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Friday, April 4, 2014

Sec.173(8) - Sec.309 - Cr.P.C. and sec.32 (1) of Evidence Act- further investigation filed by wife pending charges -allowed but gained no mass - During trial again by son an application under sec. 309 on the same set of allegations - Trail court allowed - High court confirmed - Apex court held that an attempt proved futile as nothing is gathered in the evidence during trial - the alleged letter has no direct nexus with the alleged offence as per sec.32 (1) of Evidence Act for sake hearsay evidence also - Apex court set aside the order of trial and High court = BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA & ANR. ..... APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. .... RESPONDENTS= 2014 (Apr.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41376

   Sec.173(8) - Sec.309 - Cr.P.C. and sec.32 (1) of Evidence Act- further investigation filed by wife pending charges -allowed but gained no mass - During trial again by son an application under sec. 309 on the same set of allegations - Trail court allowed - High court confirmed - Apex court held that  an attempt proved futile as nothing is gathered in the evidence during trial - the alleged letter has no direct nexus with the alleged offence as per sec.32 (1) of Evidence Act for sake hearsay evidence also - Apex court set aside the order of trial and High court =

When
    the trial was so pending, the wife of the deceased filed an application
    for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of  Criminal
    Procedure  (hereinafter  referred   to   as   ‘the   Code’),   alleging
    petitioner’s complicity in the crime,  inter  alia,  stating  that  the
    petitioner was a business rival of the deceased whereas one of the main
    accused is his business partner with whom  he  conspired  to  kill  the
    deceased.  It was alleged that petitioner was a Minister  earlier  from
    the party which was in power in the State and therefore, he was let off
    during investigation.  It was also pointed out that  a  letter  written
    almost a year ago by the deceased was recovered from his purse in which
    it was stated that in the event of his death, the petitioner  shall  be
    held responsible as he intended to kill him. =
 Notwithstanding  the
    aforesaid affidavit of the Investigating Officer,  the  Sessions  Judge
    directed for further investigation.  
In the light of the aforesaid, the
    investigating agency submitted further report stating therein that  the
    call records of the period  immediately  preceding  the  death  of  the
    deceased do not show any nexus between him and the petitioner  and  the
    deceased did not have any threat from the petitioner.  In this way, the
    police did not find the complicity of the petitioner in the crime.=

an application was filed by the son of  the
    deceased praying  for  arraigning  the  petitioner  as  an  accused  in
    exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code.  During the course of trial.
Said application  was
    allowed by the learned Sessions Judge on its finding that  prima  facie
    strong evidence exists to summon the petitioner as the letter recovered
    from the deceased incriminated him.  It  was  also  observed  that  the
    veracity of the letter recovered from the deceased was  established  by
    two witnesses who confirmed that the letter was in the  handwriting  of
    the deceased.

           Aggrieved by  the  aforesaid  order,  the  petitioner  preferred
    Special Criminal Application No. 638 of 2008 before the High  Court  of
    Gujarat.  The High  Court  by  its  order  dated  11th  December,  2008
    dismissed the said application =
About alleged letter credence 
   This Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.  State  of
    Maharashtra, 1984 (4) SCC 116,  after  review  of  a  large  number  of
    decisions of the Privy Council, various High  Courts  and  the  Supreme
    Court,  endorsed  the  view  taken  by  the  Privy  Council  in  Pakala
    Narayanswami (supra) in the following words:
           “21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above  and
           the clear language of Section 32(1) of  the  Evidence  Act,  the
           following propositions emerge:

           (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and  makes
           admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death
           is a homicide or a suicide, provided the  statement  relates  to
           the cause of death, or exhibits  circumstances  leading  to  the
           death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian  Evidence
           Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society  and  the
           diverse nature and character  of  our  people,  has  thought  it
           necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.”
    All these decisions support the view which we  have  taken  that
    the note written by the deceased does not relate to the  cause  of  his
    death or to any of the circumstances of the transaction which  resulted
    in his death and therefore, is inadmissible in law.
 Now we revert to the authority of this  Court  in  Rattan  Singh
    (supra) relied on by Dr. Singhvi.   In  the  said  case,  the  deceased
    immediately before she was fired at, spoke out  that  the  accused  was
    standing nearby with a gun.  In a split second  the  sound  of  firearm
    shot was heard and in a trice  her  life  snuffed  off.   In  the  said
    background, this Court held that the words spoken by the deceased  have
    connection with the circumstance of  transaction  which  resulted  into
    death.  In the case in hand, excepting apprehension, there  is  nothing
    in the note.  No circumstance of any transaction resulting in the death
    of the deceased is found in the note.  Hence, this decision in  no  way
    supports the contention of Dr. Singhvi.

          The other  evidence  sought  to  be  relied  for  summoning  the
    appellant is the alleged conversation between  the  appellant  and  the
    accused on and immediately after  the  day  of  the  occurrence.   But,
    nothing has come during the course of trial regarding  the  content  of
    the  conversation  and  from  call  records  alone,   the   appellant’s
    complicity in the crime does not  surface at all.

        From what we have observed above, it is evident that no evidence
    has at all come during  the  trial  which  shows  even  a  prima  facie
    complicity of the appellant in the crime.  In that view of the  matter,
    the order passed  by  the  trial  court  summoning  the  appellant,  as
    affirmed by the High Court, cannot be allowed to stand.


       2014 (Apr.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41376
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE

                                                       REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.735 OF 2014
              (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.9184 of 2008)




   BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA
   & ANR.                               ..... APPELLANTS


                                   VERSUS

   STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.            .... RESPONDENTS




                               J U D G M E N T



    Chandramauli Kr. Prasad

           Before we proceed to consider the case, we must remind ourselves
    the maxim “judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur”  which  means  that  a
    Judge is condemned when guilty person escapes punishment.  But, at  the
    same time, we cannot forget that credibility of  the  justice  delivery
    system comes under severe strain when a person is put on trial only for
    acquittal.

                 By Order dated 8th December, 2011, Veja Prabhat Bhutia  was
    added as petitioner no. 2.  He was an  accused  in  the  case  and  his
    grievance was that due to pendency of the  present  petition  filed  by
    petitioner Babubhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria, his trial has been  stayed  and
    he is unnecessarily rotting in jail.  This judgment  shall,  therefore,
    will have no bearing on him and the  expression  “petitioner/appellant”
    in this judgment would mean  petitioner  no.1/appellant  no.1  Babubhai
    Bhimabhai Bokhiria.

           Shorn of unnecessary details, facts giving rise to  the  present
    petition are that one Mulubhai Gigabhai Modhvadiya was murdered on 16th
    of November, 2005 and for that  a  case  was  registered  at  Kalambaug
    Police Station, Porbandar, under Section 302, 201, 34, 120B,  465,  468
    and 471 of the Indian Penal Code  and  Section  25  of  the  Arms  Act.
    Police after usual investigation submitted  the  charge-sheet  and  the
    case was ultimately committed for trial to the Court of Session.   When
    the trial was so pending, the wife of the deceased filed an application
    for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of  Criminal
    Procedure  (hereinafter  referred   to   as   ‘the   Code’),   alleging
    petitioner’s complicity in the crime,  inter  alia,  stating  that  the
    petitioner was a business rival of the deceased whereas one of the main
    accused is his business partner with whom  he  conspired  to  kill  the
    deceased.  It was alleged that petitioner was a Minister  earlier  from
    the party which was in power in the State and therefore, he was let off
    during investigation.  It was also pointed out that  a  letter  written
    almost a year ago by the deceased was recovered from his purse in which
    it was stated that in the event of his death, the petitioner  shall  be
    held responsible as he intended to kill him.   In  reply  to  the  said
    application, the Investigating  Officer  filed  his  affidavit  stating
    therein that during the course of investigation, nobody  supported  the
    plea of the wife that the deceased was apprehending any threat from the
    petitioner or for that matter, any other person.  In another  affidavit
    filed by the Investigating Officer, a firm  stand  was  taken  that  no
    material had surfaced to show the complicity of the petitioner  in  the
    offence.  It was pointed out by  the  Investigating  Officer  that  the
    deceased filed an application for arms licence and in that  application
    also he did not disclose any threat or apprehension to  his  life  from
    any person,  including  the  petitioner  herein.   Notwithstanding  the
    aforesaid affidavit of the Investigating Officer,  the  Sessions  Judge
    directed for further investigation.  In the light of the aforesaid, the
    investigating agency submitted further report stating therein that  the
    call records of the period  immediately  preceding  the  death  of  the
    deceased do not show any nexus between him and the petitioner  and  the
    deceased did not have any threat from the petitioner.  In this way, the
    police did not find the complicity of the petitioner in the crime.

           During the course of trial of other accused, 134 witnesses  were
    examined and at that stage, an application was filed by the son of  the
    deceased praying  for  arraigning  the  petitioner  as  an  accused  in
    exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code.  Said application  was
    allowed by the learned Sessions Judge on its finding that  prima  facie
    strong evidence exists to summon the petitioner as the letter recovered
    from the deceased incriminated him.  It  was  also  observed  that  the
    veracity of the letter recovered from the deceased was  established  by
    two witnesses who confirmed that the letter was in the  handwriting  of
    the deceased.

           Aggrieved by  the  aforesaid  order,  the  petitioner  preferred
    Special Criminal Application No. 638 of 2008 before the High  Court  of
    Gujarat.  The High  Court  by  its  order  dated  11th  December,  2008
    dismissed the said application inter alia observing as follows:

           “7. In view of the material placed before the Court, selected  by
           the parties, and in absence of comprehensive and panoramic  view
           of the entire evidence led before the Court in  respect  of  the
           heinous  crime  wherein  Section  120-B  of  I.P.C.  is  clearly
           alleged, it would be hazardous to record  an  opinion  different
           from the opinion formed by the Court conducting the case. It  is
           emphasized in the most recent judgment dated 07.11.2008  of  the
           Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab  [Criminal
           Appeal No. 1750-1751/2008],  after  reference  to  most  of  the
           previous judgments on the issue and reiterating  the  ration  in
           Bholu Ram v. State of Punjab (2008) 9 SCC 140, that the  primary
           object underlying Section 319 is that the whole case against all
           the  accused  should  be  tried  and  disposed   of   not   only
           expeditiously but also simultaneously. Justice  and  convenience
           both require that cognizance against  the  newly  added  accused
           should be taken in the same case  and  in  the  same  manner  as
           against the original accused.  In view of  the  principles  laid
           down by the Supreme Court as adumbrated hereinabove and in  view
           of the further guidelines called for  by  the  recent  referring
           judgment, it would be improper to interfere  with  the  impugned
           order, particularly when even the State and the prosecution  has
           supported the application at Ex. 225 below  which  the  impugned
           order was made.”







           It is in these circumstances, the petitioner has preferred  this
   special leave petition and assails the aforesaid order.



           Leave granted.




           Before  we  proceed  to  deal  with  the  evidence  against  the
   appellant and address whether in light of the evidence  available,  power
   under Section 319  of  the  Code  was  validly  exercised,  it  would  be
   expedient to understand the position of law in this  regard.   The  issue
   regarding the scope and extent of powers of  the  court  to  arraign  any
   person as an accused during the course of inquiry or trial in exercise of
   power under  Section  319  of  the  Code  has  been  set  at  rest  by  a
   Constitution Bench of this court in the case of Hardeep Singh v. State of
   Punjab, 2014 (1) SCALE 241. On a review of the  authorities,  this  Court
   summarised the legal position in the following words:

           “98. Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a  discretionary  and  an
           extra-ordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly  and  only
           in those cases where the circumstances of the case  so  warrant.
           It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions
           Judge is of the opinion that  some  other  person  may  also  be
           guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and  cogent
           evidence occurs against a person from the  evidence  led  before
           the court that such power should  be  exercised  and  not  in  a
           casual and cavalier manner.

           99. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case  is  to  be
           established  from  the  evidence  led  before  the   court   not
           necessarily  tested  on  the  anvil  of  Cross-Examination,   it
           requires much stronger evidence than  mere  probability  of  his
           complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more
           than prima facie case as exercised at the  time  of  framing  of
           charge,  but  short  of  satisfaction  to  an  extent  that  the
           evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction.  In  the
           absence of such satisfaction,  the  court  should  refrain  from
           exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C……..”



           Section 319 of the Code confers power on the trial court to find
    out whether a person who ought to have been added  as  an  accused  has
    erroneously been omitted or  has  deliberately  been  excluded  by  the
    investigating agency and that satisfaction has to be arrived at on  the
    basis of the evidence so led  during  the  trial.   On  the  degree  of
    satisfaction for invoking power under Section 319  of  the  Code,  this
    Court observed that though the test of prima facie case being made  out
    is same as that when the cognizance of the offence is taken and process
    issued, the degree of satisfaction under Section 319  of  the  Code  is
    much higher.

           Having summarised the law on the degree of satisfaction required
    by the courts to summon an accused to face trial in exercise  of  power
    under Section  319  of  the  Code,  we  now  proceed  to  consider  the
    submissions advanced by the learned counsel.  It is common ground  that
    the only evidence that  the  trial  court  has  relied  to  summon  the
    appellant to face the trial is the note written by the deceased in  his
    own handwriting apprehending death at the appellant’s hand.   The  same
    reads as follows:

           “Date: 18.11.2004

           I, Mulubhai Modhvadiya write this note that the  then  Irrigation
           Minister Babubhai Bokhiriya @ Babulal want to  kill  me  due  to
           personal differences with me.  Therefore I inform to  the  State
           and to the police by this note  that  whenever  I  die,  then  I
           request to do thorough investigation  because  phone  calls  are
           coming threatening to kill me.  If I will make  complaint  today
           then he will by  using  his  influence  destroy  the  complaint,
           therefore I am keeping this note in my purse and  I  am  clearly
           stating that If I will die due to murder then my murder will  be
           done by Babu Bokhiriya only, if dumb  government  listen  to  my
           note than take strict action against Babu Bhokhiriya and my soul
           will be pleased.  I am also  giving  my  finger  print  on  this
           letter and also signing under it.  Therefore you have  no  doubt
           about it.

                                                             Yours sincerely

                                                                        Sd/-

                                                      (Mulubhai Modhvadiya)”




           It is an admitted position that all those who were put on  trial
    have now been acquitted by the trial court.

           Mr. V.A. Bobde, learned Senior Counsel appearing  on  behalf  of
    the appellant submits that in the course of trial of an  offence,  when
    it appears from the evidence that any person, not  being  the  accused,
    has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together
    with the accused facing trial,  the  court  may  proceed  against  such
    person for the offence which he appears to have committed.   He  points
    out that the power under Section 319 of the Code can be exercised  when
    it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused, has
    committed any offence.  In his submission, the evidence would obviously
    mean the  evidence  admissible  in  law.   He  submits  that  the  note
    allegedly recovered from the deceased expresses  mere  apprehension  of
    death and, therefore, it is inadmissible in evidence and does not  come
    within the ambit  of  Section  32  of  the  Evidence  Act  (hereinafter
    referred to as “the Act”).  He further submits that the note  does  not
    relate to the cause of death nor it describes any circumstance that led
    to his death.  It has also been pointed out that the note recovered  is
    also not relevant under Section 32 of the Act as it  has  no  proximity
    with the event of his death, as the same was written over a year ago.

           Dr.  A.M.  Singhvi,  learned  senior   counsel   appearing   for
    Respondent No.2, however, submits  that  any  statement  –  written  or
    verbal, made under an expectation of death is relevant under Section 32
    of the Act and need not necessarily be followed by  death  immediately.
    He submits that the letter recovered  from  the  deceased  discloses  a
    relevant fact as the same has been made under apprehension of death and
    relates to its cause.  Though he admits that  the  letter  was  written
    over a year ago, it is his contention that it can still be  taken  into
    consideration as it is not necessary to have  immediate  nexus  between
    the words written  and  the  death.   In  support  of  the  submission,
    reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court  in  the  case  of
    Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1997 (4) SCC 161 wherein  it
    has been held as follows:
           “15.  ……..The  collocation  of  the  words  in   Section   32(1)
           “circumstances of the transaction which resulted in  his  death”
           is apparently of  wider  amplitude  than  saying  “circumstances
           which caused his death”. There need not necessarily be a  direct
           nexus between “circumstances” and death. It  is  enough  if  the
           words spoken by the deceased have reference to any  circumstance
           which has connection with any of the transactions which ended up
           in the death of the deceased. Such  statement  would  also  fall
           within the purview of Section 32(1)  of  the  Evidence  Act.  In
           other words, it is not necessary that such  circumstance  should
           be proximate, for, even distant circumstances  can  also  become
           admissible under the sub-section, provided it has nexus with the
           transaction which resulted in the death………………”


           We  have  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the   rival
    submissions and the first question which falls for our determination is
    whether the note in question is admissible  in  evidence  or  in  other
    words, can be treated as a dying declaration under Section  32  of  the
    Act.  Section 32 of the Act reads as follows:


           “32.Cases in which statement of relevant fact by  person  who  is
           dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.- Statements, written
           or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who  is  dead,  or
           who cannot be found, or  who  has  become  incapable  of  giving
           evidence, or whose attendance  cannot  be  procured  without  an
           amount of delay or expense, which under the circumstances of the
           case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant
           facts in the following cases:


               1) when it relates to cause of death.-When the statement  is
                  made by a person as to the cause of his death, or  as  to
                  any  of  the  circumstances  of  the  transaction   which
                  resulted in his death, in cases in  which  the  cause  of
                  that person's death comes into question.


                 xxx              xxx              xxx”



           From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it  is  evident
    that a statement of a fact by a person who is dead when it  relates  to
    cause of death is relevant.  It is an exception to the rule of hearsay.
     Any statement made by a person as to the cause of his death or  as  to
    any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death
    is relevant in a case in which the cause of death of the person  making
    the statement comes into question.  Indian law  has  made  a  departure
    from the English law where the statements which directly relate to  the
    cause of  death  are  admissible.   General  expressions  suspecting  a
    particular individual not directly related to the occasion of death are
    not admissible when the cause of  death  of  the  deceased  comes  into
    question.  In the present case, except the  apprehension  expressed  by
    the deceased, the statement made by him does not relate to the cause of
    his death or to any circumstance of the transaction which  resulted  in
    his death.  Once we hold so, the note does not satisfy the  requirement
    of Section 32 of the Act. The note, therefore, in our opinion,  is  not
    admissible in evidence and, thus,  cannot  be  considered  as  such  to
    enable exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code.

           The Privy Council had the occasion to consider  the  meaning  of
    the expression “circumstances of transaction” used in Section 32 of the
    Act in the case of Pakala Narayanswami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC  47  and
    on page 50 held as follows:

           “………The statement may be made before  the  cause  of  death  has
           arisen, or before the deceased  has  any  reason  to  anticipate
           being killed.  The circumstances must be  circumstances  of  the
           transaction : general expressions indicating fear  or  suspicion
           whether of a particular individual or otherwise and not directly
           related  to  the   occasion   of   the   death   will   not   be
           admissible……………”



           Aforesaid view had been approved by this Court in Shiv Kumar  v.
   State of Uttar Pradesh, (Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 1966,  decision  dated
   29th July, 1966), wherein it was held as under:





           “It is clear that if the statement of  the  deceased  is  to  be
           admissible under this section it must be a statement relating to
           the circumstances of the transaction resulting in his death. The
           statement may be made before the cause of death has  arisen,  or
           before the deceased has any reason to anticipate  being  killed,
           but general expressions indicating fear or suspicion whether  of
           a particular individual or otherwise and not directly related to
           the occasion of the death will not be  admissible.  A  necessary
           condition  of  admissibility  under  the  section  is  that  the
           circumstance must have some proximate  relation  to  the  actual
           occurrence. For instance, a statement made by the deceased  that
           he was proceeding to the spot where he was in fact killed, or as
           to his reasons for so proceeding, or that he was going to meet a
           particular person, or that he had been invited by such person to
           meet  him  would  each  of  them  be  a  circumstance   of   the
           transaction, and would be so whether the person was unknown,  or
           was not the person accused.  The phrase  “circumstances  of  the
           transaction” is a phrase that no doubt conveys some limitations.
           It is not as broad  as  the  analogous  use  in  “circumstantial
           evidence” which includes evidence of all relevant facts.  It  is
           on the  other  hand  narrower  than  ‘res  gestae’  [See  Pakala
           Narayana Swami v. The King Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47].  As we have
           already  stated,  the  circumstance  must  have  some  proximate
           relation to the  actual  occurrence  if  the  statement  of  the
           deceased is to be  admissible  under  s.32(1)  of  the  Evidence
           Act……….”

                                  (underlining ours)




           This Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.  State  of
    Maharashtra, 1984 (4) SCC 116,  after  review  of  a  large  number  of
    decisions of the Privy Council, various High  Courts  and  the  Supreme
    Court,  endorsed  the  view  taken  by  the  Privy  Council  in  Pakala
    Narayanswami (supra) in the following words:
           “21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above  and
           the clear language of Section 32(1) of  the  Evidence  Act,  the
           following propositions emerge:

           (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and  makes
           admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death
           is a homicide or a suicide, provided the  statement  relates  to
           the cause of death, or exhibits  circumstances  leading  to  the
           death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian  Evidence
           Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society  and  the
           diverse nature and character  of  our  people,  has  thought  it
           necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.”




           All these decisions support the view which we  have  taken  that
    the note written by the deceased does not relate to the  cause  of  his
    death or to any of the circumstances of the transaction which  resulted
    in his death and therefore, is inadmissible in law.





           Now we revert to the authority of this  Court  in  Rattan  Singh
    (supra) relied on by Dr. Singhvi.   In  the  said  case,  the  deceased
    immediately before she was fired at, spoke out  that  the  accused  was
    standing nearby with a gun.  In a split second  the  sound  of  firearm
    shot was heard and in a trice  her  life  snuffed  off.   In  the  said
    background, this Court held that the words spoken by the deceased  have
    connection with the circumstance of  transaction  which  resulted  into
    death.  In the case in hand, excepting apprehension, there  is  nothing
    in the note.  No circumstance of any transaction resulting in the death
    of the deceased is found in the note.  Hence, this decision in  no  way
    supports the contention of Dr. Singhvi.




           The other  evidence  sought  to  be  relied  for  summoning  the
    appellant is the alleged conversation between  the  appellant  and  the
    accused on and immediately after  the  day  of  the  occurrence.   But,
    nothing has come during the course of trial regarding  the  content  of
    the  conversation  and  from  call  records  alone,   the   appellant’s
    complicity in the crime does not  surface at all.




           From what we have observed above, it is evident that no evidence
    has at all come during  the  trial  which  shows  even  a  prima  facie
    complicity of the appellant in the crime.  In that view of the  matter,
    the order passed  by  the  trial  court  summoning  the  appellant,  as
    affirmed by the High Court, cannot be allowed to stand.

           To put the record straight, Mr. Bobde has raised  various  other
    contentions to show that the appellant cannot be put on trial,  but  in
    view of our answer to the aforesaid contentions, we deem it inexpedient
    to either incorporate or answer the same.










           In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the  order  of
    the trial Court summoning the appellant to face trial and the Order  of
    the High Court affirming the same.


                                                   ………………………………………………………………J



                               (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)




                           ………………………………………………………………J

                                    (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)




    NEW DELHI,
    APRIL 3, 2014.





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