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Wednesday, September 17, 2014

Return of Cheque bounce complaints by Delhi High court -Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi have taken cognizance only because the statutory notices in terms of proviso to Section 138 of the Act have been issued to the drawers of the cheque from Delhi. - Apex court held that we have no hesitation in holding that the issue of a notice from Delhi or deposit of the cheque in a Delhi bank by the payee or receipt of the notice by the accused demanding payment in Delhi would not confer jurisdiction upon the Courts in Delhi. What is important is whether the drawee bank who dishonoured the cheque is situate within the jurisdiction of the Court taking cognizance. In that view, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court which simply requires the Magistrate to examine and return the complaints if they do not have the jurisdiction to entertain the same in the light of the legal position as stated in Harman’s case (supra). All that we need to add is that while examining the question of jurisdiction the Metropolitan Magistrates concerned to whom the High Court has issued directions shall also keep in view the decision of this Court in Dashrath’s case (supra).= CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8468 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.29044 of 2009) Vinay Kumar Shailendra …Appellant Versus Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee and Anr. …Respondents= 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41877

 Return of Cheque bounce complaints by Delhi High court -Metropolitan  Magistrates  in  Delhi  have taken cognizance only because the statutory notices in terms of  proviso  to Section 138 of the Act have been issued to the drawers of  the  cheque  from Delhi. - Apex court held that we  have  no hesitation in holding that the issue of a notice from Delhi  or  deposit  of the cheque in a Delhi bank by the payee or receipt  of  the  notice  by  the accused demanding payment in Delhi would not confer  jurisdiction  upon  the Courts  in  Delhi.  What  is  important  is  whether  the  drawee  bank  who dishonoured the cheque is situate  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court taking cognizance. In that view, we see no  reason  to  interfere  with  the order passed by the High Court  which  simply  requires  the  Magistrate  to examine and return the complaints if they do not have  the  jurisdiction  to entertain the same in the light of the legal position as stated in  Harman’s case (supra). All that we need to add is that while examining  the  question of jurisdiction the Metropolitan Magistrates  concerned  to  whom  the  High Court has issued directions shall also keep in view  the  decision  of  this Court in Dashrath’s case (supra).=

      whereby the High Court has invoked its  jurisdiction  under  Article
226 of the Constitution of India  read  with  Section  482  of  Cr.P.C.  and
directed return of all complaints filed under Section 138 of the  Negotiable
Instrument Act, 1881 in which the Metropolitan  Magistrates  in  Delhi  have
taken cognizance only because the statutory notices in terms of  proviso  to
Section 138 of the Act have been issued to the drawers of  the  cheque  from
Delhi. =
The legal position on the subject was  summed
up in the following words:

“To sum up:
(i)   An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments  Act,  1881
is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused  on  an  account  being
maintained by him in a bank for  discharge  of  debt/liability  is  returned
unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount  exceeds
the arrangement made with the bank.
(ii)  Cognizance of any such offence is however forbidden under Section  142
of the Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the  payee  or  holder
of the cheque in due course within a period of one month from the  date  the
cause of action accrues to such payee or holder under clause (c) of  proviso
to Section 138.
(iii)  The  cause  of  action   to   file   a   complaint   accrues   to   a
complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due course if
(a)   the dishonoured cheque is  presented  to  the  drawee  bank  within  a
period of six months from the date of its issue.
(b) If the complainant has demanded payment of cheque amount  within  thirty
days of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the  dishonour
of the cheque and
(c)   If the drawer has failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen  days
of receipt of such notice.

(iv)   The  facts  constituting  cause  of  action  do  not  constitute  the
ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Act.
(v)   The proviso to Section  138  simply  postpones/defers  institution  of
criminal proceedings and taking of cognizance by the Court  till  such  time
cause  of  action  in  terms  of  clause  (c)  of  proviso  accrues  to  the
complainant.
(vi)  Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the  jurisdiction
of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference  to  the  place
where the cheque is dishonoured.
(vii)  The general rule stipulated under Section 177 of  Cr.P.C  applies  to
cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments  Act.  Prosecution  in
such cases can, therefore, be launched against  the  drawer  of  the  cheque
only before the Court within whose jurisdiction the  dishonour  takes  place
except  in  situations  where  the  offence  of  dishonour  of  the   cheque
punishable under Section 138 is committed along with  other  offences  in  a
single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1)  read  with  Section
184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered  by  the  provisions  of
Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof.”



6.    In the light of the above pronouncement  of  this  Court  we  have  no
hesitation in holding that the issue of a notice from Delhi  or  deposit  of
the cheque in a Delhi bank by the payee or receipt  of  the  notice  by  the
accused demanding payment in Delhi would not confer  jurisdiction  upon  the
Courts  in  Delhi.  What  is  important  is  whether  the  drawee  bank  who
dishonoured the cheque is situate  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court
taking cognizance. In that view, we see no  reason  to  interfere  with  the
order passed by the High Court  which  simply  requires  the  Magistrate  to
examine and return the complaints if they do not have  the  jurisdiction  to
entertain the same in the light of the legal position as stated in  Harman’s
case (supra). All that we need to add is that while examining  the  question
of jurisdiction the Metropolitan Magistrates  concerned  to  whom  the  High
Court has issued directions shall also keep in view  the  decision  of  this
Court in Dashrath’s case (supra).

7.    With  the  above  observations  these  appeals  fail  and  are  hereby
dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.

2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41877
    T.S. THAKUR, V. GOPALA GOWDA, C. NAGAPPAN

                                        REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.   8468    OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.29044 of 2009)

Vinay Kumar Shailendra                       …Appellant

Versus

Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee
and Anr.                                           …Respondents


                                    With

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8469   OF 2014
                   (Arising out of SLP (C) No.35762/2009)




                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    These appeals arise out of  a  judgment  dated  23rd  September,  2009
passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No.  11911
of 2009 whereby the High Court has invoked its  jurisdiction  under  Article
226 of the Constitution of India  read  with  Section  482  of  Cr.P.C.  and
directed return of all complaints filed under Section 138 of the  Negotiable
Instrument Act, 1881 in which the Metropolitan  Magistrates  in  Delhi  have
taken cognizance only because the statutory notices in terms of  proviso  to
Section 138 of the Act have been issued to the drawers of  the  cheque  from
Delhi. The matter arose out of a writ  petition  filed  by  the  Delhi  High
Court Legal Services Committee in public interest pointing out that  a  very
large number of complaints under Section 138 of  the  Act  were  pending  in
Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi in  which  cognizance  had  been
taken although the Courts concerned had no territorial  jurisdiction  to  do
so. The Committee’s case before the High  Court  was  that  such  complaints
were filed among others by financial institutions  and  banks  only  on  the
ground that the statutory notices demanding payment against the  dishonoured
cheque had been issued from Delhi. Issue of a notice  demanding  payment  of
the dishonoured cheque was not, however, sufficient to  confer  jurisdiction
upon the Courts in Delhi argued the  Committee.   Reliance  in  support  was
placed upon the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Harman  Electronics  Private
Limited and Anr. v. National Panasonic India Private Limited  (2009)  1  SCC
720. The Committee’s grievance was that notwithstanding a  clear  exposition
of law on the subject by this Court in  Harman’s  case  (supra)   complaints
had been filed and cognizance taken by the Courts  in  Delhi,  relying  upon
the decision of this Court  in  K.  Bhaskaran  v.  Sankaran  Vaidhyan  Balan
(1999) 7 SCC 510. It was in terms contended before the High  Court  that  in
the light of the pronouncement of this Court in Harman’s  case  (supra)  the
complaints could not have been entertained nor could the accused persons  be
summoned for trial in the Courts in Delhi. It was also  argued  that  number
of such complaints is so large that the Magistrates in Delhi were unable  to
handle and effectively manage the docket explosion and attend  to  what  was
otherwise  within  their  jurisdiction  and  called  for   their   immediate
attention.

3.    The contentions urged by the Committee  found  favour  with  the  High
Court who relying upon the decisions of this Court in Dwarka Nath v. Income-
tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and Anr. (AIR 1966  SC  81)  and
Air India Statutory Corporation and Ors. V. United  Labour  Union  and  Ors.
(1997) 9 SCC 377 held that the Constitution did not  place  any  fetters  on
the extraordinary jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court in a  situation
where Courts are flooded with complaints which they had no  jurisdiction  to
entertain. The High Court further held that a direction for  return  of  the
complaints  for  presentation  before  the  competent  Courts  was  in   the
circumstances necessary, as Magistrates who  had  issued  the  summons  were
unable to dismiss the complaints suo moto in the light of  the  decision  of
this Court in Adalat Prasad Rooplal v. Jindal & Ors. (2004) 7 SCC  338.  The
High  Court  accordingly  allowed  the  writ  petition  with  the  following
directions:

“Consequently, in exercise of power under Article 226  of  the  Constitution
read with Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure,  we  direct  return  to
the complainants for presentation in the  Court  of  competent  jurisdiction
all those criminal complaints filed under Section 138 of  NI  Act  that  are
pending in  the  courts  of  Metropolitan  Magistrates  in  Delhi  in  which
cognizance has been  taken  by  them  without  actually  having  territorial
jurisdiction.”



4.    The appellant who is a practicing Advocate of the High Court of  Delhi
has, with the  permission  of  this  Court,  filed  this  appeal  which  was
referred for hearing to a three-Judge Bench by an order dated 3rd  November,
2009. That is precisely how  the  present  appeal  alongwith  the  connected
appeal filed by Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd.  against  the  very  same
order passed by the High Court have come up before us.

5.    We have heard learned counsel for the  parties  at  some  length.  The
order passed by the High Court simply directs return of complaints in  cases
where the same have been filed only because the statutory notices have  been
issued from Delhi.  The direction  proceeds  on  the  basis  that  issue  of
statutory  notices  from  Delhi  by  itself  is  not  sufficient  to  confer
jurisdiction on the Delhi Courts to entertain the complaints.  Reliance  has
been placed for  that  proposition  upon  the  decision  of  this  Court  in
Harman’s case (supra).  In Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of  Maharashtra
and Anr.  (2014) 9 SCALE 97 we have had an occasion to consider whether  the
view expressed by this Court in K. Bhaskaran’s case (supra)  was  sound  and
whether complaints under Section 138 could be maintained at  a  place  other
than the place where the drawee bank is situate. Answering the  question  in
the negative this Court held that an offence under Section 138 is  committed
no sooner the cheque issued on an account maintained by the  drawer  with  a
bank and representing discharge of a debt or a liability in full or part  is
dishonoured on the ground of insufficiency of funds or on  the  ground  that
the same exceeds the arrangements made with the banker.  Prosecution of  the
offender and cognizance of  the  commission  of  the  offence  is,  however,
deferred by the proviso to Section 138 till such time  the  complainant  has
the cause of action to institute such proceedings.  This  Court  found  that
the proviso to Section 138 does not constitute ingredients  of  the  offence
punishable under Section 138.  The legal position on the subject was  summed
up in the following words:

“To sum up:
(i)   An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments  Act,  1881
is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused  on  an  account  being
maintained by him in a bank for  discharge  of  debt/liability  is  returned
unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount  exceeds
the arrangement made with the bank.
(ii)  Cognizance of any such offence is however forbidden under Section  142
of the Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the  payee  or  holder
of the cheque in due course within a period of one month from the  date  the
cause of action accrues to such payee or holder under clause (c) of  proviso
to Section 138.
(iii)  The  cause  of  action   to   file   a   complaint   accrues   to   a
complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due course if
(a)   the dishonoured cheque is  presented  to  the  drawee  bank  within  a
period of six months from the date of its issue.
(b) If the complainant has demanded payment of cheque amount  within  thirty
days of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the  dishonour
of the cheque and
(c)   If the drawer has failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen  days
of receipt of such notice.

(iv)   The  facts  constituting  cause  of  action  do  not  constitute  the
ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Act.
(v)   The proviso to Section  138  simply  postpones/defers  institution  of
criminal proceedings and taking of cognizance by the Court  till  such  time
cause  of  action  in  terms  of  clause  (c)  of  proviso  accrues  to  the
complainant.
(vi)  Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the  jurisdiction
of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference  to  the  place
where the cheque is dishonoured.
(vii)  The general rule stipulated under Section 177 of  Cr.P.C  applies  to
cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments  Act.  Prosecution  in
such cases can, therefore, be launched against  the  drawer  of  the  cheque
only before the Court within whose jurisdiction the  dishonour  takes  place
except  in  situations  where  the  offence  of  dishonour  of  the   cheque
punishable under Section 138 is committed along with  other  offences  in  a
single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1)  read  with  Section
184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered  by  the  provisions  of
Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof.”



6.    In the light of the above pronouncement  of  this  Court  we  have  no
hesitation in holding that the issue of a notice from Delhi  or  deposit  of
the cheque in a Delhi bank by the payee or receipt  of  the  notice  by  the
accused demanding payment in Delhi would not confer  jurisdiction  upon  the
Courts  in  Delhi.  What  is  important  is  whether  the  drawee  bank  who
dishonoured the cheque is situate  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court
taking cognizance. In that view, we see no  reason  to  interfere  with  the
order passed by the High Court  which  simply  requires  the  Magistrate  to
examine and return the complaints if they do not have  the  jurisdiction  to
entertain the same in the light of the legal position as stated in  Harman’s
case (supra). All that we need to add is that while examining  the  question
of jurisdiction the Metropolitan Magistrates  concerned  to  whom  the  High
Court has issued directions shall also keep in view  the  decision  of  this
Court in Dashrath’s case (supra).

7.    With  the  above  observations  these  appeals  fail  and  are  hereby
dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.



                                                        ………………………………….…..…J.
                                           (T.S. THAKUR)





                                                        .……………………………….…..…J.
                                            (V. GOPALA GOWDA)



                                                        ………………………..……………..J.
                           (C. NAGAPPAN)
New Delhi
September 4, 2014

                                                   REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1911    OF 2014
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5644 of 2010)

Times Business Solution Limited              …Appellant

Versus

Databyte                                           …Respondent

                                    With
                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1912   OF 2014
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5645 of 2010)
                                     With
                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1913   OF 2014
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5280 of 2010)



                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    These three appeals arise out of an order  dated  1st  February,  2010
passed by the High Court of Bombay whereby Criminal M.C. Nos. 281  of  2010,
282 of 2010 and 296 of 2010 filed by the appellants have been dismissed  and
the orders passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate  returning  the  complaints
filed by the appellants under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument  Act,
1881 for presentation before the competent Court upheld.

3.    It is common ground that the cheques in all the three cases  had  been
issued on different branches namely, Bank of  India,  Ruby  Park  and  ICICI
Bank, Kolkata and Punjab National Bank, Chapraula, Gautam Budh  Nagar,  U.P.
which are outside Delhi. Complaints under Section 138 of  the  NI  Act  were
all the same filed in Delhi because the cheques had been  deposited  by  the
complainants in their Delhi bank accounts for collection and because  notice
of dishonour was issued to the accused persons  from  Delhi.   Relying  upon
the decision of this Court in Ishar Alloy  Steels  Ltd.  v.  Jayaswals  Neco
Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 609 the High Court held that mere presentation of  cheques
before banks in Delhi when the drawee bank is situated  outside  Delhi  will
not confer jurisdiction upon the Delhi  courts  nor  will  the  issue  of  a
notice of dishonour from Delhi would do so. That view, in  our  opinion,  is
unexceptionable having regard to the decision  of  this  Court  in  Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra and Another (2014) 9 SCALE 97.  This
Court has in that case examined at length the principles underlying  Section
138 and held that a unilateral act of presentation of  the  cheque  anywhere
in the country or issue of a notice of dishonour from a place chosen by  the
complainant does not by itself  confer  jurisdiction  upon  the  Court  from
within whose jurisdiction  such  presentation  is  made  or  notice  issued.
Following the view taken by this Court in Dashrath’s case  (supra)  we  have
no hesitation in holding that the High Court was justified  in  refusing  to
interfere with the orders  passed  by  the  Metropolitan  Magistrate.  These
appeals accordingly fail and are hereby dismissed but in  the  circumstances
without any no orders as to costs.

                                                        ………………………………….…..…J.
                                           (T.S. THAKUR)




                                                        .……………………………….…..…J.
                                            (V. GOPALA GOWDA)



                                                        ………………………..……………..J.
                           (C. NAGAPPAN)
New Delhi
September 4, 2014
                                                   REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1914  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.690 of 2011)

M/s K K. Ploycolor India Ltd. & Ors.               …Appellants

Versus

Global Trade Finance Ltd. & Anr.             …Respondents

                                    With

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1915   OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.718 of 2011)

                                    With

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1916  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.749 of 2011)

                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    These appeals arise out of an order dated 15th September, 2010  passed
by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay  whereby  Crl.  Application
Nos.1491, 2759 and 2760 of 2010 have been allowed and the orders  passed  by
the Magistrate set aside and the matter  remitted  back  to  the  Magistrate
with the direction that the criminal complaints filed by  the  complainants-
respondents herein shall be disposed of expeditiously.

3.    Complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable  Instrument  Act,  1880
appear to have  been  filed  by  the  respondent-company  in  the  Court  of
Metropolitan Magistrate, Bandra which were  entertained  by  the  Magistrate
and process issued against the accused persons. Revision  applications  were
then  filed  before  the  Court  of  Sessions  at  Bombay  challenging   the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate to entertain the complaints.  The  Revisional
Court relying upon Harman Electronics Private Limited and Anr.  v.  National
Panasonic India Private Limited  (2009) 1 SCC 720 held that  the  Magistrate
did not have the jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  complaints.   The  orders
passed by the Magistrate were set aside and the complaints  directed  to  be
returned for presentation before the competent Court. Aggrieved by the  said
orders the complainant preferred Criminal  Applications  No.1491,  2759  and
2760 of 2010 before the High Court who relying upon  the  decision  of  this
Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510 and  three
other decisions of the Bombay High Court held that the  Magistrate  had  the
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as the  cheque  had  been  presented
before a bank at Bombay  which  fact  was,  according  to  the  High  Court,
sufficient to confer jurisdiction  upon  the  Magistrate  to  entertain  the
complaints and try the cases. The orders  passed  by  the  Revisional  Court
were accordingly set aside and the Magistrate directed to proceed  with  the
trial of the cases expeditiously as already noticed.   The  present  special
leave petitions have been filed by the accused persons  assailing  the  view
taken by the High Court.

4.    A plain reading of the orders passed by  the  High  Court  would  show
that the judgment proceeds entirely on the  authority  of  the  decision  of
this Court in K. Bhaskaran’s case (supra). That decision has  been  reversed
by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra  and  Anr.
(2014) 9 SCALE 97. This Court has, on  an  elaborate  consideration  of  the
provision of Section 138 and the law on the subject, held that  presentation
of a cheque for collection on the drawee bank or issue of a  notice  from  a
place of the choice of  the  complainant  would  not  by  themselves  confer
jurisdiction upon the Courts where cheque is  presented  for  collection  or
the default notice issued demanding payment from the drawer of  the  cheque.
Following the said decision we have no hesitation in holding that  the  High
Court was wrong in interfering with the order passed by the Sessions  Judge.


5.    We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the order  passed  by
the High Court and  restore  those  passed  by  the  Revisional  Court.  The
parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.


                                                        ………………………………….…..…J.
                                           (T.S. THAKUR)





                                                        .……………………………….…..…J.
                                            (V. GOPALA GOWDA)



                                                        ………………………..……………..J.
                           (C. NAGAPPAN)
New Delhi
September 4, 2014

                                                   REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1917  OF 2014
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.7619 of 2011)

Suku                                               …Appellant

Versus

Jagdish and Anr.                             …Respondents


                                    With



                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1918  OF 2014
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.7772 of 2011)




                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    These appeals arise out of an order dated 15th June,  2011  passed  by
the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam whereby the High Court has  held  that
the presentation of a cheque by the complainant in a bank  at  Krishnapuram,
Kayamkulam, Kerala did not confer jurisdiction upon Courts at Kayamkulam  to
entertain a complaint under Section 138 of the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act
and try the accused persons for the offence.

3.    It is not in dispute that the cheque in question  was  issued  by  the
respondent  on  Syndicate  Bank,  Gokaran  branch  in  Karnataka  which  was
presented for collection by the  complainant  at  Krishnapuram,  Kayamkulam,
Kerala but dishonoured for insufficiency  of  funds.  The  complainant  then
filed complaint at Kayamkulam in the State of Kerala which were returned  by
the Magistrate to  be  filed  before  the  proper  Court  as  the  Court  at
Kayamkulam, Kerala, had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain  the  same.
The matter was taken up before the High Court by the  complainants  in  Crl.
M.C. Nos.514 of 2011 and 1653 of 2011 which the High Court has dismissed  by
the impugned order holding that the presentation of the cheque to a Bank  in
Kerala would not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the  Kerala  Court.  The
High Court has in support of that view relied  upon  the  decision  of  this
Court in Harman Electronics Private Limited and Anr. v.  National  Panasonic
India Private Limited  (2009) 1 SCC 720  where  this  Court  held  that  the
issue of notice to the drawer of the cheque does not by itself give rise  to
a cause of action to confer jurisdiction upon the Court to take cognizance.

4.    The view taken by the Magistrate based as it is  on  the  decision  of
this Court in Harman’s case (supra) does not, in our opinion, call  for  any
interference by this Court, in the light of the pronouncement of this  Court
in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod  v. State of Maharashtra and  Another  (2014)  9
SCALE 97 where this Court has examined the issue at  some  length  and  held
that presentation of a cheque by the complainant at a place  of  his  choice
or issue of notice by him to the accused demanding  payment  of  the  cheque
amount are not sufficient by themselves  to  confer  jurisdiction  upon  the
courts where such cheque was presented  or  notice  issued.   Following  the
decision in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case (supra),  we  affirm  the  order
passed by the High Court.

5.    These appeals accordingly fail and are, hereby, dismissed but  in  the
circumstances without any orders as to costs.



                                                        ………………………………….…..…J.
                                           (T.S. THAKUR)





                                                        .……………………………….…..…J.
                                            (V. GOPALA GOWDA)



                                                        ………………………..……………..J.
                           (C. NAGAPPAN)
New Delhi
September 4, 2014


                                                                 REPPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
                   TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.)NO. 338 OF 2010

T.A.M.A. Jawahar                        …Appellant

Versus

Arun Kumar Gupta                        …Respondent


                                     AND

                    TRANSFERRED CASE (CRL.) NO.4 OF 2012

                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

Transfer Petition (Crl.) No.338 of 2010 and Transferred Case (Crl.) No.4  of
2012 are delinked and to be posted for hearing separately.

                                                        ………………………………….…..…J.
                                              (T.S. THAKUR)




                                                        .……………………………….…..…J.
                                               (V. GOPALA GOWDA)



                                                        ………………………..……………..J.
                               (C. NAGAPPAN)
New Delhi
September 4, 2014

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