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Wednesday, January 20, 2016

“The Lives of Sri Aurobindo”, a sacrilegious book =The sum and substance of the grievance of the respondents is really two-fold: firstly, the appellants failed to take any positive action to prohibit the availability of the objectionable book or dissociate themselves from the objectionable book; secondly, instead of taking some coercive action against Peter Heehs (such as removing him from the Ashram) the appellants assisted him in getting a visa for his continued stay in India by standing guarantee for him. 30. In our opinion, the second grievance would arise only if there is substance in the first grievance, namely, that the appellants failed to take proactive measures to have the objectionable book proscribed and that they failed to dissociate themselves from the contents of the book. This really begs the question whether the objectionable book ought at all to be proscribed or its sale prohibited. As we have seen above, the matter is very much alive before the Orissa High Court and it is for that Court to take a final call on the legality or otherwise of the action taken by the concerned authorities in the State in prohibiting the availability of the objectionable book. Until that decision is taken by the High Court, it would be premature to hold that the book is objectionable enough as not to be made available to readers. 31. In Swami Paramatmanand Saraswati it was held by this Court (relying upon several earlier decisions) that it is only the allegations made in the plaint that ought to be looked into in the first instance to determine whether the suit filed lies within the ambit of Section 92 of the CPC. It was also held that if the allegations in the plaint indicate that the suit has been filed to remedy the infringement of a private right or to vindicate a private right, then the suit would not fall within the ambit of Section 92 of the CPC. Finally, it was also held that in deciding whether the suit falls within the ambit of Section 92 of the CPC, the Court must consider the purpose for which the suit was filed. This view was reiterated in Vidyodaya Trust. 32. Considering the purpose of the suit filed by the respondents, it is quite clear that it was to highlight the failure of the appellants to take action against the availability of the objectionable book and against the author. As we have noted above, the issue whether the book is objectionable or not, whether it deserves to be proscribed or not, whether it violates the provisions of Section 153-A or Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code has yet to be determined by the Orissa High Court. Until that determination is made, it would be premature to expect the appellants to take any precipitate action in the matter against the author. 33. The best that the appellants could have done under the circumstances was to make it clear whether they have anything to do with the objectionable book or not. The High Court has noted quite explicitly that the appellants have not sponsored the book nor was it published under the aegis of the Aurobindo Ashram. The appellants have also, it may be recalled, expressed displeasure with the contents of the objectionable book through the communication of 11th November, 2008. This being the position, we are of the opinion that the appellants have done what could reasonably be expected of them in relation to the objectionable book, pending a determination by the Orissa High Court. 34. The High Court has effectively faulted the appellants for not making the first strike to secure a ban on the objectionable book. This is really a question of the degree of reaction to the objectionable book on which we would not like to comment. The appellants could have expressed their displeasure over the contents of the objectionable book, or dissociated themselves from the objectionable book or even taken proactive steps to have the objectionable book banned or proscribed. That the appellants chose only to express their displeasure may be construed as a mild reaction (as compared to outright condemnation of the objectionable book), particularly since the appellants had nothing to do with its publication. But the question is whether the mild reaction is perverse or could in any way be held to be a breach of trust or an absence of effective administration of the Trust warranting the removal of the trustees. We do not think so. Failure to take steps to ban a book that is critical of the philosophical and spiritual guru of a Trust would not fall within the compass of administration of the Trust. It might be an omission of the exercise of proper discretion on the part of the trustees, but certainly not an omission touching upon the administration of the Trust. We are not in agreement with the High Court that the failure of the appellants to take the initiative in banning the objectionable book gives rise to a cause of action for the removal of the trustees of the Trust and settling a scheme for its administration. The trustees of a trust are entitled to a wide discretion in the administration of a trust. A disagreement with the exercise of the discretion (however passionate the disagreement might be) does not necessarily lead to a conclusion of maladministration, unless the exercise of discretion is perverse. In our opinion, the High Court ought to have allowed the application filed by the appellants for the revocation of leave granted to the respondents to initiate proceedings under Section 92 of the CPC, in the facts of this case. 35. We were invited to express a view on the constitutional freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. It is not at all necessary for us to do so. The Orissa High Court might be called upon to do so, depending on the views of the contesting parties, one of whom we were told, is the author of the objectionable book. We express no opinion on the issue and leave the matter at that. 36. This being our conclusion with regard to the first grievance of the respondents, their second grievance is rather premature. It would arise only if and when appropriate directions are issued by the Orissa High Court in the pending litigation. Conclusion 37. We find merit in the appeal and accordingly set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and allow the application filed by the appellants for revocation of leave. The parties are left to bear their own costs and once again consider an amicable settlement of their dispute.


                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDCITON

                    CIVIL APPEAL NO.    12       OF 2016
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 25788 of 2013)

Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust and Ors.
 …Appellants
                                   Versus
R. Ramanathan and Ors.
...Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T

Madan B. Lokur, J.


1.    Leave granted.
2.    The dispute that has arisen in this appeal is one that could have  and
ought to have been settled  in  the  first  instance  in  the  Trial  Court.
Unfortunately, the feelings (if not the animosity) between the parties  have
run so high that any meaningful discussion between  them  to  sort  out  the
pending issues has been  ruled  out.  When  feelings  are  strong  (and  get
further hardened over time) and  tempers  are  high,  there  is  a  loss  of
balance and equilibrium. It is unfortunate  that  this  state  of  mind  has
persisted with both parties  who  are  well  educated  and  perhaps  have  a
philosophical and spiritual bent of mind, being trustees  and  residents  of
the Sri Aurobindo Ashram in Pondicherry and followers of Sri Aurobindo.
3.    On our part, we attempted to amicably sort  out  the  problem  between
the  parties,  but  one  of  them  refused  to  appreciate  the  meaning  of
‘dissociation’ while the other expressed the  view  that  mere  dissociation
was not enough and there must be condemnation! At the end  of  the  day,  we
felt that each party wanted to score a brownie point over the other,  little
realizing that while they would be left with some ephemeral brownie  points,
the brownies (and the cream) would be shared by somebody  else.  In  another
decision altogether, this Court had occasion to remark  that  public  trusts
for charitable and religious purpose are run for the benefit of the  public.
No individual should take benefit from them. If the  persons  in  management
of the trusts are subjected to  multiplicity  of  legal  proceedings,  funds
which are to be used for charitable or religious purposes  would  be  wasted
on litigation.[1] How true.
4.    It is time for all of us, litigants, lawyers and judges to  introspect
and decide whether a litigation being pursued is really worth the while  and
alternatively whether an amicable  dispute  resolution  mechanism  could  be
availed of to settle the dispute to the satisfaction of the litigants.  Most
problems have a positive solution and a concerted effort  must  be  made  by
all concerned to find that solution of  least  resistance  to  the  problem.
This is not only in the interest of the parties involved  but  also  in  the
larger interest of the justice delivery system.
The facts

5.    The respondents are residents of or are otherwise concerned  with  the
Sri Aurobindo Ashram in Pondicherry. They filed a civil suit being O.S.  No.
15/2010[2] before the District Judge, Pondicherry under  the  provisions  of
Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred  to  as  the
‘CPC’).[3]  It was prayed therein  that  appellants  2  to  6  who  are  the
trustees in the Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust (appellant No. 1 and  hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Trust’) be removed and new trustees be  appointed  since
these appellants have  failed  the  philosophy  of  Sri  Aurobindo  and  the
Mother.   A  prayer  was  also  made  for  settling   a   scheme   for   the
administration of the Trust.
Plaint filed by the respondents
6.    The averments made in the plaint principally pertain to a book  titled
“The Lives of Sri Aurobindo” written by one Peter Heehs  and  the  fall  out
thereafter.  The book purports to be a biography of Sri  Aurobindo  and  was
published in May 2008 by Columbia University Press  in  the  United  States.
For convenience, and for no other reason, this book  is  hereafter  referred
to as the book or the objectionable book.
7.    The respondents summarized their grievances  in  paragraph  2  of  the
plaint and the relevant portion thereof reads as follows:-
“The plaintiffs who represent the interest of the  community  of  followers,
devotees and disciples of Sri Aurobindo (for whose  benefit  the  Trust  was
created) are constrained to file the present suit, inter  alia  seeking  the
removal of the present Trustees when the Trustees acted in bad faith and  in
breach  of  their  obligations  as  trustees.   Instead  of  promoting   Sri
Aurobindo’s tenets  and  philosophy,  the  Trustees  have  and  continue  to
harbor, defend and  openly  extend  support  to  one  Mr.  Peter  Heehs  who
authored “The Lives of Sri Aurobindo”, a  sacrilegious  book  which  falsely
portrays Sri Aurobindo as a liar  and  a  mentally  imbalanced  person,  and
ridiculing his spiritual encounters and experiences as  an  outcome  of  Sri
Aurobindo’s tantric sexual indulgence and schizophrenic state of mind.   The
fact that such an offensive and venomous book was  authored  by  none  other
than one of the Ashram’s  own  members,  sent  shock  waves  throughout  the
community of thousands of devotees and disciples’ of Sri Aurobindo.   Masses
of devotees appealed to the Trustees to publicly condemn the content of  the
book and to clarify that the  book  was  not  an  official  publication/work
supported by the Trust, and further to seek the  expulsion  of  Peter  Heehs
from the Ashram.  Instead of publicly dissociating itself from  Peter  Heehs
and his book, the Trustees in absolute breach of trust, have  for  over  two
years harbored Peter Heehs within the Ashram itself and gone to  the  extent
of standing as a financial guarantor for Peter Heehs’ conduct for  his  visa
renewals.  Despite mass public outcries to the Trustees to
expel Peter Heehs.

condemn and dissociate the Trust from the sacrilegious work

stop the circulation of the book so as to protect  the  future  interest  of
the trust

The Trustees, in pursuit of some hidden agenda, chose to protect and  render
support to that very individual who has maliciously disparaged, debased  and
brought disrepute to Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy and the ashram community  at
large.  The Trustees have repeatedly disobeyed and  declined  to  carry  out
the directions of the Settler of the Trust, failed to execute the  trust  in
accordance  with  its  object  of  Trust  and  have  thus  acted  in   gross
dereliction of their duty as trustees.  The repeated conduct and failure  of
the Trustees has proven  that  the  Trustees  are  unfit  and  incapable  of
administrating the trust in conformity with the  ideals  of  Sri  Aurobindo.
Thus it is in the interest of the trust and its beneficiaries to remove  the
existing trustees and consequently appoint new trustees having faith in  Sri
Aurobindo’s philosophy and ideals and who are capable of  administering  the
trust and protecting its interest in accordance with its objects.”


8.    More specifically, it was stated that  the  book  contains  deliberate
and baseless distortions relating to the life of Sri Aurobindo, inter  alia,
to the effect that he had romantic affairs with the Mother involving  veiled
tantric sexual practices; that he was a frequent liar  and  lied  about  his
spiritual experiences; that his spiritual experiences were based  on  sexual
and schizophrenic stimuli and that he was the initiator of the  Hindu-Muslim
divide and was responsible for the partition of the country.
9.    It was stated that Peter Heehs claimed to be one of  the  founders  of
the archives of the Sri Aurobindo Ashram whereas the sole  founder  was  one
Jayanthilal Parekh and that this impersonation was mala fide  and  malicious
to lend credibility to his book.
10.    In  sum  and  substance,  according  to  the  respondents  what   was
outrageous and intolerable, as far as they and other  devotees  and  inmates
of Sri Aurobindo Ashram are concerned, was:
“a)   That the author of the deeply offensive  book  against  Sri  Aurobindo
was none other than one of the ashramites;
b)    That an individual who had been allowed to  reside,  use  and  benefit
from the  facilities  and  resources  of  the  Ashram  to  pursue  spiritual
enlightenment through Sri  Aurobindo’s  philosophy  had  instead  flagrantly
misused the Ashram’s name and its resources to launch a  disparaging  attack
on the soul and foundations of the Ashram, its faith, tenets and beliefs;



c)    That Peter Heehs, the author has intentionally tried  to  mislead  the
public  to  believe  that  the  sacrilegious  work  has  been  published  in
consultation/affiliation with the Ashram by audaciously claiming that he  is
one of the “founders of the Ashram Archives” in  a  clear  attempt  to  give
credibility to the source and foundation of a book.



d)    That the book was made possible by extensively misusing  the  Ashram’s
own research database and resources to  which  Peter  Heehs  had  privileged
access, and which has been gathered and  developed  over  40  years  by  the
Ashram’s inmates, devotees and researchers, and includes rare  materials  of
great historical value.  This database which is  intended  to  document  the
greatness of Sri Aurobindo’s life and work was misused  by  Peter  Heehs  to
misrepresent Sri Aurobindo in bad light.



e)    Work done by large teams of dedicated inmates of the  Ashram  over  40
years was claimed by Peter Heehs to be his  own  personal  research  in  the
book.



f)    Some of the rare materials published by Peter Heehs in his  book  were
without proper permission of the Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust.”



11.   In view  of  the  above,  the  respondents  and  others  made  several
petitions to the appellants  including  on  20th  September,  2008  and  2nd
October, 2008 but the appellants did not take any remedial action either  in
respect of the objectionable book or in  respect  of  Peter  Heehs.  It  was
stated that one Pranab Bhattacharya, the  Head  of  the  Physical  Education
Department had expelled Peter Heehs from the Physical  Education  Department
of the Ashram on 30th October, 2008.  The  expulsion  notice  was  displayed
prominently on the notice board but in spite of such and other actions,  the
appellants failed to take any appropriate corrective measures.
12.   It was stated in the plaint that through a communication made on  11th
November, 2008 the Trust expressed and admitted  its  displeasure  with  the
contents of the book written by Peter Heehs and  claimed  that  disciplinary
action had been initiated against him.  It was clarified  that  Peter  Heehs
was not the founder of the archives of the  Ashram  but  Jayanthilal  Parekh
was its founder.  However, this  does  not  appear  to  have  satisfied  the
respondents.
13.   Quite independent  of  the  actions  taken  within  the  Ashram,  some
devotees of  Sri  Aurobindo  took  other  proactive  measures  to  stop  the
circulation of the objectionable book. This eventually  led  the  Government
of Orissa to order forfeiture of the book under Section 95 of  the  Criminal
Procedure Code[4] for being a work punishable  under Section  295-A  of  the
Indian Penal Code.[5]
14.   The forfeiture process was initiated by one of  the  devotees  of  Sri
Aurobindo who filed a writ petition in the Orissa High Court being W.P.  No.
15939 of 2008 to prohibit the printing, publication and distribution of  the
objectionable book.  This led the Orissa High Court to pass an order on  4th
November, 2008 requiring the petitioner therein to make a representation  to
the Government of India which in turn was required to pass an order  on  the
representation. The petitioner did make a representation and the  Government
of India passed an order in December, 2008 directing  the  State  Government
of Delhi and the Union  Government  in  Pondicherry  to  ensure  that  there
should be no publication of the objectionable book without  obtaining  a  no
objection from the Government of India.
15.   The Government of Orissa also independently examined  the  matter  and
on 9th April, 2009 a Gazette Notification was issued in which  grounds  were
given to conclude that the objectionable book contained matters  which  were
deliberately and maliciously intended to insult  the  religious  beliefs  of
the  devotees  of  Sri  Aurobindo  thereby  affecting   public   peace   and
tranquility making the publication of  the  objectionable  book  an  offence
punishable under Sections 295-A and  153-A  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code.[6]
Therefore, every copy of  the  objectionable  book,  its  copies,  reprints,
translations or other documents  containing  extracts  taken  therefrom  was
forfeited to the Government.
16.   The relevant extract of the  Gazette  Notification  dated  9th  April,
2009 reads as follows:
S.R.O.NO.127/2009 – Where as on a careful consideration of materials  placed
on record, it appears to the State Government that the book titled  as  ‘The
Lives of Sri Aurobindo” written by Peter Heehs  and  published  by  Columbia
University Press, New York, U.S.A. contain objectionable  matters  depicting
distorted facts about  the   life  and  character  of  Sri  Aurobindo.   And
whereas the State Government, on the following grounds, is  of  the  opinion
that the said book contains matters which are deliberately  and  maliciously
intended to insult religious beliefs of millions of Indians who idolize  Sri
Aurobindo as a  National  Hero  and  incarnation  of  “Almighty”  and  which
promotes communal disaffection affecting public peace  and  tranquility  the
publication of which is punishable under  sections  295A  and  153A  of  the
Indian Penal Code,1860  (45 of 1860), namely –
(a) the book depicts wrong and distorted facts on the life and character  of
Sri Aurobindo, which is clearly blasphemous
(b)  the book contains absurd, irrelevant and self-made  stories,  which  do
not have any  scriptural  support  and  has  caused  widespread  indignation
amongst the devotees
(c) the writings portrayed in the book have seriously  hurt  the  sentiments
of the apostles of Sri Aurobindo and the  said  book,  with  deliberate  and
malicious intention has insulted the religious beliefs of millions;
(d)  the said book, inter  alia,  narrates  at  page  245  that  “but  those
familiar with the literature of psychiatry and clinical  psychiatry  may  be
struck by the similarity between Aurobindo’s powers and experiences and  the
symptoms of schizophrenia”;
(e)  it is mentioned at page 399 that “Early in  the  afternoon  the  Mother
rejoined him, and they walked together to the small outer  room  where  they
sat together on a sofa, the Mother on Sri  Aurobindo’s   right.   Here  they
remained for the next few hours as  ashramites  and  visitors  –  more  than
three thousand by the end of the 1940s -  passed before  them  one  by  one,
“There  is  no  suggestion  of  a  vulgar  jostle  anywhere  in  the  moving
procession,” a visitor noted.  “The mystic sits  bare-bodied  except  for  a
part of his dhoti thrown around his shoulders, A kindly light plays  in  his
eyes,” Sri Aurobindo looked directly  at  each  person  for  a  moment  “the
moving   visitor is conscious of a particular contact with these  [eyes]  as
he bends down to do his obeisance.  They leave upon him a mysterious  ‘feel’
that baffles description.  The contact, almost physical,  instills  a  faint
sense of a fragrance into his heart and he has a perception of a  glow  akin
to that  spreading  in  every  fibre  of  his  being.”   Most  visitors  had
similarly positive experiences. But some, particularly those from the  West,
were distracted by the theatricality of the setting and the  religiosity  of
the pageantry.”
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by  Sub-section  (l)  of
section 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of  1974),  the  State
Government do hereby declare that every copy of the book titled  “The  Lives
of Sri  Aurobindo”   written  by  Peter  Heehs  and  published  by  Columbia
University Press New York, U.S.A.  its  copies,  reprints,  translations  or
other documents containing extracts taken  therefrom  be  forfeited  to  the
Government.


17.   Notwithstanding the above coercive action taken by the  Government  of
Orissa and the Government of India, the appellants did not  take  any  steps
to expel Peter Heehs from the Ashram or to sever all ties of the Trust  with
him; no restatement was made by the Trust  disassociating  itself  from  the
objectionable book and no steps were taken by the  appellants  to  stop  the
publication of the book by  contacting  Columbia  University  Press  in  the
United States, while independent organizations such as Google, Flipkart  and
A1 Books made  the  objectionable  book  permanently  unavailable  on  their
websites and through sales channels in India.
18.   On the contrary, the appellants stood financial guarantee for  renewal
of Peter Heehs’ visa to stay in India. Notwithstanding  this,  the  devotees
of Sri Aurobindo and the residents of the Ashram continued to  persuade  the
appellants and addressed to them further letters dated 28th  May,  2010  and
2nd July, 2010 and several other letters.  The only  replies  received  from
the appellants were on 21st June, 2010 and 22nd  July,  2010  but  no  clear
stand was taken therein to redress the grievances  of  the  respondents.  It
was alleged in the plaint that these acts  of  omission  and  commission  by
appellants Nos. 2 to 6 was a clear indication  that  they  were  mismanaging
the affairs of the Trust and needed to be removed.
19.   Leave to sue was granted by the Trial Judge  to  the  respondents  and
summons was then issued in the civil suit to the  appellants  who  preferred
I.A. No. 494 of 2011 to revoke the  leave  granted.   This  application  was
dismissed by the Trial Judge by an order dated 6th October, 2012.
Order of the Trial Court
20.   The Trial Court was of the view that  where  leave  is  granted  under
Section 92 of the CPC without notice to the defendants in  the  suit,  those
defendants would have a right to apply for revocation  of  leave.   However,
since leave was granted to the respondents in the present case after  giving
full opportunity to the appellants to put forth their case, the question  of
revocation would arise only after evidence is  led  in  the  matter  and  on
final determination of the suit.
21.   The Trial Court rejected the contention of  the  appellants  that  the
documents referred to and relied upon by the respondents were fabricated  on
the ground that this could be adjudicated only after  oral  and  documentary
evidence was led on both sides in a full-fledged trial.  It was  also  noted
that several impleadment applications were  filed  in  the  suit  for  being
heard in the matter.  Therefore if leave is revoked, those applicants  would
lose their right and the real truth would not come out.
22.   Based on the above reasoning the Trial Judge rejected the  application
to revoke the leave granted to the respondents.
23.   Feeling aggrieved, the appellants preferred a civil revision  petition
being C.R.P. (P.D.) No. 4357 of 2012 which  came  to  be  dismissed  by  the
impugned judgment and order  dated  2nd  April,  2013  by  the  Madras  High
Court.[7]
Decision of the High Court
24.   The High Court took the view that the main allegation  in  the  plaint
is with regard to the objectionable book written  by  Peter  Heehs  who  was
allowed to reside in the Ashram and allowed access to the  archives  of  the
Ashram.
25.   The High Court took into consideration  the  law  laid  down  by  this
Court in Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati v.  Ramji  Tripathi[8]  to  hold  that
only the allegations in the plaint  should  be  looked  into  in  the  first
instance to determine whether  the  suit  filed  by  the  respondents  falls
within the scope and ambit of Section 92 of the CPC.  However, reliance  was
also placed on Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R & Ors.[9] to hold that  the
Court should go beyond the relief prayed for  and  focus  on  the  basis  on
which the suit was filed and whether it was for vindicating  public  rights.
Taking the law into consideration as well  as  the  averments  made  in  the
plaint, the High Court held as follows:
“According to me, for the purpose of deciding the  issue  involved  in  this
revision, there is no necessity to go into the veracity of the  contents  of
the book.  Admittedly, the plaintiffs have not filed the copy  of  the  book
and it is their allegation that the book has not  been  published  in  India
and it will be available for  access  only  through  the  Internet.   In  my
opinion, in the absence of producing the book before this court, it  is  not
possible to comment on the statements made in the book about Sri  Aurobindo.
 Even assuming that in the said book, derogatory remarks  are  made  against
Sri Aurobindo and his relationship with  the  Mother,  in  my  opinion,  the
revision petitioners cannot be held responsible for the same as  admittedly,
the revision petitioners have not sponsored the book nor published the  book
under the aegis of Aurobindo Ashram.  The only allegation made  against  the
revision petitioners is that they have not taken any steps to remove such  a
person from the Ashram.  According to me, such inaction on the part  of  the
revision petitioners cannot be brought into the caption of breach of  trust.
Nevertheless, having regard to the scope of section 92 of the Code of  Civil
Procedure and as per the law laid down by the Honourable  Supreme  Court  in
Vidyodaya Trust case, the court has to go beyond the  relief  and  focus  on
the basis for which the suit was filed to find out whether  a  suit  can  be
entertained under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”


26.   Thereafter, the High Court held that since the Ashram had  nothing  to
do with the publication of the objectionable book by one of its  inmates  it
could not be held that there is a breach of  trust.  However  (and  this  is
important) the High Court concluded that since the appellants had not  taken
any action to secure the ban of  the  objectionable  book  or  to  take  any
action against Peter Heehs, the respondents had made out  a  case  to  bring
the suit within the ambit of Section 92 of the CPC and therefore  the  Trial
Court was right in rejecting the application to revoke leave.  It  was  also
held that  under  these  circumstances,  the  respondents  had  no  personal
interest in the matter and the suit was not filed by them to  vindicate  any
personal interest.  Consequently, they had the necessary  locus  to  file  a
suit under Section 92 of the CPC.
27.   The High Court also held, reversing the Trial Court  in  this  regard,
that merely because leave had been granted after hearing the appellants,  it
would not be a ground to deny to them the right to file an  application  for
revocation of leave.
28.   On the above basis, the High Court rejected the revision petition  and
it is under these  circumstances  that  the  rejection  is  under  challenge
before us.
Discussion and findings
29.   The sum and substance of the grievance of the  respondents  is  really
two-fold: firstly, the appellants failed to  take  any  positive  action  to
prohibit  the  availability  of  the  objectionable   book   or   dissociate
themselves from the objectionable book; secondly,  instead  of  taking  some
coercive action against Peter Heehs (such as removing him from  the  Ashram)
the appellants assisted him in getting a visa  for  his  continued  stay  in
India by standing guarantee for him.
30.   In our opinion, the second grievance would  arise  only  if  there  is
substance in the first grievance, namely,  that  the  appellants  failed  to
take proactive measures to have the objectionable book proscribed  and  that
they failed to dissociate themselves from the contents  of  the  book.  This
really begs the question whether the objectionable book ought at all  to  be
proscribed or its sale prohibited. As we have  seen  above,  the  matter  is
very much alive before the Orissa High Court and it is  for  that  Court  to
take a final call on the legality or otherwise of the action  taken  by  the
concerned authorities in the State in prohibiting the  availability  of  the
objectionable book. Until that decision is  taken  by  the  High  Court,  it
would be premature to hold that the book is objectionable enough as  not  to
be made available to readers.
31.   In Swami Paramatmanand Saraswati it was held by  this  Court  (relying
upon several earlier decisions) that it is only the allegations made in  the
plaint that ought to be looked into  in  the  first  instance  to  determine
whether the suit filed lies within the ambit of Section 92 of  the  CPC.  It
was also held that if the allegations in the plaint indicate that  the  suit
has been filed  to  remedy  the  infringement  of  a  private  right  or  to
vindicate a private right, then the suit would not fall within the ambit  of
Section 92 of the CPC. Finally, it was also held that  in  deciding  whether
the suit falls within the ambit of Section 92 of the  CPC,  the  Court  must
consider the purpose for which the suit was filed. This view was  reiterated
in Vidyodaya Trust.
32.   Considering the purpose of the suit filed by the  respondents,  it  is
quite clear that it was to highlight the failure of the appellants  to  take
action against the availability of the objectionable book  and  against  the
author. As we have noted above, the issue whether the book is  objectionable
or not, whether it deserves to be proscribed or  not,  whether  it  violates
the provisions of Section 153-A or Section 295-A of the  Indian  Penal  Code
has yet to be determined by the Orissa High Court. Until that  determination
is made, it would  be  premature  to  expect  the  appellants  to  take  any
precipitate action in the matter against the author.
33.   The best that the appellants could have done under  the  circumstances
was  to  make  it  clear  whether  they  have  anything  to  do   with   the
objectionable book or not. The High Court has noted  quite  explicitly  that
the appellants have not sponsored the book nor was it  published  under  the
aegis of  the  Aurobindo  Ashram.  The  appellants  have  also,  it  may  be
recalled, expressed displeasure with the contents of the objectionable  book
through the communication of 11th November, 2008. This being  the  position,
we are of the opinion that the appellants have done  what  could  reasonably
be expected of them  in  relation  to  the  objectionable  book,  pending  a
determination by the Orissa High Court.
34.   The High Court has effectively faulted the appellants for  not  making
the first strike to secure a ban on the objectionable book. This  is  really
a question of the degree of reaction to the objectionable book on  which  we
would not like  to  comment.  The  appellants  could  have  expressed  their
displeasure over the contents of  the  objectionable  book,  or  dissociated
themselves from the objectionable book or  even  taken  proactive  steps  to
have the objectionable book banned or proscribed. That the appellants  chose
only to express their displeasure may be construed as a  mild  reaction  (as
compared to outright condemnation of the objectionable  book),  particularly
since the appellants had  nothing  to  do  with  its  publication.  But  the
question is whether the mild reaction is perverse or could  in  any  way  be
held to be a breach of trust or an absence of  effective  administration  of
the Trust warranting the removal of  the  trustees.  We  do  not  think  so.
Failure to take steps to ban a book that is critical  of  the  philosophical
and spiritual guru  of  a  Trust  would  not  fall  within  the  compass  of
administration of the Trust. It might be an  omission  of  the  exercise  of
proper discretion on  the  part  of  the  trustees,  but  certainly  not  an
omission touching upon the administration of  the  Trust.   We  are  not  in
agreement with the High Court that the failure of  the  appellants  to  take
the initiative in banning the objectionable book gives rise to  a  cause  of
action for the removal of the trustees of the Trust and  settling  a  scheme
for its administration. The trustees of a  trust  are  entitled  to  a  wide
discretion in the  administration  of  a  trust.  A  disagreement  with  the
exercise of the discretion (however passionate the  disagreement  might  be)
does not necessarily lead to a conclusion of maladministration,  unless  the
exercise of discretion is perverse.   In our opinion, the High  Court  ought
to have allowed the application filed by the appellants for  the  revocation
of leave granted to the respondents to initiate  proceedings  under  Section
92 of the CPC, in the facts of this case.
35.   We were invited to express a view on  the  constitutional  freedom  of
speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a) of the  Constitution.
It is not at all necessary for us to do so. The Orissa High Court  might  be
called upon to do so, depending on the views of the contesting parties,  one
of whom we were told, is the author of the objectionable  book.  We  express
no opinion on the issue and leave the matter at that.
36.   This being our conclusion with regard to the first  grievance  of  the
respondents, their second grievance is  rather  premature.  It  would  arise
only if and when appropriate directions are issued by the Orissa High  Court
in the pending litigation.
Conclusion
37.   We find merit in the appeal and accordingly  set  aside  the  impugned
judgment and order of the High Court and allow the application filed by  the
appellants for revocation of leave. The parties are left to bear  their  own
costs and once again consider an amicable settlement of their dispute.
                                                                 ……………………….J
                                                                (Madan    B.
Lokur)


                                                                 ……………………….J
                                                                    (S.   A.
Bobde)
New Delhi;
January  5, 2016

-----------------------
[1]
      [2] Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R, (2008) 4 SCC 115
[3]
      [4] Subsequently renumbered as O.S. No.15/2011
[5]
      [6]  92. Public charities.—(1) In the case of any  alleged  breach  of
any  express  or  constructive  trust  created  for  public  purposes  of  a
charitable or religious nature, or where  the  direction  of  the  Court  is
deemed necessary for the administration of any  such  trust,  the  Advocate-
General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust  and  having
obtained the leave of the Court, may institute a suit,  whether  contentious
or not, in the principal Civil Court of  original  jurisdiction  or  in  any
other Court empowered in that behalf by  the  State  Government  within  the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any  part  of  the  subject-
matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree—
      (a) removing any trustee;
      (b) appointing a new trustee;
      (c) vesting any property in a trustee;
      (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has
ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his
possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property;
      (d) directing accounts and inquiries;
      (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the
interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;
      (f) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be
let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;
      (g) settling a scheme; or
      (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case
may require.
      (2)   xxx             xxx              xxx
xxx

      (3)   xxx             xxx              xxx
xxx


[7]
      [8]  95. Power to declare certain publications forfeited and to issue
search warrants for the same.— (1) Where—
      (a) any newspaper, or book, or
      (b) any document,
      wherever printed, appears to  the  State  Government  to  contain  any
matter the publication  of  which  is  punishable  under  Section  124-A  or
Section 153-A or Section 153-B or Section 292 or Section 293 or Section 295-
A of the Indian Penal Code (45  of  1860),  the  State  Government  may,  by
notification, stating the grounds of its opinion, declare every copy of  the
issue of the newspaper containing such matter, and every copy of  such  book
or other document to be forfeited to Government, and  thereupon  any  police
officer may seize the same wherever found in India and  any  Magistrate  may
by warrant authorise any police officer not below the rank of  sub-inspector
to enter upon and search for the same in any  premises  where  any  copy  of
such issue or any such book or other document may be or  may  be  reasonably
suspected to be.
      (2) In this section and in Section 96,—
      (a) “newspaper” and “book” have the same meaning as in the Press and
Registration of Books Act, 1867 (25 of 1867);
      (b) “document” includes any painting, drawing or photograph, or other
visible representation.
      (3) No order passed or  action  taken  under  this  section  shall  be
called in question in any  Court  otherwise  than  in  accordance  with  the
provisions of Section 96.

[9]
      [10]  295-A. Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage
religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious
beliefs.—Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the
religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either
spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise,
insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that
class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
[11]
      [12]  153-A. Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of
religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts
prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.—(1) Whoever—
      (a) by words, either spoken or written, or  by  signs  or  by  visible
representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to  promote,  on  grounds
of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste  or  community
or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred  or
ill-will between different religious, racial, language  or  regional  groups
or castes or communities, or
      (b)  commits any act  which  is  prejudicial  to  the  maintenance  of
harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups  or
castes or communities, and which  disturbs  or  is  likely  to  disturb  the
public tranquillity, or
      (c) organizes any exercise, movement, drill or other similar  activity
intending that the participants in such activity shall use or be trained  to
use criminal force  or  violence  or  knowing  it  to  be  likely  that  the
participants in such activity will use or be trained to use  criminal  force
or violence, or participates  in  such  activity  intending  to  use  or  be
trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to  be  likely  that
the participants in such activity will use or be  trained  to  use  criminal
force or violence, against  any  religious,  racial,  language  or  regional
group or caste or community and such activity,  for  any  reason  whatsoever
causes or is likely to cause fear  or  alarm  or  a  feeling  of  insecurity
amongst members of such religious, racial, language  or  regional  group  or
caste or community,
      shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years,
or with fine, or with both.
      Offence committed in place of worship, etc.—(2) Whoever commits an
offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any
assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious
ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five
years and shall also be liable to fine.
[13]
      [14] Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust & Ors. v. S. Ramanathan & Ors,
MANU/TN/0541/2013
[15]
      [16] (1974) 2 SCC 695
[17]
      [18] (2008) 4 SCC 115

whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kolkata only on the ground that the Tribunal did not have the territorial jurisdiction.?=“166. Application for compensation.— * * * (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:- The provision in question, in the present case, is a benevolent provision for the victims of accidents of negligent driving. The provision for territorial jurisdiction has to be interpreted consistent with the object of facilitating remedies for the victims of accidents. Hyper technical approach in such matters can hardly be appreciated. There is no bar to a claim petition being filed at a place where the insurance company, which is the main contesting parties in such cases, has its business. In such cases, there is no prejudice to any party. There is no failure of justice. Moreover, in view of categorical decision of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra), contrary view taken by the High Court cannot be sustained. The High Court failed to notice the provision of Section 21 CPC. 15. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the award of the Tribunal.

                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10  OF 2016
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.27243 OF 2015)

MALATI SARDAR                                       …PETITIONER

VERSUS

NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
& ORS.                                                   ...RESPONDENTS

                               J U D G M E N T


ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1.    Leave granted.  The question raised in  this  appeal  is  whether  the
High Court was justified in setting aside the award of the  Motor  Accidents
Claims Tribunal, Kolkata only on the ground that the Tribunal did  not  have
the territorial jurisdiction.
2.    On 7th May, 2008, the  deceased  Diganta  Sardar,  aged  26  years,  a
school teacher, unmarried son of the appellant was hit  by  Bus  No.WB/15-A-
4959 insured with the respondent company at Hoogly, in  the  State  of  West
Bengal and died.  He was travelling on motor cycle of his  colleague,  Uttam
Samui as a pillion rider.  The appellant filed an application under  Section
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the Act”) for compensation before  the
Tribunal at Kolkata.
3.    Rash and negligent driving by  the  driver  of  the  bus  having  been
established, the Tribunal, applying the multiplier of 13 on account  of  age
of the appellant being 47 years, and taking into account the income  of  the
deceased and other relevant factors, fixed  compensation  of  Rs.16,12,200/-
with interest at the rate of 6% p.a.  from  the  date  of  filing  of  claim
petition vide its Award dated 7th February, 2012.
4.    The respondent company preferred an appeal before the  High  Court  on
the only ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of  the  Tribunal.   The
objection of the respondent was that the accident took place at  Hoogly  and
the claimant resided at Hoogly.  Office of the respondent being  at  Kolkata
did not attract jurisdiction of the Kolkata Tribunal.  Reliance  was  placed
on the decisions of this Court in Union of  India  vs.  G.S.  Grewal[1]  and
Jagmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana[2]  apart  from
the High Court judgments.  The appellant  supported  the  award  by  placing
reliance on judgment of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar vs.  Oriental  Insurance
Company Limited[3]  apart from other judgments.
5.    The High Court upheld the objection of the respondent and allowed  the
appeal  of  the  respondent  company  and  directed  refund  of  the  amount
deposited/paid, if any, to the respondent company.  It was observed :
“In the instant case admittedly the accident took  place  in  Hooghly.   The
claimant, as evident from the cause title, resides at  Hoogly.   The  owner,
the respondent, too resides at Hooghly.   Hooghly, no doubt, is  beyond  the
territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal at Kolkata.  The  argument  of  the
respondent-claimant that the Kolkata Tribunal exercises  jurisdiction  since
the regional  office  of  the  insurance  company  is  situated  within  its
territorial limits cannot be accepted  as  the  last  option  under  section
166(2) cannot be construed to mean the residential address  of  the  company
as a company can have a business or an office address and not a  residential
address.   Therefore,  the  Tribunal  at  Kolkata  had  no  jurisdiction  to
entertain the claim petition.  In this regard we follow  the  principles  of
law laid down in New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Kustiswar  Pramanik
(supra) [2010(1) T.A.C. 405 (Cal), in Nirmala  Devi  Agarwal  (supra)  [2013
(3) CLJ (Cal)] and in the unreported judgment delivered on 18th  July,  2012
in FMA 724 of 2008 with C.O.T. 22 of 2008 (The  New  Indian  Assurance  Col.
Ltd. vs. Silpi Dutta & Ors.) and we respectfully disagree with the  judgment
in FMA 1454 of 2013 (National Insurance  Company  Ltd.  vs.  Alpana  Jana  &
Ors.)”.

6.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7.    Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the  High  Court  was
in grave error in holding that  the  Kolkata  Tribunal  could  not  exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that registered office of the  insurance  company
was within its territorial limits. Jurisdiction was available under  Section
166(2) if the defendant/respondent in a claim petition was  residing  within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  The residence in  the  case  of  juristic
person included its Principal office.  In any case, the view  taken  by  the
High Court is directly in conflict with the law laid down by this  Court  in
Mantoo Sarkar (supra) under which the High Court  could  interfere  in  such
cases only if there was failure of justice.  The decisions of this Court  in
G.S. Grewal and Jagmittar Sain  Bhagat  have  no  application  to  the  fact
situation
at hand.
8.    Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  company  on  the  other  hand,
supported the view taken by the High Court and submitted that the  place  of
residence within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under  Section  166(2)  of
the Act could not mean the place of business.  He sought to distinguish  the
view taken by this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra).
9.    The question  for  consideration  thus  is  whether  the  Tribunal  at
Kolkata had the jurisdiction to decide the claim application  under  Section
166 of the Act when the accident took  place  outside  Kolkata  jurisdiction
and  the  claimant  also  resided  outside  Kolkata  jurisdiction,  but  the
respondent being a juristic person carried on business at Kolkata.   Further
question is whether in absence of failure of justice, the High  Court  could
set aside the award of the Tribunal on the ground  of  lack  of  territorial
jurisdiction.
10.   In our view, the matter is fully covered by decisions  of  this  Court
in Mantoo Sarkar (supra).  It will be  worthwhile  to  quote  the  statutory
provision of Section 166(2) of the Act :

“166. Application for compensation.—    *    *     *

(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option  of
the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal  having  jurisdiction  over  the
area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims  Tribunal  within  the
local limits of whose  jurisdiction  the  claimant  resides  or  carries  on
business or within the local limits  of  whose  jurisdiction  the  defendant
resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars  as  may  be
prescribed:

Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140 is  made  in
such application, the application shall  contain  a  separate  statement  to
that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant.”

11.   In Mantoo Sarkar (supra),  the  insurance  company  had  a  branch  at
Nainital.   Accident  took  place  outside  the  jurisdiction  of   Nainital
Tribunal. The claimant remained in the hospital at Bareilly  and  thereafter
shifted to Pilibhit where he was living for a long time.   However,  at  the
time of filing of the claim  petition  he  was  working  as  a  labourer  in
Nainital District.  The High Court took the view that Nainital Tribunal  had
no jurisdiction and reversed the view taken by the Tribunal  to  the  effect
that since the  office  of  the  insurance  company  was  at  Nainital,  the
Tribunal had the jurisdiction.  This Court reversed the  view  of  the  High
Court.  It was held that the jurisdiction of the  Tribunal  was  wider  than
the civil court.  The Tribunal could follow the provisions of Code of  Civil
Procedure (CPC).   Having regard to Section 21 CPC,  objection  of  lack  of
territorial  jurisdiction  could  not  be  entertained  in  absence  of  any
prejudice.  Distinction was required to  be  drawn  between  a  jurisdiction
with regard to subject matter on the one hand and that  of  territorial  and
pecuniary jurisdiction on the other.  A  judgment  may  be  nullity  in  the
former category, but not in the later.   Reference was also made to  earlier
decision of  this  Court  in  Kiran  Singh  vs.  Chaman  Paswan[4]   to  the
following effect :
“With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction,  Section
21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no  objection  to  the  place  of
suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional  court,  unless  there
was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has  been
adopted in  Section  11  of  the  Suits  Valuation  Act  with  reference  to
pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21  and  99  CPC  and
Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a  case
had been tried by a court on the merits and  judgment  rendered,  it  should
not be liable to be reversed purely on  technical  grounds,  unless  it  had
resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature  has  been
to treat objections  to  jurisdiction  both  territorial  and  pecuniary  as
technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless  there
has been a prejudice on  the  merits.  The  contention  of  the  appellants,
therefore, that the decree and judgment  of  the  District  Court,  Monghyr,
should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11  of  the
Suits Valuation Act.’ ”

12.   We are thus of the view that in the face of judgment of this Court  in
Mantoo Sarkar (supra),  the High Court was not justified  in  setting  aside
the award of the Tribunal in absence of  any  failure  of  justice  even  if
there was merit in the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction.   Moreover,
the fact remained that the insurance company which was the  main  contesting
respondent had its business at Kolkata.
13.   Reliance placed  on  decisions  of  this  Court  in  G.S.  Grewal  and
Jagmittar Sain Bhagat is misplaced.  In G.S. Grewal, the subject  matter  of
dispute was not  covered  by  the  definition  of  “service  matters”  under
Section 3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 and on that  ground,  it
was held that the Armed Forces Tribunal had no jurisdiction in  the  matter.
Thus, it was a case of  inherent  lack  of  jurisdiction  over  the  subject
matter.  Similarly  in  Jagmittar  Sain  Bhagat,  the  claimant  before  the
Consumer Protection Forum was  found  not  be  a  “consumer”  under  Section
2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and on that  ground  the  order
of the consumer forum was held to be without jurisdiction.  The  said  cases
did not deal with the issue of territorial jurisdiction.
 14.  The provision in question,  in  the  present  case,  is  a  benevolent
provision for the victims of accidents of negligent driving.  The  provision
for territorial jurisdiction has  to  be  interpreted  consistent  with  the
object of  facilitating  remedies  for  the  victims  of  accidents.   Hyper
technical approach in such matters can hardly be appreciated.  There  is  no
bar to a claim petition being filed at a place where the insurance  company,
which is the main contesting parties in such cases, has  its  business.   In
such cases, there is no prejudice to any party.   There  is  no  failure  of
justice.  Moreover, in view of categorical decision of this Court in  Mantoo
Sarkar (supra), contrary view taken by the High Court cannot  be  sustained.
 The High Court failed to notice the provision of Section 21 CPC.
15.   Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment  of
the High Court and restore the award of the Tribunal.


                                                    …………..……..…………………………….J.
                                                                  [ ANIL R.
                                   DAVE ]



                                                    …………..….………………………………..J.
         [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 5, 2016

-----------------------
[1]    (2014) 7 SCC 303
[2]    (2013) 10 SCC 136
[3]    (2009) 2 SCC 244
[4]    AIR 1954 SC 340

whether the respondents-workmen are entitled to the back wages till the beginning of January, 1995 or till January, 1999.= the industry was not functioning after January, 1995, there is no justification in entering a different finding without any further material before the Division Bench. The appellate bench ought to have noticed that the statement of MW-3 is itself part of the evidence before the Labour Court. Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief. When the matter came up before this Court on 08.07.2013, the Court directed the appellant to file an affidavit indicating the actual year of closure of the industry so as to determine the question as to from what date retrenchment compensation should be paid to the workmen. Accordingly, affidavit dated 11.07.2013 was filed wherein it is clearly stated that the industry became non-functional by the beginning of January, 1995 and remained defunct thereafter. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-workmen also, there is nothing to establish that the industry was functioning thereafter. Hence, the order for payment of back wages beyond January, 1995 is vacated, and in all the other aspects, the order passed by the Division Bench is retained. In case, the workmen have not been paid the benefits which they are entitled to, the same shall be paid within a period of three months from today, failing which, the respondent-workmen shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION


                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.14 OF 2016
                   (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13908/2013)


THE MANAGEMENT OF NARENDRA &
COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED                      … APPELLANT (S)

                                   VERSUS

THE WORKMEN OF NARENDRA & COMPANY      … RESPONDENT (S)


                               J U D G M E N T


KURIAN, J.:


Leave granted.


Short question is whether the respondents-workmen are entitled to  the  back
wages till the beginning of January, 1995 or till January, 1999. The  Labour
Court, Bangalore by award dated 02.08.2002  directed  reinstatement  of  the
workmen with 50 per cent back  wages.  That  award  was  challenged  by  the
appellant before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore by judgment  dated
14.03.2008 in  Writ  Petition  No.  41489  of  2002.  Though  the  appellant
attacked the award on several grounds, the learned Single Judge declined  to
interfere with the award on reinstatement. However, taking note of the  fact
that the industry was virtually closed by the beginning  of  January,  1995,
it was ordered that the award on back wages would  be  limited  to  January,
1995. The learned Single Judge, in fact,  had  entered  a  finding  in  that
regard which reads as follows:

“From the record it  shows  that  the  industry  was  functioning  till  the
beginning of 1995 and the Union though has led  the  evidence  but  has  not
proved as to whether the industry was functioning thereafter or not.”



In appeal, the Division Bench  took  the  view  that  apart  from  the  sole
evidence of MW-3, there was no other evidence on record to  prove  that  the
industry was not functional after  January,  1995.  However,  there  was  no
dispute  with  regard  to  the  fact  that  the  industry  was  closed,  and
therefore, reinstatement was not possible. In that background,  without  any
further material available on record, the Division Bench took the view  that
interest of justice would be met by extending the benefit  of  50  per  cent
back wages upto the end of January, 1999  and  consequential  benefits  with
closure compensation as well as gratuity upto that date. We may extract  the
relevant consideration by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment:

“… According to MW-3, the machines were operated only till the beginning  of
January, 1995.  However,  to  substantiate  that  contention,  there  is  no
evidence on record. In the light of such  evidence  on  record,  it  is  not
possible to record a categorical finding that the  industry  was  closed  in
the year 1995 itself. Having regard  to  the  fact  that  the  industry  was
closed, the order of re-instatement  has  been  set  aside  by  the  learned
single Judge and the workmen were entitled to retrenchment compensation  and
only 50% back wages is awarded, we are of the view  that  justice  would  be
met by extending the benefit of 50% back wages upto the end of January  1999
and  they  are  also  entitled  to  consequential  benefits   with   closure
compensation as well as gratuity upto that date. …”



Once the learned Single Judge having  seen  the  records  and  come  to  the
conclusion that the industry was not functioning after January, 1995,  there
is no justification in entering a  different  finding  without  any  further
material before the Division  Bench.  The  appellate  bench  ought  to  have
noticed that the statement of MW-3 is itself part  of  the  evidence  before
the Labour Court. Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a  finding
of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion  that  the  finding
of the Single Bench is perverse, it  shall  not  disturb  the  same.  Merely
because another view or a better  view  is  possible,  there  should  be  no
interference with or disturbance of the order passed by  the  Single  Judge,
unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief.

When the matter came up before this Court on 08.07.2013, the Court  directed
the appellant to file an affidavit indicating the actual year of closure  of
the industry  so  as  to  determine  the  question  as  to  from  what  date
retrenchment compensation  should  be  paid  to  the  workmen.  Accordingly,
affidavit dated 11.07.2013 was filed wherein it is clearly stated  that  the
industry became  non-functional  by  the  beginning  of  January,  1995  and
remained  defunct  thereafter.  In  the  counter  affidavit  filed  by   the
respondent-workmen also, there is nothing to  establish  that  the  industry
was functioning thereafter.

Hence, the order for payment of back wages beyond January, 1995 is  vacated,
and in all the other aspects, the order passed  by  the  Division  Bench  is
retained. In case, the workmen have not been paid the  benefits  which  they
are entitled to, the same shall be paid within  a  period  of  three  months
from today, failing which,  the  respondent-workmen  shall  be  entitled  to
interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum.

The appeal is partly allowed as above. There shall be no order as to costs.



                                              ………………………………………………J.
          (KURIAN JOSEPH)


                                             …………………………………………………………J.
         (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)
New Delhi;
JANUARY 4, 2016.

-----------------------
                                                                  REPORTABLE


The High Court has rightly held that the renewal was in pursuance of the Government Order dated 26th February, 2013 which itself was in conflict with the order of the High Court in Nar Narain Mishra (supra) as reiterated in Sukhan Singh (supra). In view of order of the High Court dated 29th January, 2013 in Nar Narain Mishra (supra) all pending applications as on 31st May, 2012 stood rejected. In the case of the appellant, environmental clearance was granted on 21st September, 2012 and renewal was granted on 27th April, 2013. Orders of the High Court in Nar Narain Mishra and Sukhan Singh (supra) which are not under challenge clearly debarred the grant of lease under Chapter II after 31st May, 2012. This aspect has been dealt with in greater detail in Civil Appeal Nos.4845-4846 of 2015 titled Sulekhan Singh & Co. versus State of U.P. with which the present appeal was tagged, which is being separately decided today. Stand of the State, to the contrary, can also not be appreciated. Reference may be made to the finding recorded by the High Court in the impugned order: “A Division Bench in the case of Nar Narain Mishra v. State of U.P. and others reported in  2013 (2) ADJ 166, after interpreting the Government Order dated 31.5.2012 recorded as principle of law, that once notification has been published by the State Government in exercise of powers under Rule 23 of the Rules 1963, for vacant areas being available for grant of leases under Chapter IV of Rules, 1963, no grant/renewal on the pending applications can be made, after 31.5.2012. The State was not satisfied with the legal position so explained. It came out with a Government Order dated 26.2.2013, which provided that pending applications, for renewal/grant in respect of which orders of approval have already been made by the State Government or by the competent authority shall not be controlled by the judgment in the case of Nar Narain Mishra (Supra) such cases may be processed further. This Government Order dated 26.2.2013 came up for consideration before another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sukkhan Singh v. State of U.P. and others reported in 2014 (11) ADJ 89. The Division Bench has held that the Government Order dated 26.2.2013 cannot deviate from the legal position, as has been explained in the case of Nar Narain Mishra (Supra). It, therefore, follows that no application which was pending on 31.5.2012 can be proceeded with for grant/renewal of lease under Chapter II/VI of the Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1963 after 31.5.2012. The grant, if any, after 31.5.2012 can only be made under Chapter IV of the Rules of 1963 Le. by e-auction or tendering. The State and its Officers have shown little or no respect to the orders of this Court. xxx Prima facie, we find no substance in the contention raised. In our opinion, once a notification dated 31.5.2012 had been issued declaring that all the vacant areas are available for grant of lease only under Chapter IV, no lease subsequent thereto under Chapter VI could be executed. The area remains vacant till the execution of the lease deed. The Execution of the lease in the facts of the case has taken place after 31.5.2012. Mere grant/approval in our opinion will not alter the legal position.

                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.4 OF 2016
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.28249 OF 2015)



RAMAKANT DWIVEDI                           …APPELLANT

VERSUS

RAFIQ AHMAD & ORS.                               ...RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.
Leave granted.  This appeal has been  preferred  against  order  dated  18th
June, 2015 passed by the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  in  PIL
No.35233 of 2015 granting an  interim  order  against  excavation  of  minor
minerals by the appellant in respect of lease  executed  in  his  favour  on
17th October, 2013.
In the impugned order, the High Court observed that  lease  granted  to  the
appellant was in violation of its judgments dated  29th  January,  2013   in
Nar Narain Mishra versus The State of U.P.[1]  and   dated  12th  September,
2014 Sukhan Singh versus State  of  U.P.[2].   In  Nar  Narain  Mishra,  the
operative part of the High Court order is as follows :
“In the result, all the writ  petitions  are  disposed  with  the  following
directions :

The  prayers  made  by  the  petitioners/applicants  for  considering  their
applications for renewal of  their  mining  leases  which  were  pending  on
31/5/2012, and the  applications  for  grant  of  fresh  leases  which  were
pending on 31/5/2012 are refused.

The  Government  Order  dated  26/7/2012  and  all  consequent  steps  taken
thereunder are quashed.

Notices issued by  the  District  Magistrate  inviting  applications  by  E-
tendering consequent to the Government  Order  dated  31/5/2012,  cannot  be
allowed to be finalized and are quashed with liberty to the  respondents  to
issue fresh notice in accordance with law.
Parties shall bear their own costs.”

According to the appellant, on 27th April, 2013, the pre-existing  lease  in
his favour which expired on 18th November, 2010,  was  renewed  for  further
period of three years upto 26th April, 2016.  Approval was granted  on  14th
March, 2011 and environmental  clearance  was  granted  on  21st  September,
2012.  It is submitted that order of the Government  dated  31st  May,  2012
was not applicable and was later withdrawn on 22nd October, 2014  and  thus,
the lease was valid.
This submission though also supported by  the  State,  cannot  be  accepted.
The High Court has rightly held that the renewal was  in  pursuance  of  the
Government Order dated 26th February, 2013  which  itself  was  in  conflict
with the order of the High Court in Nar Narain Mishra (supra) as  reiterated
in Sukhan Singh (supra).   In view of order of the  High  Court  dated  29th
January, 2013 in Nar Narain Mishra (supra) all pending  applications  as  on
31st May, 2012 stood rejected.  In the case of the appellant,  environmental
clearance was granted on 21st September, 2012 and  renewal  was  granted  on
27th April, 2013.   Orders of the  High  Court  in  Nar  Narain  Mishra  and
Sukhan Singh (supra)  which are not under  challenge  clearly  debarred  the
grant of lease under Chapter II after 31st  May,  2012.    This  aspect  has
been dealt with in greater detail in  Civil  Appeal  Nos.4845-4846  of  2015
titled Sulekhan Singh & Co. versus State of  U.P.  with  which  the  present
appeal was tagged,  which is being separately decided today.  Stand  of  the
State, to the contrary, can also not be appreciated. Reference may  be  made
to the finding recorded by the High Court in the impugned order:
“A Division Bench in the case of Nar Narain Mishra  v.  State  of  U.P.  and
others reported in  2013 (2) ADJ  166,  after  interpreting  the  Government
Order dated 31.5.2012 recorded as principle of law, that  once  notification
has been published by the State Government in exercise of powers under  Rule
23 of the Rules 1963, for vacant areas being available for grant  of  leases
under  Chapter  IV  of  Rules,  1963,  no  grant/renewal  on   the   pending
applications can be made, after 31.5.2012. The State was not satisfied  with
the legal position so explained. It came out with a Government  Order  dated
26.2.2013, which provided that pending applications,  for  renewal/grant  in
respect of which orders of approval have  already  been  made  by  the State
Government or by the competent authority shall  not  be  controlled  by  the
judgment in the case  of  Nar  Narain  Mishra  (Supra)  such  cases  may  be
processed further.

This Government Order dated  26.2.2013  came  up  for  consideration  before
another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sukkhan Singh  v.  State
of U.P. and others reported in 2014 (11) ADJ  89.  The  Division  Bench  has
held that the Government Order  dated  26.2.2013  cannot  deviate  from  the
legal position, as has been explained in  the  case  of  Nar  Narain  Mishra
(Supra).

It, therefore, follows that no application which was  pending  on  31.5.2012
can be proceeded with for grant/renewal of lease under Chapter II/VI of  the
Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1963 after 31.5.2012. The  grant,  if  any,
after 31.5.2012 can only be made under Chapter IV of the Rules of  1963  Le.
by e-auction or tendering. The State and its Officers have shown  little  or
no respect to the orders of this Court.

xxx

Prima facie, we find no substance in the contention raised. In our  opinion,
once a notification dated 31.5.2012 had been issued declaring that  all  the
vacant areas are available for grant of lease  only  under  Chapter  IV,  no
lease subsequent thereto under  Chapter  VI  could  be  executed.  The  area
remains vacant till the execution of the lease deed. The  Execution  of  the
lease in the facts of  the  case  has  taken  place  after  31.5.2012.  Mere
grant/approval in our opinion will not alter the legal position.

 The concern of the Court is  both,  in  respect  of  best  use  of  natural
resources  by  the State  as  well  as  for  avoiding  the  degradation   of
environment, especially near the river beds.”

5.    Last submission on behalf of the appellant is that  on  22nd  October,
2014 the State of U.P. has declared that the mining  leases  will  be  given
under Chapter II and Order dated  31st  May,  2012  was  withdrawn.  In  the
present case, lease was granted in violation of judgment of the  High  Court
as already noted. Subsequent withdrawal of the Government order  dated  31st
May, 2012 could not benefit the appellant as on the date of grant  of  lease
in favour of the appellant, the said Government order was operative.
6.    In these circumstances, we do not find any ground  to  interfere  with
the impugned interim order and leave the  issue  on  merits  to  be  finally
decided by the High Court.
7.    The appeal is dismissed.

                                                    …………..……..…………………………….J.
                                                            [ ANIL R. DAVE ]


                                                    …………..….………………………………..J.
                                                       [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 04, 2016
                                 REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                     CIVIL APPEAL NOs.4845-4846 OF 2015

                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4847-4850 OF 2015


SULEKHAN SINGH & CO. & ORS           …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P.  & ORS.                            ...RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J

1.    These appeals by special  leave  have  been  preferred  against  order
dated 6th February, 2015 in Civil  Misc.  Review  Application  Nos.5064  and
5065 of 2015 and order  dated  15th  December,  2014  in  Civil  Misc.  Writ
Petition Nos.38034, 38064, 12622 and 12663 of 2014 passed by the High  Court
of Judicature at Allahabad.


2.     The  question  for  consideration  is  whether  the  High  Court  was
justified in quashing mining lease granted in favour of the appellants  vide
orders dated 24th May, 2014 and 26th May, 2014 on the ground that  the  said
leases were granted in violation of the Government Order (G.O.)  dated  31st
May, 2012.  Under this order, mining leases  could  only  be  granted  under
Chapter IV of the U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963  (the  Rules)
by way of e-tendering in the interest of transparency and to  safeguard  the
public revenue.


3.    Appellants Sulekhan Singh and company  were  the  petitioners  in  the
High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition Nos.  12663  of  2014.   The
appellants Manoj Kumar Sood and Makhan Singh were  jointly  the  petitioners
in the High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition Nos. 12622  of  2014.
They sought direction for grant of mining lease.  Upon  grant  of  lease  in
pursuance of interim order in their  favour,   Mohammad  Aakil  and  Masihul
Khan private  respondents  herein,  sought  cancellation  of  mining  leases
granted to the appellants.


4.    The Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation)  Act,  1957  (MMDR)
provides for development and regulation of mines and minerals.   Section  15
provides for making rules by the State Governments for regulating  grant  of
mining leases and other matters in respect of ‘minor minerals’.   The  State
of U. P. framed the Rules in exercise of the said power.  The Rules  contain
two sets of procedure for grant of mining lease.  Chapter IV  of  the  Rules
provides for grant of lease by auction while Chapter II provides  for  grant
of lease otherwise than by way of auction.  Prior to  31st  May,  2012,  the
leases were being granted in the State of Uttar Pradesh  under  Chapter  II.
G.O. dated 31st May, 2012 changed this practice, providing that:


“To bring transparency in connection of approval  of  mining  lease  in  the
state, the decision has  been  taken  to  grant  lease  through  e-tendering
system by inviting tenders  under  the  provisions  of  chapter-4  of  Uttar
Pradesh Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963.  By this step,  by  lifting
the minor minerals on remission, the transparency would increase  and  along
with that competition would take place and  due  to  that  State  Government
would get maximum rate.”


5.    The above change of policy appears to be consistent with the  position
of law that State largesse ought to be distributed by non  arbitrary  method
consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution[3].


6.    It is a matter of  public  knowledge  that  the  Government  of  India
appointed a Commission of Inquiry consisting of Shri Justice  M.B.  Shah,  a
former Judge of this Court, inter alia, to enquire into the deficiencies  of
management and  regulatory  and  monitoring  systems  on  account  of  which
illegal mining could not be tackled, vide notification dated 22nd  November,
2010.  The Commission was  also  to  suggest  remedial  measures.  The  said
Commission gave  its  reports,   including  report  dated  March,  2012  (in
respect of State of Goa), June, 2013 (in respect of  the  State  of  Odisha)
and October, 2013 (in relation to the State of Jharkhand).   In  its  report
for the State of Goa, the Commission  found  that  procedure  for  grant  of
lease/renewal of lease  required  streamlining  for  transparency.   It  was
further suggested that the authority to decide the applications should be  a
committee headed by Additional Chief Secretary  (instead  of  a  lower  rank
officer) and should also have representatives  from  Departments  of  Mines,
Revenue, Forest and Environment.  It was also suggested that  mining  leases
should be granted  by  public  auction  for  transparency  and  increase  in
revenue of the State and also to check corruption/favoritism.


7.    In its report submitted in June, 2013, in relation  to  the  State  of
Orissa, referring to a letter of the Chief Minister of Orissa, it was  inter
alia observed by the Shah Commission:


“Competitive bidding should be the general methodology for  grant  of  lease
of the finite valuable national resources.”


8.    These developments led  to  policy  changes  to  ensure  fairness  and
transparency in allotment of mineral concessions and optimal utilization  of
mineral resources through  sustainable  mining  practices.   Policy  changes
include 2015 amendment to the MMDR and amendments to rules by  some  of  the
States, providing for auction as predominant way of giving mining leases.


9.    The G.O. dated 31st May 2012, passed by the State of U. P. came to  be
challenged before the High Court inter alia on the ground that  applications
already made prior to 31st May, 2012 were required to be dealt with  without
applying the G.O. dated 31st May, 2012. This plea was rejected by  the  High
Court vide its judgment dated 29th January, 2013 in Nar  Narain  Mishra  Vs.
The State of U.P.[4].   Special leave petition filed against the High  Court
judgment was dismissed by this Court[5].  The Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court relied upon judgment of this Court in State of  Tamil  Nadu  Vs.  M/s.
Hind Stone[6]  and held that pendency of  application  did  not  create  any
vested right for the application being considered otherwise than by  way  of
order dated 31st May, 2012.  The High Court upheld the stand  of  the  State
which was as follows :


“The State stand is that there is no  inviolable  rights  of  renewal  in  a
lease and the right of  consideration  of  the  renewal  and  the  claim  of
renewal of the lease have to be dealt with in accordance with the  Rules  as
existing at the relevant  time.  It  is  submitted  that  declaration  under
Chapter IV having been issued all areas stand notified for settlement  under
Chapter IV, the renewal of lease cannot be  granted  since  renewal  can  be
granted only in accordance with the procedure prescribed  under  Chapter  II
which provision is no more applicable. When the State issued the  Government
Order on 31.5.2012 applying the same to all vacant  areas,  it  intended  to
apply the Government  Order  on  the  areas  which  were  not  occupied.  No
exception has been provided in the Government order exclude out those  areas
in respect of which renewal applications are  pending.  An  application  for
renewal of lease is in essence an application for grant of  lease  and  same
principle has to be applied with regard to applications  which  are  pending
for grant of lease and  on  similar  analogy,  if  the  submissions  of  the
petitioners are to be accepted those areas on which applications  for  grant
of lease have been submitted should also be  kept  out  of  purview  of  the
Government  Order  dated  31.5.2012.  No  such  intention   or   object   is
decipherable from the  Government  order.  By  subsequent  Government  Order
dated 5.9.2012, the State Government has provided  that  those  areas  where
renewal has been sanctioned or granted on or before 5.9.2012, shall  not  be
settled under Chapter IV.”


10.   The High Court also rejected the objection that the order  dated  31st
May, 2012 was required to be confined only to “Boulder” and did  not  extend
to “Building Stone”.  It was observed :


“Government Order dated 31/5/2012, uses the  word  "Boulder".  However,  the
Government Order dated 31/5/2012, does not confine  to  the  word  "Boulder"
which is found in the Riverbed. The word  "Boulder"  can  be  used  for  the
minerals which is found in the Riverbed as well  as  the  mineral  which  is
found "In situ rock deposit". Petitioner's case  in  the  writ  petition  is
that since the word "Boulder" is found only in the Riverbed, the  Government
Order dated 31/5/2012, does  not  cover  "Imarti  Patthar"  is  misconceived
since the Government Order  dated  31/5/2012,  does  not  confine  the  word
"Boulder" to one which is found in the Riverbed. In this context a  look  of
1st Schedule and 2nd Schedule to the Rules, 1963 makes  it  clear  that  the
word "Boulder" is included in the heading "Building Stone" as well  as  when
found in mixed form in the Riverbed.”


11.   Further, following the judgment of this  Court  in  Deepak  Kumar  Vs.
State of Haryana[7], the High Court directed that  measures  for  protection
of environment as noted by this  Court  be  adopted  while  granting  mining
leases.


12.   The High Court held that no direction for grant of  a  lease  contrary
to G.O. dated 31st May, 2012 could be issued and cancelled all  applications
pending on 31st May, 2012.  The concluding part of the  order  of  the  High
Court is as follows :


“In the result, all the writ  petitions  are  disposed  with  the  following
directions:


The  prayers  made  by  the  petitioners/applicants  for  considering  their
applications for renewal of  their  mining  leases  which  were  pending  on
31/5/2012, and the  applications  for  grant  of  fresh  leases  which  were
pending on 31/5/2012 are refused.


xxxxxxx


 Notices issued by the  District  Magistrate  inviting  applications  by  e-
tendering consequent to the Government  Order  dated  31/5/2012,  cannot  be
allowed to be finalized and are quashed with liberty to the  respondents  to
issue fresh notices in accordance with law.”


13.   Inspite of the said judgment of the High Court,  certain  leases  were
granted in violation  of  G.O.  dated  31st  May,  2012  which  came  to  be
challenged before the High Court. Reiterating  its  view,  in  its  judgment
dated 12th September, 2014 in Sukhan Singh versus State of U.P.[8],  it  was
held that no pending application  as  on  31st  May,  2012  could  be  taken
cognizance of.  It was held that :

“19.   The basic position in law is that the mere filing of  an  application
either for the grant of a lease or for the  renewal  of  a  lease  does  not
confer a vested  right  for  the  grant  or  renewal  of  a  lease  and,  an
application has to be disposed of on the basis of the rules  as  they  stand
on the date of the disposal of the application.

20.  This being the clear position in law which has been enunciated  in  the
judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu (supra),  it  would  be
impermissible to accept the contention of the  fourth  respondent  that  its
applications were liable to  be  disposed  of,  not  on  the  basis  of  the
provisions of Chapter IV but under Chapter II of  the  Rules.  Besides,  the
acceptance of any such submission would be contrary to the law laid down  by
a Division Bench of this Court in Nar Narain Mishra  (supra)  which  follows
the decision of the Supreme Court.”

14.   It is in this background that the present matters were  considered  by
the High Court. To seek an exception to  G.O.  dated  31st  May,  2012,  the
appellants contended that they had already applied in  pursuance  of  notice
dated 18th July, 2009 in accordance with Chapter II  of  the  Rules.    When
the said notice was cancelled and fresh notice dated 10th August,  2010  was
issued, the appellants challenged the same.  They were  relegated  to  their
departmental remedy.  They challenged the order  passed  by  the  department
again by another writ petition and the High Court directed the matter to  be
considered vide order dated 10th February, 2012.   As  the  said  order  was
prior to 31st May, 2012, appellant acquired a  right  to  get  lease  as  an
exception to order dated 31st May, 2012.  The High Court passed  an  interim
order in their favour which led to the grant of mining leases on  24th  May,
2014 and 26th May, 2014.


15.   The stand of the appellants was held to be against  the  earlier  High
Court judgments.  Thus, after hearing finally, the High Court rejected  this
plea as follows :


“It is not in dispute that their applications for grant  of  lease  had  not
been disposed of prior to the date of declaration made under Rule 23 (1)  of
the Rules of 1963 and they had been granted the  lease  by  means  of  order
dated 24.05.2014  and  26.05.2014,  after  the  date  of  declaration,  i.e.
31.05.2012.  In Nar  Narain  Mishra’s  case,  this  Court  held  that  those
petitioners, who have claimed mandamus for directing consideration of  their
lease renewal application, which were pending on  31.05.2012  could  not  be
granted any relief.  Similarly applications for grant of fresh  lease  under
Chapter II of the Rules, 1963, which were pending on 31.05.2012  could  also
not be directed to be considered.


In Public Interest Litigation (PIL)  No.31643  of  2014,  Sukhan  Singh  vs.
State of U.P. & 3 others.  This Court has considered  the  judgment  of  the
Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in Deepak Kumar’s case  (supra)  as  well  as
judgment of this Court in Nar Narain Mishra’s  case  (supra)  and  has  held
that “The basic position in law is that the mere filing  of  an  application
either for the grant of a lease or for the  renewal  of  a  lease  does  not
confer a vested  right  for  the  grant  or  renewal  of  a  lease  and,  an
application has to be disposed of on the basis of the rules  as  they  stand
on the date of the disposal of the application.”


16.   Additionally, the appellants also argued  that  the  G.O.  dated  22nd
October, 2014 cancelled G.O. dated 31st May, 2012  and  decided  to  proceed
with the grant of mining leases under Chapter II instead of Chapter IV.   It
was submitted that in view of change of policy, G.O. dated  31st  May,  2012
could not be taken into account. This plea was also  rejected  by  the  High
Court as the amended policy dated 22nd  October,  2014  could  not  be  made
applicable to the grant of lease at a time when the said revised policy  was
not in force.  The High Court observed :


“Through supplementary affidavit, the respondent no.2 and 3 have brought  on
record the 37th Amendment of the Rules of 1963, which is called  “The  Uttar
Pradesh Minor Mineral (Concession) (37th Amendment) Rules, 2014”.


By this amendment, several directions  issued  by  this  Court  as  well  as
Hon’ble Supreme Court have been  incorporated.   The  State  Government  has
also issued a Government Order dated 22.10.2014 whereby provisions 2, 3  and
6 of the Rules of 1963 have been  made  applicable.   The  Government  Order
also requires a fresh exercise  for  grant  of  lease  under  the  terms  of
Government order dated 22.10.2014 as well as under the  provisions  of  37th
Amendment of the Rules of 1963.   Several  subsequent  developments  in  the
matter as has been made as discussed above, do not lead  us  to  permit  the
respondents no.4 and 5 to operate their leases further.”


17.   When the matter came  up  for  consideration  before  this  Court,  an
interim order dated 15th May, 2015 was passed permitting the  appellants  to
operate the mining leases in question.    This appears to be on  account  of
the fact that the State of U.P. supported the stand  of  the  appellants  by
filing affidavit dated 13th April, 2015 and submitted that “Building  Stone”
were not covered by G.O. dated 31st May, 2012.  We now find that this  stand
is clearly contrary to the judgment of the High Court in Nar  Narain  Mishra
(supra).


18.   On the other hand,  Respondent  No.4,  the  original  writ  petitioner
before the High Court, has filed an affidavit  objecting  to  the  grant  of
leases in favour of the appellants under Chapter II and supported  the  view
taken by the High Court.  In its counter affidavit dated 8th May, 2015,  the
said respondent has pointed out that in view  of  earlier  judgment  of  the
High Court in Nar Narain Mishra and Sukhan Singh (supra)   grant  of  mining
lease under Chapter II was not permissible. The G.O. dated  31st  May,  2012
covered “Building Stone” also.  It was also submitted that mining  lease  of
less than five hectares was not permissible in  view  of  judgment  of  this
Court in Deepak Kumar (supra) which also rendered lease  in  favour  of  the
appellants illegal.  It is further pointed out that Special  Leave  Petition
(Civil) No.35075 of 2014 filed against the judgment  dated  12th  September,
2014 of the High Court of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  in  Sukhan  Singh  was
dismissed by this Court on 5th January, 2015.


19.   We have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.


20.    The plea of the appellants that they  had  acquired  a  vested  right
prior to G.O. dated 31st May, 2012 cannot be  accepted.   Order  dated  31st
May, 2012 was issued by the State of U.P. to bring  about  transparency  and
to safeguard the Government revenue and was consistent  with  the  decisions
of this Court in Article 14 of the Constitution.  The validity  thereof  was
upheld by the High Court in Nar Narain Mishra (supra).   The  said  judgment
applied to the mineral in question as specifically laid  down  by  the  High
Court.  The High Court upheld the  stand  of  the  State  that  pendency  of
application did not create any  right  in  favour  of  the  appellants.  All
applications pending as on 31st  May,  2012  stood  rejected  including  the
application of the appellants.  Admittedly, the appellants did not  make  an
application after the changed policy dated 22nd October, 2014 and  thus  the
said G.O. had no application to the present case.  We are  not  called  upon
to decide validity of order dated 22nd October,  2014  in  cancelling  order
dated 31st May, 2012.  This question can be gone into as and when raised.


21.   In Hind Stone (supra), this Court observed:

“13. Another submission of  the  learned  counsel  in  connection  with  the
consideration of applications for renewal was that applications  made  sixty
days or more before the date of GOMs No. 1312 (December 2, 1977)  should  be
dealt with as if Rule 8-C had not come into force.  It  was  also  contended
that even applications for grant of leases made  long  before  the  date  of
GOMs No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C had not come  into  force.
The submission  was  that  it  was  not  open  to  the  government  to  keep
applications for the grant of leases and applications  for  renewal  pending
for a long  time  and  then  to  reject  them  on  the  basis  of  Rule  8-C
notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long  prior  to
the date on which Rule 8-C came into force.  While  it  is  true  that  such
applications should be dealt with within a reasonable  time,  it  cannot  on
that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in  a
reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right  to  have  the
application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at  the  time  of
the making of the application. No one has a vested right  to  the  grant  or
renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an  application
for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt  with  in  a  particular  way,  by
applying particular provisions. In the  absence  of  any  vested  rights  in
anyone, an application  for  a  lease  has  necessarily  to  be  dealt  with
according to the rules  in  force  on  the  date  of  the  disposal  of  the
application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making  of
the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission  of  the
learned counsel that applications for the grant of renewal  of  leases  made
long prior to the date of GOMs No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule  8-C
did not exist.

22.   Reiterating the decision in Hind Stone (supra), this Court  in  Monnet
Ispat & Energy Ltd. vs. Union of India[9] held as under:


“132. ……Minerals—like rivers and forests—are a  valuable  natural  resource.
Minerals constitute our national wealth  and  are  vital  raw  material  for
infrastructure,  capital  goods  and  basic  industries.  The  conservation,
preservation and intelligent utilisation of minerals is not  only  the  need
of the day but is also  very  important  in  the  interest  of  mankind  and
succeeding generations. Management of minerals  should  be  in  a  way  that
helps in the country’s  economic  development  and  which  also  leaves  for
future generations to conserve and develop  the  natural  resources  of  the
nation in the best possible way. For the proper development of  economy  and
industry,  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources  cannot  be   permitted
indiscriminately;  rather  the  nation’s  natural  wealth  has  to  be  used
judiciously so that it may not be exhausted within a few years.


133.…………..No person has any fundamental right to claim  that  he  should  be
granted mining lease or  prospecting  licence  or  permitted  reconnaissance
operation in any land belonging to the Government. It is apt  to  quote  the
following statement of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Hind  Stone  (SCC  p.  213,
para 6) albeit in the context of minor mineral,


“6. … The public interest which induced Parliament to make  the  declaration
contained in Section 2 … has naturally to be the paramount consideration  in
all matters concerning the  regulation  of  mines  and  the  development  of
minerals”.


He went on to say: (Hind Stone case, SCC p. 217, para 10)


“10. … The statute with which we  are  concerned,  the  Mines  and  Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, is aimed … at  the  conservation  and  the
prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals. Surely, in the case  of
a scarce mineral, to permit exploitation by the State or its agency  and  to
prohibit exploitation by private agencies is the most  effective  method  of
conservation and prudent exploitation. If  you  want  to  conserve  for  the
future, you must prohibit in the present.”


23.   It was further observed :


“182.7. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked  in  abstract.
When it is sought to  be  invoked,  the  court  must  consider  all  aspects
including the result sought to be achieved and the  public  good  at  large.
The fundamental principle of equity must forever be present to the  mind  of
the court. Absence of  it  must  not  hold  the  Government  or  the  public
authority to its promise, assurance or representation.”

                 xxxx

188.3 Where the decision of an authority is founded in  public  interest  as
per executive policy or law, the court would be reluctant to interfere  with
such decision by  invoking  the  doctrine  of  legitimate  expectation.  The
legitimate expectation doctrine cannot  be  invoked  to  fetter  changes  in
administrative policy if it is in the public interest to do so.”


24.   In view of the above, we do not find any merit in these  appeals.   We
also do not approve the stand  of  the  State  of  U.P.  in  supporting  the
appellants, as already mentioned.


25.   Accordingly, the appeals are  dismissed.   Interim  order  granted  by
this Court stands vacated.   The State will assess the extent  of  pecuniary
advantage taken by the appellants under the interim order  and  recover  the
same from the appellants.




                                                    …………..……..…………………………….J.
                                                            [ ANIL R. DAVE ]

                                                    …………..….………………………………..J.
                                                       [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 04, 2016

-----------------------
[1]

       2013(2) ADJ 166
[2]    2014(11) ADJ 89
[3]
       (2012) 3 SCC 1 Centre for Public Interest  Litigation  Vs.  Union  of
India; (2012) 10  SCC  1   Natural  Resources  Allocation,  in  Re,  Special
Reference No.1 of 2012; (2014) 9 SCC 516 Manohar Lal  Sharma  Vs.  Principal
Secretary  and  (2014) 6 SCC 590 Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India
[4]    2013(2) ADJ 166
[5]    SLP (Civil) No.14372/2013, dismissed on 3.3.2014.
[6]    1981 (2) SCC 205
[7]    2012 (4) SCC 629
[8]    2014 (11) ADJ 89
[9]    2012 (11) SCC 1