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Monday, March 31, 2014

Contempt of court - No confidence Motion - sec.28(2) of Panchayat Act - Art.243 C(ii) constitution of India - whether the state has got power to frame No Confidence motion section - High court dismissed the challenge made against No confidence - In appeal raised new point that constitution not empowered the panchayats with No confidence powers - dismissed to file review - High court dismissed the review - in the meanwhile No confidence proceedings completed - In appeal , Apex court granted status quo - contempt petitions filed - Apex court held that State has got power to frame sections sec.28(2) is valid one - dismissed the appeal as well as contempt petitions = Usha Bharti …Appellant VERSUS State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents = 2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41355

    Contempt of court - No confidence Motion - sec.28(2) of Panchayat  Act - Art.243 C(ii) constitution of India - whether the state has got power to frame No Confidence motion section - High court dismissed the challenge made against No confidence - In appeal raised new point that constitution not empowered the panchayats with No confidence powers - dismissed to file review - High court dismissed the review - in the meanwhile No confidence proceedings completed - In appeal , Apex court granted status quo - contempt petitions filed - Apex court held that  State has got power to frame sections sec.28(2) is valid one - dismissed the appeal as well as contempt petitions =

 The notice calling for  a  Motion  of  No  Confidence  was
      signed by 37 members. The legal requirement  under  Section  28(2)  is
      that a motion expressing want of confidence in the  Adhyaksh  must  be
      signed by not less than half of the total number of  elected  members.=
“in view of the provisions of Article 243C(ii) of the Constitution  of
      India, there being no provision in the Panchayat election  for  Motion
      of No Confidence whether Section 28  of  the  Panchayatiraj  Adhiniyam
      would continue to operate in view of Article 243N”.=
 “243C. Composition of Panchayats. -
           (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, the Legislature of a
           State  may,  by  law,  make  provisions  with  respect  to   the
           composition of Panchayats:
                 Provided that the  ratio  between  the  population  of  the
           territorial area of a Panchayat at any level and the  number  of
           seats in such Panchayat to be filled by election shall,  so  far
           as practicable, be the same throughout the State.
           (2) All the seats in a Panchayat  shall  be  filled  by  persons
           chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the
           Panchayat area and, for this purpose, each Panchayat area  shall
           be divided into territorial constituencies in such  manner  that
           the ratio between the population of each  constituency  and  the
           number of seats allotted to it shall, so far as practicable,  be
           the same throughout the Panchayat area.
           (3)   The Legislature of a State may, by law,  provide  for  the
           representation—
           (a)   of the Chairpersons  of  the  Panchayats  at  the  village
                 level, in the Panchayats at the intermediate level  or,  in
                 the  case  of  a  State  not  having  Panchayats   at   the
                 intermediate level,  in  the  Panchayats  at  the  district
                 level;
           (b)   of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at the  intermediate
                 level, in the Panchayats at the district level;
           (c)   of the members of the House of the People and the  members
                 of the  Legislative  Assembly  of  the  State  representing
                 constituencies which comprise wholly or partly a  Panchayat
                 area at a level other  than  the  village  level,  in  such
                 Panchayat;
           (d)   of the members of the Council of States and the members of
                 the Legislative  Council  of  the  State,  where  they  are
                 registered as electors within—
                 (i)    a Panchayat  area  at  the  intermediate  level,  in
                       Panchayat at the intermediate level;
                 (ii)  a Panchayat area at the district level, in  Panchayat
                       at the district level.
           (4)   The Chairperson of a Panchayat  and  other  members  of  a
           Panchayat  whether  or  not  chosen  by  direct  election   from
           territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area shall have  the
           right to vote in the meetings of the Panchayats.
           (5)   The Chairperson of—
                 (a)   a panchayat at the village level shall be elected  in
                       such manner as the Legislature of  a  State  may,  by
                       law, provide; and
                 (b)   a Panchayat at the  intermediate  level  or  district
                       level shall be elected  by,  and  from  amongst,  the
                       elected members thereof.”
           This Article as well as some others, such as Articles 243-A, 243-
      C(5), 243-D(4), 243-D(6), 243-F(1), (6), 243-G, 243-H, 243-I(2),  243-
      J, 243-K(2), (4) of the Constitution etc make provision for the  State
      to enact necessary legislation to implement the provisions in Part  IX
      of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we are not able to agree with
      the submission of Mr. Bhushan that  State  Legislature  will  have  no
      power to make provision for no-confidence motion against the Adhyaksha
      of Zila Panchayat.

In view of the observations made  in  the  aforesaid  judgments,  this
      Court would not be justified in holding that the High Court has  erred
      in law in not reviewing its earlier judgment.


  65. This apart, we have examined the entire issue threadbare ourselves  as
      the issue  with  regard  to  the  adverse  impact  on  the  candidates
      belonging to the reserves categories has not been  raised  before  the
      High Court nor considered by it.  In the earlier round, the issue  was
      also neither raised nor considered by this Court. When the order dated
      19th February, 2013 was passed, the issue with regard  to  reservation
      was also not canvassed.  But now that the issue had  been  raised,  we
      thought it appropriate to examine the issue  to  put  an  end  to  the
      litigation between the parties.


  66. In view of the above, the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

2014 (March. Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41355
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA

REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO………………. OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.22035 of 2013)


      Usha Bharti                                        …Appellant

      VERSUS


      State of U.P. & Ors.                        ...Respondents


                                    WITH
                  CONTEMPT PETITION (C) No. 287 of 2013
                                     IN
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO………………. OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.22035 of 2013)


                                    WITH
                  CIVIL APPEAL NO……………OF 2014
                   (Arising out of SLP(C) No.29740 of 2013)




                               J U D G M E N T
      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
        1. Leave granted.
   2. These appeals are directed against the judgment and  order  passed  by
      the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow  Bench)  in  Review
      Petition No.103 of 2013  on  4th  July,  2013  dismissing  the  review
      petition filed by the appellant.


   3. Since the issues raised in these  appeals  are  pristinely  legal,  it
      would not be necessary to make a  detailed  reference  to  the  facts,
      leading to the filing of the present  appeals.   Even  otherwise,  the
      High Court in the impugned judgment has made an  elaborate  survey  of
      the facts. Therefore, it is unnecessary to repeat the  same.  However,
      the foundational facts for challenging the impugned  judgment  of  the
      High Court are recapitulated for ready reference.


   4. The appellant successfully contested the  election  held  in  October,
      2010 for becoming a Member of the Zila  Panchayat,  Sitapur,  U.P.  62
      candidates were elected as the Members of the Zila Panchayat including
      the appellant and respondents 5 to 37. On  12th  December,  2010,  the
      appellant was elected as Adhyaksh of the Zila Panchayat,  Sitapur.  On
      30th October, 2012, a notice of proposed Motion of No  Confidence  was
      given to the Collector, Sitapur for calling a meeting under Section 28
      of the U.P. Kshettra Panchayat & Zila Panchayat Act, 1961  (for  short
      ‘the Act’). The notice calling for  a  Motion  of  No  Confidence  was
      signed by 37 members. The legal requirement  under  Section  28(2)  is
      that a motion expressing want of confidence in the  Adhyaksh  must  be
      signed by not less than half of the total number of  elected  members.
      On  31st  October,  2012,  the  Collector,  Sitapur  issued  a  notice
      informing the elected members  that  a  meeting  for  considering  the
      Motion of No Confidence will be held on 23rd November, 2012.


   5. Aggrieved by the issuance of said notice,  the  appellant  filed  Writ
      Petition No.9654 of 2012 on various grounds alleging that  the  motion
      for no confidence has been done with an ulterior motive to  usurp  the
      office of the appellant. It was alleged  that  atleast  three  members
      whose names were mentioned in the Motion for  No  Confidence  had  not
      signed the motion/notice requesting the Collector to call  a  meeting.
      The appellant made the following prayers in the writ petition :-
           “(i)  Issue an appropriate  writ,  order  or  direction  in  the
                 nature of certiorari quashing the impugned notice of intent
                 to bring no-confidence motion against the petitioner;
           (ii)  Issue a writ, order or direction or writ in the nature  of
                 certiorari quashing the notice dated  31st  October,  2012,
                 issued by respondent No.3, as contained in Annexure No.1 to
                 the writ petition.
           (iii)       Issue a writ, order or  direction  or  writ  in  the
                 nature of mandamus directing the respondent No.3 to  verify
                 the genuineness of the signature of  the  member’s  on  the
                 notice to bring motion  against  the  petition  dated  30th
                 October, 2012,
           (iv)        Issue a writ, order or  direction  or  writ  in  the
                 nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties  to  let
                 the petitioner to continue on the office of Adhyaksha, Zila
                 Panchayat Sitapur of Tehsil & District Sitapur.
           (v)   Issues an ad-interim mandamus to the above effect.
           (vi)  Issue any other appropriate writ, order  or  direction  in
                 favour of the petitioner as the Hon’ble Court may deem  fit
                 in the circumstances of the case.
                          And
           (vii)       Award the costs of the petition to the  petitioner.”




   6. The High Court on 21st November, 2012 directed the District  Judge  or
      any Additional District Judge nominated by him to hold an  enquiry  to
      ascertain genuineness of the affidavits and signatures of members  and
      to submit a report thereon before the next date  of  hearing.  It  was
      also directed that further proceedings of “No Confidence Motion” shall
      remain in abeyance. The matter was to  be  listed  on  20th  December,
      2012. The report was duly submitted, which indicated that  33  Members
      had admitted  their  signatures  appearing  on  the  notice,  and  the
      affidavits, submitted in connection with the motion of no  confidence.
      It was also stated that “among  those  members,  in  respect  of  whom
      signatures and affidavits were doubted, the report of Deputy  Director
      (Pralekh) mentions that Zila Panchayat Member Mr. Vijay Kumar has also
      proved to have been signed and submitted the notice and the affidavit.
      Accordingly, 34 Zila Panchayat Members are found to have  applied  for
      bringing in the motion of no confidence.” Taking note of the aforesaid
      report, the High Court dismissed the writ petition with the  following
      observations:
           “As the requirement of valid signature for carrying out  the  No
           Confidence Motion is only 31, whereas in the enquiry  report  it
           has been found to be 34, now nothing would survive in this  writ
           petition. Hence, it is dismissed.”


   7. On 6th February, 2013, the Collector,  Sitapur  issued  notice  fixing
      22nd February, 2013 for consideration of the Motion of No Confidence.


   8. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dated 5th February,  2013,
      the appellant moved this Court through S.L.P.(C) No.8542 of 2013.


   9. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant
      submitted that the High Court  had  wrongly  relied  upon  the  report
      submitted  by  the  Additional  District  Judge  without  giving   the
      appellant any opportunity to submit any objection to the report.  This
      apart, in view of the provisions contained in  Article  243C(2)of  the
      Constitution of India, no provision has been made  for  No  Confidence
      Motion in Panchayat elections. It was submitted by Mr. Shanti  Bhushan
      that the aforesaid issues with regard to the  applicability  of  scope
      and ambit of Article 243 of the Constitution  of  India,  even  though
      specifically raised the writ petition and argued before the High Court
      have neither been noticed nor considered. Taking note of the aforesaid
      submissions, this Court passed the following order :-
           “If that be so, in our opinion, the  remedy  of  the  petitioner
           would be to seek review of the judgment of the High Court rather
           than to  challenge  the  same  by  way  of  this  special  leave
           petition.”


  10. The prayer made by Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan  that  the  operation  of  the
      impugned order be stayed for two weeks  to  enable  the  appellant  to
      approach the High Court by way of review  petition  was  declined.  It
      was, however, made clear that the result of  the  meeting,  which  was
      scheduled to be held on 22nd February, 2013, shall not be declared for
      a further period of two weeks.


  11. Thereafter, the petitioner filed  Review  Petition                 No.
      103 of 2013 before the High Court. The appellant stated  that  members
      owning allegiance to the Samajwadi Party led by Smt. Madhu Gupta,  W/o
      Shri Hari Om Gupta – Respondent No.5, were  not  able  to  muster  any
      signature for the initiation of the Motion  and,  therefore,  appended
      forged signature of several Members on the notice of  intent  to  move
      the Motion of No Confidence.  These forged signatures were used by the
      Samajwadi Party to induce other Members to join for giving the  notice
      for moving the Motion of No Confidence.  It was stated that  the  very
      initiation of the Motion was a fraud on the  system  and  against  the
      settled democratic principles.  The act of forgery of  signatures  was
      committed on the instance of Respondent  No.  5  and  her  supporters.
      Therefore, the initiation of Motion of No Confidence was  invalid  and
      illegal.  The appellant pointed out that in the earlier writ petition,
      it was specifically  pleaded  that  in  terms  of  Article  243N,  the
      provision of Section 28 have  been  rendered  otiose.   The  provision
      contained in Section 28  of  the  Act,  being  inconsistent  with  the
      constitutional scheme,  which  does  not  comprehend  the  removal  of
      Adhyaksh of Zila Panchayat, mid term and as such, the Motion otherwise
      also could not be permitted to be carried.  It was further stated that
      “in view of the provisions of Article 243C(ii) of the Constitution  of
      India, there being no provision in the Panchayat election  for  Motion
      of No Confidence whether Section 28  of  the  Panchayatiraj  Adhiniyam
      would continue to operate in view of Article 243N”.


  12. Upon completion of the pleadings,  the  High  Court  by  an  elaborate
      judgment has dismissed the Review Petition by the impugned order dated
      4th July, 2013.  On 10th July, 2013, the District Magistrate,  Sitapur
      fixed a meeting for counting of votes on 12th July,  2013.   Aggrieved
      by the judgment of the High Court, the appellant  filed  SLP  in  this
      Court on 11th July, 2013.  The matter was mentioned in Court at  10.30
      A.M. before the Chief Justice of India.  A direction was issued by the
      Chief Justice of India to the Registry to place the matter before this
      bench at the end of the list.  In the meantime, No  Confidence  Motion
      was passed against the appellant with 33 votes in  favour  of  the  No
      Confidence Motion and 23 against with 6 votes being declared  invalid.
      The  counting  was  supervised  by  the  Civil  Judge,  Sitapur.   The
      representative of the petitioner/appellant was present and had  stated
      that he is satisfied with the counting of votes.  There  has  been  no
      challenge to the result of the No Confidence Motion,  with  regard  to
      the counting of votes.  On 12th July, 2013, at about 12.15 P.M.,  this
      Court issued notice and directed that “in the meanwhile,  status  quo,
      as it exists today, shall be maintained”.  Since Respondent  No.5  had
      filed a caveat on 11th July, 2013 at about 11.00 A.M.  and  no  notice
      had been given to her before hearing the Special Leave  Petition,  she
      filed an application seeking recall of the aforesaid order dated  12th
      July, 2013.  It was claimed that Respondent No. 5 sought recall on the
      following grounds:-
           (i)   No notice was  given  to  Respondent  before  hearing  and
                 passing Order dated 12.07.2013.
           (ii)  Counting of votes was already done and the  no  confidence
                 Order was  passed  well  before  passing  the  Order  dated
                 12.07.2013 by this Hon’ble Court.
           (iii) Present SLP is not maintainable as  per  the  settled  law
                 laid down by this Hon’ble Court namely that an SLP  is  not
                 maintainable against the dismissal of review  filed  before
                 the HC after dismissal of SLP.
           (iv)  In any case the SLP is also not maintainable as the  issue
                 raised in the SLP is already covered  by  the  judgment  of
                 this Hon’ble Court in Bhanumati and Ors. V. State of U.P. &
                 Ors. reported in 2010 (12)  SCC 1.


  13. Whilst the matter was pending, on  23rd  July,  2013,  the  petitioner
      filed Contempt Petition No. 287 of 2013 for violating  the  orders  of
      this Court dated 12th July, 2013.  It is stated that  Respondent  No.5
      admittedly made false statement in the application to recall the order
      dated   12th July, 2013.  The order of  this  Court  was  communicated
      whilst the meeting for counting of votes was still in  progress.   The
      appellant states that one of the newspapers “Amar Ujala” has  reported
      that the result had been declared at 1.15 P.M.


  14. Respondent No. 5 was impleaded as Respondent   No. 4 in the  aforesaid
      Contempt Petition.   However,  notice  of  contempt  was  issued  only
      against official Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3.  I.A. No. 8 was filed  on
           18th November, 2013 pointing out that in spite of  No  Confidence
      Motion having been passed, the appellant has continued to take  policy
      decisions which were not only prejudicial to public interest but would
      also create several problems for Zila Panchayat, in case  the  present
      appeal is dismissed.  The aforesaid application came up for hearing on
      19th November, 2013.  It was pointed out on behalf of Respondent No. 5
      that the appellant had issued a Notice of  Meeting  on  8th  November,
      2013 of the meeting of the Zila  Panchayat,  Sitapur  to  be  held  on
      20th November, 2013 at 11.30 A.M. to take decision on Subject  Nos.  1
      to 16 enumerated in Annexure A3 to the Interlocutory Application.


  15. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of  the  appellant  that
      the notice merely  indicates  the  subjects  on  which  decisions  are
      required to  be  taken  for  the  development  work  within  the  Zila
      Panchayat.  It was submitted that the appellant ought to be  permitted
      to  take  necessary  decisions.    However,  during  the   course   of
      deliberations, Mr. Shanti Bhushan had very fairly submitted  that  the
      appellant will voluntarily not preside  over  the  aforesaid  meeting,
      rather the Collector  may  be  requested  to  chair  the  meeting.   A
      direction was, therefore, issued that the District Magistrate, Sitapur
      would chair the meeting on 8th November, 2013.  It was made clear that
      the issuance of  the  aforesaid  direction  will  not  in  any  manner
      vary/alter the status quo order passed by this  Court  on  12th  July,
      2013, which was directed to continue.  Submissions of the  parties  in
      the appeal were heard on 3rd December, 2013, 5th  December,  2013  and
      11th December, 2013 when the judgment was reserved.


  16. Very detailed and elaborate submissions have been made by the  learned
      counsel for the parties, which can be briefly summed up as follows:-
           (i)   At the outset, Dr. Rajiv Dhawan submitted that the Special
                 Leave Petition is not maintainable as it is  directed  only
                 against the judgment rendered by the High Court  in  Review
                 Petition No. 103 of 2013.  In support of  the  submissions,
                 learned senior counsel relied on judgments of this Court in
                 State of Assam Vs.  Ripa  Sarma[1]  and  Suseel  Finance  &
                 Leasing Co.  Vs.  M.  Lata  &  Ors.[2].   Dr.  Dhawan  also
                 submitted that even  otherwise,  the  SLP  deserves  to  be
                 dismissed as the matter is  squarely  covered  against  the
                 petitioner/appellant by  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in
                 Bhanumati & Ors. Vs. State of  Uttar  Pradesh  through  its
                 Principal Secretary & Ors.[3]   Relying  on  the  aforesaid
                 judgment,  it  was  submitted  by  Dr.  Dhawan   that   the
                 petitioner can not even be heard on  the  proposition  that
                 Section 28 of the Act is inconsistent with Part IX  of  the
                 Constitution.  Mr. Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel also
                 submitted that in view of the law laid down in Bhanumati  &
                 Ors. (supra), the issue raised  herein  is  no  longer  res
                 integra.  Learned senior counsel also  submitted  that  the
                 SLP against the judgment of the High Court rendered in  the
                 Review  Petition  would   not   be   maintainable   without
                 challenging the judgment which was sought to be reviewed.


           (ii)  Mr. Shanti Bhushan has submitted that the issue raised  in
                 the present appeal is of vital  importance,  i.e.,  whether
                 Section 28 of the  Act,  which  provides  for  bringing  No
                 Confidence Motion against the Chairman of Zila Panchayat is
                 valid in so far as it is inconsistent with Part IX  of  the
                 Constitution of India.  Therefore, this Court will have  to
                 determine whether the impugned provision falls  within  the
                 legislative competence of the State Legislature.  The Court
                 will also  have  to  decide  as  to  whether  the  impugned
                 provision  is  inconsistent  with  Article  243N   of   the
                 Constitution of India?
           (iii) It is submitted by the learned  senior  counsel  that  the
                 provision of No Confidence Motion for removing the Chairman
                 or Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat is inconsistent with Part IX
                 of the  Constitution.  He  submits  that  Part  IX  of  the
                 Constitution containing Articles 243A to 243O were inserted
                 wide the Constitution (73rd  Amendment  Act,  1992)  w.e.f.
                 24th April, 1993.  The aforesaid articles  have  laid  down
                 exhaustive  provisions  for  self-governance  at  Panchayat
                 level.  This includes election of Panchayat Members and its
                 Chairman as well as their  disqualification.   However,  no
                 provision is made  for  bringing  a  No  Confidence  Motion
                 against the  Chairperson  of  Panchayat.   Article  243C(v)
                 provides that the Chairperson of a Panchayat at the village
                 level shall be elected in such a manner as the  Legislature
                 of a State may, by law,  provide.   Article  243F  provides
                 that  Panchayat  can  make  law  for  disqualification   of
                 Panchayat Members.  Sections 18, 19  and  29  of  the  Act,
                 which provides for composition of Zila Panchayat,  election
                 of Adhyaksha and removal of Adhyaksha respectively  are  in
                 consonance with the aforesaid Articles of the  Constitution
                 of India.  Section 19 of the  aforesaid  Act  provides  for
                 election of  Adhyaksha  by  elected  members  of  the  Zila
                 Panchayat from amongst themselves.  Section  29(1)  of  the
                 Act enumerates the grounds for  removal  of  Adhyaksha  but
                 does not include the provision for bringing a Motion of  No
                 Confidence against the Chairman.
           (iv)   Learned  senior  counsel  further  submitted   that   the
                 provision  contained  in  Section  28(1)  of  the  Act   is
                 repugnant to Part  IX  of  the  Constitution.   Mr.  Shanti
                 Bhushan submits that in any event, the provisions contained
                 in Section 28 of the Act could  not  have  continued  after
                 expiry of one year of the enactment of the  73rd  Amendment
                 of the Constitution of India, which came into  effect  from
                 24th April, 1993.  Such continuance would  be  inconsistent
                 with the  provisions  contained  in  Article  243N  of  the
                 Constitution of India.
           (v)   Learned senior counsel further submitted that Article 243D
                 for the first time  introduced  reservation  of  seats  for
                 Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes as well as  ladies  both
                 in the election of members of Panchayat as well as for  the
                 office of Chairperson.  It is submitted that the  provision
                 of “No Confidence” like Section 28 of the Act can frustrate
                 the provision for such  reservation.   SC,  ST  and  ladies
                 always being in minority in Panchayat, a  Chairperson  from
                 the reserved category can easily be removed from  the  said
                 office by majority of general category  Panchayat  members.
                 Such a result was not envisaged by the provisions contained
                 in Article 243D.   It is further submitted that Part IX  of
                 the Constitution has exhaustively specified the  areas  for
                 which a State Legislature, as local  self-governance  falls
                 in the State List, can make laws in order to have  complete
                 decentralization of the governance.  This, according to the
                 learned senior counsel was the main objective of  the  73rd
                 Amendment Act which does not provide for any law to be made
                 by the State  Legislature  for  bringing  a  No  Confidence
                 Motion against the Chairperson/Adhyaksha/Zila Panchayat.
           (vi)  According to Mr. Bhushan, if there had  been  no  existing
                 provision for No Confidence like Section  28  in  the  Act,
                 then after 73rd amendment in the  Constitution,  the  State
                 Legislature could not have brought such a provision  as  it
                 is not competent to do so.  The provision, according to Mr.
                 Bhushan, is likely to be struck down as the  powers  vested
                 in the elected body are sought to be taken over and  vested
                 in the executive, which  would  be  opposed  to  the  basic
                 structure  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   Mr.  Bhushan
                 emphasized that by permitting the provisions in Section  28
                 to continue, the State Legislature and Executive are trying
                 to deprive the elected representatives of their fundamental
                 rights  enshrined  in  Part  III  and  Part   IX   of   the
                 Constitution of India.  Relying on  the  judgment  of  this
                 Court in  I.R.  Coelho  Vs.  Union  of  India[4].   He  has
                 submitted that fundamental rights include within itself the
                 right to choose.   The  aforesaid  right  to  choose  would
                 continue till the  tenure  of  the  representative  of  the
                 people for which he has been  elected  is  exhausted.   The
                 provision  in  Section  28  permits  such  tenure   to   be
                 curtailed, which would infringe the  fundamental  right  of
                 the voters that elected such  a  member.   Giving  numerous
                 examples from different Articles  of  the  Constitution  of
                 India, it is submitted  that  provision  of  No  Confidence
                 Motion has  been  specifically  provided  wherever  it  was
                 intended.  As example, he points out Articles 67(b), 90(c),
                 94(c) providing for No Confidence Motion for the removal of
                 Vice President, Deputy Chairman of the  Council  of  States
                 and the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the  House  of  people
                 respectively.   He  also  points   out   that   there   are
                 offices/posts in the  Constitution,  which  are  filled  up
                 through a process of election but the  persons  so  elected
                 can not be removed  by  way  of  moving  a  Motion  for  No
                 Confidence.  For  example,  he  relies  on  Article  80(4),
                 81(1)(a) and Article 54.  Therefore, Rajya  Sabha  Members,
                 Lok Sabha Members and President of India can not be removed
                 by moving a Motion for No Confidence.  Mr. Bhushan  submits
                 that the question here is as to whether the  No  Confidence
                 provisions contained in the  Act  can  continue  after  the
                 amendment of the Constitution.  A provision  for  moving  a
                 Motion for No Confidence is in other  words  the  right  to
                 recall  of  an  elected  member   by   the   voters.    The
                 Constitution may or may not provide for moving a Motion for
                 No Confidence.  He submitted that provision for moving  the
                 Motion  for  No  Confidence  is  not  necessarily  part  of
                 democracy.  In fact, right to recall an elected member  has
                 not  been  legally  recognized.    In   support   of   this
                 submission, he makes a reference to Article 243N read  with
                 Article 243(c)(iv) and (v) and  in  particular,  sub-clause
                 5(b).   He  further  submits  that  the   reservation   was
                 introduced for the first  time  by  73rd  amendment,  which
                 incorporated Article  243  in  the  Constitution  of  India
                 w.e.f. 24th April,  1993.   He,  thereafter,  outlined  the
                 various provisions for reservation of seats as contained in
                 Article  243D.   It  is  emphasized  that   the   provision
                 contained in Article 243D(ii) makes it mandatory  that  not
                 less than one third of the total number of  seats  reserved
                 under Clause 1 shall be reserved for  ladies  belonging  to
                 the Scheduled Castes or as the case may be,  the  Scheduled
                 Tribes.  Articles 243F(1)(a) and Article  243F(1)(b)  which
                 correspond  to   Article   102   and   103   provides   for
                 disqualification for being  chosen  as,  and  for  being  a
                 member of a Panchayat.   Mr.  Bhushan  submitted  that  the
                 Constitution  provides  for   removal   and   consequential
                 disqualification.  This would not apply to  a  vote  of  No
                 Confidence.  This would tantamount to giving the  voters  a
                 right to recall which does not exist in law in  so  far  as
                 Panchayat Adhyaksha is concerned.  Learned  senior  counsel
                 further submitted that  Article  243  makes  provision  for
                 reservation, to advance the aim of our Constitution for the
                 upliftment of the poor sections of the society.  Therefore,
                 the Parliament has taken extra care  to  ensure  that  such
                 members of the weaker society once elected  should  not  be
                 removed by the strongest segment of the society by bringing
                 a Motion of No Confidence.  He reiterated that wherever  it
                 was felt necessary, the Parliament had provided for  moving
                 a  Motion  of  No  Confidence.   He  has  made  a  specific
                 reference to Articles 89, 90, 93, 94(c),  80(iv),  81,  54,
                 61, 66 and 67(b).
           (vii) In support of the submission that Section 28 of the Act is
                 repugnant to Part IX  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  in
                 particular,  Article  243N.   The  learned  senior  counsel
                 relied on a number of judgments of this Court:-
                 Deep Chand Vs. State  of  U.P.[5],  Zaverbhai  Amaidas  Vs.
                 State of  Bombay[6],  N.  Bhargawan  Pillai  Vs.  State  of
                 Kerala[7], State  of  U.P.  Vs.  Synthetics  and  Chemicals
                 Ltd.[8], Babu Parasu Kaikadi Vs. Babu[9],  Nirmaljeet  Kaur
                 Vs. State of M.P.[10], Zee  Telefilms  Ltd.  Vs.  Union  of
                 India[11], Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Netaji
                 Cricket Club[12]
           (viii)      Learned  senior  counsel  then  submitted  that  the
                 judgment in Bhanumati & Ors. (supra) is per incuriam as the
                 issue  with  regard  to  the  reservation  had   not   been
                 considered at all.  The judgment also does not consider the
                 provisions where specifically Motion for No Confidence  has
                 not been provided.  It is also submitted that most  of  the
                 judgment is obiter.  In fact, Mr.  Bhushan  submitted  that
                 the judgment is a treatise in law and should be  given  the
                 same status.
           (ix)  Mr. Bhushan then addressed us on the issue as  to  whether
                 the SLP would be maintainable against the judgment rendered
                 in review without challenging the  judgment  of  which  the
                 review was sought.  The learned  senior  counsel  submitted
                 that firstly the petitioner had challenged  the  main  writ
                 petition by way of SLP No. 8542  of  2013.   The  same  was
                 disposed of with opportunity to file review petition before
                 the High Court after noticing the objections raised by  the
                 petitioner, which were not considered by  the  High  Court.
                 The earlier judgment of the High Court in the writ petition
                 clearly merged in the judgment of the High Court dismissing
                 the review petition.  Therefore, it was necessary only,  in
                 the peculiar facts of this  case,  to  challenge  only  the
                 judgment of the High Court in the review petition.   It  is
                 submitted by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that Section 114 of the CPC
                 contains no limits on the  circumstances  under  which  the
                 Court can review its  own  judgment.   The  section  merely
                 states that the person aggrieved may apply for a review  of
                 judgment to the Court, which passed the decree or made  the
                 order, and the Court may make such order on it as it thinks
                 fit.  So far as the High Court is concerned, it would  have
                 inherent powers to review any decision.
           (x)   Learned senior counsel elaborated  that  Section  114  CPC
                 gives full powers to the Court to pass  any  order  in  the
                 interest of justice.  It can not be curtailed by the  Rules
                 made by the High Court or the Supreme Court.   These  Rules
                 can be amended by the High Court or the Supreme  Court  but
                 Section 114 can only be  amended  by  the  Parliament.   He
                 points out that Section 121 and 122, which permits the High
                 Court to make their  own  rules  on  the  procedure  to  be
                 followed in the High Court as well as in  the  Civil  Court
                 subject to their superintendence.  Learned  senior  counsel
                 further submitted that  even  Order  47  Rule  1  does  not
                 curtail  the  power  to  review   which   is   untrammeled.
                 According to Mr. Bhushan, Section 114  is  incorporated  in
                 Order 47 Rule 1 as it provides that review can be  made  by
                 the Courts either on facts as well as on  law.   The  Court
                 has a power to rehear the entire  matter  in  order  to  do
                 complete  justice  between  the  parties.               Mr.
                 Bhushan further pointed out that Section 151  CPC  is  also
                 part of the same scheme to do complete justice between  the
                 parties.  It is emphasized that the powers  of  the  Courts
                 have not been curtailed by the Code of Civil Procedure.  In
                 fact, it is well known that the provisions of Code of Civil
                 Procedure are a hand maiden  to  justice.   He,  therefore,
                 submitted that full play should be given to the  expression
                 “or for any other sufficient reason”  to  ensure  that  the
                 Court can do complete justice.  The  principle  of  Ejusdem
                 Generis  should  not  be  applied  for  interpreting  these
                 provisions.  Learned senior  counsel  relied  on  Board  of
                 Cricket Control (supra).  He relied on  Paragraphs  89,  90
                 and 91.  learned senior counsel also relied on S. Nagaraj &
                 Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.[13]  He submits  finally
                 that all these judgments show that justice  is  above  all.
                 Therefore, no constraints can be put on the power to review
                 of the Court.  Mr. Bhushan also relied on Green View Tea  &
                 Industries Vs. Collector, Golaghat, Assam & Anr.[14]
           (xi)  Mr. Bhushan has submitted that grounds for challenging the
                 theories of the Act of the anvil of Article 243 or will  be
                 read into Prayers 1and 2(i) wherein a specific  declaration
                 is  sought  that  the  provision  is  ultra  vires  to  the
                 Constitution  of  India.   Mr.  Bhushan  then  referred  to
                 Article 243N.  He reiterated that the provision in  Section
                 28 ceased to exist after one year.  Therefore, it  was  not
                 necessary to plead  as  Section  28  would  ipso  facto  be
                 rendered unconstitutional.  He reiterated on the  basis  of
                 Paragraphs 20 and 21 that  necessary  averments  have  been
                 made  that  provision  for  No  Confidence  Motion  is  not
                 provided for in Part  IX  of  the  Constitution  of  India.
                 Therefore, if Paragraph 28 and Paragraph 31 are  read  with
                 Ground F, it would clearly indicate that the removal  under
                 the Act can only be under Section 29 which does not provide
                 for moving a Motion for No Confidence.
           (xii)  Coming  back  to  the  submission  that  Section  28   is
                 inconsistent with Part IX of the Constitution of India,  he
                 submits that Part IX is a  complete  code  in  relation  to
                 Panchayats.  Therefore, State Legislature can  not  make  a
                 provision inconsistent to Part IX.  Similar power has  been
                 reserved  for  the  Stated  Legislature  as  exceptions  as
                 enumerated in Articles 243a, 243C(iv) &  (v).   He  further
                 submitted that  Article  243f,  243G  and  243H  only  give
                 limited powers to the State Legislature.  This clearly show
                 that Part IX is a complete code.  Therefore,  unless  power
                 is specifically conferred  on  the  State  Legislature,  it
                 would not be competent to legislate on  matters  which  are
                 specifically dealt with in Part  IX.   He  also  refers  to
                 Articles 243I (ii), (iii) & (iv), J(iv) and K to  emphasise
                 that even in these Articles no provision existed for moving
                 a Motion for No Confidence.  Finally, it  is  submitted  by
                 Mr. Shanti Bhushan that since  the  issues  raised  in  the
                 appeal entail  interpretation  of  the  provisions  of  the
                 Constitution of India, the matter needs to be  referred  to
                 at-least five judges.
           (xiii)      Mr. Ashok Desai, learned  senior  counsel  appearing
                 for Respondent No. 5  has  submitted  that  admittedly  the
                 petitioner does not enjoy the confidence of the majority of
                 the members of the Panchayat.  She has not even  challenged
                 the result of the No Confidence  vote.   He  has  given  an
                 elaborate explanation of all the proceedings, which we have
                 recounted earlier.
           (xiv) Countering the submissions of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that  the
                 Petitioner belongs to the Scheduled Casts,  therefore,  she
                 is entitled to special  protection,  Mr.  Ashok  Desai  has
                 submitted that this  issue  was  not  raised  in  the  writ
                 petition or even in the review petition and is sought to be
                 raised for the first time before this  Court.   He  further
                 pointed  out  that  the  petitioner  did  not  contest  the
                 election of Adhyaksha as a member of Scheduled  Castes  but
                 as a lady candidate for whom the  seat  was  reserved.   He
                 further submitted that the present case is, in  any  event,
                 squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in Bhanumati
                 & Ors. (supra).  Therefore, there is no need for  embarking
                 on a fresh reconsideration  of  all  the  issues.   He  has
                 submitted that the submission of Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan  that
                 the earlier judgment  was  confined  to  the  amendment  of
                 Section 28 and not the original  statute  is  a  result  of
                 misreading of judgment.  The  judgment  of  this  Court  in
                 Bhanumati & Ors. (supra) clearly applies in the  facts  and
                 circumstances of this  case  and,  therefore,  the  Special
                 Leave Petition deserves to be  dismissed.   Learned  senior
                 counsel elaborated  that  the  submission  with  regard  to
                 Section 28 of the Act being inconsistent with  Part  IX  of
                 the Constitution deserves to be  rejected  outright.   This
                 submission can only be considered on the basis  of  precise
                 pleadings  in  the  present  case.   Except  for  making  a
                 statement that the provision in  the  act  is  inconsistent
                 with Part IX of the  Constitution,  no  other  reasons  are
                 given.


           (xv)    This apart, Section 28 can not be said to be contrary to
                 the foundational principles of democracy.  These provisions
                 are referring to Sections 17, 18, 21 and  28  of  the  Act.
                 The learned senior counsel  submitted  that  the  aforesaid
                 provisions are to ensure that the Adhyaksha  always  enjoys
                 confidence of the constituency while in  power  during  the
                 term for which such a person is elected.
           (xvi) Mr.  P.N.  Mishra  appearing  for  Respondent  No.1  to  4
                 submitted that the Special Leave Petition  deserves  to  be
                 dismissed on the short ground that it is filed only against
                 the judgment rendered by the High Court in review petition.
                  He has relied on judgment of this Court in Shanker Motiram
                 Nale Vs. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput[15].  He also  relied
                 on an unreported judgment in Sandhya Educational Society  &
                 Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. [SLP(C) No. 2429 of 2012] to
                 the same effect.  He submitted that the  powers  of  review
                 would not permit this Court to reopen the entire issue  and
                 to rehear the entire  matter  on  merits.   The  review  is
                 limited to the provision contained in Section 114 CPC  read
                 with  Order  47  Rule  1.   He  submits  that  under   this
                 provision, review is limited only  to  circumstances  where
                 review is sought on discovery of new and important  matter;
                 or where  evidence  could  not  be  produced  in  spite  of
                 exercise of due diligence or on account of some mistake  or
                 error apparent on the face of the record.  He submits  that
                 the expression “or for any other sufficient  reason”  would
                 not permit the Court to reopen the entire issue, which  has
                 already been judicially determined.  This apart,  according
                 to the learned counsel, the petitioner has failed  to  show
                 that injustice has been done to her in the face of the fact
                 that majority of the members of her constituency have voted
                 in favour of the  No  Confidence  Motion.   Learned  senior
                 counsel further submitted that it is  a  matter  of  record
                 that the No Confidence Motion was not challenged on merits.
                  Therefore, the SLP deserves to be dismissed.
           (xvii)      Mr. Shanti Bhushan in  reply  submitted  that  these
                 submissions  of  Mr.  Ashok  Desai  and   Mr.  Mishra   are
                 fallacious as no Act of Parliament can interfere  with  the
                 powers of this Court under Article 136.  In the event, this
                 Court holds that SLP is only against the judgment of review
                 and is not maintainable, it would  tantamount  to  amending
                 Article 136 of the  Constitution  of  India.   The  learned
                 senior counsel submitted that the discretion of this  Court
                 cannot be whittled down let alone taken away  as  suggested
                 by  the  learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the
                 respondents. Even on facts, Mr. Bhushan submitted that  the
                 main judgment was challenged. In the judgment  relied  upon
                 by Mr. Mishra in State of Assam Vs. Ripa Sarma (supra), the
                 impugned judgment had not been challenged. Therefore,  this
                 Court said that no SLP would be maintainable  only  against
                 the judgment  of  the  High  Court  rendered  in  a  review
                 petition,  without  challenging  the  main   judgment.   He
                 reiterated that the judgment in Bhanumati & Ors. (supra) is
                 mostly “obiter”. It is also per incuriam as reservation for
                 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had  not  been  taken
                 into consideration.


  17. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
      parties.


  18. We are not able to accept the submission  of               Mr.  Shanti
      Bhushan that the provision contained in Section 28 of the Act are,  in
      any manner, inconsistent with the provisions contained in Part IX,  in
      particular, Article 243N of the Constitution of India.


  19. Section 19 of the Act  provides  that  in  every  Zila  Panchayat,  an
      Adhyaksha shall  be  elected  by  the  elected  members  of  the  Zila
      Panchayat through amongst themselves.  Section 19-A was introduced  by
      U. P. Act No.9 of 1994 providing for reservation  of  the  offices  of
      Adhyaksha, for persons belonging  to  Scheduled  Casts  and  Scheduled
      Tribes and the Backward Classes. It is,  however,  provided  that  the
      number of offices of Adhyaksha, so reserved, shall bear, as nearly  as
      may be the same proportion to the total number of such offices in  the
      State as the population of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes  and
      the Backward Classes in the State, bears to the  total  population  of
      the State. The Section even provides  that  the  offices  so  reserved
      shall be allotted by rotation to  different  Zila  Panchayats  in  the
      State in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government. But
      the reservation for the Backward Classes shall not exceed 27%  of  the
      total number of offices of the Adhyakshas in the  State.  Section  19-
      A(2) is important in the present context which provides that “not less
      than one-third of  the  offices  shall  be  reserved  for  the  ladies
      belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes  or  the  Backward
      Classes as the case may be.” Under this Section, on  a  seat  reserved
      for the aforesaid categories of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
      the Backward Classes, a person belonging to  that  category  would  be
      elected from a particular Panchayat in which reservation  is  made  on
      the basis of the roster provided in Section 19-A(3). Section 20 of the
      Act provides that a Zila Panchayat shall continue for five years  from
      the date appointed for its first meeting and no  longer.  It  is  also
      provided that Section 20(2) that the term of office of a member  of  a
      Zila Panchayat shall expire with the term  of  Zila  Panchayat  unless
      otherwise determined under the  provisions  of  the  Act.  Section  21
      provides that save as otherwise provided in  this  Act,  the  term  of
      office of the Adhyaksha shall commence on his election  and  with  the
      term of Zila Panchayat. Section 23 provides for  disqualification  for
      corrupt practices, which  is  not  applicable  in  the  present  case.
      Section 24 provides for resignation of Adhyaksha, again not applicable
      in the present case. Section 25 relates to filing of  casual  vacancy,
      again  not  applicable  in  this  case.  Section   26   provides   for
      disqualification for being a member or an Adhyaksha in case  a  person
      has incurred any disqualification for being elected as a member of the
      Panchayat.


  20. The whole debate  in  this  case  centres  around  Section  28,  which
      provides for a Motion of  No  Confidence  in  Adhyaksha.  The  section
      provides detailed procedure with regard to  the  issuance  of  written
      notice of  intent  to  make  the  motion,  in  such  form  as  may  be
      prescribed, signed by not less than one-half of the  total  number  of
      the elected members of the Zila Panchayat for  the  time  being.  Such
      notice together with the  copy  of  the  proposed  motion  has  to  be
      delivered  to  the  Collector  having  jurisdiction  over   the   Zila
      Panchayat. Therefore, the Collector shall convene  a  meeting  of  the
      Zila Panchayat for consideration of the motion on a date appointed  by
      him which shall not be later than 30 days  the  date  from  which  the
      notice was delivered to him. The  Collector  is  required  to  give  a
      notice to the elected members of not less than 15 days of such meeting
      in the manner prescribed. The meeting has to be presided over  by  the
      District Judge or a Civil Judicial Officer not below  the  rank  of  a
      Civil Judge.  Interestingly,  the  debate  on  the  motion  cannot  be
      adjourned by virtue of provisions contained  in  Section  28(7).  Sub-
      section (8) further provides that the  debate  on  the  No  Confidence
      Motion shall automatically terminate on the expiration of 2 hours from
      the time appointed for the commencement of the meeting, if it  is  not
      concluded earlier. Either at the end of 2 hours or earlier, the motion
      has to be put to vote. Further more, the Presiding  Officer  would  be
      either District Judge or a Judicial Officer is not permitted to  speak
      on the merits of the motion, and  also  not  entitled  to  vote.  Sub-
      section (11) provides that “if the motion is carried with the  support
      of (more than half) of the total number of (elected  members)  of  the
      Zila Panchayat for the time being”.  In  our  opinion,  the  aforesaid
      provision contained in Section 28 is, in no manner, inconsistent  with
      the provisions contained in Article 243N. To accept the submission  of
      Mr. Bhushan of inconsistency would  be  contrary  to  the  fundamental
      right of democracy that those who elect can also remove elected person
      by  expressing  No  Confidence  Motion   for   the   elected   person.
      Undoubtedly, such  No  Confidence  Motion  can  only  be  passed  upon
      observing the procedure prescribed under the relevant statute, in  the
      present case the Act.


  21. We are unable to accept the submission of           Mr.  Bhushan  that
      removal of Adhyaksha can only be  on  the  grounds  of  misconduct  as
      provided under Section 29 of the Act. The aforesaid  Section  provides
      that a procedure for removing an Adhyaksha  who  is  found  guilty  of
      misconduct in the discharge of his/her duties.  This  Section,  in  no
      manner, either overrides the provisions contained in Section 28 or  is
      in conflict with the same.


  22. We also do not agree with the submission of Mr. Bhushan  that  Section
      28 could not have continued after expiry of one year of the  enactment
      of 73rd Amendment of the Constitution of India, which came into effect
                      on 24th April, 1993. Such an  eventuality  would  have
      arisen only in case it was found that Section 28 is inconsistent  with
      any provision of Part IX of the Constitution. Merely  because  Article
      243F is silent with regard to the removal of an Adhyaksha on the basis
      of  a  Motion  of  No  Confidence  would  not  render  the   provision
      inconsistent with the Article 243 of the Constitution of India.


  23. We also do not find any merit in the submission of  Mr.  Bhushan  that
      the petitioner being a Scheduled Caste Lady cannot be removed  through
      a vote of No Confidence. We do not find any merit that the  provisions
      contained in Section 28 would frustrate the provisions for reservation
      for Scheduled Caste Ladies. Even if an Adhyaksha belonging to  one  of
      the reserved categories, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  other
      Backward Classes is removed on the basis of the vote of No Confidence,
      she can only be replaced by  a  candidate  belonging  to  one  of  the
      reserved categories. Therefore,  the  submission  of       Mr.  Shanti
      Bhushan seems to be focused only on the petitioner, in particular, and
      not on  the  candidates  elected  from  the  reserved  categories,  in
      general. The submission is wholly devoid of any merit  and  is  hereby
      rejected.


  24. We are entirely in agreement with Mr. Shanti Bhushan that Part  IX  of
      the Constitution has made provisions for self-governance at  Panchayat
      level, including the election of Panchayat Members and  its  Chairman.
      Thus, ushering in complete  decentralization  of  the  Government  and
      transferring the power to the grass roots level bodies;  such  as  the
      Panchayats  at  the  village,  intermediate  and  District  level,  in
      accordance with Article 243C of the Constitution. Article 243C  is  as
      under:
           “243C. Composition of Panchayats. -
           (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, the Legislature of a
           State  may,  by  law,  make  provisions  with  respect  to   the
           composition of Panchayats:
                 Provided that the  ratio  between  the  population  of  the
           territorial area of a Panchayat at any level and the  number  of
           seats in such Panchayat to be filled by election shall,  so  far
           as practicable, be the same throughout the State.
           (2) All the seats in a Panchayat  shall  be  filled  by  persons
           chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the
           Panchayat area and, for this purpose, each Panchayat area  shall
           be divided into territorial constituencies in such  manner  that
           the ratio between the population of each  constituency  and  the
           number of seats allotted to it shall, so far as practicable,  be
           the same throughout the Panchayat area.
           (3)   The Legislature of a State may, by law,  provide  for  the
           representation—
           (a)   of the Chairpersons  of  the  Panchayats  at  the  village
                 level, in the Panchayats at the intermediate level  or,  in
                 the  case  of  a  State  not  having  Panchayats   at   the
                 intermediate level,  in  the  Panchayats  at  the  district
                 level;
           (b)   of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at the  intermediate
                 level, in the Panchayats at the district level;
           (c)   of the members of the House of the People and the  members
                 of the  Legislative  Assembly  of  the  State  representing
                 constituencies which comprise wholly or partly a  Panchayat
                 area at a level other  than  the  village  level,  in  such
                 Panchayat;
           (d)   of the members of the Council of States and the members of
                 the Legislative  Council  of  the  State,  where  they  are
                 registered as electors within—
                 (i)    a Panchayat  area  at  the  intermediate  level,  in
                       Panchayat at the intermediate level;
                 (ii)  a Panchayat area at the district level, in  Panchayat
                       at the district level.
           (4)   The Chairperson of a Panchayat  and  other  members  of  a
           Panchayat  whether  or  not  chosen  by  direct  election   from
           territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area shall have  the
           right to vote in the meetings of the Panchayats.
           (5)   The Chairperson of—
                 (a)   a panchayat at the village level shall be elected  in
                       such manner as the Legislature of  a  State  may,  by
                       law, provide; and
                 (b)   a Panchayat at the  intermediate  level  or  district
                       level shall be elected  by,  and  from  amongst,  the
                       elected members thereof.”
           This Article as well as some others, such as Articles 243-A, 243-
      C(5), 243-D(4), 243-D(6), 243-F(1), (6), 243-G, 243-H, 243-I(2),  243-
      J, 243-K(2), (4) of the Constitution etc make provision for the  State
      to enact necessary legislation to implement the provisions in Part  IX
      of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we are not able to agree with
      the submission of Mr. Bhushan that  State  Legislature  will  have  no
      power to make provision for no-confidence motion against the Adhyaksha
      of Zila Panchayat.

  25.   We   are   also   unable   to   agree   with   the   submission   of
       Mr. Bhushan that a person once elected to the position  of  Adhyaksha
      would be permitted to continue in office till the expiry of  the  five
      years terms, even though he/she no longer enjoys the confidence of the
      electorate. To avoid such catastrophe, a provision for  no-confidence,
      as observed earlier, has been made in  Section  28  of  the  Act.  The
      extreme submission made by Mr. Bhushan, if accepted, would destroy the
      foundational precepts of democracy that a person who is elected by the
      members of the Zila Panchayat can only remain in power so long as  the
      majority support is with such person.


  26. We also do not find any merit in the submission of  Mr.  Bhushan  that
      permitting the provision contained in Section 28 of the Act to  remain
      on the statute book would enable the executive to deprive the  elected
      representatives of their fundamental rights enshrined in Part III  and
      Part IX of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, the ratio of the
      judgment in I.R.Coelho (supra) relied upon by Mr.  Bhushan  is  wholly
      inapplicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. There is  no
      interference whatsoever in the right  of  the  electorate  to  choose.
      Rather Section 28 ensures that an elected representative can only stay
      in power so long as such person enjoys the support of the majority  of
      the elected members of the Zila Panchayat. In the present case, at the
      time of election, the petitioner was the chosen one, but, at the  time
      when the Motion of No Confidence in the petitioner was passed, she was
      not wanted. Therefore, the right to chose of the electorate,  is  very
      much alive as a consequence of the provision contained in Section 28.


  27. We are unable to accept the submission of             Mr. Bhushan that
      the provisions contained in Section 28 of the Act cannot be  sustained
      in the eyes of law as it fails to satisfy the twin test of  reasonable
      classification and  rational  nexus  with  the  object  sought  to  be
      achieved. In support of this submission, Mr. Bhushan has relied on the
      judgment of this Court in D.S. Nakara vs. Union of India[16]. We  fail
      to see how the provisions contained in Section 28  of  the  Act  would
      take away the autonomy of the  Panchayati  Raj  Institutions.  In  our
      opinion, the judgments relied upon by Mr. Bhushan in  support  of  the
      submissions that provisions of No Confidence Motion in Section  28  of
      the Act would put the executive authorities in the State in control of
      Village Panchayats or District  Panchayats.  Apart  from  the  use  of
      superlatives, that the party now in power is trying to remove all  the
      office holders of Panchayats in U.P. belonging to the opposite  party,
      no other material has been placed on the record.


  28. It is true that in the Constitution, Article 67B provides for  removal
      of the Vice-President by a resolution of  the  Council  of  States  as
      provided therein passed by the majority of all the then members of the
      Council and agreed to by the House of People. It is also correct  that
      under Article 90C, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of States can be
      removed from his office on a resolution of the Council passed  by  all
      the majority members  of  the  then  Council.  Similarly,  Article  94
      provides that a member of holding office as Speaker or Deputy Speakers
      of the House of People may be removed from his office by a  resolution
      of the House of People passed by a majority of all the then members of
      the House.


  29. It is also true that there are certain positions in the  Constitution,
      which are filled up through election but individuals so elected cannot
      be removed by way of No Confidence Motion, e.g. Rajya  Sabha  Members,
      Lok Sabha Members and the President of India. We are, however,  unable
      to  accept  the  submission  of  Mr.  Bhushan  that  Part  IX  of  the
      Constitution of India has placed office of  an  Adhyaksha  of  a  Zila
      Panchayat on the same pedestal as the President of India. Article 243F
      empowers the States to enact  any  law  for  a  person  who  shall  be
      disqualified for being chosen as a member of a Panchayat.  This  would
      also include a member of a Panchayat, who is subsequently appointed as
      Adhyaksha of a Zila Panchayat. There is no prohibition  under  Article
      243F disenabling any State Legislature for enacting  that  an  elected
      Adhyaksha shall remain in office only so long as such  elected  person
      enjoys the majority  support  of  the  elected  members  of  the  Zila
      Panchayat. Therefore, we have no hesitation in rejecting the aforesaid
      submissions of Mr. Shanti Bhushan.


  30. The submissions of Mr. Bhushan on depriving a candidate  belonging  to
      the reserved category of a position  to  which  he  or  she  has  been
      elected on the basis of reservation are wholly  fallacious.  The  seat
      for the office  of Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat was reserved for  women
      candidates, i.e.,  all  women  candidates.  It  was  not  specifically
      reserved for Ladies belonging to the reserved categories of  Scheduled
      Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  the  Backward  Classes.  The  petitioner
      contested as a Lady Candidate and not as a candidate belonging to  any
      reserved category and was elected on  a  seat  reserved  for    Ladies
      generally.


  31. Having said all this, we would  like  to  point  out  that  in  normal
      circumstances the present SLP would not  have  been  entertained.  Dr.
      Rajiv Dhawan and Mr. Ashok Desai had pointed out at the  very  initial
      hearing that the SLP would not be maintainable as it  challenges  only
      the judgment of the High Court rendered in review petition.  The  main
      judgment dated 5th February, 2013 rendered in W.P.(C) No.9654 of  2012
      which has been reviewed by the High Court in the  impugned  order  has
      not been challenged.  As  a  pure  statement  of  law,  the  aforesaid
      proposition is unexceptionable. However, in the present case, we  have
      been persuaded to entertain the present  SLP  in  view  of  the  order
      passed by this Court on            19th February, 2013. In Ripa  Sarma
      case (supra), it was not disputed before this Court that the  judgment
      and order dated 20th November, 2007 passed in Ripa Sarma  (supra)  was
      not challenged by way of an SLP before this Court. Relying on Order 47
      Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the earlier  judgments
      of this Court it was held that :
           “In view of the above, the law seems to be well settled that  in
           the absence of a challenge to the  main  judgment,  the  special
           leave petition  filed  challenging  only  the  subsequent  order
           rejecting the review petition, would not be maintainable.”


  32. With regard to the second submission of                Dr. Dhawan  and
      Mr. Ashok Desai that the issue raised in the present proceeding is  no
      longer res integra in view of the law  laid  down  by  this  Court  in
      Bhanumati (supra), we are of the opinion that the submission  deserves
      to be accepted, in so far as the matter is covered by the  ratio  laid
      down in Bhanumati (supra).


  33. A careful perusal of the judgment of this Court in  Bhanumati  (supra)
      would show that this Court had considered the provisions contained  in
      all the Articles Part IX of the Constitution,  in  all  its  hues  and
      colours. However, it appears that the issue with regard to the adverse
      impact of the provision in Section 28 of the Act  on  the  reservation
      for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes  was
      neither argued nor considered. We have, therefore, examined the  issue
      raised by Mr. Bhushan.


  34. In our opinion, the provision under Section  28A  of  the  Act  in  no
      manner dilutes or nullifies the protection  given  to  the  candidates
      belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  Backward  Classes
      in the 73rd Amendment of the  Constitution  of  India.  Therefore,  we
      accept the submission of Dr. Dhawan and Mr. Ashok Desai that  in  view
      of the law laid down in Bhanumati’s case  (supra),  the  issue  is  no
      longer res integra.


  35. As noticed earlier, we have been persuaded to  entertain  the  Special
      Leave Petition as Mr. Bhushan had highlighted that permitting the Vote
      of No Confidence  as  a  ground  for  disqualifying  an  elected  Zila
      Panchayat Adhyaksha, Zila Panchayat would leave a  candidate,  elected
      from the reserved categories of Scheduled  Castes/  Scheduled  Tribes,
      vulnerable to unjustified attacks from  the  elected  members  of  the
      general category.  This issue was not raised  before  the  High  Court
      either in original writ petition being W.P. No. 9654 of 2012  nor  was
      it raised before the High Court in the Review Petition.   However,  in
      view of the seminal importance of the issue raised, we had entertained
      the Special Leave Petition.  Having said that, it must be pointed  out
      that the raising of such an issue is neither justified nor relevant in
      the facts of the present case.  As pointed out earlier, the petitioner
      herein had contested the election as an Adhyaksha, Zila Panchayat from
      a seat reserved for Ladies.  Merely because she happens to  belong  to
      the reserved category, it can not be permitted to be argued, that  the
      provision with regard to  the  reservation  for  the  members  of  the
      Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Backward Classes  has  been  in  any
      manner diluted, let alone nullified.  It has been  specifically  noted
      in the  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons  of  the             73rd
      Amendment as follows:-
           “Though the Panchayati Raj institutions have been  in  existence
           for a long time, it has been observed  that  these  institutions
           have not been able to acquire the status and dignity  of  viable
           and responsive people’s  bodies  due  to  a  number  of  reasons
           including absence of regular elections, prolonged supersessions,
           insufficient representation of weaker  sections  like  Scheduled
           Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  Women,  inadequate  devolution  of
           powers and lack of financial resources.


           2. Article 40 of the Constitution which  enshrines  one  of  the
           directive principles of State Policy lays down  that  the  State
           shall take steps to organise Village Panchayats and  endow  them
           with such powers and authority as may  be  necessary  to  enable
           them to function as units of self-government. In  the  light  of
           the experience in the last  forty  years  and  in  view  of  the
           shortcomings which have been observed,  it  is  considered  that
           there is an imperative need  to  enshrine  in  the  Constitution
           certain  basic  and  essential  features   of   Panchayati   Raj
           institutions to impart certainty,  continuity  and  strength  to
           them.”






  36. The provisions of the 73rd Constitutional amendment are to ensure that
      Panchayati Raj Institutions acquire “the status and dignity of  viable
      and responsive people’s bodies”.  The  provisions  are  not  meant  to
      provide an all pervasive  protective  shield  to  an  Adhyaksha,  Zila
      Panchayat, even in cases of loss of confidence  of  the  constituents.
      Provision in Section 28, therefore, cannot be said to be repugnant  to
      Part IX of the Constitution of India.


  37.  In our opinion, the amendment  as  well  as  the  main  provision  in
      Section 28 is in absolute accord with the vision explicitly enunciated
      in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.   In  fact,  the  spirit
      which led to ultimately encoding the goals of “WE THE PEOPLE”  in  the
      Preamble of the Constitution of India, permeates all other  provisions
      of the Constitution of India. The fundamental aim of the  Constitution
      of India is to give power  to  the  People.   Guiding  spirit  of  the
      Constitution is “WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA”.  In India,  the  People  are
      supreme, through the  Constitution  of  India,  and  not  the  elected
      Representatives. Therefore, in our opinion, the provision for right to
      recall through the Vote of No Confidence is in no manner repugnant  to
      any of the provisions of the Constitution of India.


  38. Upon examination of the entire Scheme of the       73rd Amendment,  in
      the context of framing of the Constitution of  India,  this  Court  in
      Bhanumati & Ors. (supra), observed as follows:-
           “54. The argument that as a result  of  the  impugned  amendment
           stability and dignity of the  Panchayati  Raj  institutions  has
           been undermined, is also not well founded. As a  result  of  no-
           confidence motion the  Chairperson  of  a  panchayat  loses  his
           position as a Chairperson but  he  remains  a  member,  and  the
           continuance of panchayat as an institution is  not  affected  in
           the least.”


            We are in respectful agreement with aforesaid conclusion.
  39. We reiterate the view earlier expressed by this Court in  Bhanumati  &
      Ors. (supra), wherein this Court observed as follows:-
           “57. It has already been pointed out that  the  object  and  the
           reasons of Part IX are to lend status and dignity to  Panchayati
           Raj  institutions  and  to  impart  certainty,  continuity   and
           strength  to  them.  The  learned  counsel  for  the   appellant
           unfortunately, in his argument, missed the  distinction  between
           an individual and an institution. If a no-confidence  motion  is
           passed against the Chairperson of a panchayat, he/she ceases  to
           be a Chairperson, but continues to be a member of the  panchayat
           and the panchayat continues with  a  newly-elected  Chairperson.
           Therefore, there is no institutional setback  or  impediment  to
           the continuity or stability of the Panchayati Raj institutions.


           58. These institutions must run  on  democratic  principles.  In
           democracy  all  persons  heading  public  bodies  can   continue
           provided they enjoy the confidence of the persons  who  comprise
           such bodies. This is the essence  of  democratic  republicanism.
           This explains why this provision  of  no-confidence  motion  was
           there in the  Act  of  1961  even  prior  to  the  Seventy-third
           Constitution Amendment and has been continued  even  thereafter.
           Similar provisions are there in different States in India.”


  40. The whole edifice of the challenge to the constitutionality of Section
      28 is built on the status of the petitioner as a member  belonging  to
      the reserved category. It has nothing  to  do  with  the  continuance,
      stability, dignity and the status of the Panchayat  Institutions.   In
      our opinion, the personal desire, of the petitioner to cling on to the
      office of Adhyaksha is camouflaged as  a  constitutional  issue.   The
      provision of No  Confidence  Motion,  in  our  opinion,  is  not  only
      consistent with Part IX of the Constitution, but is also  foundational
      for  ensuring  transparency  and   accountability   of   the   elected
      representatives, including Panchayat Adhyakshas.  The provision  sends
      out a clear message that an elected Panchayat Adhyaksha  can  continue
      to function as such only so long as he/she enjoys  the  confidence  of
      the constituents.


      Is Bhanumati & Ors. per incuriam ?
  41.  This submission again, in our opinion, is not well founded. The  only
      ground urged in support of the submission by Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan  was
      that this Court in Bhanumati & Ors. (supra)  had  not  considered  the
      provision with regard to special protection to be given to the members
      of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  the  Backward  Classes.
      Firstly, such a  submission  was  never  made  before  this  Court  in
      Bhanumati & Ors. (supra). Secondly, as we  have  already  pointed  out
      earlier, the issue with regard to reservation  for  Scheduled  Castes,
      Scheduled Tribes and the Backward Classes, does not arise in the facts
      of this case as the petitioner had not been elected to the  office  of
      Adhyaksha  of  Zila  Panchayat  reserved  for  Scheduled  Castes   and
      Scheduled Tribes.   Mr. Ashok Desai has placed before us enclosure  to
      Government Order No.2746/33-1-2010-37G/2000 dated 15th September, 2010
      indicating reservation for the year 2010 for the office  of  Adhyaksha
      of Zila Panchayat, District wise in the State of  Uttar  Pradesh.  The
      order is divided into two columns: Districts’  reserved  for  Schedule
      Caste  Lady  and  Districts’  reserved  for  Ladies.  Extract  of  the
      aforesaid order is as follows:-
|Districts’ reserved for        |Districts’ reserved for Ladies |
|Schedule Caste Lady            |                               |
|S.No.  |District               |S.No. |District               |
|1      |Chatrapati Sahuji      |1     |Allahabad              |
|       |Maharajnagar           |      |                       |
|2      |Sant Ravidas Nagar     |2     |Sitapur                |
|       |(Bhadohi)              |      |                       |
|3      |Jaunpur                |3     |Hardoi                 |
|4      |Ghajipur               |4     |Lakhimpur Khiri        |
|5      |Sant Kabir Nagar       |5     |Azamgadh               |


  42. It is a matter of record that the petitioner was elected as  Panchayat
      Adhyaksha of Sitapur District Reserved for Ladies, it is not  reserved
      for a Schedule Caste Lady. Therefore, we are not able  to  accept  the
      submission of Mr. Bhushan.


  43.  We also do  not  accept  the  submission  of                      Mr.
      Bhushan that the aforesaid judgment needs reconsideration.  A  perusal
      of the judgment would show that this Court traced the history  leading
      upto the insertion of Article 40 of the  Constitution  of  India.  The
      Court examined the relevant  commentaries  of  many  learned  authors,
      Indian as well as Foreign; Constituent Assembly Debates; and concluded
      as follows :
           “13. The Constitution’s quest for an inclusive governance voiced
           in the Preamble is not consistent with panchayat  being  treated
           merely as  a  unit  of  self-government  and  only  as  part  of
           directive  principle.  If  the  relevant  Constituent   Assembly
           Debates are perused one  finds  that  even  that  constitutional
           provision about panchayat was inducted after  strenuous  efforts
           by some of the members. From the  debates  we  do  not  fail  to
           discern a substantial difference of opinion between one  set  of
           members who wanted to finalise the Constitution  solely  on  the
           parliamentary  model  by  totally  ignoring  the  importance  of
           panchayat principles and another group of members who wanted  to
           mould  our  Constitution  on  Gandhian  principles  of   Village
           Panchayat.”


  44. The Court emphasized that Dr. Rajendra Prasad was the strongest critic
      of the Draft Constitution, who had opined that “the village  has  been
      and will even continue to be our unit in this country.” (Para 15). The
      Court further notices the opinion of Mr. M.A.  Ayangar  and  Mr.  N.G.
      Ranga,  both  of  whom  suggested  some  amendments   to   the   Draft
      Constitution. The Court  also  notices  that  a  similar  opinion  was
      expressed by           Mr. S.C. Mazumdar, who  had  struck  a  balance
      between  Gandhian  Principles  and  the  Parliamentary  model  of  the
      Constitution.  The  insertion  of  Article  40  was  accepted  by  Dr.
      Ambedkar. This Court further notices the opinion of  Seth  Govind  Das
      from the Central Provinces and  Berar  (Constituent  Assembly  Debates
      Vol. VII, PP.523-24) (See Paras 12 to 20).


  45.  Thereafter,  the  Court  notices  that   “in   other   representative
      democracies of the world committed to a written Constitution and  Rule
      of Law, the  principles  of  self-Government  are  also  part  of  the
      Constitutional   doctrine.”   The   Court   emphasized   that    under
              the 73rd Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  Panchayats  become
      “Institution of self-governance, which  was  previously  a  mere  unit
      under Article 40”. It was emphasized that the 73rd Amendment  heralded
      a new era, which is a turning point in  the  history  of  local  self-
      governance (Para 22). It was also emphasized that the  73rd  Amendment
      is very powerful “tool of social engineering” (Para 24). We  reiterate
      the opinion of this Court that as 74% of the Indian population live in
      villages, it is necessary to  ensure  that  the  power  of  governance
      should vest  in  the  smallest  units  of  the  Panchayat  having  its
      hierarchy as provided under  various  Panchayat  Acts  throughout  the
      country. The judgment analyses the  changes  introduced  by  the  73rd
      Amendment and concludes as follows :
           “34. The changes introduced by the  Seventy-third  Amendment  of
           the  Constitution  have  given  Panchayati  Raj  institutions  a
           constitutional status  as  a  result  of  which  it  has  become
           permanent in the Indian political system as a third  Government.
           On a careful reading of this amendment, it  appears  that  under
           Article 243-B of the Constitution, it  has  been  mandated  that
           there shall  be  panchayat  at  the  village,  intermediate  and
           district levels in accordance with the provisions of Part IX  of
           the Constitution.”


  46.   This Court concluded upon examination of the  Constitutional  scheme
      introduced  by                               the  73rd  Amendment   as
      follows:
           “39. Thus, the composition of the panchayat, its  function,  its
           election and various other aspects of its administration are now
           provided in great detail under the Constitution with  provisions
           enabling the State Legislature to enact laws  to  implement  the
           constitutional mandate. Thus, formation  of  panchayat  and  its
           functioning is now a vital part  of  the  constitutional  scheme
           under Part IX of the Constitution. Obviously, such a system  can
           only thrive on the  confidence  of  the  people,  on  those  who
           comprise the system.”




  47. In our opinion, the provision for removing an  elected  representative
      such as Panchayat Adhyaksha is of fundamental importance to ensure the
      democratic functioning of the Institution as well  as  to  ensure  the
      transparency and accountability in  the  functions  performed  by  the
      elected representatives.


  48. We also do not agree with Mr. Bhushan that the issue  with  regard  to
      the constitutionality of Section 28 of the Act was not  considered  by
      this Court in Bhanumati & Ors. (supra). The  submission  made  by  the
      counsel for the petitioner therein is noticed as follows:
           “40. In the background of these provisions, learned counsel  for
           the appellants argued that the provision of no-confidence, being
           not  in  Part  IX  of  the  Constitution  is  contrary  to   the
           constitutional scheme of things and would run  contrary  to  the
           avowed purpose of the constitutional amendment which is meant to
           lend stability and dignity to Panchayati  Raj  institutions.  It
           was further argued that reducing the period from “two years”  to
           “one year” before a no-confidence motion can be brought, further
           unsettles the running of the panchayat.  It  was  further  urged
           that under the impugned  amendment  that  such  a  no-confidence
           motion can be carried on the basis of a simple majority  instead
           of two-thirds majority dilutes the concept of stability.”




           From this it is evident that  the  provision  of  No  Confidence
      Motion in Section 28 was challenged on three grounds:
        (a) It would be repugnant to the Scheme of the 73rd      Amendment.
        (b) It would unsettle the running of the Panchayat.
        (c) It would dilute the concept of stability.




  49. Upon consideration of the relevant provisions contained in various sub-
      articles of Article 243 and in particular, Article 243C(v), this Court
      concludes as under:
           “41. This Court is not at all persuaded to accept this  argument
           on various grounds discussed below. A  Constitution  is  not  to
           give all details of the provisions contemplated under the scheme
           of amendment. In the said  amendment,  under  various  articles,
           like Articles 243-A, 243-C(1),  (5),  243-D(4),  243-D(6),  243-
           F(1), (6), 243-G, 243-H, 243-I(2), 243-J, 243-K(2), (4)  of  the
           Constitution, the legislature of the State has been empowered to
           make law to implement the constitutional provisions.


            43. Therefore, the argument that the provision of no-confidence
           motion against the Chairman,  being  not  in  the  Constitution,
           cannot be provided in the statute, is wholly  unacceptable  when
           the Constitution specifically enables the State  Legislature  to
           provide the details of election of the Chairperson.”


           The Court also mentions  that  the  statutory  provision  of  No
      Confidence Motion against  the  Chairperson  is  a  pre-constitutional
      provision and was there in Section 15  of  the  1961  Act  (Para  44).
      After taking into consideration Article 243N of  the  Constitution  of
      India, it is observed as follows:-
           “45. It is clear that the  provision  for  no-confidence  motion
           against the Chairperson was  never  repealed  by  any  competent
           legislature as being inconsistent with any of the provisions  of
           Part IX. On the other hand by  subsequent  statutory  provisions
           the said provision of no-confidence has been confirmed with some
           ancillary changes but the essence of the no-confidence provision
           was continued. This Court is clearly of  the  opinion  that  the
           provision of no-confidence is not inconsistent with Part  IX  of
           the Constitution.”




  50. In the face of these findings, it would not be possible to accept  the
      submission of Mr. Bhushan  that  the  judgment  in  Bhanumati  &  Ors.
      (supra) is either per incuriam or requires reconsideration.
  51. Under Article 243N, any provision of law  relating  to  Panchayats  in
      force immediately before the 73rd  Amendment,  which  is  inconsistent
      with Part IX continues to be enforced until amended or  repealed.   In
      the absence of such amendment or repeal,  the  inconsistent  provision
      will continue until the expiration of one year from  the  commencement
      of the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1993.  It  is  a  matter  of
      record that the State of Uttar  Pradesh  enacted  U.P.  Panchayat  Law
      (Amendment) Act, 1994 on 22nd  April,  1994  to  give  effect  to  the
      provisions of Part IX of the Constitution.  The pre-existing provision
      of No Confidence was not repealed.  It was amended subsequently by the
      Amendment Act of 1998 (U.P. Act No. 20 of 1998).  There was a  further
      amendment by the Amendment Act of 2007 (U.P. Act No. 4 of  2007).   By
      this amendment, the period for  moving  a  No  Confidence  Motion  was
      reduced from two years to one year.  Furthermore the requirement  that
      for a Motion of No Confidence to be carried, it had to be supported by
      a majority of “not less than two third”  was  reduced  to  “more  than
      half”.  It was these amendment changes brought about by the  Amendment
      Act of 2007, which was challenged by the petitioners in  the  case  of
      Bhanumati & Ors. (supra).  The  continuous  of  the  provision  of  No
      Confidence Motion was not even challenged.  In spite of the fact  that
      the challenge was limited only to the amendment, this  Court  examined
      the question as to whether provision  for  bringing  a  Motion  of  No
      Confidence in Section 28 of the 1961 Act was repugnant or inconsistent
      with Part IX of the Constitution of India.  Ultimately,  in  Paragraph
      51, this Court records the following opinion:-
           “51. Many issues in our constitutional jurisprudence evolved out
           of this doctrine of silence. The basic structure doctrine vis-à-
           vis Article 368 of the Constitution emerged out of this  concept
           of silence in the Constitution. A Constitution  which  professes
           to be democratic and republican in character  and  which  brings
           about a revolutionary change by the Seventy-third Constitutional
           Amendment  by   making   detailed   provision   for   democratic
           decentralisation and self-government on the principle of  grass-
           root democracy cannot be interpreted to exclude the provision of
           no-confidence motion in respect of the office of the Chairperson
           of the panchayat just because of its silence on that aspect.”


           We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid opinion.


  52. The Court thereafter notices  the  submission  that  the  position  of
      Panchayat Adhyaksha is comparable with that of the President of India.
      On this analogy, it was submitted that the office of Chairperson, i.e.
      Panchayat Adhyaksha should have the same immunity. This Court rejected
      the submission with the observation  that  “this  is  an  argument  of
      desperation and has been advanced, with respect, without any regard to
      the vast difference in constitutional status and position between  the
      two posts.”  Mr. Bhushan has made the same submission before  us.   We
      would like to add here, that even by stretching the imagination beyond
      all reasonable bounds, we are unable to accept the submission  of  Mr.
      Bhushan that Chairman of a District Panchayat should  be  put  on  the
      same pedestal as the President of India.
  53. Mr. Shanti Bhushan had also submitted that  since  the  issues  raised
      herein pertained to the interpretation of the Constitution  of  India,
      the matter needs to be referred to the  five  Judges  as  provided  in
      Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India read with Order VII Rule 2
      of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.


  54. We are of the opinion that no substantial question of  law  arises  as
      envisaged under Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India as to  the
      interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  in  the  facts  and
      circumstances of this case. The entire issue has been elaborately, and
      with erudition, dilated  upon  by  this  Court  in  Bhanumati  &  Ors.
      (supra). We also do not find  any  force  in  the  submission  of  Mr.
      Bhushan that there is any occasion for reconsideration of the judgment
      of this Court in Bhanumati & Ors. (supra).
  55. Mr. Bhushan has relied on numerous judgments of this Court in  support
      of his submissions.  Let us now consider the same.
  56. On the issue of repugnancy, Mr. Bhushan has cited following judgments:


      (1) I.R.Coelho vs. Union of India (supra) –
            In our opinion, the reliance on the aforesaid judgment is wholly
      misplaced as the right to choose of the constituents is not  curtailed
      by Section 28 of  the  Act.  It  is  only  the  right  of  an  elected
      Chairman/Adhyaksha to continue, who has lost  the  confidence  of  the
      electorate that has been curtailed.
      (2) Deep Chand vs. State of U.P. (supra) –
            In this case, this Court culled out the law  pertaining  to  the
      rule of repugnancy. The three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy  as
      formulated by Nicholas in his Australian Constitution 2nd Edition have
      been noticed which are as under:

            “(1) There may be inconsistency in  the  actual  terms  of  the
           competing statutes;


           (2) Though there may be no direct conflict, a State law  may  be
           inoperative because the Commonwealth law, or the  award  of  the
           Commonwealth Court, is intended  to  be  a  complete  exhaustive
           code; and


           (3) Even in the absence of intention, a conflict may arise  when
           both State and Commonwealth seek to exercise their  powers  over
           the same subject-matter.”




  57. The aforesaid three rules have been accepted by this Court in Ch. Tika
      Ramji Vs. State of U.P.[17]  Similar test was laid down by this  Court
      in, Zaverbhai Amaidas Vs. State of Bombay (supra)  as follows:

             “(1)  Whether  there  is  direct  conflict  between  the   two
           provisions;


           (2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an  exhaustive  code
           in respect of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the  State
           Legislature and


           (3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made  by  the
           State Legislature occupy the same field.




  58. In our opinion, the provision contained in            Section  28  can
      not be said to be repugnant to              the 73rd Amendment on  the
      basis of the aforesaid tests laid down by this Court.
  59. On the  issue  of  per  incuriam,  Mr.  Bhushan  has  cited  following
      judgments:


      (1) N. Bhargawan Pillai Vs. State of Kerala (supra) –
            Mr. Bhushan had relied on observations made  by  this  Court  in
      Paragraph 14 of the judgment.  It was held that the  judgment  in  the
      case of Bore Gowda Vs. State of Karnataka[18] was per incuriam  as  it
      did not consider  the  impact  of  Section  18  of  the  Probation  of
      Offenders Act, 1958.
           In Bhanumati & Ors.  (supra),  it  can  not  be  said  that  any
      relevant provision of the Constitution or the Act had not  been  taken
      into consideration.


      (2) State of U.P. Vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (supra)
            The observations made in Paragraph 86 in the earlier judgment of
      Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Ors.  Vs. State  of  U.P.  &  Ors.[19]
      were found to be per incuriam.  The aforesaid observations  would  not
      be applicable in the present case as no such legitimate criticism  can
      be made against the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Bhanumati  &  Ors.
      (supra).


      (3)   Babu Parasu Kaikadi Vs. Babu (supra)
           This judgment also reiterated the well known  principle  of  per
      incuriam.  It was held that the judgment in Dhondiram Tatoba Kadam Vs.
      Ramchandra Balwantrao Dubal (since deceased) by His  LRs.  &  Anr.[20]
      was per incuriam as it had not noticed the earlier  binding  precedent
      of a coordinate Bench and also having  not  considered  the  mandatory
      provisions as contained in Sections 15 and 29 of  the  Bombay  Tenancy
      and Agricultural Lands  Act,  1948  (67  of  1948).   The  well  known
      principle with regard to a judgment not being a binding  precedent  as
      stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 26 is as under:-
            “A decision is given per incuriam when the court has  acted  in
           ignorance of a previous decision of its own or  of  a  court  of
           coordinate jurisdiction which covered the  case  before  it,  in
           which case it must decide which case to follow; or when  it  has
           acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in  which  case
           it must follow that decision; or when the decision is  given  in
           ignorance of the terms of a statute  or  rule  having  statutory
           force.”


           The same principle has been reiterated by this Court in State of
      U.P. Vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (supra):-
           “40. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’. In  practice  per
           incuriam appears to mean per  ignoratium.  English  courts  have
           developed this principle in relaxation  of  the  rule  of  stare
           decisis. The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and ignored if  it  is
           rendered,  ‘in  ignoratium  of  a  statute  or   other   binding
           authority’. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.) Same has  been
           accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while  interpreting
           Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the  doctrine  of
           precedents as a matter of law.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)


           In our opinion, the judgment in Bhanumati & Ors. (supra) can not
      be said per incuriam on the applicability of the aforesaid tests.


      (4)   Zee Telefilms Ltd. Vs. Union of India (supra)
            In this case, again this Court reiterated that a decision is  an
      authority for the question of law determined by it and that it  should
      not be read as a statute.  A decision is  not  an  authority  for  the
      proposition  which  did  not  call  for  its   consideration.    These
      observations again are of no assistance to the petitioner.
      (5)   Nirmaljeet Kaur Vs. State of M.P.
           In this case also, this  Court  has  reiterated  the  principles
      earlier enunciated. Thus, this judgment is again of  no  help  to  the
      petitioner.


  60.  On  the  submission  with  regard  to  the  Validity/Legality  of   a
      Legislative Act, reliance was placed upon:
           D.S.Nakara  vs.  Union  of  India[21];  Union   of   India   vs.
           G.Ganayutham[22]; Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs.  Maddula
           Ratnavalli[23] and State of A.P. v/s McDowell & Co.[24]. In  our
           opinion, all these judgments are inapplicable to  the  facts  of
           this case.


  61. On the  submission  with  regard  to  Arbitrary/discretionary/unguided
      power to  executive  authority,  Mr.  Bhushan  relied  upon  following
      judgments:
      Senior Superintendent of Post Offices vs.  Izhar  Hussain[25],  Khoday
      Distilleries Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka[26], Maganlal  Chhagalal  (P)
      Ltd. vs. Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Bombay[27]  Director  of
      Industries vs. Deep Chand Agarwal[28]. In our opinion, these judgments
      have no application whatsoever either to the legal  issue  or  to  the
      facts of this case.


  62. We have no hesitation in accepting the submission of Mr. Bhushan  that
      the High Court or this Court, in exercise of its powers of review  can
      reopen the case and rehear the entire matter. But we  must  hasten  to
      add that whilst exercising such power the court cannot be oblivious of
      the provisions contained in Order 47 Rule 1 of  CPC  as  well  as  the
      rules framed by the High Courts and  this  Court.  The  limits  within
      which the Courts can exercise the powers  of  review  have  been  well
      settled in a catena of judgments.  All the judgments have in fact been
      considered by the High Court in Pages 16 to 23.  The  High  Court  has
      also considered the judgment in              S.  Nagaraj  &  Ors.  Vs.
      State of Karnataka & Anr. (supra), which reiterates the principle that


           “19. Review literally and even judicially  means  re-examination
           or re-consideration. Basic philosophy  inherent  in  it  is  the
           universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the  realm  of
           law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour  of
           finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions  both
           statutorily and judicially  have  been  carved  out  to  correct
           accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even  when  there
           was no statutory provision and  no  rules  were  framed  by  the
           highest court indicating the circumstances  in  which  it  could
           rectify its order the courts culled  out  such  power  to  avoid
           abuse of process or miscarriage of justice……………..”


  63.  These  principles  are  far  too  well  entrenched  in   the   Indian
      jurisprudence, to warrant  reiteration.   However,  for  the  sake  of
      completion, we may notice that Mr. Bhushan had relied  upon  Board  of
      Control for Cricket in India v/s  Netaji  Cricket  Club  (supra),  and
      Green View Tea & Industries (supra). It would be useful  to  reiterate
      the following excerpts:
           In the case of Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra), it
      was observed that:
           “90. Thus, a mistake on  the  part  of  the  court  which  would
           include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call
           for a review of the order. An application for review would  also
           be maintainable if there  exists  sufficient  reason  therefore.
           What would constitute sufficient  reason  would  depend  on  the
           facts and circumstances  of  the  case.  The  words  “sufficient
           reason” in Order 47 Rule 1  of  the  Code  are  wide  enough  to
           include a misconception of fact or law by a  court  or  even  an
           advocate. An application for review may be necessitated  by  way
           of invoking the doctrine “actus curiae neminem gravabit”.


           This court in Green View Tea & Industries (supra) reiterated the
      view adopted by it in S. Nagaraj & Ors (supra). Therefore,  the  ratio
      of Green View Tea is not applicable in this case.


  64. In view of the observations made  in  the  aforesaid  judgments,  this
      Court would not be justified in holding that the High Court has  erred
      in law in not reviewing its earlier judgment.


  65. This apart, we have examined the entire issue threadbare ourselves  as
      the issue  with  regard  to  the  adverse  impact  on  the  candidates
      belonging to the reserves categories has not been  raised  before  the
      High Court nor considered by it.  In the earlier round, the issue  was
      also neither raised nor considered by this Court. When the order dated
      19th February, 2013 was passed, the issue with regard  to  reservation
      was also not canvassed.  But now that the issue had  been  raised,  we
      thought it appropriate to examine the issue  to  put  an  end  to  the
      litigation between the parties.


  66. In view of the above, the appeal is accordingly dismissed.


      Contempt Petition No.287 of 2013 in CIVIL  APPEAL  NO……………….  OF  2014
      (Arising out of SLP (C) No.22035 of 2013)




  67.   This  Petition  was  filed  by  the  Petitioner/Appellant,   seeking
      initiation     of     contempt     proceedings     against     alleged
      contemnors/respondent for disobeying the order  of  status  quo  dated
      12th July, 2013 passed by this Court in the aforesaid Civil Appeal.


  68. In view of the judgment passed by this Court in Civil Appeal  No………………
      of 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.22035 of 2013),  this  Petition  is
      dismissed as having become infructuous.


      CIVIL APPEAL NO……………OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.29740 of 2013


  69. This Civil Appeal was filed by Smt. Rukmini  Devi,  challenging  final
      order and judgment dated 19th August, 2013 passed by the High Court of
      Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Writ Petition No. (MB)  5999
      of 2013.


  70. The issues raised in this civil appeal are identical to those that  we
      have examined in Civil Appeal No……………… of 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C)
      No.22035 of 2013). Therefore, in view of the  judgment  in  the  Civil
      Appeal No……………… of 2014 (Arising out of SLP  (C)  No.22035  of  2013),
      this appeal is also dismissed.












                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                    [Surinder    Singh
      Nijjar]






                                                      ………………………………………….…..J.
                                            [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
                                 Kalifulla]


      New Delhi;
      March 28, 2014.

-----------------------
[1] (2013) 3 SCC 63
[2] (2004) 13 SCC 675
[3] (2010) 12 SCC 1
[4] (2007) 2 SCC 1
[5] (1959) Supp. 2 SCR 8
[6] (1955) 1 SCR 799
[7] (2004) 13 SCC 217
[8] (1991) 4 SCC 139
[9] (2004) 1 SCC 681
[10] (2004) 7 SCC 558
[11] (2005) 4 SCC 649
[12] (2005) 4 SCC 741
[13] (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595
[14] (2004) 4 SCC 122
[15] (1994) 2 SCC 753
[16] (1983) 1 SCC 305
[17] (1956) SCR 393
[18] (2000) 10 SCC 620
[19] (1990 1 SCC  109
[20] (1994) 3 SCC 366
[21] (1983) 1 SCC 305
[22] (1997) 7 SCC 463
[23] (2007) 6 SCC 81
[24] (1996) 3 SCC 709
[25] (1989) 4 SCC 318
[26] (1996) 10 SCC 304
[27] (1974) 2 SCC 402
[28] (1980) 2 SCC 332

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