LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Saturday, September 27, 2025

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Ss. 439(2), 401, 482 – Cancellation/Revocation of Bail – Held: Distinction reaffirmed. Cancellation of bail applies where accused misuses liberty, tampers with evidence, threatens witnesses, commits similar offences, absconds, etc. Revocation of grant of bail applies where order granting bail is perverse, illegal, or passed on irrelevant considerations – superior courts may set aside such orders. [(P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211; Abdul Basit, (2014) 10 SCC 754, followed)]. Bail – Delay in filing application for cancellation – Delay alone not fatal. However, long lapse of time coupled with good conduct of accused on bail weighs in favour of continuation of liberty. Bail – Factors for grant/refusal – While antecedents relevant, they cannot by themselves constitute a ground to deny bail. Period of incarceration and conduct during bail period may tilt balance towards liberty. [(Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763, relied on)]. Bail – High Court’s power – Once Sessions Court grants bail mechanically without considering relevant factors, High Court may either (i) remit matter for fresh consideration by Sessions Court, or (ii) itself assess and revoke, depending on circumstances. Bail Jurisprudence – Balancing liberty and fair trial – Supreme Court reiterates principle: “Bail is the rule, jail is the exception” (Krishna Iyer, J.). Court must balance individual liberty with victim’s rights and societal interests. Strict conditions can ensure trial integrity without unnecessary curtailment of liberty. Bail – Post-bail misconduct allegation – Affidavit by alleged victim (Abhiram) disowning FIR against appellant Vishnu undermined allegation of fresh offence. FIR in such circumstances did not warrant cancellation of bail. Practice & Procedure – Conditions imposed by Supreme Court – Bail restored subject to stringent conditions: Accused barred from entering Alappuzha district (except for trial). Mandatory police station attendance every alternate day. No tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. No deferment of cross-examination of eye-witnesses. Liberty to seek modification of restrictions post recording of all eye-witness evidence. Bail bonds to satisfaction of trial court. State directed to ensure witness protection and presence; trial court to expedite trial. Result – Impugned judgment revoking bail set aside. Appeals allowed. Accused to remain on bail subject to stringent conditions.

2025 INSC 1136 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.4197-4199 OF 2025

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NOS.5814-5816 OF 2025]

ABHIMANUE ETC. ETC. … APPELLANTS

VS.

STATE OF KERALA … RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 4200-4201 OF 2025

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NOS.7641-7642 OF 2025]

VISHNU ETC. … APPELLANTS

VS.

STATE OF KERALA & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Assailed in the present set of appeals is the judgment and order

dated 11th December, 20241

 of the Kerala High Court, passed on a

batch of petitions2

 filed by the State of Kerala praying for setting

aside of grant of bail (through separate orders) to a total of 10

(ten) accused. Vide the impugned order, the High Court set aside

1 impugned order

2 Crl. M Nos. 4707, 4713, 4716, 4739, 4749, 4752, 4762, 4767 & 4798 of 2024

1

the orders granting bail to 5 (five) of the 10 (ten) accused, who

are the appellants before us.

3. A First Information Report3

 under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149,

324 and 302, Indian Penal Code, 18604

, was registered on 19th

December, 2021, against unknown persons. It was alleged

therein that such unknown persons committed the said offences

under the leadership of one political activist of a particular

political organization (not a party to these proceedings). Soon

thereafter, the appellants were arrested. As per the narrative in

the police report (charge-sheet) filed under Section 173(2), Code

of Criminal Procedure, 19735

 dated 15th March, 2022, the accused

are activists of a particular political organization who, allegedly,

due to political enmity murdered the victim on 18th December,

2021. Accused 2-6 formed an unlawful assembly, followed the

victim in a vehicle and collided with his scooter at 5:50 pm. The

victim fell down whereupon he was brutally attacked; ultimately,

he succumbed to his injuries at 11:30 pm. The accused were

consequently charged with having committed offences under

Sections 120-B, 109, 115, 143, 147, 148, 149, 324 and 302, IPC

and Section 27(1) of the Arms Act, 1959. We note that the

appellants Abhimanue, Athul, Sanand, Vishnu and Dhaneesh

figure as A-3, A-5, A-4, A-2 and A-6, respectively, in the chargesheet.

3 FIR No. 621/2021, PS Mannanchery, District Alappuzha, Kerala

4 IPC

5 Cr. PC

2

4. In December 2022, vide separate orders of various dates, after

being in custody for nearly a year, the appellants and the coaccused were granted bail by the trial court. The State applied for

cancellation of bail before the Additional Sessions Judge, who

rejected the application on 5th April, 2024.

5. Next, the State approached the High Court in May 2024 praying

for setting aside of the orders granting bail to the accused

persons.

6. The High Court divided the accused into two categories – (i)

conspirators and (ii) persons against whom the specific overt act

of murder was alleged. The appellants belong to the second

category. The High Court noted that bail was granted to the

appellants by the Sessions Court in a mechanical manner,

without referring to any “circumstance that should have been

borne in mind while granting bail in a heinous crime as murder”.

The High Court further noted that the Sessions Court granted bail,

based on two factors. First, the accused had been in custody for

more than a year, and secondly, there was no opposition from the

Public Prosecutor. The possibility of influencing the witnesses or

tampering with evidence was not borne in mind by the Sessions

Court, whereas only a few weeks prior, their bail applications

were rejected finding that they may influence the witnesses and

tamper with evidence. The High Court found that there was no

change of circumstances, and hence bail should not have been

granted. The High Court also rejected the argument that bail

3

should not be cancelled, as the applications praying for

cancellation were filed more than a year and a half after the grant

of bail. Accordingly, the bail granted in favour of the appellants

stood set aside by the High Court.

7. Aggrieved by the impugned order revoking grant of bail, the

appellants have now carried it to this Court in appeal.

8. Mr. Soumya Chakraborty, learned senior counsel, submitted on

behalf of the appellants that setting aside orders granting bail, on

an application filed more than 18 (eighteen) months after such

grant, was unjustified. Further, the appellants did not tamper

evidence or influence witnesses, did not abscond, and did not

violate any other bail condition while on bail; as such, setting

aside of the orders granting bail was uncalled for and without

justifiable reasons. He further submitted that the application for

cancellation of bail, preferred by the State before the High Court,

was not maintainable. Since an earlier application for cancellation

had already been rejected by the Sessions Judge, the proper

remedy of the State was to approach the High Court under

Sections 401 and 482, Cr. PC, rather than by way of a fresh

application for cancellation before the High Court. Lastly, as the

State did not challenge the order of the Sessions Judge refusing

to cancel the bail, the said order has attained finality and is now

unassailable.

9. The State filed a status report pursuant to an order of this Court.

Upon perusal of the report, apart from the antecedents of the

4

accused, it is seen that the accused were identified based on

CCTV footage of the crime, which was recovered from a nearby

house. Relying thereon, learned senior counsel Mr. Dinesh,

representing the State, urged that the impugned order suffers

from no infirmity and, thus, deserves to be upheld.

10. It was also stated in the status report that Vishnu (A-2) had

violated a condition of interim bail (granted by this Court vide

order dated 28th May, 2025) by entering the district of Alappuzha

on 30th July, 2025. Vishnu (A-2), along with Rajendra Prasad (A-1),

allegedly assaulted and threatened (by knife) a person named

Abhiram on the same day which led to registration of FIR No.

1006/2025.

11. Opposing the petitions, Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2 (widow of the

victim), submitted that the Sessions Court failed to consider the

severity of the allegations against the appellants and granted bail

by a non-speaking order. On the other hand, the order impugned

in these appeals is well-reasoned and this Court ought to be loath

to interfere therewith. Out of the total 10 (ten) accused, the High

Court set aside the orders granting bail of only 5 (five) accused,

after considering all relevant factors. Distinguishing them from

the conspirators, the appellants herein were classified in the

category of the actual assailants in the gruesome murder.

Specific overt acts attributable to each accused were discussed in

detail by the High Court. Our attention was also drawn to the

5

several criminal antecedents of the appellants. A-2, along with a

co-accused, allegedly committed offences even after the grant of

interim protection by this Court on 30th July, 2025. Moreover, it

was submitted that the Sessions Court granted bail to the several

accused upon hearing only the Public Prosecutor and not the

Special Public Prosecutor, who was appointed for the case. Lastly,

the High Court rightly held that delay in filing an application for

revocation of bail is no ground for rejecting such an application.

12. Mr. Chakraborty responded by stating that Vishnu entered into

the district as he was required to attend the ongoing trial of the

case on that date. As regards the commission of an offence by

Vishnu, it was submitted that the purported victim (Abhiram) had

denied the involvement of the accused persons in the offence by

way of an affidavit filed before the High Court in proceedings

instituted by Vishnu under Section 482, Cr. PC.

13. Heard learned senior counsel appearing for the parties and

perused the record.

14. Before proceeding further, we consider it appropriate to begin our

analysis by addressing one of the arguments raised by Mr.

Chakraborty. He has challenged the very maintainability of the

application filed before the High Court. According to him, once an

application under Section 439(2), Cr. PC seeking cancellation of

bail has been rejected by the Sessions Judge, a second

application under the same provision cannot be filed directly

before the High Court. Instead, the proper course would be either

6

to challenge the Sessions Judge’s order in a petition for revision,

or to invoke the inherent powers of the High Court under Section

482, Cr. PC.

15. We are unable to agree with this argument. We note that, in the

present case, the application before the High Court was filed

under “Section 482 r/w 439 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure”.

That being the case, nothing prevented the High Court from

exercising its inherent powers.

16. We now propose to proceed with our discussion on the other

aspects of the case.

17. Law is well settled that cancellation of bail is distinct from

revocation of an order granting bail. Bail may be cancelled when

the accused violates any of the conditions imposed. On the other

hand, an order granting bail can be revoked if such an order is

found to be perverse or illegal. In P v. State of Madhya

Pradesh6

, a three-judge Bench of this Court, after analyzing

various previous decisions, discussed the distinction between the

two. Relevant paragraphs of the decision are reproduced below:

21. Echoing the above principle, in Ranjit Singh v. State of

M.P. [Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P., (2013) 16 SCC 797 : (2014) 6 SCC

(Cri) 405], it has been held thus:

“19. … There is also a distinction between the concept of setting

aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order and cancellation of

an order of bail on the ground that the accused has

misconducted himself or certain supervening circumstances

warrant such cancellation. If the order granting bail is a perverse

one or passed on irrelevant materials, it can be annulled by the

superior court.”

6 (2022) 15 SCC 211

7

22. In Abdul Basit v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary [Abdul

Basit v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary, (2014) 10 SCC 754 : (2015) 1

SCC (Cri) 257], this Court has opined that: (SCC p. 763, para 19)

“19. Therefore, the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal

or perverse order is different from the concept of cancellation of

a bail on the ground of accused's misconduct or new adverse

facts having surfaced after the grant of bail which require such

cancellation and a perusal of the aforesaid decisions would

present before us that an order granting bail can only be set

aside on grounds of being illegal or contrary to law by the court

superior to the court which granted the bail and not by the same

court.”

***

24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling

bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening

circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant

of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to

permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail

during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995

SCC (Cri) 237] . To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this

Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court

below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or

perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an

order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate

court.

25. Some of the circumstances where bail granted to the accused

under Section 439(1) CrPC can be cancelled are enumerated below:

(a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other

criminal activity;

(b) If he interferes with the course of investigation;

(c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence;

(d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses;

(e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings;

(f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smooth

investigation;

(g) If he is likely to flee from the country;

(h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going

underground and/or becoming unavailable to the

investigating agency;

(i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his

surety.

(j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which are

considered unconducive to a fair trial.

We may clarify that the aforesaid list is only illustrative in nature

and not exhaustive.

(emphasis ours)

8

18. In the present case, the High Court revoked the orders granting

bail after noting that the Sessions Court kept only two

considerations in mind: period of custody and ‘no opposition from

the prosecution’, without a discussion of the other factors in

detail. However, the Sessions Court having primarily proceeded

on the premise of there being no objection from the side of the

prosecution for grant of bail, it would have been just and proper

for the High Court to direct the Sessions Court to consider all the

relevant factors and decide afresh the application of the

appellants for bail. Evidently, in the absence of the Sessions

Court looking into all relevant factors for grant of bail, the High

Court took upon itself such a responsibility. Looking at the gravity

of the crime and the apprehension of evidence being tampered

and witnesses being susceptible to influence and intimidation,

the High Court proceeded to revoke the bail.

19. What weighs with us now, in the facts and circumstances of the

present case, is whether the High Court ought to have revoked

the bail for the reasons that it assigned or should the High Court

have directed the Sessions Court to decide the application for bail

afresh.

20. Directing the Sessions Court to decide the application for grant of

bail is an available option to us given the circumstances noted

above but having regard to the lapse of time and the submissions

advanced, we propose to decide the appeals on merits.

9

21. Apart from the fact that it has not been shown to our satisfaction

that the appellants violated any of the conditions of bail except in

one case, which we propose to consider a little later, we are of

the considered opinion that notwithstanding the gravity of the

offences alleged against the appellants, the conflicting interests

of individual liberty on the one hand and the victim’s rights as

well as concerns for community safety on the other could have

been better balanced bearing in mind that the appellants had

suffered incarceration for nearly a year and thereafter had been

on bail for almost 2 (two) years before the orders granting bail

were revoked vide the impugned order. The likelihood of the

accused influencing the witnesses or tampering with the

evidence and ensuring smooth progress of the trial could have

been taken care of by imposing stringent conditions over and

above those which were imposed while granting bail.

22. Reverting to the sole instance of violation of bail condition, we

note that after the grant of interim bail by this Court, Vishnu and

A-1 had allegedly assaulted and threatened Abhiram with a knife,

which led to Abhiram lodging an FIR under Sections 115 (2),

118(1), 351(2) and 25 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Seeking quashing of the said FIR, Vishnu approached the High

Court. The records indicate that Abhiram filed an affidavit before

the High Court denying Vishnu’s involvement in the crime stating

that “(T)he police may have for reasons best known to them

implicated him in the offence. After preparing the statement, I

10

merely affixed by signature at the paper as shown by them

without reading the statement. I was never aware that the

Petitioner’s name was included … .”. Abhiram also denied having

settled the dispute and clarified that “upon conciliation talks only

the misunderstanding was mitigated”. Suffice it to record on

perusal of the above statement that there is much more than

what meets the eyes. We are not prepared to accept the

contention that the FIR lodged by Abhiram affords ground for

cancellation of bail granted to Vishnu.

23. Our attention was also invited to the status report filed by the

State, to indicate the various criminal antecedents of the

appellants. Suffice it to say, however, that such antecedents by

themselves cannot constitute a ground for denial of bail. In this

context, a useful reference may be made to the decision of a

coordinate Bench of this Court in Ayub Khan v. State of

Rajasthan7 of which one of us (Augustine George Masih, J.) was

a member. The relevant paragraph therefrom is extracted below:

10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only one of

the several considerations for deciding the prayer for bail made by

him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a strong prima

facie case, depending upon the fact situation and period of

incarceration, the presence of antecedents may not be a ground to

deny bail. There may be a case where a Court can grant bail only on

the grounds of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may

not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant

default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are irrelevant in

such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar facts, the Court can

grant bail notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents. ……… .

24. Cancellation/revocation of bail, no doubt, seeks to uphold trial

integrity. The dominant purpose thereof is to ensure a fair trial

7 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763

11

and protect societal interests by preventing persons accused of a

heinous or grave crime and having tendencies to influence or

intimidate witnesses or to tamper evidence from being released.

Indeed, if such accused are likely to interfere with witness

testimony, the courts could be justified in ordering the accused to

be taken back into custody. However, at the same time, the

golden rule of bail jurisprudence propounded by Hon’ble V.R.

Krishna Iyer, J. of ‘bail being the rule and jail an exception’ cannot

be ignored. Taking back the appellants in custody for no better

reason than that the Sessions Court should not have been

swayed by omission of the Public Prosecutor to raise any

objection to grant of bail should not operate to the appellants’

prejudice, more so when two years have passed in the

interregnum.

25. Upon perusing the status report filed by the State, we find that

the case was posted for “schedule trial” on 30th May, 2025 and

thereafter the case has been listed on various dates. As per the

chargesheet, a total of 141 (one hundred forty-one) witnesses are

to be examined. Of them, there are at least five witnesses who

allegedly witnessed the crime. The trial will obviously take time to

conclude. Bearing in mind that the appellants since grant of bail

have not been involved in any similar or other offence, we prefer

to lean in favour of liberty rather than its curtailment.

Accordingly, while setting aside the impugned order, the

12

appellants’ liberty is not curtailed subject to imposition of certain

stringent conditions.

26. To obviate any possibility of tampering with evidence and

intimidation and/or influencing of the witnesses by the appellants,

we impose the following conditions for grant of bail to the

appellants:

a. The appellants shall not enter the limits of district Alappuzha,

save when their presence is required for the purposes of trial.

b. The appellants shall inform the trial court of their respective

address where they propose to stay during such time condition

(a) remains in force.

c. On every alternative day, the appellants shall mark their

presence at the police station having jurisdiction in respect of

their proposed places of stay. Such attendance need not be

marked, if on any particular day, they are required to remain

present before the trial court.

d. The appellants shall not procrastinate the trial and fully

cooperate with the trial court to take the trial to its logical

conclusion without any delay.

e. The appellants shall not tamper with prosecution evidence and

influence/intimidate the witnesses.

f. The appellants shall not pray for deferment of crossexamination of any eye-witness.

13

g. After the evidence of all the alleged eye-witnesses is recorded,

the appellants shall be at liberty to seek modification of

condition (a) supra before the trial court.

h. The appellants shall be required to furnish bail bonds to the

satisfaction of the trial court.

27. The trial court, in addition to the aforesaid conditions, may

impose any other conditions as it may deem fit and proper.

28. The police administration of the State may appoint the

investigating officer of the case or any other police officer to

ensure that not only do the appellants not influence/intimidate

the witnesses but also that protection to the witnesses, as and

when the occasion so demands, is provided.

29. We direct the State too to cooperate with the trial court by

ensuring the presence of all the private and official witnesses on

the dates fixed by the trial court for recording evidence.

30. The trial court is encouraged to expedite the trial by scheduling

dates in such a manner that witness testimony is recorded

without undue delay.

31. The appellants shall continue to remain on bail, pending trial,

subject to adherence to the terms and conditions for such grant

as imposed by the trial court, in addition to the conditions

imposed by us. Should there be any breach of the terms and

conditions and the same is brought to the notice of the trial court,

14

appropriate orders may be passed including cancellation of the

bail granted by this Court.

32. The impugned judgment and order revoking the orders granting

bail stands set aside. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed.

33. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

………..…………….………………J.

 (DIPANKAR DATTA)

…………..……………..……………J.

 (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 22, 2025.

15