2025 INSC 1130
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418–9420 of 2016
M/s Quippo Energy Ltd. —v— Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad–II
Bench: J. J.B. Pardiwala and J. K.V. Viswanathan.
Date of Judgment: 19th September, 2025.
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Subject / Statute — Central Excise Act, 1944; Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Section/Chapter Notes); definition of “manufacture” under Section 2(f).
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Facts (short) — Assessee imported complete gas generating sets (“Gensets”) and, for lease-based supply, mounted them inside steel containers and fitted additional components (radiator, silencer, ventilation fans, oil tank, pumps, piping, cable trays, control panel, testing, etc.) producing “Containerized Gensets” / “Power Packs”. Department contended that the process amounted to “manufacture” and classified the finished units under sub-heading 8502.2090; duty, penalties and confiscation were imposed. CESTAT held process amounts to manufacture (but set aside extended period/penalties); appeals arose.
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Issue — Whether placing an imported Genset within a steel container and fitting it with the listed components/parts amounts to “manufacture” within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
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Legal test / Principle — The Court reiterated the settled two-fold test drawn from prior authority: (i) Transformation test — whether by the process a different commercial commodity emerges (the identity of the original commodity ceases to exist; a new name/character/use arises); and (ii) Marketability test — whether the transformed product is marketable as such. Both prongs must be read conjunctively and applied contextually; transformation is primary. Processes that merely remove foreign matter or effect only convenience/value-addition without change of essential character do not amount to manufacture.
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Parts v. Accessories — A ‘part’ is an integral/constituent component without which the article cannot perform its primary function; an ‘accessory’ is non-essential and adds secondary convenience. Classification of appended items as ‘parts’ or ‘accessories’ is a factual enquiry.
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Application / Holding — The Court found that containerization plus fitting of integral components produced a product with different constituent elements, structure and functional utility (notably portability and leasing suitability) and therefore satisfied the transformation test. The components affixed were held to be ‘parts’ (not mere accessories) because the Genset would not function as a containerized unit without them. The finished “Power Pack” was admittedly marketable. Both tests satisfied → the activity constitutes manufacture under Section 2(f)(i) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Consequently, the units are dutiable and properly classifiable under sub-heading 8502.2090.
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Reliefs / Disposition — Appeals dismissed on merits; however, the Court set aside demands for the extended period of limitation, confiscation and penalties/redeemption fine on facts (assessee acted bona fide; had sought departmental clarification). CENVAT credit to be allowed subject to verification while quantifying duty for the normal period.
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Ratio / Practical Rule — Reengineering or structural alteration of an imported complete machine by adding integral parts that create a distinct, marketable commodity (even if core function remains) constitutes manufacture. Mere labeling or convenience-oriented modifications do not automatically preclude excise liability; substance of change (parts, structure, identity, marketability) governs.
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Notable authorities applied / considered — Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills; J.G. Glass; Servo-Med Industries; S.R. Tissues; Satnam Overseas; Maruti Suzuki (as discussed and applied in reasons).
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Significance — Clarifies that creation of a containerized/packaged variant of an imported machine can give rise to excisable manufacture where the additions produce a new identifiable marketable commodity; emphasizes fact-specific enquiry — parts v. accessory, transformation and marketability — and confirms that bona fide approach to department may mitigate extended limitation/penalties.
— Result: Appeals dismissed; duties for normal period sustained; demands for extended period, confiscation and penalties set aside; CENVAT credit to be considered while quantifying duty.
2025 INSC 1130 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 9418-9420 OF 2016
M/S QUIPPO ENERGY LTD. ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE AHMEDABAD – II ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 1 of 39
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.:
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:
INDEX
A. FACTUAL MATRIX...............................................................2
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES.....................11
(i) Submissions on behalf of the Appellant .................................. 11
(ii) Submissions on behalf of the Respondent............................... 13
C. ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED...............................................14
D. ANALYSIS..........................................................................15
(i) What amounts to “manufacture” under the Act, 1944? ........... 15
(ii) Whether the activity undertaken by the Appellant amounts to
“manufacture”?....................................................................... 24
E. CONCLUSION ....................................................................39
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 2 of 39
1. These appeals under Section 35L(b) of the Central Excise Act,
1944 (for short, the “Act, 1944”) are at the instance of an
assessee and are directed against the Final Order dated
15.10.2015 (for short, the “Impugned Order”) passed by the
Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal West Zonal
Bench (for short, the “CESTAT”) at Ahmedabad in Appeal
bearing Nos. E/640/2009-DB, E/1284,1285/2009-DB &
E/557/2012-DB respectively, by which all the three appeals
filed by the assessee came to be partly allowed by setting aside:
(i) the demand of duty with interest for the extended period of
limitation and (ii) the imposition of fine, penalty and
confiscation of goods. However, the CESTAT in the impugned
order held that the activities undertaken by the assesseeappellant to set up the “Containerized Gensets” would amount
to “manufacture” and the same are liable to be classified under
the sub-heading No. 8502.2090 of the Schedule to the Central
Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (for short, the “Act, 1985”). Accordingly,
the demand of duty along with interest for the period other than
the extended period was upheld.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The appellant is engaged in the business of providing
containerised gas generating sets known as the Power Packs on
a lease basis.
3. To carry out the above business, the appellant imported Gas
Generating Sets (for short, “Gensets”) consisting of an engine
(prime mover) coupled with an alternator on a common base
frame. The Gensets are imported along with the standard
accessories and total electronic management system. At the
time of import, the Customs Authorities assessed the Gensets
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 3 of 39
under the sub-heading 8502.2090 of the Schedule to the
Customs Tariff Act, 1975, categorising them as “Generating sets
with spark-ignition combustion piston engines of an output
exceeding 3.5 kVA”.
4. Since the Gensets were to be provided on a lease basis, the
appellant considered it unfeasible to install them at customer
premises. This was because, in cases of non-renewal of the
lease, the Genset would have to be relocated to the premises of
a new customer.
5. In such circumstances, to avoid inconvenience during shifting
and to provide for ease of transportation, the appellant placed
the Genset in a steel container. Further, in order to ensure the
functioning of the Genset within the container, the appellant
indigenously procured components such as radiator, ventilation
fan, air filter unit, oil tank, pipes, pumps, valve, silencer and
fitting items and fixed them to the container. The appellant has
described the process as follows:
(i) Using jacks and rollers, the imported equipment is first rolled
into a steel transport container and properly positioned on
anti- vibrating mounting pad.
(ii) Remote radiator is lifted by crane and properly positioned
onto the roof of the container. Further, it is arrested on the roof
with suitable sized nuts, bolts and washers.
(iii) Lube Oil Tank is lifted by crane and moved onto the roof of
the container. It is properly placed on the mounting channels
and locked on the roof top by suitable nuts, bolts and
washers.
(iv) For the purpose of HT, LT, Water and Lube Oil pipe lining on
the roof of the container, necessary fittings like pipes,
reducers, valves, tee, elbows, flanges, etc. are fitted.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 4 of 39
(v) Similar process is done for HT, LT, Water, DM Water and Lube
Oil line inside the container. Pumps, 3-way valve etc. are
located inside the container.
(vi) Ventilation fans and cowls are thereafter mounted.
(vii) The silencer is lifted by crane and located on the rooftop at
the appropriate position.
(viii) Necessary Cable Trays are placed inside and outside the
container. Proper earthing is done.
(ix) Control panel and other electrical items are properly placed
inside the container. Cabling with all other accessories is
done.
(x) All pipings are de-assembled. Pipings are then caustic
cleaned, hydraulic test is done thereon and painted.
(xi) Testing process involves hydraulic testing of piping for
leakage and electrical testing of all electrical connections.
6. As per the appellant, the role of each individual component is
as follows:
Component
Name
Purpose
Ventilation Fan This supplies ambient air to the generating
set to cool down the heat which surrounds
it because of the internal working of the
engine. This has no role to play in
generation of electricity.
Air Filter Unit This prevents dust from entering internal
parts of engine. It is common knowledge
that process of combustion needs oxygen
that is available in air. This is called
consumable and is being replaced from
time to time. Thus, Air Filter unit has no
role to play in generation of electricity. That
work is performed only by the imported
Gas Genset
Oil Tank Lubricant oil which kept in a pan beneath
engine of Gas Genset is circulated to
various moving parts for proper
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 5 of 39
lubrication. Oil tank is required to
replenish the oil in the pan and thus has
no role to play in generation of electricity.
Electricity is generated only by the
imported Gas Genset.
Pumps These pumps are used to move fluids from
one location to another. They are used to
carry water. Fitting of pump to Gas Genset
does not give rise to new product with
distinct name, character or use.
Valve It is a flow control device and have no
participation as such in generation of
electricity
Silencer &
Radiator
Silencer helps in controlling the noise
produced by exhaust gases during
operation. Therefore, silencer has no role
to play in Generation of Electricity by Gas
Genset.
While generating electricity the internal
parts of Gas Generator becomes very hot
due to process of combustion. Radiator
merely helps in radiating heat into the air
and cooling the engine. Coolant flows
through the generator block and then to
the radiator. In many cases, chiller is used
instead of radiator to extract heat that is
otherwise thrown into the environment.
Thus, radiator has no role to play in
generation of electricity. That work is
performed only by the imported gas
genset.
Pipes, Flanges,
Nut-bolts, Gasket
These are used for fitting of the above
items.
7. The appellant vide letter dated 22.11.2007 explained to the
Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad about the
activities carried out by it and sought an opinion as regards its
liability under the Act, 1944. Thereafter, on 17.07.2008 the
officers of Central Excise (Preventive), Ahmedabad-II visited the
appellant’s factory and examined the process undertaken by it.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 6 of 39
8. The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad-II,
vide its letter dated 19.08.2008 informed the appellant that the
activities undertaken by it would amount to “manufacture” by
virtue of Notes 4 and 6 of Section XVI of the Schedule to the Act,
1985, respectively.
9. The appellant in the aforesaid context filed an appeal before the
Commissioner (Appeals), questioning the communication of the
Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise. The Commissioner
(Appeals) vide order dated 27.03.2009 dismissed the appeal.
10. A Show Cause Notice dated 19.11.2008 was issued proposing
demand of duty along with interest and levy of penalty on the
Power Packs cleared during the period from November 2006 to
July 2008. The said Show Cause Notice was adjudicated by the
Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad and vide the
Order-in-Original No.10/Commissioner/RKS/AHD-II/2009
dated 28.04.2009 the demand and penalty were confirmed.
11. Thereafter, six Show Cause Notices were issued proposing
demand of duty along with interest and levy of penalty on the
Power Packs cleared during the period from August 2008 to
March 2011. The said Show Cause Notices were adjudicated
and vide the Order-in-Original No. 01 to
06/COMMR/RAJU/AHD-II/2012 dated 29.03.2012 the
demand and penalty were confirmed.
12. In the aforementioned Orders-in-Original, the respective
authorities have held that the “Containerized Genset” i.e., the
“Power Pack” has a distinct name, character and use and is
capable of being sold and marketed. Thereby, the activity
undertaken by the appellant satisfies the conditions of
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 7 of 39
“manufacture” as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act, 1944.
Consequently, the said goods are classifiable under the subheading No.8502.2090 of the Schedule to the Act, 1985 and are
liable for Central Excise duty.
13. The appellant filed appeals before the CESTAT against the order
passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 27.03.2009, the
Order-in-Original dated 28.04.2009 and the Order-in-Original
dated 29.03.2012 respectively.
14. The CESTAT while disposing of the appeals filed by the
appellant held as under:
“13. .......It is submitted that the Gensets imported by
the Appellant remains essentially the same. We have
already observed that in the present case, the
imported Gensets after certain process sold as Power
Pack, different and distinct nature. As per statement
of Shri Divyesh Shah, the Gensets imported by the
Appellant is incomplete machine, can be used into
complete form after assembly of various
accessories/components. Note 6 of the Section XVI of
Customs Tariff Act provides that the conversion of an
incomplete or unfinished article into complete or
finished goods shall amount to manufacture. It is
evident from the record that the activities undertaken
by the Appellant are incidental to the completion of
manufacture of Power Pack, and without such
activities Power Pack cannot be used by the
customers Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act, 1944, the
definition of manufacture includes the process
incidental to the completion of a manufactured
product. Heading 85.02 covers Electric Generating
Sets and Rotary Connectors". Sub-heading
8502.2090 covers "Generating sets with sparkignition internal combustion piston engines" other
than Electric portable generators of an output not
exceeding 3.5 KVA. As per Notes of Chapter 85 of
HSN, Generating Sets consisting of the generator and
its prime mover which are mounted (or designed to be
mounted) together as one unit or on a common base.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 8 of 39
In the present case, the activities of fixing of antivibrating mounting pad, radiator, Lube Oil Tank,
Ventilation, fans, silencers, Cable Trays, Control
Panel and other electrical items, hydraulic test
processing etc, are mounted together as one unit on a
common base, known as Power Pack and also
Containerized Gensets.
14. According to the Appellant, the Gensets imported
by them were capable of generating electricity, and
the Gensets itself is marketed. But, it is seen from the
record that the process undertaken by the Appellant
on the imported Gensets for the industrial customers.
Thus, the industrial customer would buy Power Pack
rather than Gensets. The imported Gensets and
Power Pack are known separately in the trade and
parlance. It is also noted that the use of both the items
are for different purposes. In our considered view, the
process undertaken by the Appellant would
constitute manufacture as it emerges a new
commodity in the market.
xxx xxx xxx
16. In case of Laminated Packing Pvt Ltd (supra) the
Hon’ble Supreme Court considered that manufacture
is bringing into the goods as known in the Excise law
i.e. known in the market having distinct and separate
and identifiable function. In the present case, we
have also noticed the photograph of the products of
the Gensets and the Power Pack are different and
distinct items. The learned Advocate contended that
the imported Gensets is covered under the subheading 8502.2090 of the First Schedule to Customs
Tariff Act "Generating sets with Spark - Ignition
Combustion System Engine" of an output not
exceeding 3.5 KVA." It is submitted that the Customs
Department had assessed the goods as complete
electric generating sets and classification under the
same heading under the Central Excise Tariff Act,
1985, cannot be sustained. We find that the identical
issue was raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Laminated Packings Pvt. Ltd (supra). It
has been observed that the goods belongs to the same
entry is also not relevant because even if the goods
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 9 of 39
belong to the same entry, the goods are different
identifiable goods known as such in the market. If
that is so, the manufacture occurred and if
manufacture takes place, it is dutiable. The said
decision would squarely apply in the present case
and the Power Pack is rightly classified under subheading No.8502.2090 of Central Excise Tariff Act,
1985.
17. However, we find force in the submissions of the
learned Advocate that the extended period of
limitation cannot be invoked. On perusal of the
records, we find that the Appellant by letter
dt.22.11.2007, informed the Assistant Commissioner
of Central Excise for a clarification on any possible
liability of Central Excise duty. The Appellant also
pursued the matter before the Department. There is
no material on record of suppression of facts with
intent to evade payment of duty. The Hon'ble Gujarat
High Court in the case of Gujarat Glass Pvt. Ltd
(supra) observed that the Assessee on his own
brought to the notice of the Department the fact about
the clearance of the goods to its sister unit without
duty before the date of visit of the officers. The
Assessees conduct was candid and therefore, bona
fide. There is no evidence of intentional evasion.
18. In the case of Anand Nishikawa Company ltd Vs
CCE Meerut 2005 (185) EL T 149 (SC), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that there was no deliberate
attempt of non-disclosure of excise duty. No claim as
to "suppression of facts" would be entertained for the
purpose of invoking extended period of limitation
within the meaning of proviso to Section 11A(1) of the
Act. It is also noted that Hon’ble Supreme Court in
series of cases, has held that the extended period of
limitation, would not be invoked in the case of
revenue neutrality as the CENVAT Credit is available
against the demand of duty.
19. We find that the Appellant acted under a bona
fide belief that the activities undertaken by them
would not amount to manufacture. It is the case of
interpretation of the provisions of law and therefore,
the imposition of penalties on the Appellants are not
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 10 of 39
warranted. It is noted that the goods were available
for confiscation. It is well settled that if the goods are
available, the same cannot be confiscated.
Accordingly, the confiscation of goods and imposition
of penalty cannot be sustained.
20. In view of the above discussions. we hold that the
activities undertaken by the Appellant would amount
to manufacture and Power Pack also known as
"Containerized Gensets" would be classifiable under
sub-heading No.8502.2090 of the Schedule to the
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 and the demand of
duty alongwith interest for the normal period is
upheld. The adjudicating authority is directed to
extend CENVAT Credit benefit, while quantifying
duty, subject to verification of record. The demand of
duty with interest for the extended period of limitation
and confiscation and imposition of redemption fine
and penalties are set aside. The appeal filed by the
Appellant company is disposed of in the above terms.
The appeal filed by the Appellant No.2 Shri Montu
Patwa, General Manager (F&A) is allowed. The
applications for extension of stay order are dismissed
as infructuous.”
15. Thus, the CESTAT held that the process undertaken by the
appellant would amount to “manufacture” on the following
grounds:
a. The Power Packs are different and distinct in nature from
the imported Gensets, and the activities undertaken by the
appellant are incidental to the completion of manufacturing
Power Packs. Thus, these activities would amount to
“manufacture” under Section 2(f) of the Act, 1944, which
brings under the ambit of “manufacture” any process
incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured
product;
b. Imported Gensets and the Power Packs are known
separately in trade and parlance and both items are used
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 11 of 39
for different purposes. Thus, the process undertaken by the
appellant would constitute “manufacture” as it leads to the
emergence of a new product in the market; and
c. Imported Gensets are incomplete machines and can be
used in complete form after assembly of various
components procured by the appellant. Note 6 of Section
XVI of the Act, 1985 provides that conversion of an
incomplete or finished goods falling under that section shall
amount to “manufacture”.
16. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here
before this Court with the present appeals.
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES
(i) Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
17. Ms. Charanya Lakshmikumaran, the learned counsel appearing
for the appellant, submitted the following:
a. A process would amount to “manufacture” if the following
two-fold test, as explained by this Court in a catena of
judgments, is satisfied: (i) Whether by the said process a
different commercial commodity comes into existence or
whether the identity of the original commodity ceases to
exist (Transformation Test); and (ii) Whether the
commodity which was already in existence would be of no
commercial use but for the said process (Marketability
test).
b. The two limbs must be satisfied cumulatively. As held by
this Court in Servo-Med Industries Pvt Ltd v.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai reported in
(2015) 14 SCC 47, fulfilment of any one of these limbs is
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 12 of 39
not conclusive if the other limb of the test is not satisfied.
In the facts of the present case, both the limbs of the above
test are not satisfied.
c. The transformation test is not satisfied as the product
remains a Genset performing the function of generating
electricity and does not transform into another distinct
commodity, whereby its original identity as a Genset ceases
to exist. The various accessories attached to the container
serve the sole purpose of making the generating set fit to
work within a container box (for logistical purposes). Mere
enhancement of the functionality with the use of these
accessories will not detract from the fact that the product
continues to remain a generating set and can generate
electricity without such accessories. Thus, the process does
not transform the imported Genset into a different
commercial commodity. The term ‘Power Pack’ is merely a
trade name given by the appellant, and the use and
character of the product imported remains the same.
d. The imported Gensets were complete and functional
Gensets in themselves and it would be incorrect to say that
the addition of accessories leads to completing an
incomplete machine.
e. The marketability test is also not satisfied, as it cannot be
said that the product, in its imported form, served no
purpose without the activity undertaken by the appellant.
It was capable of generating electricity and was
commercially available for such purpose de hors the
accessories.
f. Without prejudice to the aforesaid even if it were to be held
that the second test is satisfied in the present case, i.e., by
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 13 of 39
way of containerization and adding accessories the Genset
becomes marketable for a customer, this test has to be
simultaneously and cumulatively satisfied along with the
first test. However, the transformation test is not satisfied
in the present case, as there was no transformation of the
imported Genset into a different and distinct product.
Thus, the activity undertaken by the appellant would not
amount to “manufacture”.
18. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel
prayed that there being merit in her appeal, the impugned order
be set aside.
(ii) Submissions on behalf of the Respondent
19. Ms. Nisha Bagchi, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
Revenue, submitted the following:
a. The findings recorded in the impugned order have been
arrived at after considering all the relevant material and
applying the established test for determining
“manufacture”. Thus, the impugned order is unassailable
in law as well as on the facts.
b.The Genset in its imported form is not functional. It is
undisputed that the appellant is not selling the imported
Genset as such. The Genset is containerized using various
locally procured parts to transform it into a functional
Power Pack. The Power Pack is a different product having a
distinct character, name and use and is marketable as
such. The test of no commercial use without further
process is satisfied, and the fact of “manufacture” stands
established. The present dispute falls within the fourth
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 14 of 39
category enunciated in Servo-Med (supra), i.e., where the
goods are transformed into marketable, different/new
goods after a particular process. Thus, “manufacture”
could be said to have taken place as contemplated under
Note 6 of Section XVI of the Schedule to the Act, 1985 and
Section 2(f) of the Act 1944, respectively, thereby attracting
the levy of Central Excise duty.
c. Further, emphasis was laid on the fact that “part” of an
article is something necessary for the completion of that
article. It is an integral, constituent or component part,
without which the article to which it is to be joined would
not function as such an article. On the other hand, an
“accessory” is something that is not necessary for the
functioning of an article. In this context, the
characterisation of components such as radiator,
ventilation fan, etc., by the appellant as ‘accessories’ is
wholly untenable. The Genset, once placed in the
container, would not function without these components,
and thus these components should rightly be termed as
‘parts’ of the Power Pack.
C. ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED
20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the following
question falls for our consideration:
• Whether the process of placing the Genset within a steel
container and fitting the steel container with components
such as radiator, ventilation fan, air filter unit, oil tank,
pipes, pumps, valve and silencer would amount to
“manufacture” under Section 2(f) of the Act, 1944?
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 15 of 39
D. ANALYSIS
(i) What amounts to “manufacture” under the Act, 1944?
21. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either
side, we must look into a few provisions of the Act, 1944. Section
2(f) defines the term “manufacture”. The same reads as follows:
“2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context,—
xxx xxx xxx
(f) “manufacture” includes any process—
(i) incidental or ancillary to the completion of a
manufactured product;
(ii) which is specified in relation to any goods
in the Section or Chapter Notes of the Fourth
Schedule as amounting to manufacture; or,
(iii) which in relation to the goods specified in
the Third Schedule, involves packing or
repacking of such goods in a unit container or
labelling or re-labelling of containers including
the declaration or alteration of retail sale price
on it or adoption of any other treatment on the
goods to render the product marketable to the
consumer and the word “manufacture” shall
be construed accordingly and shall include not
only a person who employs hired labour in the
production or manufacture of excisable goods,
but also any person who engages in their
production or manufacture on his own
account;”
22. The term “manufacture” assumes vital importance as under the
Act, 1944, the event of taxation is at the point of manufacturing.
Section 3 of the Act, 1944, which is the charging section, lays
down that the excise duty is to be levied on goods which are
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 16 of 39
produced or manufactured in India. This is because excise duty
is primarily a duty on the goods produced or manufactured
within the country.
23. Sub-clause (i) of Section 2(f) is inclusive, and “manufacture”
has been defined to include any process incidental or ancillary
to the completion of the manufactured product. Sub-clause (ii)
of Section 2(f) stipulates that “manufacture” would include any
process which has been specified in the Section/Chapter notes
of the Schedule to the Act, 1985, as amounting to
“manufacture”. In other words, if a process is declared as
amounting to “manufacture” in the section or chapter notes, it
would come within the definition of Section 2(f) and become
liable to excise duty.
24. At first blush, Section 2(f)(i) may suggest that any process
undertaken on the goods in question would fall within the ambit
of “manufacture”. However, this Court has consistently held
that such a broad interpretation would be erroneous. The
courts must try to appreciate the nuanced yet critical
distinction that the law draws between mere ‘processing’ on the
one hand, and ‘manufacturing’ on the other. The following
paragraphs of the decision of this Court in Union of India v.
Delhi Cloth & General Mills reported in 1962 SCC OnLine
SC 148, would help in elucidating this very important
distinction between processing and manufacturing:
“13. The other branch of Mr. Pathak's argument is
that even if it be held that the respondents do not
manufacture "refined oil" as is known to the market
they must be held to manufacture some kind of
"non-essential vegetable oil" by applying to the raw
material purchased by them, he processes of
neutralisation by alkali and bleaching by activated
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 17 of 39
earth and/or carbon. According to the learned
Counsel "manufacture" is complete as soon as
by the application of one or more processes,
the raw material undergoes some change. To
say this is to equate "processing" to
"manufacture" and for this we can find no
warrant in law. The word "manufacture" used
a as verb is generally understood to mean as
"bringing into existence a new substance" and
does not mean merely "to produce some
change in a substance", however minor in
consequence the change may be. This distinction
is well brought about in a passage thus quoted in
Permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, Vol. 26,
from an American Judgment. The passages runs
thus :-
'Manufacture' implies a change, but
every change is not manufacture and
yet every change of an article is the
result of treatment, labour and
manipulation. But something more is
necessary and there must be
transformation; a new and different
article must emerge having a distinctive
name, character or use.
xxx xxx xxx
15. These definitions make it clear that to become
"goods" an article must be something which can
ordinarily come to the market to be bought and
sold.
16. This consideration of the meaning of the word
"goods" provides strong support for the view that
'manufacture' which is liable to excise duty under
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, must be the
"bringing into existence of a new substance known
to the market." " But," says the learned Counsel,
"look at the definition of 'manufacture' in the
definition clause of the Act and you will find
that 'manufacture' is defined thus :
'Manufacture' includes any process incidental
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 18 of 39
or ancillary to the completion of a
manufactured product (s. 2(f))". We are unable
to agree with the learned Counsel that by
inserting this definition of the word
"manufacture" in s. 2(f) the legislature
intended to equate "processing" to
"manufacture" and intended to make mere
"processing" as distinct from "manufacture" in
the same sense of bringing into existence of a
new substance known to the market, liable to
duty. The sole purpose of inserting this definition
is to make it clear that at certain places in the Act
the word 'manufacture' has been used to mean a
process incidental to the manufacture of the article.
Thus in the very item under which the excise duty
is claimed in these cases, we find the words : "in or
in relation to the manufacture of which any process
is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power". The
definition of 'manufacture' as in s. 2(f) puts it
beyond any possibility of controversy that if power
is used for any of the numerous process that are
required to turn the raw material into a finished
article known to the market the clause will be
applicable; and an argument that power is not used
in the whole process of manufacture using the word
in its ordinary sense, will not be available. It is only
with this limited purpose that the legislature, in our
opinion, inserted this definition of the word
'manufacture' in the definition section and not with
a view to make the mere "processing" of goods as
liable to excise duty.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
25. As per this Court’s decision in Delhi Cloth & General Mills
(supra) for an activity to amount to “manufacture” and not be
considered as merely ‘processing’ it has to produce a
‘transformation’ of the subject article i.e, a new and different
article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or
use. This test, as laid down by this Court in Delhi Cloth &
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 19 of 39
General Mills (supra), has been extensively applied by this
Court in its subsequent rulings.
26. In Union of India & Ors v. J.G Glass Industries Ltd & Ors
reported in (1998) 2 SCC 32, this Court was dealing with the
question whether printing on glass bottles amounts to
“manufacture” within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act,
1944. The Court accepted the contention of the respondents
that the activity of printing names or logos on the bottles did
not change the basic character of the commodity and that the
plain bottles in themselves were commercial commodities and
could be sold and used as such. Thus, the Court held that
printing on glass bottles did not amount to “manufacture”
under Section 2(f) of the Act, 1944. The relevant observations
made by this Court are reproduced as follows:
“16. On an analysis of the aforesaid rulings, a twofold test emerges for deciding whether the process
is that of "manufacture". First, whether by the
said process a different commercial
commodity comes into existence or whether
the identity of the original commodity ceases
to exist; secondly, whether, the commodity
which was already in existence will serve no
purpose but for the said process. In other
words, whether the commodity already in
existence will be of no commercial use but for
the said process. In the present case, the plain
bottles are themselves commercial commodities
and can be sold and used as such. By the process
of printing names or logos on the bottles, the basic
character of the commodity does not change. They
continue to be bottles. It cannot be said that but for
the process of printing, the bottles will serve no
purpose or are of no commercial use.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 20 of 39
27. This Court in J.G. Glass (supra) established a two-fold test to
ascertain if an activity constitutes “manufacture”:
a. Fundamental Change Test: The first criterion is to determine
if the process results in a new commercial item being
created, or if the original item’s identity is fundamentally
altered or ceases to exist. This means assessing whether a
transformation occurs such that a distinct product with a
new name, identity, character, or use emerges;
b. But for the process Test: The second criterion evaluates
whether the product that existed before the process would
be commercially useless or serve no purpose without
undergoing that specific process. In other words, if the preexisting commodity would lack any commercial utility were
it not for the process, this condition is met.
28. This Court in Servo-Med (supra) undertook extensive analysis
and discussed its various previous judgments to clarify the
issue as to what constitutes a manufacturing activity. The Court
classified the existing case law into the following distinct
categories for the purpose of examining the different aspects of
the term “manufacture” under the Act, 1944:
a. When transformation occurs/does not occur: In this
category, the Court discussed instances where goods are
transformed into something different and/or new, which
typically indicates “manufacture”, as against instances
where changes/processes do not lead to transformation into
a new product.
b. Retaining of essential character: In this category, the Court
discussed instances where the activity did not amount to
“manufacture” as the goods remained essentially the same
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 21 of 39
after a particular process, with the original article
continuing to hold its core identity despite changes.
c. “But for the process” test / no commercial user without
further process: In this category, the Court evaluated
instances where a product in existence would serve no
commercial purpose without undergoing a specific process,
and whether undertaking such a process would amount to
“manufacture”.
29. This Court in Servo-Med (supra) also discussed the ratio of the
judgment in J.G Glass (supra), more particularly as to how the
‘but for the process’ test ought to be understood and applied.
The relevant observation is reproduced as follows:
“24. It is important to understand the correct ratio
of the judgment in the J.G. Glass case. This
judgment does not hold that merely by application
of the second test without more manufacture comes
into being. The Court was at pains to point out that
a twofold test had emerged for deciding whether
the process is that of manufacture. The first test is
extremely important-that by a process, a different
commercial commodity must come into existence as
a result of the identity of the original commodity
ceasing to exist. The second test, namely that
the commodity which was already in existence
will serve no purpose but for a certain process
must be understood in its true perspective. It
is only when a different and/or finished
product comes into existence as a result of a
process which makes the said product
commercially usable that the second test laid
down in the judgment leads to manufacture.
Thus understood, this judgment does not lead
to the result that merely because the
unsterilized syringe and needle is of no
commercial use without sterilization, the
process of sterilization which would make it
commercially usable would result in the
sterilization process being a process which
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 22 of 39
would amount to manufacture. If the original
commodity i.e. syringes and needles continue
as such post sterilization, the second test
would not lead to the conclusion that the
process of sterilization is a process which
leads to manufacture. This is because, in all
cases, there has first to be a transformation in the
original article which transformation brings about a
distinctive or different use in the article.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, this Court in Servo-Med (supra) has held that both the
prongs of the two-prong test must be fulfilled in order for an
activity to amount to “manufacture”. The ‘but for the process’
test cannot be applied in isolation, without first establishing
that the fundamental test of transformation has been satisfied.
30. While we are in respectful agreement with the above extracted
observations of this Court in Servo-Med (supra), we believe a
further clarification is necessary as regards the application of
the two pronged test laid down in J.G. Glass (supra). If the
second wing of the J.G. Glass test—namely, that the original
commodity would serve no purpose but for the said process
were to be applied as a rigid and universal mandate, it would
lead to manifest absurdity. To illustrate this, we may give a
simple example of a flour mill that processes wheat grain into
flour. The wheat grain, which is the input, is a perfectly
marketable commodity in its own right; it can be sold as seed
or used as animal feed. If one were to apply the second test as
propounded in J.G. Glass (supra) in a mechanical manner, the
inescapable conclusion would be that since the wheat grain was
in itself a marketable commodity, the process of milling it into
flour would not amount to “manufacture”, as the second prong
of the test is not being satisfied.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 23 of 39
31. Even in the facts of the present case, it is the contention of the
appellant that the imported Genset had commercial utility even
without the activity being undertaken. This argument, when
pedantically read with this Court’s clarification in Servo-Med
(supra) that both prongs of the test have to be satisfied, would
mean that just because the subject article had commercial
utility prior to it being subjected to the process, the process
undertaken would not lead to “manufacture” even if it was
transformative in nature. Such an interpretation would be
patently erroneous. In order to avoid such absurdity, it is
important that the applicability of the second wing of the J.G.
Glass (supra) test must be judged on the facts and
circumstances of each individual case, and the same cannot be
brandished as a universal rule.
32. This Court in Servo-Med (supra) categorised the entire case law
into four categories. In paragraph 27, the Court lists them out
as follows:
“27. The case law discussed above falls into four
neat categories.
(1) Where the goods remain exactly the same even
after a particular process, there is obviously no
manufacture involved. Processes which remove
foreign matter from goods complete in themselves
and/or processes which clean goods that are
complete in themselves fall within this category.
(2) Where the goods remain essentially the same
after the particular process, again there can be no
manufacture. This is for the reason that the original
article continues as such despite the said process
and the changes brought about by the said process.
(3) Where the goods are transformed into something
different and/or new after a particular process, but
the said goods are not marketable. Examples
within this group are the Brakes India case and
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 24 of 39
cases where the transformation of goods having a
shelf life which is of extremely small duration. In
these cases also no manufacture of goods takes
place.
(4) Where the goods are transformed into
goods which are different and/or new after a
particular process, such goods being
marketable as such. It is in this category that
manufacture of goods can be said to take
place.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
33. A close reading of the four categories referred to above would
indicate that this Court in Servo-Med (supra) has also laid down
a two pronged test for the purpose of determining whether an
activity amounts to “manufacture”. The two-fold test is: (i)
Transformation test (Whether a distinct product with a new
name, identity, character, or use emerges?); and (ii)
Marketability test (Whether the transformed product is
marketable as such?).
(ii) Whether the activity undertaken by the Appellant
amounts to “manufacture”?
34. We now proceed to apply the test laid down in Servo-Med
(supra) for the purpose of answering the following two
questions:
a. Whether the Imported Gensets have undergone a
transformation into Power Packs, i.e. whether the imported
Gensets and the Power Packs are distinct/different
products, each with their own separate character, identity,
or use?; and
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 25 of 39
b. Whether the Power Packs can be considered to be
marketable?
35. The dispute between the parties before us primarily lies with
respect to the transformation test. It is the case of the appellant
that no transformation has occurred and there is no change in
the character, identity or name as: (i) the function and end use
of both the imported Gensets and Power Packs remains the
same i.e., generating electricity; and (ii) placing the Genset
inside the steel container and fitting it with various accessories
is only for logistical purposes and the same merely enhances
functionality.
36. In Servo-Med (supra), the question before this Court was
whether the process of sterilizing syringes and needles would
amount to “manufacture” under the Act, 1944. Answering in the
negative, the Court held as follows:
“28. The instant case falls within the first category
aforementioned. This is a case of manufacture of
disposable syringes and needles which are used
for medical purposes. These syringes and
needles, like in the J.G. Glass case and unlike
the Brakes India case, are finished or
complete in themselves. They can be used or
sold for medical purposes in the form in which
they are. The fact that medically speaking they are
only used after sterilization would not bring this
case within the ratio of the Brakes India case. All
articles used medically in, let us say, surgical
operations, must of necessity first be sterilized.
xxx xxx xxx
30. The added process of sterilization does not
mean that such articles are not complete articles in
themselves or that the process of sterilization
produces a transformation in the original articles
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 26 of 39
leading to new articles known to the market as
such. A surgical equipment such as a knife
continues to be a surgical knife even after
sterilization. If the Department were right, every
time such instruments are sterilized, the same
surgical instrument is brought forth again and
again by way of manufacture and excisable duty is
chargeable on the same. This would lead to an
absurd result and fly in the face of common sense.
If a surgical instrument is being used five times a
day, it cannot be said that the same instrument has
suffered a process which amounts to manufacture
in which case excise duty would be liable to be paid
on such instruments five times over on any given
day of use. Further, what is to be remembered here
is that the disposable syringe and needle in
question is a finished product in itself. Sterilization
does not lead to any value addition in the said
product. All that the process of sterilization
does is to remove bacteria which settles on the
syringe's and needle's surface, which process
does not bring about a transformation of the
said articles into something new and
different. Such process of removal of foreign
matters from a product complete in itself
would not amount to manufacture but would
only be a process which is for the more
convenient use of the said product. In fact, no
transformation of the original articles into
different articles at all takes place. Neither
the character nor the end use of the syringe
and needle has changed post-sterilization.
The syringe and needle retains its essential
character as such even after sterilization.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
According to this Court in Servo-Med (supra), the syringes and
needles even before sterilization were complete and finished
articles and all that the process of sterilization did was to
remove the foreign particles which settled on the surfaces of
such needles and syringes. Neither the character nor the end
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 27 of 39
use of the syringe and needle changed post sterilisation.
Consequently, no transformation had occurred.
37. In Commissioner of Central Excise-I, New Delhi v. S.R
Tissues Pvt Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) 6 SCC 310, the
question before this Court was whether the cutting/slitting of
jumbo rolls of tissue paper into various sizes suitable for use as
toilet papers, table napkins or facial tissues would amount to
“manufacture” in terms of Section 2(f) of the Act, 1944. The
Court held as follows:
“12. At the outset, we may point out that the
assessee is one of the downstream producers. The
assessee buys duty-paid jumbo rolls from M/s
Ellora Paper Mills and M/s Padamjee Paper Mills.
There are different types of papers namely, tissue
paper, craft paper, thermal paper, writing paper,
newsprints, filter paper etc. The tissue paper is the
base paper which is not subjected to any treatment.
The jumbo rolls of such tissue papers are bought by
the assessee, which undergoes the process of
unwinding, cutting/slitting and packing. It is
important to note that the characteristics of
the tissue paper are its texture, moisture
absorption, feel etc. In other words, the
characteristics of table napkins, facial
tissues and toilet rolls in terms of texture,
moisture absorption capacity, feel etc. are the
same as the tissue paper in the jumbo rolls.
The said jumbo rolls cannot be conveniently
used for household or for sanitary purposes.
Therefore, for the sake of convenience, the
said jumbo rolls are required to be cut into
various shapes and sizes so that it can be
conveniently used as table napkins, facial
tissues, toilet rolls etc. However, the end-use
of the tissue paper in the jumbo rolls and the
end-use of the toilet rolls, the table napkins
and the facial tissues remains the same,
namely, for household or sanitary use. The
predominant test in such a case is whether
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 28 of 39
the characteristics of the tissue paper in the
jumbo roll enumerated above is different from
the characteristics of the tissue paper in the
form of table napkin, toilet roll and facial
tissue. In the present case, the tribunal was right
in holding that the characteristics of the tissue
paper in the jumbo roll are not different from the
characteristics of the tissue paper, after slitting and
cutting, in the table napkins, in the toilet rolls and
in the facial tissues.
13 . In the case of Brakes India Ltd. v. Supdt. of
Central Excise & Others this Court has very aptly
brought out the test of character or end-use by
observing as follows:
" If by a process, a change is effected in a
product, which was not there previously,
and which change facilitates the utility of the
product for which it is meant, then the
process is not a simple process, but a
process incidental or ancillary to the
completion of a manufactured product. It will
not be safe solely to go by a test as to
whether the commodity after the change
takes in a new name, though in stated
circumstances, it may be useful to resort to
it. This may prove to be deceptive
sometimes, for it will suit the manufacturer
to retain the same name to the end product
also. The 'character or use' test has been
given due importance by pronouncements of
the Supreme Court. When adopting a
particular process, if a transformation takes
place, which makes the product have a
character and use of its own, which it did not
bear earlier, then the process would amount
to manufacture under section 2 irrespective
of the fact whether there has been a single
process or have been several processes."
14. Applying the above tests, we hold that no
new product had emerged on winding,
cutting/slitting and packing. The character
and the end-use did not undergo any change
on account of the abovementioned activities
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 29 of 39
and, therefore, there was no manufacture on
first principles.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
In S.R. Tissues (supra), this Court dealt with a fact situation
wherein the form and shape of the subject article were being
changed to facilitate the convenience of use. However, such a
change in form did not lead to a change in either its character
or use i.e., both the character and use of the product remained
the same before and after undergoing the process.
38. In Satnam Overseas Ltd v. Commercial of Central Excise,
New Delhi, reported in (2015) 13 SCC 166, the assessee was
engaged in packing combination of mixture of raw rice,
dehydrated vegetables and spices in the name of ‘Rice and
Spice’. The department contended that this process of mixing
raw rice, dehydrated vegetables and spices amounted to
“manufacture” as per Section 2(f) of the Act, 1944. The Court
held that there was no transformation into a new commodity
and thus the process did not amount to “manufacture”. The
relevant observation reads thus:
“11. The first judgment which we want to mention,
which was cited by Ms. Charanya, is Crane Betel
Nut Powder Works v. Commissioner of Customs,
Central Excise, Tirupathi. In the said case the
Assessee was engaged in the business of
marketing betel nuts in different sizes after
processing them by adding essential/non-essential
oils, menthol, sweetening agent etc. Initially, the
Assessee cleared the goods under Chapter Subheading 2107 of the Central Excise Tariff and was
paying duty accordingly. However, the Assessee
filed a revised classification declaration Under Rule
173B of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, with effect
from 17th July, 1997, claiming classification of its
product under Chapter Sub-heading 0801.00 of the
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 30 of 39
Central Excise Tariff. It was contended by the
Assessee that the crushing of betel nuts into
smaller pieces with the help of machines and
passing them through different sizes of sieves to
obtain goods of different sizes/grades and
sweetening the cut pieces did not amount to
manufacture in view of the fact that mere crushing
of betel nuts into smaller pieces did not bring into
existence a different commodity which had a
distinct character of its own.
12. Though the authorities below had decided
against the Assessee, this Court reversed the said
view holding that the said process would not
amount to 'manufacture' as the process involving
manufacture does not always result in the creation
of a new product. In the instant case
notwithstanding the manufacturing process, it
could not be said that a transformation had taken
place resulting in the formation of a new product.
The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced
below:
31. In our view, the process of manufacture
employed by the Appellant company did not
change the nature of the end product, which
in the words of the Tribunal, was that in the
end product the 'betel nut remains a betel
nut'. The said observation of the Tribunal
depicts the status of the product prior to
manufacture and thereafter. In those
circumstances, the views expressed in the
D.C.M. General Mills Ltd. (supra) and the
passage from the American Judgment
(supra) become meaningful. The observation
that manufacture implies a change, but
every change of not manufacture and yet
every change of an article is the result of
treatment, labour and manipulation is
apposite to the situation at hand. The
process involved in the manufacture of
sweetened betel nut pieces does not result in
the manufacture of a new product as the end
product continues to retain its original
character though in a modified form.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 31 of 39
What is to be highlighted is that even after the
betel nut which had been cut to different sizes
and had undergone the process, the Court did
not treat it as 'manufacture' within the
meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act on the
ground that the end product was still a betel
nut and there was no change in the essential
character to that article even when it was the
result of treatment, labour and manipulation,
inasmuch as even after employing the same it
had not resulted in the manufacture of a new
product as the end product continued to
retain its original character.
13. Another judgment which was referred to by
learned Counsel for the Appellant is Commissioner
of Central Excise v. Laljee Godhoo and Co. Vide this
judgment the Court affirmed the view taken by the
CEGAT, holding that the process of subjecting raw
asafoetida (hing) resulting in formation of
compounded asafoetida does not amount to
manufacture, even when this process has
undergone chemical change, because of the reason
that the said chemical change had not brought even
after it underwent a process, any new product as
the product remained the same at starting and
terminal points of the process....
14.....Again the test which was applied was
that essential character of the product did not
change and, therefore, it would not amount to
manufacture. It was so held even when gum
arabic as well as wheat flour were mixed in
the process. A pertinent aspect which was
noted was that mixing of these articles did not
result in chemical reaction with asafoetida.
15. Last judgment to which we would like to refer
to is Deputy Commissioner Sales Tax (Law), Board
of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. PIO Food
Packers. In that case, the process undertaken by
the Assessee was to wash the pineapple, after
purchase, and then remove inedible portion, the
end crown as well as skin and inner core. After
removing those inedible portions the pineapple fruit
used to be sliced and the slices were filled in canes
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 32 of 39
after adding sugar as preservative. Thereafter,
canes would be sealed under temperature and then
put in a boiled water for sterilisation. Identical
question was posed viz. whether this process
amounted to 'manufacture'. Giving the answer in
the negative, the Court held that even when
with each process suffered, the original
commodity experienced a change, such a
change would not amount to 'manufacture'
unless it seized to be the original commodity
and a new and distinct article was produced
therefrom....
xxx xxx xxx
17. It follows from the above that mere addition
in the value, after the original product has
undergone certain process, would not bring it
within the definition of 'manufacture' unless
its original identity also under goes
transformation and it becomes a distinctive
and new product.
18. When we apply the aforesaid principle to the
facts of this case, it is clear that mere addition of
dehydrated vegetables and certain spices to
the raw rice, would not make it a different
product. Its primary and essential character
still remains the same as it is continued to be
known in the market as rice and is sold as rice
only. Further, this rice, again, remains in raw
form and in order to make it edible, it has to
be cooked like any other cereal. The process
of cooking is even mentioned on the pouch
which contains cooking instructions. Reading
thereof amply demonstrates that it is to be
cooked in the same form as any other rice is
to be cooked. Therefore, we do not agree with the
CEGAT that there is a transformation into a new
commodity, commercially known as distinct and
separate commodity.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, Satnam Overseas (supra) clarified that the addition of
elements to a subject article would in itself not lead to
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 33 of 39
“manufacture”, as long as the essential character of the subject
article is being retained.
39. In Maruti Suzuki India Ltd v. Commissioner of Central
Excise, reported in (2015) 13 SCC 186, the appellant’s primary
contention was that the process of Electro Deposition Coating
of various spare parts such as bumpers, grills, etc, did not
amount to “manufacture” as the same was in the nature of antirust and was merely done to increase the shelf life of the said
spare parts. Agreeing with the appellant, the Court held as
follows:
“17. On the facts of the present case, we have first,
therefore, to arrive at whether there is
"manufacture" at all and only subsequently does
the question arise as to if this is so, what is the
valuation of the processed goods and whether duty
is payable upon them. We have found on facts that
for the purposes of the proviso to Rule 57F(ii), the
inputs that were not ultimately used in the
final product but were removed from the
factory for home consumption remain the
same despite ED coating and consequent value
addition. We follow the law laid down in S.R
Tissues Pvt. Ltd.'s case and state that on
account of mere value addition without more
it would be hazardous to say that
manufacture has taken place, when in fact, it
has not. It is clear, therefore, that the inputs
procured by the Appellants in the present case,
continue to be the same inputs even after ED
coating and that Rule 57F(ii) proviso would
therefore apply when such inputs are removed from
the factory for home consumption, the duty of
excise payable being the amount of credit that has
been availed in respect of such inputs under Rule
57A.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 34 of 39
40. At first glance, it may seem that the observations in various
decisions discussed above fortify the appellant’s stance that no
transformation could have occurred from placing imported
Genset into a steel container and fitting the steel container with
multiple additional components. The appellant may legitimately
argue, in the facts of the present case, like in the
aforementioned cases: (i) no change in end use of the subject
article is occurring [Servo-Med (supra)]; (ii) merely form is being
changed for the sake of convenience [S.R Tissues (supra)] and
utility [Maruti Suzuki (supra)]; and (iii) the additional elements
do not change the character of the good [Satnam Overseas
(supra)]. Consequently, undertaking the necessary process
would not amount to “manufacture” under Section 2(f) of the
Act, 1944.
41. However, such contention should fail. In all the aforementioned
cases, the character or use of the subject article did not change,
and hence, there was no transformation. In S.R Tissues
(supra), the change in form of the tissue roll did not lead to a
change in the characteristics of the tissue. Similarly, in Satnam
Overseas (supra), the additional elements did not change the
essential characteristics of the subject article. However, in the
facts of the present case, the change in the form/structure and
the addition of new components to the imported Genset has
transformed it and brought into existence a different product,
i.e. the Power Pack, which has its own distinct character and
identity.
42. Determining the ‘character’ and ‘identity’ of goods is an
inherently fact-specific inquiry, necessitating assessment on a
case-to-case basis. Given the vast diversity of products and
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 35 of 39
manufacturing processes, it is impossible to lay down one
universal definition for these terms.
43. In the facts of the present case, we are convinced that the steel
container and the other additional components do transform
the imported Genset and bring into existence a distinct product
which has its own character and identity. On a preliminary
analysis itself, it is amply evident that the constituent
components of the imported Genset are very different from the
constituent components of the Power Pack. The appellant
argued that mere addition of extra components would not
transform the imported Genset as all the additional components
are in the nature of mere accessories being attached for the sake
of convenience and utility. Consequently, the addition of these
components would not transform the imported Genset into a
different and distinct product.
44. At this juncture, it is necessary to determine whether these
components attached to the steel container would constitute as
‘parts’ or ‘accessories’ of the Power Pack. This is crucial because
if these additional components are ‘parts’ of the Power Pack, it
would establish beyond doubt that the imported Genset has
undergone transformation as its constituent elements are very
different from that of the Power Pack.
45. The judicial understanding of the terms ‘part’ and ‘accessory’
respectively is as presented below:
a. A part is an integral/ constituent component which renders
the article complete and functional i.e., the article would not
be able to fulfill its primary function without this component.
[See Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Central
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 36 of 39
Excise, Delhi- III, reported in (2014) 15 SCC 625, and M/s
Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central
Excise, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1232];
b. An accessory on the other hand is a component which while
not being essential to the primary functioning of the article,
is used in conjunction with the article and adds
supplemental/secondary value by providing for additional
beauty, elegance, comfort or convenience of use in relation
to that article. [See Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi
v. Insulation Electrical Private Limited reported in
(2008) 12 SCC 45].
To illustrate, an air conditioner installed in a car would not be
considered a ‘part’ of that car. This is because the car can
effectively perform its primary function of transportation even
without an air conditioner. Conversely, the air conditioner
would be classified as an ‘accessory’ because it enhances
comfort and convenience when utilised with the car. It provides
supplemental/secondary value by enabling the ability to control
the temperature within the car. On the other hand, a steering
wheel would be considered as a ‘part’ of the car because without
a steering wheel the car would not be able to perform its primary
function, i.e., transportation.
46. Applying the above enunciated judicial understanding of ‘parts’
and ‘accessories’ to the facts of this case, it becomes evident
that the additional components should be considered as ‘parts’
of the Power Pack. The appellant itself has admitted to the fact
that once the Genset is placed in the steel container, these
additional components, such as the radiator, ventilator fan and
air filter unit, are required for its effective functioning. However,
according to the appellant, these components do not have a
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 37 of 39
direct role in generating the electricity. Even if that be the case,
it cannot be denied that these components play an equally vital
role in facilitating such generation of electricity. It would be safe
to assume that without these additional components, the Power
Pack would not produce electricity within the steel container
and thereby be able to fulfil its primary function. Thus, these
additional components are not mere ‘accessories’ attached for
the sake of convenience.
47. Further, the change in the form of the imported Genset after
undergoing the process is drastic and substantial. Unlike in S.R
Tissues (supra) wherein the tissue roll was itself cut/slit into
different forms, what is happening in the present case is not
mere restructuring of the imported Genset. Rather, the Genset
is being reengineered so that it can function within a container.
In order to facilitate the same a number of additional
components are being added, and they are all recognisable as
‘parts’ of the Power Pack. In fact, the pictorial representations
of the imported Genset and Power Pack itself indicates that
structurally there is a profound distinction between both the
products. In such circumstances, the fact that the process was
undertaken merely for the sake of logistical purposes would not
change the undeniable fact that the imported Genset has been
transformed into a different product.
48. The appellant’s submission that the Genset was complete and
functional at the time of import and the end-use of both the
imported Genset and the Power Pack is the same i.e., generation
of electricity, is also devoid of any merit. There is a serious
dispute between the parties as to whether or not the Genset at
the time of import was complete and functional. Even if we
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 38 of 39
assume it was complete and functional, that still would not help
in driving home the appellant’s contention. This is because the
core end-use of a subject article might remain the same pre and
post application of the process and yet it might have undergone
a transformation into a different product.
49. The contention of the appellant that the end-use of both
products is merely the ‘generation of electricity’ is an
oversimplification that conflates the core function of a product
with its functional utility. The Genset at the time of the import
was in a form that was suitable/intended for permanent
installation. The process undertaken by the appellant imparts
the core functional utility of portability to the Genset, a utility
that was non-existent in the product at the time of its import.
This is not a minor, value-added feature, it is the defining
attribute from which the final product derives its entire identity
and character.
50. We have no doubt in our mind that the test of transformation
is satisfied in the facts of the present case. The imported Genset
and the Power Pack are two different commodities with distinct
constituent elements, structure and functional utility.
51. We now turn to the final test of marketability. No evidence has
been adduced by the appellant to suggest that the Power Packs
are not marketable. On the contrary, it is an admitted position,
clear from the record, that it is these very Power Packs that are
the subject of the lease agreements and are delivered to the
ultimate customer. Thus, no serious question regarding the
marketability of the final product remains, it is an established
and undisputed fact.
Civil Appeal Nos. 9418-9420 of 2016 Page 39 of 39
E. CONCLUSION
52. In the facts of the present case, both the transformation test
and the marketability test stand fulfilled. The process of placing
the Genset within the steel container and fitting that container
with additional, integral components brings into existence a
new, distinct, and marketable commodity. This process would
thus amount to “manufacture” under Section 2(f)(i) of the Act,
1944. Consequently, the appellant is liable to pay excise duty
on the goods manufactured.
53. For all the foregoing reasons, the appeals fail and are hereby
dismissed.
….………………………….…. J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
….………………………….…. J.
(K.V.VISWANATHAN)
New Delhi.
September 19, 2025.