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Sunday, May 15, 2011

The appellant's case is that the suit was instituted between the plaintiff-respondent No.1 herein and 1st defendant- respondent No.2 herein under the pretext of partition but in fact the idea behind institution of the suit was to oust the appellant who continued to be in possession of half of the share of the property being the sole legal representative of the younger son of Laksmi Naicker who was Andi Naicker. As already stated, the appellant in fact was not even made a party in the partition suit initially but was 8 later impleaded as 2nd defendant after she filed an application for her impleadment. "Whether the sale deed executed by the de facto guardian on behalf of the minor without the permission of the court could be held to be valid ?


                                                       REPORTABLE


            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



            CIVIL APPEAL NO. 562 OF 2003




RANGAMMAL                                                  .. Appellant



                               Versus



KUPPUSWAMI & ANR.                                         ..Respondents




                        J U D G M E N T





GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.


            This appeal by special leave has been filed by the



appellant   Tmt.   Rangammal   against   the   order   dated



11.07.2002 passed by the learned single Judge of the High



Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras   in   Second   Appeal   No.



703/1992   by   which     the   appeal     was   dismissed   by



practically     a   summary   order   although   the   substantial



question   of   law   which   was   formulated   at   the   time   of



admission of the appeal was as follows:




            "Whether   the   sale   deed   executed  by   the

          de facto  guardian on behalf of   the minor

          without   the   permission     of   the   court

          could be held to be valid ?


2.            However,     on   hearing   the   appeal   in   the   light   of



the   prevailing     facts   and   circumstances     of   the   instant



matter,   we   are   of   the   view     that   the   question     also   arises



whether  in a partition suit  filed by the plaintiff/respondent



No.1   herein,   the   courts   below   could   shift   the   burden   of



proof  on the defendant - appellant regarding the validity  of



a   sale   deed,   which   was   executed   when   the   appellant     was



admittedly   a minor,  contrary  to  the  pleading     in  the  plaint



filed   in   a   suit     for   partition,   who   claimed     title   to   the   suit



land on the basis of the  alleged sale deed.    Still further the



question   arises   whether   the   question   of   limitation   could



arise   against   the     defendant/appellant   shifting   the   burden



on   her   to   challenge   the   sale   deed,   when   the   story   of



execution     of   the   alleged     sale   deed   was   set   up     by   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1     in   the   plaint   for   the   first   time



when   he   filed   partition   suit     against   his   brother,   without



impleading the appellant,  but claimed benefit of title to the



suit land on the basis of the alleged sale deed.


3.           In order to  decide the aforesaid  controversy, it is



necessary  to relate the facts  giving rise  to  this  appeal  in



so      


far as   it is relevant which disclose that the appellant Tmt.



Rangammal   was   impleaded   as   second   defendant   in   a   suit



for   partition   bearing   O.S.   No.   255/1982   which   had   been



filed by    one   Kuppuswami  plaintiff-respondent  No.1   herein



in   the   court   of   District   Munsif,   Palani,   against   his   brother



Andivelu          who         was           the         principal         defendant/1st



defendant/respondent   No.2   herein     for     partition   and



separate   possession,   but   the   plaintiff   also     included     the



property    of the  appellant-Rangammal    in the schedule   to



the plaint  without including  her as a party to the suit as  it



was pleaded   by the plaintiff-respondent No.1-Kuppuswami



that  the  share   which  originally     belonged  to   the   appellant-



Rangammal,     was     transferred   to   their   predecessors,   who



were     father     and   uncle     of   the   plaintiff   and   defendant



No.1/Respondent   No.1   Andivelu,     by   way   of   a   sale   deed



dated     24.2.1951   executed   in   their     favour   by     Kumara



Naicker     who   claimed   to   be     the   legal   guardian   of   the



Rangammal              when          the          appellant/Rangammal                 was



admittedly a minor and was barely  few years old, less than



even three years.   The sale deed was claimed   to have been





                                                                                        4


executed  for  legal  necessity   in  order  to  discharge   the



debt          





of     the   deceased   mother   of   the   appellant   in   the   year   1951



which according to the case of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1



had   been   transferred   to   their   branch   by   virtue   of   the



aforesaid sale deed   executed on   24.2.1951 by the   alleged



guardian of the appellant  Kumara Naicker.  



4.           Since   the   appellant   had   not   been   impleaded   in



the suit for partition although her property was included in



the   partition   suit   between   the   two   brothers   i.e.   plaintiff



Kuppuswami-respondent   No.1   herein     and   Andivelu   1st



defendant   -respondent   No.2   herein,   the   appellant   filed   an



application for impleadment in  the partition suit  before the



trial court which was allowed.



5.             The   appellant   herein   who   was   impleaded   as   a



second   defendant     in   the   suit     clearly     pleaded   that   the



partition     suit     filed   by   Kuppuswami-plaintiff   against   his



brother   Andivelu   1st  defendant   -respondent   No.2   herein,



was collusive   in nature as this was   clearly to deprive the




                                                                             5


appellant from her share by  relying on an alleged sale deed



dated 24.2.1951 by fraudulently   stating that the deceased



mother of the appellant  was owing  certain debt  during her



lifetime     and     in     order     to     discharge     the     same,   the   so-



called                    





legal guardian  of the appellant Kumara Naicker executed a



sale deed  in favour of   the father  and uncle  of the plaintiff



and   defendant   No.1   who   are   respondents   herein.     It   was,



therefore,  submitted  by the appellant/2nd defendant  in the



suit       that   the sale deed   dated 24.2.1951 alleged to have



been     executed     in   order   to     discharge     the   debt   of   her



deceased   mother,     when   the   appellant   was   a  minor,   ought



not to be held   legally binding on her   and so as to include



her   property   for   partition     in   the   partition   suit   which   had



been     instituted     by   an   altogether   different   branch     of   the



family   who     had   separated     more   than   three   generations



ago. Hence she specifically pleaded   that the   partition suit



including her property was clearly collusive in nature   and



therefore the suit was fit to be dismissed.





                                                                                   6


6.            In   order   to   appreciate   whether   the   courts   below



were   justified   in   depriving   the   appellant   Tmt.   Rangammal



from   her   share,   it   appears   necessary   to   relate   some   other



salient   facts   of   the   case   leading   up   to   the   filing   of     this



appeal.   The   schedule-property   comprising   an   area   of   4



acres  and  10 cents    described in various    survey numbers



originally   belonged   to   one     Laksmi   Naicker-the   common



ancestor   of   contesting   parties   who   had   two   sons     and   an



oral partition had taken place between them in regard to the



properties   of   the   joint   family   including   the   schedule-



property.     Thereafter,   a   sale   deed   dated   24.2.1951   in



respect   of   the   schedule-property   was   executed   by   Kumara



Naicker   -alleged   legal   guardian     of   appellant-Rangammal



who was   one of the sons of late Kumara Naicker   and wife



of the elder son of Laksmi Naicker-Thottammal a cousin  of



her son, who was descendent of  Kumara Naicker.  Kumara



Naicker,     i.e.   the   son   of   the   elder   son   of   Laksmi   Naicker



executed   the   sale   deed   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   herein,



who   was   the   daughter   of     younger   son   of   Laksmi   Naicker



and   Andi   Naicker     was   admittedly   a   minor,   representing



himself  as her guardian since she had lost both  her father





                                                                                 7


and   her   mother   at   the   time   of   the   execution   of   the   sale



deed.     However,   the   appellant   according   to   her   case



continued   in   possession     of     half   of   the   schedule   property



according   to   the   oral   partition   which   had   fallen   into   the



share of her father since the  only brother of the appellant/



Rangammal   had   died   unmarried.     Thus,   the     appellant



continued to be in possession of half of the property without



any  knowledge about the alleged sale deed.  



7.           The appellant's case  is that   as she was a minor



and   had   lost   both   her   parents,   she   was   living   with   her



maternal   uncle   even   at   the   time   of   the   alleged   sale.       The



appellant's case is that the suit was instituted between  the



plaintiff-respondent   No.1   herein   and   1st                 defendant-



respondent   No.2   herein  under   the  pretext   of   partition   but



in   fact  the   idea   behind  institution  of  the   suit  was     to   oust



the appellant  who continued to be in possession of  half of



the share of the property being the sole legal representative



of   the   younger   son   of     Laksmi   Naicker   who   was   Andi



Naicker.       As already stated, the appellant in fact was not



even   made     a   party   in   the   partition   suit   initially   but   was





                                                                               8


later   impleaded   as   2nd  defendant     after   she   filed     an



application for her impleadment.



8.           However,   the High Court   while dealing with the



second   appeal   arising   out   of   the   partition   suit,   cast   the



burden     completely     on   the   appellant/2nd  defendant     to



prove   that the property shown in the sale   deed which fell



into the share of the   appellant, was not for the purpose of



discharge   of   the     liability   of   her   deceased   mother   who



according   to   her   case   was   not   owing   any   debt   to   anyone



including   Kumara   Naicker.     But   the     suit   was   finally



decreed   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff/respondent   No.1   holding



therein   that   the   appellant's   deceased   mother     was   owing



certain   debts   and   for   discharge   of   the   same,   the   so-called



legal   guardian   of   the   appellant   who   was   Kumara   Naicker



executed   a   sale   deed   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff's   father   and



defendant No.1's  father       in  respect of  the   entire    property



of     Rangammal     and     this   was   done   ostensibly     as   the



appellant's   mother     had   to   discharge   certain   debts   which



she   was   owing   to   the   plaintiff's   father   during   her   lifetime.



Thus, the District Munsif, Palani, decreed the suit in favour



of   the   plaintiff/1st  respondent   herein   Kuppuswami.     While





                                                                               9


doing   so, the trial court   recorded a finding   that the sale



deed dated 24.2.1951 by which  half  share  of the appellant



in   the   suit   property     was   transferred   when   the   appellant



was a minor had been executed  by legal guardian   Kumara



Naicker     for   legal   necessity       according   to   the   case   of   the



appellant   herein,   Kumara   Naicker   the   so-called   legal



guardian   was   neither   her   natural   guardian   nor   guardian



appointed   by   the   court   and   hence     the   sale   deed  executed



by him to the extent of half share of the schedule property



of appellant-Rangammal was clearly void, illegal, inoperative



and   hence not binding on her.   The trial court decreed the



suit against which the appeal before the 1st  appellate court



was dismissed.  The matter then came up to the High Court



by way of a second appeal.  



9.           Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   while



challenging   the     judgment   and   orders   of   the   courts   below



submitted   that   the   sale   deed   executed   by   the   so-called  de



facto guardian Kumara Naicker and Thottammal  cannot be



held to be binding         on   her     as   she   was   a   minor   in   the



custody   of   her   maternal   uncle   and  not  Kumara     Naicker   -



father   of   the   respondent   No.2     and   hence   the   sale   deed





                                                                              10


executed by him on her behalf was not binding on her   as



the same was executed   in order to deprive  her of her  half



share   in     the   disputed   property     which   is   situated   on   the



eastern portion of the schedule property.



10.           The   learned   single   Judge   of   the   High   Court



however was pleased to dismiss the second appeal   holding



therein   that   the   present   suit       out   of   which   the     second



appeal arose was filed in the year 1982 which was after 31



years   of   the   execution   of   the   sale   deed   dated     24.2.1951.



The   single   Judge   further   observed     that   if   the   appellant



Tmt. Rangammal   was aggrieved   of the sale deed executed



by the de facto  guardian,   she   ought   to   have   challenged   it



within three years  from the date of  attaining majority.  The



High Court  went  on to hold  that until the date  of filing of



the present  suit by the  1st  respondent and even thereafter,



the   appellant   had   not   chosen   to   challenge   the   sale   deed



executed   by   the  de   facto  guardian   and   she   never   asserted



any   title   in   respect   of   the   suit   property   irrespective   of   the



sale   deed   in  order   to   establish  that  she     was     aggrieved  of



the  sale deed and hence it was too late for the appellant to





                                                                               11


raise   such   a   plea   in   the   High   Court     by   way   of   a   second



appeal.



11.          We have heard learned counsel for the parties  at



length and on   a consideration of their   submissions in the



light   of   the     judgments   and   orders   of   the   courts   below,



specially the High Court, we are clearly of the view that the



High   Court   as   also   the   courts   below   have   clearly



misconstrued  the entire case of the plaintiff  as well as the



respondents   and   tried   it   contrary   to   the   pleadings.     The



High Court has recorded that   "the present suit which  was



filed in the year 1982, is after 31 years" i.e. after 31 years of



the execution of the sale deed dated 24.2.1951.   But it can



be     instantly   noticed   that  the   High  Court   has  fallen   into  a



crystal clear error   as it has   patently   and unambiguously



missed   that   the   suit     had   not   been   filed   by   the   appellant



Tmt. Rangammal   as she was   the 2nd   defendant   who was



later impleaded in the suit  but the partition  suit had been



filed   by   the   plaintiff-Kuppuswami-respondent   No.1   herein



against   his   brother   the   2nd             respondent-Andivelu-1st



defendant     which   was   a   suit   for   partition     of   the   property



but   while   doing   so   he     included   and   asserted     title   to   the





                                                                              12


property in the schedule of the plaint which  admittedly had



fallen   into     the   share     of   the   appellant's   deceased-father



which     devolved     upon   her     after   the   death   of   her   father,



mother   and   brother     who   died   unmarried.     But   it   is     the



plaintiff/respondent No.1 who came up with a   case   in the



plaint   that this property was transferred for legal necessity



by   the   so-called   legal   guardian     of   the     appellant   by



executing   a   sale   deed   on   24.2.1951   in   favour   of   the



respondents predecessors who were father and uncle  of the



plaintiff  and 1st defendants/respondents herein.



12.          The  learned  single   Judge     of  the   High   Court     as



also the trial court  and the lower appellate court  thus have



lost sight of the fact that  it is the plaintiff/respondent No.1



herein who had come up with a case that the half share of



the     disputed   property     which   on   partition   had   fallen   into



the   share     of   the   appellant's   father     was   sold     out   by



Kumara   Naicker   as   guardian   of   the   appellant-who   was   a



minor in order to discharge some debt which the appellant's



deceased   mother   was   alleged   to   be   owing.     However   the



disputed property which was sold in order to discharge  the



alleged burden of debt vide sale deed dated 24.2.1951 was





                                                                            13


purchased  by the plaintiff-1st  respondent's father Arumuga



Gounder     and   their   uncle     Kumara   Naicker   which   means



that the legal guardian Kumara Naicker claims the property



of the appellant who was minor and then sold it  to himself



and     nephew     Arumuga   Gounder.     Furthermore,   it   is   also



the plaintiff's case   that the property which had fallen into



the   share     of   Tmt.   Rangammal   had   been   sold   out   by



Kumara   Naicker   to   the   father   of     Kuppuswami-Arumuga



Gounder and Andivelu who was his own  son.



13.           Therefore,   it   is   more   than   apparent     that   when



the   plaintiff/respondent   came   up   with   a   case   of   execution



of   sale   deed   on   24.2.21951   for   half     of     the   schedule



property/disputed   property     alleged   to   have   been   sold   out



for   legal   necessity   which   had   fallen   into   the   share   of



appellant   Rangammal,   the   burden   clearly       lay   on   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1   to   discharge   that   the   sale   deed



executed   by     Kumara   Naicker   to   his   own   son   and   nephew



Arumuga   Gounder     in   regard   to   the   share   which   had



admittedly     fallen     into   the   appellant     share     Rangammal



who was a minor, was sold  for the legal necessity.  But this



burden   by   the   trial     court   was   wrongly   cast   upon   the





                                                                         14


appellant/Rangammal     to   discharge,   although,     it   is   well-



settled   that  the     party     who  pleads    has  also to  prove  his



case.



14.           Section   101   of   the       Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872



defines   `burden   of   proof'   which     clearly   lays   down       that



whosoever     desires   any   court     to   give   judgment   as   to   any



legal right or law  dependent on the existence of facts which



he   asserts,   must   prove   that   those   facts   exist.     When     a



person is  bound to prove  the        existence     of  any  fact it is



said  that the burden of proof lies on that person.  Thus, the



Evidence   Act   has   clearly   laid   down   that   the   burden   of



proving     fact     always   lies   upon   the   person   who   asserts.



Until   such   burden   is   discharged,   the   other   party   is   not



required  to be called upon to prove his case.  The court has



to examine   as to whether   the person upon whom burden



lies     has   been   able   to   discharge   his   burden.     Until       he



arrives at such conclusion, he cannot proceed on the basis



of weakness of the other party.  In view of this legal position



of   the   Evidence   Act,   it   is   clear   that   in   the   instant   matter,



when   the   plaintiff/respondent   No.1   pleaded   that   the



disputed   property     fell   into   the   share   of   the   plaintiff   by





                                                                               15


virtue of the sale deed dated 24.2.1951, then it was clearly



for   the   plaintiff/respondent   No.1   to   prove     that   it   was



executed  for  legal necessity of the appellant-while she was



a   minor.       But,   the   High  Court   clearly   took     an   erroneous



view     while   holding   that   it   is   the   defendant/appellant   who



should   have   challenged   the   sale   deed   after   attaining



majority   as   she   had   no   reason   to   do   so   since   the   plaintiff



/respondent No.1   failed to first of all discharge the burden



that   the   sale   deed   in   fact   had   been   executed     for   legal



necessity   of   the   minor's   predecessor   mother   was   without



permission           of         the         court.         It         was         not         the



defendant/respondent who  first of all claimed benefit of the



sale deed  or asserted its genuineness, hence the burden of



challenging the sale deed specifically when she had not even



been dispossessed from the disputed share, did not arise at



all.



15.          Plethora of commentaries   emerging from   series



of case  laws  on burden of proof  which are too  numerous



to   cite,   lay   down   that  when   a   person   after   attaining



majority, questions any sale of his property by his guardian



during   his   minority,   the   burden   lies   on   the   person   who





                                                                                               16


upholds/asserts the purchase not   only to   show that   the



guardian   had the power to sell   but further that the whole



transaction   was   bona   fide.    This     was   held   in   the   case   of



Roop   Narain  vs.    Gangadhar,   9WR   297,  as   also     in  Anna



Malay      vs.     Na   U   Ma,      17C   990.   Thus   when   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1   came   up   with   a   case   that   the



minor's share/appellant herein was sold for legal necessity



by   her   uncle   Kumara   Naicker,   then                  it   was   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1   who   should   have   discharged   the



burden to prove that the minor/appellant's share had been



sold   of   by   the  de   facto  guardian   Kumara   Naicker   without



permission of the court, could be held to be legal and valid



so as to include the same in the partition suit between two



brothers,   which   has   not   been   discharged   at   all   by   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1.     In   fact,   the   real   brother   of



plaintiff   Kuppuswami   who   is   defendant   No.1/respondent



No.1 herein Andivelu has also not supported the case of the



plaintiff that the half share of appellant/Rangammal in the



disputed   property     was   sold   out   vide   sale   deed   dated



24.2.1951   for   legal   necessity   without   permission   of   the



Court and hence  defendant No.1/respondent No.2 also has





                                                                            17


not supported  the  case  of the  plaintiff/respondent  No.1  on



this count.



16.             The   plaintiff/respondent   No.1   therefore   has



miserably  failed to prove his case as per his pleading in the



plaint   and   the   burden   to   prove   that   the   sale   deed   in   fact



was   valid   has   not   even   been   cast   on   plaintiff/respondent



No.1 that the share of appellant-Rangammal had been sold



out by Kumara Naicker vide sale deed  dated  24.2.1951 for



consideration   without   permission   of   the   Court   when   the



appellant was a minor.



17.             The   High   Court,   therefore,     has   fallen   into   an



error   while  observing  that  the  appellant/defendant   No.2  in



the suit  should have assailed the sale deed and  cannot do



so  after 31 years of its execution when it is unambiguously



an          admitted         factual         position         that         it         is         the



plaintiff/respondent  No.1  who had  filed a suit for partition



against his brother defendant No.1/respondent No.2 and in



that   partition   suit     it   was     plaintiff/respondent   No.1   who



banked upon the story  that a sale deed had been executed



by his Uncle Kumara Naicker who claimed it to be the legal



guardian of the appellant-Rangammal who admittedly was a





                                                                                                  18


minor for legal necessity which was to discharge the debt of



the appellant's deceased mother.   Hence, in view of Section



101   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872   it   is   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1     who   should   have   first   of   all



discharged   the   burden     that  in    fact   a  sale   deed  had   been



executed   for   the   share   which   admittedly   belonged   to



appellant-Rangammal   in   order   to   discharge   the   burden   of



debt for legal necessity and for the benefit of the appellant



who admittedly was a minor.



18.          When the plaintiff-respondent  No.1-Kuppuswami



came with a specific pleading for the first time in a partition



suit  that the appellant's share had been sold out by her de



facto guardian Kumara Naicker without even the permission



of     the   court,   it   was   clearly   the   plaintiff/respondent   No.1



who should have discharged the burden that the same was



done for legal necessity   of the minor in order to discharge



the   debt   which   the   deceased   mother   of   the   appellant   was



alleged   to   have   been   owing     to   some   one.     When   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1   failed   to   discharge     this   burden,



the   question   of   discharge   of   burden     to   disprove     the   sale



deed     by   the   2nd  defendant/appellant-Rangammal   do   not





                                                                            19


arise  at all as per the provisions of Evidence Act.  It may be



relevant at this stage to cite  the ratio of the decision of this



Court     delivered   in   the   matter   of  Subhra   Mukherjee  vs.



Bharat   Coaking   Coal   Ltd,   AIR   2000   SC   1203,  whether   the



document in question was genuine   or sham   or bogus, the



party who  alleged it to be bogus had to prove nothing until



the   party   relying     upon     the   document   established       its



genuineness.  This  was the view expressed by this Court in



the   matter   of  Subhra   Mukherjee  vs.  Bharat   Coaking   Coal



Ltd,  AIR   2000   SC   1203   =   2000   (3)   SCC   312.      This   case



although did not relate   to a suit   for partition or question



relating   to   minority,     it   was   a   case   wherein   the   appellant



refused   to   hand   over   possession   of   property   to   the



respondent-government   company     when   ordered   to   do   so.



Instead she filed a suit for declaration of  title in respect of



property.     The   evidence   of   plaintiff/appellant   indicated



several     discrepancies     and   inconsistencies     due   to   which



the trial court dismissed the suit but the 1st appellate court



and     the   High   Court,     had   allowed   the   appeal   which   was



upheld by the Supreme Court  as it was  held  that the High



Court   rightly   allowed   the   respondent's/government





                                                                           20


company's second appeal and rightly found that the sale in



favour of the appellant was not bona fide   and thus confer



no  rights on them.  



19.           Application   of     Section   101   of   the   Evidence   Act,



1872 thus came up for discussion in this matter and while



discussing the law on the burden of proof in the context of



dealing   with     the   allegation   of       sham   and   bogus



transaction, it was held that   party which makes allegation



must   prove   it.     But   the   court   was   further   pleased   to   hold



wherein   the     question   before   the   court   was   "whether     the



transaction in question   was a bona fide and genuine one"



so that the party/plaintiff relying  on the transaction had to



first of all prove  its genuineness and only  thereafter would



the defendant  be required to discharge the burden in order



to   dislodge   such   proof   and   establish     that   the   transaction



was   sham   and   fictitious.     This   ratio     can   aptly     be   relied



upon     in   this   matter   as   in   this   particular   case,   it   is   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1-Kuppuswami     who   relied   upon



the   alleged   sale   deed   dated   24.2.1951   and   included   the



subject-matter of the property which formed part of the sale



deed and claimed partition.   This sale deed  was denied by





                                                                               21


the   defendant/appellant   on   the   ground   that   it   was   bogus



and   a  sham transaction  which   was  executed  admittedly   in



1951   when   she   was   a   minor.                Thus,   it   was   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1   who   should   have   first   of   all



discharged   the   burden   that   the   sale   deed   executed   during



the minority of the appellant  was  genuine and was fit to be



relied upon.   If the courts below   including the High Court



had   felt   satisfied     on   this   aspect,     only   then     the   burden



could   be     shifted   on   the   defendant/appellant   to     dislodge



the case  of the plaintiff  that the sale deed was not genuine.



But   when   the   plaintiff   merely     pleaded   in   the   plaint     but



failed  to lead any evidence - much   less proof, that the sale



deed   was   genuine   and   was   executed   in   order   to   discharge



the burden of legal necessity  in the interest of  minor, then



the   High   Court     clearly   misdirected   itself     by   recording   in



the   impugned   order   that   it   is   the   defendant/appellant



herein who should  have challenged  the genuineness of the



sale   deed   after   attaining   majority   within   the   period   of



limitation.



20.            Since  the  High  Court  has  misplaced    burden  of



proof,   it   clearly   vitiated   its   own   judgments   as   also   of   the





                                                                             22


courts   below  since   it   is   well   established   dictum   of   the



Evidence Act that misplacing  burden of proof would vitiate



judgment.       It is also equally   and undoubtedly   true that



the burden of proof may not be of much consequence  after



both   the   parties     lay   evidence,   but   while     appreciating   the



question of  burden of proof, misplacing of  burden of proof



on a particular party and recording  findings in a particular



way definitely  vitiates the judgment  as it has happened in



the   instant   matter.     This   position   stands   reinforced     by



several authorities   including the one   delivered in the case



of    Koppula     Koteshwara   Rao  vs.    Koppula   Hemant   Rao,



2002 AIHC 4950 (AP).



21.          It has been further held  by the Supreme Court in



the case   of   State  of J & K  vs.  Hindustan  Forest Company,



2006 (12) SCC 198, wherein  it was held that the onus is on



the plaintiff  to positively   establish its case on the basis of



material   available   and   it   cannot   rely   on   the   weakness   or



absence of defence to discharge onus.



22.          It   was     still   further   held     by   this   Court   in   the



matter of   Corporation  of City  of Bangalore  vs.  Zulekha   Bi,



2008 (11) SCC 306 (308)  that it is for the plaintiff   to prove





                                                                              23


his   title   to   the   property.     This   ratio   can   clearly   be   made



applicable  to the facts of this case for it is the plaintiff who



claimed title to the  property  which was a subject-matter of



the alleged sale deed of 24.2.1951 for which  he had sought



partition   against   his  brother   and,  therefore,     it  was   clearly



the plaintiff who should have first of all established his case



establishing   title   of   the     property   to   the   joint   family   out   of



which     he   was   claiming   his   share.     When   the   plaintiff



himself failed to discharge the burden to prove that the sale



deed   which   he   executed     in   favour   of   his   own   son   and



nephew     by     selling   the   property     of   a  minor   of   whom     he



claimed   to   be   legal   guardian     without   permission   of   the



court,   it was clearly   fit to be set aside by the High Court



which   the     High   Court     as   also   the   courts   below     have



miserably  failed to discharge.  The onus was clearly on the



plaintiff     to   positively   establish     his   case     on   the   basis     of



material available   and could not have been allowed by the



High Court to rely on the weakness   or absence   of defence



of  the defendant/appellant herein to discharge  such onus.



23.           The   courts   below   thus   have   illegally   and



erroneously   failed   not   to   cast   this   burden   on   the





                                                                                 24


plaintiff/respondent   No.1   by   clearly   misconstruing   the



whole   case   and   thus   resulted   into   recording   of   findings



which   are   wholly   perverse   and   even   against   the   admitted



case of the parties.



24.          It   is   further   well-settled   that   a   suit     has   to   be



tried on the basis of the pleadings  of the contesting parties



which is filed   in the suit before the trial court in the form



of     plaint   and   written   statement   and   the   nucleus     of   the



case   of   the   plaintiff     and   the   contesting   case   of   the



defendant   in the form of issues emerges out of   that.   This



basic  principle,  seems to have been missed not only by the



trial   court     in   this   case   but   consistently   by   the   first



appellate   court   which   has   been     compounded   by   the   High



Court.



25.          Thus, we are of the view,  that the whole case out



of which   this  appeal arises had been  practically made  a



mess  by  missing  the  basic     principle     that the  suit  should



be     decided   on   the   basis   of   the   pleading   of   the   contesting



parties   after  which  Section  101  of The  Evidence  Act  would



come  into play  in  order   to determine  on  whom  the  burden



falls for proving the issues which have been determined.





                                                                              25


26.          We   further   fail   to   comprehend   as   to   how   the



basic   case   pleaded   by   the   plaintiff   had   been   misconstrued



and   the   burden   of   discharge   of   genuineness,   veracity   and



legal   efficacy of the sale deed dated 24.2.1951 was shifted



on the appellant-Rangammal   clearly missing   that it is the



plaintiff's/respondent   No.1   case   who   was   bent   upon   to



include   Rangammal's   property   also   for   partition   by   relying



upon the story of execution of sale deed  when the partition



suit     was   between   the   two   brothers     who   were   plaintiff-



Kuppuswami and defendant No.1-Andivelu.



27.          Coming now to the next question, we are unable



to   appreciate   as  to   how  the   High   Court     has  held  that  the



delay   in   challenging   the     sale   deed   of   1951   should   have



been   done   at   the   instance   of   the   2nd  defendant-appellant



herein     when   it   is   the   plaintiff     who   brought   the



theory/story   of     execution   of     the   sale   deed     of   appellant



Rangammal's             property         into         the         branch         of



plaintiff/respondents'     branch   by   pleading   and   asserting



that  this had fallen into the share of  their predecessor  as



one of the predecessors was the  de facto  guardian     of   the



appellant Rangammal.  In fact, if there was a dispute about





                                                                                 26


the   genuineness   and   veracity   of   the   sale   deed   and   the



appellant   was   in   occupation   of   her   share,   then   it   is   the



plaintiff  who should  have filed  a suit claiming title on the



basis   of     the   sale   deed   which   was   claimed   to   have       been



executed   in   their   favour   by   the  de   facto    guardian   of



Rangammal   when   she   was   a   minor   before   this   property



could   be   included   in   the   suit   for   partition   between   the



brothers excluding the 2nd  defendant/appellant Rangammal



and   the     consequence   of   not   doing   so   or   delay   in   this



regard,   obviously   will   have   to   be   attributed   to   the



plaintiff/respondent.



28.           Thus, the High Court fell into a clear error when



it observed that the suit was barred by limitation as it had



been   filed   after   31   years   of   the   execution   of   the   sale   deed



which   on   the   face   of   it   is   factually   incorrect.     The   High



Court has clearly erred while recording   so,   as it seems to



have     missed   that   the     suit   had   not   been   filed   by   the



appellant herein  but she was merely contesting the suit as



the   2nd  defendant   by   getting   herself   impleaded   in   the



partition   suit   when   it   came   to   her   knowledge   that   the



property   which   is     in   her   occupation   and   possession   has





                                                                               27


also been included in the schedule in the suit   for partition



between   plaintiff/respondent   No.1   herein-Kuppuswamy



and   the   1st  defendant/respondent   No.2   herein-Andivelu



and when she received   the copy of the plaint, execution of



the   alleged   sale   deed   way   back   in   1951   was     disclosed   to



her for the first time.   Hence, there was no cause of action



for   her     to   file   a   suit   challenging   the   alleged   sale   deed   as



knowledge   of   the   same   cannot   be   attributed   to   her   in   this



regard   as   she     asserted   actual   physical   possession   on   her



share.



29.           The   appellant   who   claimed   to   be   in   occupation



and peaceful possession of   her share   to the extent of half



which   is   situated   on   the   eastern     side   of   the   schedule



property,   had   no     reason   to   file   a   suit   assailing     the   sale



deed   when   she   was   in   actual   physical   possession   of   her



share   and   suddenly   out   of   the   blue,   a   partition   suit     was



filed by  the  plaintiff/respondent  No.1 wherein the property



of   the   appellant   also   was   included   in   the   schedule   of   the



partition suit which was to be partitioned  between the two



brothers by metes and bounds by setting a cooked up story



that   the   appellant's   share,   who   belonged   to   an   altogether





                                                                                28


different branch of the family, had been   given away by her



de facto guardian Kumara Naicker by executing a sale deed



in   favour   of   the   respondents'   predecessor   way   back   on



24.2.1951 when the appellant admittedly was  a minor.



30.          We are, therefore,  constrained to  partly set aside



the  judgment  and  order  of  the  High Court   in so  far   as  the



share   of   the   appellant   Rangammal   is   concerned   and



consequently  the  decree  passed   by  the   trial   court,  upheld



by   the   first   appellate   court   and   the   High   Court   which   had



been illegally decreed   including the share   of the appellant



-Rangammal   which   had   not   devolved   on   the   family   of   the



plaintiff/respondent   No.1   and   defendant   No.1/respondent



No.2,   but   was   claimed   on   the   basis   of   a   sale   deed   which



could not be proved either by evidence or law, is fit to be set



aside.



31.          It hardly needs to be   highlighted   that  in   a suit



for partition, it is   expected of the plaintiff   to include only



those properties for partition to which the family has clear



title and unambiguously  belong to the members of the joint



family   which   is   sought   to   be   partitioned   and   if   someone



else's     property     meaning   thereby     disputed   property     is





                                                                           29


included   in the  schedule  of  the  suit for partition,  and the



same   is   contested   by   a   third   party   who   is   allowed   to   be



impleaded   by   order   of   the   trial   court,   obviously   it   is   the



plaintiff who will have to first of  all discharge the burden of



proof     for     establishing   that   the   disputed   property   belongs



to   the   joint     family   which   should   be   partitioned   excluding



someone   who   claims   that   some   portion   of   the   joint   family



property   did   not   belong   to   the   plaintiff's   joint   family   in



regard to which decree for partition is sought.



32.              However, we make it clear that the decree which



has   been   passed   by   the   trial   court   in   so   far   as   partition



between           plaintiff/respondent          No.1         and         defendant



No.1/respondent   No.2   is   concerned,   shall   remain   in   tact



but   the   said   decree   shall   exclude   the   property   which   had



fallen   into   the   share   of     appellant-Rangammal   but   was



claimed   to   have   been   transferred     to   the   branch   of     the



plaintiff   and   1st  defendant-respondents   herein   vide   sale



deed     dated   24.2.1951     The   trial   court   being   the   court   of



District Munsif, Palani, accordingly shall modify the decree



passed   in   O.S.   No.255   of   1982   by   excluding     the   share   of



the appellant -Rangammal claimed on the basis of the sale





                                                                                30


deed dated 24.2.1951.   Thereafter,   if the decree   is put to



execution,   the   executing   court     shall   ensure   that   such



portion     of   the   property   which   is   in   occupation     of



Rangammal   which   was   alleged  to   have   been  sold  vide   sale



deed dated 24.2.1951, shall not be put into execution while



partitioning   the   remaining   property   between   the   plaintiff-



Kuppuswami   and   1st  defendant   -Andivelu   -   respondent



No.2.



33.          Thus,   this   appeal   in   so   far   as   the   claim     of   the



appellant- Rangammal to the  extent  of half of the share in



the   schedule   to   the   suit   property,   situated   on   the   eastern



portion   is   concerned,   stands   allowed   with   a   token   cost



which   is   quantified     at   rupees  twenty   five   thousand   as   we



are   of   the   view   that   the   appellant   who   was   in   actual



physical and peaceful possession of her property which she



had inherited from her deceased parents, was unnecessarily



dragged into this litigation at the instance of   the plaintiff-



Kuppuswami   who   filed   a   partition   suit     which   was



apparently collusive in nature as it included the share of a



third party to which the plaintiff and 1st  defendant's family



had   no   clear   title.         Under   the   facts   and   circumstance   of





                                                                               31


the instant case, it was clearly a compulsion on the part of



the appellant/Tmt. Rangammal to contest the collusive suit



for   decades   Kwasting   time,   energy   and   expense   over   a



litigation  which  was  started by the plaintiff  clearly  with  an



oblique motive and evil design. Hence the cost shall be paid



by   the   respondent   No.1-Kuppuswami   to   the   appellant-



Rangammal as indicated above.



34.         Accordingly,   this   appeal   stands   allowed   with



costs.





                                        ..................................J

                                           (J.M. Panchal)





                                        ..................................J

                                         (Gyan Sudha Misra )



New Delhi,

May 13, 2011





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