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Sunday, February 7, 2016

“In the instant case, from the above facts, it is obvious that the allotment which has been permitted without considering other applications, is unreasonable and lacks good faith and could not be said to be in public interest. The order passed by the State Government effecting the order of transfer in favour of opposite party No.6 is unreasonable and invalid. In these circumstances, the allotment order passed in favour of opposite party No.6 cannot be allowed to stand.= requisite notices were issued to Respondent No.1 and that it was afforded adequate opportunity. The observations of the High Court in that behalf are not quite correct. The supplementary affidavit filed in January 2000 made the position quite clear. The petition was therefore wrongly allowed on the ground that no opportunity was given to Respondent No.1. We have also seen the record and are satisfied that Respondent No.1 had closed its operation in the year 1997. According to annexure No. R-16 placed along with the rejoinder affidavit, an inspection report was apparently prepared. That report is a solitary piece in support of its submissions of having started manufacturing activity. Nothing has been placed on record, no licence is adverted to nor is it shown how and in what manner Respondent No.1 started its activity of manufacturing PVC pipes. Nothing was filed or placed on record pursuant to notices dated 20.03.1998 and 27.03.1998. We do not find any merit in the submissions that Respondent No.1 has been conducting any activity of manufacturing of PVC pipes. The claim of Respondent No.1 must therefore be rejected. At the same time it is absolutely clear on record that the Appellant has been having allotment of three sheds namely B-6, C-1 and C-2 in its favour in the same Industrial Estate. No special equities are in its favour and no case is therefore made out for allotment of concerned shed to the Appellant. The observation of the High Court that the order dated 15.06.1998 was issued without any public auction or inviting tenders and as such was completely unsustainable, in our view is absolutely correct. In the circumstances we allow the present appeal with following directions:- (a) The claim of Respondent No.1 was rightly rejected while cancelling allotment made in favour of M/s Surya Chemicals vide letter of cancellation dated 09.06.1998. The order of cancellation dated 09.06.1998 is sustained and shall be fully operative. Respondent No.1 who has been in wrongful occupation of the concerned shed must surrender the possession immediately. The authorities are directed to recover the possession forthwith and report compliance to this Court. (b) In view of the change in circumstances namely allotment of sheds C-1 and C-2 in its favour, the Appellant is not entitled to claim any special equity. The order of allotment dated 15.6.1998 passed in its favour therefore stands set aside. (c) The authorities are directed to conduct public auction or invite tenders for allotment of the concerned shed at the present market value. Needless to mention that the present Appellant and Respondent No.1 or any other person is free to participate in such public auction or tender.


                                                              Non-Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 361  OF 2016
                 (Arising out of  SLP (C) No. 10951 of 2014)


M/s Metal Seam Co. of  India (P) Ltd.             …Appellant


                                  Vs.


M/s Avadh Delicacies & Others                    …Respondents




                            J U D G M E N T



Uday U. Lalit, J.



Leave granted.





This appeal challenges the judgment and order  dated  28.03.2014  passed  by
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench,  Lucknow  in  Writ
Petition No.1840 of 1998 whereby the High Court  was  pleased  to  set-aside
the orders dated 09.06.1998 and 15.06.1998 passed by  the  General  Manager,
District Industries Centre, Lucknow.





The facts in the present matter are as under:-


In 1956, Shed  No.B-5  inclusive  of  appurtenant  open  space  situated  in
Talkatora  Industrial  Estate,  Lucknow  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
“concerned shed”) was allotted to M/s Surya Chemicals for  establishment  of
a factory. Under the Hire Purchase agreement entered into between M/s  Surya
Chemicals and the Director of Industries on  behalf  of  the  Government  of
U.P., it was expressly stipulated in Condition No.4 as under:-

“Not to sell, mortgage, assign or otherwise transfer  the  factory  building
except  with  the  previous  permission  in  writing  of  the  Director   of
Industries, U.P. till the price has been fully  paid  and  the  transfer  as
aforesaid shall be as such conditions as the Director of  Industries,  U.P.,
may lay down while granting such permission.”




The present Appellant was allotted the adjoining  shed  namely  B-6  in  the
year 1968 and in due course of time it started manufacturing containers  and
drums. As the business of the Appellant  expanded,  it  required  additional
premises. Around this time M/s Surya Chemicals  was  in  arrears  in  making
payment of instalments in respect of the concerned shed. At  one  stage  the
allotment in its favour was cancelled but on  an  assurance  that  it  would
start production, it was given time and  the  allotment  was  restored.  The
Appellant approached the Joint Director of Industries for allotment  of  the
concerned shed on payment of entire cost.


Since M/s Surya Chemicals was in default, the Joint Director  of  Industries
recommended cancellation of allotment of the concerned  shed  and  wrote  to
the General Manager  to  take  the  appropriate  steps  after  taking  legal
opinion in the matter. The  General  Manager  however  by  his  order  dated
01.12.1983 recommended transfer of the concerned shed  in  favour  of  Avadh
Delicacies,  Respondent  No.1  herein.  Respondent  No.1  was  a  new   firm
provisionally registered as a Small Scale Industries unit with  the  General
Manager. The  order  was  passed  on  an  application  moved  by  M/s  Surya
Chemicals for transfer of the concerned shed to Respondent No.1.


d)    On 25.02.1984 the Joint Director of Industries accepted  the  transfer
application moved by M/s Surya Chemicals  permitting  the  transfer  of  the
concerned shed in favour of Respondent No.1. This led to the filing of  Writ
Petition No.1166 of 1984 by  the  Appellant  in  the  High  Court.   It  was
submitted that the application for transfer ought to  have  been  considered
along with other pending  applications  and  when  the  application  of  the
Appellant was pending there was no question of  accepting  the  transfer  as
proposed by M/s Surya Chemicals.

e)    That writ petition was allowed by the High Court by its  judgment  and
order dated 04.03.1987.  It was observed as under:-
“In the instant  case,  from  the  above  facts,  it  is  obvious  that  the
allotment which has been permitted without considering  other  applications,
is  unreasonable and lacks good faith and could not be said to be in  public
interest. The order passed by the State Government effecting  the  order  of
transfer in favour of opposite party No.6 is unreasonable  and  invalid.  In
these circumstances, the allotment order passed in favour of opposite  party
No.6 cannot be allowed to stand.

The writ petition is accordingly allowed and a writ of certiorari is  issued
quashing the order dated  25.02.1984,  passed  by  the  Joint   Director  of
Industries (Annexure-14) and the  order  dated  23.02.1984,  passed  by  the
State Government contained in Annexure-13 to the  writ  petition.   However,
it will be open to the opposite parties to consider the merits of  the  case
of the petitioner and that of opposite party No.6 and in case  the  opposite
party No.6 in fact has started  any  production  regarding  which  there  is
dispute and doubt, his claim would be given due  consideration  and  in  any
view the opposite parties will, so far as possible, allot any other shed  to
opposite party No.6 if circumstances warrant that  he  should  not  get  and
keep possession over shed No.5-B.”




f)    Thus the order of transfer in  favour  of  opposite  party  No.6  i.e.
Respondent No.1 was quashed.  The authorities were directed to consider  the
merits of the case of the Appellant and Respondent  No.1  and  in  case  the
claim of Respondent No.1 was to be accepted,  its claim could inter-alia  be
considered in respect of any other shed.


g)  The aforementioned judgment and order dated  04.03.1987  was  challenged
by Respondent No.1 in this Court by filing Civil Appeal  No.  3062  of  1987
and during  its  pendency  nothing  could  be  done.   It  appears  that  on
25.09.1997 Shed No.C-1 in  the  very  same  Industrial  Estate  came  to  be
allotted to the Appellant.  On 29.09.1997 the  aforesaid  civil  appeal  was
dismissed for non-prosecution by this Court and such dismissal has  attained
finality.


h)    Soon thereafter  the  matter  was  taken  up  for  consideration.   On
20.03.1998 a notice was issued to the Respondent No.1 to  present  its  case
along with necessary record relating  to  the  concerned  shed.   A  further
notice in that behalf was again issued to  Respondent  No.1  on  27.03.1998.
Similar notices were also issued to the Appellant and M/s Surya Chemicals.


i)    In the meeting of Zila Udyog Bandhu held  on  20.05.1998,  the  matter
concerning allotment of concerned shed  was  considered.   It  was  observed
that in the year 1997 Shed No.C-1 was already  allotted  in  favour  of  the
Appellant.  The committee however concluded as under:-


“Having considered the  entire  facts  of  the  above  case  and  after  due
deliberations, the Chairman has taken the decision that  Shed  No.  B-5  was
allotted to M/s Surya Chemicals in the year 1965 and the possession  of  the
shed was handed over on 01.01.1966 but they have not commenced any  work  at
their own and transferred Shed No. B-5 to M/s Avadh Delicacies.   M/s  Surya
Chemicals is not interested in setting up of unit  and  started  production,
therefore, the committee has taken the decision to cancel the  allotment  of
Shed No. B-5 to M/s Surya Chemicals and make its allotment in favour of  M/s
Metal Seam Company of India under the provisions  of  Government  Order  No.
1888/18-2-92-25(3)/92 dated 30.4.1992 as per rules.”




j)    On 09.06.1998 General Manager,  District  Industries  Centre,  Lucknow
issued a letter cancelling the allotment of the  concerned  shed  which  was
made in favour of M/s Surya Chemicals and re-claimed the possession  of  the
concerned shed.  Further, by order dated  15.06.1998  the  General  Manager,
District Industries Centre, Lucknow  allotted  the  concerned  shed  to  the
Appellant.  M/s Surya Chemicals did not challenge the order of  cancellation
dated 09.06.1998.  However, Respondent No.1 challenged  the  said  order  by
filing Writ Petition  No.1840  of  1998  in  the  High  Court.   During  the
pendency of the writ petition, there  was  an  order  of  status  quo  which
continued till the disposal of  the  writ  petition.   It  appears  that  on
10.03.2006 another shed in the same Industrial Estate being Shed No.C-2  was
allotted to the Appellant herein.  The Appellant since then has been  having
allotment of three sheds, namely, B-6, C-1 and C-2 in its favour.

k)    In the aforesaid writ petition a supplementary affidavit was filed  by
General Manager, District Industries Centre  in  January,  2000  stating  as
under:

      “That this Hon’ble Court on 13.09.1999  (when  the  instant  case  was
listed) was pleased to enquire whether the petitioner’s case was  considered
or not for allotment of industrial plot in question in view of the  judgment
of this Hon’ble Court dated 04.03.1987 passed in Writ Petition No.  1166  of
1984 (MB) (Metal Seams Co. of India v. State of UP & Ors.)  in  this  regard
it is submitted that in paragraph 23 of the counter affidavit filed  in  the
instant writ  petition  i.e.  Writ  Petition  No.  1840  of  1998(MB)  dated
19.03.1999 it has been specifically asserted that  after  the  dismissal  of
the SLP against the judgment and  order  dated  04.03.1987  the  steps  were
taken by the Department for the assessment of the comparative  need  of  the
conflicting parties in respect of shed in question.  In the  said  paragraph
it was further stated that all the parties namely (1) M/s  Surya  Chemicals,
(2) M/s Metal Seams Co. and  (3)  M/s  Avadh  Delicacies  were  called  vide
letters dated 20.03.1998 and 27.03.1998 by the committee consisting  of  (1)
General Manager, District Industries Centre, Lucknow, (2) Director,  Central
Design Centre, Lucknow and (3)  Project  Manager  in  the  office  of  Joint
Director Industries, Lucknow.  The said letters  were  annexed  as  annexure
Nos. (A-3 and A-4) to the said counter affidavit.





l)    The record  placed  before  us  indicates  that  Respondent  No.1  had
initially got registration to manufacture ayurvedic medicines  in  the  year
1987.  However, in the year 1992 it had obtained  licence  to  run  a  Flour
Mill and to deal in and store food grains.  On  25.06.1997  Respondent  No.1
had written to the Trade Tax Officer, Lucknow as under:

“1.   The firm of the applicant is registered with your office  under  State
Trade Tax Act vide Registration No. LKO-0366347 dated 17.05.1992.

2.    That the trader has closed down his business because of  the  loss  in
it.

3.    That Form No.15 and 19 are already submitted in the office.

Hence, the applicant urges that the notice of closure may  be  admitted  and
the firm may be permanently closed.”


(m)    The aforementioned Writ Petition No.1840 of 1998 came to  be  allowed
by the High Court by its judgment  and  order  dated  28.03.2014.  The  High
Court observed that  Annexure  No.R-16  placed  on  its  record  by  way  of
rejoinder affidavit, disclosed that Respondent No.1 was running an  industry
for manufacturing PVC pipes and accessories  and  its  production  had  also
started.  It  was  further  observed  that  the  order  of  allotment  dated
15.06.1998 in  favour  of  the  Appellant  was  passed  without  giving  any
opportunity of hearing or issuing any show cause notice to  Respondent  No.1
and without complying with the directions in  the  order  dated  04.03.1987.
The High Court also stated that order dated 15.06.1998 was  not  sustainable
in as much as it was issued without any public auction or inviting tenders.


4.    This appeal by special leave challenges the judgment and order  passed
by the High Court setting aside the order  of  allotment  dated  15.06.1998.
In support of the appeal, Mr. H.P. Raval, learned Senior Advocate  submitted
that the notices dated  20.03.1998  and  27.03.1998  clearly  indicate  that
requisite  opportunity  was  afforded  to  Respondent  No.1,   that   record
indicated  that  the  cases  of  all  three  claimants  including  that   of
Respondent  No.1  were  considered  before  letter  of  cancellation   dated
09.06.1998 was issued, that cancellation was never challenged by  M/s  Surya
Chemicals and that Respondent No.1 had no stateable claim in respect of  the
concerned shed.  Appearing for Respondent  No.1,  Mr.  Guru  Krishna  Kumar,
learned Senior Advocate submitted that in keeping with the direction  issued
in the judgment and order dated 04.03.1987 the claim of Respondent No.1  was
required to be considered, which is a matter of fact, was not considered  at
all and that the requirement of the Appellant stood completely satisfied  by
allotment of two sheds namely  C-1  and  C-2  during  the  pendency  of  the
proceedings.


5.    We have considered the submissions and gone through  the  record.  The
Appellant is right in its submissions that requisite notices were issued  to
Respondent  No.1  and  that  it  was  afforded  adequate  opportunity.   The
observations of the High Court in that behalf are  not  quite  correct.  The
supplementary affidavit filed  in  January  2000  made  the  position  quite
clear. The petition was therefore wrongly allowed  on  the  ground  that  no
opportunity was given to Respondent No.1. We have also seen the  record  and
are satisfied that Respondent No.1 had closed  its  operation  in  the  year
1997.  According to annexure  No.  R-16  placed  along  with  the  rejoinder
affidavit, an inspection report was apparently prepared.  That report  is  a
solitary  piece  in  support  of   its   submissions   of   having   started
manufacturing activity. Nothing has been placed on  record,  no  licence  is
adverted to nor is it shown how and in what manner Respondent  No.1  started
its activity of manufacturing PVC pipes.  Nothing was  filed  or  placed  on
record pursuant to notices dated 20.03.1998 and 27.03.1998.  We do not  find
any merit in the submissions that Respondent No.1 has  been  conducting  any
activity of manufacturing of PVC pipes. The claim of  Respondent  No.1  must
therefore be rejected.  At the same time it is absolutely  clear  on  record
that the Appellant has been having allotment of three sheds namely B-6,  C-1
and C-2 in its favour in the same Industrial  Estate.  No  special  equities
are in its favour and no  case  is  therefore  made  out  for  allotment  of
concerned shed to the Appellant.   The observation of the  High  Court  that
the order  dated  15.06.1998  was  issued  without  any  public  auction  or
inviting tenders and as such was completely unsustainable, in  our  view  is
absolutely correct.


6.    In the circumstances  we  allow  the  present  appeal  with  following
directions:-


(a)    The claim of Respondent No.1 was rightly  rejected  while  cancelling
allotment made in favour of M/s Surya Chemicals vide letter of  cancellation
dated 09.06.1998. The order of cancellation dated  09.06.1998  is  sustained
and shall be fully operative. Respondent  No.1  who  has  been  in  wrongful
occupation of the concerned shed must surrender the possession  immediately.
The authorities are directed to recover the possession forthwith and  report
compliance to this Court.


(b)  In view of the change in circumstances namely allotment  of  sheds  C-1
and C-2 in its favour, the Appellant is not entitled to  claim  any  special
equity. The  order  of  allotment  dated  15.6.1998  passed  in  its  favour
therefore stands set aside.


(c)  The authorities are  directed  to  conduct  public  auction  or  invite
tenders for allotment of the concerned shed at  the  present  market  value.
Needless to mention that the present Appellant and Respondent  No.1  or  any
other person is free to participate in such public auction or tender.





7.     This appeal thus stands allowed and the judgment of  the  High  Court
under appeal stands modified to  the  aforesaid  extent.   No  order  as  to
costs.



                                                               ……………………………J.
                              (V. Gopala Gowda)


                                                            ……..………………..……J.
                             (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
January 19, 2016



ITEM NO.1E-For Judgment       COURT NO.10             SECTION XI

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

C.A. No.361/2016 @ Petition(s) for  Special  Leave  to  Appeal  (C)   No(s).
10951/2014

M/S.METAL SEAM CO.OF INDIA (P)LTD.                 Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

M/S.AVADH DELICACIES & ORS.                        Respondent(s)

Date : 19/01/2016 This appeal was called on for pronouncement  of  JUDGEMENT
today.

For Petitioner(s)
                     Mr. Anil Kumar Mishra,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. Gaurav Dhingra,Adv.

                        Mr. Akshit Gadhok, Adv.
                     Mr. Munawwar Naseem,Adv.


      Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit pronounced the  judgment  of  the
Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda and His Lordship.
      Leave granted.
      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed non-reportable judgment.

|(VINOD KUMAR)                          | |(MALA KUMARI SHARMA)                  |
|COURT MASTER                           | |COURT MASTER                          |


           (Signed Non-Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for being in possession of 1 kg of opium without any permit or licence.=The appellant was told that he was suspected to be carrying opium in his possession and as such his personal search had to be undertaken and that he had a right to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. The appellant was given an appropriate notice vide Ext. PA under Section 50 of the Act and by his reply Ext. PA/1 he opted to be searched before a Gazetted Officer. Thereafter a wireless message was sent to PW4 Shyam Singh Rana, DSP Gohana who reached the spot. The appellant was produced before him and PW4 was also acquainted with the facts of the case. Thereafter, on the instructions of PW4, personal search of the appellant was undertaken which resulted in recovery of opium from the possession of the appellant. The opium was found in a polythene bag tied in a cloth around the stomach of the appellant. On weighment, it was found to be 1kg 50gms. A sample was taken and put in a small plastic bag while the remainder was put in a bag of cloth. The sample and the remainder were separately sealed and taken in possession vide memo Ext. PB. The seal was then handed over to PW1 ASI Bishamber Lal. Thereafter Ruqa Ext. PC was sent to the Police Station for registration of crime, whereupon FIR Ext. PC was recorded by PW2 Head Constable Om Parkash= it was observed in Megha Singh as under: “After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that there is discrepancy in the depositions of the P.Ws.2 and 3 and in the absence of any independent corroboration such discrepancy does not inspire confidence about the reliability of the prosecution case. We have also noted another disturbing feature in this case. PW3, Siri Chand, head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation.” = In Megha Singh, the search was not conducted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer, as is required in a case under the Act. In the instant case the search of the appellant was conducted in the presence of and under the instructions of PW4. The extracts of depositions of other prosecution witnesses show that it was not PW6 S.I. Satbir Singh alone who was involved in the investigation. In our view the principle laid down in Megha Singh and followed in State vs. Rajangam does not get attracted in the present matter. Relevant to note that this was not even a ground projected in support of the case of the appellant and does not find any reference in the judgment under appeal. We therefore reject the submission.

                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 50  of 2016
                (Arising from the SLP(Crl.) No. 2082 of 2015)


Surender @ Kala                                   …. Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Haryana                                  …. Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T

Uday U. Lalit, J.


Leave granted.



This appeal is directed against the  judgment  and  order  dated  11.12.2014
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana  dismissing  Criminal  Appeal
No. S-318-SB of 2004 preferred  by  the  appellant  against  his  conviction
under Section 18 of Narcotic Drugs and  Psychotropic  Substances  Act,  1985
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for being in possession of  1  kg  of
opium without any permit or licence.



According to the prosecution PW6 SI Satbir Singh was on  usual  patrol  duty
on 24.06.2002 along with other police officials  at  bus  stand  of  village
Bichpar, Distt Sonipat. Secret information was  received  by  him  that  the
appellant was selling opium and was roaming in  the  village  in  search  of
customers.  This information was reduced to writing  in  the  form  of  Ruqa
Ext. PF and was sent to the Police Station for  information,  whereupon  DDR
Ext. PC was recorded.  PW6 Satbir and other  police  officials  reached  the
bus stand and saw the appellant coming from village Gangana  side.   He  was
apprehended. The appellant was told that he was  suspected  to  be  carrying
opium in  his  possession  and  as  such  his  personal  search  had  to  be
undertaken and that he had a right to be  searched  in  the  presence  of  a
Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. The appellant  was  given  an  appropriate
notice vide Ext. PA under Section 50 of the Act and by his reply  Ext.  PA/1
he opted to be searched before a Gazetted Officer.



Thereafter a wireless message was sent to PW4 Shyam Singh Rana,  DSP  Gohana
who reached the spot. The appellant was produced  before  him  and  PW4  was
also acquainted with the facts of the case. Thereafter, on the  instructions
of PW4, personal search of the appellant was undertaken  which  resulted  in
recovery of opium from the possession of the appellant. The opium was  found
in a polythene bag tied in a cloth around the stomach of the  appellant.  On
weighment, it was found to be 1kg 50gms. A sample was taken  and  put  in  a
small plastic bag while the remainder was put in a bag of cloth. The  sample
and the remainder were separately sealed and taken in possession  vide  memo
Ext. PB. The seal was then handed over to PW1 ASI Bishamber Lal.  Thereafter
Ruqa Ext. PC was sent to the  Police  Station  for  registration  of  crime,
whereupon FIR Ext. PC was recorded by PW2 Head Constable Om Parkash.



The appellant along with the case property was produced before PW3  Yad  Ram
SHO of Police Station who verified the fact and put  his  own  seal  bearing
impression “YR” on the sample as well as on the  remainder.  Thereafter  the
sealed case property was  handed  over  to  the  Investigating  Officer  who
deposited the same with Malkhana. In due course of time the FSL report  Ext.
PD was received wherein it was  opined  that  the  sample  in  question  was
opium. After completion of investigation the  appellant  was  charge-sheeted
and tried for having committed the offence punishable under  Section  18  of
the Act.



The prosecution in support of its  case  examined  six  witnesses.  PW1  ASI
Bishamber Lal stated as under:-

“As contraband article was suspected with the accused so he was served  with
a notice Ext. PA to opt about his search before  a  Gazetted  Officer  or  a
Magistrate, which is bearing my signatures. Accused  opted  for  his  search
before a Gazetted officer vide endorsement Ex.  PA/1  which  is  bearing  my
signatures.”



PW2 Head Constable Om Parkash in his deposition stated as under:-

“On that day ASI  Bishamber Lal deposited the case property with  me,  which
was sealed with seal SS.”

Pw 3 SI Yad Ram in his deposition stated as under:-

“On 24.06. 2002, I was posted SI/HO P.S.  Baroda.  On  that  day  SI  Satbir
Singh had produced the accused now present in the court, two sealed  parcels
and the witnesses before me. I verified the  investigation  and  affixed  my
own bearing inscription “YR”. I directed SI  Satbir  Singh  to  deposit  the
case property with seals intact with the MHC P.S. Baroda.”

PW4 Shyam Singh Rana DSP stated as under:-

“I directed SI Satbir Singh to carry out the search of the  accused.  During
the course of search SI Satbir Singh recovered opium wrapped in a cloth  was
tied with the stomach of the accused underneath the shirt and  the  vest  of
the accused wrapped in a polythene pack. On weighment it  was  found  to  be
one kilogram. SI Satbir Singh took out 50grams of opium from  the  recovered
bulk and sealed the sample and the remainder into two separate parcels  with
the sealed bearing inscription SS. Both the sealed parcels were  taken  into
possession vide recovery memo EX. PB which was signed by ASI  Bishamber  Lal
and HC Suresh Kumar and was attested by me also.”



7.    In his statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C. the appellant  denied  the
prosecution  allegations  and  pleaded  innocence.   After  considering  the
material on record and rival submissions, the Special Judge,  Sonipat  found
the appellant guilty of offence punishable under Section 18 of the  Act  and
by his  judgment  and  order  dated  14.11.2004  sentenced  him  to  undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 5 years  and  to  pay  fine  of  Rs.  10000/-,  in
default whereof to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period  of  8
months.

8.     The judgment of conviction and sentence  was  challenged  by  way  of
Criminal Appeal of S-318 –SB of 2004 in the High  Court.  After  considering
the entire material on record, the High Court by its judgment  under  appeal
affirmed the view taken by the Trial Court and  dismissed  the  appeal.  The
correctness of the view taken by the High Court is under  challenge  in  the
present appeal.

9.    It was submitted by Mr. Rakesh Dahiya, learned advocate appearing  for
the appellant that the investigation in the matter was conducted by  PW6  SI
Satbir Singh who himself was the complainant. Relying  on  the  decision  of
this court in State by Inspector of Police,  Narcotic  Intelligence  Bureau,
Madhurai, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam[1], the learned counsel submitted that  the
investigation by PW6 SI Satbir Singh was  improper  and  the  appellant  was
entitled to acquittal.

10.   We have given anxious consideration to the submissions of the  learned
counsel. In State v. Rajangam (supra), the  High  Court  had  acquitted  the
accused. Relying upon the decision of this court in Megha Singh v. State  of
Haryana[2], the view taken by the High Court was affirmed by this  Court  in
an appeal against acquittal.  In Megha Singh the  accused  was  tried  under
the provisions of the TADA Act and the Arms Act for being in  possession  of
a country made pistol and three live cartridges.  The  prosecution  did  not
examine any independent witness and simply relied upon the testimony of  PW3
Investigating Officer. There was also discrepancy in the depositions of  PW3
Investigating Officer and another police person namely PW2. In the light  of
these facts,  it was observed in Megha Singh as under:

      “After considering  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  it
appears to us that there is discrepancy in the  depositions  of  the  P.Ws.2
and 3 and in the absence of any independent corroboration  such  discrepancy
does not inspire confidence about the reliability of the  prosecution  case.
We have also noted another  disturbing  feature  in  this  case.  PW3,  Siri
Chand, head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted  by
him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It  was  on
his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case  was
initiated.  He  being  complainant  should  not  have  proceeded  with   the
investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he  was  not  only  the
complainant in the case  but  he  carried  on  with  the  investigation  and
examined witnesses under Section 161  Cr.P.C.  Such  practice,  to  say  the
least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be  any  occasion  to
suspect fair and impartial investigation.”


11.   In Megha Singh, the search was not conducted  in  the  presence  of  a
Gazetted Officer, as is required in a case under the Act.   In  the  instant
case the search of the appellant was conducted in the presence of and  under
the instructions of PW4. The extracts of depositions  of  other  prosecution
witnesses show that it was not PW6 S.I. Satbir Singh alone who was  involved
in the investigation. In our view the principle laid  down  in  Megha  Singh
and followed in State vs. Rajangam does not get  attracted  in  the  present
matter. Relevant to note that this  was  not  even  a  ground  projected  in
support of the case of the appellant and does not find any reference in  the
judgment under appeal. We therefore reject the submission.

12.   Having gone through the entirety of the matter, we  do  not  find  any
reason to differ from the  view  taken  by  the  High  Court.  We  therefore
dismiss this appeal.


………………………J.
(V. Gopala Gowda)


…………………..……J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
January 19, 2016

ITEM NO.1D-For Judgment        COURT NO.10            SECTION IIB

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Crl.A.No.50/2016 @ Petition(s) for Special Leave to  Appeal  (Crl.)   No(s).
2082/2015

SURENDER @ KALA                                    Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA                                   Respondent(s)

Date : 19/01/2016 This appeal was called on for  pronouncement  of  JUDGMENT
today.

For Petitioner(s)
                     Mr. Rakesh Dahiya,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. Sanjay Kumar Visen,Adv.


      Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit pronounced the  judgment  of  the
Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda and His Lordship.
      Leave granted.
      The appeal is dismissed in terms of the  signed  reportable  judgment.

      Pending application(s), if any,stand(s) disposed of.
|(VINOD KUMAR)                          | |(MALA KUMARI SHARMA)                  |
|COURT MASTER                           | |COURT MASTER                          |



      (Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
-----------------------
[1]   1. 2010(15) SCC 369
[2]     1996(11) SCC 709

Special Economic Zone = grant of lease of land admeasuring 1500 acres out of Survey No.141 of Village Mundra, Taluka Mundra, District Kutch for the purposes of manufacturing salt. That application came to be rejected by the District Collector on 05.06.1993 on the ground “Land not available as asked for”=The original application simply made a demand that the respondent be allotted 1500 acres of land from Survey No.141 of Village Mundra. It is true that certain allotments were made from and out of Survey No.141 of Village Mundra but after the setting up of Special Economic Zone at Mundra all those applicants have surrendered their lands. The stand of the appellant - State is very clear and categorical that there was no land available at Village Mundra. Further, the application having been rejected by the District Collector on 18.12.1999, Revision was preferred more than five years later. This Revision was rejected on the ground of delay and was taken up in challenge before the High Court again after a delay of five years. In the circumstances the Single Judge of the High Court was right in observing that the respondent had remained indolent in pursuing its remedy and that because of delay and latches on its part, no indulgence could be shown. In our considered view, the Division Bench was not justified in reversing the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge, nor was it right in directing the Collector to allot to the respondent land for salt production from any other survey number.



                                                              Non-Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.360 of 2016
                (Arising from the SLP(Civil) No.527 of 2015)



State of Gujarat and Another                        ….Appellants


                                   Versus


Shree Ratnakar Enterprise                     …. Respondent




                               J U D G M E N T


Uday U. Lalit, J.


Leave granted.



This appeal challenges the judgment and order  dated  08.01.2014  passed  by
the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat  in  Letters  Patent  Appeal
No.218 of 2012 arising out of the dismissal  of  Special  Civil  Application
No.16050 of 2011 by the Single Judge of the High Court.


The facts in the present matter are as under:

(a)   The respondent preferred an application  before  the  appellant  State
for grant of lease of land admeasuring 1500 acres out of  Survey  No.141  of
Village  Mundra,  Taluka  Mundra,  District  Kutch  for  the   purposes   of
manufacturing salt. That application came to be  rejected  by  the  District
Collector on 05.06.1993 on the ground “Land not  available  as  asked  for”.
The rejection of the application  was  challenged  in  Revision  before  the
Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue Department who remanded the matter  back
to the Collector for fresh consideration. Thereafter,  the  Collector  again
rejected the application vide  order dated 18.12.1999  on  the  ground  that
the land available with the Government was  scattered  over  various  places
and land to the tune of 1500 acres as requested was  not  available  in  one
place. That order was again challenged  by  filing  Revision  on  02.02.2005
i.e. more than five years after the rejection of application on  18.12.1999.
The revisional authority refused to condone  the  delay  in  preferring  the
Revision and by its order dated 27.04.2005 affirmed the order  of  rejection
passed by the Collector. A copy of the order dated 27.04.2005 was marked  to
the concerned parties.

(b)   Thereafter, a proposal for setting up  of  Special  Economic  Zone  at
Mundra was taken up for  consideration.  The  Central  Government  vide  its
order dated 24.05.2009 provided for setting up ofSpecial  Economic  Zone  at
Mundra. The notification in question pertained  to  lands  including  Survey
No.141 of Village  Mundra.  The  coastal  lands  required  for  the  Special
Economic Zone were surrendered by  various  persons  to  the  Government  in
order to enable setting up of the Special Economic Zone.

(c)   Almost six years after the disposal of  Revision  on  27.04.2005,  the
respondent preferred Special Civil Application No.16050 of 2011 in the  High
Court of Gujarat praying inter-alia  that  the  order  dated  27.04.2005  be
quashed and appropriate direction be issued to allot land as prayed  for  by
the respondent. It was submitted that the  respondent  had  recently  become
aware about the order passed on 27.04.2005.

(d)   That Special Civil Application was rejected by  Single  Judge  of  the
High Court vide judgment and order dated 28.11.2011. It  was  observed  that
the rejection of Revision in 2005 was challenged  by  filing  Special  Civil
Application in the year 2011 and that the  respondent  itself  had  remained
indolent in pursuing its remedy; that because of such delay and  latches  no
indulgence could be shown in favour of the respondent; that no violation  of
any fundamental right or any legal right was shown by  the  respondent;  and
that  there  was  no  infirmity  in  the  order  passed  by  the  revisional
authority.



(e)   The decision of the Single Judge  was  challenged  by  filing  Letters
Patent Appeal No.218 of 2012 before the Division Bench of  the  High  Court.
During the pendency of this Appeal, an affidavit was filed on behalf of  the
appellant - State that no  land  was  earmarked  for  salt  production  from
Survey No.141 but over the years  lands  situated  near  coastal  area  were
allotted to various applicants for salt production and that said lands  were
surrendered by said persons to the appellant - State after  the  demand  for
land for Mundra Special Economic Zone came up. The  Division  Bench  by  its
judgment and order dated 08.01.2014 allowed  the  appeal.  It  was  observed
that there was no delay on part of the respondent as it was prosecuting  the
matter since the year 1992 and that the delay was actually on  part  of  the
appellant - State. The  Division  Bench  further  observed  that  since  the
respondent had applied in the year 1992 its priority ought to be  maintained
and that the Collector must ensure that the land  for  salt  cultivation  be
allotted to the respondent from any survey number within a period  of  three
months from the receipt of the order.




4.     The  appellant  State  has  preferred  this  Appeal  challenging  the
decision of the Division Bench of the High Court submitting inter-alia  that
after the establishment of Special Economic Zone  at  Mundra,  no  land  was
available which could be allotted to the  respondent,  that  the  respondent
could not claim the land as a matter of right for  production  of  salt  and
that  there  was  no  infirmity  in  the  order  passed  by  the  revisional
authority.  It  was  further  submitted  that  the  appellant  -  State  had
allotted small pieces of land for salt production and  no  person  was  ever
allotted 1500 acres of land for production of salt.  This Court was  pleased
to issue notice in the matter, whereafter the respondent filed affidavit  in
reply. It was submitted that if 1500 acres of  land  was  not  available  in
Survey No.141, whatever was available could be allotted  from  other  survey
numbers but the application of the respondent could not  and  ought  not  to
have been rejected.





5.    We heard Ms. Jesal Wahi, learned Advocate who appeared in  support  of
the Appeal and Mr. Abhijeet Sinha, learned Advocate  who  appeared  for  the
respondent. After concluding the hearing on 07.12.2015, liberty was  granted
to the parties to file written submissions, if any, within  two  weeks.  The
respondent filed an application for direction submitting inter-alia that  it
wished to rely on the  policy  of  the  State  Government  dated  31.12.1981
governing the matter in issue and that it  be  granted  hearing  to  address
this Court on such document. The respondent further prayed for extension  of
time to file its written submission.





6.    We have gone through the record. At no stage the alleged policy  dated
31.12.1981 was either referred to or relied upon.  No  submission  was  ever
advanced to project  the  entitlement  or  the  extent  thereof  under  this
policy. The original application simply made a demand  that  the  respondent
be allotted 1500 acres of land from Survey No.141 of Village Mundra.  It  is
true that certain allotments were made from and  out  of  Survey  No.141  of
Village Mundra but after the setting up of Special Economic Zone  at  Mundra
all those  applicants  have  surrendered  their  lands.  The  stand  of  the
appellant - State is very clear and  categorical  that  there  was  no  land
available at Village Mundra. Further, the application having  been  rejected
by the District Collector on 18.12.1999, Revision was  preferred  more  than
five years later.   This Revision was rejected on the ground  of  delay  and
was taken up in challenge before the High Court again after a delay of  five
years. In the circumstances the Single Judge of the High Court was right  in
observing that the respondent had remained indolent in pursuing  its  remedy
and that because of delay and latches on its part, no  indulgence  could  be
shown. In our considered view, the  Division  Bench  was  not  justified  in
reversing the judgment and order passed by the  Single  Judge,  nor  was  it
right in directing the Collector to allot to the respondent  land  for  salt
production from any other survey number.





7.    In the circumstances this appeal is allowed. The  judgment  and  order
of the Division Bench of the High Court is set-aside and that was passed  by
the Single Judge of the High Court is restored.  Application for  directions
preferred by the respondent after conclusion  of  hearing  is  rejected.  No
order as to costs.





                                 ………………………J.
 (V. Gopala Gowda)



………………..……J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)

New Delhi,
January 19, 2016


ITEM NO.1C.- For Judgment        COURT NO.10           SECTION IX

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

C.A. No.360/2016 @ Petition(s)  for  Special  Leave  to  Appeal  (C)  No(s).
527/2015

STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.                            Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

SHREE RATNAKAR ENTERPRISE                          Respondent(s)

Date : 19/01/2016 This appeal was called on for pronouncement  of   JUDGMENT
today.

For Petitioner(s)       Ms. Hemantika Wahi,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. Mohit Paul,Adv.


      Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit pronounced the judgement  of  the
Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda and His Lordship.
      Delay condoned.
      Leave granted.
      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed non-reportable  judgment.

      Pending application(s), if any,stand(s) disposed of.
|(VINOD KUMAR)                          | |(MALA KUMARI SHARMA)                  |
|COURT MASTER                           | |COURT MASTER                          |



             (Signed Non-Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

Reverse of the order - liable to be refunded with interest at 12% per annum from the date of withdrawal till the payment = “ In our view, the Arbitral Tribunal went beyond the scope of the contract and it clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. We, therefore, set aside the award insofar as it allows Claim No. 8. Consequently, the appeal stands allowed. At the interim stage, this Court had directed the Appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.70,65,039/- which upon deposit was withdrawn by the Respondent on furnishing a bank guarantee. The appellant is entitled to encash that bank guarantee to recover the sum that was deposited. No order as to costs.”= Interlocutory Application No.4 of 2015 was thereafter preferred by the appellant contending that the decretal amount was withdrawn by the respondent in December 2012 whereas the appeal was allowed in favour of the appellant on 24.4.2015 and that the respondent had reaped the benefits of decretal amount for more than three years. It was submitted that the Arbitral Tribunal had awarded interest @ 12% per annum against the appellant and that the respondent be directed to pay interest @ 12% per annum on the amount of Rs.70,65,039/- from the date of withdrawal till the date of actual payment.=The appellant is right in its submission that the Arbitral Tribunal in its award dated 09.01.2012 had awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum on amounts awarded under various claims. Matter in issue in Civil Appeal No.6158 of 2013 pertained only to Claim No.8. In the fitness of things, the appellant is certainly entitled to interest at the same rate on the amount which was enjoyed by the respondent. The entitlement of the respondent to this amount stood negated by judgment and order dated 24.04.2015 and as such the respondent must pay back the amount with interest at the same rate. We therefore, direct that the respondent shall pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount in question namely Rs.70,65,039/- from the date of withdrawal till the amount was made over by the respondent to the appellant. Such payment shall be made within six weeks from today. Interlocutory Application Nos.4 and 5 stand disposed of accordingly

                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                               I.A. Nos. 4 & 5

                                     IN

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6158 OF 2013


NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA       ……Applicant/

                                       Appellant
                                   Versus

M/S NCC- KNR (JV)                                                 ….
Respondent


                                  O R  D E R


Uday Umesh Lalit J.


1.    These Interlocutory Applications arise out of Civil Appeal No.6158  of
2013 which was disposed of by this Court on 24.4.2015. While  allowing  said
appeal preferred by National Highways  Authority  of  India,  the  appellant
herein, it was directed by this Court as under:-
“  In our view, the Arbitral Tribunal went beyond the scope of the  contract
and it clearly exceeded its  jurisdiction.  We,  therefore,  set  aside  the
award insofar as it allows Claim No.  8.  Consequently,  the  appeal  stands
allowed. At the interim stage, this Court  had  directed  the  Appellant  to
deposit a sum of Rs.70,65,039/- which upon  deposit  was  withdrawn  by  the
Respondent on furnishing a bank guarantee.  The  appellant  is  entitled  to
encash that bank guarantee to recover the sum that was deposited.  No  order
as to costs.”


2.    Soon thereafter Interlocutory Application No.3 of  2015 was  filed  on
behalf of the respondent, which was disposed of by this Court by  its  order
dated 8.5.2015, which order was to the following effect:-
“Mr. Amit George, leaned  counsel  appearing  for  the  applicant-respondent
shall pay to the petitioner,  National  Highways  Authority  of  India  and,
therefore,  the  bank  guarantee  in  question  need  not  be  encashed.  He
undertakes that the respondent shall  make  the  payment  to  the  applicant
within four weeks from today. The said amount shall be  paid  by  way  of  a
bank draft drawn on a nationalized bank. If the amount is  not  paid  within
the stipulated period, the bank guarantee shall  be  encashed  forthwith  by
the petitioner.

I.A. No. 3 of 2015 stands disposed of accordingly.”


3.    Accordingly, the respondent made over the amount  in  question  within
the  time  stipulated  under  the  order  dated  08.05.2015.   Interlocutory
Application  No.4  of  2015  was  thereafter  preferred  by  the   appellant
contending that the decretal amount  was  withdrawn  by  the  respondent  in
December 2012 whereas the appeal was allowed in favour of the  appellant  on
24.4.2015 and that the  respondent  had  reaped  the  benefits  of  decretal
amount for more than three  years.   It  was  submitted  that  the  Arbitral
Tribunal had awarded interest @ 12% per  annum  against  the  appellant  and
that the respondent be directed to pay interest  @  12%  per  annum  on  the
amount of Rs.70,65,039/- from the  date  of  withdrawal  till  the  date  of
actual payment.



4.    The  appellant is right in its submission that the  Arbitral  Tribunal
in its award dated 09.01.2012 had awarded interest at the rate  of  12%  per
annum on amounts  awarded under various claims. Matter  in  issue  in  Civil
Appeal No.6158 of 2013 pertained only to  Claim  No.8.  In  the  fitness  of
things, the appellant is certainly entitled to interest at the same rate  on
the amount which was enjoyed by  the  respondent.  The  entitlement  of  the
respondent to  this  amount  stood  negated  by  judgment  and  order  dated
24.04.2015 and as  such  the  respondent  must  pay  back  the  amount  with
interest at the same rate.



 We therefore,  direct that the respondent shall pay interest  at  the  rate
of 12% per annum on the amount in question namely  Rs.70,65,039/-  from  the
date of withdrawal till the amount was made over by the  respondent  to  the
appellant.  Such  payment  shall  be  made  within  six  weeks  from  today.
Interlocutory Application Nos.4 and 5 stand disposed of accordingly.



                                 ……………………….J
                                                    (Dipak Misra)


                                ..………………………J.
                                        (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi
January 19, 2016
ITEM NO.1A-For Order          COURT NO.10             SECTION XIV

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

I.A. 4 & 5 in Civil Appeal  No(s).  6158/2013

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA               Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

M/S NCC KNR JV                                     Respondent(s)


Date : 19/01/2016 These applications were called on for pronouncement of
ORDER today.

For Appellant(s)  Mr. T.S. Sidhu, Adv.
                        Ms. Gunjan S. Jain, Adv.
                        Mr. Vivek Oriel, Adv.
                        Mr. Vikas Soni, Adv.
                     For M/s. M. V. Kini & Associates

For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. R. Sathish,Adv.

      Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh  Lalit  pronounced  the  order  of  the
Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra and His Lordship.
      I.A. Nos. 4 and 5  are  disposed  of  in  terms  of  the  signed  non-
reportable order.
      Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
|(VINOD KUMAR)                          | |(MALA KUMARI SHARMA)                  |
|COURT MASTER                           | |COURT MASTER                          |

   (Signed Non-Reportable order is placed on the file)

quashed the notifications dated 08.10.2003 and 07.05.2004 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, respectively, by the State of Haryana regarding acquisition of land measuring 129 kanals 14 marlas in village Lakarpur, District Faridabad. The High Court has further quashed the Award dated 05.05.2006, passed by respondent No. 4 in respect of land owned by respondent No. 1 Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd., which was acquired through the above mentioned notifications.= “Salus Populi est suprema lex: regard for the public welfare is the higher law.” This principle is based on the implied agreement of every member of society that his own individual welfare shall in cases of necessity yield to that of community. His property, liberty and life shall under certain circumstances be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good.”=We are of the view that the High Court is incorrect in holding that the State has not acted bonafide, after 1992 acquisition proceedings were dropped. It is apparent from the record that earlier proceedings were dropped in the light of orders passed in M.C. Mehta’s Case in the year 1996, restraining construction in the area, and after modification in the said order in the year 1998, the State took fresh decision to acquire the land for public purpose and there is no illegality in the same.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.354 OF 2016
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7553 of 2008)


State of Haryana                             … Appellant

                                   Versus

Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd. and others          …Respondents

                                  WITH

                 CIVIL APPEAL NO.355 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27588 of 2008)






                               J U D G M E N T




Prafulla C. Pant, J.


      Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.

These appeals are directed against  judgment  and  order  dated  21.01.2008,
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil  Writ  Petition  No.
10611 of 2004  whereby  said  Court  has  quashed  the  notifications  dated
08.10.2003  and   07.05.2004  issued  under  Sections  4  and  6   of   Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, respectively,  by  the  State  of  Haryana  regarding
acquisition of land measuring 129 kanals  14  marlas  in  village  Lakarpur,
District Faridabad.  The High Court has  further  quashed  the  Award  dated
05.05.2006, passed  by  respondent  No.  4  in  respect  of  land  owned  by
respondent No. 1 Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd., which was acquired  through
the above mentioned notifications.

Succinctly stated total area of 172 kanals 19  marlas  situated  in  village
Lakharpur Tehsil  Ballabgarh  in  District  Faridabad  was  proposed  to  be
acquired by the State  of  Haryana  through  notification  dated  08.10.2003
issued under Section 4 of Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  out  of  which  129
kanals 14 marlas (for short subject land) belonged to respondent  no.1  M/s.
Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd.  The details of the  persons  whose  land  is
acquired is as under:

|S.   |Name of owner      |Total Area  |Status                       |
|No.  |                   |            |                             |
|1.   |Shri Sekher        |6 kanal     |Compensation paid. Possession|
|     |S/o Shri Roshan Lal|2 ½ marla   |taken over.                  |
|2.   |Shri Sissar S/o    |6 kanal     |Compensation paid. Possession|
|     |Shri Roshan Lal    |2 ½ marla   |taken over.                  |
|3.   |M/s. Eros City     |129 kanal   |Compensation deposited before|
|     |Developers Pvt.    |14 marla    |the Land Acquisition         |
|     |Ltd.(Respondent    |            |Collector. Acquisition       |
|     |No.1 herein)       |            |quashed vide impugned        |
|     |                   |            |judgment.                    |
|4.   |Shri Vikram Bakshi |25 kanal    |C.W.P. No. 1510 of 2005      |
|     |S/o Shri DN Bakshi |2 marla     |pending before the High      |
|     |                   |            |Court.  Status quo with      |
|     |                   |            |regard to the possession of  |
|     |                   |            |the land ordered during the  |
|     |                   |            |pendency of the writ petition|
|     |                   |            |vide order dated 22.5.2006.  |
|     |                   |            |Compensation deposited before|
|     |                   |            |the Land Acquisition         |
|     |                   |            |Collector.                   |
|5.   |M/s. Faridabad     |2 kanal     |Compensation paid. Possession|
|     |Compex             |18 marla    |taken over.                  |

The subject land was stated  to  have  been  acquired  for  the  purpose  of
expansion and systematic development  of  Surajkund  Tourist  Complex  which
included development of parking  area  adjacent  to  the  Surajkund  Tourist
Complex near annual Surajkund Fair.

Admittedly, earlier in 1992 an attempt was made to  acquire  the  same  land
but the acquisition proceedings were dropped after this court  passed  order
dated 10.05.1996 in WP  (C)  No.  4677  of  1985  i.e.,  M.C.  Mehta’s  case
restraining the constructions in the area.   Meanwhile  in  1993  contesting
respondent appears to have purchased the land indicated  above.   It  is  in
1998, the order dated 10.05.1996 said to have been modified,  and  Municipal
Corporation Faridabad and the State Government  were  directed  to  consider
the plan of hotel project submitted by the respondent No.1.

Learned counsel for the appellant  State  submitted  that  annual  Surajkund
Mela, is held every year in February in Faridabad District, and  has  become
a regular feature of  international  fame.   As  such,  there  was  need  to
develop Surajkund Tourist Complex by acquiring land adjoining  to  Surajkund
Mela ground in Faridabad.  It is  also  pointed  out  that  significance  of
Surajkund fair was noticed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 4677 of 1985  (M.C.
Mehta vs. Union of India and ors.) wherein effective directions were  issued
in the year 1996 to protect and maintain the  sanctity  of  the  area.   The
acquisition of subject-land is thus not only in public interest but also  to
maintain the integral development of the Surajkund Complex in a unified  and
planned manner.  It is  contended  that  while  quashing  the  notifications
mentioned above, the High Court has erred  in  not  considering  the  public
interest and public purpose over private  interest  of  the  respondent/writ
petitioner, a private colonizer.  The impugned  order  passed  by  the  High
Court has been assailed by the  appellant,  also  on  the  ground  that  the
equity doctrines of promissory  estoppel  and  legitimate  expectation  were
wrongly applied by the High Court in favour of  respondent  No.  1.   It  is
stated that before issuance of notification under  Section  6  of  the  Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) objections filed  on  behalf  of
respondent No. 1 under Section 5A of the Act were  duly  considered  by  the
authority concerned, and there was no illegality in the acquisition.

On the other hand, on behalf of respondent No. 1, Shri  Shyam  Divan  Senior
Counsel contended that Government of  Haryana  which  earlier  attempted  to
acquire the same land in the  year  1992,  itself  dropped  the  acquisition
proceedings as such  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  land  in  question  is
genuinely required for any public purpose.  The  contesting  respondent  has
pleaded that the land in question was purchased by it in the year 1993  with
the object to construct a hotel complex of international  standard.  In  the
counter affidavit, it is  stated  that  the  answering  respondent  got  the
permission for change of land use and submitted the plan for  sanction  from
the Municipal Corporation.  It also obtained permission  from  Public  Works
Department for  construction  of  approach  road  to  the  land.   Even  the
Director, Tourism, Government of Haryana,  had  accorded  approval  for  the
hotel project of respondent No. 1.  However, the  answering  respondent  was
prevented from  raising  construction  due  to  the  restraint  order  dated
10.5.1996, passed by this Court in M.C. Mehta’s case (in W.P. (C)  No.  4677
of 1985).  Said order was modified on 13.05.1998.  On application  filed  by
the answering respondent, vide order dated 12.10.1998, this  Court  directed
the Municipal Corporation, Faridabad, and State Government to accept  option
plan A with regard to hotel project (ground plus four floors), submitted  by
it.  It is submitted that  there  was  malice  on  the  part  of  the  State
Government in acquiring the land in question through the notification  dated
08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of the  Act.   It  is  also  pleaded  that
there were overwhelming circumstances in favour of the answering  respondent
to  invoke  doctrine  of  promissory  estoppel,  and  that   of   legitimate
expectation.  In this connection, it  is  pointed  out  that  permission  of
change of land use was also granted in favour of the  answering  respondent.
Lastly, it is  submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  rightly  quashed  the
notifications issued by the State Government for  acquisition  of  the  land
owned by the answering respondent.

 In reply to this, on behalf of the State of Haryana, it is  submitted  that
since the construction did not start within six  months  as  required  under
the terms of order by which permission for change of land  use  was  granted
as such merely for  the  reason  that  permission  to  change  of  land  use
granted, the acquisition cannot be  questioned.   It  is  further  submitted
that the acquisition proceedings have been  upheld  by  the  High  Court  in
Civil Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2005 filed by Vikram Bakshi, who  was  owner
of another piece of land acquired  by  same  notification  dated  08.10.2003
issued under Section 4 of  the  Act  read  with  consequential  notification
issued under Section 6 of the Act.

We have also gone through the copy of order dated 07.07.2010 passed  by  the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Civil  Writ  Petition  No.  1510  of  2005
filed by Vikram  Bakshi,  said  writ  petition  was  filed  challenging  the
notification dated 08.10.2003 issued under Section  4  of  Land  Acquisition
Act, 1894, and the consequential notification issued under Section 6 of  the
Act.  The land for which acquisition sought to be quashed by  Vikram  Bakshi
relates to 32 kanal of land comprising of rectangle no. 40 khasra  Nos.  14,
17/1, 17/2, 18/1, 23/1, and  24/1 of Village  Lakharpur  Tehsil  Ballabhgarh
District Faridabad. In said petition also,  public  purpose  i.e.  expansion
and systematic development of Surajkund Tourist Complex was questioned,  and
issue relating to consideration of objections filed under  Section  5-A  was
raised.  The High Court after considering the rival  submissions  and  going
through the record opined that there was no illegality  in  the  acquisition
and dismissed the Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2005 on 07.07.2010.

In Sooraram Pratap Reddy and Others  vs.  District  Collector,  Ranga  Reddy
District and others (2008) 9 SCC 552, this Court has held that  the  project
for which land is acquired should be taken as a whole  and  must  be  judged
whether it is in the larger  public  interest.   It  cannot  be  split  into
different components and to consider whether each and every  component  will
serve public good.  A holistic approach has to be adopted in  such  matters.
This Court further observed in said case that development of  infrastructure
is legal and legitimate public  purpose  for  exercising  power  of  eminent
domain.  In deciding whether acquisition is for  “public  purpose”  or  not,
prima facie, the Government is the best judge.   Although  the  decision  of
the Government is not beyond judicial scrutiny, normally, in such matters  a
writ court should  not  interfere  by  substituting  its  judgment  for  the
judgment of the Government.  In Sooraram Pratap Reddy  (supra),  this  Court
has further explained that the meaning of  expression  “public  purpose”  is
wider than that of “public necessity”.

Clause (f) of Rule 26-D of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and  Controlled  Areas
Restriction of Unregulated Development Rules, 1965 (for short “1965  Rules”)
requires the applicant seeking  change  of  land  use  for  construction  to
undertake to start construction on the land within a period  of  six  months
and complete the construction within a period of two years from the date  of
order permitting the change of land use. It  appears  that  no  construction
was done in terms of Clause (f) of Rule 26-D of 1965 Rules on  the  land  in
question, for which acquisition is quashed by the impugned order.

In State of Haryana and Others vs. Vinod Oil and General Mills  and  Another
(2014) 15 SCC 410, this Court has held that permission for  change  of  land
use has no relevance while considering the validity of  acquisition.  It  is
further observed in said case  that  there  is  no  bar  to  the  subsequent
acquisition  of  a  land,  after  the  land  was   released   from   earlier
acquisition.

In A.P. Pollution Control Board  II  vs.  M.V.  Nayudu  (Retd.)  and  Others
(2001) 2 SCC 62, this Court has observed in para 69 as under:

“69. The learned Appellate Authority erred in thinking that because  of  the
approval of plan by  the  Panchayat,  or  conversion  of  land  use  by  the
Collector or grant of letter of intent by the  Central  Government,  a  case
for applying principle of “promissory estoppel”  applied  to  the  facts  of
this case. There could be no estoppel against the statute…...”

As far as the argument advanced on behalf of  the  respondent   relating  to
the promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation is concerned,  in  Monnet
Ispat and Energy Limited vs. Union of India and  Others  (2012)  11  SCC  1,
this  Court  while  enumerating  the  principles  relating  to  doctrine  of
promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation has  clearly  held  that  the
protection of legitimate expectation does not  require  the  fulfillment  of
the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise.   In
other words, personal benefit must give  way  to  public  interest  and  the
doctrine of legitimate expectation  cannot  be  invoked  which  would  block
public interest for private benefit.
 In Hira Tikkoo vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh  and  Others  (2004)  6  SCC
765, this Court explaining the scope of principle of legitimate  expectation
has held that the doctrine cannot be pressed into service where  the  public
interest is likely to suffer as against the personal interest  of  a  party.
In paragraph 22 this Court has observed as under:
“22. In public law in certain situations, relief to  the  parties  aggrieved
by action or promises of public authorities can be granted on  the  doctrine
of “legitimate expectation” but when grant of such relief is likely to  harm
larger public interest, the doctrine cannot be allowed to  be  pressed  into
service. We may usefully call in aid the  legal  maxim:  “Salus  Populi  est
suprema lex: regard  for  the  public  welfare  is  the  higher  law.”  This
principle is based on the implied agreement of every member of society  that
his own individual welfare shall in cases of  necessity  yield  to  that  of
community. His property, liberty and life shall under certain  circumstances
be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good.”

  In view of the principle of law laid down by this Court as above,  in  our
opinion the High Court has erred in quashing  the  acquisition  of  land  in
question,  by  applying  doctrine  of  promissory  estoppel  and  legitimate
expectation, in the facts of the present case.  We  have  no  hesitation  in
holding that the purpose i.e. for expansion and  systematic  development  of
Surajkund Tourist Complex, is a public purpose. It included  development  of
parking area adjacent to Surajkund Tourist  Complex  near  annual  Surajkund
Fair. We are of the view that the High Court is incorrect  in  holding  that
the State has not acted bonafide, after 1992  acquisition  proceedings  were
dropped. It is apparent  from  the  record  that  earlier  proceedings  were
dropped in the light of orders passed in  M.C.  Mehta’s  Case  in  the  year
1996, restraining construction in the area, and after  modification  in  the
said order in the year 1998, the State took fresh decision  to  acquire  the
land for public purpose and there is no illegality in the same.

Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed and impugned  judgment  and  order
dated 21.01.2008 passed by the High Court in CWP No.10611 of  2004,  is  set
aside. No order as to costs.

………………………….J
(Ranjan Gogoi)

………………………..J
(Prafulla C. Pant)
New Delhi
Dated: January 19, 2016