published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40737 NON-
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7384 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.24415 of 2009)
Delhi Union of Journalist Cooperative
House Building Society Ltd. and others …Appellants
versus
Union of India and others …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
G.S. SINGHVI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Whether the amendment made in the Master Plan of Delhi vide
Notification dated 20.9.1995 permitting utilization of the sites
earmarked for Nursery Schools for other purposes is ultra vires the
provisions of the Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957 (for short,
‘the Act’) or is otherwise arbitrary and
whether allotment of 1000 sq.
yards (in some paragraphs of the special leave petition and the
documents annexed with it the size of the plot has also been mentioned
as 1200 sq. yards) of land earmarked in Gulmohar Park for Nursery
School to respondent No.4 – Kala Ashram, School of Dance and Drama,
New Delhi is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and/or
the Act are the questions which arise for consideration in this appeal
filed against judgment dated 24.10.2008 of the Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court.
3. Appellant No.1 is a cooperative housing society, appellant No.2
is a body representing four cooperative house building societies which
have land in and around the area known as ‘Gulmohar Park’ and
appellant No.3 is a society formed for establishing a Nursery School
in Gulmohar Park.
4. The site in question was initially allotted to Bethal Education
Society for construction of a Nursery School but the same was not
utilized for long time. In 1989, the appellants made representations
to the DDA for allotment of the land in question, but could not
persuade the concerned authorities to entertain their prayer.
Therefore, they filed CWP No.1185/1998 for issue of a mandamus to the
Delhi Development Authority (for short, ‘the DDA’) to allot the site
to them for establishing a Nursery School. When the writ petition was
taken up for hearing, it was noticed that the appellants had not
challenged the notification by which the Master Plan had been amended.
Faced with the possibility of dismissal of the writ petition on that
ground, learned counsel for the appellants made a request for
permission to withdraw the same with liberty to file a fresh one. The
learned Single Judge accepted the request and passed order dated
27.1.2000, the relevant portions of which are extracted below:
“I have perused the contents of the aforesaid amendment
application. It transpires therefrom that the petitioner seeks
to make the said petition, a public interest litigation. In that
view of the matter, the petition would be required to be heard
by the Division Bench, if the said amendment is allowed.
Counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the
present petition in order to enable the petitioner to file a
consolidated writ petition before the Division Bench with a
further order that the interim order passed on 9.3.1998 be
continued for another ten days. Permission granted.
The petition stands dismissed as withdrawn with a liberty to the
petitioner to file a consolidated petition before the Division
Bench. Pending applications stand disposed of accordingly. The
interim order passed by this Court on 9.3.1998 shall continue to
operate for another ten days.”
5. After few days, the appellants filed CWP No.662/2000 for
quashing notification dated 20.9.1995 issued by the Government of
India, Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment (Delhi Division) for
modification of the Master Plan and the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4. The Division Bench of the High Court referred to the
nature of amendment made in the Master Plan and observed:
“However, thereafter the purpose came to be amended by issuing a
notification dated 20.9.95, a copy of which is produced as
Annexure-7. The modification reads as under:-"At page 157 of the
Gazette of India Part-II Section 3 sub-section (ii) dated
1.8.1990 under heading Nursery School and Kindergarten School
(080) the following is added:
"The following neighbourhood facilities are permissible in
nursery school sites according to the layout plan, where no such
facility is available in the vicinity:
| | |
|i) |post office |
|ii) |community hall cum library |
|iii) |Dispensary |
|iv) |Health Centre |
|v) |Creche and Day care centre |
|vi) |Electric sub-station |
|vii) |Cooperative store |
|viii) |Milk booth |
|ix) |Fine arts school |
|x) |Maternity home |
|xi) |Child Welfare Centre |
| |(Charitable) |
It is pointed out by the petitioner that if there is a Fine Art
School in neighbourhood, then a plot reserved could not have
been allotted for another Fine Art School.
It is required to be noted that in the instant case, according
to the petitioner he has been trying his level best to get the
plot of land for the purpose of nursery school and he has been
writing for a long time. Copies of such correspondence are
placed on record. It is contended that a wrong has been done to
the petitioner by not allotting the plot for nursery school. It
is pointed out in para no. 11 of the affidavit sworn by Ms. Asma
Manzar, Director (Lands), DDA, that the petitioner was advised
vide letter-dated 25.10.1989 to get its case sponsored from the
Director of Education, Delhi Administration for taking further
action, while informing that the earlier allotment to Bethal
Education Society had been cancelled.
In view of this, the petition is not required to be entertained.
However, if the petitioner approaches the DDA with the requisite
recommendation/sponsorship, the DDA shall consider its case in
accordance with law. The petition is dismissed.”
6. Special Leave Petition (C) No. 18712/2004 filed by the
appellants was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 27.1.2006.
7. Unfazed by dismissal of the writ petition and the special leave
petition, the appellants made representation dated 10/13.2.2006 to
the Chairman, DDA for cancellation of the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4 and for allotment of the site to them for establishing
a Nursery School. Soon thereafter, they filed Writ Petition Nos.3192-
3194/2006 with similar prayer. The writ petitions were disposed of by
the learned Single Judge by taking cognizance of the statement made by
the counsel for the DDA that the Vice-Chairman would take appropriate
decision on the appellants’ representation keeping in view note dated
2.12.1990 recorded by the Minister for Urban Development.
8. In furtherance of the undertaking given by the counsel, Vice-
Chairman, DDA considered the representation of the appellants and
passed order dated 3.4.2006 whereby he rejected the appellants’ prayer
for cancellation of the allotment made in favour of respondent No.4 on
the ground that the writ petition and the special leave petition filed
by the appellants for quashing the allotment had already been
dismissed by the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court, respectively.
9. The appellants challenged the order of the Vice-Chairman in Writ
Petition (C) Nos.12122-12124/2006. They relied upon note dated
2.12.1999 recorded by the then Minister, Urban Development
incorporating therein his views against the allotment of Nursery
School sites for any other purpose.
10. The learned Single Judge referred to order dated 24.3.2004
passed by the Division Bench in WP(C) No.662/2000 and held that it was
not permissible for the appellants to resurrect their challenge to
notification dated 20.9.1995 or the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4. As regards the Minister’s noting, the learned Single
Judge observed that it was a general note and had nothing to do with
notification dated 20.9.1995 issued by the Central Government.
Paragraphs 9 to 11 of the order passed by the learned Single Judge,
which contain the reasons for rejection of the appellants prayer are
extracted below:
“To this Court it appears that the Respondents are justified in
contending that the prayers made by the writ petitioners here
already stand rejected by the Division Bench of this Court by
the order-dated 24.3.2004 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.662/2000.
The rejection of the said writ petition meant that the Division
Bench of this court had negatived the Petitioners' challenge to
both the notification dated 20.9.1995 of the Central Government
as well as the challenge to the allotment in favour of
Respondent No.4 pursuant to the said notification. The last
line of that order, which permitted the Petitioners to make a
representation to the DDA for considering its case in accordance
with law, was not meant to permit the Petitioners to raise the
very contentions, which had been rejected by the court by the
dismissal of the writ petition in Writ Petition (Civil)
No.662/2000. It only meant that the Petitioners could have
sought for the allotment of some other land, if available and
subject to the requirements of the law. Instead, what the
Petitioners appear to have done, is to re-agitate the issue
which already stood covered by the Order dated 24.3.2004 of the
Division Bench of this Court. This was clearly impermissible and
not intended by the said order.
The order dated 3.3.2006 of the learned Single Judge of this
Court requiring the DDA to take into account the note dated
2.12.1999 of the minister of Urban Development, has to be seen
in the light of the fact that the said note was not specific to
the allotment of the Respondent No.4. Moreover, the said note
was issued more than 2 years after the allotment made in favour
of Respondent No.4. That note is of a general nature and does
not advert to the notification dated 20.9.1995 issued by the
Central government, the challenge to the validity of which was
negatived by this Court and which has not been withdrawn or
cancelled by the Central Government, at least till such time the
allotment was made in favour of Respondent No.4.
The mere fact that the impugned order dated 3.4.2006 passed by
the DDA does not refer to the note dated 2.12.1999 of the
Minister of Urban Development, cannot make any difference to the
fact that the challenge to the validity of allotment in favour
of Respondent No.4 already stood negatived by this Court by its
Order dated 24.3.2004 rejecting the Writ Petition (Civil)
No.662/2000. The order dated 3.3.2006 certainly does not permit
the Petitioner to re-agitate the same issue all over again
either before the DDA or before this court.”
11. The Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed
by the Division Bench of the High Court. Some of the observations made
by the Division Bench are extracted below:
“14. We are further constrained by the result of the earlier
litigation initiated by the appellants and the challenge of the
appellants having been rejected. The principal plea of there
being another Fine Arts School in the vicinity and, thus, the
notification dated 20.9.1995 itself providing that in such a
case there was no need for making another allotment formed
subject matter of the first round of litigation. The appellants,
unfortunately, did not succeed and that SLP was also rejected by
the Supreme Court. That issue cannot be re-agitated again.
15. In the second round of litigation, all that could have been
done was that the effect of the note of the then Minister for
Urban Development to be considered. As to what would be the
result of such consideration is itself a moot point in view of
the challenge rejected in the first round of litigation. It is
true that the note dated 2.12.1999 of the then Urban Development
Minister has not been specifically mentioned in the decision
taken by the Vice Chairman, DDA on 3.4.2006. However, an
important aspect is that the note is general in nature and
cannot really be stated to constitute a substratum for giving
rights to the appellants to agitate the matter in Court. It was
the view of the then Minister of Urban Development arising from
a problem which was noticed by a certain members of Parliament.
Not only that the most important aspect of the note is that the
note itself makes it clear that the allotment should “cease
forthwith”. The note as made could, at best, have a future
impact while the allotment in favour respondent No. 4 stood
crystallized on the same being made, payment being accepted and
the possession having been handed over and much prior in time.”
12. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants argued that the impugned judgment and the order passed by
the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside because the High
Court committed serious error by invoking the doctrine of res judicata
for non-suiting the appellants. Learned senior counsel emphasised that
order dated 3.4.2006 passed by the Vice-Chairman gave fresh cause to
the appellants to seek intervention of the Court and the High Court
could not have dismissed the writ petition and the appeal on the
premise that the earlier writ petition had been dismissed. Shri Ranjit
Kumar then submitted that even though the note recorded by the
Minister, Urban Development was not translated into a formal order of
the Government, Vice-Chairman, DDA was duty bound to consider the same
and cancel the allotment made in favour of respondent No.4 because the
amendment made in the Master Plan was totally arbitrary and
unjustified. Learned senior counsel further argued that the disputed
allotment was ex-facie arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution because the same was not preceded by an advertisement
inviting applications from the eligible persons for allotment of the
site.
13. Shri L.N. Rao, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing
for the Union of India and Shri Atual Y. Chitale, learned senior
counsel appearing for respondent No.4 supported the impugned judgment
and argued that the appellants’ challenge to the allotment of site to
respondent No.4 was rightly rejected because CWP No.662/2000 filed by
them for quashing notification dated 20.9.1995 was dismissed by the
Division Bench of the High Court and the special leave petition was
dismissed by this Court. The learned Additional Solicitor General
relied upon the judgment in Shanti Sports Club and another v. Union of
India and others (2009) 15 SCC 705 and argued that note dated
2.12.1999 recorded by the then Minister, Urban Development cannot be
enforced because the same had not been translated into an order of the
Government of India. Shri Atul Y. Chitale argued that the High Court
rightly refused to entertain the appellants’ challenge to the order of
Vice-Chairman, DDA because the principal grievance made by them in the
matter of allotment of site to respondent No.4 had already been
negatived.
14. We have considered the respective arguments and scrutinized the
record. It is not in dispute that the writ petition filed by the
appellants for quashing notification dated 20.9.1995 by which the
Master Plan had been amended permitting use of Nursery School sites
for other purposes was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High
Court and their challenge to the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4 was also rejected. It is also not in dispute that the
appellants carried the matter to this Court but could not succeed and
the special leave petition filed by them was dismissed after hearing
counsel for the parties. Therefore, the representation made by them
to the Chairman, DDA for withdrawing the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4 was clearly misconceived and the High Court did not
commit any error by refusing to entertain the appellants’ prayer for
quashing the allotment of the site to respondent No.4.
15. The appellants got an opportunity to indulge in another round of
litigation because the advocate who appeared on behalf of DDA before
the High Court volunteered to make a statement that the Vice-Chairman
would take necessary decision in the light of note dated 2.12.1999 of
the Minister of Urban Development. It is impossible for any person of
ordinary prudence to accept the suggestion that the counsel appearing
for the DDA was unaware of the fate of the writ petition and the
special leave petition filed by the appellants questioning
notification dated 20.9.1995 and the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4. This being the position, there is no escape from the
conclusion that the undertaking given by the learned counsel was
totally uncalled for and the order passed by Vice-Chairman, DDA did
not entitle the appellants to file fresh writ petition for questioning
the rejection of their representation or for quashing notification
dated 20.9.1995 and the allotment made in favour of respondent No.4.
16. The note recorded by the Minister, Urban Development on
2.12.1999 did not have any legal sanctity and the same could not have
been relied upon by the appellants for seeking cancellation of the
allotment made in favour of respondent No.4 in 1997 because no order
was issued on the basis of that note and no notification was issued
withdrawing the amendment made in the Master Plan vide notification
dated 20.9.1995.
17. In Shanti Sports Club and another v. Union of India and others
(supra), a similar question was considered in the context of noting
recorded by the then Minister, Urban Development for release of the
acquired land in favour of the appellant.
While rejecting the
appellants’ prayer, this Court referred to the earlier judgments and
held:
“All executive actions of the Government of India and the
Government of a State are required to be taken in the name of
the President or the Governor of the State concerned, as the
case may be [Articles 77(1) and 166(1)]. Orders and other
instruments made and executed in the name of the President or
the Governor of a State, as the case may be, are required to be
authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be
made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be
[Articles 77(2) and 166(2)]. Article 77(3) lays down that:
“77. (3) The President shall make rules for the more
convenient transaction of the business of the Government of
India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said
business.”
Likewise, Article 166(3) lays down that:
166. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more
convenient transaction of the business of the Government of
the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the
said business insofar as it is not business with respect to
which the Governor is by or under this Constitution
required to act in his discretion.”
This means that unless an order is expressed in the name of the
President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order
on behalf of the Government.
A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and
nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the
particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting
can be treated as a decision of the Government. Even if the
competent authority records its opinion in the file on the
merits of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be
termed as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified
and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with Articles
77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file
or even a decision gets culminated into an order affecting right
of the parties only when it is expressed in the name of the
President or the Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated
in the manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A
noting or even a decision recorded in the file can always be
reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned and the court cannot
take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise
of the power of judicial review.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. By applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of
this case, we hold that note dated 2.12.1999 recorded by the Minister,
Urban Development cannot be made basis for quashing the allotment made
in favour of respondent No.4.
19. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
…………………………..J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
………………………….J.
(V. GOPALA GOWDA)
New Delhi;
September 6, 2013.
-----------------------
13
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7384 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.24415 of 2009)
Delhi Union of Journalist Cooperative
House Building Society Ltd. and others …Appellants
versus
Union of India and others …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
G.S. SINGHVI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Whether the amendment made in the Master Plan of Delhi vide
Notification dated 20.9.1995 permitting utilization of the sites
earmarked for Nursery Schools for other purposes is ultra vires the
provisions of the Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957 (for short,
‘the Act’) or is otherwise arbitrary and
whether allotment of 1000 sq.
yards (in some paragraphs of the special leave petition and the
documents annexed with it the size of the plot has also been mentioned
as 1200 sq. yards) of land earmarked in Gulmohar Park for Nursery
School to respondent No.4 – Kala Ashram, School of Dance and Drama,
New Delhi is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and/or
the Act are the questions which arise for consideration in this appeal
filed against judgment dated 24.10.2008 of the Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court.
3. Appellant No.1 is a cooperative housing society, appellant No.2
is a body representing four cooperative house building societies which
have land in and around the area known as ‘Gulmohar Park’ and
appellant No.3 is a society formed for establishing a Nursery School
in Gulmohar Park.
4. The site in question was initially allotted to Bethal Education
Society for construction of a Nursery School but the same was not
utilized for long time. In 1989, the appellants made representations
to the DDA for allotment of the land in question, but could not
persuade the concerned authorities to entertain their prayer.
Therefore, they filed CWP No.1185/1998 for issue of a mandamus to the
Delhi Development Authority (for short, ‘the DDA’) to allot the site
to them for establishing a Nursery School. When the writ petition was
taken up for hearing, it was noticed that the appellants had not
challenged the notification by which the Master Plan had been amended.
Faced with the possibility of dismissal of the writ petition on that
ground, learned counsel for the appellants made a request for
permission to withdraw the same with liberty to file a fresh one. The
learned Single Judge accepted the request and passed order dated
27.1.2000, the relevant portions of which are extracted below:
“I have perused the contents of the aforesaid amendment
application. It transpires therefrom that the petitioner seeks
to make the said petition, a public interest litigation. In that
view of the matter, the petition would be required to be heard
by the Division Bench, if the said amendment is allowed.
Counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the
present petition in order to enable the petitioner to file a
consolidated writ petition before the Division Bench with a
further order that the interim order passed on 9.3.1998 be
continued for another ten days. Permission granted.
The petition stands dismissed as withdrawn with a liberty to the
petitioner to file a consolidated petition before the Division
Bench. Pending applications stand disposed of accordingly. The
interim order passed by this Court on 9.3.1998 shall continue to
operate for another ten days.”
5. After few days, the appellants filed CWP No.662/2000 for
quashing notification dated 20.9.1995 issued by the Government of
India, Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment (Delhi Division) for
modification of the Master Plan and the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4. The Division Bench of the High Court referred to the
nature of amendment made in the Master Plan and observed:
“However, thereafter the purpose came to be amended by issuing a
notification dated 20.9.95, a copy of which is produced as
Annexure-7. The modification reads as under:-"At page 157 of the
Gazette of India Part-II Section 3 sub-section (ii) dated
1.8.1990 under heading Nursery School and Kindergarten School
(080) the following is added:
"The following neighbourhood facilities are permissible in
nursery school sites according to the layout plan, where no such
facility is available in the vicinity:
| | |
|i) |post office |
|ii) |community hall cum library |
|iii) |Dispensary |
|iv) |Health Centre |
|v) |Creche and Day care centre |
|vi) |Electric sub-station |
|vii) |Cooperative store |
|viii) |Milk booth |
|ix) |Fine arts school |
|x) |Maternity home |
|xi) |Child Welfare Centre |
| |(Charitable) |
It is pointed out by the petitioner that if there is a Fine Art
School in neighbourhood, then a plot reserved could not have
been allotted for another Fine Art School.
It is required to be noted that in the instant case, according
to the petitioner he has been trying his level best to get the
plot of land for the purpose of nursery school and he has been
writing for a long time. Copies of such correspondence are
placed on record. It is contended that a wrong has been done to
the petitioner by not allotting the plot for nursery school. It
is pointed out in para no. 11 of the affidavit sworn by Ms. Asma
Manzar, Director (Lands), DDA, that the petitioner was advised
vide letter-dated 25.10.1989 to get its case sponsored from the
Director of Education, Delhi Administration for taking further
action, while informing that the earlier allotment to Bethal
Education Society had been cancelled.
In view of this, the petition is not required to be entertained.
However, if the petitioner approaches the DDA with the requisite
recommendation/sponsorship, the DDA shall consider its case in
accordance with law. The petition is dismissed.”
6. Special Leave Petition (C) No. 18712/2004 filed by the
appellants was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 27.1.2006.
7. Unfazed by dismissal of the writ petition and the special leave
petition, the appellants made representation dated 10/13.2.2006 to
the Chairman, DDA for cancellation of the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4 and for allotment of the site to them for establishing
a Nursery School. Soon thereafter, they filed Writ Petition Nos.3192-
3194/2006 with similar prayer. The writ petitions were disposed of by
the learned Single Judge by taking cognizance of the statement made by
the counsel for the DDA that the Vice-Chairman would take appropriate
decision on the appellants’ representation keeping in view note dated
2.12.1990 recorded by the Minister for Urban Development.
8. In furtherance of the undertaking given by the counsel, Vice-
Chairman, DDA considered the representation of the appellants and
passed order dated 3.4.2006 whereby he rejected the appellants’ prayer
for cancellation of the allotment made in favour of respondent No.4 on
the ground that the writ petition and the special leave petition filed
by the appellants for quashing the allotment had already been
dismissed by the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court, respectively.
9. The appellants challenged the order of the Vice-Chairman in Writ
Petition (C) Nos.12122-12124/2006. They relied upon note dated
2.12.1999 recorded by the then Minister, Urban Development
incorporating therein his views against the allotment of Nursery
School sites for any other purpose.
10. The learned Single Judge referred to order dated 24.3.2004
passed by the Division Bench in WP(C) No.662/2000 and held that it was
not permissible for the appellants to resurrect their challenge to
notification dated 20.9.1995 or the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4. As regards the Minister’s noting, the learned Single
Judge observed that it was a general note and had nothing to do with
notification dated 20.9.1995 issued by the Central Government.
Paragraphs 9 to 11 of the order passed by the learned Single Judge,
which contain the reasons for rejection of the appellants prayer are
extracted below:
“To this Court it appears that the Respondents are justified in
contending that the prayers made by the writ petitioners here
already stand rejected by the Division Bench of this Court by
the order-dated 24.3.2004 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.662/2000.
The rejection of the said writ petition meant that the Division
Bench of this court had negatived the Petitioners' challenge to
both the notification dated 20.9.1995 of the Central Government
as well as the challenge to the allotment in favour of
Respondent No.4 pursuant to the said notification. The last
line of that order, which permitted the Petitioners to make a
representation to the DDA for considering its case in accordance
with law, was not meant to permit the Petitioners to raise the
very contentions, which had been rejected by the court by the
dismissal of the writ petition in Writ Petition (Civil)
No.662/2000. It only meant that the Petitioners could have
sought for the allotment of some other land, if available and
subject to the requirements of the law. Instead, what the
Petitioners appear to have done, is to re-agitate the issue
which already stood covered by the Order dated 24.3.2004 of the
Division Bench of this Court. This was clearly impermissible and
not intended by the said order.
The order dated 3.3.2006 of the learned Single Judge of this
Court requiring the DDA to take into account the note dated
2.12.1999 of the minister of Urban Development, has to be seen
in the light of the fact that the said note was not specific to
the allotment of the Respondent No.4. Moreover, the said note
was issued more than 2 years after the allotment made in favour
of Respondent No.4. That note is of a general nature and does
not advert to the notification dated 20.9.1995 issued by the
Central government, the challenge to the validity of which was
negatived by this Court and which has not been withdrawn or
cancelled by the Central Government, at least till such time the
allotment was made in favour of Respondent No.4.
The mere fact that the impugned order dated 3.4.2006 passed by
the DDA does not refer to the note dated 2.12.1999 of the
Minister of Urban Development, cannot make any difference to the
fact that the challenge to the validity of allotment in favour
of Respondent No.4 already stood negatived by this Court by its
Order dated 24.3.2004 rejecting the Writ Petition (Civil)
No.662/2000. The order dated 3.3.2006 certainly does not permit
the Petitioner to re-agitate the same issue all over again
either before the DDA or before this court.”
11. The Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed
by the Division Bench of the High Court. Some of the observations made
by the Division Bench are extracted below:
“14. We are further constrained by the result of the earlier
litigation initiated by the appellants and the challenge of the
appellants having been rejected. The principal plea of there
being another Fine Arts School in the vicinity and, thus, the
notification dated 20.9.1995 itself providing that in such a
case there was no need for making another allotment formed
subject matter of the first round of litigation. The appellants,
unfortunately, did not succeed and that SLP was also rejected by
the Supreme Court. That issue cannot be re-agitated again.
15. In the second round of litigation, all that could have been
done was that the effect of the note of the then Minister for
Urban Development to be considered. As to what would be the
result of such consideration is itself a moot point in view of
the challenge rejected in the first round of litigation. It is
true that the note dated 2.12.1999 of the then Urban Development
Minister has not been specifically mentioned in the decision
taken by the Vice Chairman, DDA on 3.4.2006. However, an
important aspect is that the note is general in nature and
cannot really be stated to constitute a substratum for giving
rights to the appellants to agitate the matter in Court. It was
the view of the then Minister of Urban Development arising from
a problem which was noticed by a certain members of Parliament.
Not only that the most important aspect of the note is that the
note itself makes it clear that the allotment should “cease
forthwith”. The note as made could, at best, have a future
impact while the allotment in favour respondent No. 4 stood
crystallized on the same being made, payment being accepted and
the possession having been handed over and much prior in time.”
12. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants argued that the impugned judgment and the order passed by
the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside because the High
Court committed serious error by invoking the doctrine of res judicata
for non-suiting the appellants. Learned senior counsel emphasised that
order dated 3.4.2006 passed by the Vice-Chairman gave fresh cause to
the appellants to seek intervention of the Court and the High Court
could not have dismissed the writ petition and the appeal on the
premise that the earlier writ petition had been dismissed. Shri Ranjit
Kumar then submitted that even though the note recorded by the
Minister, Urban Development was not translated into a formal order of
the Government, Vice-Chairman, DDA was duty bound to consider the same
and cancel the allotment made in favour of respondent No.4 because the
amendment made in the Master Plan was totally arbitrary and
unjustified. Learned senior counsel further argued that the disputed
allotment was ex-facie arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution because the same was not preceded by an advertisement
inviting applications from the eligible persons for allotment of the
site.
13. Shri L.N. Rao, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing
for the Union of India and Shri Atual Y. Chitale, learned senior
counsel appearing for respondent No.4 supported the impugned judgment
and argued that the appellants’ challenge to the allotment of site to
respondent No.4 was rightly rejected because CWP No.662/2000 filed by
them for quashing notification dated 20.9.1995 was dismissed by the
Division Bench of the High Court and the special leave petition was
dismissed by this Court. The learned Additional Solicitor General
relied upon the judgment in Shanti Sports Club and another v. Union of
India and others (2009) 15 SCC 705 and argued that note dated
2.12.1999 recorded by the then Minister, Urban Development cannot be
enforced because the same had not been translated into an order of the
Government of India. Shri Atul Y. Chitale argued that the High Court
rightly refused to entertain the appellants’ challenge to the order of
Vice-Chairman, DDA because the principal grievance made by them in the
matter of allotment of site to respondent No.4 had already been
negatived.
14. We have considered the respective arguments and scrutinized the
record. It is not in dispute that the writ petition filed by the
appellants for quashing notification dated 20.9.1995 by which the
Master Plan had been amended permitting use of Nursery School sites
for other purposes was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High
Court and their challenge to the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4 was also rejected. It is also not in dispute that the
appellants carried the matter to this Court but could not succeed and
the special leave petition filed by them was dismissed after hearing
counsel for the parties. Therefore, the representation made by them
to the Chairman, DDA for withdrawing the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4 was clearly misconceived and the High Court did not
commit any error by refusing to entertain the appellants’ prayer for
quashing the allotment of the site to respondent No.4.
15. The appellants got an opportunity to indulge in another round of
litigation because the advocate who appeared on behalf of DDA before
the High Court volunteered to make a statement that the Vice-Chairman
would take necessary decision in the light of note dated 2.12.1999 of
the Minister of Urban Development. It is impossible for any person of
ordinary prudence to accept the suggestion that the counsel appearing
for the DDA was unaware of the fate of the writ petition and the
special leave petition filed by the appellants questioning
notification dated 20.9.1995 and the allotment made in favour of
respondent No.4. This being the position, there is no escape from the
conclusion that the undertaking given by the learned counsel was
totally uncalled for and the order passed by Vice-Chairman, DDA did
not entitle the appellants to file fresh writ petition for questioning
the rejection of their representation or for quashing notification
dated 20.9.1995 and the allotment made in favour of respondent No.4.
16. The note recorded by the Minister, Urban Development on
2.12.1999 did not have any legal sanctity and the same could not have
been relied upon by the appellants for seeking cancellation of the
allotment made in favour of respondent No.4 in 1997 because no order
was issued on the basis of that note and no notification was issued
withdrawing the amendment made in the Master Plan vide notification
dated 20.9.1995.
17. In Shanti Sports Club and another v. Union of India and others
(supra), a similar question was considered in the context of noting
recorded by the then Minister, Urban Development for release of the
acquired land in favour of the appellant.
While rejecting the
appellants’ prayer, this Court referred to the earlier judgments and
held:
“All executive actions of the Government of India and the
Government of a State are required to be taken in the name of
the President or the Governor of the State concerned, as the
case may be [Articles 77(1) and 166(1)]. Orders and other
instruments made and executed in the name of the President or
the Governor of a State, as the case may be, are required to be
authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be
made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be
[Articles 77(2) and 166(2)]. Article 77(3) lays down that:
“77. (3) The President shall make rules for the more
convenient transaction of the business of the Government of
India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said
business.”
Likewise, Article 166(3) lays down that:
166. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more
convenient transaction of the business of the Government of
the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the
said business insofar as it is not business with respect to
which the Governor is by or under this Constitution
required to act in his discretion.”
This means that unless an order is expressed in the name of the
President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order
on behalf of the Government.
A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and
nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the
particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting
can be treated as a decision of the Government. Even if the
competent authority records its opinion in the file on the
merits of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be
termed as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified
and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with Articles
77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file
or even a decision gets culminated into an order affecting right
of the parties only when it is expressed in the name of the
President or the Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated
in the manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A
noting or even a decision recorded in the file can always be
reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned and the court cannot
take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise
of the power of judicial review.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. By applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of
this case, we hold that note dated 2.12.1999 recorded by the Minister,
Urban Development cannot be made basis for quashing the allotment made
in favour of respondent No.4.
19. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
…………………………..J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
………………………….J.
(V. GOPALA GOWDA)
New Delhi;
September 6, 2013.
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