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Wednesday, January 16, 2013

whether the manufacture and sale of specified goods that do not physically bear a brand name, from branded sale outlets, would disentitle an assessee from the benefit of S.S.I. Notification No. 1/93-C.E., dated 28th February, 1993, as amended from time to time.= once it is established that a specified good is a branded good, whether it is sold without any trade name on it, or by another manufacturer, it does not cease to be a branded good of the first manufacturer. Therefore, soft drinks of a certain company do not cease to be manufactured branded goods of that company simply because they are served in plain glasses, without any indication of the company, in a private restaurant. The good will continue to be a branded good of the company that manufactured it. The same principle would apply in the case of potato chips, chocolates, biscuits, wafers, powders and other such goods often sold from various locations.- the cookies were sold from a dedicated outlet of “Cookie Man” where no other products but those of the assessee were sold. The invoices carry the name of the company and the cookies were sold from a counter of the store. In our opinion, the store’s decision to sell some cookies without containers that are stamped with its brand or trade name does not change the brand of the cookies. We are convinced that the cookies sold even without inscription of the brand name, indicate a clear connection with the brand name, in the course of assessee’s business of manufacture and sale of cookies under the brand name “Cookie Man”. They continue to be branded cookies of “Cookie Man” and hence cannot claim exemption under the SSI Notification. 21. In view of the aforegoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the impugned decision of the Tribunal is erroneous and unsustainable. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.


                                                     REPORTABLE
|IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                                     |
|CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                                      |
|CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 2826 OF 2006                                    |
|                                                                  |
|COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, |—         |      APPELLANT       |
|CHENNAI-II COMMISSIONERATE,     |          |                      |
|CHENNAI                         |          |                      |
|                                                                  |
|VERSUS                                                            |
|M/S AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P)  |—         |RESPONDENT            |
|LTD., CHENNAI                   |          |                      |


                               J U D G M E N T


D.K. JAIN, J.


1. The short question of law which arises for consideration in  this  appeal
   is,
whether the manufacture and sale  of  specified  goods  that  do  not
   physically bear a brand name, from branded sale outlets, would disentitle
   an assessee from the benefit of S.S.I. Notification No. 1/93-C.E.,  dated
   28th February, 1993, as amended from time to time.

2. Briefly stated, the material facts giving rise  to  the  appeal,  are  as
   follows:

      Pursuant  to  an  inspection  by  the  officials  of  the  enforcement
Commissionerate,  Chennai-II  at  the  sales  outlet   of   the   respondent
(hereinafter referred as “the assessee”), revealed  that  the  assessee  was
engaged in the manufacture and sale of cookies from branded  retail  outlets
of “Cookie Man”. The assessee had acquired this brand name from  M/s  Cookie
Man Pvt. Ltd, Australia (which in turn acquired it from M/s Auto- bake  Pvt.
Ltd., Australia). The brand name used the  words  “Cookie  Man”  accompanied
with a logo depicting the smiling face of a mustachioed chef.  The  assessee
was selling some of these cookies in  plastic  pouches/containers  on  which
the brand name described above was printed. No brand  name  was  affixed  or
inscribed on the cookies.  Excise duty was duly paid, on  the  cookies  sold
in the said pouches/containers.  However, on the cookies sold  loosely  from
the counter of the same retail outlet, with plain plates and  tissue  paper,
duty was not paid.

3. The retail outlets did  not  receive  any  loose  cookies  nor  did  they
   manufacture them. They received all cookies in sealed pouches/containers.
   Those sold loosely were taken out of the  containers  and  displayed  for
   sale separately. Even though  no  separate  register  was  maintained  to
   account for the sale of the cookies  sold  loosely,  their  numbers  were
   calculated from the number of empty pouches/containers left behind at the
   end of day.

4.   On scrutiny of the documents recovered from the said outlet and on  the
   basis of the statement of the Executive Director,  a  notice  dated  20th
   December, 2012 was issued to the assessee by  the  Commissioner  to  show
   cause as to why (i) the cookies sold by the assessee at  its  outlets  be
   not classified under Chapter sub-heading 1905.11 as biscuits and (ii)  in
   view of their use of brand name  “Cookie  Man”  on  sale  of  cookies  in
   plastic pouches/containers, S.S.I. exemption should not be disallowed.

5. Upon consideration of the explanation  furnished  by  the  assessee,  the
   Commissioner  inter-alia  came  to  the  conclusion   (relevant  for  the
   controversy at hand) that unless the specified goods or the packaging  in
   which these are sold, bear the brand name or the logo, prescribed  S.S.I.
   exemption cannot be denied. Thus, the Commissioner held that since  there
   was neither any material evidence nor averment to prove  that  the  brand
   name was embossed on the cookies, the assessee was eligible to  avail  of
   the benefit of small scale exemption in respect of cookies  sold  loosely
   from the counter of the retail outlet. Being aggrieved by the order, both
   the Department and the assessee filed cross appeals before  the  Customs,
   Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench  at  Chennai
   (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal).

6.  The decision of the Commissioner having been affirmed by  the  Tribunal,
   the revenue is before us in this  appeal  under  Section  35L(b)  of  the
   Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short “the Act”).

7. There is no dispute that the specified good is  to  be  classified  under
   sub-heading 1905.11 as Biscuits, manufactured with the aid of power.  The
   controversy revolves around para 4 of S.S.I. notification  No.  1/93-C.E.
   dated 28th February, 1993, which, in its erstwhile form, read as follows:
   -
        “4. The exemption contained in this notification shall not apply to
        the specified goods where  a  manufacturer  affixes  the  specified
        goods with a brand name  or  trade  name  (registered  or  not)  of
        another person who is not eligible for the grant of exemption under
        this notification…”

8. The  meaning  of  a  “brand  name”  or  “trade  name”  is  enunciated  in
   Explanation IX of the said notification which says: -
        “Explanation IX- ‘Brand name’ or ‘trade name’ shall  mean  a  brand
        name or trade name, whether registered or not, that  is  to  say  a
        name or a mark, such  as  symbol,  monogram,  label,  signature  or
        invented word  or  writing  which  is  used  in  relation  to  such
        specified goods for the purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate
        a connection in the course of trade between  such  specified  goods
        and some person using  such  name  or  mark  with  or  without  any
        indication of  the identity of that person.”



9. Para 4 of the said notification that deals  with  exemption  for  certain
   goods “affixed” with a brand name was amended vide notification No. 59/94-
   C.E. dated 1st March, 1994, to read:-
        “4. The exemption contained in this notification shall not apply to
        the specified goods, bearing a brand name or trade name (registered
        or not) of another person…”



10. Part (iii) of para J of the Budget Changes-1994-95 dealt  with  “Changes
   in the SSI schemes”   explains  the  purpose  of  the  amendment  in  the
   following words:
        “(iii) Brand name provision has been amended so as to provide  that
        SSI concession shall not apply to the goods bearing the brand  name
        or trade name of another person. The effect of  this  amendment  is
        that if an SSI unit manufactures  the  branded  goods  for  another
        person irrespective of whether the brand name owner himself is  SSI
        unit or not, such goods shall not be eligible for  the  concession.
        Another implication of this amendment is that  the  requirement  of
        affixation or brand name by the SSI unit has been changed  and  now
        the only condition is that the goods cleared by SSI unit bearing  a
        brand name  of  another  person  shall  not  be  eligible  for  the
        concession irrespective of the fact  whether  the  brand  name  was
        affixed by the SSI unit or that, the input material used by the SSI
        unit was already affixed with brand name.”



11.  Mr. N.Venkataraman, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf  of  the
   assessee argued that a combined reading of Para 4 and Explanation  IX  of
   the notification, along with Para J of the Budget Changes, would lead  to
   the conclusion that only specified goods bearing an affixed  brand  name,
   or in other words, those goods that physically display  the  brand  name,
   are not covered by the exemption.  Learned counsel relied on the decision
   of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Central  Excise,  Jamshedpur
   Vs. Superex Industries, Bihar[1] for  the  proposition  that  a  physical
   manifestation of a brand name on a good is a  necessary  requirement  for
   disqualification  from   the   exemption   granted   by   the   concerned
   notification. Learned counsel also relied on the same  decision  to  urge
   that this Court cannot look into the surrounding circumstances of a good,
   especially the specific outlet from which it is sold, to construe  if  it
   is branded or not; scrutiny, in his  opinion,  must  be  limited  to  the
   specified good itself. The relevant  paragraph  of  the  order  on  which
   emphasis was laid, reads as follows:
         “3. CEGAT has held that the benefit of the notification  would  be
        lost only if the manufacturer affixes the specified  goods  with  a
        brand name or trade name of the another who is not eligible to  the
        exemption under the notification. It could not be denied  that  the
        name Kirloskar is not affixed to the  generating  sets.  CEGAT  has
        held that merely because, in the invoices, the set is passed off as
        a Kirloskar generating set, the benefit of the  notification  would
        not be lost. We see no infirmity in this reasoning. We,  therefore,
        see no reason to interfere.”


12. We are unable to appreciate  as  to  how  a  compulsory  requirement  of
   physical manifestation of a brand name on the specified good, for  it  to
   be construed as a branded good, can be derived from  the  above  passage.
   The decision in the above case simply recognizes that the  benefit  would
   be lost only if a manufacturer affixes the specified goods with  a  brand
   or trade name of another who is not eligible for the exemption under  the
   notification. It does not state that the specified good must itself  bear
   or  be  physically  affixed  with  the  brand  or  trade  name.  Such  an
   interpretation would lead to absurd results in case of goods,  which  are
   incapable of physically bearing brand names.  For  instance,  the  goods,
   which, due to their very nature and structure, are incapable  of  bearing
   brand names, would always be  deemed  unbranded.  Liquids,  soft  drinks,
   milk, dairy products, powders, edible  products,  salt,  pepper,  sweets,
   gaseous products, perfumes, deodorants etc., to name a  few,  are  either
   liquids, gases or amorphous/brittle solids, making it impossible for  the
   good to be affixed with  a  brand  name.  In  some  situations,  such  an
   affixation may be impossible, in which case, it would be permissible  for
   the specified good to continue being a  branded  good,  as  long  as  its
   environment conveys that it is branded. By environment we mean  packaging
   and wrapping of the good, accessories  it  is  served  with,  uniform  of
   vendors, invoices, menu cards, hoardings and display  boards  of  outlet,
   furniture and props used, the specific outlet itself in its entirety  and
   other such factors, all of which together or individually  or  in  parts,
   may convey that a good is a branded one, notwithstanding that there is no
   physical inscription of the brand or  trade  name  on  the  good  itself.
   Further, a specific, dedicated and exclusive outlet from which a good  is
   sold is often the most crucial and conclusive factor to hold  a  good  as
   branded. The decision referred to above only made a  limited  point  that
   invoices alone cannot be the sole basis of construing whether a good is a
   branded good or not; it does not hold that a specified good  itself  must
   be stamped with a brand  name.  It  is  therefore,  permissible  to  look
   into the environment of the good. However, like in the case of  Kirloskar
   generators [Superex Industries  (supra)],  invoices  bearing  brand  name
   could not be the sole basis of construing whether goods  are  branded  or
   not. That decision would depend on the facts  and  circumstances  of  the
   case. There can be no precise formula for such a determination;  in  some
   cases certain factors may carry more weight  than  in  other  situations.
   However, in most circumstances, an exclusive branded  outlet  from  which
   the good is sold, would be a crucial factor in determining the question.

13.   Learned counsel strongly relied on another decision of this  Court  in
   Kohinoor Elastics (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore[2],
   for the proposition that only the “specified good” in  question  must  be
   scrutinized and the expression cannot  be  expanded  to  mean  “specified
   outlets” or other surrounding circumstances.  To bring  home  his  point,
   reliance was placed on the following paragraphs from the said decision:

      “5. Clause  4  of  the  notification  is  unambiguous  and  clear.  It
      specifically states that the exemption contained in  the  notification
      shall not apply to specific goods which bear a  brand  name  or  trade
      name (registered or not) of another person. It is settled law that  to
      claim exemption under a notification one must strictly comply with the
      terms of the notification. It is not permissible to imply  words  into
      the notification which the legislature has  purposely  not  used.  The
      framers were aware that use of a brand/trade name is generally to show
      to a consumer a connection between the goods and a person. The framers
      were aware that  goods  may  be  manufactured  on  order  for  captive
      consumption by that customer and bear the  brand/trade  name  of  that
      customer. The framers were aware that such goods  may  not  reach  the
      market in the form in which they were supplied to  the  customer.  The
      framers were aware that the customer may merely use such goods  as  an
      input for the goods manufactured by him.  Yet  clause  4  provides  in
      categoric terms that the exemption is  lost  if  the  goods  bear  the
      brand/trade name  of  another.  Clause  4  does  not  state  that  the
      exemption is lost only in respect of such goods as reach  the  market.
      It does not carve out an exception for goods manufactured for  captive
      consumption. The framers meant what they provided. The  exemption  was
      to be available only to goods which did not bear a brand/trade name of
      another. The reason for this is obvious. If use of  brand/trade  names
      were to be permitted on  goods  manufactured  as  per  the  orders  of
      customers or which are to be captively  consumed  then  manufacturers,
      who are otherwise not entitled to exemption, would get their goods  or
      some inputs manufactured on  job-work  basis  or  through  some  small
      party, freely use their brand/trade name on the goods and avail of the
      exemption. It is to foreclose such a thing that clause 4 provides,  in
      unambiguous terms, that the exemption is lost if the  “goods”  bear  a
      brand/trade name of another.”

           xxxxx       xxxxx            xxxxx
       
      “7. ….Now in this case there is no dispute on facts.  The  “course  of
      trade” of the appellants is making elastics for  specified  customers.
      It is an admitted  position  that  the  appellants  are  affixing  the
      brand/trade name of their customers on the elastics. They are being so
      affixed because the appellants and/or the customer wants  to  indicate
      that the “goods (elastic)” have a connection with that customer.  This
      is clear from the fact that the elastics on which brand/trade name  of
      ‘A’ is affixed will not  and  cannot  be  used  by  any  person  other
      than the person using that brand/trade name. As  set  out  hereinabove
      once a brand/trade name  is  used  in  the  course  of  trade  of  the
      manufacturer, who is  indicating  a  connection  between  the  “goods”
      manufactured by him and the person using  the  brand/trade  name,  the
      exemption is lost. In  any  case  it  cannot  be  forgotten  that  the
      customer wants his brand/trade name affixed on the product not for his
      own knowledge or interest. The elastic supplied by the  appellants  is
      becoming part and parcel of the undergarment. The customer is  getting
      the brand/trade name affixed because he wants the ultimate customer to
      know that there is a connection between the product and him…”


14. We feel that to hold from the above passages that  every  good  must  be
   physically stamped with a brand or trade name to be considered a  branded
   good in terms of the notification, and that, one  is  forbidden  to  look
   beyond the specified good into the surrounding environment of the good in
   construing if  it  is  a  branded  good  or  not,  would  be  a  complete
   misunderstanding of the above judgment and a distortion of the concept of
   a brand or trade name. The above judgment makes no such  observation  and
   was delivered on a completely different set of facts  and  circumstances.
   It involved a case of undergarments manufactured by a producer P2,  which
   used branded elastics produced by P1, and retained the brand name  of  P1
   in the final product. P2 was denied exemption under the same notification
   involved in the present case because of the appearance of brand  name  of
   another i.e. P1, not covered by the  same  notice.  P2  argued  that  the
   presence of  P1’s  brand  name  should  not  be  taken  as  a  basis  for
   disqualification from the benefits of the exemption  since  the  customer
   buying the good would continue to associate the good with P2 and not  P1,
   thus making it a branded  good  of  only  P2.  This  Court  rejected  the
   contention and held that P1 is providing  a  stamped  input  for  captive
   consumption to P2 “because he wants the ultimate customer  to  know  that
   there is a connection between the product and  him”.  The  Court  further
   observed that the term “specified goods” is used without any caveats  and
   hence rejected the contention that some consideration should be given  to
   the fact that P1 was used only as an input in the  making  of  the  final
   product of P2.  It is in this background that this  Court  observed  that
   the requirement of the notifications must  be  adhered  to  strictly  and
   cannot be diluted by substituting the term  “specified  goods”  with  the
   nature of goods or the manner of disposal.  In case  the  specified  good
   clearly exhibits a brand name of another not covered by the notification,
   it would squarely fall within the confines of Para 4 of the notification;
   looking beyond the specified good to consider whether it is an  input  or
   not is not necessary in case of a conspicuous  brand  name.  However,  to
   apply this principle to the scenario of a specified good  that  does  not
   contain a brand name at all would be equivalent to fitting a  square  peg
   in a round hole. If a final product is marked or  stamped  with  a  brand
   name, it is clearly a branded good; to stretch this  principle  to  imply
   that one not marked by any brand is an unbranded good, is  untenable.  In
   case a scrutiny of the good itself fails to reveal a brand name then  the
   search must not end  there;  one  ought  to  look  into  the  surrounding
   circumstances of the good to decipher, if it is in fact branded or not.

15. We are of the opinion that such an approach  is  necessary  to  maintain
   the essence of the concept of a brand name. A brand/ trade name must  not
   be reduced to a label or sticker that is affixed on a good. The  test  of
   whether the good is branded  or  unbranded,  must  not  be  the  physical
   presence of the brand name on the good, but whether it, as Explanation IX
   reads, “is used in relation to such specified goods for  the  purpose  of
   indicating, or so as to indicate a connection  in  the  course  of  trade
   between such specified goods and some person using such name or mark with
   or without any indication of the  identity  of  the  person.”  Therefore,
   whether the brand name appears in entirety or in parts or does not appear
   at all cannot be the chief criterion; primary focus has to be on  whether
   an indication of a connection is conveyed in the course of trade  between
   such specified goods and some person using the  mark.  Highlighting  this
   principle, this Court in  Commissioner  of  Central  Excise,  Trichy  Vs.
   Rukmani Pakkwell Traders[3] observed thus: -

      “6. The Tribunal had also held that under  the  notification  the  use
      must be of “such brand name”. The Tribunal has  held  that  the  words
      “such brand name” show that the very same brand  name  or  trade  name
      must be used. The Tribunal has held that if there are any  differences
      then the exemption would not be lost. We are afraid that in coming  to
      this conclusion the Tribunal has ignored Explanation  IX.  Explanation
      IX makes it clear that the brand name or trade name shall mean a brand
      name or trade name (whether registered or not), that is to say, a name
      or a  mark,  code  number,  design  number,  drawing  number,  symbol,
      monogram, label, signature or invented word or writing. This makes  it
      very clear that even a use of part of a brand name or trade  name,  so
      long as it indicates a connection in the  course  of  trade  would  be
      sufficient to disentitle the person from getting exemption  under  the
      notification. In this case, admittedly, the brand name or  trade  name
      is the word “ARR” with the photograph of the  founder  of  the  group.
      Merely because the registered trade mark is  not  entirely  reproduced
      does not take the respondents out of clause 4 and make  them  eligible
      to the benefit of the notification.”

16. Similarly, in Commissioner of Central Excise,         Chandigarh-I,  Vs.
   Mahaan Dairies[4], it was noted as follows:
      “6. We have today  delivered  a  judgment  in CCE v. Rukmani  Pakkwell
      Traders, (2004) 11 SCC 801  wherein we have held in respect of another
      notification containing identical words that it  makes  no  difference
      whether the goods on which the trade name or mark is used are the same
      in respect of which the trade mark is registered. Even  if  the  goods
      are different, so long as the trade name or brand name  of some  other
      company  is  used  the  benefit  of  the  notification  would  not  be
      available. Further, in our view, once a trade name or brand  name   is
      used then mere use of additional words would not enable the  party  to
      claim the benefit of the notification.”


      “8.  It  is  settled  law  that  in  order  to  claim  benefit  of   a
      notification, a party must strictly  comply  with  the  terms  of  the
      notification. If on wording of the notification  the  benefit  is  not
      available then by stretching the  words  of  the  notification  or  by
      adding words to the notification  benefit  cannot  be  conferred.  The
      Tribunal has  based  its  decision  on  a  decision  delivered  by  it
      in Rukmani Pakkwell Traders v. CCE (1999) 109 ELT 204 (CEGAT). We have
      already overruled the decision in that case. In this case also we hold
      that the decision of the Tribunal is unsustainable. It is  accordingly
      set aside.”




17. As aforesaid, once it is established that a specified good is a  branded
   good, whether it is sold without any trade name  on  it,  or  by  another
   manufacturer, it does not cease  to  be  a  branded  good  of  the  first
   manufacturer. Therefore, soft drinks of a certain company do not cease to
   be manufactured branded goods of that company  simply  because  they  are
   served in plain glasses, without any indication  of  the  company,  in  a
   private restaurant. The good will continue to be a branded  good  of  the
   company that manufactured it. The same principle would apply in the  case
   of potato chips, chocolates, biscuits, wafers,  powders  and  other  such
   goods often sold from various locations.

18. In case of goods sold from exclusive  single  brand  retail  outlets  or
   restaurants or stores, the fact that a good is sold  from  such  a  store
   ought to be a relevant fact in construing if the good is its branded good
   or not. In the case of  such  goods,  perhaps  a  rebuttable  presumption
   arises in favour of such goods  being  branded  goods  of  the  specified
   store. Such a presumption can  be  rebutted  if  it  is  shown  that  the
   specified  good  being  sold  is  in  fact  a  branded  good  of  another
   manufacturer. Thus, branded potato chips, soft  drinks,  chocolates  etc.
   though sold from such outlets, will not be considered to be goods of such
   outlets. However, all other goods, sold without any appearance of a brand
   or trade name on them, would  not  be  deemed  unbranded  goods;  to  the
   contrary, they may be deemed to be branded goods of that outlet unless  a
   different brand or trade name appears.

19. Hence, we hold that it is not necessary for goods to be stamped  with  a
   trade or brand name to be considered  as  branded  goods  under  the  SSI
   notification,  discussed   above.   A   scrutiny   of   the   surrounding
   circumstances is not only permissible,  but  necessary  to  decipher  the
   same; the most important of these factors being the specific outlet  from
   which the good is sold. However, such factors would carry different  hues
   in different scenarios. There can be no single formula to determine if  a
   good is branded or not; such determination would vary from case to  case.
   Also, our observations must be  limited  to  this  notification  and  not
   supplanted to other laws with similar subject matter pertaining to  trade
   names and brand names.

20. Applying the said principles on the facts at hand,
we fail  to  see  how
   the same branded cookies, sold in containers,  can  transform  to  become
   unbranded ones, when  sold  from  the  same  counter,  or  even  from  an
   adjoining counter, without packaging carrying the brand name.
Admittedly,
   on the same cookies,  physically  bearing  brand  “Cookie  Man”  sold  in
   containers carrying brand name duty is paid.
It is interesting  to  note
   that learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the  assessee  first  argued
   that to determine if the cookies sold from the  counter  are  branded  or
   not, scrutiny must be limited to  the  case  of  the  cookies  themselves
   without looking at the surrounding circumstances; yet went  on  to  argue
   that the tissues and plates they were served on did not bear the brand of
   the specified good. Either the environment of the  goods  can  be  looked
   into,  or  cannot  be  taken  into  consideration  at  all.
Once  it  is
   established, as in the instant case, that the environment  of  the  goods
   can be gone into to construe if it is branded or not, we do not  see  why
   the environment of the goods should be limited to the plates and tissues,
   on which they are served.
As aforesaid, in the instant case,
the cookies were sold from a dedicated outlet of “Cookie Man” where no other products but those of the assessee were sold. 

The invoices carry the name  of  the company and the cookies were sold from a counter of the  store.  
 In  our
   opinion, the store’s decision to sell  some  cookies  without  containers
   that are stamped with its brand or trade name does not change  the  brand
   of the cookies.  
We are convinced that  the  cookies  sold  even  without
   inscription of the brand name, indicate a clear connection with the brand
   name, in the course of assessee’s business of  manufacture  and  sale  of
   cookies under the brand name “Cookie Man”.  
They continue to  be  branded
   cookies of “Cookie Man” and hence cannot claim exemption  under  the  SSI
   Notification.

21. In view of the aforegoing discussion, we are of  the  opinion  that  the
   impugned  decision  of  the  Tribunal  is  erroneous  and  unsustainable.
   Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set  aside,
   leaving the parties to bear their own costs.


|                         |……..………………………………….                     |
|                         |(D.K. JAIN, J.)                        |
|                         |                                       |
|                         |                                       |
|                         |……..………………………………….                     |
|                         |(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)             |
|                                                                 |
|NEW DELHI,               |                                       |
|JANUARY 14, 2013         |                                       |

RS















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[1]    (2005) 4 SCC 207
[2]    (2005) 7 SCC 528
[3]    (2004) 11 SCC 801
[4]    (2004) 11 SCC 798

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