Criminal Law – Registration of FIR – Cognizable Offence – Duty of Police – Preliminary Enquiry – Scope –
Where complaints by private citizens disclosed prima facie commission of cognizable offences (illegal seizure of documents without seizure memo, abuse of authority, intimidation, derogation of bail orders) against CBI officers on deputation, the High Court was justified in directing registration of FIR and investigation. Held, under Section 154 Cr.P.C., registration of FIR is mandatory if information discloses cognizable offence; police is not required to test genuineness or credibility of information at that stage. Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2006) 2 SCC 677; Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 – relied on.
Criminal Procedure – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Writ under Article 226 – Alternative Remedy – Maintainability –
Availability of alternative remedy (approaching Magistrate under Sections 156(3) or 200 Cr.P.C.) not an absolute bar. High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, can direct registration of FIR where serious allegations of abuse of power by public servants are made out.
Preliminary Inquiry – CBI Report – Effect –
Report of CBI Joint Director holding that no cognizable offence was made out, is at best a preliminary inquiry report prior to registration of FIR. Such a report is not conclusive and does not bind the Court; I.O. may look into it during investigation but must independently investigate without being influenced by such findings.
Public Servant – Protection – Section 197 Cr.P.C. – Sanction – Stage of Consideration –
Plea of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. or bar under Section 140 of Delhi Police Act cannot be a ground to refuse registration of FIR. Whether protection is available to public servant is a matter to be considered at later stage, not at FIR stage.
Investigation – Forum –
Direction of High Court to have matter investigated by Special Cell (meant for terrorism-related cases) modified by Supreme Court. Investigation to be carried out by Delhi Police, by an officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police.
Delay – Challenge to High Court Order – Condonation –
Though appeals were filed after 12 years, delay condoned as appellants had bona fide pursued LPAs which were later dismissed as not maintainable.
Practice and Procedure – Appeals – Scope of Interference – Article 136 –
Supreme Court declined to interfere with High Court’s discretionary order directing registration of FIR, as same was based on material showing prima facie commission of cognizable offences.
Directions –
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FIR to be registered and investigated by Delhi Police (ACP rank or above).
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Preliminary inquiry report of CBI may be considered by I.O., but not treated as conclusive.
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Investigation to conclude preferably within 3 months.
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Appellants to cooperate with I.O. and appear as directed; no arrest or coercive steps unless custodial interrogation found necessary.
2025 INSC 1095
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7900 of 2019)
VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SEESH RAM SAINI & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. of 2025)
(D.No. 10495 of 2019)
VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHEESH RAM SAINI & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7897 of 2019)
VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
VIJAY AGGARWAL & ANR. RESPONDENT(S)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. of 2025)
(D. No. 10508 of 2019)
VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
VIJAY AGGARWAL & ANR. RESPONDENT(S)
2
J U D G M E N T
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel,
Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General
and Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel for
the parties.
4. The cases are quite simple but have a chequered
history, involving the appellants, who are two
officers of the Central Bureau of Investigation1. One
is Vinod Kumar Pandey, the then Inspector of CBI,
and the other is Neeraj Kumar, the then Joint
Director of CBI.
5. The two petitions being Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 675
of 2001 and Writ Petition (Crl.) No.738 of 2001
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read
with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure2, 1973 came to be filed by one Vijay
Aggarwal and other by one Sheesh Ram Saini
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CBI’
2 Hereinafter referred to as’Cr.P.C.’
3
respectively, seeking directions for registration of
First Information Report3 against the above two
officers on deputation to the CBI, namely, Vinod
Kumar Pandey and Neeraj Kumar for committing
offences under Sections 506, 341, 342 and 166,
and Sections 218, 463, 465, 469, 166 and 120-B of
the Indian Penal Code4, 1860, as alleged in the writ
petitions respectively.
6. The aforesaid two writ petitions were decided by the
Single Judge of the High Court on 26.06.2006 but
by separate order(s) passed in identical terms. Both
the petitions were partly allowed and directions
were issued to the Delhi Police to register a case on
the basis of the allegations contained in the
complaint dated 05.07.2001 lodged by Sheesh Ram
Saini with PS Lodhi Colony and complaint dated
23.02.2004 addressed to Commissioner of Police,
Delhi by Vijay Aggarwal respectively, and to get the
matter investigated by the Special Cell of the Delhi
Police by an Officer not below the rank of Assistant
Commissioner of Police, uninfluenced by the
3
In short ‘FIR’
4
In short ‘IPC’
4
findings and the observations contained in the
Inquiry Report dated 26.04.2005 conducted by the
Joint Director, CBI.
7. In short, the writ petitions were partly allowed with
the direction to register the FIR with the finding
that prima facie cognizable offences are made out
for investigation against the appellant-officers.
8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment(s) and order(s)
of the High Court dated 26.06.2006, both the
officers of the CBI preferred separate Letters Patent
Appeal(s)5 before the Division Bench of the High
Court. The said LPAs were dismissed on 13.03.2019
on the ground of maintainability.
9. Out of the present four appeals, two appeals
[D.No.10495 of 2019 and D.No.10508 of 2019] are
against the order(s) of the learned Single Judge
dated 26.06.2006 partly allowing the petitions, and
other two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and
S.L.P.(C) No. 7897 of 2019] are against the order of
the Division Bench of the High Court dated
13.03.2019 dismissing the LPAs as not
maintainable.
5 Hereinafter referred to as ‘LPA’
5
10. We had made it clear to the parties in the very
beginning that we would not enter into the question
of maintainability of the LPAs so as to adjudicate
the appeals arising out of their dismissal for the
reason that we would consider the correctness of
the judgment and order(s) dated 26.06.2006 on
merits as would have been done in the LPAs by the
Division Bench. The counsel for the parties agreed
and proceeded to advance arguments accordingly
on merits.
11. A preliminary objection was raised with regard to
delay of more than 12 years in challenging the
judgment and order(s) of the Single Judge dated
26.06.2006.
12. The said delay has been explained taking the
ground that the appellants were bona fide pursuing
their LPAs before the Division Bench of the High
Court and once they realized that the LPAs are not
maintainable and they have been dismissed as not
maintainable, they decided to challenge the
judgment and order(s) passed by the learned Single
Judge before the Supreme Court.
6
13. In view of the above explanation, though
technically, pursuing the LPAs and the time spent
thereon may not be a very good cause to condone
the delay but since there is no willful or deliberate
delay or any default on part of the appellants in
assailing the judgment and order(s) of the Single
Judge dated 26.06.2006 rather they were all
thoroughly vigilant of their rights, we have ignored
the delay and have heard the parties on merits,
more particularly, on the correctness of the
judgment and order(s) of the Single Judge.
14. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
appellants, argued that the information/complaint
submitted by Sheesh Ram Saini and by Vijay
Kumar Aggarwal does not make out a cognizable
offence for enabling the Court to direct for the
registration of the FIR. The High Court could not
have directed for the registration of the FIR as the
procedure laid down by the various decisions of this
Court was not followed before approaching the High
Court. Secondly, the High Court could not have
recorded a finding of commission of a cognizable
7
offence which leaves nothing for the Investigating
Officer6 to opine on after the completion of the
investigation, except to submit a chargesheet. He
further argued that in the so-called preliminary
inquiry conducted by the Joint Director, CBI, it has
been reported that no cognizable offence is made
out for the purpose of investigation, therefore, it
was not open for the High Court to have substituted
its own finding and to direct for the registration of
the FIR.
15. He emphasized that even if for the sake of argument
it is accepted that a case for investigation is made
out against Vinod Kumar Pandey, there is no
averment or iota of material to rope in Neeraj
Kumar, the other officer.
16. A further submission has been made by Mr. Ranjit
Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants,
that the High Court manifestly erred in directing the
investigation to be conducted by the Special Cell of
the Delhi Police, which ordinarily investigates the
matters relating to terrorism. The High Court also
committed an error in directing the exclusion of
6
In short ‘I.O.’
8
preliminary inquiry report dated 26.04.2005 of the
Joint Director, CBI from consideration during the
investigation.
17. Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General
for the respondents, pressed an application for the
impleadment of the CBI contending that as the
preliminary inquiry was conducted by an officer of
the CBI and the case involves allegations against
the officers of the CBI, therefore, the CBI is a proper
party so as to defend the inquiry report and its
officers.
18. On merits, he submitted that the complaints do not
make out any cognizable offence and are barred by
Section 197 Cr.P.C., as whatever acts have been
performed by the officers, they were in discharge of
their official duties. The complaints are also hit by
Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 and are
barred by limitation.
19. Admittedly, the CBI was a party in the writ petitions
before the High Court and had not chosen to assail
the impugned order(s), meaning thereby that the
CBI never felt aggrieved by the said order(s). The
9
CBI, even if impleaded, would be added as the
respondent or a proforma respondent. It is well
recognized in law that a respondent or a proforma
respondent may support the judgment impugned
but cannot assail the same in his capacity as a
respondent. The CBI has not independently
challenged the aforesaid order(s) of the High Court.
20. Moreover, the CBI is not the party actually
aggrieved by the direction given by the High Court
for the registration of the FIR against the two
officers. It is the officers who are aggrieved in their
personal capacity and not the institution to which
they are on deputation. It is, therefore, for the
officers to defend themselves by taking appropriate
legal remedies and the CBI has nothing to do with
it. This apart, the report of the CBI is not under
challenge, therefore, the contention that CBI has to
support the report of its officer is not appreciable.
Accordingly, we do not deem it necessary to permit
impleadment of the CBI and to consider any
objections as raised by the learned Additional
Solicitor General.
10
21. The plain reading of the impugned judgment and
order(s) of the Single Judge of the High Court dated
26.06.2006 reveals that the officers of the CBI in
the dock have committed irregularities, if not
illegality in discharge of their official duties and are
prima facie guilty of the commission of the offences
as alleged. This is clearly reflected from the
averments contained in the complaints and the
petitions. Both the officers have acted in
connivance, and it is alleged that one of the officers,
Vinod Kumar Pandey, had acted at the behest of the
Senior Officer, Neeraj Kumar. The question whether
Vinod Kumar Pandey acted on the advice or behest
of Neeraj Kumar or whether they were in
connivance, is a matter of fact which has to be
investigated.
22. The Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition
(Crl.) No. 738 of 2001, upon consideration of the
material on record including the inquiry report
dated 26.04.2005 of the Joint Director of CBI,
found that cognizable offences were prima facie
made out against the officers of the CBI i.e. the
11
appellants. The allegation that the documents were
seized on 26.04.2000 without preparation of the
seizure memo stood substantiated even in the
inquiry report, which recorded that the memo of
seizure was prepared only on 27.04.2000 and not at
the time of seizure on 26.04.2000. The Court
disagreed with the explanation that the documents
were taken for scrutiny on 26.04.2000 noting that
such a version was contrary both to the records and
the findings of the inquiry itself. The Single Judge
also refused to accept that it was a procedural
irregularity and held that the preparation of seizure
memo in the facts and circumstances of the case
was not in accordance with the CBI Crime Manual
and attracted penal provisions of Sections 218, 463,
465, 469, 166 and 120-B IPC.
23. The High Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.675 of
2001, preferred by Vijay Aggarwal, observed that
V.K. Pandey had summoned Vijay Aggarwal on
07.06.2001 and 11.06.2001 in clear derogation of a
bail order dated 27.11.2000 passed by the Special
Judge, which prima facie indicated a mala fide and
12
malicious exercise of authority.
24. The Court held that the allegations of abuse,
intimidation, and threats, including use of vulgar
language to coerce Vijay Aggarwal to ensure
withdrawal of his brother’s complaint against Neeraj
Kumar, were serious and not unfounded. The Court
observed that such conduct was grave in nature
and prima facie disclosed the commission of
cognizable offences under IPC.
25. The High Court rejected the conclusion reached by
the CBI’s enquiry officer that no offence was made
out and that the allegations of abuse and coercion
were unsubstantiated. It was observed that the
correctness or veracity of the allegations could not
have been gone into at the stage of a preliminary
enquiry and that such allegations, being serious in
nature, could not be brushed aside lightly. The
Court clarified that Vijay Aggarwal’s failure to file
objections to the enquiry report could not amount
to acceptance of its findings.
26. The Writ Court emphasized that CBI officers, being
public servants, cannot claim immunity if they
13
knowingly prepare false or incorrect records during
the course of seizure or abuse their official position.
Such acts on their part are serious acts and are not
capable of being ignored and therefore, investigation
in the matter is necessary.
27. In Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of
Gujarat,7 this Court, in a very recent judgment
held, that where the allegations pertain to the abuse
of official position and corrupt practices while
holding public office, such actions fall squarely
within category of cognizable offences and therefore,
they are to be inquired into, and holding of any
preliminary inquiry before the registration of the
FIR is not necessary. If the information provided to
the police or the preliminary report discloses a
commission of a cognizable offence, the police is
duty bound under Section 154 Cr.P.C. to register
an FIR without any delay.
28. The report of the CBI at best is a preliminary
enquiry report submitted before the registration of
the FIR. However, such an enquiry is not ordinarily
contemplated in law before registration of FIR, and
7
(2025) 4 SCC 818
14
hence is not a conclusive report to be relied upon to
oust the power of the Constitutional Court to record
its own conclusion about commission of a
cognizable offence, if any, on the material or the
allegations in the complaints.
29. Undoubtedly, the High Court(s) should discourage
writ petitions or petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
where alternative remedies are available.
Nonetheless, as observed even in Sakiri Vasu v.
State of U.P.,8 it is equally true that alternative
remedy is not an absolute bar for invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction or the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.
30. In Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi)9, the
Court denounced the dismissal of the petition
seeking registration of the FIR, solely on the ground
of alternative remedy, and held that ground of
alternative remedy would not be a substitute in law
for refusing to register a case when the complaint of
the citizen makes it a cognizable offence.
8
(2008) 2 SCC 409
9
(2006) 2 SCC 677
15
31. In a recent landmark decision, Anurag Bhatnagar
& Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.10, this
Court held that although the complainant
approached the Court, in that case the Magistrate,
without exhausting the alternative remedies
available, it was a mere procedural irregularity and
not illegality, as the Court was competent to order
registration of the FIR. It was further observed that
when information disclosing commission of
cognizable offence is conveyed to the police, they
cannot refuse to register the FIR.
32. Since, it is the duty of the police to register an FIR if
a prima facie cognizable offence is made out, the
police is not required to go into the genuineness
and credibility of the said information. It has been
so laid down very clearly in Ramesh Kumari
(Supra) that the genuineness or credibility of the
information is not the condition precedent for
registration of an FIR.
33. The complainants Sheesh Ram Saini and Vijay
Kumar Aggarwal have approached the police
authorities by means of complaints dated
10 2025 INSC 895
16
05.07.2001 and 23.02.2004 to get the matter
investigated, but as no action was purportedly
taken thereof rather it is alleged that the police
authorities expressed reluctance to entertain the
complaints as it would not be proper on part of the
police to investigate against the officers of the CBI,
the complainants approached the Constitutional
Court for necessary action.
34. Therefore, if the Constitutional Court has exercised
its discretion in entertaining the petitions and
directing for the registration of the FIR against the
two officers, on being satisfied that the commission
of a cognizable offence is prima facie made out
against them, we see no good reason to interfere
with such discretion. At best, as argued by Mr.
Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
appellants, we can say that the opinion expressed
by the High Court in regard to commission of the
cognizable offences is only a prima facie opinion and
has to be treated as such, so as not to affect the
discretion of the I.O., subsequent to the
investigation.
17
35. The registration of the FIR against the two officers is
not likely to cause any prejudice to them. They will
have the right to participate in the investigation to
establish that they have not committed any offence,
as alleged. Thereupon, the I.O. on consideration of
the material collected during investigation, may
submit a closure report or file the chargesheet. In
the event, a closure report is filed and accepted by
the Magistrate, the appellants will have no
grievance. On the other hand, in the event, a charge
sheet is submitted, the appellants will have an
opportunity to assail the same before the
appropriate forum.
36. It would however, not be a prudent exercise at this
stage to scuttle the registration of the FIR or the
investigation, when the High Court in exercise of its
constitutional powers had opined that prima facie, a
cognizable offence is made out against the two
officers, that too upon elaborate consideration of
the preliminary inquiry report of the Joint Director
of CBI.
37. It is trite to point out that the offence is alleged to
18
have been committed in the year 2000 and till date
the matter had not been allowed to be investigated.
It would be dichotomy of justice if such an offence
is allowed to go uninvestigated particularly when
there is involvement of the officers on deputation to
CBI. It is cardinal in law that justice must not only
be done, but must also be seen to be done. It is
high time that sometimes those who investigate
must also be investigated to keep alive the faith of
the public at large in the system.
38. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we
do not consider it appropriate to interfere with the
impugned judgment and order(s) of the High Court
in exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
39. However, we make it clear that since the Special
Cell of the Delhi Police is supposed to investigate
the matters concerning terrorism, upon registration
of the FIR in the case at hand, the investigation
would be conducted by the Delhi Police itself but by
an officer not below the rank of Assistant
Commissioner of Police.
19
40. Secondly, in view of the law laid down in Lalita
Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and
Ors.
11, and reiterated thereafter to the effect that
registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154
Cr.P.C. if the information discloses commission of a
cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry before
FIR is permissible in such a situation; however, if
the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates necessity of an
inquiry being conducted, a preliminary inquiry may
be conducted only to ascertain facts disclosing
cognizable offence, if any. Thus, treating the inquiry
conducted by the Joint Director, CBI as a
preliminary inquiry, we permit the same to be
looked into, if necessary, by the I.O. during the
investigation by him, but not to treat it as
conclusive. The I.O. would conduct the investigation
strictly in accordance with law without being
influenced by any finding or observation made by
the High Court in the impugned order(s) or by this
Court hereinabove and shall conclude the same as
expeditiously as possible, preferably within three
11 (2014) 2 SCC 1
20
months as the matter is quite old.
41. The appellants are directed to join the investigation
and to cooperate with the I.O. by appearing before
him, as and when called upon. In the event they
join the investigation and appear before the I.O.
regularly, no coercive steps shall be taken against
them, including that of arrest, until and unless the
I.O. records satisfaction that custodial interrogation
at any stage is necessary.
42. The two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and
S.L.P.(C) No. 7897 of 2019] stand disposed of in the
above terms and the two appeals [D.No.10495 of
2019 and D.No.10508 of 2019] are partly allowed by
modifying the judgment and orders of the High
Court dated 26.06.2006 as indicated above.
43. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
…………………………………...J.
[PANKAJ MITHAL]
…………………………………...J.
[PRASANNA B. VARALE]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 10, 2025.
