REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 32763281 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.3038330388 of 2011)
Chand Kaur (D) Thr.Lrs. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Mehar Kaur (D) Thr.Lrs ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the final
judgment and order dated 23.03.2011 passed by
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh
in RSA Nos. 2066, 2067, 2068, 2292 and 2294 of
1987.
1
3. It is not necessary to set out the facts in detail
for the disposal of these appeals for the reason that
having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
on perusal of the record of the case, we have formed
an opinion to remand the case to the High Court for
deciding the second appeals, out of which these
appeals arise, for their fresh disposal on merits in
accordance with law.
4. The need to remand these cases to the High
Court is called for because we find that the High
Court though disposed of bunch of second appeals
(RSA Nos.2066 to 2068 of 1987 and RSA 2292 to
2294 of 1987) but it did so without framing any
substantial question(s) of law as is required to be
framed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”).
2
5. In our opinion, framing of substantial
question(s) of law in the present appeals was
mandatory because the High Court allowed the
second appeals and interfered in the judgment of
the First Appellate Court, which was impugned in
the second appeals. It is clear from the last
paragraph of the impugned order quoted
hereinbelow:
“However, I am unable to convince
myself with the latter part of the judgment of
the ld. lower appellate court wherein Chand
Kaur was held to be entitled to ½ share of
the property of Jaimal, by placing reliance on
the judgment delivered in the previous
litigation between Mehar Singh and Chand
Kaur. Once the ld. lower Appellate Court
arrived at a specific finding of fact that
Chand Kaur was neither the daughter of
Santo nor Santo is daughter of Cheta, thus,
there was no basis for it to hold that Chand
Kaur was entitled to hold half of the property
of late Jaimal. By placing reliance on the
previous judgment, the ld. Lower Appellate
Court went against its own judgment and
impliedly admitted that Santo was the
daughter of Cheta. It is obvious that such a
status of things cannot coexist. By
necessary implication, as a result of the
finding arrived at by the ld. Lower Appellate
3
Court regarding Santo not being the daughter
of Cheta, the entitlement of the property of
late Jaimal falls on Mehar Singh and Mehar
Kaur in equal shares.
In view of above, RSA Nos.2066, 2067
and 2068 of 1987 filed by Mehar Kaur
succeed and RSA Nos.2292, 2293 and 2294 of
1987 filed by Chand Kaur are dismissed. The
findings of the ld. lower Appellate Court are
modified to the extent that Mehar Singh and
legal heirs of Mehar Kaur are held entitled to
succeed to the entire property of late Jaimal
Singh in equal shares and the legal heirs of
Chand Kaur shall have no right to such
property at all.”
6. This Court has consistently held that the High
Court has no jurisdiction to allow the second appeal
without framing a substantial question of law as
provided under Section 100 of the Code. In other
words, the sine qua non for allowing the second
appeal is to first frame the substantial question(s) of
law arising in the case and then decide the second
appeal by answering the question(s) framed.(See
Surat Singh(Dead) vs. Siri Bhagwan & Ors., (2018)
4
4 SCC 562 and Vijay Arjun Bhagat & Ors. vs.
Nana Laxman Tapkire & Ors., (2018) 6 SCC 727).
7. Since in this case, we find that the High Court
failed to frame any substantial question either at
the time of admitting the appeal or before final
hearing and yet proceeded to allow some of the
second appeals in the bunch by modifying the
judgment impugned therein, the High Court
committed jurisdictional error requiring this Court
to interfere.
8. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals
succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned
order is set aside. All the second appeals, out of
which these appeals arise, are restored to their
original numbers before the High Court.
9. The High Court will now first frame substantial
question(s) which, according to the appellants of the
5
second appeals, arise in their respective second
appeals.
10. Since we have formed an opinion to remand
the case in the light of what is held above, we have
not expressed any opinion on the merits of the
controversy.
11. The High Court will accordingly decide the
appeals on merits strictly in accordance with law
uninfluenced by any observations made in the
impugned order and also in this order.
.………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J.
[DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
March 28, 2019
6
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 32763281 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.3038330388 of 2011)
Chand Kaur (D) Thr.Lrs. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Mehar Kaur (D) Thr.Lrs ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the final
judgment and order dated 23.03.2011 passed by
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh
in RSA Nos. 2066, 2067, 2068, 2292 and 2294 of
1987.
1
3. It is not necessary to set out the facts in detail
for the disposal of these appeals for the reason that
having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
on perusal of the record of the case, we have formed
an opinion to remand the case to the High Court for
deciding the second appeals, out of which these
appeals arise, for their fresh disposal on merits in
accordance with law.
4. The need to remand these cases to the High
Court is called for because we find that the High
Court though disposed of bunch of second appeals
(RSA Nos.2066 to 2068 of 1987 and RSA 2292 to
2294 of 1987) but it did so without framing any
substantial question(s) of law as is required to be
framed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”).
2
5. In our opinion, framing of substantial
question(s) of law in the present appeals was
mandatory because the High Court allowed the
second appeals and interfered in the judgment of
the First Appellate Court, which was impugned in
the second appeals. It is clear from the last
paragraph of the impugned order quoted
hereinbelow:
“However, I am unable to convince
myself with the latter part of the judgment of
the ld. lower appellate court wherein Chand
Kaur was held to be entitled to ½ share of
the property of Jaimal, by placing reliance on
the judgment delivered in the previous
litigation between Mehar Singh and Chand
Kaur. Once the ld. lower Appellate Court
arrived at a specific finding of fact that
Chand Kaur was neither the daughter of
Santo nor Santo is daughter of Cheta, thus,
there was no basis for it to hold that Chand
Kaur was entitled to hold half of the property
of late Jaimal. By placing reliance on the
previous judgment, the ld. Lower Appellate
Court went against its own judgment and
impliedly admitted that Santo was the
daughter of Cheta. It is obvious that such a
status of things cannot coexist. By
necessary implication, as a result of the
finding arrived at by the ld. Lower Appellate
3
Court regarding Santo not being the daughter
of Cheta, the entitlement of the property of
late Jaimal falls on Mehar Singh and Mehar
Kaur in equal shares.
In view of above, RSA Nos.2066, 2067
and 2068 of 1987 filed by Mehar Kaur
succeed and RSA Nos.2292, 2293 and 2294 of
1987 filed by Chand Kaur are dismissed. The
findings of the ld. lower Appellate Court are
modified to the extent that Mehar Singh and
legal heirs of Mehar Kaur are held entitled to
succeed to the entire property of late Jaimal
Singh in equal shares and the legal heirs of
Chand Kaur shall have no right to such
property at all.”
6. This Court has consistently held that the High
Court has no jurisdiction to allow the second appeal
without framing a substantial question of law as
provided under Section 100 of the Code. In other
words, the sine qua non for allowing the second
appeal is to first frame the substantial question(s) of
law arising in the case and then decide the second
appeal by answering the question(s) framed.(See
Surat Singh(Dead) vs. Siri Bhagwan & Ors., (2018)
4
4 SCC 562 and Vijay Arjun Bhagat & Ors. vs.
Nana Laxman Tapkire & Ors., (2018) 6 SCC 727).
7. Since in this case, we find that the High Court
failed to frame any substantial question either at
the time of admitting the appeal or before final
hearing and yet proceeded to allow some of the
second appeals in the bunch by modifying the
judgment impugned therein, the High Court
committed jurisdictional error requiring this Court
to interfere.
8. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals
succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned
order is set aside. All the second appeals, out of
which these appeals arise, are restored to their
original numbers before the High Court.
9. The High Court will now first frame substantial
question(s) which, according to the appellants of the
5
second appeals, arise in their respective second
appeals.
10. Since we have formed an opinion to remand
the case in the light of what is held above, we have
not expressed any opinion on the merits of the
controversy.
11. The High Court will accordingly decide the
appeals on merits strictly in accordance with law
uninfluenced by any observations made in the
impugned order and also in this order.
.………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J.
[DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
March 28, 2019
6