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Saturday, April 15, 2017

The “grammar of humility in law” in the hierarchical system basically means to abide by the precedents unless distinguishable but not to ignore them and pass orders because of an individual notion or perception. = “humility”, and “request” as used by this Court, has to be appositely understood by the High Courts. It requires attention. And attention in the context is disciplined and concerned awareness. Nothing more need be said. 26. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we cannot but hold that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court is absolutely unsustainable. But the controversy does not end there. It is the admitted position that the respondent-college has been granted approval for the academic session 2017-2018. By virtue of the interim order passed by the High Court, three students had been admitted and they are prosecuting their studies. We intend to strike a balance. The students who have been admitted shall be allowed to continue their courses, but their seats shall be adjusted from the academic session 2017-2018. The respondent- college cannot be allowed to get a premium. The grant of bounty is likely to allow such institutions to develop an attitude of serendipity. Such a culture is inconceivable. Therefore, apart from the adjustment of seats for the next academic session, we also direct the respondent-college to deposit a sum of Rs. 30 Lakhs before the Registry of this Court within eight weeks hence and to ensure such compliance, the matter shall be listed in the third week of July, 2017 for further directions. After the amount is deposited, it shall be determined how to deal with the sum. The costs that has been directed to be deposited before the Registry of this Court shall in no manner be recovered from the students who had been admitted nor shall it be collected from the students who will be admitted to the course in the next year. That apart, the respondent-college shall not think of any kind of adjustment.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.4926 OF 2017
                    (@ S.L.P. (Civil) No. 26887 OF 2016)

Dental Council of India                        ... Appellant(s)


Dr. Hedgewar Smruti Rugna Seva
Mandal, Hingoli & Ors.                        ... Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.
      Though this Court  ordinarily  is  loath  to  interfere  with  interim
orders or directions issued by the High Court, yet the impugned order  dated
27.05.2016 passed in Writ Petition No. 4529 of 2016 by the learned  Vacation
Judge of the High Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay,  Bench  at  Aurangabad,
constrains, in a way, obliges us to pen a verdict  with  some  concern,  for
abandonment to  write  a  decision  in  the  obtaining  circumstances  would
tantamount  to  playing  possum  with  the  precedents,  which  need  to  be
recapitulated by the High Courts.

2.    The facts are simple.  The respondent, a dental college,  vide  letter
dated  26.05.2015,  submitted  its  scheme  on  29.07.2015  for   grant   of
permission to start post-graduate course  of  Orthodontics  and  Dentofacial
Orthopaedics along with four other specialties.  A team  of  Dental  Council
of India (for short, ‘the Council’), the appellant herein, conducted a  pre-
PG assessment of the respondent-college on 17th and 18th November, 2015  and
submitted its report to the Council.  The  assessment  report  submitted  by
the said team was placed before the Executive Committee of  the  Council  in
its meeting  held  on  03.12.2015  whereupon  the  Committee  found  many  a
deficiency relating to infrastructure, teaching faculty and  other  physical
facilities in the respondent-college.  The Committee decided  to  call  upon
the  respondent-college  to  rectify  the  deficiencies   and   submit   its
compliance within seven days.   The  said  decision  was  communicated  vide
letter dated 08.12.2015.   The  respondent-college  vide  its  letter  dated
17.12.2015 submitted its compliance report whereafter the assessors  of  the
Council carried out a compliance verification assessment of the  respondent-
college on 21.12.2015.   The  case  of  the  respondent-college  was  placed
before the Executive Committee  for  consideration,  which  found  that  the
respondent-college fulfilled the eligibility criteria at  the  undergraduate
level.  On 29.01.2016,  the  Council  decided  to  carry  out  the  physical
assessment of the dental college in order to ascertain  the  infrastructure,
clinical  material,  teaching  faculty  and  other  physical  facilities  in
respect  of  four  postgraduate  specialties  and  in  accordance  with  the
decision, inspection was conducted on 28th  and  29th  January,  2016.   The
assessment report was considered by the Executive Committee in  its  meeting
held on 12.02.2016 and it observed that  there  were  deficiencies  and  the
college was required to submit compliance.

3.    As is evident from the materials brought on  record  the  decision  of
the Committee was communicated to the college on  18.02.2016  whereupon  the
respondent-college communicated that the  defects  had  been  removed.   The
Council proceeded to verify the compliance made by the college  and  keeping
in view the various facilities and regard being had to the decision of  this
Court in Royal Medical Trust (Registered) and another v. Union of India  and
another[1], decided to recommend to the Government of  India  not  to  grant
permission  to  the  respondent-college  for  starting   the   post-graduate
courses.  The  Government  of  India,  after  affording  an  opportunity  of
hearing to the respondent-college, vide letter  dated  21.03.2016,  required
the Council to verify/review the schemes and further desired to furnish  its
revised recommendation.

4.    The communication received from the Government  of  India  was  placed
before the Committee and the Committee keeping in  view  the  cut-off  date,
postulated in Royal Medical Trust (supra) and Ashish Ranjan  and  others  v.
Union of India and others[2], decided to reiterate  its  earlier  stand  and
accordingly it was communicated to the Government of  India  on  28.03.2016.
The  Government  of  India  after  considering  the  recommendation  of  the
Council, vide  letter  dated  31.03.2016,  disapproved  the  scheme  of  the
respondent-college for starting MDS course in the specialty of  Orthodontics
and Dentofacial Orthopaedics for the academic session 2016-2017.

5.    Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Government of India  which
is based on  the  recommendation  of  the  Council,  the  respondent-college
knocked at the doors of the High Court by filing a  writ  petition  and  the
learned Vacation Judge upon   hearing the learned counsel for  the  parties,
passed the following order:-

“The controversy or the issue involved in the matter requires  consideration
and due to paucity of time, this Court  is  unable  to  decide  this  matter
finally.  In  such  circumstances  the  impugned  communication  dated  31st
March, 2016 is hereby stayed until next date i.e. 06.06.2016. The  admission
process undertaken by the petitioner is at the risk of the petitioner.   The
petitioner shall intimate the order passed by this  Court  to  the  students
who are intending to take admission for M.D.S. course  in  Orthodontics  and
Denotfacial Orthopaedics.”

      After passing the said direction, the Court adjourned  the  matter  to

6.    Assailing the said order,  it  is  submitted  by  Mr.  Gaurav  Sharma,
learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court  could  not  have,  in
the absence of approval of the scheme submitted by the  college,  passed  an
order of the present nature by staying the  order  and  observing  that  the
admission process undertaken by the institution would be at  its  own  risk.
Learned counsel would submit  that  though  the  learned  Single  Judge  has
opined that the college shall intimate the students  who  are  intending  to
take  admission  to  MDS  course  in  the   Orthodontics   and   Dentofacial
Orthopaedics about the order passed by the  Court,  yet  such  an  order  is
impermissible as it brings in anarchy and chaos in the process of  admission
to medical courses.  He has referred to certain authorities, which we  shall
refer to in the course of the judgment.

7.    Mr. S.M. Jadhav, learned counsel for the                   respondent-
college would contend, in his turn, that decision of the Council  was  prima
facie erroneous and, therefore, the High Court was justified in staying  the
said order.  It is further canvassed by  him  that  the  High  Court,  while
staying the order, had  imposed  the  conditions  and  hence,  there  is  no
justification  or  warrant  on  the  part  of  the  Council  to  invoke  the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136  of  the  Constitution  and  it
would have been advisable for it to wait for the final decision of the  High
Court.  Additionally, it is urged by him  that  the  respondent-college  has
been granted due approval for the academic session 2017-2018 and that  would
make the non-denial of the approval for the earlier order  illegal  and,  in
any case, the three students who have been admitted by virtue of  the  order
passed by the High Court  should  not  put  in  a  state  of  suffering  and

8.     The  narration  of  facts  is  absolutely  telling  that  the  scheme
submitted by the respondent-college for starting the MDS course in  the  two
specialties  had  been  disapproved  by  the  Government   of   India.   The
justifiability of the said non-approval was the subject matter  of  the  lis
before the High Court. The High  Court  was  expected  to  adjudicate  under
Article 226 of the Constitution within its parameters as regards the  nature
of deficiencies pointed out by the Council, steps taken by the college  with
regard to removal of such  deficiencies  and  whether  there  had  been  any
perversity  in  the  decision  making  process  of  the  Council  while  not
recommending for approval to the Government of India and  further  declining
to  review the decision  after  the  Government  of  India  required  it  to
verify/review the scheme and  furnish  the  revised  recommendation.  As  is
evident, the Council keeping in view the cut-off  date  prescribed  by  this
Court in Royal Medical Trust (supra) and Ashish  Ranjan  (supra)  reiterated
its earlier recommendation. Thus, the ultimate  result  was  disapproval  of
the scheme by the Government of India.  Hence, the writ court  observed,  as
is demonstrable from the order which we have reproduced  hereinbefore,  that
the controversy required consideration  and  as  the  matter  could  not  be
finally adjudicated, the circumstances required interim direction  and  stay
of the impugned communication.  True it is, the  High  Court  has  qualified
its order by stating that the admission process shall be at the risk of  the
college and the students shall be intimated, but the  heart  of  the  matter
is,  whether  the  High  Court  should  have  stayed  the  order  with  such
conditions. Basically, the order amounts  to  granting  permission  for  the
admission of students  in  certain  courses  in  a  college  which  had  not
received approval. There may be a case where the court may  ultimately  come
to the conclusion that the recommendation  is  unacceptable  and  eventually
the decision of disapproval by the Government  of  India  is  unsustainable.
But the issue is whether before arriving at  such  conclusions,  should  the
High Court, by way of interim   measure, pass such an order.

9.  Such a controversy has not arisen for the first time. A two-Judge  Bench
in Union of India v. Era Educational Trust and  another[3]      stated  that
normally this Court  would  hesitate  to  interfere  with  an  interlocutory
order, but was compelled to do so where prima facie  it  appeared  that  the
said order could not be justified by any  judicial  standard,  the  ends  of
justice and the need to maintain judicial discipline required the  Court  to
do so and  to  indicate  the  reasons  for  such  interference.  The  Court,
adverting to the aspects  of  passing  of  orders  relating  to  provisional
admission, quoted a passage from Krishna Priya  Ganguly   v.  University  of
Lucknow[4] which reads thus:-

“[T]hat whenever a writ petition is filed provisional admission  should  not
be given as a matter of course on the petition  being  admitted  unless  the
court is fully satisfied that the petitioner has a cast-iron case  which  is
bound to succeed or the  error  is  so  gross  or  apparent  that  no  other
conclusion is possible.”

       The  Court  also  thought  it  appropriate   to   reproduce   further
observations from Krishna Priya Ganguly (supra):-

“Unless the institutions can provide complete and full  facilities  for  the
training of each candidate who is admitted in the various  disciplines,  the
medical education will be incomplete and the universities would  be  turning
out doctors not fully qualified which would adversely affect the  health  of
the people in general.”

10.   Adverting to the facts in the case before it, the Court held:-
“9. In the present case, this type of situation has arisen  because  of  the
interim order passed by the High Court  without  taking  into  consideration
various judgments rendered by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction  under
Article 226. It is apparent that even at the  final  stage  the  High  Court
normally could not have  granted  such  a  mandatory  order.  Unfortunately,
mystery has no place in judicial process. Hence, the impugned  order  cannot
be justified by any judicial standards and requires to be  quashed  and  set

      The aforesaid  passage  is  quite  vivid  and  reflects  the  surprise
expressed by the learned Judges.
11.   In Medical Council of India  v.  Rajiv  Gandhi  University  of  Health
Sciences and others[5] the three-Judge Bench referred to  the  authority  in
Era Educational Trust (supra) and emphatically reiterated the  law  declared
therein.  The reiteration is as follows:-
“4. We once again emphasise that the law declared by this Court in Union  of
India v. Era Educational Trust (supra) that  interim  order  should  not  be
granted as a matter of course, particularly  in  relation  to  matter  where
standards of institutions are involved and the permission to be  granted  to
such institutions is subject to certain provisions of  law  and  regulations
applicable to the same, unless the same are complied with. Even if the  High
Court  gives  certain  directions  in  relation  to  consideration  of   the
applications filed  by  educational  institutions  concerned  for  grant  of
permission or manner in which the same should be processed should  not  form
a basis to direct the admission of students in these institutions which  are
yet to get approval from the authorities concerned  or  permission  has  not
been granted by the Council.”

      The aforesaid pronouncement, as is manifest,  rules that issue  of  an
interim order in respect of  an  institution  which  has  not  received  the
approval is not countenanced in law.
12.   In Medical Council of India v. JSS Medical College and another[6]  the
issue had arisen with regard to passing of interim orders by the High  Court
relating to permission for increase of seats. The anguish expressed  by  the
Court is reflectible from the following passage:-
“12. Without adverting to the aforesaid issues and many other  issues  which
may arise for determination, the  High  Court,  in  our  opinion,  erred  in
permitting increase in seats by an interim order.  In  normal  circumstances
the High Court should  not  issue  interim  order  granting  permission  for
increase of the seats. The High Court ought to realise  that  granting  such
permission by an interim order has a cascading effect.  By  virtue  of  such
order students are admitted as in the present case and though many  of  them
had taken the risk knowingly but few may be ignorant. In most of such  cases
when finally the issue is  decided  against  the  College  the  welfare  and
plight of the students are ultimately projected to arouse  sympathy  of  the
Court. It results in a very awkward and difficult situation. If on  ultimate
analysis it is found that the College’s  claim  for  increase  of  seats  is
untenable, in such an event the admission of students with reference to  the
increased  seats  shall  be  illegal.  We  cannot  imagine   anything   more
destructive of the rule of law than  a  direction  by  the  Court  to  allow
continuance of such students, whose  admissions  is  found  illegal  in  the
ultimate analysis.”

13.   In Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh  and  others[7]  dealing  with
various aspects, the Court  was  in  pain  and  thought  it  appropriate  to
request the High Courts with humility.  The lucid  statement   is  extracted
“78.4. With all the humility at our command, we request the High  Courts  to
ensure  strict  adherence  to  the  prescribed  time  schedule,  process  of
selection and to the rule of merit. We reiterate what  has  been  stated  by
this Court earlier, that except in very exceptional cases,  the  High  Court
may consider it appropriate to decline interim  orders  and  hear  the  main
petitions finally, subject to the convenience of the Court. …”

14.   In   Medical  Council  of  India  v.  M.G.R.  Educational  &  Research
Institute University & another[8] treating the admission as unauthorized  as
there had been no approval by the MCI, the Court  imposed  costs  of  Rs.  5
crores on the respondent institution therein, for it had created a  complete
mess insofar as the students were admitted  to  the  second  batch  of  MBBS
course in the college. There has been a further direction  that  the  amount
of costs that was directed to be  deposited  before  the  Registry  of  this
Court was not to be recovered in any manner from  any  student  or  adjusted
against the fees or provision for  facilities  for  students  of  subsequent
15.   The three-Judge Bench in Royal Medical Trust  (supra),  while  dealing
with time schedule, stated thus:-
“33. The cases in hand show that the Central Government did  not  choose  to
extend the time-limits in the  Schedule  despite  being  empowered  by  Note
below  the  Schedule.  Though  the  Central   Government   apparently   felt
constrained by the directions in Priya Gupta (supra) it  did  exercise  that
power in favour of government medical colleges. The decision of  this  Court
in Priya Gupta  (supra)  undoubtedly  directed  that  the  Schedule  to  the
Regulations must be strictly and scrupulously observed. However,  subsequent
to that decision,  the  Regulations  stood  amended,  incorporating  a  Note
empowering the Central Government to modify the stages  and  time-limits  in
the Schedule to the Regulations. The effect of similar such empowerment  and
consequential exercise of power as expected from the Central Government  has
been considered by this Court in Priyadarshini[9].  The  Central  Government
is thus statutorily empowered to modify the Schedule in respect of class  or
category of applicants, for reasons to be recorded in  writing.  Because  of
subsequent amendment and incorporation of the Note as aforesaid, the  matter
is now required to be seen in the light of and in accord with  Priyadarshini
(supra) where similar Note in pari materia  Regulations  was  considered  by
this Court. We therefore hold that the directions  in  Priya  Gupta  (supra)
must now be understood in the light of such  statutory  empowerment  and  we
declare that it is open to the Central Government, in terms of the Note,  to
extend or modify  the  time-limits  in  the  Schedule  to  the  Regulations.
However the deadline, namely, 30th of September  for  making  admissions  to
the first MBBS course as laid down by this  Court  in  Madhu  Singh[10]  and
Mridul Dhar (5)[11] must always be observed.”

16.   The question of tenability of an interim  order  passed  by  the  High
Court in matters of admission came for consideration in  a  recent  decision
in Medical Council of India v. Kalinga Institute of Medical Sciences  (KIMS)
and others[12].  The  Court  found  that  after  the  MCI  and  the  Central
Government having twice considered the inspection report, the  matter  ought
to have been given a quietus by the High Court for the academic  year  2015-
2016.  It has been further observed that the High Court ought to  have  been
more circumspect in directing the admission of students  and  there  was  no
need for the High Court to rush into an area that MCI feared to  tread.   It
was further observed that:-
“27.  … Granting admission to students in an  educational  institution  when
there is a serious doubt whether admission should at all be granted  is  not
a matter to be taken lightly. First of  all  the  career  of  a  student  is
involved — what would a student do if his admission is found to  be  illegal
or is quashed? Is it not a huge waste of time for him or her? Is  it  enough
to say that the student will not claim any equity in his or her  favour?  Is
it enough for student to be told that his or her  admission  is  subject  to
the outcome of a pending litigation? These are all questions that arise  and
for which there is no easy answer. Generally speaking, it is better  to  err
on the side of caution and deny admission to a student rather than have  the
sword of Damocles hanging over him or her. There  would  at  least  be  some

      We respectfully concur with the said observations.
17.   It is worthy to note that the Court thought it appropriate to  observe
that for the fault of the institution, the students should  not  suffer  nor
should the institution get away scot-free.  It issued certain directions  to
the institution that it should not have entered into adventurist  litigation
and costs of Rs. 5 crores were imposed for playing with the  future  of  the
students and the mess that the institution had created  for  them.   Certain
other directions were issued in this case which we need not advert to.
18.   In Ashish Ranjan (supra), the Court after hearing the Union of  India,
MCI and all the States, had fixed a time schedule and directed as  follows:-

“3. Regard being had to the prayer in the writ petition, nothing remains  to
be adjudicated. The order passed today be sent to the Chief  Secretaries  of
all the States so that they shall  see  to  it  that  all  the  stakeholders
follow the schedule  in  letter  and  spirit  and  not  make  any  deviation
whatsoever. Needless to say AIIMS and  PGI  (for  the  examination  held  in
July) shall also follow the schedule in letter and spirit.”

19.   From the aforesaid authorities,  it  is  perspicuous  that  the  court
should not pass such interim orders in the matters of  admission,  more  so,
when the institution had not been accorded approval. Such  kind  of  interim
orders are likely to cause chaos, anarchy and uncertainty. And, there is  no
reason  for  creating  such  situations.  There  is  no   justification   or
requirement. The High Court may  feel  that  while  exercising  power  under
Article 226 of the Constitution,  it  can  pass  such  orders  with  certain
qualifiers as has been done by the impugned order, but it  really  does  not
save the situation.  It is because an institution which has not  been  given
approval for the course, gets a premium. That apart, by  virtue  of  interim
order, the court grants approval in a way which is  the  subject  matter  of
final adjudication before it.  The anxiety of the students to get  admission
reigns supreme as they feel that the institution is  granting  admission  on
the basis of an order passed by the High Court.  The  institution  might  be
directed to inform the students that the  matter  is  sub  judice,  but  the
career oriented students get into the college with the hope  and  aspiration
that in the ultimate eventuate everything shall  be  correct  for  them  and
they will be saved.  It can be thought of  from  another  perspective,  that
is, the students had deliberately got into such  a  situation.   But  it  is
seemly to note that it is the  institution  that  had  approached  the  High
Court and sought a relief  of  the  present  nature.   By  saying  that  the
institution may give admission at its own risk invites further  chaotic  and
unfortunate situations.
20.   The  High  Court  has  to  realize  the  nature  of  the  lis  or  the
controversy. It is quite different. It is not a construction which is  built
at the risk of a plaintiff or the  defendant  which  can  be  demolished  or
redeemed by grant of compensation.  It is a situation where  the  order  has
the potentiality to play with the career and life of young. One may say,  “…
life is a foreign language; all mis-pronounce it”, but it has  to  be  borne
in mind that artificial or contrived accident is not the goal of life.
21.   There is no reason to invite a disaster by way of an interim order.  A
Judge has to constantly remind himself about the  precedents  in  the  field
and not to be swayed away by his own convictions. In this context, the  oft-
quoted passage from Felix Frankfurter[13] would be apt to remember:-
“For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to subordinate one’s  personal
pulls and one’s private views to the law of which we  are  all  guardians  ?
those impersonal convictions that make a society a civilized community,  and
not the victims of personal rule.”

22.   That leads us to say something about  following  the  precedents.  The
purpose is to have consistency. A three-Judge Bench in Government of  Andhra
Pradesh and others v. A.P. Jaiswal and others[14] observed:-
“24. Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of justice. It  is
consistency which creates confidence in the system and this consistency  can
never be achieved without respect to the rule of  finality.  It  is  with  a
view to achieve consistency in  judicial  pronouncements,  the  courts  have
evolved the rule of precedents,  principle  of  stare  decisis,  etc.  These
rules and principle are based on public policy….”

 23.  In Arasmeta Captive Power  Company  Private  Limited  and  another  v.
Lafarge India Private Limited[15], dealing with the matter that  related  to
the field of arbitration, the Court emphatically  observed  that  it  is  an
“endeavour to clear the maze, so that certainty  remains  “A  Definite”  and
finality is “Final””.  In this regard, we may travel a  decade  and  a  half
back. In Chandra Prakash and others v. State of  U.P.  and  another[16],  it
has been held:-
“22.  …  The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost  importance  in  the
administration  of  our  judicial  system.   It   promotes   certainty   and
consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes  confidence
in the system,  therefore,  there  is  this  need  for  consistency  in  the
enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court.”

24.   In the instant case, the precedents are clear and  luculent.  It  does
not allow any space for any kind of equivocation. In  Priya  Gupta  (supra),
the Court had requested the High Courts to ensure strict  adherence  to  the
prescribed time schedule, process of selection and role of merit and  except
in very exceptional cases, to decline interim orders.  The Court  had  added
the words “humility at our command”.   The “grammar of humility in  law”  in
the hierarchical system basically means to abide by  the  precedents  unless
distinguishable but not to  ignore  them  and  pass  orders  because  of  an
individual  notion  or  perception.    Adjudication   in   accordance   with
precedents is cultivation of humility.  As long as a  precedent  is  binding
under the constitutional scheme, it has to be  respected  by  all.   It  has
been said by Simone Weil[17]:-
“In the intellectual order, the virtue of humility is nothing more nor  less
than the power of attention”

25.   We reiterate  the  concept  of  humility  as  stated  in  Priya  Gupta
(supra). However, we intend to  add  that  the  meaning  behind  the  words,
namely, “humility”,  and  “request”  as  used  by  this  Court,  has  to  be
appositely understood by  the  High  Courts.   It  requires  attention.  And
attention in the context is disciplined and  concerned  awareness.   Nothing
more need be said.
26.   In view of the  aforesaid  analysis,  we  cannot  but  hold  that  the
impugned order passed by the   learned Single Judge of  the  High  Court  is
absolutely unsustainable.  But the controversy does not  end  there.  It  is
the admitted position that the respondent-college has been granted  approval
for the academic session 2017-2018. By virtue of the  interim  order  passed
by  the  High  Court,  three  students  had  been  admitted  and  they   are
prosecuting their studies.  We intend to strike a balance. The students  who
have been admitted shall be allowed to continue  their  courses,  but  their
seats shall be adjusted from the academic session 2017-2018. The respondent-
college cannot be allowed to get a premium.  The grant of bounty  is  likely
to allow such institutions to develop an attitude  of  serendipity.  Such  a
culture is inconceivable. Therefore, apart from the adjustment of seats  for
the next academic session, we also direct the respondent-college to  deposit
a sum of Rs. 30 Lakhs before the Registry of this Court within  eight  weeks
hence and to ensure such compliance, the  matter  shall  be  listed  in  the
third week of July,  2017  for  further  directions.  After  the  amount  is
deposited, it shall be determined how to deal with the sum.  The costs  that
has been directed to be deposited before the Registry of  this  Court  shall
in no manner be recovered from the students who had been admitted nor  shall
it be collected from the students who will be admitted to the course in  the
next year. That apart, the respondent-college shall not think  of  any  kind
of adjustment.
27.   The appeal stands disposed of in above terms.

                                  (Dipak Misra)

                                  (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)
APRIL 11, 2017

      [2]  (2015) 10 SCC 19

      [4]  (2016) 11 SCC 225

      [6] (2000) 5 SCC 57

      [8] (1984) 1 SCC 307

      [10] (2004) 6 SCC 76

      [12] (2012) 5 SCC 628
[13]  [14] (2012) 7 SCC 433
[15]  [16] (2015) 4 SCC 580
[17]  [18] (2011) 4 SCC 623
[19]  [20] (2002 ) 7 SCC 258
[21]  [22] (2005) 2 SCC 65
[23]  [24] (2016) 11 SCC 530
[25]  [26] FRANKFURTER, Felix, in Clark, Tom C., “Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
‘A Heritage for all Who Love the Law’,” 51 A.B.A.J. 330, 332 (1965)
[27]  [28] (2001) 1 SCC 748
[29]  [30] (2013) 15 SCC 414
[31]  [32] (2002) 4 SCC 234
[33]  [34] Simone Weil, 1909-1943 Gravity and Grace, 1947

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