registry is directed to  send  a  copy  of  this  order  to  the
      concerned Tribunal.


                           …...……..................................J.
                                [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]


                           ………...................................J.
                                  [NAVIN SINHA]
      New Delhi;
      April 13, 2017

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