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Saturday, January 10, 2026

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where shares of an amalgamating company are held a...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where shares of an amalgamating company are held a...: advocatemmmohan Income-tax Act, 1961 – Section 28 Profits and gains of business – Stock-in-trade – Amalgamation Where shares of an amalgam...

Income-tax Act, 1961 – Section 28

Profits and gains of business – Stock-in-trade – Amalgamation

Where shares of an amalgamating company, held as stock-in-trade, are substituted by shares of the amalgamated company pursuant to a court-sanctioned scheme of amalgamation, and such substituted shares are realisable in money and capable of definite valuation, the substitution constitutes commercial realisation giving rise to taxable business income under Section 28.
(Paras 30, 31)


Income-tax Act, 1961 – Sections 2(47), 45 and 47(vii)

Transfer – Capital assets – Distinction from stock-in-trade

Section 47(vii) exempts only transfers of capital assets in a scheme of amalgamation. The exemption does not extend to shares held as stock-in-trade, which fall outside the capital gains regime and are governed by Section 28.
(Paras 12, 27)


Income-tax Act, 1961 – Section 28

Real income – Receipt in kind – Commercial realisability

Business income under Section 28 may arise in kind and does not require an actual sale or exchange, provided the assessee receives a real and presently realisable commercial benefit. Mere statutory substitution without realisability does not attract tax.
(Paras 15, 18, 24)


Amalgamation – Nature and effect

Amalgamation results in the extinguishment of the corporate identity of the amalgamating company and statutory substitution of rights in the amalgamated company. Such substitution may amount to commercial realisation when trading assets are replaced by assets of definite market value.
(Paras 16, 18, 19)


Accrual and timing of taxability – Section 28

In cases of amalgamation involving stock-in-trade, taxability under Section 28 arises only upon allotment of the new shares, and not on the appointed date or date of court sanction.
(Paras 25, 30)


High Court jurisdiction – Section 260A

The High Court does not exceed jurisdiction under Section 260A by dealing with incidental or collateral questions of law necessary for deciding the appeal, even if not formally framed, provided parties had full opportunity to address them.
(Paras 9–9.6)


ANALYSIS

1. Core controversy

The principal issue was whether, upon amalgamation, substitution of shares held as stock-in-trade by shares of the amalgamated company results in taxable business income under Section 28, or whether taxation arises only upon subsequent sale.


2. Tribunal vs High Court

The Tribunal declined to decide whether the shares were capital assets or stock-in-trade, holding that no income accrues without sale or transfer. The High Court reversed this approach, holding that if shares were stock-in-trade, substitution itself could result in taxable business income, and remitted the matter for factual determination.


3. Supreme Court on Section 260A

The Court rejected the objection that the High Court exceeded jurisdiction, holding that:

  • the issue of Section 28 taxability was incidental to the framed questions;

  • parties were fully heard; and

  • no prejudice was caused.
    (Paras 9–9.6)


4. Scope of Section 28

The Court emphasised that:

  • Section 28 is a wide charging provision;

  • it does not depend on “transfer” as defined in Section 2(47);

  • profits may arise in cash or kind;

  • the decisive test is real income and commercial realisability.
    (Paras 15–15.3)


5. Amalgamation and real income

Amalgamation is a statutory substitution. Mere substitution does not automatically create income. However, where:

  • stock-in-trade ceases to exist;

  • substituted shares have definite and ascertainable market value; and

  • such shares are freely tradable,
    the transaction results in commercial realisation.
    (Paras 18–18.6, 24)


6. Timing

Taxability does not arise:

  • on the appointed date, or

  • on court sanction of the scheme.

It arises only on allotment of shares, when the assessee acquires a realisable commercial benefit.
(Paras 25, 30)


7. Capital vs business field

The Court highlighted the legislative distinction:

  • Capital assets → protected by Section 47(vii);

  • Stock-in-trade → no such protection; governed by Section 28.

Extending Section 47(vii) to stock-in-trade would undermine the business-income tax base.
(Paras 27–27.4)


8. Result

The High Court’s judgment was affirmed. The legal principle was settled in favour of the Revenue, while factual application was remitted to the Tribunal.


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. Where shares of an amalgamating company are held as stock-in-trade and are substituted by shares of the amalgamated company pursuant to amalgamation, such substitution constitutes taxable business income under Section 28, provided the substituted shares are realisable in money and capable of definite valuation.

  2. Section 47(vii) applies only to capital assets and does not exempt transactions involving stock-in-trade.

  3. Taxability under Section 28 arises only upon allotment of the substituted shares, and not on the appointed date or date of sanction of the scheme.

  4. The High Court may consider incidental or collateral questions under Section 260A without formally framing them, where such consideration is necessary to decide the appeal and parties have been heard.

Declaration of title and recovery of possession Ancestral property – Alienation Where the plaint schedule property is found to be ancestral property of the plaintiffs, neither one co-owner nor a family manager can alienate the property so as to confer valid title on a third party. (Paras 17–18) Agreement of sale – Unregistered document – Title An unregistered agreement of sale does not convey title in immovable property. When execution of such document is denied and handwriting expert evidence establishes forgery, no rights can be claimed thereunder. (Paras 18–19) Burden of proof – Forged document When the plaintiffs deny execution of an agreement of sale and establish forgery through expert evidence, the burden is not discharged by the defendants merely by producing the document and examining attestors. (Paras 17–18) Evidence – Admissions Admissions of defendants that the plaint schedule property is ancestral property and that plaintiffs inherited the same are relevant and binding and justify decree for declaration and possession. (Para 17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100

Second Appeal – Scope – Substantial question of law

Second Appeal lies only when the case involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, cannot be interfered with unless shown to be perverse, contrary to evidence, or based on inadmissible material.
(Paras 15, 19)


Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLI Rule 31

First Appellate Court – Judgment – Compliance

Where the First Appellate Court has independently considered the evidence and confirmed the findings of the Trial Court, the appellate judgment cannot be faulted for non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC.
(Paras 11, 15)


Declaration of title and recovery of possession

Ancestral property – Alienation

Where the plaint schedule property is found to be ancestral property of the plaintiffs, neither one co-owner nor a family manager can alienate the property so as to confer valid title on a third party.
(Paras 17–18)


Agreement of sale – Unregistered document – Title

An unregistered agreement of sale does not convey title in immovable property. When execution of such document is denied and handwriting expert evidence establishes forgery, no rights can be claimed thereunder.
(Paras 18–19)


Burden of proof – Forged document

When the plaintiffs deny execution of an agreement of sale and establish forgery through expert evidence, the burden is not discharged by the defendants merely by producing the document and examining attestors.
(Paras 17–18)


Evidence – Admissions

Admissions of defendants that the plaint schedule property is ancestral property and that plaintiffs inherited the same are relevant and binding and justify decree for declaration and possession.
(Para 17)


Concurrent findings – Interference barred

When findings of fact are concurrently recorded by both courts below after proper appreciation of evidence, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence in Second Appeal.
(Paras 19–20)


Relief – Time to vacate

Even while dismissing the Second Appeal at the admission stage, reasonable time may be granted to vacate the premises.
(Para 20)


ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Nature of the suit and procedural history

The suit was filed for declaration of title, recovery of possession, and mesne profits. The Trial Court decreed the suit. The First Appellate Court confirmed the decree. Defendants 2 to 5 preferred the present Second Appeal.
(Paras 1–3, 11)


2. Plaintiffs’ case

Plaintiffs asserted that the plaint schedule property was ancestral property, inherited from their ancestors, and that it was let out to the first defendant. On denial of title by the tenant in rent control proceedings, the suit was instituted.
(Paras 3–4, 16)


3. Defence of defendants

Defendants claimed title under an agreement of sale dated 06-08-1997 (Ex.B1) allegedly executed by the first plaintiff and another family member and pleaded delivery of possession in part performance.
(Paras 5–6, 12, 16)


4. Evidence and findings on Ex.B1

The Trial Court considered:

  • admissions of defendants regarding ancestral nature of property,

  • handwriting expert evidence (Ex.X1) opining that Ex.B1 was forged, and

  • the fact that Ex.B1 was an unregistered document.

Both Courts held that no title passed under Ex.B1 and that it was pressed into service only to squat over the property.
(Paras 17–18)


5. Ancestral property and power of alienation

The Courts below found that the property was ancestral and that neither the first plaintiff nor the family manager had authority to alienate it in favour of the second defendant.
(Para 17)


6. Scope of Second Appeal

The High Court reiterated the settled meaning of “substantial question of law” and held that none of the grounds raised by the appellants satisfied the statutory requirement under Section 100 CPC.
(Paras 15, 19)


7. Final outcome

The Second Appeal was dismissed at the admission stage. Six months’ time was granted to vacate and hand over possession.
(Para 20)


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC is maintainable only when a substantial question of law arises; concurrent findings of fact based on evidence are not open to interference.

  2. An unregistered agreement of sale does not convey title to immovable property, and when its execution is denied and forgery is proved by expert evidence, no rights can be claimed thereunder.

  3. Ancestral property cannot be validly alienated by one co-owner or family manager so as to bind other co-owners.

  4. Admissions of defendants regarding ancestral nature of property and inheritance by plaintiffs constitute strong evidence supporting decree for declaration and possession.

  5. High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the courts below in the absence of perversity or illegality

A tenant continuing in possession after expiry of lease without acceptance of rent by the landlord is a tenant at sufferance and not a tenant holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Filing of eviction proceedings and issuance of notice demanding vacation constitute sufficient notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. One co-owner or legal representative of a deceased landlord is competent to maintain a suit for eviction; non-joinder of other co-owners or heirs is not fatal unless prejudice is shown. Concurrent findings on default in payment of rent and fixation of damages, based on appreciation of evidence, are not open to interference in second appeal in the absence of perversity or illegality. Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC can be exercised only when a substantial question of law arises; re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100

Second Appeal – Scope – Concurrent findings

High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot re-appreciate evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below unless such findings are perverse, based on inadmissible evidence, or recorded by ignoring material evidence. Existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non.
(Paras 31–32)


Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 106

Notice to quit – Sufficiency

Filing of eviction proceedings and issuance of notice demanding vacation of premises clearly demonstrate intention of landlord to terminate tenancy. Eviction suit itself constitutes sufficient notice to quit.
(Paras 17–18)


Tenant holding over – Tenant at sufferance – Distinction

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sections 116 & 111

A tenant continuing in possession after expiry of lease without consent of landlord is a tenant at sufferance and not a tenant holding over. Acceptance of rent after expiry of lease is sine qua non to claim tenancy by holding over.
(Paras 18–23)


Landlord and Tenant – Default in payment of rent

Where documentary evidence establishes persistent default in payment of rent and refusal of landlord to accept rent on account of default, tenant cannot claim protection as tenant holding over.
(Paras 15–16, 23)


Eviction suit – Non-joinder of parties – Co-owners

One of the co-owners or legal representatives of the deceased landlord is competent to maintain a suit for eviction against the tenant. Non-joinder of other co-owners or legal heirs is not fatal in the absence of objection from them.
(Paras 26–29)


Damages / Mesne profits – Fixation

Assessment of damages for unauthorised occupation, based on evidence on record and concurrent findings of courts below, does not warrant interference in second appeal in the absence of illegality.
(Paras 24–25)


Additional evidence – Order XLI Rule 27 CPC

Rejection of application to receive additional evidence by the appellate court after assigning reasons does not warrant interference in second appeal.
(Para 29)


Second Appeal – Dismissal

Where no substantial question of law arises from concurrent findings based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, second appeal is liable to be dismissed.
(Paras 31–33)


ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Nature of the litigation

The suit was filed by the landlord seeking eviction of the defendant-tenant and recovery of damages. The Trial Court decreed eviction and damages. The First Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding court, confirmed the decree. The defendant invoked Section 100 CPC.
(Paras 1–8)


2. Relationship of landlord and tenant

The landlord-tenant relationship was admitted. The tenancy originated under an unregistered lease deed dated 26-04-2001 for 11 months, with subsequent continuation and enhancement of rent.
(Paras 3, 5, 13)


3. Default in payment of rent

The Trial Court and Appellate Court relied on documentary evidence (Exs.A7 to A9) and admissions to conclude that the defendant committed default in payment of rent. These findings were concurrent and based on evidence.
(Paras 15–16)


4. Notice under Section 106 TPA

The High Court held that:

  • filing of eviction proceedings itself manifests intention to terminate tenancy, and

  • issuance of Ex.A3 legal notice further establishes termination.
    Hence, the plea of invalid notice under Section 106 TPA was rejected.
    (Paras 17–18)


5. Tenant holding over vs tenant at sufferance

The Court elaborated the distinction:

  • absence of acceptance of rent after expiry of lease negates tenancy by holding over;

  • defendant, having defaulted and whose rent was not accepted, was only a tenant at sufferance.
    (Paras 18–23)


6. Non-joinder of necessary parties

The Court reiterated settled law that one co-owner or legal representative can maintain eviction proceedings. The death of the original landlord and substitution by his son did not render the suit defective.
(Paras 26–29)


7. Damages

The fixation of damages at Rs.5,000/- per month was based on evidence and admissions. The High Court found no illegality or perversity warranting interference.
(Paras 24–25)


8. Scope of interference under Section 100 CPC

Re-emphasising settled jurisprudence, the Court held that it cannot re-appreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings in the absence of a substantial question of law. None arose in the present case.
(Paras 31–32)


9. Final outcome

The second appeal was dismissed without costs, and all pending miscellaneous petitions were closed.
(Para 33)


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. A tenant continuing in possession after expiry of lease without acceptance of rent by the landlord is a tenant at sufferance and not a tenant holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act.

  2. Filing of eviction proceedings and issuance of notice demanding vacation constitute sufficient notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

  3. One co-owner or legal representative of a deceased landlord is competent to maintain a suit for eviction; non-joinder of other co-owners or heirs is not fatal unless prejudice is shown.

  4. Concurrent findings on default in payment of rent and fixation of damages, based on appreciation of evidence, are not open to interference in second appeal in the absence of perversity or illegality.

  5. Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC can be exercised only when a substantial question of law arises; re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Landlord and tenant – Eviction and specific perfor...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Landlord and tenant – Eviction and specific perfor...: advocatemmmohan Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 Second Appeal – Scope – Substantial question of law Jurisdiction of the High C...

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100

Second Appeal – Scope – Substantial question of law

Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 CPC can be exercised only when a substantial question of law arises. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, are not liable to interference unless shown to be perverse, based on inadmissible evidence, or rendered by ignoring material evidence.
(Paras 17–21, 28–32)


Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c)

Specific performance – Readiness and willingness

Specific performance cannot be granted unless the plaintiff not only pleads but also proves continuous readiness and willingness to perform essential terms of the contract. Mere assertion without supporting conduct and evidence is insufficient.
(Paras 10–11, 22–26, 27–29)


Specific performance – Equitable relief – Clean hands

Relief of specific performance being discretionary and equitable, a party approaching the Court with unclean hands, false pleas, or forged documents is not entitled to such relief.
(Paras 10–11, 24, 31)


Burden of proof – Agreement of sale denied

Where execution of an unregistered agreement of sale is specifically denied, the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove execution and payment of consideration. The defendant is not required to prove the negative.
(Paras 27–29)


Order XLI Rule 31 CPC – First appellate judgment

Non-repetition of trial court reasoning does not vitiate the appellate judgment if there is substantial compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC and the appellate court records points for consideration, concurs with findings, and assigns its own reasons.
(Paras 14–16, 19–21)


Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 – Section 32(c)

Jurisdiction – Civil Court

Jurisdiction of the Civil Court is to be determined on the basis of plaint averments. Where the rent pleaded is below the statutory threshold, the bar under Section 32(c) of the Act is not attracted.
(Paras 17–18)


Landlord and tenant – Eviction and specific performance – Parallel proceedings

Where suit for specific performance filed by tenant is found to be an afterthought following eviction proceedings and is based on a forged agreement, dismissal of the specific performance suit and decree of eviction are justified.
(Paras 3, 10–11, 31–32)


Equitable relief – Grant of time to vacate

Even while dismissing second appeals, the High Court may grant reasonable time to the tenant to vacate the premises on equitable considerations.
(Paras 33–35)


ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Background and nature of litigation

Two suits were tried together:
• an eviction suit filed by the owner, and
• a suit for specific performance filed by the tenant.
The Trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance and decreed eviction. Both first appeals were dismissed, leading to the present second appeals.
(Paras 1–5)


2. Findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court

The Trial Court held that:

  • the tenant failed to prove execution of the agreement of sale,

  • readiness and willingness were not established,

  • the alleged agreement was forged and an afterthought, and

  • the tenant approached the Court with unclean hands.
    These findings were affirmed by the First Appellate Court.
    (Paras 10–11)


3. Substantial questions raised in second appeal

The principal grounds urged were:

  • alleged non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, and

  • alleged bar of civil court jurisdiction under Section 32(c) of the AP Rent Control Act.
    (Para 12)


4. Order XLI Rule 31 CPC

The High Court held that the First Appellate Court framed points for consideration, concurred with the Trial Court, and assigned reasons. Substantial compliance was found, and no infirmity was made out.
(Paras 14–16, 19–21)


5. Jurisdiction under Rent Control Act

The Court held that jurisdiction depends on plaint averments. Since rent pleaded was Rs.1,100/- per month, the statutory bar under Section 32(c) was not attracted.
(Paras 17–18)


6. Readiness and willingness & burden of proof

Applying Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and binding precedents, the Court held that:

  • mere pleading of readiness and willingness is insufficient,

  • conduct of the plaintiff is decisive, and

  • failure to issue notice or tender balance consideration is fatal.
    The plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving execution and consideration.
    (Paras 22–29)


7. Scope of Section 100 CPC

The Court reiterated that it cannot re-appreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact in the absence of perversity or a substantial question of law. None was found.
(Paras 17–21, 28–32)


8. Final relief

Both second appeals were dismissed. However, considering equities, the appellant was granted six months’ time to vacate the shop.
(Paras 32–35)


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. Specific performance cannot be granted unless the plaintiff proves continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act; mere assertion without supporting conduct is insufficient.

  2. Where execution of an agreement of sale is denied, the burden lies entirely on the plaintiff to prove execution and payment of consideration; the defendant is not required to prove the negative.

  3. Concurrent findings of fact dismissing a suit for specific performance and decreeing eviction, based on appreciation of evidence, are not open to interference in second appeal in the absence of a substantial question of law.

  4. Substantial compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC is sufficient; non-elaborate repetition of trial court reasoning does not vitiate an appellate judgment.

  5. Civil court jurisdiction under the AP Rent Control Act is determined on plaint averments; where rent pleaded is below the statutory threshold, the bar under Section 32(c) does not apply.

  6. Even while dismissing second appeals, the High Court may grant reasonable time to vacate on equitable considerations.

Friday, January 9, 2026

Specific Relief – Suit for specific performance – Burden of proof Where execution of agreement of sale and passing of advance consideration are specifically denied, the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove the genuineness of the agreement and payment of consideration. (Paras 12–13) Agreement of sale – Suspicious circumstances – Discrepant signatures Material discrepancies in signatures and execution of an agreement of sale, coupled with inconsistent evidence of attestors and scribe, constitute valid grounds for courts to disbelieve the document. (Paras 13–16) Evidence – Attestors and scribe – Credibility Where attestor and scribe depose that they signed on a particular page of the document but their signatures appear on a different page, such inconsistency affects the credibility of execution of the document. (Paras 14–15)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100

Second Appeal – Scope – Substantial question of law

Existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless such findings are perverse, based on inadmissible evidence, or recorded by ignoring material evidence.
(Paras 17–20)


Specific Relief – Suit for specific performance – Burden of proof

Where execution of agreement of sale and passing of advance consideration are specifically denied, the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove the genuineness of the agreement and payment of consideration.
(Paras 12–13)


Agreement of sale – Suspicious circumstances – Discrepant signatures

Material discrepancies in signatures and execution of an agreement of sale, coupled with inconsistent evidence of attestors and scribe, constitute valid grounds for courts to disbelieve the document.
(Paras 13–16)


Evidence – Attestors and scribe – Credibility

Where attestor and scribe depose that they signed on a particular page of the document but their signatures appear on a different page, such inconsistency affects the credibility of execution of the document.
(Paras 14–15)


Concurrent findings of fact – Finality

Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and confirmed by the First Appellate Court, based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, are binding and not open to interference in second appeal.
(Paras 16–20)


Second Appeal – Dismissal at admission stage

When no substantial question of law arises for consideration, second appeal is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage itself.
(Paras 20–21)


ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Nature of the litigation

The plaintiff filed O.S. No.97 of 2017 seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 21.04.2013 or, in the alternative, refund of advance amount with interest. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the dismissal was confirmed in first appeal. The plaintiff approached the High Court under Section 100 CPC.
(Paras 1–7)


2. Core defence and burden of proof

The defendant categorically denied execution of the agreement of sale and receipt of advance consideration, asserting that signed blank papers obtained in a prior loan transaction were misused. In such circumstances, the High Court held that the burden squarely lay on the plaintiff to prove execution and payment.
(Paras 5, 12)


3. Appreciation of Ex.A1 agreement of sale

Both courts below found serious discrepancies in Ex.A1:

  • Different forms of the defendant’s signature on two pages;

  • Thumb impression appearing only on one page;

  • Attestor and scribe claiming to have signed on the stamp paper, though their signatures appeared on the green paper.
    These inconsistencies were held to be unexplained and fatal to the plaintiff’s case.
    (Paras 13–16)


4. Concurrent findings and Section 100 CPC

The High Court reiterated settled principles governing Section 100 CPC, relying on Supreme Court precedents, holding that:

  • Findings of fact cannot be reopened;

  • Re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible;

  • Interference is justified only if findings are perverse or contrary to settled law.
    No such infirmity was found.
    (Paras 17–20)


5. Conclusion

Since the findings of the courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and no substantial question of law arose, the second appeal was dismissed at the admission stage without costs.
(Paras 20–21)


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. In a suit for specific performance, when execution of the agreement of sale and payment of advance consideration are denied, the burden of proof lies entirely on the plaintiff to establish the genuineness of the agreement and the transaction.

  2. Material discrepancies in execution, signatures, and supporting testimony of attestors and scribe justify rejection of an agreement of sale as not proved.

  3. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, cannot be interfered with in second appeal unless shown to be perverse or contrary to law.

  4. In the absence of a substantial question of law, a second appeal under Section 100 CPC is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage.