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Saturday, September 28, 2013

When a court not inclined to grant anticipatory bail , can not direct the lower court to grant bail on the surrender of the accused - the orders to consider the bail application on surrender and release him on it's satisfaction of sureties submitted was misread by lower courts = On a reading of the said authoritative pronouncement and the principles that have been culled out in Savitry Agarwal there is remotely no indication that the Court of Session or the High Court can pass an order that on surrendering of the accused before the Magistrate he shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the learned Magistrate may deem fit and proper or the superior court would impose conditions for grant of bail on such surrender. When the High Court in categorical terms has expressed the view that it is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner-accused it could not have issued such a direction which would tantamount to conferment of benefit by which the accused would be in a position to avoid arrest. It is in clear violation of the language employed in the statutory provision and in flagrant violation of the dictum laid down in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and the principles culled out in Savitri Agarwal.”= In the case at hand, though such an order was not passed by the learned single Judge, yet the order passed by him was potent enough to create enormous confusion. And it has so happened. It is the duty of the superior courts to follow the command of the statutory provisions and be guided by the precedents and issue directions which are permissible in law. We are of the convinced opinion that the observations made by the learned single Judge while dealing with second application under Section 438 CrPC was not at all warranted under any circumstance as it was neither in consonance with the language employed in Section 438 CrPC nor in accord with the established principles of law relating to grant of anticipatory bail. We may reiterate that the said order has been interpreted by this Court as an order only issuing a direction to the accused to surrender, but as we find, it has really created colossal dilemma in the mind of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. We are pained to say that passing of these kind of orders has become quite frequent and the sagacious saying, “A stitch in time saves nine” may be an apposite reminder now. We painfully part with the case by saying so. 30. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the modification in the order passed by the learned single Judge in M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013 and the observations made hereinabove.

           published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40837
             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1545 OF 2013
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7678 of 2013)




      Ranjit Singh                                       … Appellant


                                   Versus


      State of M.P. and others                           …Respondents














                               J U D G M E N T




      Dipak Misra, J.




            Leave granted.

        2. This appeal, by special leave, is  directed  against  the  order
           dated 16.8.2013 passed by the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh,
           Bench at Gwalior, in  M.Cr.C.  No.  3370  of  2013  whereby  the
           learned single Judge has cancelled the order of bail granted  by
           learned first Additional Sessions Judge, Guna vide  order  dated
           6.2.2013 to the appellant.

        3. The facts  giving  rise  to  the  present  appeal  are  that  on
           14.8.2012 an FIR bearing No. 376/2012 was registered  at  Police
           Station, Kotwali, Guna, for offences punishable  under  Sections
           307, 147, 148, 149, 120B read with  Section  34  of  the  Indian
           Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act alleging
           that the appellant along with one Abhishek Hada and two  unknown
           persons had come to the market place where an altercation ensued
           between them and the informant and others.  It  was  alleged  in
           the FIR that two of these four persons were carrying weapons and
           they fired at the informant, respondent No. 3  herein,  and  one
           Dilip Singh.  After  the  injured  succumbed  to  the  injuries,
           Section 302 IPC was added.
The  appellant  apprehending  arrest
           filed an application under Section 438 of the Code  of  Criminal
           Procedure (CrPC) before the  first  Additional  Sessions  Judge,
           Guna, who vide order dated 14.9.2012 rejected the  same.  
Being
           unsuccessful in obtaining an  anticipatory  bail  the  appellant
           filed M.Cr.C. No. 8023 of 2012 which was dismissed as withdrawn.



        4. As the facts would further uncertain, after a  gap  of  sometime
           the appellant preferred the  second  application  for  grant  of
           anticipatory bail and the learned single Judge  in  M.Cr.C.  No.
           701 of 2013, by order dated 1.2.2013, took note of the fact that
           the petitioner therein  was  an  accused  in  crime  No.  376/12
           registered for commission of offences punishable under  Sections
           307, 302/34, 147, 148, 149, 120-B IPC and Sections 25 and 27  of
           the Arms Act and the submissions  canvassed  on  behalf  of  the
           learned counsel for the accused and the learned counsel for  the
           prosecution and ultimately directed as follows: -

           “Considering the nature  of  the  allegation  and  the  evidence
           collected in the case-diary, the petition is disposed of with  a
           short direction that the petitioner shall surrender  before  the
           Competent Court and shall apply for regular bail  and  the  same
           shall be considered upon furnishing necessary bail bond.”

        5. After the said order came to be passed, the appellant 
moved  two
           applications, 
one  under  Section  44(2)  and  
the  other  under
           Section 439 CrPC before the learned Sessions  Judge,  Guna,  who
           transferred the applications to the learned Additional  Sessions
           Judge for consideration.  
The learned Additional Sessions Judge,
           Guna, admitted the appellant to bail on  imposition  of  certain
           conditions.  We shall refer to the said order in detail when  we
           deal with the legal propriety of the same and  the  cancellation
           of the same by the High Court by the impugned order.

        6. At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the  wife  of  the
           deceased filed S.L.P. (Crl.) No.  2055  of  2013  assailing  the
           order dated 1.2.2013  passed by  the  learned  single  Judge  in
           M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013.  
This Court allowed the application for
           permission to file the special leave and thereafter observed  as
           follows: -

           “Although, we are of the view that this special  leave  petition
           has  no  substance,  since  the  order  under  challenge  merely
           directed  the  respondent-accused  to  surrender  and  pray  for
           regular bail.”

        7. Be it noted, in the said order taking note of the grievance that
           the wife and children of the deceased  were  threatened  by  the
           accused  this  Court   granted   liberty   to   apply   to   the
           Superintendent of Police, Guna, M.P. and also the Station  House
           Officer of Police Station Kotwali,  Guna  and  a  direction  was
           issued  that  if  such  application  would  be  made,  the  said
           authorities shall look into the matter with all seriousness  and
           take appropriate steps for  the  safety  of  the  wife  and  the
           children.
This Court  also  took  note  of  the  fact  that  an
           application for modification of the order was pending before the
           Division Bench of the High Court and, accordingly, observed that
           the  Division  Bench  may  consider  disposing   of   the   said
           application as expeditiously as possible.

        8. The Division Bench,  while  dealing  with  the  application  for
           modification, i.e., M.Cr.C. No. 971 of 2013,  vide  order  dated
           15.3.2013, reproduced the order passed in  M.Cr.C.  No.  701  of
           2013 and ascribing certain reasons modified the  order  and  set
           aside the order dated 6.2.2013  granting  regular  bail  by  the
           learned Additional Sessions Judge to the accused.

        9. Grieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred  Special
           Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2826 of 2013.  This Court on 4.4.2013,
           while dealing with the legal substantiality of the  said  order,
           opined thus: -

           “Having heard learned counsel for the parties,  we  are  of  the
           view that no useful SLP (Crl.) 2826/13 purpose will be served in
           keeping this matter pending here in view of the  fact  that  the
           Code of Criminal Procedure  does  not  provide  for  any  review
           against an order passed in criminal proceedings.

           The  proceedings  before  the  Division   Bench   was   entirely
           misconceived.  In the event the  order  of  the  learned  Single
           Judge of the High Court was misconstrued by  the  learned  trial
           court while granting bail to the petitioner, the remedy  of  the
           complainant would be to  challenge  the  same  before  the  High
           Court.

           Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition is allowed, the order of
           the Division Bench of the High Court  impugned  in  the  Special
           Leave Petition is set aside.  The complainant will be at liberty
           to proceed against the order of the trial court, granting  bail,
           if so advised.”

       10. It may be noted here that a grievance was made  with  regard  to
           grant of police protection and this Court  taking  note  of  its
           earlier order dated 6.3.2013 made certain observations.

       11. At this stage, we may sit in a time machine  and  take  note  of
           certain proceedings and the orders passed therein as  they  have
           been emphatically stressed upon by Mr. Anupam Lal  Das,  learned
           counsel for the appellant.
An application for  cancellation  of
           bail was filed before the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge,
           Guna by Dinesh Raghuvanshi, the  informant,  who,  on  2.4.2013,
           withdrew the application as by that time the Division Bench  had
           already set aside the order granting bail.  It is also necessary
           to state that the Additional Public Prosecutor, Guna,  had  also
           filed application for cancellation of  bail  on  11.2.2013.   An
           assertion has been made by learned  counsel  for  the  appellant
           that the same has been withdrawn when the High Court  was  moved
           for cancellation of the order granting bail.
We  have  referred
           to these events, as the learned counsel has endeavoured hard  to
           impress upon us that there has been suppression of facts by  the
           informant as well as the State, but  we  have  no  scintilla  of
           doubt that the non-reference to the said facts or non-mentioning
           of the same has, in  fact,  no  impact  on  the  merits  of  the
           impugned order passed by the High Court.

       12. Coming back to the chronology of narration,  after  disposal  of
           the Special Leave Petition (Crl.) 2826 of  2013,  the  informant
           and the wife of the deceased filed an application under  Section
           439(2) CrPC for cancellation of bail order dated 6.2.2013 passed
           by the learned 1st  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Guna  in  Bail
           Application No. 13 of 2013.  The learned single  Judge,  by  the
           impugned order, narrated the factual  matrix,  referred  to  the
           order passed by the High Court under Section 438 CrPC, took note
           of the submissions advanced at the Bar and  after  referring  to
           certain authorities which deal with cancellation  of  bail,  the
           allegations made in the FIR, the  proceedings  before  the  High
           Court and this Court, import of the order passed in M.Cr.C.  No.
           701 of 2013 and thereafter stated thus: -

           “In the instant case, as pointed hereinabove, the learned  First
           ASJ has not taken pain to consider the aforesaid aspects.   When
           this Court has expressly given the direction that respondent No.
           1 shall surrender before the Competent Court and shall apply for
           regular bail and the  same  shall  be  considered,  it  was  the
           bounden duty of  the  learned  First  ASJ  to  consider  
whether
           respondent No. 1 is entitled for the benefit of bail or not.  It
           is unfortunate that despite the objection raised  on  behalf  of
           the petitioners that this Court has not granted  the  bail,  the
           learned First ASJ, Guna, did  not  think  it  fit  to  seek  the
           clarification from this Court.  Instead of doing so, the learned
           First ASJ has granted the benefit of bail to respondent No. 1.”

       13. Thereafter, the learned single Judge referred  to  the  criminal
           antecedents  of  the  accused  and,  ultimately,    passed   the
           following order: -

           “In view of the aforesaid  analysis,  considering  that  learned
           First ASJ, Guna, while granting bail, misread the order of  this
           Court passed in  M.Cr.C.  No.  701/13  on  1.2.13,  has  ignored
           relevant material and has not  considered  the  well  recognized
           principles underlying the power to grant bail and  further  that
           there is prima facie material  that  after  releasing  on  bail,
           respondent No. 1 gave threatening to the widow of  the  deceased
           and her children and  obstructed  the  course  of  justice,  the
           petition deserves to be allowed.  
Hence, it is allowed  and  the
           bail granted by  learned  First  ASJ,  Guna,  vide  order  dated
           6/2/2013 to respondent No. 1 is hereby cancelled.  Bail Bonds of
           respondent No. 1 are cancelled.  
It is directed that  respondent
           No. 1 shall surrender before the learned First ASJ, Guna, and he
           shall be taken into custody forthwith.”

       14. We have heard Mr. Anupam Lal Das, learned counsel appearing  for
           the  appellant,  Mr.  Surendra  Singh,  learned  senior  counsel
           appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3, and the  learned  counsel
           for the State.

       15. First, we shall deal with the order passed by the High Court  in
           M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013.  We have already reproduced  the  same.
           The said order was the subject-matter of  challenge  in  Special
           Leave Petition (Crl.) No.  2055  of  2013  and  this  Court  has
           observed that the order under challenge was a mere direction  to
           the accused to surrender and pray for bail.  Thus, this  is  the
           interpretation placed by this Court on that order.  It is apt to
           mention here that prior to passing of the said order the learned
           Additional Sessions Judge had allowed the application for  grant
           of regular bail.  The Division Bench entertaining an application
           under Section 482 CrPC had modified  the  order  dated  1.2.2013
           passed in M.Cr.C.  No.  701  of  2013  and  on  that  basis  had
           cancelled the order granting bail in favour of the accused.  The
           said order was assailed  before  this  Court  in  Special  Leave
           Petition (Crl.) No. 2826 of 2013 and it was  set  aside  holding
           that the order was wholly misconceived  as  the  Division  Bench
           could not have reviewed the  earlier  order  under  Section  482
           CrPC.  However,  as  stated  hereinbefore,  this  Court  clearly
           stated that in the event the order of the learned  single  Judge
           of the High Court is misconstrued by  the  learned  trial  Court
           while granting bail to the accused, remedy  of  the  complainant
           would be to challenge the same before  the  High  Court.   There
           cannot be any trace of doubt that the challenge to the grant  of
           bail order by the learned Additional  Sessions  Judge  was  kept
           alive by this Court  and,  accordingly,  application  was  filed
           before the High Court which has been dealt with by  the  learned
           single Judge by the impugned order.

       16. The thrust of the matter is whether the learned trial Judge  has
           actually misconstrued the order and granted bail or  has  really
           considered the necessary facets as  required  to  be  considered
           while entertaining an application under Section  439  CrPC.   We
           have  bestowed   our   anxious   consideration   and   carefully
           scrutinized the order  dated  6.2.2013  passed  by  the  learned
           Additional Sessions  Judge,  Guna.   It  is  manifest  that  the
           learned trial Judge accepted the application for  surrender  and
           thereafter referring to the order passed in M.Cr.C. No.  701  of
           2013 has opined thus: -

           “In the aforementioned case the  Hon’ble  High  Court  vide  its
           order dated 01.02.2013 passed the  orders  with  the  directions
           that the applicant will surrender himself before  the  Competent
           Court and he will submit his application for regular  bail,  and
           the said concerned court will accept the said application  after
           furnishing of bail bonds.  Therefore, the Hon’ble High Court has
           issued the orders to  the  competent  court  in  favour  of  the
           applicant.  In compliance of order dated  01.02.2013  passed  by
           the Hon’ble High Curt in MCRC Case No. 701/13  u/s  438  Cr.P.C.
           surrendered before the Ld. Court, and because for trial of  case
           u/s 302 IPC the Ld. Court is  the  Competent  Court,  hence  the
           application of surrender of applicant may be  accepted  and  the
           bail application u/s 439 Cr.P.C. submitted by the applicant  may
           please be decided.”

       17. It is apt  to  note  here  that  number  of  times  the  learned
           Additional Sessions Judge has referred to the  order  passed  by
           the High Court and at one stage he has stated as follows: -

           “… the applicant had submitted  a  bail  application  being  No.
           154/2012 u/s 438 Cr.P.C. before the Ld. Session Judge.  The said
           application  was  rejected  on  14.09.2012  by  the  Ld.   First
           Additional Session Judge Shri R.P. Mankalia and being  aggrieved
           with the said  order,  the  applicant  filed  a  petition  being
           application No. M.C.R.C. No. 701/13 u/s 438 Cr.P.C.  before  the
           Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior Bench.  In  this
           matter, the Hon’ble High Court passed  its  judgment  and  order
           dated 01.02.2013 with the directions  that  the  applicant  will
           surrender himself before the competent court and  the  applicant
           will submit his application for regular bail and  the  concerned
           court  will  accept  the  application  and  bail  bonds  of  the
           applicant.  Therefore the Hon’ble  High  Court  has  issued  the
           directions for the Competent Court in favour of the applicant.”

       18. After so stating the learned trial Judge  has  referred  to  the
           submissions, application for remand  for  further  investigation
           and, eventually, passed the following order: -

           “It has been revealed after perusal of case and  case  diary  of
           the case that the bail application of the co-accused persons has
           already been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court.  Offence of the
           applicant/ accused person is not different from the  offence  of
           other  co-accused  persons.   Applicant  himself  has  presented
           himself before the Ld. Session Judge, Guna and he also presented
           himself before this Court.  After hearing all the parties by the
           Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh  at  Gwalior  Bench  titled
           Ranjit Singh Versus State of  Madhya  Pradesh  in  M.C.R.C.  No.
           701/13, the  Hon’ble  High  Court  has  passed  the  orders  for
           furnishing necessary bail bonds, hence, the application filed by
           the applicant u/s 439 Cr.P.C. is  justified  and  found  proper,
           therefore, the application of the applicant is accepted  and  he
           may be enlarged on bail on furnishing two bail bonds of sureties
           of Rs.75,000-75,000 each and personal bail bond of Rs.1,50,000/-
           to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guna.”

       19. We have reproduced the  said  order  in  extenso  to  appreciate
           whether as a matter of  fact  the  learned  Additional  Sessions
           Judge has misconstrued the import of the order  or  decided  the
           application under Section 439  CrPC  regard  being  had  to  the
           considerations that are to be kept in mind  while  dealing  with
           such an  application.   As  is  evincible,  there  has  been  no
           deliberation with regard to the requirements under  Section  439
           CrPC.  The order read in  entirety  clearly  reflects  that  the
           learned Additional Sessions Judge had  an  erroneous  perception
           and fallacious understanding of the order  passed  by  the  High
           Court and it is clear as day that the regular bail  was  granted
           on the bedrock of the order passed by the High  Court.   He  had
           absolutely misconstrued the order.  Thus, the  order  passed  by
           the learned Additional Sessions Judge is totally unjustified and
           illegal.

       20. It needs no special emphasis to state that there is  distinction
           between the parameters for grant of  bail  and  cancellation  of
           bail.  There is  also  a  distinction  between  the  concept  of
           setting aside an unjustified,  illegal  or  perverse  order  and
           cancellation of an order of bail on the ground that the  accused
           has misconducted himself or  certain  supervening  circumstances
           warrant such cancellation.  If the  order  granting  bail  is  a
           perverse one or  passed  on  irrelevant  materials,  it  can  be
           annulled by the superior court.  We  have  already  referred  to
           various paragraphs of the order passed by the  High  Court.   We
           have already held that the learned trial Judge has  misconstrued
           the order passed by the High Court.  However, we may  hasten  to
           add that the learned single Judge  has  taken  note  of  certain
           supervening circumstances to cancel the bail, but we are of  the
           opinion that in the obtaining factual matrix the  said  exercise
           was not necessary as the grant of bail  was  absolutely  illegal
           and unjustified as the court below had enlarged the  accused  on
           bail on the strength of the order passed in M.Cr.C. No.  701  of
           2013 remaining oblivious of the parameters  for  grant  of  bail
           under Section 439 Cr.P.C.  It is well settled in law that  grant
           of bail though involves exercise of discretionary power  of  the
           court, yet the said exercise has  to  be  made  in  a  judicious
           manner and not as a matter of course.

       21. In Chaman Lal v. State of U.P.[1],  this  Court,  while  dealing
           with an application for bail, has stated  that  certain  factors
           are to be borne in mind and they are: -

           “…. (i) the nature of accusation and the severity of  punishment
           in case of conviction and the  nature  of  supporting  evidence,
           (ii) reasonable apprehension of tampering with  the  witness  or
           apprehension of threat to the complainant, and (iii) prima facie
           satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.”

       22. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v.  Ashis  Chatterjee[2],  this  Court,
           while  emphasizing  on  the  exercise  of  discretionary   power
           generally has to be done in strict  compliance  with  the  basic
           principles laid down in plethora of decisions of this Court, has
           observed as follows: -

           “9… among other circumstances, the factors which are to be borne
           in mind while considering an application for bail are:

              i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to be
                 believed that the accused had committed the offence;

             ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

            iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

             iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on
                 bail;

              v) character, behavior, means, position and  standing  of  the
                 accused;

             vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

            vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being  influenced;
                 and

           viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted  by  grant  of
                 bail.”

       23. The said principles have been reiterated in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv
           Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu and another[3].

       24. In this  context,  we  may  refer  with  profit  to  the  recent
           pronouncement in Central Bureau of Investigation v. V. Vijay Sai
           Reddy[4] wherein the learned Judges have expressed thus: -

           “28.  While granting bail, the court has to  keep  in  mind  the
           nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof,
           the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the
           character of the accused, circumstances which  are  peculiar  to
           the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence  of
           the  accused  at  the  trial,  reasonable  apprehension  of  the
           witnesses being tampered  with,  the  larger  interests  of  the
           public/ State and other similar considerations.  It has also  to
           be kept in mind that for  the  purpose  of  granting  bail,  the
           Legislature  has  used  the  words   “reasonable   grounds   for
           believing” instead of  “the  evidence”  which  means  the  Court
           dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether
           there is a  genuine  case  against  the  accused  and  that  the
           prosecution will be able to  produce  prima  facie  evidence  in
           support of the charge.  It is not expected, at  this  stage,  to
           have the evidence establishing the guilt of the  accused  beyond
           reasonable doubt.”

       25. We repeat at the cost of repetition that the  aforesaid  aspects
           have not been kept in view by the  learned  Additional  Sessions
           Judge and, therefore, we are obliged in law  to  set  aside  the
           order passed by him and we so do.  In view of the extinction  of
           the order granting bail, the appellant shall surrender forthwith
           to custody failing which he shall be taken  to  custody  as  per
           law.  Liberty is granted to the appellant to move an application
           for grant of regular bail.  Needless to say, on such application
           being moved, the same shall be  considered  on  its  own  merits
           regard being had to the parameters which have been laid down  in
           aforestated authorities.

       26. We may hasten to add that because of  our  above  direction  the
           judgment of the High Court is required to  be  modified  as  the
           learned single Judge has cancelled the bail  by  taking  certain
           other aspects into consideration.  We may clearly state that  it
           would have been appropriate on the part of the High Court to set
           aside the order of  granting  bail  by  the  learned  Additional
           Sessions Judge and permit the accused to  surrender  to  custody
           and move an application  for  regular  bail.   Accordingly,  the
           order passed by the High Court is modified to that  extent.   It
           needs to be stated that when an application for regular bail  is
           moved, the learned trial Judge shall be free to  deal  with  the
           matter as per law without being influenced by  the  factum  that
           there had been an order of cancellation of bail.  We  have  said
           so as we have set aside the order  admitting  the  appellant  to
           bail as it is illegal and unjustified being solely based on  the
           observation made by the  High  Court  in  its  order  passed  in
           M.Cr.C. No. 701  of  2013.   We  may  further  add  that  proper
           opportunity shall be afforded to the Public  Prosecutor  to  put
           forth his stand and stance at the time of consideration  of  the
           application preferred by the accused for grant of bail.

       27. After saying so we would have proceeded  to  record  our  formal
           conclusion.  But, something more is required to be  stated.   We
           are absolutely conscious that this Court on earlier occasion  in
           Special Leave Petition (Crl.)  No.  2055  of  2013  had  clearly
           stated that  the  order  under  challenge  merely  directed  the
           respondent-accused to surrender and pray for regular bail.   The
           said clarification was made by this Court.  Prior to  that,  the
           learned trial Judge misconstruing the  order  had  enlarged  the
           accused on bail.

       28. This Court in Rashmi Rekha Thatoi and another v. State of Orissa
           and others[5] has dealt with an order of the High Court  whereby
           the learned single Judge, while not granting  anticipatory  bail
           to some accused persons, had directed that in case  the  accused
           persons surrender and move an application for regular bail, they
           shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be
           deemed fit and proper.  After referring to the language employed
           in Section 438 CrPC, the Constitution Bench decision in Gurbaksh
           Singh, Sibbia v. State of Punjab[6], and the law  laid  down  in
           Savitri Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra[7], Adri Dharan  Das  v.
           State  of  West  Bengalr[8],  State  of  Maharashtra  v.   Mohd.
           Rashid[9] and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal[10],  this
           Court has ruled thus: -

           “33.  We  have  referred  to  the  aforesaid  pronouncements  to
           highlight how the Constitution Bench in  Gurbaksh  Singh  Sibbia
           had analysed and explained  the  intrinsic  underlying  concepts
           under Section 438 of the Code, the nature of orders to be passed
           while conferring the said privilege,  the  conditions  that  are
           imposable and the discretions to be used by the  courts.   
On  a
           reading  of  the  said  authoritative  pronouncement   and   the
           principles that have been culled out in Savitry Agarwal there is
           remotely no indication that the Court of  Session  or  the  High
           Court can pass an order that  on  surrendering  of  the  accused
           before the Magistrate he shall be released on bail on such terms
           and conditions as the learned Magistrate may deem fit and proper
           or the superior court would impose conditions for grant of  bail
           on such surrender. 
 When the High Court in categorical terms has
           expressed the view that it is not inclined to grant anticipatory
           bail to the petitioner-accused it could not have issued  such  a
           direction which would tantamount to  conferment  of  benefit  by
           which the accused would be in a position to avoid arrest.  
It is
           in clear violation of the language  employed  in  the  statutory
           provision and in flagrant violation of the dictum laid  down  in
           Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and the principles culled out  in  Savitri
           Agarwal.”

            In the said case it has also been observed thus: -

           “… it is to be borne in mind that a court  of  law  has  to  act
           within the statutory command and not deviate from it.  It  is  a
           well-settled proposition of law what cannot  be  done  directly,
           cannot be done indirectly.  While exercising a statutory power a
           court is bound to act within  the  four  corners  thereof.   The
           statutory exercise of power stands on a different  footing  than
           exercise of power of judicial review.  This has been  so  stated
           in Bay Berry Apartments (P) Ltd. v. Shobha[11]  and  U.P.  State
           Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey[12].”

       29. In the case at hand, though such an order was not passed by  the
           learned single Judge, yet the order passed  by  him  was  potent
           enough to create enormous confusion.  
And it  has  so  happened.
           It is the duty of the superior courts to follow the  command  of
           the statutory provisions and be guided  by  the  precedents  and
           issue directions which are permissible in law.  
We  are  of  the
           convinced opinion that the  observations  made  by  the  learned
           single Judge while dealing with second application under Section
           438 CrPC was not at all warranted under any circumstance  as  it
           was neither in consonance with the language employed in  Section
           438 CrPC nor in accord with the established  principles  of  law
           relating to grant of anticipatory bail.  
We may  reiterate  that
           the said order has been interpreted by this Court  as  an  order
           only issuing a direction to the accused to surrender, but as  we
           find, it has really created colossal dilemma in the mind of  the
           learned Additional Sessions Judge.  
We are pained  to  say  that
           passing of these kind of orders has become  quite  frequent  and
           the sagacious saying, “A stitch in time saves nine”  may  be  an
           apposite reminder now.  We  painfully  part  with  the  case  by
           saying so.

       30. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the  modification  in  the
           order passed by the learned single Judge in M.Cr.C. No.  701  of
           2013 and the observations made hereinabove.




                                                                ……………………….J.
                                                              [Anil R. Dave]






                                                                ……………………….J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]


      New Delhi;
      September 27, 2013.
-----------------------
[1]    (2004) 7 SCC 525
[2]    (2010) 14 SCC 496
[3]    (2012) 9 SCC 446
[4]    2013 (7) SCALE 15
[5]    (2012) 5 SCC 690
[6]    (1980) 2 SCC 565
[7]    (2009) 8 SCC 325
[8]    (2005) 4 SCC 303
[9]    (2005) 7 SCC 56
[10]   (2008) 13 SCC 305
[11]   (2006) 13 SCC 737
[12]   (2006) 1 SCC 479


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