published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40703
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.7212-7213 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.29306-29307 of 2010)
Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. …Appellant
Versus
Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao & Ors. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise out of a judgment and order dated 7th September
2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
in Writ Appeal No.936 of 2006 and an order dated 21st August 2009 passed in
W.A.M.P. No.2901 of 2008 in W.A. No.936 of 2006 whereby
the High Court has
dismissed the Writ Appeal and the review petition filed by the appellant
holding that the LAO/Collector, Land Acquisition having made the Award
beyond the period of two years stipulated in Section 11-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated by the authorities
have lapsed.
3. The appellant happens to be a Government company engaged in coal
mining operations in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In terms of a
notification dated 30th August, 1992 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, a large extent of land measuring 35 acres and 09 gts. in
Survey Nos.285, 287 and 288 situated in village Jallaram, Kamanpur Mandal
and Karimnagar Districts was notified for acquisition for the benefit of
the appellant-company. A final declaration in terms of Section 6 was made
on 2nd March, 1994, the validity whereof was assailed by four owners
(Pattadars), respondents in this appeal in Writ Petition No.27/483 of 1995
primarily on the ground that the declaration under Section 6 had been
issued beyond the period of limitation stipulated for the purpose. An
application for interim stay was also moved by the writ-petitioners, in
which a Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh granted an interim
stay on 6th September, 1995. The writ petition was finally dismissed by the
High Court by a judgment and order dated 20th July, 1999. Aggrieved by the
said order of dismissal the respondent filed Writ Appeal No.1228 of 1999
which too failed and was dismissed by the Division Bench on 13th August,
1999.
4. With the dismissal of the writ petition and the appeal arising out of
the same, the Collector made an Award under Section 11 of the Land
Acquisition Act on 5th November, 1999. The appellant-company’s case is that
all the owners, except the four respondents who had moved the High Court,
sought a reference of the dispute regarding the quantum of compensation
payable to them to the Civil Court in which Senior Civil Judge, Manthani,
District Karimnagar, A.P. held the expropriated owners entitled to receive
compensation @ Rs.60,000/- per acre besides enhanced value of the
structure, wells and trees standing on the same. The appellant-company
claims to have deposited one third of the enhanced value of compensation in
the appeal preferred by it against the Award made by the Civil Court. The
appeal is, according to the appellant, pending for disposal by the High
Court.
5. In the meantime respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal who apparently did
not seek any reference to the Civil Court for enhancement of the
compensation filed Writ Petition No.22875 of 1999 challenging the validity
of the Award made by the LAO/Collector on the ground that the same was
beyond the period of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act.
That contention found favour with the learned Single Judge of the High
Court before whom the matter was argued. The Single Judge held that the
Award having been passed beyond the period of limitation stipulated under
Section 11-A of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed.
6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the appellant
filed Writ Appeal Nos.1315 of 2001 and 936 of 2006 before the Division
Bench of the High Court who affirmed the view taken by the Single Judge and
dismissed the appeals by its order dated 7th September, 2006. The appellant-
company then appears to have filed review petition No.2901 of 2008 which
too failed and was dismissed by the Division Bench by its order dated 21st
August, 2009 as already indicated. The present appeals call in question
the said two judgments and orders.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
Section 11-A
of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows:
“11-A. Period within which an Award shall be made. –
(1) The
Collector shall make an Award under section 11 within a period
of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration
and if no Award is made within that period, the entire
proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been
published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, the Award shall be made within a period
of two years from such commencement.
Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred to
in this section, the period during which any action or
proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is
stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.”
8. It is evident from the above that in order to be valid, the Award
must be made within a period of two years from the date of the publication
of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The declaration in the
instant case was published on 2nd March, 1994 while the Award was made on
5th November, 1999. The same was, therefore, clearly beyond two years’
period stipulated under the above provisions. Even so the Award could be
held to be valid if the same was within two years of the declaration after
excluding the period during which the High Court had stayed the proceedings
in the writ petition filed by the respondent-landowners. That is because
Explanation to Section 11-A (supra) permits exclusion of the period during
which the Court had stayed the acquisition proceedings for the purpose of
reckoning the period of two years prescribed for making the Award. In the
case at hand the interim order of stay was issued by the High Court on 6th
December, 1995 which order was finally vacated on 28th July, 1999 with the
dismissal of the writ petition. This means that the restraint order
remained in force for a period of 3 years, 7 months and 22 days. That
period shall have to be added to the period of two years prescribed for
making the Award in the light of Explanation to Section 11-A. The
difficulty is that even if the said period is added to the time allowed for
making an Award, the Award stands beyond the period prescribed. Confronted
with this proposition Mr. Altaf Ahmad argued that the period taken to
obtain a copy of the order by which the High Court vacated the stay earlier
granted by it ought also to be excluded from consideration and when so
excluded the Award would fall within the outer limit of two years
stipulated under Section 11-A. Reliance in support of that submission was
placed by Mr. Altaf Ahmad on the decision of this Court in N. Narasimhaiah
and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 3
SCC 88. It was contended that although the said decision was reversed by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Ors. v.
State of T.N. and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533, the law declared by this Court was
made applicable prospectively. This would, according to Mr. Altaf Ahmad,
imply that on the date the Award in question was made, the legal position
stated in Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) would hold the field. It would also,
according to the learned counsel, mean that the time taken for obtaining a
copy of the order of the High Court would have to be excluded in the light
of the judgment in Narasimhaiah’s case (supra).
9. On behalf of the respondents, on the contrary, learned counsel placed
reliance upon a decision of this Court in R. Indira Saratchandra v. State
of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2011) 10 SCC 344 to contend that this Court having
noticed the previous decisions on the subject had clearly repelled the
contention that a stay order vacated by the Court should all the same
remain operative till delivery or receipt of a copy of such order by the
Collector/LAO. It was submitted that the view expressed in N.
Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) which was followed in State of Karnataka v.
D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619 having been overruled by this Court in
case of Padma Sundara Rao’s case, there was no question of placing reliance
upon the ratio of the said two decisions. The contrary view expressed in
A.S. Naidu and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (2010) 2 SCC 801
having been found to be the correct view, not only by the Constitution
Bench in Padma Sundara Rao’s case (supra) but also in R. Indira
Sartchandra’s case (supra), the ratio of the said decisions alone stated
the correct legal position, which was squarely applicable to the case at
hand.
10. It is, in our opinion, not necessary to delve deep into the merits of
the contention urged on behalf of the appellant which is founded entirely
on the ratio of the decision of this Court in N. Narasimhaiah’s case
(supra). Correctness of the view taken in N. Narasimhaiah’s case (supra)
was examined by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao’s
case (supra) and overruled. If the matter rested there, we may have
examined the question whether the prospective overruling of the decision in
N. Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) was of any assistance to the appellant in
the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. That exercise is rendered
unnecessary by the decision rendered by this Court in R. Indira
Sartchandra’s case (supra), which places the matter beyond the pale of any
further debate on the subject. In R. Indira Sartchandra’s case (supra)
also the Award made by the Collector was sought to be supported on the
ground that the period of two years prescribed under Section 11-A of the
Act should be counted, not from the date of the Judgment by which the
interim stay order was vacated but from the date on which a copy thereof
was supplied to the Collector. The High Court had accepted that contention
relying upon the decisions of this Court in N Narasimhaiah and Ors. v.
State of Karnataka and Ors. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 88; State
of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. L. N. Krishnan and Ors. 1996 (1) SCC 250;
Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, U.P. v. Suresha Nand
Juyal alial Musa Ram (Deceased) by Lrs. and Ors. 1997 (9) SCC 224;
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Others 1996 (11) SCC 501; Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors. 2000 (2) SCC 48; Tej Kaur and Ors.
v. State of Punjab 2003 (4) SCC 48.
11. This Court, however, reversed the view taken by the High Court
holding that Section 11-A did not admit of an interpretation by which the
period of two years would start running from the date a copy of the order
vacating the stay granted by the Court is served upon the Collector. This
Court observed:
“10. There is nothing in Section 11-A from which it can be
inferred that the stay order passed by the court remains
operative till the delivery of copy of the order. Ordinarily,
the rules framed by the High Court do not provide for supply of
copy of the judgment or order to the parties free of cost. The
parties to the litigation can apply for certified copy which is
required to be supplied on fulfillment of the conditions
specified in the relevant rules. However, no period has been
prescribed for making of an application for certified copy of
the judgment or order or preparation and delivery thereof. Of
course, once an application is made within the prescribed period
of limitation, the time spent in the preparation and supply of
the copy is excluded in computing the period of limitation
prescribed for filing an appeal or revision.”
12. The above, in our opinion, is a complete answer to the contention
urged on behalf of the appellant that not only the period during which the
interim order of stay remains in force but also the time taken for
obtaining the copy of the order vacating the stay should be excluded for
reckoning the period of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act.
13. There is yet another dimension to the contention urged before us
which too in our opinion stands concluded by the decision of this Court in
Ravi Khullar and Another v. Union of India & Ors. (2007) 5 SCC 231. That
was a case where a preliminary notification under Section 4 was issued on
23rd January, 1965 and a declaration under Section 6 published on 26th
December, 1968 i.e. before the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984.
In terms of sub-section (1) of Section 11-A applicable to such a
declaration, an Award was required to be made within a period of two years
from such commencement. So calculated, the Award ought to have been made on
or before 28th September, 1986 when the period of two years from the
commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984 expired. The land owner however
had filed a writ petition before the High Court on 12th September, 1986 in
which an order for maintenance of status quo was made on 18th September,
1986 restraining the Land Acquisition Officer from announcing the Award.
That order continued to remain in force till 13th February, 2003. The High
court, eventually, dismissed the writ petition on 13th February, 2003. An
application was made for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment which
was ready only on 27th February, 2003. The Award was then pronounced on
1st March, 2003 after excluding the period during which the interim stay
order was operative. The Award should have been pronounced on or before
18th February, 2003. Having been pronounced on 1st March, 2003, the Award
was made beyond the period prescribed under Section 11-A. The contention
urged on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer was that a public
functionary had to look into the contents of the order passed by the Court
before taking any action, including the pronouncement of the Award and,
therefore, the time taken between 14th February, 2003 and 27th February,
2003 must also be excluded which meant that the Award could have been made
up to any date till 4th March, 2003. Support was drawn for that proposition
from the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act which according to
the Land Acquisition Officer ought to have applied for computing the period
of limitation under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Rejecting
that contention, this Court observed:
“54. ……The Land Acquisition Collector in making an Award does
not act as a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It
is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made
applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the
matter of making an Award under Section 11-A of the Act.
However, Section 11-A of the Act does provide a period of
limitation within which the Collector shall make his Award. The
Explanation thereto also provides for exclusion of the period
during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance
of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such being
the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11-A
of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the
Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the Limitation
Act is also confined to matters enumerated therein. The time
taken for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment is excluded
because a certified copy is required to be filed while
preferring an appeal/revision/review, etc. challenging the
impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into
Section 11-A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken
to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and order. The Court
has, therefore, no option but to compute the period of
limitation for making an Award in accordance with the provisions
of Section 11-A of the Act after excluding such period as can be
excluded under the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act.”
14. This Court drew a comparison between Section 11-A and Section 28-A of
the Act, and based on the difference between the two provisions, observed:
“56. It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it
considered necessary incorporated by express words the rule
incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It has done so
expressly in Section 28-A of the Act while it has consciously
not incorporated this rule in Section 11-A even while providing
for exclusion of time under the Explanation. The intendment of
the legislature is therefore unambiguous and does not permit the
court to read words into Section 11-A of the Act so as to enable
it to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of
the Land Acquisition Act.”
15. We are in respectful agreement with the above line of reasoning.
Section 11-A in terms does not provide for exclusion of the time taken to
obtain a certified copy of the Judgment or order by which the stay order
was either granted or vacated. Section 12 of the Limitation Act has no
application to the making of an Award under the Land Acquisition Act. In
the absence of any enabling provision either in Section 11-A of the Land
Acquisition Act or in the Limitation Act, there is no room for borrowing
the principles underlying Section 12 of the Limitation Act for computing
the period or determining the validity of an Award by reference to Section
11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.
16. Mr. Altaf Ahmad made a feeble attempt to argue that omission of a
specific provision in Section 11-A excluding the time taken in obtaining a
copy of the order passed by the Court was casus omissus and that this Court
could while interpreting the said provision supply the unintended omission
of the Parliament. There is, in our view, no merit in that contention. We
say so for more than one reasons. Firstly, because while applying the
doctrine of casus omissus the Court has to look at the entire enactment and
the scheme underlying the same. In the case at hand, we find that
Parliament has, wherever it intended, specifically provided for exclusion
of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order. For instance, under
Section 28A which provides for re-determination of the amount of
compensation on the basis of the Award of the Court, the aggrieved party is
entitled to move a written application to the Collector within three months
from the date of the Award of the Court or the Collector requiring him to
determine the amount of compensation payable to him on the basis of the
amount Awarded by the Court. Proviso to Section 28A specifically excludes
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Award while computing the
period of three months within which the application shall be made to the
Collector. It reads:
“28A. Re- determination of the amount of compensation on the
basis of the Award of the Court.- (1) Where in an Award under
this part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of
compensation in excess of the amount Awarded by the collector
under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land
covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section
(1) and who are also aggrieved by the Award of the Collector
may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to
the Collector under section 18, by written application to the
Collector within three months from the date of the Award of the
Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them
may be re- determined on the basis of the amount of compensation
Awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months
within which an application to the Collector shall be made under
this sub- section, the day on which the Award was pronounced and
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Award shall be
excluded.”
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
17. Absence of a provision analogous to proviso to Section 28A (supra) in
the scheme of Section 11-A militates against the argument that the omission
of such a provision in Section 11-A is unintended which could be supplied
by the Court taking resort to the doctrine of casus omissus.
18. Secondly, because the legal position regarding applicability of the
doctrine of casus omissus is settled by a long line of decisions of this
Court as well as Courts in England. Lord Diplock in Wentworth Securities
v. Jones (1980) AC 1974, revived the doctrine which was under major
criticism, by formulating three conditions for its exercise namely, (1)
What is the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2)
Whether it was by inadvertence that the draftsman and the Parliament had
failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and (3)
What would be the substance of the provision that the Parliament would have
made, although not necessarily the precise words that the Parliament would
have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The House of Lords while
approving the above conditions in Inco Europe v. First Choice Distribution
(2000) 1 All ER 109, went further to say that there are certain exceptions
to the rule inasmuch the power will not be exercised when the alteration is
far-reaching or when the legislation in question requires strict
construction as a matter of law.
19. The legal position prevalent in this country is not much different
from the law as stated in England. This Court has in several decisions held
that casus omissus cannot be supplied except in the case of clear necessity
and when reason for it is found within the four corners of the statute
itself. The doctrine was first discussed by Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar in
the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj
Tradus (1980) 1 SCC 370. Interpretative assistance was taken by this Court
from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) pg. 33 and 47. The
Court said:
“10. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus
omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a
whole-appear to be well settled. In regard to the former the
following statement of law appears in Maxwell on Interpretation
of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 33:
Omissions not to be inferred-"It is a corollary to the general
rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or
taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to
justify the inference that the legislature intended something
which it omitted to express. Lord Mersey said: 'It is a strong
thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not
there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing
to do.' 'We are not entitled,' said Lords Loreburn L.C., 'to
read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it
is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.' A
case not provided for in a statute is not to be dealt with
merely because there seems no good reason why it should have
been omitted, and the omission in consequence to have been
unintentional.
In regard to the latter principle the following statement of law
appears in Maxwell at page 47:
A statute is to be read as a whole-"It was resolved in the case
of Lincoln College (1595) 3 Co. Rep. 58 that the good expositor
of an Act of Parliament should 'make construction on all the
parts together, and not of one part only by itself.' Every
clause of a statute is to 'be construed with reference to the
context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible,
to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.' (Per Lord
Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. R: 1898 AC 735)
In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus cannot
be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity
and when reason for it found in the four corners of the statute
itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be
readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute
or section must be construed together and every clause of a
section should be construed with reference to the context and
other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a
particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole
statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a
particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous
results which could not have been intended by the Legislature.
"An intention to produce an, unreasonable result", said
Danckwerts L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou [1966] 1 Q.B. 878 "is
not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other
construction available." Where to apply words literally would
"defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a
wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the
words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a
rational construction, (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C.-1968 AC
557 where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new
problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely
emerges. In the light of these principles we will have to
construe Sub-section (2)(b) with reference to the context and
other clauses of Section 33B.”
20. Arijit Pasayat, J. has verbatim relied upon the above in Padmasundara
Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu 2 (2002) 3 SCC 533, Union of India v. Dharmendra
Textile Processors (2008) 13 SCC 369, Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj
Mandi Samiti & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 364, Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India
(2005) 7 SCC 484, State of Kerala & Anr. v. P.V. Neelakandan Nair & Ors.
(2005) 5 SCC 561, UOI v. Priyankan Sharan and Anr. (2008) 9 SCC 15, Maulavi
Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004) CriLJ 3860, Unique
Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and Ors.
(2003) 2 SCC 455, UOI v. Rajiv Kumar with UOI v. Bani Singh (2003) SCC (LS)
928, Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers and
Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 659, Prakash Nath Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner of
Income Tax and Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 686, State of Jharkhand & Anr. v. Govind
Singh (2005) 10 SCC 437, Trutuf Safety Glass Industries v. Commissioner of
Sales Tax, U.P. (2007) 7 SCC 242.
21. In Padma Sundara Rao’s (supra) this Court examined whether the
doctrine of casus omissus could be invoked while interpreting Section 6(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act so as to provide for exclusion of time taken
for service of copy of the order upon the Collector. Repelling the
contention this Court said:
“12. The court cannot read anything into a statutory provision
which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the
legislature. The language employed in a statute is the
determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and
primary rule of construction is that the intention of the
legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature
itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been
intended but what has been said.
xxx xxx xxx
14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets
the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is
misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for
the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed
necessary.”
22. There is in the case at hand no ambiguity nor do we see any apparent
omission in Section 11-A to justify application of the doctrine of casus
omissus and by that route re-write 11-A providing for exclusion of time
taken for obtaining a copy of the order which exclusion is not currently
provided by the said provision.
The omission of a provision under Section
11-A analogous to the proviso under Section 28A is obviously not unintended
or inadvertent which is the very essence of the doctrine of casus omissus.
We, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the contention urged by Mr.
Altaf Ahmad.
23. The High Court was in the above circumstances perfectly justified in
holding that the Award made by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer was non est and that the acquisition proceedings had elapsed by reason of a breach of Section 11-A of the Act.
We, however, make it clear that the
declaration granted by the High Court and proceedings initiated by the
Collector shall be deemed to have elapsed only qua the writ petitioners-
respondents herein. With those observations, these appeals fail and are
hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.
……………………………………….……….…..…J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
…………………………..…………………..…..J.
(VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
New Delhi
August 29, 2013
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.7212-7213 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.29306-29307 of 2010)
Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. …Appellant
Versus
Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao & Ors. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise out of a judgment and order dated 7th September
2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
in Writ Appeal No.936 of 2006 and an order dated 21st August 2009 passed in
W.A.M.P. No.2901 of 2008 in W.A. No.936 of 2006 whereby
the High Court has
dismissed the Writ Appeal and the review petition filed by the appellant
holding that the LAO/Collector, Land Acquisition having made the Award
beyond the period of two years stipulated in Section 11-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated by the authorities
have lapsed.
3. The appellant happens to be a Government company engaged in coal
mining operations in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In terms of a
notification dated 30th August, 1992 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, a large extent of land measuring 35 acres and 09 gts. in
Survey Nos.285, 287 and 288 situated in village Jallaram, Kamanpur Mandal
and Karimnagar Districts was notified for acquisition for the benefit of
the appellant-company. A final declaration in terms of Section 6 was made
on 2nd March, 1994, the validity whereof was assailed by four owners
(Pattadars), respondents in this appeal in Writ Petition No.27/483 of 1995
primarily on the ground that the declaration under Section 6 had been
issued beyond the period of limitation stipulated for the purpose. An
application for interim stay was also moved by the writ-petitioners, in
which a Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh granted an interim
stay on 6th September, 1995. The writ petition was finally dismissed by the
High Court by a judgment and order dated 20th July, 1999. Aggrieved by the
said order of dismissal the respondent filed Writ Appeal No.1228 of 1999
which too failed and was dismissed by the Division Bench on 13th August,
1999.
4. With the dismissal of the writ petition and the appeal arising out of
the same, the Collector made an Award under Section 11 of the Land
Acquisition Act on 5th November, 1999. The appellant-company’s case is that
all the owners, except the four respondents who had moved the High Court,
sought a reference of the dispute regarding the quantum of compensation
payable to them to the Civil Court in which Senior Civil Judge, Manthani,
District Karimnagar, A.P. held the expropriated owners entitled to receive
compensation @ Rs.60,000/- per acre besides enhanced value of the
structure, wells and trees standing on the same. The appellant-company
claims to have deposited one third of the enhanced value of compensation in
the appeal preferred by it against the Award made by the Civil Court. The
appeal is, according to the appellant, pending for disposal by the High
Court.
5. In the meantime respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal who apparently did
not seek any reference to the Civil Court for enhancement of the
compensation filed Writ Petition No.22875 of 1999 challenging the validity
of the Award made by the LAO/Collector on the ground that the same was
beyond the period of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act.
That contention found favour with the learned Single Judge of the High
Court before whom the matter was argued. The Single Judge held that the
Award having been passed beyond the period of limitation stipulated under
Section 11-A of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed.
6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the appellant
filed Writ Appeal Nos.1315 of 2001 and 936 of 2006 before the Division
Bench of the High Court who affirmed the view taken by the Single Judge and
dismissed the appeals by its order dated 7th September, 2006. The appellant-
company then appears to have filed review petition No.2901 of 2008 which
too failed and was dismissed by the Division Bench by its order dated 21st
August, 2009 as already indicated. The present appeals call in question
the said two judgments and orders.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
Section 11-A
of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows:
“11-A. Period within which an Award shall be made. –
(1) The
Collector shall make an Award under section 11 within a period
of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration
and if no Award is made within that period, the entire
proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been
published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, the Award shall be made within a period
of two years from such commencement.
Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred to
in this section, the period during which any action or
proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is
stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.”
8. It is evident from the above that in order to be valid, the Award
must be made within a period of two years from the date of the publication
of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The declaration in the
instant case was published on 2nd March, 1994 while the Award was made on
5th November, 1999. The same was, therefore, clearly beyond two years’
period stipulated under the above provisions. Even so the Award could be
held to be valid if the same was within two years of the declaration after
excluding the period during which the High Court had stayed the proceedings
in the writ petition filed by the respondent-landowners. That is because
Explanation to Section 11-A (supra) permits exclusion of the period during
which the Court had stayed the acquisition proceedings for the purpose of
reckoning the period of two years prescribed for making the Award. In the
case at hand the interim order of stay was issued by the High Court on 6th
December, 1995 which order was finally vacated on 28th July, 1999 with the
dismissal of the writ petition. This means that the restraint order
remained in force for a period of 3 years, 7 months and 22 days. That
period shall have to be added to the period of two years prescribed for
making the Award in the light of Explanation to Section 11-A. The
difficulty is that even if the said period is added to the time allowed for
making an Award, the Award stands beyond the period prescribed. Confronted
with this proposition Mr. Altaf Ahmad argued that the period taken to
obtain a copy of the order by which the High Court vacated the stay earlier
granted by it ought also to be excluded from consideration and when so
excluded the Award would fall within the outer limit of two years
stipulated under Section 11-A. Reliance in support of that submission was
placed by Mr. Altaf Ahmad on the decision of this Court in N. Narasimhaiah
and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 3
SCC 88. It was contended that although the said decision was reversed by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Ors. v.
State of T.N. and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533, the law declared by this Court was
made applicable prospectively. This would, according to Mr. Altaf Ahmad,
imply that on the date the Award in question was made, the legal position
stated in Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) would hold the field. It would also,
according to the learned counsel, mean that the time taken for obtaining a
copy of the order of the High Court would have to be excluded in the light
of the judgment in Narasimhaiah’s case (supra).
9. On behalf of the respondents, on the contrary, learned counsel placed
reliance upon a decision of this Court in R. Indira Saratchandra v. State
of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2011) 10 SCC 344 to contend that this Court having
noticed the previous decisions on the subject had clearly repelled the
contention that a stay order vacated by the Court should all the same
remain operative till delivery or receipt of a copy of such order by the
Collector/LAO. It was submitted that the view expressed in N.
Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) which was followed in State of Karnataka v.
D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619 having been overruled by this Court in
case of Padma Sundara Rao’s case, there was no question of placing reliance
upon the ratio of the said two decisions. The contrary view expressed in
A.S. Naidu and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (2010) 2 SCC 801
having been found to be the correct view, not only by the Constitution
Bench in Padma Sundara Rao’s case (supra) but also in R. Indira
Sartchandra’s case (supra), the ratio of the said decisions alone stated
the correct legal position, which was squarely applicable to the case at
hand.
10. It is, in our opinion, not necessary to delve deep into the merits of
the contention urged on behalf of the appellant which is founded entirely
on the ratio of the decision of this Court in N. Narasimhaiah’s case
(supra). Correctness of the view taken in N. Narasimhaiah’s case (supra)
was examined by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao’s
case (supra) and overruled. If the matter rested there, we may have
examined the question whether the prospective overruling of the decision in
N. Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) was of any assistance to the appellant in
the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. That exercise is rendered
unnecessary by the decision rendered by this Court in R. Indira
Sartchandra’s case (supra), which places the matter beyond the pale of any
further debate on the subject. In R. Indira Sartchandra’s case (supra)
also the Award made by the Collector was sought to be supported on the
ground that the period of two years prescribed under Section 11-A of the
Act should be counted, not from the date of the Judgment by which the
interim stay order was vacated but from the date on which a copy thereof
was supplied to the Collector. The High Court had accepted that contention
relying upon the decisions of this Court in N Narasimhaiah and Ors. v.
State of Karnataka and Ors. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 88; State
of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. L. N. Krishnan and Ors. 1996 (1) SCC 250;
Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, U.P. v. Suresha Nand
Juyal alial Musa Ram (Deceased) by Lrs. and Ors. 1997 (9) SCC 224;
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Others 1996 (11) SCC 501; Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors. 2000 (2) SCC 48; Tej Kaur and Ors.
v. State of Punjab 2003 (4) SCC 48.
11. This Court, however, reversed the view taken by the High Court
holding that Section 11-A did not admit of an interpretation by which the
period of two years would start running from the date a copy of the order
vacating the stay granted by the Court is served upon the Collector. This
Court observed:
“10. There is nothing in Section 11-A from which it can be
inferred that the stay order passed by the court remains
operative till the delivery of copy of the order. Ordinarily,
the rules framed by the High Court do not provide for supply of
copy of the judgment or order to the parties free of cost. The
parties to the litigation can apply for certified copy which is
required to be supplied on fulfillment of the conditions
specified in the relevant rules. However, no period has been
prescribed for making of an application for certified copy of
the judgment or order or preparation and delivery thereof. Of
course, once an application is made within the prescribed period
of limitation, the time spent in the preparation and supply of
the copy is excluded in computing the period of limitation
prescribed for filing an appeal or revision.”
12. The above, in our opinion, is a complete answer to the contention
urged on behalf of the appellant that not only the period during which the
interim order of stay remains in force but also the time taken for
obtaining the copy of the order vacating the stay should be excluded for
reckoning the period of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act.
13. There is yet another dimension to the contention urged before us
which too in our opinion stands concluded by the decision of this Court in
Ravi Khullar and Another v. Union of India & Ors. (2007) 5 SCC 231. That
was a case where a preliminary notification under Section 4 was issued on
23rd January, 1965 and a declaration under Section 6 published on 26th
December, 1968 i.e. before the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984.
In terms of sub-section (1) of Section 11-A applicable to such a
declaration, an Award was required to be made within a period of two years
from such commencement. So calculated, the Award ought to have been made on
or before 28th September, 1986 when the period of two years from the
commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984 expired. The land owner however
had filed a writ petition before the High Court on 12th September, 1986 in
which an order for maintenance of status quo was made on 18th September,
1986 restraining the Land Acquisition Officer from announcing the Award.
That order continued to remain in force till 13th February, 2003. The High
court, eventually, dismissed the writ petition on 13th February, 2003. An
application was made for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment which
was ready only on 27th February, 2003. The Award was then pronounced on
1st March, 2003 after excluding the period during which the interim stay
order was operative. The Award should have been pronounced on or before
18th February, 2003. Having been pronounced on 1st March, 2003, the Award
was made beyond the period prescribed under Section 11-A. The contention
urged on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer was that a public
functionary had to look into the contents of the order passed by the Court
before taking any action, including the pronouncement of the Award and,
therefore, the time taken between 14th February, 2003 and 27th February,
2003 must also be excluded which meant that the Award could have been made
up to any date till 4th March, 2003. Support was drawn for that proposition
from the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act which according to
the Land Acquisition Officer ought to have applied for computing the period
of limitation under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Rejecting
that contention, this Court observed:
“54. ……The Land Acquisition Collector in making an Award does
not act as a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It
is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made
applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the
matter of making an Award under Section 11-A of the Act.
However, Section 11-A of the Act does provide a period of
limitation within which the Collector shall make his Award. The
Explanation thereto also provides for exclusion of the period
during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance
of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such being
the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11-A
of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the
Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the Limitation
Act is also confined to matters enumerated therein. The time
taken for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment is excluded
because a certified copy is required to be filed while
preferring an appeal/revision/review, etc. challenging the
impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into
Section 11-A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken
to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and order. The Court
has, therefore, no option but to compute the period of
limitation for making an Award in accordance with the provisions
of Section 11-A of the Act after excluding such period as can be
excluded under the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act.”
14. This Court drew a comparison between Section 11-A and Section 28-A of
the Act, and based on the difference between the two provisions, observed:
“56. It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it
considered necessary incorporated by express words the rule
incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It has done so
expressly in Section 28-A of the Act while it has consciously
not incorporated this rule in Section 11-A even while providing
for exclusion of time under the Explanation. The intendment of
the legislature is therefore unambiguous and does not permit the
court to read words into Section 11-A of the Act so as to enable
it to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of
the Land Acquisition Act.”
15. We are in respectful agreement with the above line of reasoning.
Section 11-A in terms does not provide for exclusion of the time taken to
obtain a certified copy of the Judgment or order by which the stay order
was either granted or vacated. Section 12 of the Limitation Act has no
application to the making of an Award under the Land Acquisition Act. In
the absence of any enabling provision either in Section 11-A of the Land
Acquisition Act or in the Limitation Act, there is no room for borrowing
the principles underlying Section 12 of the Limitation Act for computing
the period or determining the validity of an Award by reference to Section
11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.
16. Mr. Altaf Ahmad made a feeble attempt to argue that omission of a
specific provision in Section 11-A excluding the time taken in obtaining a
copy of the order passed by the Court was casus omissus and that this Court
could while interpreting the said provision supply the unintended omission
of the Parliament. There is, in our view, no merit in that contention. We
say so for more than one reasons. Firstly, because while applying the
doctrine of casus omissus the Court has to look at the entire enactment and
the scheme underlying the same. In the case at hand, we find that
Parliament has, wherever it intended, specifically provided for exclusion
of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order. For instance, under
Section 28A which provides for re-determination of the amount of
compensation on the basis of the Award of the Court, the aggrieved party is
entitled to move a written application to the Collector within three months
from the date of the Award of the Court or the Collector requiring him to
determine the amount of compensation payable to him on the basis of the
amount Awarded by the Court. Proviso to Section 28A specifically excludes
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Award while computing the
period of three months within which the application shall be made to the
Collector. It reads:
“28A. Re- determination of the amount of compensation on the
basis of the Award of the Court.- (1) Where in an Award under
this part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of
compensation in excess of the amount Awarded by the collector
under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land
covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section
(1) and who are also aggrieved by the Award of the Collector
may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to
the Collector under section 18, by written application to the
Collector within three months from the date of the Award of the
Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them
may be re- determined on the basis of the amount of compensation
Awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months
within which an application to the Collector shall be made under
this sub- section, the day on which the Award was pronounced and
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Award shall be
excluded.”
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
17. Absence of a provision analogous to proviso to Section 28A (supra) in
the scheme of Section 11-A militates against the argument that the omission
of such a provision in Section 11-A is unintended which could be supplied
by the Court taking resort to the doctrine of casus omissus.
18. Secondly, because the legal position regarding applicability of the
doctrine of casus omissus is settled by a long line of decisions of this
Court as well as Courts in England. Lord Diplock in Wentworth Securities
v. Jones (1980) AC 1974, revived the doctrine which was under major
criticism, by formulating three conditions for its exercise namely, (1)
What is the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2)
Whether it was by inadvertence that the draftsman and the Parliament had
failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and (3)
What would be the substance of the provision that the Parliament would have
made, although not necessarily the precise words that the Parliament would
have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The House of Lords while
approving the above conditions in Inco Europe v. First Choice Distribution
(2000) 1 All ER 109, went further to say that there are certain exceptions
to the rule inasmuch the power will not be exercised when the alteration is
far-reaching or when the legislation in question requires strict
construction as a matter of law.
19. The legal position prevalent in this country is not much different
from the law as stated in England. This Court has in several decisions held
that casus omissus cannot be supplied except in the case of clear necessity
and when reason for it is found within the four corners of the statute
itself. The doctrine was first discussed by Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar in
the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj
Tradus (1980) 1 SCC 370. Interpretative assistance was taken by this Court
from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) pg. 33 and 47. The
Court said:
“10. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus
omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a
whole-appear to be well settled. In regard to the former the
following statement of law appears in Maxwell on Interpretation
of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 33:
Omissions not to be inferred-"It is a corollary to the general
rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or
taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to
justify the inference that the legislature intended something
which it omitted to express. Lord Mersey said: 'It is a strong
thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not
there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing
to do.' 'We are not entitled,' said Lords Loreburn L.C., 'to
read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it
is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.' A
case not provided for in a statute is not to be dealt with
merely because there seems no good reason why it should have
been omitted, and the omission in consequence to have been
unintentional.
In regard to the latter principle the following statement of law
appears in Maxwell at page 47:
A statute is to be read as a whole-"It was resolved in the case
of Lincoln College (1595) 3 Co. Rep. 58 that the good expositor
of an Act of Parliament should 'make construction on all the
parts together, and not of one part only by itself.' Every
clause of a statute is to 'be construed with reference to the
context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible,
to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.' (Per Lord
Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. R: 1898 AC 735)
In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus cannot
be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity
and when reason for it found in the four corners of the statute
itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be
readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute
or section must be construed together and every clause of a
section should be construed with reference to the context and
other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a
particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole
statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a
particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous
results which could not have been intended by the Legislature.
"An intention to produce an, unreasonable result", said
Danckwerts L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou [1966] 1 Q.B. 878 "is
not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other
construction available." Where to apply words literally would
"defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a
wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the
words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a
rational construction, (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C.-1968 AC
557 where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new
problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely
emerges. In the light of these principles we will have to
construe Sub-section (2)(b) with reference to the context and
other clauses of Section 33B.”
20. Arijit Pasayat, J. has verbatim relied upon the above in Padmasundara
Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu 2 (2002) 3 SCC 533, Union of India v. Dharmendra
Textile Processors (2008) 13 SCC 369, Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj
Mandi Samiti & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 364, Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India
(2005) 7 SCC 484, State of Kerala & Anr. v. P.V. Neelakandan Nair & Ors.
(2005) 5 SCC 561, UOI v. Priyankan Sharan and Anr. (2008) 9 SCC 15, Maulavi
Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004) CriLJ 3860, Unique
Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and Ors.
(2003) 2 SCC 455, UOI v. Rajiv Kumar with UOI v. Bani Singh (2003) SCC (LS)
928, Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers and
Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 659, Prakash Nath Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner of
Income Tax and Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 686, State of Jharkhand & Anr. v. Govind
Singh (2005) 10 SCC 437, Trutuf Safety Glass Industries v. Commissioner of
Sales Tax, U.P. (2007) 7 SCC 242.
21. In Padma Sundara Rao’s (supra) this Court examined whether the
doctrine of casus omissus could be invoked while interpreting Section 6(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act so as to provide for exclusion of time taken
for service of copy of the order upon the Collector. Repelling the
contention this Court said:
“12. The court cannot read anything into a statutory provision
which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the
legislature. The language employed in a statute is the
determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and
primary rule of construction is that the intention of the
legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature
itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been
intended but what has been said.
xxx xxx xxx
14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets
the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is
misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for
the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed
necessary.”
22. There is in the case at hand no ambiguity nor do we see any apparent
omission in Section 11-A to justify application of the doctrine of casus
omissus and by that route re-write 11-A providing for exclusion of time
taken for obtaining a copy of the order which exclusion is not currently
provided by the said provision.
The omission of a provision under Section
11-A analogous to the proviso under Section 28A is obviously not unintended
or inadvertent which is the very essence of the doctrine of casus omissus.
We, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the contention urged by Mr.
Altaf Ahmad.
23. The High Court was in the above circumstances perfectly justified in
holding that the Award made by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer was non est and that the acquisition proceedings had elapsed by reason of a breach of Section 11-A of the Act.
We, however, make it clear that the
declaration granted by the High Court and proceedings initiated by the
Collector shall be deemed to have elapsed only qua the writ petitioners-
respondents herein. With those observations, these appeals fail and are
hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.
……………………………………….……….…..…J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
…………………………..…………………..…..J.
(VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
New Delhi
August 29, 2013
