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Sunday, March 9, 2014

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (for short ‘the Tenancy Act’) -Vs- Arbitration & conciliation Act - Unregistered lease deed - suit for eviction and for recovery of arrears of rents and for injunction - defendant filed an application under sec.8 of arbitration Act - Trial court dismissed the application and order to file written statement - High court allowed - Apex court held that the relief claimed by the appellants being mainly for eviction, it could only be granted by the “Civil Judge having jurisdiction” in a suit filed by the landlord as provided in Section 6 of the Tenancy Act. The expression “Civil Judge having jurisdiction”will obviously mean the Civil Judge who has jurisdiction to grant the other reliefs: decree for arrears of rent, decree for recovery ofarrears of proportionate and enhanced municipal taxes, a decree for mesne profits and a decree for permanent injunction claimed in the suit. and held that the High court committed wrong and allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to trial court for filing written statement = Ranjit Kumar Bose & Anr. … Appellants Versus Anannya Chowdhury & Anr. … Respondents = 2014 (March. Part )judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41306

  West Bengal  Premises  Tenancy  Act,  1997  (for short      ‘the  Tenancy  Act’) -Vs- Arbitration & conciliation Act - Unregistered lease deed - suit for eviction and for recovery of arrears of rents and for injunction - defendant filed an application under sec.8 of arbitration Act - Trial court dismissed the application and order to file written statement - High court allowed - Apex court held that the relief  claimed  by  the  appellants  being  mainly  for eviction, it  could  only  be  granted  by  the  “Civil  Judge  having  jurisdiction” in a suit filed by the landlord as provided in Section 6 of the Tenancy Act. The expression “Civil Judge having  jurisdiction”will obviously mean the Civil Judge who has jurisdiction to grant  the other reliefs: decree for arrears of  rent,  decree  for  recovery  of arrears of proportionate and enhanced municipal taxes,  a  decree  for
 mesne profits and a decree for permanent  injunction  claimed  in  the suit. and held that the High court committed wrong and allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to trial court for filing written statement =

   The appellants have inducted the respondents as tenants in respect  of
      a shop room measuring 600 sq. feet at HA-3, Sector-3, Salt Lake  City,
      Kolkata, and paying a monthly rent to the appellants.  In  respect  of
      the tenancy, the appellants  and  the  respondents  have  executed  an
      unregistered tenancy agreement which has been notarized on 10.11.2003.
       On 06.03.2008, the appellants,  through  their  Advocates,  served  a
      notice on the respondents terminating the tenancy and asking  them  to
      vacate the shop premises and the notice stated that after April,  2008
      the relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and the
      respondents shall cease to exist and the respondents will be deemed to
      be trespassers liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs.500/-  per  day
      for wrongful occupation of the shop.  
The  respondents,  however,  did
      not vacate the shop premises and the appellants filed Title Suit No.89
      of 2008 against the respondents for eviction, arrears of rent, arrears
      of municipal tax, mesne profit and for  permanent  injunction  in  the
      Court of the Civil Judge (Senior  Division),  2nd  Court  at  Barasat,
      District North 24-Parganas in the State of West Bengal.  
In the  suit,
      the respondents filed a petition under Section 8  of  the  Arbitration
      and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the 1996 Act’) stating  therein
      that the tenancy agreement contains an arbitration agreement in clause
      15 and praying that all the disputes in the suit be  referred  to  the
      arbitrator.  
By  order  dated  10.06.2009,  the  learned  Civil  Judge
      dismissed the petition under Section 8 of the 1996 Act and posted  the
      matter to 10.07.2009 for filing of written statement by the defendants
      (respondents herein). =
High court
By  the  impugned  judgment   dated
      16.04.2010, the High Court has held that in view of the  decisions  of
      this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Pinkcity  Midway
      Petroleums [(2003) 6 SCC 503], Agri Gold Exims  Ltd.  v.  Sri  Lakshmi
      Knits & Wovens & Ors. [(2007) 3 SCC 686]  and  Branch  Manager,  Magma
      Leasing & Finance Limited & Anr. v. Potluri Madhavilata & Anr. [(2009)
      10 SCC 103], the Court has no  other  alternative  but  to  refer  the
      disputes to the arbitrators to be appointed by the parties as per  the
      arbitration agreement.  The High Court, however, has observed  in  the
      impugned  judgment  that  if   any   dispute   is   raised   regarding
      arbitrability of such  dispute  before  the  arbitral  tribunal,  such
      dispute will be decided by the arbitral tribunal. =
Apex court 
The High Court, therefore, was not correct in coming to the conclusion
      that as per the decisions of this Court in the aforesaid three  cases,
      the Court has no alternative but to refer the parties  to  arbitration
      in view of the clear mandate in Section 8 of the  1996  Act.   
On  the
      contrary, the relief  claimed  by  the  appellants  being  mainly  for
      eviction, it  could  only  be  granted  by  the  “Civil  Judge  having
      jurisdiction” in a suit filed by the landlord as provided in Section 6
      of the Tenancy Act.  
The expression “Civil Judge having  jurisdiction”
      will obviously mean the Civil Judge who has jurisdiction to grant  the
      other reliefs: decree for arrears of  rent,  decree  for  recovery  of
      arrears of proportionate and enhanced municipal taxes,  a  decree  for
      mesne profits and a decree for permanent  injunction  claimed  in  the
      suit.

  15.  For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal  and  set  aside  the
      impugned judgments of the High  Court  and  the  Civil  Judge,  Senior
      Division, and remand the matter to the  learned  Civil  Judge,  Senior
      Division, who will now give an opportunity to the respondents  to  put
      in their written statements and thereafter proceed with  the  suit  in
      accordance with law.  Considering the peculiar  facts  of  this  case,
      there shall be no order as to costs.

2014 (March. Part )judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41306
A.K. PATNAIK, V. GOPALA GOWDA
                                                               REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL No.  3334  OF 2014
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15165 of 2010)

Ranjit Kumar Bose & Anr.                                … Appellants

                                   Versus


Anannya Chowdhury & Anr.                         … Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.



Leave granted.
Facts of the Case

   2. The appellants have inducted the respondents as tenants in respect  of
      a shop room measuring 600 sq. feet at HA-3, Sector-3, Salt Lake  City,
      Kolkata, and paying a monthly rent to the appellants.  In  respect  of
      the tenancy, the appellants  and  the  respondents  have  executed  an
      unregistered tenancy agreement which has been notarized on 10.11.2003.
       On 06.03.2008, the appellants,  through  their  Advocates,  served  a
      notice on the respondents terminating the tenancy and asking  them  to
      vacate the shop premises and the notice stated that after April,  2008
      the relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and the
      respondents shall cease to exist and the respondents will be deemed to
      be trespassers liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs.500/-  per  day
      for wrongful occupation of the shop.  The  respondents,  however,  did
      not vacate the shop premises and the appellants filed Title Suit No.89
      of 2008 against the respondents for eviction, arrears of rent, arrears
      of municipal tax, mesne profit and for  permanent  injunction  in  the
      Court of the Civil Judge (Senior  Division),  2nd  Court  at  Barasat,
      District North 24-Parganas in the State of West Bengal.  In the  suit,
      the respondents filed a petition under Section 8  of  the  Arbitration
      and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the 1996 Act’) stating  therein
      that the tenancy agreement contains an arbitration agreement in clause
      15 and praying that all the disputes in the suit be  referred  to  the
      arbitrator.  By  order  dated  10.06.2009,  the  learned  Civil  Judge
      dismissed the petition under Section 8 of the 1996 Act and posted  the
      matter to 10.07.2009 for filing of written statement by the defendants
      (respondents herein).

   3. Aggrieved, the respondents filed an application (C.O. No.2440 of 2009)
      under Article 227 of the Constitution of  India  before  the  Calcutta
      High Court and  contended  that  the  tenancy  agreement  contains  an
      arbitration agreement in Clause 15, which provides  that  any  dispute
      regarding the contents or construction of  the  agreement  or  dispute
      arising out of the agreement shall be settled by Joint Arbitration  of
      two arbitrators, one to be appointed by the landlords and the other to
      be appointed by the tenants and the decision  of  the  arbitrators  or
      umpires appointed by them shall be final and that the arbitration will
      be in accordance with the 1996 Act and, therefore, the  learned  Civil
      Judge rejected the petition of the respondents to refer  the  disputes
      to arbitration contrary to the mandate in Section 8 of the  1996  Act.
      The appellants opposed  the  application  under  Article  227  of  the
      Constitution of India contending inter alia that the  dispute  between
      the appellants and the respondents,  who  are  landlords  and  tenants
      respectively, can only be decided by a Civil Judge in accordance  with
      the provisions of the West Bengal  Premises  Tenancy  Act,  1997  (for
      short      ‘the  Tenancy  Act’).   By  the  impugned  judgment   dated
      16.04.2010, the High Court has held that in view of the  decisions  of
      this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Pinkcity  Midway
      Petroleums [(2003) 6 SCC 503], Agri Gold Exims  Ltd.  v.  Sri  Lakshmi
      Knits & Wovens & Ors. [(2007) 3 SCC 686]  and  Branch  Manager,  Magma
      Leasing & Finance Limited & Anr. v. Potluri Madhavilata & Anr. [(2009)
      10 SCC 103], the Court has no  other  alternative  but  to  refer  the
      disputes to the arbitrators to be appointed by the parties as per  the
      arbitration agreement.  The High Court, however, has observed  in  the
      impugned  judgment  that  if   any   dispute   is   raised   regarding
      arbitrability of such  dispute  before  the  arbitral  tribunal,  such
      dispute will be decided by the arbitral tribunal.
Contentions of the learned counsel for the parties

   4. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  submitted  that  in  Hindustan
      Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway  Petroleums,  Agri  Gold
      Exims Ltd. v. Sri Lakshmi Knits & Wovens & Ors.  and  Branch  Manager,
      Magma Leasing & Finance Limited & Anr. v. Potluri Madhavilata  &  Anr.
      (supra), this Court has not decided as to whether the dispute  between
      the landlord and the tenant could be  decided  by  the  arbitrator  in
      accordance with the arbitration agreement between the landlord and the
      tenant and the provisions of the 1996 Act or by the appropriate  forum
      in accordance with the law relating to tenancy.  He cited the decision
      of this Court in Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v.  Navrang  Studios  &  Anr.
      [(1981) 1 SCC 523], wherein it has  been  held  that  Court  of  Small
      Causes alone and not the arbitrator as a matter of public  policy  has
      been empowered to decide disputes between the landlord and the  tenant
      under the Bombay Rent Act.  He also relied on the observations of this
      Court in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home  Finance  Limited  &
      Ors. [(2011) 5 SCC 532] in para  36  at  page  547  that  eviction  or
      tenancy matters governed by a special statute where the tenant  enjoys
      statutory protection against eviction  can  be  decided  by  specified
      courts conferred with the jurisdiction  to  grant  eviction  and  such
      disputes are non-arbitrable.

   5. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, relied on  the
      decisions of this Court in Hindustan  Petroleum  Corporation  Ltd.  v.
      Pinkcity Midway Petroleums, Agri Gold Exims Ltd. v. Sri Lakshmi  Knits
      & Wovens & Ors. and Branch Manager, Magma Leasing & Finance Limited  &
      Anr. v. Potluri Madhavilata & Anr. (supra)  to  support  the  impugned
      judgment.  He submitted that there can be no doubt  that  the  Tenancy
      Act will determine the rights of the landlord and the tenant  in  this
      case, but when there is an arbitration agreement  between  a  landlord
      and a tenant, instead of the Civil Judge, the arbitrator  will  decide
      the disputes between the landlord  and  the  tenant  by  applying  the
      provisions of the Tenancy Act.
Findings of the Court

   6. The relevant portion of Section 6 of the Tenancy Act  1997  is  quoted
      hereinbelow:


         “6. Protection of  tenant  against  eviction.—(1)  Notwithstanding
         anything to the contrary contained in any other law for  the  time
         being in force or in any contract, no  order  or  decree  for  the
         recovery of the possession of any premises shall be  made  by  the
         Civil Judge having jurisdiction in favour of the landlord  against
         the tenant, except on a suit being instituted by such landlord  on
         one or more of the following grounds:—
         ………………………………………………………..”



It will be clear from the language of Section 6  of  the  Tenancy  Act  1997
quoted above that ‘notwithstanding anything to  the  contrary  contained  in
any contract’, no  order  or  decree  for  recovery  of  possession  of  any
premises shall be made by the Civil Judge having jurisdiction in  favour  of
the landlord against the tenant, ‘except on a suit being instituted by  such
landlord’ on one or more grounds mentioned therein. It is, thus, clear  that
Section 6 of the Tenancy Act overrides a contract between the  landlord  and
the tenant and provides that only the Civil Judge  having  jurisdiction  can
order or decree for recovery of possession only in a suit  to  be  filed  by
the landlord.

   7. Part-I of the 1996 Act is titled ‘arbitration’.  Section 8 of the 1996
      Act is extracted hereinbelow:


         “8. Power to refer  parties  to  arbitration  where  there  is  an
         arbitration agreement.-- (1) A judicial authority before which  an
         action is  brought  in  a  matter  which  is  the  subject  of  an
         arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later  than
         when submitting his  first  statement  on  the  substance  of  the
         dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.


         (2) The application referred to in subsection  (1)  shall  not  be
         entertained unless it is accompanied by the  original  arbitration
         agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.


         (3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made  under  sub-
         section (1) and that the issue  is  pending  before  the  judicial
         authority, an arbitration may be commenced  or  continued  and  an
         arbitral award made.”



A reading of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of  the  1996  Act  will  make  it
clear that a judicial authority before which  an  action  is  brought  in  a
matter which is the subject of an  arbitration  agreement  shall  refer  the
parties to arbitration.  Without ‘an arbitration  agreement’,  therefore,  a
judicial authority cannot refer the parties to arbitration.

   8.   In this case, there is an arbitration agreement in clause 15 of  the
      tenancy agreement, which  provides  that  any  dispute  regarding  the
      contents or construction of the tenancy agreement or  dispute  arising
      out of the tenancy  agreement  shall  be  settled  by  arbitration  in
      accordance with the  provisions  of  the  1996  Act.   But  the  words
      ‘notwithstanding anything in any contract’ in Section 6 of the Tenancy
      Act, will override the arbitration  agreement  in  clause  15  of  the
      tenancy agreement where a suit  for  recovery  of  possession  of  any
      premises has been filed by a landlord against the tenant.  Such a suit
      filed by the landlord against the tenant for recovery  of  possession,
      therefore, cannot be referred under Section  8  of  the  1996  Act  to
      arbitration.  In fact, sub-section (3) of Section 2 of  the  1996  Act
      expressly provides that Part-I which relates  to  ‘arbitration’  where
      the place of arbitration is in India shall not affect  any  other  law
      for the time being in force by virtue of which  certain  disputes  may
      not be submitted to arbitration.  Section 6 of the Tenancy Act is  one
      such law which clearly bars  arbitration  in  a  dispute  relating  to
      recovery of possession of premises by the landlord  from  the  tenant.
      Since the suit filed by the appellants was for eviction, it was a suit
      for recovery of possession and could not be  referred  to  arbitration
      because of a statutory provision in Section 6 of the Tenancy Act.

   9. In Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios &  Anr.  (supra),  there
      was a leave and licence agreement between Natraj Studios (P) Ltd.  and
      Navrang  Studios.   On  28.04.1979,  Navrang  Studios   purported   to
      terminate the leave and  licence  agreement  and  called  upon  Natraj
      Studios (P) Ltd. to hand over the possession of the studios  to  them.
      Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. filed a suit on 08.05.1979  in  the  Court  of
      Small Causes, Bombay, for a declaration that Natraj Studios  (P)  Ltd.
      was a monthly tenant of the studios and for fixation of standard  rent
      and  other  reliefs.   Navrang  Studios  filed  a  written   statement
      contesting the suit.  Natraj Studios (P)  Ltd.  filed  an  application
      under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 in the Bombay High Court
      for a declaration that the arbitration clause in the leave and licence
      agreement was invalid and inoperative.  The High Court  dismissed  the
      application.  Thereafter, Navrang Studios filed an  application  under
      Section 8 of the Arbitration Act,  1940  for  appointment  of  a  sole
      arbitrator to decide the disputes and differences between the  parties
      under the leave and licence agreement.  The  High  Court  allowed  the
      application and appointed a sole arbitrator.  On appeal being  carried
      to this Court by Natraj Studios (P) Ltd., this Court held that Section
      28(1) of the Bombay Rent Act vests an exclusive  jurisdiction  in  the
      Court of Small Causes to entertain and  try  any  suit  or  proceeding
      between a landlord and tenant relating to  the  recovery  of  rent  or
      possession of any premises.  This Court further held that  the  Bombay
      Rent Act was a  welfare  legislation  aimed  at  the  definite  social
      objective of protection of tenants against harassment by landlords  in
      various ways and public policy requires that contracts to the contrary
      which nullify the rights conferred on tenants by  the  Act  cannot  be
      permitted and it follows that arbitration agreements  between  parties
      whose rights are regulated by the Bombay Rent Act cannot be recognized
      by a court of law.  This  decision  in  Natraj  Studios  (P)  Ltd.  v.
      Navrang Studios &  Anr.  (supra)  supports  our  conclusion  that  the
      arbitration agreement between the landlord and tenant has to give  way
      to Section 6 of the Tenancy Act which confers  exclusive  jurisdiction
      on the Civil Judge, to decide a dispute between the landlord  and  the
      tenant with regard to recovery of possession of the tenanted  premises
      in a suit filed by the landlord.

  10.  The High Court, however, has relied on three decisions of this  Court
      to hold that it is for the arbitral tribunal to decide  under  Section
      16 of the 1996 Act whether it  has  the  jurisdiction  to  decide  the
      dispute  between  the  appellants  and  the   respondents.    We   may
      distinguish those cases from the facts of the present case.

  11. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway  Petroleums
      (supra),  Hindustan  Petroleum  Corporation  Ltd.  stopped  supply  of
      petroleum products to the dealer and the dealer filed a civil suit  in
      the Court of Civil Judge, Rewari, for a  declaration  that  the  order
      stopping supply  of  petroleum  product  was  illegal  and  arbitrary.
      Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. filed a petition under Section  8
      of the 1996 Act praying for referring the dispute pending  before  the
      Civil Court to the arbitrator as  per  Clause  40  of  the  Dealership
      Agreement.  The Civil  Judge  dismissed  the  petition  and  Hindustan
      Petroleum Corporation Ltd. filed a revision before the High Court, but
      the High Court  also  dismissed  the  revision.   Hindustan  Petroleum
      Corporation Ltd. thereafter filed an appeal before this Court and this
      Court held that Section 8 of the 1996 Act in its clear terms  mandates
      a judicial authority before  whom  an  application  is  brought  in  a
      matter, which is the subject-matter of an  arbitration  agreement,  to
      refer such parties to the arbitration.  In this case, the  arbitration
      agreement contained in Clause 40 of the Dealership Agreement  was  not
      hit by a statutory provision like the one in Section 6 of the  Tenancy
      Act providing that the dispute shall be decided only by a Civil  Judge
      in a suit notwithstanding a provision in the contract to the contrary.

  12. In Agri Gold Exims Ltd. v. Sri Lakshmi Knits & Wovens & Ors.  (supra),
      the parties had entered into a memorandum of understanding in relation
      to  the  business  of  export  and  the  memorandum  of  understanding
      contained an arbitration clause that in case of  any  dispute  between
      the two parties, the same shall be referred  to  arbitration,  by  two
      arbitrators, nominated by each of the parties and  the  award  of  the
      arbitrators shall be binding on both the  parties.   Agri  Gold  Exims
      Ltd. filed a suit in the District Court at Vijayawada for recovery  of
      an amount of Rs.36,14,887/- and  for  future  interest  on  a  sum  of
      Rs.53,79,149/-.  Sri Lakshmi Knits & Wovens filed an application under
      Section 8 of the 1996 Act for referring the dispute  to  the  arbitral
      tribunal in terms  of  the  arbitration  agreement  contained  in  the
      memorandum of understanding.  This application, however, was dismissed
      by the District Court, but on revision the  High  Court  reversed  the
      order of the District Court and referred the parties  to  arbitration.
      Agri Gold Exims Ltd. carried an appeal to this Court  and  this  Court
      reiterated that Section 8 of the 1996 Act is peremptory in nature  and
      in a case where there exists an arbitration agreement,  the  Court  is
      under obligation to refer the parties to arbitration in terms  of  the
      arbitration agreement, relying on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
      (supra).   In  this  case  again,  there  was  no  statutory  bar   to
      arbitration like the one in Section 6 of  the  Tenancy  Act  providing
      that the dispute can only be decided by the Civil Judge in a suit.

  13.  In Branch Manager, Magma Leasing & Finance Limited & Anr. v.  Potluri
      Madhavilata &  Anr.  (supra),  Magma  Leasing  Limited  Public  United
      Company (for short ‘Magma’) and Smt. Potluri  Madhavilata  (for  short
      ‘hirer’) entered into an agreement of hire-purchase for  the  purchase
      of a motor vehicle whereunder the hirer  was  required  to  pay  hire-
      purchase price in 46 instalments.    When  the  instalments  were  not
      paid, Magma seized the vehicle and sent a notice to the  hirer  saying
      that the hire-purchase agreement has been terminated.  The hirer  then
      filed a suit against Magma in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge  for
      recovery of possession of the vehicle and for restraining  Magma  from
      transferring the vehicle.  Magma filed a  petition  before  the  Civil
      Judge under Section 8 of the 1996 Act praying that the dispute  raised
      in the suit be referred to an arbitrator in terms of Clause 22 of  the
      Hire-Purchase Agreement, which contained  the  arbitration  agreement.
      This Court reiterated that Section 8 is in  the  form  of  legislative
      command  to  the  court  and  once  the  prerequisite  conditions  are
      satisfied, the Court must refer the parties to arbitration.   In  this
      case again, there was no statutory bar to arbitration like  Section  6
      of the Tenancy Act providing that the dispute can only be decided by a
      Civil Judge.

  14. The High Court, therefore, was not correct in coming to the conclusion
      that as per the decisions of this Court in the aforesaid three  cases,
      the Court has no alternative but to refer the parties  to  arbitration
      in view of the clear mandate in Section 8 of the  1996  Act.   On  the
      contrary, the relief  claimed  by  the  appellants  being  mainly  for
      eviction, it  could  only  be  granted  by  the  “Civil  Judge  having
      jurisdiction” in a suit filed by the landlord as provided in Section 6
      of the Tenancy Act.  The expression “Civil Judge having  jurisdiction”
      will obviously mean the Civil Judge who has jurisdiction to grant  the
      other reliefs: decree for arrears of  rent,  decree  for  recovery  of
      arrears of proportionate and enhanced municipal taxes,  a  decree  for
      mesne profits and a decree for permanent  injunction  claimed  in  the
      suit.

  15.  For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal  and  set  aside  the
      impugned judgments of the High  Court  and  the  Civil  Judge,  Senior
      Division, and remand the matter to the  learned  Civil  Judge,  Senior
      Division, who will now give an opportunity to the respondents  to  put
      in their written statements and thereafter proceed with  the  suit  in
      accordance with law.  Considering the peculiar  facts  of  this  case,
      there shall be no order as to costs.


                                                         .....……………..…….J.
                                                          (A. K. Patnaik)





                                         ....…………..……….J.
                                                       (V. Gopala Gowda)

New Delhi,
March 07, 2014.





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