LAW FOR ALL : SENSATIONAL TRIPLE MURDER CASE OF DARASING - NO TEST IDENTIFICATION PARED- IDENTIFICATION IN COURT - CORROBORATED

Sunday, January 23, 2011

SENSATIONAL TRIPLE MURDER CASE OF DARASING - NO TEST IDENTIFICATION PARED- IDENTIFICATION IN COURT - CORROBORATED - CONVICTION

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1366 OF 2005

Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh .... Appellant(s)

Versus

Republic of India .... Respondent(s)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1259 OF 2007

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1357-1365 OF 2005

JUDGMENT

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) These appeals relate to a sensational case of triple

murder of an Australian Christian Missionary - Graham

Stuart Staines and his two minor sons, namely, Philip Staines,

aged about 10 years and Timothy Staines aged about 6 years.

2) Criminal Appeal No. 1366 of 2005 is filed by Rabindra

Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh against the final judgment and order

dated 19.05.2005 passed by the High Court of Orissa at

Cuttack in Criminal Appeal No. 239 of 2003 whereby the High

Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant upholding the

conviction and commuting the death sentence passed by the

trial Court into that of life imprisonment. Against the same

judgment, Criminal Appeal No. 1259 of 2007 is filed by

Mahendra Hembram challenging his life imprisonment

awarded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court.

Against the acquittal of rest of the accused by the High Court,

the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short "the CBI") filed

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1357-1365 of 2005. Since all the

appeals arose from the common judgment of the High Court

and relating to the very same incident that took place in the

midnight of 22.01.1999/23.01.1999, they are being disposed

of by this judgment.

3) The case of the prosecution is as under:

(a) Graham Stuart Staines, a Christian Missionary from

Australia, was working among the tribal people especially

lepers of the State of Orissa. His two minor sons, namely,

Philip Staines and Timothy Staines were burnt to death along

with their father in the midnight of 22.01.1999/23.01.1999.

The deceased-Graham Staines was engaged in propagating

and preaching Christianity in the tribal area of interior Orissa.

Manoharpur is a remote tribal village under the Anandapur

Police Station of the District Keonjhar of Orissa. Every year,

soon after the Makar Sankranti, the said missionary used to

come to the village to conduct the Jungle Camp. Accordingly,

on 20.01.1999, the deceased-Staines, along with his two

minor sons Philip and Timothy and several other persons

came to the village Manoharpur. They conducted the camp for

next two days by hosting a series of programmes.

(b) On 22.01.1999, the Missionary Team, as usual conducted

different programmes in the village near the Church and

retired for the day. Graham Staines and his two minor sons

slept in their vehicle parked outside the Church. In the mid-

night, a mob of 60-70 people came to the spot and set fire to

the vehicle in which the deceased persons were sleeping. The

mob prevented the deceased to get themselves out of the

vehicle as a result of which all the three persons got burnt in

the vehicle. The local police was informed about the incident

on the next day.

investigation satisfactorily, on 23.04.1999, the same was

handed over to the State Crime Branch. Even the Crime

Branch failed to conduct the investigation, ultimately, the

investigation was transferred to CBI.

(d) On 03.05.1999, the investigation was taken over by the

CBI. After thorough investigation, charge sheet was filed by

the CBI on 22.06.1999. On the basis of charge sheet, as many

as 14 accused persons were put to trial. Apart from these

accused, one minor was tried by Juvenile Court.

(e) The prosecution examined as many as 55 witnesses

whereas in defence 25 witnesses were examined. Series of

documents were exhibited by the prosecution. By a common

judgment and order dated 15.09.2003 and 22.09.2003,

Sessions Judge, Khurda convicted all the accused and

sentenced them for offences punishable under various

sections. The death sentence was passed against Dara Singh-

appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1366 of 2005 and others

were awarded sentence of life imprisonment.

(f) The death reference and the appeals filed by the

convicted persons were heard together by the High Court and

were disposed of by common judgment dated 19.05.2005

concluding that the witnesses are not trustworthy and no

credence should be given to their statements and confessional

statements were procured by the investigating agency under

threat and coercion. The High Court, by the impugned

judgment, modified the death sentence awarded to Dara Singh

into life imprisonment and confirmed the life imprisonment

imposed on Mahendra Hembram and acquitted all the other

accused persons. Questioning the conviction and sentence of

life imprisonment, Dara Singh and Mahendra Hembram filed

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1366 of 2005 and 1259 of 2007

respectively and against the acquittal of rest of the accused,

CBI filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 1357-65 of 2005 before this

Court.

4) Heard Mr. KTS Tulsi and Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned

senior counsel for the accused/appellants and Mr. Vivek K.

Tankha, learned Addl. Solicitor General for the CBI.

5) Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for

Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh (A1) and other accused in

the appeals against acquittal filed by the CBI, after taking us

through all the relevant materials has raised the following

contentions:-

(i) Confessions of various accused persons, particularly, Rabi

Soren (A9), Mahadev Mahanta (A11) and Turam Ho (A12)

under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(hereinafter referred to as `Cr.P.C.') cannot be considered to be

voluntary on account of the fact that all the co-accused

persons were produced before the Magistrate from the police

custody and were remanded back to police custody. Similarly,

Dayanidhi Patra @ Daya (A14) was produced from the police

custody for confession while Umakant Bhoi (A13) made his

statement while on bail. Besides all confessions being

exculpatory and made after conspiracy ceased to be operative

and inadmissible.

(ii) Inasmuch as recording of confessions of various accused

persons was done after the investigation was taken over by

Jogendra Nayak (PW 55), I.O. of the CBI which shows the

extent to which strong arm tactics were used by the

investigating agency.

(iii) The statements of eye-witnesses are contradictory to each

other on all material points.

(iv) There are several circumstances which are inconsistent

with the fire started by arson from outside and several

circumstances consistent with the fire emanating from inside

of the vehicle and then spread to rest of the vehicle after fuel

tank caught fire.

(v) This Court in cases of appeals against acquittal has held

that when two views are possible, one in favour of the accused

should be accepted.

6) Mr. Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for the accused

Mahendra Hembram (A3) reiterating the above submissions of

Mr. Tulsi also pinpointed deficiency in the prosecution case

insofar as (A3) is concerned.

7) Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned Addl. Solicitor General, after

taking us through oral and documentary evidence, extensively

refuted all the contentions of the learned senior counsel for

the accused and raised the following submissions:-

(i) The High Court committed an error in altering the death

sentence into life imprisonment in favour of (A1) and

acquitting all other accused except (A3). He pointed out that

the appreciation of the evidence by the High Court is wholly

perverse and it erroneously disregarded the testimony of

twelve eye-witnesses.

(ii) The High Court failed to appreciate the fact that the three

accused, namely, Mahendra Hembram (A3), Ojen @ Suresh

Hansda (A7) and Renta Hembram (A10) belonging to the same

village were known to the eye-witnesses and, therefore, there

is no requirement to conduct Test Identification Parade (in

short `TIP').

(iii) The High Court erred in acquitting 11 accused persons

on the sole ground that TIP was not conducted and, therefore,

identification by the eye-witnesses was doubtful.

(iv) The evidence of identification in Court is substantive

evidence and that of the identification in TIP is of corroborative

value.

(v) The High Court committed a serious error in law in

disregarding the confessional statements made under Section

164 of the Cr.P.C. as well as the extra-judicial confessions

made by Dara Singh (A1) and Mahendra Hembram (A3).

(vi) The High Court wrongly held inculpatory confessional

statements as exculpatory and on that ground rejected the

same. The High Court failed to appreciate that in their

confessional statements (A9), (A11), (A12), (A13) and (A14)

have clearly admitted their plan for committing the crime.

(vii) The adverse observations against (PW 55) the Investigating

Officer of CBI, by the High Court are not warranted and in any

event not supported by any material.

(viii) Inasmuch as it was Dara Singh (A1) who originated and

organized the heinous act and also prevented the deceased

persons from coming out of the burning vehicle, the High

Court ought to have confirmed his death sentence.

(ix) The reasons given by the High Court in acquitting 11

persons are unacceptable and the judgment to that extent is

liable to be set aside.

8) We have considered the rival submissions and perused all

the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution and

defence.

9) With the various materials in the form of oral and

documentary evidence, reasoning of the trial Judge and the

ultimate decision of the High Court, we have to find out

whether the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment

imposed on Dara Singh (A1) and Mahendra Hembram (A3) is

sustainable and whether prosecution has proved its case even

against the accused who were acquitted by the High Court.

Eye witnesses

10) According to the learned senior counsel for the accused,

the statements of eye-witnesses are contradictory to each

other on all material points. It is his further claim that

exaggerated and improved version of the incident makes it

difficult to place implicit reliance on the statements of any of

those witnesses. On the other hand, it is the claim of the

prosecution that the statements of eye-witnesses are reliable

and acceptable and it was rightly considered by the trial Court

and erroneously rejected except insofar as against Dara Singh

(A1) and Mahendra Hembram (A3) by the High Court.

i) PW2, Basi Tudu, one of the prime eye-witness, identified in

dock the previously known accused of her village Ojen

Hansda. She was not examined by local police, however,

examined by the CID on 04.02.1999 and by the CBI on

05.06.1999. In her evidence, she stated that she is a

Christian by faith. Before the court, she deposed that her

house is located near the place of occurrence. She also stated

that Graham Staines along with his two sons came at

Manoharpur church after Makar Sankranti and stayed there

in the night. He along with his two sons slept inside the

vehicle. Inside the court, during her deposition, she first

wrongly identified accused Rajat Kumar Das as accused Ojen

Hansda. However, when she had a better view of the accused

in the court, she correctly identified Ojen Hansda as the

person whom she saw among 60 persons holding torch lights

and lathis going towards the church. She stated that in the

midnight, on hearing barking of dogs, she woke up from sleep

and came out of the house. She found about 60 persons going

towards the church where the vehicles of Graham Staines

were parked. Those persons did not allow her to proceed

further. Therefore, she went to the thrashing floor from where

she found that people had surrounded the vehicle of Graham

Staines. Thereafter, she found the vehicle on fire. The wheels

of vehicle in which Graham Staines and his two sons were

sleeping, bursted aloud, and they were burnt to death. The

people who surrounded the vehicles raised slogans "Jai

Bajarang Bali" and "Dara Singh Zindabad". It is clear that she

could identify only Ojen @ Suresh Hansda by face for the first

time before the trial Court. No TIP was held to enable her to

identify him. It shows that her identification of Ojen @ Suresh

Hansda by face during trial was not corroborated by any

previously held TIP. It is also clear that though she was

examined by the State Police/CID, she never disclosed the

name of Ojen @ Suresh Hansda. Though she claims to have

identified Ojen @ Suresh Hansda by the light of the lamp

(locally called Dibri) which she had kept in the Verandah, it

must be noted that it was midnight during the peak winter

season and there is no explanation for keeping the lamp in the

Verandah during midnight. In her cross-examination, she

admitted that she could not identify any of the persons who

had surrounded the vehicle of Graham Staines and set it

ablaze.

ii) The next eye-witness examined on the side of the

prosecution is PW3, Paul Murmu. He admitted that he was

converted to Christianity in the year 1997. He identified

accused Dara Singh in dock. He was examined by the local

police on 23.01.1999, by CID on 10.02.1999 and by the CBI

on 20.04.1999. He used to accompany Graham Staines at

different places. He last accompanied Graham Staines on his

visit to Manoharpur on 20.02.1999. He stated that Graham

Staines with his two sons was in a separate vehicle and the

witness along with other three persons was in another vehicle.

In the night of 22.01.1999, Graham Staines along with his two

sons slept in his vehicle, which was parked in front of the

church. The witness slept in a hut, which was raised behind

the church. In the midnight, Nimai Hansda (driver of vehicle)

woke him up. He heard the sound of beating of the vehicles

parked in front of the church. He along with Nimai Hansda

went near the chruch and found 60-70 persons putting straw

beneath the vehicle of Graham Staines and setting it on fire.

Three persons broke the glass panes of the vehicle in which

Graham Staines and his two sons were sleeping and gave

strokes to them with sticks. They were focusing the torch into

the vehicles. One of them was having a beard. The witness

pointed out to the accused Dara Singh (A1) on the dock saying

that the bearded man resembled like him. The witness was

unable to identify the other two persons who were in the dock.

However, he also asserted the hearing of slogans saying "Dara

Singh Zindabad" which corroborates his identification.

iii) The next eye-witness examined by the prosecution is PW4,

Rolia Soren. It was he who lodged FIR. He was examined by

the local police on 23.01.1999, by the CID on 03.02.1999 and

by the CBI on 09.04.1999. He is a resident of Manohapur

Village (the place of occurrence) and Graham Staines was well

known to him. He stated that Graham Staines along with his

two sons and other persons visited Manoharpur on

20.01.1999. In the night of 22.01.1999, Graham Staines and

his two sons slept in the vehicle bearing No. 1208 which was

parked in front of the church. Another vehicle No. 952 was

also parked in front of the church. The house of witness was

situated in the south of church, four houses apart and the

vehicles parked in front of church were visible from the road in

front of his house. In the night of 22.01.1999, his wife woke

him up and said that she found large number of people with

lathis and torches going towards the church. After walking

about 100 ft. towards the vehicles, he found a large number of

people delivering lathis blow on the vehicle in which Graham

Staines and his two sons were sleeping and the other vehicle

bearing No. 952 was already set on fire. Three-four persons

belonging to the group caught hold of him by collar and

restrained him from proceeding towards the vehicle. The

witness could not recognize them as their heads were covered

with caps and faces by mufflers. The witness went towards

the village and called Christian people. When along with these

persons, the witness reached near the church, he found both

the vehicles burnt. Graham Staines and his two sons were

also burnt to death. The next day, at about 9 P.M., the

Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Anandpur PS showed his written paper

and said that was the FIR and he had to lend his signature

and accordingly, he lend his signature thereon. The witness

had identified his signatures during his deposition in the

court. Though he mentioned large number of miscreants, but

they were not chargesheeted. In the FIR itself it was stated by

this witness that at the time of occurrence miscreants raised

slogans saying "Bajrang Bali Zindabad" and "Dara Singh

Zindabad".

iv) Singo Marandi (PW5) was examined as next eye-witness.

Though he named accused Ojen Hansda, in his deposition

stated that he belonged to his village and in the dock he could

not identify him with certainty. His statement was not

recorded by the local police but recorded by the CID on

03.02.1999 and by the CBI on 07.06.1999. This witness is a

resident of Manoharpur (the place of occurrence). He stated

that on Saraswati Puja day of 1999, after witnessing the Nagin

dance along with his mother, he slept in Verandah of Galu and

her mother was sitting by his side. At about midnight, his

mother woke him up. He saw something was burning near the

church and found a vehicle moving towards the road. Ojen

and Chenchu of his village carrying torch and lathis came to

them and warned them not to go near the fire as some people

were killing the Christians there. Thereafter, he heard sounds

of blowing of whistles thrice and raising slogans saying "Dara

Singh Zindabad". It is seen from his evidence that at that

time he was prosecuting his studies at Cuttack and his

mother was working as a labourer in Bhadrak. It is also not

clear as to what was the need for him to sleep in Verandah of

another person with his mother sitting beside him till

midnight during peak of the winter.

v) The next eye-witness examined by the prosecution is Nimai

Hansda (PW10). He was examined by the local police on

23.01.1999, by the CID on 11.02.1999 and by the CBI on

20.04.1999. He did not identify any of the accused.He was the

driver of Graham Staines. Vehicle No. 1208 was driven by

him. He along with Graham Staines and others came to the

place of occurrence on 20.01.1999. Graham Staines and his

two sons used to sleep in the said vehicle. He stated that in

the midnight of 22.01.1999, on hearing bursting sounds, he

woke up. He heard the sound of beating the vehicles parked

in front of church in which Graham Staines and his two sons

were sleeping. He ran towards the vehicles and found some

people beating the vehicles with lathis. They first broke the

glass pane of vehicle No. 952. Thereafter, a boy set the vehicle

on fire. Before setting the vehicle on fire, he put bundle of

straw at front right wheel of vehicle. When the witness raised

a noise of protest, those people assaulted him. He went to call

the people but nobody came. When he came back to the place

of occurrence, he found both the vehicles on fire. The witness

stated that there were about 30-40 people armed with lathis

and holding torches. They raised slogan `Jai Bajarang Bali'

and `Dara Singh Zindabad. The fire was extinguished at 3

a.m. By that time, both the vehicles were completely burnt.

Graham Staines and his two sons were completely charred

and burnt to death. The witness could not identify any of the

miscreants who set the vehicles on fire.

vi) PW11, Bhakta Marandi was next examined on the side of

the prosecution as eye-witness. He identified accused Dara

Singh and Rajat Kumar Das in dock. His statement was

neither recorded by local police nor by the CID but recorded by

the CBI on 05.06.1999. He belongs to Village Manoharpur

(the place of occurrence). His house is situated two houses

apart from the church. He stated that the deceased Graham

Staines was known to him. He last visited Manoharpur on

20.01.1999 along with his two sons and others in two vehicles.

Graham Staines and his two sons used to sleep in the night

inside the vehicle parked in front of the church. As usual in

the night of 22.01.1999, Graham Staines and his two sons

had slept in a vehicle. In the midnight, the witness was woken

up by his wife on hearing bursting sounds. He came out of his

house and found 4/5 persons standing in front of his house

holding torches and lathis. They were threatening that they

will kill the persons who will dare to come in their way. One of

them threw a baton like stick at him. He retreated to his house

and went to the house of another person situated one house

apart from the church. A slim and tall man was holding an

axe. They set on fire one of the vehicles. Some of them brought

straw and put the same on the vehicle. They set fire both the

vehicles and both the vehicles were burnt. They raised the

slogans "Jai Bajarang Bali" and "Dara Singh Zindabad". The

witness pointed accused Dara Singh (A1) and accused Rajat

Kumar Das in the dock as two of those persons beating the

vehicles and setting fire on the vehicles. The witness identified

accused Dara Singh (A1) as slim and tall fellow holding the axe

and guiding the miscreants. The witness further stated that

the CBI while interrogating him showed photographs of some

persons and he had identified two of the photographs as that

of miscreants. He had signed on those photographs. About

the admissibility of the identification of the accused persons

with the photographs can be considered at a later point of

time. He did not report the incident to the Collector or any

other police officer camping at the site.

vii) The next eye-witness examined was Mathai Marandi

(PW15). He identified accused Uma Kant Bhoi (A 13) in the

TIP. He also identified accused Dara Singh (A1), Dipu Das

(A2), Ojen @ Suresh Hansda and Mahadev. Out of these

accused, Ojen Hansda was previously known to him,

belonging to the same street of his village. In his evidence, it

is stated that he is native of Manoharpur village and the

church (Place of occurrence) is located adjacent to his house.

Deceased Graham Staines was well known to him as he used

to visit his village for the last 15-16 years. He stated that

Graham Staines last visited their village on 20.01.1999. He

along with his two sons and other persons came there in two

vehicles. He further stated that in the night of 22.01.1999, on

hearing bursting sound, his wife woke him up. After coming

out of the house, he found 40-50 persons gathered near the

vehicles parked in front of the church and beating the vehicles

by lathis. Those miscreants were holding lathis, axe, torches,

bows and arrows. He heard cries raised by the minor sons of

Graham Staines. He went near the vehicle, but 3 to 4 persons

threatened him with lathis and, therefore, he retreated to his

house. Thereafter, he went to the huts raised behind the

church and called the persons staying there and went to the

place of occurrence and found the vehicles set on fire. The

miscreants put the straw inside the vehicle and set it on fire.

They first set the empty vehicle on fire and thereafter the

vehicle in which Graham Staines and his sons were sleeping.

Both the vehicles caught fire and were burnt. The witness

identified accused Dara Singh (A1), Dipu Das (A2), Ojen @

Suresh Hansda and Mahadev as the miscreants present at the

scene of occurrence and taking part in the offence. The

witness further stated that Ojen Hansda and Mahendra

Hembram belonged to his village. He had identified accused

Uma Kanta Bhoi in the TIP conducted at Anandpur Jail as one

of the persons setting fire on the vehicle. He further stated

that after the vehicles were burnt, the miscreants blew whistle

thrice and raised slogan "Jai Bajarang Bali" and "Dara Singh

Zindabad". However, it is relevant to note that his omission to

mention all important aspects in his evidence including names

of the appellants and his previous statements recorded by

three Investigating Officers creates a doubt about his veracity.

viii) Joseph Marandi (PW23) was examined as another eye-

witness to the occurrence. He belonged to village Manoharpur

(Place of occurrence) and his house is located near the church.

He identified accused Renta Hembram, Mahendra Hembram,

Dara Singh and Rajat Kumar Dass @ Dipu. Out of these, two

accused - Renta Hembram and Mahendra Hembram, were

previously known to him as they belonged to his village. He

was examined by the local police on 02.02.1999, by the CID

on 06.02.1999 and by the CBI on 03.06.1999. He stated that

Graham Staines along with his two sons and other persons

came to Manoharpur on 20.01.1999 on two vehicles. On

22.01.1999 deceased Graham Staines and his two sons slept

in a vehicle parked in front of the church and other persons

slept in the huts raised behind the church. In the mid-night,

he heard the sound of beating of vehicles and woke up. When

he came out of the house, 3 to 4 persons holding lathis and

torches restrained and threatened him to assault if he

proceeds further. Thereafter, he stood in a lane between his

house and the church. He saw that about 20-22 persons had

surrounded the vehicle in which deceased Graham Staines

and his two sons were sleeping. Some people were setting the

vehicle on fire by putting straw beneath it and igniting it by

match sticks. After the vehicle caught fire and was burnt,

somebody blew whistle thrice and they shouted slogan "Jai

Bajarang Bali" and "Dara Singh Zindabad". The other vehicle

was not visible to the witness. The witness identified accused

Renta Hembram and Mahendra Hembram of his village who

were among the miscreants. The witness also identified

accused Dara Singh (A1) and accused Rajat Kumar Das @Dipu

(A2) as the miscreants who among others had set fire to the

vehicles. The witness further stated that the CBI officers had

shown him 30-40 photographs out of which he identified the

photographs of the accused Renta Hembram, Mahendra

Hembram, Dara Singh (A1) and Rajat Kumar Das @ Dipu (A2).

He is also a witness to the seizure of some articles seized from

the place of occurrence and he has proved the seizure list.

Admittedly, he did not disclose the names of these persons

before either of the aforesaid three I.Os.

ix) Raghunath Dohari (PW36), one of the eye-witnesses,

identified accused Dara Singh, Harish Chandra, Mahadev and

Turam Ho. His statement was not recorded by local police and

the CID but it was recorded by the CBI on 04.12.1999. He

belongs to village Manoharpur (place of occurrence). He stated

that about 3 years before his deposition (1999) during

Saraswati puja, Graham Staines visited their village. In the

night, he heard the sound of beating. He got up and went to

the church, where there was a gathering of 60-70 persons in

front of the Church and they were beating the vehicles with

sticks. They brought straw and set fire to the vehicles by

burning straw. The witness identified accused Dara Singh

(A1), Harish Chandra, Mahadev and Turam Ho as the

miscreants who were in the gatherings and set fire to the

vehicles. It is relevant to point out that apart from the police

party, the Collector and other Police Officers though were

camping at the place of occurrence, the fact remains that this

witness did not report the incident either to the concerned

Investigating Officer or to the Collector for about four months.

However, the fact remains that he identified some of the

appellants before the trial Court for the first time. As stated

earlier, the legality or otherwise of dock identification, for the

first time, would be dealt with in the later part of the

judgment.

x) Another eye-witness PW39, Soleman Marandi identified

accused Dara Singh, Rajat Kumar Dass, Surtha Naik, Harish

Chandra, Ojen Hansda and Kartik Lohar. Out of these

accused, Ojen Hansda was known to him being resident of his

village. His statement was not recorded by the local police but

recorded by the CID on 03.02.1999 and by the CBI on

30.05.1999. He is a resident of village Manoharpur (place of

occurrence). He stated that Graham Staines visited

Manhorpur last time about 3 years back i.e. in the year 1999

after Makar Sankranti. He came there with his two sons and

other persons in two vehicles. In the third night of his stay, he

along with his two sons slept in the vehicle during night. The

vehicles were parked in front of the church. In the midnight,

the witness heard the sound of beating of vehicles. He came

out of the house and went near the church. He found that

about 30-40 persons had surrounded the vehicles and some of

them were beating the vehicles in which Graham Staines along

with his two sons was sleeping. He heard the cries of two sons

of Graham Staines coming from the vehicle. These people set

fire to the second vehicle parked near the vehicle of Graham

Staines. When the vehicle caught fire, the vehicle moved

towards the road. Three of those miscreants put a log of wood

preventing the vehicle moving further. The witness identified

accused Dara Singh as (A1), Rajat Kumar Das, Suratha Naik,

Harish Mahanta, Ojen Hansda and Kartik Lohar amongst the

accused persons in the dock as the miscreants who had set

fire to the vehicles. Accused Ojen Hansda belonged to his

village. The witness further stated that CBI showed him

number of photographs among which he identified

photographs of 5 persons who had taken part in the

occurrence. He identified Dara Singh (A1) without any

difficulty and it is also corroborated by the slogan he heard

which miscreants raised in the name of Dara Singh.

xi) The last eye-witness examined on the side of the

prosecution is PW43, Lablal Tudu. He identified accused Dara

Singh, Turam Ho, Daya Patra and Rajat Kumar Das. His

statement was not recorded by local police and by the CID but

recorded by the CBI on 03.06.1999. He is also a resident of

Manoharpur village and his house is located near the Church

(the place of occurrence). He stated that Graham Staines

visited their village about three years before his deposition in

the Court (January, 1999). He came there on Wednesday and

stayed till Friday. On Friday night, Graham Staines and his

two sons slept in a vehicle parked in front of the church. In

the midnight, his mother (PW2) heard the beating sounds of

vehicle and woke him up. He found 50-60 persons beating the

vehicle by lathis in which Graham Staines and his two sons

had slept. Three-four of them put the straw beneath the empty

vehicle and lit the straw by matchsticks. After setting the

empty vehicle ablaze, those persons put straw beneath the

vehicle of Graham Staines and his two sons and ignited the

same. Those two vehicles caught fire and began to burn. The

witness identified four persons, namely, Dara Singh (A1),

Turam Ho (A12), Daya Patra (A14) and Rajat Das (A2) as the

persons beating the vehicle and setting on fire. The fact

remains that admittedly he did not report the incident to his

mother about what he had seen during the occurrence. He

also admitted that there was a police camp from the next day

of the incident. However, he did not make any statement to

the State Police and only for the first time his statement was

recorded by the CBI i.e., five months after the occurrence.

11) It is relevant to note that the incident took place in the

midnight of 22.01.1999/23.01.1999. Prior to that, number of

investigating officers had visited the village of occurrence.

Statements of most of the witnesses were recorded by PW 55,

an officer of the CBI. In the statements recorded by various

IOs, particularly, the local police and State CID these eye

witnesses except few claim to have identified any of the

miscreants involved in the incident. As rightly observed by the

High Court, for a long number of days, many of these eye-

witnesses never came forward before the IOs and the police

personnel visiting the village from time to time claiming that

they had seen the occurrence. In these circumstances, no

importance need to be attached on the testimony of these eye-

witnesses about their identification of the appellants other

than Dara Singh (A1) and Mahendra Hembram (A3) before the

trial Court for the first time without corroboration by previous

TIP held by the Magistrate in accordance with the procedure

established. It is well settled principle that in the absence of

any independent corroboration like TIP held by judicial

Magistrate, the evidence of eye-witnesses as to the

identification of the appellants/accused for the first time

before the trial Court generally cannot be accepted. As

explained in Manu Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6

SCC 1 case, that if the case is supported by other materials,

identification of the accused in the dock for the first time

would be permissible subject to confirmation by other

corroborative evidence, which are lacking in the case on hand

except for A1 and A3.

12) In the same manner, showing photographs of the

miscreants and identification for the first time in the trial

Court without being corroborated by TIP held before a

Magistrate or without any other material may not be helpful to

the prosecution case. To put it clear, the evidence of witness

given in the court as to the identification may be accepted only

if he identified the same persons in a previously held TIP in

jail. It is true that absence of TIP may not be fatal to the

prosecution. In the case on hand, (A1) and (A3) were identified

and also corroborated by the evidence of slogans given in his

name and each one of the witnesses asserted the said aspect

insofar as they are concerned. We have also adverted to the

fact that none of these witnesses named the offenders in their

statements except few recorded by IOs in the course of

investigation. Though an explanation was offered that out of

fear they did not name the offenders, the fact remains, on the

next day of the incident, Executive Magistrate and top level

police officers were camping the village for quite some time.

Inasmuch as evidence of the identification of the accused

during trial for the first time is inherently weak in character,

as a safe rule of prudence, generally it is desirable to look for

corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as

to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in

the form of earlier TIP. Though some of them were identified

by the photographs except (A1) and (A3), no other

corroborative material was shown by the prosecution.

13) Now let us discuss the evidentiary value of photo

identification and identifying the accused in the dock for the

first time. Learned Addl. Solicitor General, in support of the

prosecution case about the photo identification parade and

dock identification, heavily relied on the decision of this Court

in Manu Sharma (supra). It was argued in that case that PW

2 Shyan Munshi had left for Kolkata and thereafter, photo

identification was got done when SI Sharad Kumar, PW 78

went to Kolkata to get the identification done by picking up

from the photographs wherein he identified the accused Manu

Sharma though he refused to sign the same. However, in the

court, PW 2 Shyan Munshi refused to recognise him. In any

case, the factum of photo identification by PW 2 as witnessed

by the officer concerned is a relevant and an admissible piece

of evidence. In para 254, this Court held:

"Even a TIP before a Magistrate is otherwise hit by Section

162 of the Code. Therefore to say that a photo identification

is hit by Section 162 is wrong. It is not a substantive piece of

evidence. It is only by virtue of Section 9 of the Evidence Act

that the same i.e. the act of identification becomes

admissible in court. The logic behind TIP, which will include

photo identification lies in the fact that it is only an aid to

investigation, where an accused is not known to the

witnesses, the IO conducts a TIP to ensure that he has got

the right person as an accused. The practice is not borne out

of procedure, but out of prudence. At best it can be brought

under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, as evidence of conduct

of a witness in photo identifying the accused in the presence

of an IO or the Magistrate, during the course of an

investigation."

It was further held:

It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence

of identification in court. Apart from the clear provisions of

Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well

settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The facts,

which establish the identity of the accused persons, are

relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general

rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement

made in court. The evidence of mere identification of the

accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very

nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior

test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the

trustworthiness of that evidence. It is, accordingly,

considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for

corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as

to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in

the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of

prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for

example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on

whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other

corroboration. The identification parades belong to the stage

of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code which

obliges the investigating agency to hold or confers a right

upon the accused to claim a test identification parade. They

do not constitute substantive evidence and these parades are

essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to

hold a test identification parade would not make

inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. The

weight to be attached to such identification should be a

matter for the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may

accept the evidence of identification even without insisting

on corroboration.

It was further held that "the photo identification and TIP are

only aides in the investigation and do not form substantive

evidence. The substantive evidence is the evidence in the

court on oath".

14) In Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia vs. Intelligence

Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, AIR 1999 SC 2562, the

following conclusion is relevant:

"12. In the present case prosecution does not say that they

would rest with the identification made by Mr. Mkhatshwa

when the photograph was shown to him. Prosecution has to

examine him as a witness in the court and he has to identify

the accused in the court. Then alone it would become

substantive evidence. But that does not mean that at this

stage the court is disabled from considering the prospect of

such a witness correctly identifying the appellant during

trial. In so considering the court can take into account the

fact that during investigation the photograph of the

appellant was shown to the witness and he identified that

person as the one whom he saw at the relevant time"

15) In Jana Yadav vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 7 SCC 295,

para 38, the following conclusion is relevant:

"Failure to hold test identification parade does not make the

evidence of identification in court inadmissible, rather the

same is very much admissible in law, but ordinarily

identification of an accused by a witness for the first time in

court should not form the basis of conviction, the same

being from its very nature inherently of a weak character

unless it is corroborated by his previous identification in the

test identification parade or any other evidence. The previous

identification in the test identification parade is a check

valve to the evidence of identification in court of an accused

by a witness and the same is a rule of prudence and not law.

It is clear that identification of accused persons by witness in

dock for the first time though permissible but cannot be given

credence without further corroborative evidence. Though

some of the witnesses identified some of the accused in the

dock as mentioned above without corroborative evidence the

dock identification alone cannot be treated as substantial

evidence, though it is permissible.

16) Mr. Tulsi, learned senior counsel for the accused heavily

commented on the statements of eye-witnesses which,

according to him, are contradictory to each other on material

points. He highlighted that exaggerated and improved version

of the incident makes it difficult to place implicit reliance on

the statements of any of these witnesses. He cited various

instances in support of his claim.

a) As regards the number of persons who have allegedly

attacked the vehicles, it was pointed out that PW 23 - Joseph

Marandi (brother of PW 15)/Christian/15 years at the time of

incident) has stated that 20-22 persons surrounded the

vehicle. On the other hand, PW 39 - Soleman Marandi and

PW 10 - Nimai Hansda deposed that 30/40 persons

surrounded the vehicle. PW 15 - Mathai Marandi found

40/50 persons were beating with lathis. PW 43 - Lablal Tudu

(son of PW 2) deposed that 50/60 persons were beating the

vehicle whereas PW 2 - Basi Tudu found 60 persons going

towards the church. PW 3, Paul Murmu found 60/70 persons

putting straw beneath the vehicle and setting fire. PW 36 -

Raghunath Dohal mentioned that about 60-70 people

gathered in front of the church.

b) As regards straw being kept on the roof of the vehicle to

prevent cold, PWs 3, 10, 11, 15, 36, 39, 43, 45 and 52

mentioned different versions.

c) With regard to whether there was a light or not which is

vital for identification of miscreants prior to vehicle caught fire,

PW 2 has stated that Moon had already set and he identified

Chenchu and A 7 in the light of lamp (dibri) put in the

verandah. On the other hand, PW 5, who was 11 years old at

the time of evidence has mentioned that it was dark night. PW

11 has stated that he had not seen any lamp burning in the

verandah of neighbours but saw some miscreants due to

illumination of fire. PW 43 has stated that there is no

electricity supply in the village and stated that they do not

keep light in verandah while sleeping inside the house during

night.

d) About chilly wintry night, PW3 has stated it was chilly

night with dew dropping whereas PW15 has stated that he

cannot say whether there was fog at the night of occurrence

and PW 36 has stated it was wintry night and PW52 has

stated fog occurs during the month of December and January

and he could not say if there was any fog at the night of

occurrence.

e) With regard to clothes worn by attackers, PW36 has

stated that A1 was wearing a Punjabi Kurta, A3 and A12 were

wearing a banian. PW19 has stated that he saw 9 persons out

of which 8 were wearing trousers and shirts and one person

who was addressed as Dara was wearing a lungi and Punjabi

Kurta. PW39 has stated that during winter season people

usually come with their body covered. PW52 has stated that

usually people wear winter clothing during December and

January.

f) With regard to the aspect whether the accused persons

had covered their faces, PW 4 who is the informant has stated

that the faces of the accused were covered. On the other

hand, PWs 11, 15 and 36 have asserted that none covered

their faces.

g) As regard to who lit the fire, PW3 has stated that a short

person lit fire. PW10 has mentioned that he did not see

anyone whereas PW11 has stated that number of people set

fire. PW32 has mentioned that there was no gathering near

the vehicles when they caught fire. PW 36 has stated not seen

any villager in between the house of the PW4 and the Church

and PW39 has stated he had not seen any female near the

place of occurrence.

h) As regard to whether Nagin dance was over or not, PW 32

had deposed that when the vehicle caught fire, Nagin dance

was being performed whereas PW 39 has deposed that dance

continued throughout the night.

i) Whether Nagin dance was visible from the place of

occurrence, PW 3 has stated that it was not visible due to

darkness. PW 4 has stated the distance between Nagin dance

and Church is 200 ft. PW 5 has stated that Church was not

visible from the place of Nagin dance and the distance was 200

ft. PW 6 has mentioned that Church was visible from the

place of Nagin dance and distance was 200 ft and finally PW

32 has stated the church was visible from the place of Nagin

dance.

j) With regard to distance between place of occurrence and

Nagin dance, PW 15 has mentioned the distance is 200 ft. PW

32 has stated that vehicles were visible from the place of Nagin

dance, PW 36 has stated Nagin dance staged 10-12 houses

apart from Church at front side whereas PW 39 has stated

Nagin dance staged 4 houses apart from Chruch and PW 43

has stated that it was staged 5 houses apart from church and

he admitted that he was not sure of the distance between

church and the place of Nagin dance.

k) With regard to their arrival at the place of occurrence, PW

11 has stated that PWs 4, 15 and 23 came to the place of

occurrence an hour after the miscreants left the place whereas

they deposed that they were present there from the beginning.

PW 10 has stated that he woke up on hearing bursting and

beating sound. PW 15 has deposed that he went to the huts

behind the church and called PWs 10, 3 and others. PW 3 has

stated that he was woken up by PW 10.

17) By pointing out these contradictions, Mr. Tulsi submitted

that the presence of these witnesses becomes doubtful.

However, if we see these witnesses through microscope, it is

true that the above mentioned contradictions would be visible

and clear but by and large they explained the prosecution case

though they could not identify all the accused persons with

clarity except Dara Singh (A1) and Mahendra Hembram (A3).

By virtue of these minor contradictions, their testimony cannot

be rejected in toto. But, by and large, there are minor

contradictions in their statements as demonstrated by Mr.

Tulsi. In the face of the above-mentioned difference in the

evidence of prosecution witnesses with regard to light,

clothing, number of accused persons, fog, faces covered or not,

it is not acceptable in toto except certain events and incidents

which are reliable and admissible in evidence.

CONFESSIONS:

18) It was submitted that confessions of various accused

persons, namely, A9, A 11 and A 12 under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

cannot be considered to be voluntary on account of the fact

that all the co-accused persons were produced before the

Magistrate from police custody and were remanded back to

police custody. It was further highlighted that accused No. 14

was produced from police custody for recording his confession

while A 13 made his statement when he was on bail and in no

case the Magistrate ensured the accused persons that if they

decline they would not be sent to police custody. It was

further highlighted that illiterate accused persons cannot be

expected to have knowledge of finest nuances of procedure. It

was pointed that besides all confessions being exculpatory and

made after conspiracy ceases to be operative are inadmissible.

Finally, it was stated that Section 164 Cr.P.C. requires faithful

compliance and failure impairs their evidentiary value.

19) Section 164 Cr.P.C. speaks about recording of

confessions and statements. It reads thus:

"164. Recording of confessions and statements. (1) Any

Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate may, whether

or not he has jurisdiction in the case, record any confession

or statement made to him in the course of an investigation

under this Chapter or under any other law for the time being

in force, or at any, time afterwards before the

commencement of the inquiry or trial:

Provided that any confession or statement made under this

sub-section may also be recorded by audio-video electronic

means in the presence of the advocate of the person accused

of an offence:

Provided that no confession shall be recorded by a police

officer on whom any power of a Magistrate has been

conferred under any law for the time being in force.

(2) The Magistrate shall, before recording any such

confession, explain to the person making it that he is not

bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may

be used as evidence against him; and the Magistrate shall

not record any such confession unless, upon questioning the

person making it, he has reason to believe that it is bear,

made voluntarily.

(3) If at any time before the confession is recorded, the

person appearing before the Magistrate states that he is not

willing to make the confession, the Magistrate shall not

authorize the detention of such person in police custody.

(4) Any such confession shall be recorded in the manner

provided in section 281 for recording the examination of an

accused person and shall be signed by the person making

the confession; and the Magistrate shall make a

memorandum at the foot of such record to the following

effect.

"I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to make a

confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may

make may be used as evidence against him and I believe

that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in

my presence and hearing, and was read over to the person

making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it

contains a full and true account of the statement made by

him.

(Signed) A.B.

Magistrate

(5) Any statement (other than a confession) made under

sub-section (1) shall be recorded in such manner hereinafter

provided for the recording of evidence as is, in the opinion of

the Magistrate, best fitted to the circumstances of the case;

and the Magistrate shall have power to administer oath to

the person whose statement is so recorded.

(6) The Magistrate recording a confession or statement under

this section shall forward it to the Magistrate by whom the

case is to be inquired into or tried. "

20) While elaborating non-compliance of mandates of Section

164 Cr.P.C., Mr. Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for

the accused cited various instances.

(a) Accused No. 9, Rabi Soren, was arrested by the

investigating agency and remanded to police custody for 7

days i.e. from 20.05.1999. It is their claim that on

18.05.1999, Accused No.9 made a statement under Section

164 Cr.P.C. and thereafter remanded back to police custody.

It was also pointed out that in his statement under Section

313 Cr.P.C. the accused person stated that he was beaten by

the investigating agency.

(b) Another instance relates to Mahadev Mahanta, Accused

No. 11 who was arrested on 01.07.1999 by the investigating

agency and he was remanded to police custody. However, on

08.07.1999, Accused No. 11 made a statement under Section

164 Cr.P.C. PW 55, I.O. has stated that the statement of the

accused was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. that he was

under police custody and he was remanded back to police

custody. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. he also

stated that he was beaten by the investigating agency.

on 13.05.1999 by the Investigating Agency and from

19.05.1999 to 23.05.1999 the accused person was in custody

of the investigating agency. While so, on 21.05.1999, the

accused No. 12 made a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C

and thereafter remanded back to police custody. It was

pointed out that he also stated in his statement under Section

313 Cr.P.C. that he was beaten by the investigating agency.

(d) The next instance relates to Umakanta Bhoi, Accused No.

13 who refused to make a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C

prayed by I.O. to be put for 16.03.1999 for recording

statement. It was directed to jail authority to keep the

accused under calm and cool atmosphere. A 13 was produced

from Judicial Custody for recording statement under Section

164 Cr.P.C. and he refused to make a statement. However, on

31.08.1999, he made a confessional statement.

(e) In the case of Dayanidhi Patra, Accused No. 14, on

21.09.1999, he was arrested by the Investigating Agency. On

24.09.1999, Learned ASJ granted police remand for 7 days i.e.

on 01.10.1999 and that on that day A 14 made a statement

under Section 164 Cr.P.C. It was pointed out that in his

statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the accused person

stated that he was beaten by the investigating agency.

21) Before analyzing the confessional statements of various

accused persons and its applicability and the procedure

followed by the Magistrate in recording the statement, let us

consider various decisions touching these aspects.

22) In Bhagwan Singh and Ors. vs. State of M.P. (2003) 3

SCC 21, while considering these issues, it was held:

"27......The first precaution that a Judicial Magistrate is

required to take is to prevent forcible extraction of confession

by the prosecuting agency (see State of U.P. v. Singhara

Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358). It was also held by this Court in

the case of Shivappa v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 2 SCC 76

that the provisions of Section 164 CrPC must be complied

with not only in form, but in essence. Before proceeding to

record the confessional statement, a searching enquiry must

be made from the accused as to the custody from which he

was produced and the treatment he had been receiving in

such custody in order to ensure that there is no scope for

doubt of any sort of extraneous influence proceeding from a

source interested in the prosecution.

28. It has also been held that the Magistrate in particular

should ask the accused as to why he wants to make a

statement which surely shall go against his interest in the

trial. He should be granted sufficient time for reflection. He

should also be assured of protection from any sort of

apprehended torture or pressure from the police in case he

declines to make a confessional statement. Unfortunately, in

this case, the evidence of the Judicial Magistrate (PW 1) does

not show that any such precaution was taken before

recording the judicial confession.

29. The confession is also not recorded in questions-and-

answers form which is the manner indicated in the criminal

court rules.

30. It has been held that there was custody of the accused

Pooran Singh with the police immediately preceding the

making of the confession and it is sufficient to stamp the

confession as involuntary and hence unreliable. A judicial

confession not given voluntarily is unreliable, more so when

such a confession is retracted. It is not safe to rely on such

judicial confession or even treat it as a corroborative piece of

evidence in the case. When a judicial confession is found to

be not voluntary and more so when it is retracted, in the

absence of other reliable evidence, the conviction cannot be

based on such retracted judicial confession. (See Shankaria

v. State of Rajasthan, (1978) 3 SCC 435 (para 23)"

23) In Shivappa vs. State of Karnataka (1995) 2 SCC 76,

while reiterating the same principle it was held:-

"6. From the plain language of Section 164 CrPC and the

rules and guidelines framed by the High Court regarding the

recording of confessional statements of an accused under

Section 164 CrPC, it is manifest that the said provisions

emphasise an inquiry by the Magistrate to ascertain the

voluntary nature of the confession. This inquiry appears to

be the most significant and an important part of the duty of

the Magistrate recording the confessional statement of an

accused under Section 164 CrPC. The failure of the

Magistrate to put such questions from which he could

ascertain the voluntary nature of the confession detracts so

materially from the evidentiary value of the confession of an

accused that it would not be safe to act upon the same. Full

and adequate compliance not merely in form but in essence

with the provisions of Section 164 CrPC and the rules

framed by the High Court is imperative and its non-

compliance goes to the root of the Magistrate's jurisdiction to

record the confession and renders the confession unworthy

of credence. Before proceeding to record the confessional

statement, a searching enquiry must be made from the

accused as to the custody from which he was produced and

the treatment he had been receiving in such custody in order

to ensure that there is no scope for doubt of any sort of

extraneous influence proceeding from a source interested in

the prosecution still lurking in the mind of an accused. In

case the Magistrate discovers on such enquiry that there is

ground for such supposition he should give the accused

sufficient time for reflection before he is asked to make his

statement and should assure himself that during the time of

reflection, he is completely out of police influence. An

accused should particularly be asked the reason why he

wants to make a statement which would surely go against

his self-interest in course of the trial, even if he contrives

subsequently to retract the confession. Besides

administering the caution, warning specifically provided for

in the first part of sub-section (2) of Section 164 namely,

that the accused is not bound to make a statement and that

if he makes one it may be used against him as evidence in

relation to his complicity in the offence at the trial, that is to

follow, he should also, in plain language, be assured of

protection from any sort of apprehended torture or pressure

from such extraneous agents as the police or the like in case

he declines to make a statement and be given the assurance

that even if he declined to make the confession, he shall not

be remanded to police custody.

7. The Magistrate who is entrusted with the duty of

recording confession of an accused coming from police

custody or jail custody must appreciate his function in that

behalf as one of a judicial officer and he must apply his

judicial mind to ascertain and satisfy his conscience that the

statement the accused makes is not on account of any

extraneous influence on him. That indeed is the essence of a

`voluntary' statement within the meaning of the provisions of

Section 164 CrPC and the rules framed by the High Court for

the guidance of the subordinate courts. Moreover, the

Magistrate must not only be satisfied as to the voluntary

character of the statement, he should also make and leave

such material on the record in proof of the compliance with

the imperative requirements of the statutory provisions, as

would satisfy the court that sits in judgment in the case,

that the confessional statement was made by the accused

voluntarily and the statutory provisions were strictly

complied with.

8. From a perusal of the evidence of PW 17, Shri Shitappa,

Additional Munsif Magistrate, we find that though he had

administered the caution to the appellant that he was not

bound to make a statement and that if he did make a

statement that may be used against him as evidence but PW

17 did not disclose to the appellant that he was a Magistrate

and that the confession was being recorded by him in that

capacity nor made any enquiry to find out whether he had

been influenced by anyone to make the confession. PW 17

stated during his deposition in court: "I have not stated to

the accused that I am a Magistrate" and further admitted: "I

have not asked the accused as to whether the police have

induced them (Chithavani) to give the statement." The

Magistrate, PW 17 also admitted that "at the time of

recording the statement of the accused no police or police

officials were in the open court. I cannot tell as to whether

the police or police officials were present in the vicinity of the

court". From the memorandum prepared by the Munsif

Magistrate, PW 17 as also from his deposition recorded in

court it is further revealed that the Magistrate did not lend

any assurance to the appellant that he would not be sent

back to the police custody in case he did not make the

confessional statement. Circle Police Inspector Shivappa

Shanwar, PW 25 admitted that the sub-jail, the office of the

Circle Police Inspector and the police station are situated in

the same premises. No contemporaneous record has been

placed on the record to show that the appellant had actually

been kept in the sub-jail, as ordered by the Magistrate on

21-7-1986 and that he was out of the zone of influence by

the police keeping in view the location of the sub-jail and the

police station. The prosecution did not lead any evidence to

show that any jail authority actually produced the appellant

on 22-7-1986 before the Magistrate. That apart, neither on

21-7-1986 nor on 22-7-1986 did the Munsif Magistrate, PW 17

question the appellant as to why he wanted to make the

confession or as to what had prompted him to make the

confession. It appears to us quite obvious that the Munsif

Magistrate, PW 17 did not make any serious attempt to

ascertain the voluntary character of the confessional

statement. The failure of the Magistrate to make a real

endeavour to ascertain the voluntary character of the

confession, impels us to hold that the evidence on the record

does not establish that the confessional statement of the

appellant recorded under Section 164 CrPC was voluntary.

The cryptic manner of holding the enquiry to ascertain the

voluntary nature of the confession has left much to be

desired and has detracted materially from the evidentiary

value of the confessional statement. It would, thus, neither

be prudent nor safe to act upon the confessional statement

of the appellant....."

24) In Dagdu and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977)

3 SCC 68, the following paragraph is relevant:-

"51. Learned Counsel appearing for the State is right that

the failure to comply with Section 164(3) of the Criminal

Procedure Code, or with the High Court Circulars will not

render the confessions inadmissible in evidence. Relevancy

and admissibility of evidence have to be determined in

accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. Section

29 of that Act lays down that if a confession is otherwise

relevant it does not become irrelevant merely because, inter

alia, the accused was not warned that he was not bound to

make it and the evidence of it might be given against him. If,

therefore, a confession does not violate any one of the

conditions operative under Sections 24 to 28 of the Evidence

Act, it will be admissible in evidence. But as in respect of any

other admissible evidence, oral or documentary, so in the

case of confessional statements which are otherwise

admissible, the Court has still to consider whether they can

be accepted as true. If the facts and circumstances

surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a

doubt on the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the

Court may refuse to act upon the confession even if it is

admissible in evidence. That shows how important it is for

the Magistrate who records the confession to satisfy himself

by appropriate questioning of the confessing accused, that

the confession is true and voluntary. A strict and faithful

compliance with Section 164 of the Code and with the

instructions issued by the High Court affords in a large

measure the guarantee that the confession is voluntary. The

failure to observe the safeguards prescribed therein are in

practice calculated to impair the evidentiary value of the

confessional statements."

25) Davendra Prasad Tiwari vs. State of U.P. (1978) 4 SCC

474, the following conclusion arrived at by this Court is

relevant:-

"13..... It is also true that before a confessional statement

made under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

can be acted upon, it must be shown to be voluntary and

free from police influence and that the confessional

statement made by the appellant in the instant case cannot

be taken into account, as it suffers from serious infirmities

in that (1) there is no contemporaneous record to show that

the appellant was actually kept in jail as ordered on

September 6, 1974 by Shri R.P. Singh, Judicial Magistrate,

Gorakhpur, (2) Shri R.P. Singh who recorded the so called

confessional statement of the appellant did not question him

as to why he was making the confession and (3) there is also

nothing in the statement of the said Magistrate to show that

he told the appellant that he would not be remanded to the

police lock-up even if he did not confess his guilt. It cannot

also be gainsaid that the circumstantial evidence relied upon

by the prosecution must be complete and incapable of

explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of

the accused."

26) In Kalawati & Ors. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh,

1953 SCR 546 at 631, this Court held:

"...In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution

relies upon the confession of one accused person against

another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to

consider the other evidence against such an accused person,

and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the

court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain

the charge framed against the said accused person, the

court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that

the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other

evidence is right."

27) In State thr. Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT vs.

Nalini and Others (1999) 5 SCC 253 at 307, the following

paragraphs are relevant which read as under:-

"96. What is the evidentiary value of a confession made by

one accused as against another accused apart from Section

30 of the Evidence Act? While considering that aspect we

have to bear in mind that any confession, when it is sought

to be used against another, has certain inherent

weaknesses. First is, it is the statement of a person who

claims himself to be an offender, which means, it is the

version of an accomplice. Second is, the truth of it cannot be

tested by cross-examination. Third is, it is not an item of

evidence given on oath. Fourth is, the confession was made

in the absence of the co-accused against whom it is sought

to be used.

97. It is well-nigh settled, due to the aforesaid weaknesses,

that confession of a co-accused is a weak type of evidence. A

confession can be used as a relevant evidence against its

maker because Section 21 of the Evidence Act permits it

under certain conditions. But there is no provision which

enables a confession to be used as a relevant evidence

against another person. It is only Section 30 of the Evidence

Act which at least permits the court to consider such a

confession as against another person under the conditions

prescribed therein. If Section 30 was absent in the Evidence

Act no confession could ever have been used for any purpose

as against another co-accused until it is sanctioned by

another statute. So, if Section 30 of the Evidence Act is also

to be excluded by virtue of the non obstante clause

contained in Section 15(1) of TADA, under what provision

can a confession of one accused be used against another co-

accused at all? It must be remembered that Section 15(1) of

TADA does not say that a confession can be used against a

co-accused. It only says that a confession would be

admissible in a trial of not only the maker thereof but a co-

accused, abettor or conspirator tried in the same case.

98. Sir John Beaumont speaking for five Law Lords of the

Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R., AIR 1949 PC 257 had

made the following observations:

"Section 30 seems to be based on the view that an admission

by an accused person of his own guilt affords some sort of

sanction in support of the truth of his confession against

others as well as himself. But a confession of a co-accused is

obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed

come within the definition of `evidence' contained in Section

3, Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in

the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by

cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than

the evidence of an approver which is not subject to any of

those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the

court may take the confession into consideration and

thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may

act; but the section does not say that the confession is to

amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The

confession is only one element in the consideration of all the

facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and

weighed with the other evidence."

99. The above observations had since been treated as the

approved and established position regarding confession vis-

`-vis another co-accused. Vivian Bose, J., speaking for a

three-Judge Bench in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., AIR

1952 SC 159 had reiterated the same principle after quoting

the aforesaid observations. A Constitution Bench of this

Court has followed it in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar,

AIR 1964 SC 1184."

28) In State of Maharashtra vs. Damu (2000) 6 SCC 269,

the same principles had been reiterated which read as under:-

"19. We have considered the above reasons and the

arguments addressed for and against them. We have realised

that those reasons are ex facie fragile. Even otherwise, a

Magistrate who proposed to record the confession has to

ensure that the confession is free from police interference.

Even if he was produced from police custody, the Magistrate

was not to record the confession until the lapse of such time,

as he thinks necessary to extricate his mind completely from

fear of the police to have the confession in his own way by

telling the Magistrate the true facts.

25. We may make it clear that in Kashmira Singh this Court

has rendered the ratio that confession cannot be made the

foundation of conviction in the context of considering the

utility of that confession as against a co-accused in view of

Section 30 of the Evidence Act. Hence the observations in

that decision cannot be misapplied to cases in which

confession is considered as against its maker. The legal

position concerning confession vis-`-vis the confessor

himself has been well-nigh settled by this Court in Sarwan

Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab as under:

"In law it is always open to the court to convict an accused

on his confession itself though he has retracted it at a later

stage. Nevertheless usually courts require some

corroboration to the confessional statement before convicting

an accused person on such a statement. What amount of

corroboration would be necessary in such a case would

always be a question of fact to be determined in the light of

the circumstances of each case."

This has been followed by this Court in Kehar Singh v. State

(Delhi Admn.)"

29) The following principles emerge with regard to Section

164 Cr.P.C.:-

(i) The provisions of Section 164 Cr.P.C. must be complied

with not only in form, but in essence.

(ii) Before proceeding to record the confessional statement, a

searching enquiry must be made from the accused as to the

custody from which he was produced and the treatment he

had been receiving in such custody in order to ensure that

there is no scope for doubt of any sort of extraneous influence

proceeding from a source interested in the prosecution.

(iii) A Magistrate should ask the accused as to why he wants

to make a statement which surely shall go against his interest

in the trial.

(iv) The maker should be granted sufficient time for

reflection.

(v) He should be assured of protection from any sort of

apprehended torture or pressure from the police in case he

declines to make a confessional statement.

(vi) A judicial confession not given voluntarily is unreliable,

more so, when such a confession is retracted, the conviction

cannot be based on such retracted judicial confession.

(vii) Non-compliance of Section 164 Cr.P.C. goes to the root of

the Magistrate's jurisdiction to record the confession and

renders the confession unworthy of credence.

(viii) During the time of reflection, the accused should be

completely out of police influence. The judicial officer, who is

entrusted with the duty of recording confession, must apply

his judicial mind to ascertain and satisfy his conscience that

the statement of the accused is not on account of any

extraneous influence on him.

(ix) At the time of recording the statement of the accused, no

police or police official shall be present in the open court.

(x) Confession of a co-accused is a weak type of evidence.

(xi) Usually the Court requires some corroboration from the

confessional statement before convicting the accused person

on such a statement.

Judicial Magistrates (PWs-29 & 34)

30) Ashok Kumar Agrawal, PW29 and Tojaka Bharti, PW34,

Judicial Magistrates recorded the confessional statements of

some of the accused. Judicial Magistrate, PW29 recorded the

confessional statement of Rabi Soren and Turam Ho and

PW34, Judicial Magistrate recorded the confessional statement

of Mahadev Mahanta, Uma Kant Bhoi and Dayanidhi Patra. It

is the claim of Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel for the

accused, that the evidence of PW29 and PW34, Judicial

Magistrates shows that they were blissfully unaware of the

stringent responsibility cast on them by Section 164 Cr.P.C.

According to him, their evidence create an impression that

they were not aware of the difference between the police

custody and judicial custody nor do they seem to understand

the significance of Section 164 Cr.P.C. He pointed out that

why the first four pages in case of each of the accused persons

is not signed by the accused is not explained. They neither

asked any searching questions regarding the nature of custody

either from the accused persons or from police nor did they

scrutinize the records to ascertain the same from remand

orders. He also pointed out that none of the accused who

have confessed had been given the assurance that if they

refuse to make any confession, they would not be remanded to

police custody. This assurance is required for an accused to

make an informed decision being fully aware of the

consequences of refusing.

31) It is seen from the evidence of PW29, who recorded the

confession of Rabi Soren, that at the relevant time the accused

was in the custody of CBI and from that custody he was

produced before the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate on

18.05.1999. Though PW29 had asked the accused many

things about the voluntariness, the High Court, on analysis of

his entire evidence, came to a conclusion that only a routine

statutory certificate as required under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was

given by him. The High Court also pointed out that he did not

caution that if the accused Rabi Soren refused to make any

confession, he would not be remanded to C.B.I. or Police

custody. He was not informed that if he confessed, such

confession may be used in evidence against him and on that

basis there was possibility of his being sentenced to death or

life imprisonment. It was also pointed out that his body was

not checked to find out as to whether he was subjected to

torture when he was in police custody. It was also pointed out

by the High Court that five hours' time was given for reflection

during which period he was in the custody of his Bench Clerk

in his Chamber. PW29, after recording confessional statement

of Rabi Soren on 18.05.1999, again remanded him to the

custody of police, i.e. C.B.I. till 20.05.1999. This is clear from

the evidence of PW55 (I.O.). It is relevant to point out that

under sub-section (3) of Section 164 Cr.P.C. that if any

accused refuses to make any confessional statement, such

Magistrate shall not authorize detention of the accused in

police custody. Remanding Rabi Soren to Police custody after

his statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not

justified. As rightly observed by the High Court, possibility of

coercion, threat or inducement to the accused Rabi Soren to

make the confession cannot be ruled out. In the same

manner, confession of another accused Turam Ho was also

recorded by the very same Magistrate. Here again, the High

Court pointed out that he was not cautioned that if he made

any confession, same may be used against him in evidence

and on that basis he may be sentenced to death or

imprisonment for life. Equally he was not cautioned by PW29

that if he refused to make the confessional statement, he

would not be remanded to police custody. It is further seen

that both of these accused, in their confessional statements,

made exculpatory statements.

32) PW34, Judicial Magistrate, recorded the confessional

statement of accused Mahadev Mahanta on 08.07.1999

immediately after his production before him from the police

custody. PW34 was directed by the Addl. C.J.M. to record the

confessional statement of Mahadev Mahanta. It was noted

that he was given only 10 minutes' time for reflection after his

production from police custody. The other accused who made

the confessional statement is Dayanidhi Patra whose

statement was recorded by PW34. The High Court, on

corroboration of the confessional statement, had found that

the entire confessional statement is exculpatory and he also

retracted from the confession. It was further found that this

confessional statement was made long after the charge-sheet

was filed i.e. on 22.06.1999. The analysis of evidence of PWs

29 & 34 - Judicial Magistrates shows that many of the

confessional statements were recorded immediately after

production of the maker after long CBI custody and in some

cases after such statements were made and recorded by the

Judicial Magistrate, the maker was remanded to police

custody. Though the Magistrates have deposed that the

procedure provided under Section 164 Cr.P.C. has been

complied with, various warnings/cautions required to be given

to the accused before recording such confession, have not

been fully adhered to by them.

33) Apart from the strong observation of the High Court

about procedural lapse on the part of PWs 29 & 34, we also

verified their statements and requirements in terms of Section

164 Cr.P.C. In the certificate, there is no specific reference

about the nature of the custody from which these persons

were produced nor about the assurance that they would not

be remanded to police custody if they declined. We have

already pointed out that Section 164 Cr.P.C. requires strict

and faithful compliance of sub-sections 2 to 4, the failure to

observe safeguards not only impairs evidentiary value of

confession but cast a doubt on nature and voluntariness of

confession on which no reliance can be placed. As rightly

observed by the High Court, no exceptional circumstances

could be brought to our notice by the prosecution in respect of

the appellants other than A1 and A3.

34) It was next argued that the incident could not have been

happened as suggested by the prosecution. According to the

learned senior counsel for the accused the reason of possibility

of the incident which took place in the dead of the night as a

result of the accident from burning of the stove etc. for

generating heat on cold wintry night cannot be ruled out. In

support of the above contention, he pointed out several

circumstances which are inconsistent with the fire starting by

arson from outside. On going through the entire materials, we

are unable to accept the said contention. Though we noticed

several inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence and the

accused persons were not specifically identified except A1 and

A3, the fact remains that the Van in which Graham Staines

and his two children were sleeping were set on fire and burnt

to death due to the cause of the miscreants. In other words,

death of these three persons by setting fire by the miscreants

cannot be ruled out. There is no material to conclude that the

fire emanated from inside of the vehicle and then spread to

rest of the vehicle after the fuel tank caught fire. There is no

basis for such conclusion though the prosecution witnesses

could not pin-point and identify the role of each accused.

35) Another question which we have to consider is whether

the Police (CBI) had the power under the Cr.P.C. to take

specimen signature and writing of A3 for examination by the

expert. It was pointed out that during investigation, even the

Magistrate cannot direct the accused to give his specimen

signature on the asking of the police and only in the

amendment of the Cr.P.C. in 2005, power has been given to

the Magistrate to direct any person including the accused to

give his specimen signature for the purpose of investigation.

Hence, it was pointed out that taking of his signature/writings

being per se illegal, the report of the expert cannot be used as

evidence against him. To meet the above claim, learned Addl.

Solicitor General heavily relied on a 11-Judge Bench decision

of this Court in The State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad

and Ors., (1962) 3 SCR 10 = AIR 1961 SC 1808. This larger

Bench was constituted in order to re-examine some of the

propositions of law laid down by this Court in the case of M.P.

Sharma and Ors. vs. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate,

Delhi and Ors., (1954) SCR 1077. After adverting to various

factual aspects, the larger Bench formulated the following

questions for consideration:

"2. ... ... On these facts, the only questions of constitutional

importance that this Bench has to determine are; (1)

whether by the production of the specimen handwritings -

Exs. 27, 28, and 29 - the accused could be said to have been

'a witness against himself' within the meaning of Article

20(3) of the Constitution; and (2) whether the mere fact that

when those specimen handwritings had been given, the

accused person was in police custody could, by itself,

amount to compulsion, apart from any other circumstances

which could be urged as vitiating the consent of the accused

in giving those specimen handwritings. ... ...

4. ... ... The main question which arises for determination in

this appeal is whether a direction given by a Court to an

accused person present in Court to give his specimen writing

and signature for the purpose of comparison under the

provisions of section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act infringes

the fundamental right enshrined in Article 20(3) of the

Constitution.

The following conclusion/answers are relevant:

10. ... ... Furnishing evidence" in the latter sense could not

have been within the contemplation of the Constitution-

makers for the simple reason that - though they may have

intended to protect an accused person from the hazards of

self-incrimination, in the light of the English Law on the

subject - they could not have intended to put obstacles in

the way of efficient and effective investigation into crime and

of bringing criminals to justice. The taking of impressions or

parts of the body of an accused person very often becomes

necessary to help the investigation of a crime. It is as much

necessary to protect an accused person against being

compelled to incriminate himself, as to arm the agents of law

and the law courts with legitimate powers to bring offenders

to justice. ... ....

11. ... ... When an accused person is called upon by the

Court or any other authority holding an investigation to give

his finger impression or signature or a specimen of his

handwriting, he is not giving any testimony of the nature of a

'personal testimony'. The giving of a 'personal testimony'

must depend upon his volition. He can make any kind of

statement or may refuse to make any statement. But his

finger impressions or his handwriting, in spite of efforts at

concealing the true nature of it by dissimulation cannot

change their intrinsic character. Thus, the giving of finger

impressions or of specimen writing or of signatures by an

accused person, though it may amount to furnishing

evidence in the larger sense, is not included within the

expression 'to be a witness'.

12. ... ... A specimen handwriting or signature or finger

impressions by themselves are no testimony at all, being

wholly innocuous because they are unchangeable except in

rare cases where the ridges of the fingers or the style of

writing have been tampered with. They are only materials for

comparison in order to lend assurance to the Court that its

inference based on other pieces of evidence is reliable. They

are neither oral nor documentary evidence but belong to the

third category of material evidence which is outside the limit

of 'testimony'.

16. In view of these considerations, we have come to the

following conclusions :-

(1) An accused person cannot be said to have been

compelled to be a witness against himself simply because he

made a statement while in police custody, without anything

more. In other words, the mere fact of being in police

custody at the time when the statement in question was

made would not, by itself, as a proposition of law, lend itself

to the inference that the accused was compelled to make the

statement, though that fact, in conjunction with other

circumstances disclosed in evidence in a particular case,

would be a relevant consideration in an enquiry whether or

not the accused person had been compelled to make the

impugned statement.

(2) The mere questioning of an accused person by a police

officer, resulting in a voluntary statement, which may

ultimately turn out to be incriminatory, is not 'compulsion'.

(3) 'To be a witness' is not equivalent to 'furnishing evidence'

in its widest significance; that is to say, as including not

merely making of oral or written statements but also

production of documents or giving materials which may be

relevant at a trial to determine the guilt innocence of the

accused.

(4) Giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm

or fingers or specimen writings or showing parts of the body

by way of identification are not included in the expression 'to

be a witness'.

(5) 'To be a witness' means imparting knowledge in respect of

relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement in writing,

made or given in Court or otherwise.

(6) 'To be a witness' in its ordinary grammatical sense means

giving oral testimony in Court. Case law has gone beyond

this strict literal interpretation of the expression which may

now bear a wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in

Court or out of Court by a person accused of an offence,

orally or in writing.

(7) To bring the statement in question within the prohibition

of Article 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the

character of an accused person at the time he made the

statement. It is not enough that he should become an

accused, any time after the statement has been made."

In view of the above principles, the procedure adopted by the

investigating agency, analyzed and approved by the trial Court

and confirmed by the High Court, cannot be faulted with. In

view of oral report of Rolia Soren, PW 4 which was reduced

into writing, the evidence of PW 23, two letters dated

01.02.2002 and 02.02.2002 addressed by Mahendra

Hembram (A3) to the trial Judge facing his guilt coupled with

the other materials, we are unable to accept the argument of

Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel for Mahendra

Hembram (A3) and we confirm the conclusion arrived by the

High Court.

Additional factors-Mahendra Hembram (A3).

36) Coming to the role of Mahendra Hembram A3, the

prosecution very much relied on his letters dated 01.02.2002

and 02.02.2002 addressed to the Sessions Judge wherein he

confessed his guilt. Though a serious objection was taken

about the admissibility of these two letters, the contents of

these two letters addressed to the Sessions Judge in the

course of trial lend ample corroboration to his identification

before the trial Court by Joseph Marandi, PW 23. Even in his

case, it is true that there was no TIP conducted by Judicial

Magistrate. However, inasmuch as when he was facing trial,

he sent the above-mentioned two letters to the Sessions Judge

which lend corroboration to his identification in the trial court

by PW 23 and rightly observed by the High Court, the same

can be safely relied upon. The evidence reveals that Rolia

Soren (PW 4) accompanied by PW 23 soon after the incident

proceeded to inform the same to the police and finding the

police to have already left for Manoharpur, returned back and

finally on the oral report of PW 4, the Officer In-charge of

Anandapur P.S. (PW 52) prepared FIR (Ext. 1/1) and

registered a case under Sections 147, 148, 435, 436 and 302

read with 149 IPC against Dara Singh (A 1) and five others.

The prosecution has also relied on a letter (Ext.2 after it was

translated to English marked as Ext. 49) said to have been

addressed by Mahendra Hembram (A3) to Kapura Tudu (PW 9)

which, according to the prosecution, contains his admission of

involvement in the incident.

37) An excerpt from the letter of Mahendra Hembram may be

translated into English as under:-

"You may be knowing the Manoharpur incident. No one

ever thought that such a thing will happen in the

village. I had not told any of my family members that

such a work will be done. Dara Singh stayed in our

house and did the work. I also did the work as I had

quarrel with the `Jisu'. I had not disclosed the identity

of Dara Singh even to my mother. The conspiracy to kill

Manoharpur `Jisu' was hatched at HOROHND for which

I took leave during training period and stayed in our

house with Dara Singh for five days and went to the

forest thereafter. The villagers know that I have done

this work as I have got cordial relationship with Dara

Singh."

This is a confessional statement of accused Mahendra

Hembram (A3) inculpating himself and Dara Singh (A1).

38) Accused Mahendra Hembram, in his letter dated

10.02.1999 (Ex. 2) addressed to his sister-in-law, Kapura

Tudu (PW9), confessed that he along with Dara Singh burnt

the `Jisu' (Christian Missionary). All the ocular witnesses have

testified that after setting fire to vehicles and burning Graham

Staines and his two sons alive, the miscreants raised slogans

"Jai Bajrang Bali" and "Dara Singh Zindabad".

39) Joseph Marandi, PW23 has testified that accused

Mahendra Hembram amongst others set fire to the vehicles.

Mahendra Hembram, in his statement recorded under Section

313 Cr.P.C., on 04.02.2002 has stated that he may be the

short statured person. Accused Mahendra Hembram in his

letter dated 10.02.1999 (Ex. 2) addressed to his sister-in-law,

Kapura Tudu (PW9) had confessed to have burnt the Christian

missionary along with Dara Singh. In the course of trial, he

filed petitions on 01.02.2002 and 02.02.2002 pleading guilty

and confessing to have set fire to the vehicles. In his

statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 04.02.2002,

he has admitted to have set fire to the vehicles and in his

statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 24.03.2003

has admitted to have filed petitions pleading guilty and to have

stated in his earlier examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

that he had set fire to the vehicles. There is no impediment in

relying on a portion of the statement of the accused and

finding him guilty in consideration of the other evidence

against him as laid by the prosecution.

40) It is clear that the letters marked as (Ex. 213) were written

by Mahendra Hembram though denied by him, contents of the

said two letters amount to confession, or in any event

admission of important incriminating materials. He had been

identified before the trial Court by Joseph Marandi (PW23) as

a participant in the crime. As rightly observed by the High

Court, contents of these two letters lend support to the

evidence in identification before the trial Court for the first

time as narrated by PW23. In this way, his identification for

the first time in the trial Court is an exceptional case and even

in the absence of further corroboration by way of previously

held TIP, his involvement in the crime is amply corroborated

by the above said letters written by him.

41) Learned Addl. Solicitor General has pointed out that

insofar as Mahendra Hembram is concerned, three types of

evidence are available against him: a) Confession; b) testimony

of eye-witnesses/identification in court/PW 23 Joseph

Marandi; and c) absconding of the accused. Learned Addl.

Solicitor General while advancing his argument besides

referring to the evidence of PW 23 laid more emphasis on the

statement of the appellant. Though an objection was raised as

to the manner in which the trial Judge questioned A3 with

reference to contents of his letters dated 01.02. 2002 and

02.02.2002, it is relevant to point out that when the person

facing trial insisted to look into the contents of his letters, the

presiding officer concerned has to meet his requirement

subject to the procedure established. The learned trial Judge

accepted the entire contents of the admission made by A3 and

affording reasonable opportunity and by following the

appropriate procedure coupled with the corroborative evidence

of PW 23, upheld his involvement and participation in the

crime along with A1 which resulted in rioting, arson and

murder of three persons. Though learned senior counsel

appearing for A3 was critical on relying upon the letter Ex. 49

said to have been written by A3 to his Sister-in-law PW 9, it

shows that A3 confessed to have participated in the incident

along with A1. It is seen that the entire contents of letter were

used by the trial Judge which was rightly accepted by the High

Court. The other circumstance urged by the prosecution was

that A3 absconded soon after the incident and avoided arrest

and this abscondence being a conduct under Section 8 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 should be taken into consideration

along with other evidence to prove his guilt. The fact remains

that he was not available for quite sometime till he was

arrested which fact has not been disputed by the defence

counsel. We are satisfied that before accepting the contents of

the two letters and the evidence of PW 23, the trial Judge

afforded him required opportunity and followed the procedure

which was rightly accepted by the High Court.

Additional factors - Dara Singh (A1)

42) In addition to what we have highlighted and elicited from

the materials placed, it is relevant to point out that all the eye-

witnesses examined by the prosecution consistently stated

that during occurrence the miscreants raised slogans in the

name of Dara Singh as "Dara Singh Zindabad". The story of

this slogan was also mentioned in the first information report

lodged soon after the occurrence. This slogan is in the name

of Dara Singh, corroborates the identification before the trial

Court for the first time. In addition to the same, some of the

witnesses identified Dara Singh by photo identification. We

have already highlighted the evidentiary value of photo

identification and identifying the person in the dock. In other

words, we have pointed out that those materials coupled with

the other corroborative evidence are permissible. In addition

to the same, all the witnesses mentioned about the blowing of

whistle by Dara Singh.

43) Though the trial Court awarded death sentence for Dara

Singh, the High Court after considering entire materials and

finding that it is not a rarest of rare case, commuted the death

sentence into life imprisonment. The principles with regard to

awarding punishment of death have been well settled by

judgments of this Court in Bachan Singh vs. State of

Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898, Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab

(1983) 3 SCC 470, Kehar Singh vs. State (Delhi

Administration) (1988) 3 SCC 609. It is clear from the above

decisions that on conviction under Section 302 IPC, the

normal rule is to award punishment of life imprisonment and

the punishment of death should be resorted to only for the

rarest of rare cases. Whether a case falls within the rarest of

rare case or not, has to be examined with reference to the facts

and circumstances of each case and the Court has to take

note of the aggravating as well as mitigating circumstances

and conclude whether there was something uncommon about

the crime which renders the sentence of imprisonment for life

inadequate and calls for death sentence. In the case on hand,

though Graham Staines and his two minor sons were burnt to

death while they were sleeping inside a station wagon at

Manoharpur, the intention was to teach a lesson to Graham

Staines about his religious activities, namely, converting poor

tribals to Christianity. All these aspects have been correctly

appreciated by the High Court and modified the sentence of

death into life imprisonment with which we concur.

44) Though an argument was advanced that only after the

intervention of PW 55, I.O. from CBI, several persons made a

confessional statement by applying strong arm tactics that

were used by the investigating agency, the entire case of the

prosecution has to be rejected, we are unable to accept the

same for the reasons stated by the trial Court and the High

Court. We have ourselves in the earlier paras adverted to the

fact that some of the witnesses did not mention anything

about the incident to the local police or the District Magistrate

or the higher level police officers who were camping from the

next day of the incident. However, regarding the fresh steps

taken by the Officer of the CBI, particularly, the efforts made

by PW 55, though certain deficiencies are there in the

investigation, the same cannot be under estimated. Likewise,

it was pointed out that young children were being coerced into

being witness to the occurrence whereas the elder family

members were never joined as witness by the prosecuting

agency. It is true that the prosecution could have examined

elders and avoided persons like PW 5 who was a minor on the

date of the incident. We have already discussed about the

veracity of witnesses and found that certain aspects have been

established and accepted by the trial Court as well as the High

Court.

45) Finally, insofar as the appeals filed by the CBI against

the order of acquittal by the High Court in respect of certain

persons, it was pointed out that when two views are possible,

the one in favour of the accused should be accepted. It is true

that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle

of criminal jurisprudence. Further, presumption of innocence

is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the

judgment in his favour. [Vide State of Uttar Pradesh vs.

Nandu Vishwakarma & Ors., (2009) 14 SCC 501 (Para 23),

Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh & Ors. Vs. State of

Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 (Para 13), Rahgunath vs.

State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 (Para 33) and

Allarakha K. Mansuri vs. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57

(Paras 6 & 7)]. In the earlier paragraphs, we have highlighted

the weakness and infirmities of the prosecution case insofar as

acquitted accused who are all poor tribals. In the absence of

definite assertion from the prosecution side, about their

specific role and involvement, as rightly observed by the High

Court, it is not safe to convict them. We entirely agree with

the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court insofar as the

order relating to acquittal of certain accused persons.

Conclusion

46) In a country like ours where discrimination on the

ground of caste or religion is a taboo, taking lives of persons

belonging to another caste or religion is bound to have a

dangerous and reactive effect on the society at large. It strikes

at the very root of the orderly society which the founding

fathers of our Constitution dreamt of. Our concept of

secularism is that the State will have no religion. The State

shall treat all religions and religious groups equally and with

equal respect without in any manner interfering with their

individual right of religion, faith and worship.

47) The then President of India, Shri K R. Narayanan once

said in his address that "Indian unity was based on a tradition

of tolerance, which is at once a pragmatic concept for living

together and a philosophical concept of finding truth and

goodness in every religion". We also conclude with the hope

that Mahatma Gandhi's vision of religion playing a positive

role in bringing India's numerous religion and communities

into an integrated prosperous nation be realised by way of

equal respect for all religions. It is undisputed that there is no

justification for interfering in someone's belief by way of `use of

force', provocation, conversion, incitement or upon a flawed

premise that one religion is better than the other.

48) The analysis of entire materials clearly shows that the

High Court is right in arriving at its conclusion. In the case on

hand, there is no material to prove conspiracy charge against

any of the accused. However, as pointed out by the High

Court which we also adverted to in the earlier paras even in

the midst of uncertainties, the witnesses have specified the

role of (A1) and (A3) which we agree with and confirm the

same and we also maintain the conviction of the appellant

Dara Singh (A1), Mahendra Hembram (A3) and the sentence of

life imprisonment imposed on them. In the same way, in the

absence of acceptable materials and in view of the various

infirmities in the prosecution case as pointed out by the High

Court, we confirm the order of acquittal of others who are all

poor tribals.

49) In the result, Criminal Appeal No. 1366 of 2005 filed by

Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh, Criminal Appeal No. 1259

of 2007 filed by Mahendra Hembram and Criminal Appeal

Nos. 1357-1365 filed by CBI are dismissed.

..........................................J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

...........................................J.

(DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 21, 2011

LAW FOR ALL

LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

Sunday, January 23, 2011

SENSATIONAL TRIPLE MURDER CASE OF DARASING - NO TEST IDENTIFICATION PARED- IDENTIFICATION IN COURT - CORROBORATED - CONVICTION