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Sunday, June 17, 2012

Muslim law-Religious endowment-Surplus income to be dis- tributed amongst the members of the family-Claim by females- If governed by custom or personal law-Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (26 of 1937), as amended by Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Madras Amendment) Act, 1949 (Mad. 18 of 1949), S. 2. Limitation-Declaratory suit with consequential relief-If maintainable-Right to sue-Computation-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), art. 120. Under a scheme a Board of Trustees was appointed for administration of the Durga and a Masjid for the maintenance of which the Nawab of Carnatic had granted two villages in Inam. The income of the institution after disbursing the expenses had since long been shared by the descendants in four families in equal shares. The scheme also provided that the surplus income was to be distributed amongst the members of the said four families. One of the descendants died leaving him surviving his wife and two daughters who were obstructed in the performance of the "Urs" by the appellant's father. The said Muslim female members filed a suit for declaration that they were entitled to enjoy the properties and to manage the Durga, perform the "Urs" festival and receive all incomes, endowments and perquisites thereof once in every eight years according to their turn. The right to a share in the income was denied by the appellant contending that by custom in the family, females were excluded from inheritance and that the claim was barred by the law of limitation and that, in any event, the suit for mere declaration was not maintainable. Held, that a suit for declaration of rights with a consequential relief for injunction was not a suit for declaration simpliciter; it was a suit for declaration with further relief and was not barred under art. 120 Of the Indian Limitation Act merely because the contesting defendant did not recognise the right. The period of six years prescribed by art. 120 is to be computed from the date when the right to sue accrued and there could be no right to sue until there was an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequi- vocal threat to infringe that right. If under the law a person was entitled to any legitimate right, the mere denial of the right will not set the period of limitation running against the person entitled to such right. 68 Held, further, that on the enactment of the Shariat Act 26 Of 1937, as amended by the' Madras Act r8 Of 1949, the Muslim Personal Law applies in all cases relating to the matters specified notwithstanding any customer usage to the contrary even at the stage of appeals, if other conditions prescribed under the Act are fulfilled. Kunj Behari Prasadji Purshottam Prasadji v. Keshavld Hiralal. (1904) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 567, discussed. Syed Roshan Ali v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi and Others, A.I.R. 1943 Lah. 219, disapproved. 1961 AIR 808, 1962( 1 )SCR 67, , ,


PETITIONER:
C.MOHAMMED YUNUS

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
SYED UNISSA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
14/02/1961

BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
KAPUR, J.L.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:
 1961 AIR  808  1962 SCR  (1) 67
 CITATOR INFO :
 R    1966 SC 470 (13)
 F    1974 SC 923 (49)


ACT:
Muslim law-Religious  endowment-Surplus income to  be dis-
tributed amongst the members of the family-Claim by females-
If  governed by custom or personal law-Muslim  Personal Law
(Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (26 of 1937), as amended  by
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Madras Amendment)
Act, 1949 (Mad. 18 of 1949), S. 2.
Limitation-Declaratory suit  with  consequential  relief-If
maintainable-Right to sue-Computation-Indian Limitation Act,
1908 (IX of 1908), art. 120.



HEADNOTE:
Under  a  scheme  a  Board of  Trustees was  appointed for
administration of the Durga and a Masjid for the maintenance
of  which the Nawab of Carnatic had granted two villages  in
Inam. The income of the institution after  disbursing the
expenses  had since long been shared by the  descendants  in
four  families in equal shares.  The scheme  also  provided
that  the surplus income was to be distributed amongst the
members of the said four families.  One of the descendants
died  leaving him surviving his wife and two  daughters who
were  obstructed  in  the performance of the  "Urs"  by the
appellant's father.
The said Muslim female members filed a suit for declaration
that  they  were  entitled to enjoy the properties  and  to
manage the Durga, perform the "Urs" festival and receive all
incomes,  endowments and perquisites thereof once  in  every
eight  years according to their turn.  The right to a  share
in the income was denied by the appellant contending that by
custom in the family, females were excluded from inheritance
and  that the claim was barred by the law of limitation and
that,  in any event, the suit for mere declaration  was not
maintainable.
Held,  that  a suit  for  declaration of  rights  with   a
consequential  relief  for  injunction was not a  suit for
declaration simpliciter; it was a suit for declaration with
further relief and was not barred under art. 120  Of the
Indian Limitation  Act  merely  because   the  contesting
defendant  did not recognise the right. The period  of six
years prescribed by art. 120 is to be computed from the date
when the right to sue accrued and there could be no right to
sue until there was an accrual of the right asserted in the
suit  and its infringement or at least a clear and  unequi-
vocal threat to infringe that right.
If  under  the law a person was entitled to  any  legitimate
right, the mere denial of the right will not set the  period
of  limitation running against the person entitled  to such
right.
68
Held,  further, that on the enactment of the Shariat Act  26
Of  1937,  as  amended by the' Madras Act r8  Of  1949, the
Muslim Personal  Law applies in all cases relating  to the
matters specified notwithstanding any customer usage to the
contrary  even at the stage of appeals, if other  conditions
prescribed under the Act are fulfilled.
Kunj   Behari  Prasadji Purshottam  Prasadji  v.   Keshavld
Hiralal. (1904) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 567, discussed.
Syed Roshan Ali v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi and Others, A.I.R. 1943
Lah. 219, disapproved.



JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 512 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated
August 29' 1952, of the Madras High Court in Second  Appeal
No. 2349 of 1946.
Azizuddin and K. R. Choudhury , for the appellant.
Shaukat Hussain and P.C. Agarwala, for respondents  Nos.  1
and 2.
1961.  February 14.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
SHAH  J.-There is  in the  village  of Cavelong,  District
Chiugleput in the State of Madras an ancient Durgah to which
is appurtenant a Masjid.  The Nawab of Carnatic had  granted
two  villages in inam for the maintenance of the Durgah and
the  Masjid.   Offerings from the devotees who visited the
Durgah and the Maajid were also received.  The income of-the
institution  after disbursing the expenses of "Sandal", and
"Urs" and of feeding the poor has since long been shared  by
descendants  in four families in equal shares. By  'Custom
females and persons claiming through females were  excluded
from  receiving a share of the income and  the income was
distributed  amongst the males descended 'in the male  fine.
In original suit No. 27 of 1940 of the file of the  Subordi-
nate   Judge, Chingleput,   a scheme  was framed for
administration of the Durgah and the Masjid and a Board  of
trustees  was  appointed for that purpose.  By the  scheme,
provision  was. made for distribution of the surplus  income
amongst the members of the four families.
69
Fakruddin,  in the following genealogy, belonged to  one  of
the four families which received the income.
    Sheik Mohammad
Fakir Mohammad     Sheik Miran
Giasuddin     Nismat Ulla
Khamruddin     Nayeem Uddir
Fakir Mohammad
Fakruddin=Sulai- Niama Ulla   Abdul  Safi
man Bi      Wahid  Ulla
(2nd plaintiff) (1st deft.)
Nayeemuddin
(died unmarried)
Ramat      Syed Un-
Unnissa (2nd      nissa (Ist
defendant)       plaintiff)
As  a  descendant of Sheik Mohammad,  Fakruddin received  a
1/8th share of. the income.  He was also by arrangement with
others entitled to perform the "Urs" ceremony once in  eight
years. Fakruddin  died in 1921 leaving him  surviving his
wife  Sulaiman Bi and two daughters Rahmat Unnissa and Syed
Unnissa.  Sulaiman Bi is plaintiff No. 2 and Rahmat  Unnissa
and  Syed  Unnissa  are respectively  defendant No.  2 and
plaintiff  No. 1 in suit No. 156 of 1937 out of which this
appeal arises.
In  the year 1926, it was the turn of Fakruddin to  perform
the  "Urs" and it is claimed by the plaintiffs that  it was
performed on behalf of the widow and daughters of  Fakruddin
by their deputies.  The next turn was in the year 1934, but
in  the performance  of  the  "Urs",  the  plaintiffs and
defendant  No. 2  were obstructed by  Abdul  Wahid  son  of
Nayeem-Uddin   belonging  to  the  other  branch  in   Sheik
Mohammad's  family.  Plaintiffs 1 and 2 then filed suit No.
156 of
70
1937 in the court of the District Munsif at Chingleput .For
a   declaration that  they  were  entitled  to enjoy the
properties  described in the schedule annexed to the  plaint
and  to manage the Durgah, perform the "Urs"  festival and
receive all  "incomes, endowments and perquisites  thereof
once  in  every eight years" since 1934 according  to  their
turn. They  also claimed an injunction  restraining  Abdul
Wahib  from  interfering with their rights in  that  behalf.
Rahmat Unnissa  the  eldest  daughter of  Fakruddin was
impleaded  as defendant No. 2. Abdul Wahid defendant  No.  1
died during the pendency of the suit and defendants 4 to  10
who were brought on record on their own application as heirs
and  legal representatives to the exclusion of the  daughter
of Abdul Wahid defended the suit.  They denied the right  of
the plaintiffs to a share in the income contending that lay
custom in   the  family,  females   were   excluded from
inheritance,  that  the office of "Peshimam",  "Khatib" and
"Mujavar" could only be held by males and that females were
excluded from those offices, that the plaintiffs' claim was
barred by the law of limitation and that in any  event the
suit for a mere declaration was not maintainable.
The Trial Judge held-and the appellate court agreed with him
that   there   was  an immemorial  custom   governing the
institutions  precluding  the  plaintiffs  from  performing
services  or sharing the income, emoluments and perquisites
and  therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to  perform
those services and enjoy the surplus income, and accordingly
they  were not entitled to the declaration of an  injunction
prayed for.  In second appeal, the High Court at Madras held
that by virtue of the Shariat Act, 1937, the income received
from the institution had to be shared according to the per-
sonal law of the parties and that the plaintiffs' claim was
not barred by the law of limitation nor was the suit open to
the  objection that  it was  as  framed  not  maintainable.
Against the  decree passed by the High Court, this  appeal
with  special  leave under Art. 136 of the  Constitution  is
preferred.
In  our view, the suit as framed  was maintainable. The
management of the institution is vested in the
71
trustees.   The four families, it is true, are by  tradition
entitled to perform and officiate at certain ceremonies and
also to share in the income.  A suit for declaration with  a
consequential  relief  for  injunction, is not a  suit for
declaration  simpliciter; it is a suit for declaration with
further relief.   Whether the further relief claimed  in  a
particular  case  as  consequential  upon  a,declaration  is
adequate must always depend upon the facts and circumstances
of each case.
In  Kunj  Behari Prasadji Purshottam Prasadji  v.  Keshavlal
Hiralal (1), it was held that s. 42 of the Specific  Relief
Act  does  not empower the court to dismiss a suit  for  a
declaration  and  injunction  and that an  injunction  is  a
further relief within the meaning of s. 42 of the  Specific
Relief Act.  In that case, the plaintiff had claimed that  a
certain will  was  null and void and  that  being  a  close
relative of the last holder of a gadi, he was entitled to be
the  Acharya  in the place of that last holder and  for  an
injunction  restraining the defendants from  offering any
obstruction to his occupation of the gadi.  It was held that
such a suit was maintainable.
The surplus income-.of the institution is distributed by the
trustees and the plaintiffs are seeking a declaration of the
right to  receive  the  income  and  also  an  injunction
restraining   the  defendants  from  interfering  with the
exercise of their right.  The High Court hold that plaintiff
No.  1 was at the date of the suit 19 years of age  and was
entitled to file a suit for enforcement of her right even if
the  period  of limitation had expired during  her  minority
within three  years  from the date on which  she  attained
majority  by virtue of ss. 6 and 8 of the Indian  Limitation
Act.   Apart from this ground which saves the claim  of the
first  plaintiff alone, a suit for a declaration of a  right
and   an   injunction  restraining   the   defendants from
interfering  with the exercise of that right is governed  by
art. 120. of the Limitation Act and in such a suit the right
to  sue arises when  the cause  of  action  accrues. The
plaintiffs  claiming  under  Fakruddin sued  to  obtain   a
declaration of their rights in the institution which
(1)  I.L.R. (1904) XXVIII Bom. 567.
72
was  and  is in the management of the trustees.  The  trial
judge hold that the plaintiffs were not "in enjoyment of the
share" of  Fakruddin since 1921 and the suit filed  by the
plaintiffs  more than 12 years from the date of Fakruddin's
death  must  be held barred, but he did not  refer  to any
specific article in the first schedule of the Limitation Act
which  barred the suit. It is not shown that  the  trustees
have ever denied or are interested to deny the right of the
plaintiffs  and defendant No. 2; and if the trustees do not
deny their rights, in our view, the suit for declaration  of
the  rights  of the heirs of Fakruddin will  not  be  barred
under  art.  120 of the Limitation Act merely because the
contesting  defendant  did not recognize  that right. The
period of  six years prescribed by art.  120 has  to  be
computed  from the date when the right to sue accrues and
there could be no right to sue until there is an accrual  of
the  right asserted in the suit and its infringement  or  at
least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right.
If  the trustees were willing to give a share and  on the
record of  the case it must be  assumed  that they  being
trustees appointed under a scheme would be willing to  allow
the plaintiffs their legitimate rights including a share  in
the income if under the law they were entitled thereto, mere
denial by the defendants of the rights of the plaintiffs and
defendant No'. 2 will not set the period of limitation
running against them.
The trial court as well as the first appellate court held on
an  exhaustive review of the evidence that  there  was  an
immemorial  custom  governing the institutions whereby the
plaintiffs were not entitled to perform service or share the
income, emoluments and perquisites.  But since the enactment
of  the Shariat lot 26 of 1937, this custom must  be  deemed
inapplicable  to the members of the family.  By s. 2 of the
Act, it was enacted as follows:
     "Notwitlwtanding any customs or usage to the
     contrary in  all questions  (save  questions
     relating to  agricultural  lands)   regarding
     intestate succession,  ,special property  of
     females, including personal property inherited
     or obtained under contract or gift or
     73
     any other provision of Personal Law, marriage,
     dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila,
     zihar, lian, khula and mubarrat, maintenance,
     dower, guardian. ship, gifts, trusts and trust
     properties,  and wakfs (other  than  charities
     and charitable institutions and charitable and
     religious endowments) the rule of decision  in
     cases  where the parties are Muslims shall  be
     the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)."
Under  the  Shariat  Act,, 1937,  as  framed,  in  questions
relating  to  charities and  charitable  institutions and
charitable  and religious endowments, the custom  or  usage
would prevail.   But-the  Act enacted  by   the   Central
Legislature was amended by Madras Act 18 of 1949 and a. 2 as
amended provides:
     "Notwithstanding any custom or usage  to the
     contrary, in all questions regarding intestate
     succession,   special  property of   females
     including  personal  property  inherited  or
     obtained under contract, or gift or arty other
     provision   of personal   law,   marriage,
     dissolution  of  marriage,  including  Tallaq,
     ila,   zihar,   lian,  Khula   and   Mubarrat,
     maintenance,   dower,   guardianship,   gifts,
     trusts  and trust proper. ties and  wakfs the
     rule  of decision in cases where the  parties
     are  Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law
     (Shariat)."
Manifestly  by this  act' "the rule  of  decision"  in all
questions   relating  to  intestate  succession and   other
specified  matters including wakfs where the parties to the
dispute are Muslims is the Muslim Personal Law. The,  terms
of the Act as amended are explicit.  Normally statute  which
takes  away or impairs vested rights under existing laws  is
presumed not to have retrospective operation.  Where  vested
rights are  affected  and  the question  is  not  one  of
procedure,  there  is  a presumption that  it  was  not the
intention  of the legislature to alter vested  rights. But
the  question is always one of intention of the legislature
to  be gathered from the language used in the  statute.  In
construing an enactment, the court starts with a presumption
against retrospectivity  if the enactment seeks  to  affect
vested rights: but such a presumption
74
may be deemed rebutted by the amplitude of the language used
by the Legislature.  It is expressly enacted in the  Shariat
Act as amended that in all questions relating to the matters
specified, "the rule of decision" in cases where the parties
are   Muslims  shall  be  the  Muslim  Personal Law. The
injunction is one directed against the court: it is enjoined
to  apply the Muslim Personal Law in all cases relating  to
the matters specified notwithstanding any custom or usage to
the  contrary. The intention of the legislature appears  to
be clear; the Act applies to all suits and proceedings which
were pending on the date when the Act came into operation as
well as to suits and proceedings filed after that date.  It
is  true that suits and proceedings which have been  finally
decided would not  be affected by  the  enactment  of the
Shariat Act, but if a suit or proceeding be pending even  in
appeal on the date when the Act was brought into  operation,
the law applicable for decision would be the Muslim Personal
Law  if the  other conditions prescribed  by  the  Act are
fulfilled.  In our view, the High Court was right in holding
that it was bound to apply the provisions of the Shariat Act
as amended by Madras Act 18 of 1949 to the suit filed by the
plaintiffs.
We  are unable to agree with the view of  the Lahore High
Court  in  Syed Roshan Ali-v.  Mt.  Behmat Bibi (1)  that  a
right  acquired before 1937 (the date on which the  Shariat
Act  was  brought  into operation) to bring  a suit  for  a
declaration  that  the alienation by the widow of  the last
holder who  had by custom succeeded to the  limited  estate
left  by her husband was not binding upon  the reversioner,
was  not taken away by the enactment of the Muslim  Personal
Law  (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. It may be  observed
that the court proceeded merely upon the general presumption
against retrospectivity and their attention, it appears, was
not  directed to the phraseology used by the legislature  to
give s. 2 a retrospective operation.
The  plea raised by counsel for. the  contesting  defendants
that  even  under  the Muslim Personal  Law, females are
excluded from performing the duties of
(1)  A.I.R. 1943 Lah. 219.
75
the  offices of "Peshimam", "Khatib" and "Mujavar" and that
they  cannot  carry  out the duties of those  offices even
through deputies is one which was not raised before the High
Court. The trial court has found that the duties of  those
offices could be performed through  deputies.  The  first
appellate court did not express any opinion on that question
and before the High Court, this question was not mooted.  We
do  not think that we would be justified  in  allowing the
contesting defendants to argue this question in this appeal.
In  any event, if the income was being distributed  amongst
the  four  families,  the plaintiffs  and  defendant  No.  2
claiming under Fakruddin would, by virtue of the  provisions
of  the Shariat Act, be entitled to  receive  that  income.
There is nothing on the record to suggest that the right  to
receive the income is conditional upon the  performance  of
the  duties  of the offices  of  "Peshimam",  "Khatib" and
"Mujavar".
In that view of the case, this appeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.