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Wednesday, June 1, 2011

It is clear that respondent no. 1 did not strike the deceased at the first instance, but he struck him after an interval of time since he left the place of occurrence, went to his home and then came back armed with a Farsa. In order to bring a case under exception (4) to section 300 IPC, the evidence must show that the accused acted without any pre- mediation and in a heat of passion and without having taken undue advantage and he had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Every one of these circumstances is required to be proved to attract exception (4) to section 300 IPC and it is not sufficient to prove only some of them.


                                                         REPORTABLE

                           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                           CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 1318 OF 2005



STATE OF RAJASTHAN                                Appellant (s)

                 VERSUS

ISLAM                                             Respondent(s)

                                    JUDGMENT

GANGULY, J.



         Heard learned counsel for the parties.




         The State of Rajasthan is in appeal before us impugning

the   judgment   dated   19.2.2003   passed   by   the   High   Court   whereby

the   High   Court   by   its   judgment   disposed   of   two   appeals,   being

Criminal Appeal No. 401 of 1997 and Criminal Appeal No. 380 of

1997.  The appeal of the State is in respect of Criminal Appeal

No. 401 of 1997.   By the judgment of acquittal rendered by the

High   Court   in   the   aforesaid   criminal   appeal,   it   inter   alia,

confirmed the  conviction of  the other  accused, namely,  Rujdar,

Ilias,   Muvin,   and   Manna     under   Section   323   IPC   but   modified

their sentence awarded to them by enhancing the fine instead of

imposing imprisonment.




         The   appeal   of   the   accused   Asru,   Guncheri,   Mohammada,

Kalto, Roshan and Titta was allowed and they were acquitted from

the charges under Sections 148 and 336/149 IPC.


                                   -2-




        So  far  as  Islam  is  concerned,  the  High  Court  set  aside

his conviction under Section 302 and converted it under Section

304   Part   II   IPC   considering   that   Islam   had   already   undergone

detention for more than six years.  The High Court also imposed

a fine of Rs. 30,000(Rupees Thirty Thousand) on Islam and held

that the same would meet the ends of justice.




        Impugning   that   judgment,   when   the   State   filed   Special

Leave Petition before this Court, a Bench of this Court, while

granting leave, passed the following order:-




               "Delay condoned.

               Leave   granted   to   the   extent   of   respondent   No.

      1-Islam   only.     As   to   other   respondents   the   special

      leave petition is dismissed.

               Issue   warrants   bailable   in   an   amount   of

      Rs.   10,000/-   only   requiring   production   of   accused-

      respondent no. 1 before the Trial Court on the dates

      to   be   appointed   by   it   or   before   this   Court   as

      directed.     The   bail   bonds   shall   be   furnished   to   the

      satisfaction of the Trial Court."


         Therefore, the purpose of our examination is confined to

the   question   whether   in   passing   the   order   of   conversion   of

sentence   from   Section   302   IPC   to   Section   304   Part   II   IPC   in

respect   of   respondent   no.   1,   the   High   Court   exercised   its

judicial discretion properly.  It may be mentioned in this

                                    -3-




  connection   that   the   Trial   Court,   namely,   Court   of   Additional

District & Sessions Judge, Deeg convicted respondent no. 1 under

section 302 IPC and convicted him to undergo life imprisonment

and   a   fine   of   Rs.   1000/-,   in   default,   to   further   undergo

imprisonment of six months.




          Learned counsel for the appellant while taking us though

the   judgment   of   the   Trial   Court   drew   our   attention   to   the

evidence of PW 7, PW 9, PW 12, PW 16 ad PW 17 and submitted that

these are all eye-witnesses and there is consistent evidence of

these eye-witnesses about the involvement of respondent no. 1 in

the   commission   of   crime,   namely,   the   murder   of   Jenu.     The

material   facts   relevant   for   our   consideration   are   that   on   the

date of the incident, i.e. 18.3.1988, a meeting was held in the

morning for raising some funds for repairing the mosque and in

the said  meeting, an  altercation took  place between  respondent

no.  1  and  various  other  persons  of  the  area  who  assembled  for

the meeting.   One of the person assembled there told PW 7 that

he   had   been   treacherous   in   misappropriating   public   funds   for


repair of the mosque.   There was a minor shuffle amongst those

who had assembled there.   It is the consistent evidence of the

witnesses   mentioned   above   that   after   that,   respondent   no.   1

along with others went home and came back armed with a 'Farsa'.

It   is   also   the   consistent   evidence   that   respondent   no.   1   hit

Jenu thrice on his head with the Farsa.  This evidence has been

consistently  repeated  by  PW  7,  PW  9,  PW  16  and  PW  17.    PW  12

said that Islam hit Jenu with Farsa on his head but the number

                                    -4-




 of times had not been mentioned by him.




         Appreciating  the  evidence  of  these  witnesses,  the  Trial

Court   reached   the   finding   that   respondent   no.   1   can   be   held

guilty   under   Section   302   IPC   and   accordingly   found   him   guilty

under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him for life imprisonment.

The   High   Court   has   noted     the   injuries   on   the   deceased.     The

injuries on the deceased are as follows:




     1. One incised wound 7 cm X 1 cm X bone deep on left frontal

       region of head.

     2. One incised wound 6.5 cm X 1 cm X bone deep on Rt. Frontal

       region of head.

     3. One incised wound 8 cm X 1 cm X bone deep on Rt. Parietal

       region of head.


         PW 3 Dr. Ashok Kumar Gupta in his evidence said the cause

of death of the deceased was in view of the head injury leading

to   compression   of   Brain   and   Coma.     From   the   nature   of   the

injuries, it is clear that they were inflicted by a deadly and

sharp weapon and undoubtedly Farsa is one such weapon.




         In the context of this evidence, the judgment of the High

Court is rather surprising.  The High Court while converting the

conviction   of   the   respondent   no.   1   from   Section   302   IPC   to

Section   304   Part-II   in   paragraph   12   held   that   the   relations

between respondent no. 1 and the deceased Jenu were cordial and

                                    -5-




  only one blow was caused by Islam on the head of the deceased

and   that   proved   fatal.     The   High   Court   further   said   that   the

injury inflicted by respondent no. 1 was not pre-meditated and

the   respondent   no.   1   did   not   take   any   undue   advantage   or   nor

acted   in   a   cruel   manner   and   as   such,   the   case   of   respondent

Islam is covered by Explanation IV appended to Section 300 IPC

and could only be held guilty under Section 304 Part II IPC.




         We fail to appreciate the aforesaid reasoning by the High

Court in the context of the consistent evidence discussed above.

It cannot be said that respondent no. 1 had no intention to kill

the deceased.  After attending the assembly in which there was a

minor   scuffle,   respondent   no.   1   Islam   admittedly   went   to   his


house and came back armed with a Farsa which is a deadly weapon.

Thereafter, he hit the deceased repeatedly on the head, a vital

part   of   human   body,   with   Farsa   and   caused   very   grevious

injuries.     It   may   be   true   that   initially   there   was   no   pre-

mediation  or  intention  of  the  respondent  no.  1  but  it  is  well

settled   that   intention   can   develop   on   the   spot   and   in   the

instant case, there is some amount of pre-meditation on the part

of respondent no. 1 when he had gone to his house and came back

to   the   place   of   occurrence   armed   with   a   deadly   weapon   and   in

furtherance   of   that   intention   struck   the   deceased   with   that

weapon   repeatedly   and   at   a   vital   part   of   his   body.     In   the

background of this consistent evidence against respondent no. 1,

this   Court   is   of   the   opinion   that   the   conversion   of   the

conviction of respondent Islam from Section 302 IPC to Section

                                     -6-




 304 Part II IPC cannot be sustained and the entire approach of

the High Court is misconceived, if not perverse.




         The   finding   of   the   High   Court   that   the   act   of   the

respondent no. 1 is coming under the fourth exception cannot be

sustained   at   all.     It   is   clear   that   respondent   no.   1   did   not

strike   the   deceased   at   the   first   instance,   but   he   struck   him

after an interval of time since he left the place of occurrence,

went   to   his   home   and   then   came   back   armed   with   a   Farsa.     In

order  to  bring  a  case  under  exception  (4)  to  section  300  IPC,


the evidence must show that the accused acted without any pre-

mediation   and   in   a   heat   of   passion   and   without   having   taken

undue   advantage   and   he   had   not   acted   in   a   cruel   or   unusual

manner.     Every   one   of   these   circumstances   is   required   to   be

proved to attract exception (4) to section 300 IPC and it is not

sufficient to prove only some of them.




         In the facts of this case, none of above ingredients have

been proved from the evidence to bring the case under exception

(4)   to   Section   300   IPC.     The   High   Court's   finding   to   the

contrary is totally against the evidence on record.




         The learned counsel for respondent no. 1 has urged that

this Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Article 136 of the Constitution when an order of acquittal

was granted by the High Court and respondent no. 1 had suffered

imprisonment for 6 years.  There is no such absolute proposition

                                    -7-




  in law as has been said to be advanced by the learned counsel

for   respondent   no.   1.     When   this   Court   exercises   its

jurisdiction   under   Article   136,   it   definitely   exercises   a

discretionary   jurisdiction   but   such   discretionary   jurisdiction

has   to   be   exercised   in   order   to   ensure   that   there   is   no

miscarriage of justice.  If the consideration by the High Court

is   misconceived   and   perverse   as   indicated   above,   there   is


nothing   in   law   which   prevents   this   Court   from   exercising   its

jurisdiction   under   Article   136   against   an   order   of   acquittal

when such acquittal cannot be sustained at all, in view of the

evidence of record.




        The  golden  thread  which  runs  through  the  administration

of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible,

one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to the

innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be

adopted.  The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure

that   miscarriage   of   justice   is   prevented.    A   miscarriage   of

justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less

than from a conviction of an innocent.




        The   principle   to   be   followed   by   appellate   court

considering   an   appeal   against   an   order   of   acquittal   is   to

interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons

to do so.





                                   -8-




        Thus,   in   such   cases,   this   Court   would   usually   not

interfere unless

     a. The finding is vitiated by some glaring infirmity in the


appraisal of evidence. (State of U.P. Vs. Sahai, AIR 1981

SC 1442 at paras 19-21)

b.   The   finding   is   perverse.   (State   of   MP   Vs.   Bachhudas,

(2007) 9 SCC 135 at para 10 and State of Punjab Vs. Parveen

Kumar (2005) 9 SCC 769 at para 9)

c.   The   order   suffers   from   substantial   errors   of   law   and

fact (Rajesh Kumar Vs. Dharamvir 1997(4) SCC 496 at para 5)

d. The order is based on misconception of law or erroneous

appreciation   of   evidence   (State   of   UP   Vs.   Abdul  1997(10)

SCC 135; State of UP Vs. Premi 2003(9) SCC 12 at para 15)

e. High  Court has  adopted an  erroneous approach  resulting

in miscarriage of justice (State of TN Vs. Suresh  1998(2)

SCC 372 at paras 31 and 32;  State of MP Vs. Paltan Mallah

2005(3) SCC 169 at para 8)

f.   Acquittal   is   based   on   irrelevant   grounds   (Arunachalam

Vs. Sadhanatham 1979(2) SCC 297 at para 4

g.   High   Court   has   completely   misdirected   itself   in

reversing   the   order   of   conviction   by   the   Trial   Court

(Gaurishanker Sharma Vs. State of UP, AIR 1990 SC 709)

h. The  judgment is  tainted with  serious legal  infirmities

(State   of   Maharashtra   Vs.   Pimple,   AIR   1984   SC   63   at   para

75)





                              -9-


        In reversing an acquittal, this Court keeps in mind that

presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is fortified

by an order of acquittal and if the view of the High Court is

reasonable and founded on materials on record, this Court should

not interfere.




        However,   if   this   Court   is   of   the   opinion   that   the

acquittal is not based on a reasonable view, then it may review

the   entire   material   and   there   will   be   no   limitation   on   this

Court's   jurisdiction   under   Article   136   to   come   to   a   just

decision quashing the acquittal (See 1985(4) SCC 476 at para 45;

1996(7) SCC 471 at para 4)




        For the reasons aforesaid, this Court cannot approve the

judgment of the High Court insofar as conversion of conviction

in respect of respondent no. 1 from Section 302 to Section 304

Part-II   is   concerned.     This   Court   approves   the   judgment   and

order of conviction passed by the Trial Court and restores the

same.  The bail bonds of respondent no. 1 are discharged.  He is

directed   to   immediately   surrender   before   the   Trial   Court   and

serve out the sentence imposed on him by the Trial Court.


                               -10-




          The appeal of the State is thus allowed.





                                       ..........................J.
                                       (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)





                                       ..........................J.
                                       (DEEPAK VERMA)



     NEW DELHI

     MAY 24, 2011.