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Sunday, March 31, 2019

whether it is the Authorised Officer under that Act or the Magistrate under the CrPC who is vested with the power to order interim release of forest produce seized under the Act. = Our analysis of the amendments brought by MP Act 25 of 1983 to the Indian Forest Act 1927 leads to the conclusion that specific provisions have been made for the seizure and confiscation of forest produce and of tools, boats, vehicles and articles used in the commission of offences. Upon a seizure under Section 52(1), the officer effecting the seizure has to either produce the property before the Authorised Officer or to make a report of the seizure under sub-section (2) of Section 52. Upon being satisfied that a forest offence has been committed, the Authorised Officer is empowered, for reasons to be recorded, to confiscate the forest produce together with the tools, vehicles, boats and articles used in its commission. Before confiscating any property under sub-section (3), the Authorised Officer is required to send an intimation of the initiation of the proceedings for the confiscation of the property to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence. Where it is intended to immediately launch a criminal proceeding, a report of the seizure is made to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence. The order of confiscation under Section 52(3) is subject to an appeal under Section 52-A and a revision under Section 52-B. Subsection (5) of Section 52-B imparts finality to the order of the Court of Sessions in revision notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in the CrPC and provides that it shall not be called into question before any court. Section 52-C stipulates that on the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate under sub-section (4) of Section 52, no court, tribunal or authority, other than an Authorised Officer, an Appellate Authority or Court of Sessions (under Sections 52, 52-A and 52-B) shall have jurisdiction to pass orders with regard to possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of the property in regard to which confiscation proceedings have been initiated. Sub-section (1) of Section 52-C has a non obstante provision which operates notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Forest Act 1927 or in any other law for the time being in force. The only saving is in respect of an officer duly empowered by the State government for directing the immediate release of a property seized under Section 52, as provided in Section 31 Hence, upon the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate of the initiation of confiscation proceedings under sub-section (4)(a) of Section 52, the bar of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 52-C is clearly attracted. The scheme contained in the amendments enacted to the Indian Forest Act 1927 in relation to the State of Madhya Pradesh, makes it abundantly clear that the direction which was issued by the High Court in the present case, in a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC, to the Magistrate to direct the interim release of the vehicle, which had been seized, was contrary to law. The jurisdiction under Section 451 of the CrPC was not available to the Magistrate, once the Authorised Officer initiated confiscation proceedings The Madhya Pradesh amendments to the Indian Forest Act 1927 are infused with a salutary public purpose. Protection of forests against depredation is a constitutionally mandated goal exemplified by Article 48A28 of the Directive Principles and the Fundamental Duty of every citizen incorporated in Article 51A(g)29. By isolating the confiscation of forest produce and the instruments utilised for the commission of an offence from criminal trials, the legislature intended to ensure that confiscation is an effective deterrent.

1

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 524 of 2019
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl) No 2001 of 2012)
The State of Madhya Pradesh ...Appellant
Versus
Uday Singh ...Respondent
With
Criminal Appeal No. 525 of 2019
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl) No 5413 of 2013)
The State of Madhya Pradesh ...Appellant
Versus
Rakesh Lavaniya …Respondent
With
REPORTABLE
2
Criminal Appeal Nos 1362-1363 of 2012
Adhikshak Rashtriya Chambal Abhyaran ...Appellant
Versus
Narottam Singh ...Respondent
And With
Criminal Appeal No 1364 of 2012
Authorised Officer & Sub-Divisional
Officer, Shivpuri, M.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Jashrat Singh ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
1 Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions.
Criminal Appeal No.524 of 2019 @ SLP (Crl.) No.2001 of 2002:
2 This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at its Gwalior Bench dated 29 July 2011. Allowing a
3
petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 19731
, the High
Court set aside a revisional order dated 16 June 2011 of the Additional Sessions
Judge, Morena. The Additional Sessions Judge had confirmed an order of the
Judicial Magistrate First Class2
, Ambah dismissing an application under Section
451 of the CrPC seeking the release of a tractor and trolley which had been
seized for being involved in the illegal excavation of sand from the Chambal river.
3 On 26 March 2011, the Forest Officer apprehended a tractor and trolley
belonging to the respondent alleged to have been carrying sand illegally
excavated from a restricted area of Dalijeet Pura Ghat at the National Sanctuary,
Chambal without permission and in the absence of a transit pass. The tractor and
trolley was seized together with the sand by the officers of the Forest Department
under Sections 41, 52 and 52-A of the Indian Forest Act, 19273
 and Sections 27,
29, 39(1)(d), 51 and 52 of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972. Intimation of the
seizure was given to the Magistrate under Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act,
1927 on 27 March 2011. The respondent moved an application4
 under Section
451 of the CrPC5
 before the JMFC, Ambah for interim release of the seized
vehicle. The Magistrate dismissed the application by an order dated 21 April
1 “CrPC”
2 “JMFC”
3 “Indian Forest Act”
4 Application No 9661 of 2009
5 “Section 451 - Order for custody and disposal of property pending trial in certain cases. — When any
property is produced before any Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it
thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial, and, if the property
is subject to speedy and natural decay, or if it is otherwise expedient so to do, the Court may, after recording such
evidence as it thinks necessary, order it to be sold or otherwise disposed of.
Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, "property" includes—
(a) property of any kind or document which is produced before the Court or which is in its custody.
(b) any property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed or which appears to have
been used for the commission of any offence”
4
2011. A Criminal Revision6
 met with the same fate before the District and
Sessions Judge, Morena on 16 June 2011. The respondent then instituted
proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC7
 before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at its Gwalior Bench. By a judgment dated 29 July 2011, the High Court
directed the Magistrate to pass orders for the interim release of the vehicle. The
State of Madhya Pradesh has instituted these proceedings under Article 136 of
the Constitution to assail the judgment of the High Court.
4 The grievance of the State of Madhya Pradesh is that similar orders have
been passed by the High Court directing the Magistrate to release seized
vehicles, relying on a decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v
Madhukar Rao8
. According to the State, in Madhukar Rao, this Court interpreted
the provisions of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 and came to the conclusion
that the Magistrate has the power and jurisdiction under Section 451 of the CrPC
to order interim release of a seized vehicle. On the other hand, it has been
submitted that the present case and other cases of its genre are governed by the
provisions of the Indian Forest Act 1927 as amended in relation to the State of
Madhya Pradesh by MP Act 25 of 1983. The submission is that the confiscation
proceedings have been initiated in terms of Section 52(3) and hence the
procedure is governed by Sections 52 and 52-A. Consequently, the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate under Section 451 of the CrPC would (it has been urged) stand
excluded. Elaborating on the above submissions, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant has relied on the decisions of this Court in: (i) Divisional
6 68 of 2011
7 Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 5171 of 2011
8 (2008) 14 SCC 624
5
Forest Officer v GV Sudhakar Rao9
, (ii) State of Karnataka v KA
Kunchindammed10
, (iii) State of West Bengal v Sujit Kumar Rana11; and (iv)
State of Madhya Pradesh v Kallo Bai12
.
5 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that:
(i) Section 52 of the Forest Act provides that when a forest offence has been
committed in respect of any forest produce, the produce together with all
tools, boats, vehicles, ropes, chains or any other article used in committing
the offence may be seized by any Forest Officer. Section 52(3) provides that
subject to sub-section (5), where the Authorised Officer, upon production
before him of property seized or upon receipt of a report about seizure, as
the case may be, is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in
respect thereof, he may order in writing, for reasons to be recorded, the
confiscation of the forest produce so seized together with all tools, vehicles,
boats, chains or any other article used in committing the offence;
(ii) For the State of Madhya Pradesh, MP Act 25 of 1983 substituted the original
provisions of Section 52 of the Forest Act, with certain conditions. Subsection (3) of Section 52 as enacted by MP Act 25 of 1983, empowers the
Authorised Officer to make an order in writing with reasons confiscating the
forest produce so seized along with the tools, vehicles or any other article
used in committing the offence. Similarly, for the State of Madhya Pradesh,
MP Act 25 of 1983 inserted Section 52-A which provides for an appeal
9 (1985) 4 SCC 573
10 (2002) 9 SCC 90
11 (2004) 4 SCC 129
12 (2017) 14 SCC 502
6
against the order of confiscation to the Appellate Authority within thirty days
of the order of confiscation being passed by the Authorised Officer;
(iii) The High Court has erred in directing the release of the seized vehicle in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. The High
Court failed to appreciate that in the present case confiscation proceedings
have been initiated in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 52 of the Forest
Act, and the procedure thereafter would be governed by Sections 52 and
52-A. Since the confiscation proceedings have been initiated by the forest
department, in terms of Section 52(3), the Magistrate in pursuance of the
power conferred under Section 451 of the CrPC cannot direct release of the
seized vehicle, as the jurisdiction of the criminal court stands excluded;
(iv) This Court in Sujit Kumar Rana (supra) has held that once confiscation
proceedings are initiated, the jurisdiction of the criminal court stands
excluded. Since confiscation proceedings have been initiated by the forest
authorities in terms of Section 52(3), the Magistrate cannot order release of
the vehicle under Section 451 of the CrPC. Similarly, the High Court cannot
under Section 482 of the CrPC direct release of the seized vehicle as the
jurisdiction of the criminal court stands excluded; and
(v) The legislative intent while inserting the abovementioned provisions must be
kept in mind. Forests are a national wealth which are required to be
preserved. In most cases, the State is the owner of the forest and forest
produce and is enjoined with a duty to preserve forests to maintain an
ecological balance. Therefore, statutory interpretation of such provisions
should have regard to the principle of purposive construction so as to give
7
effect to the aim and object of the legislature, and keeping the principles
contained in Articles 48-A and 51-A(g) of the Constitution in mind.
6 On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the respondent 13 that
Chapter IX of the Forest Act, as amended in its application to the State of
Madhya Pradesh, does not oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to deal with
seized property, once it becomes a part of evidence at a criminal trial under the
CrPC. In this context, it was urged that:
(i) Under Section 52(2), where the intention is to launch criminal proceeding,
the report is to be sent only to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the
offence and not the Authorised Officer. The expression “officer seizing the
property” needs to be distinguished from the expression “authorised officer
under the Act”;
(ii) The said Authorised Officer can proceed to satisfy herself whether a forest
offence has been committed or not under Section 52(3), only if the seized
property is produced before the Authorised Officer. If under Section 52(2),
the report of the seizure has been sent to the Magistrate, the Authorised
Officer cannot decide upon the commission of a forest offence, as the report
of seizure is not before the Authorised Officer;
(iii) Since Authorised Officers cannot apply themselves to whether the seizure
was valid, the circumstance of the Authorised Officer passing an order of
confiscation does not arise at all. It follows that the intimation under Section
52(4) cannot be given when there is no confiscation;
13 In SLP (Crl.) No 5413 of 2013
8
(iv) The bar on jurisdiction under Section 52-C only applies after intimation
under Section 52(4) is given. Since the Authorised Officer cannot pass an
order of confiscation, the jurisdiction for trial of a criminal offence and the
power to deal with the property involved rests with the Magistrate; and
(v) Therefore, there is no scope for parallel proceedings before both the
Authorised Officer and the Magistrate, if the officer seizing the property
believes that the gravity of the offence calls for a criminal trial and sends the
report of seizure directly to the Magistrate.
7 The rival submissions fall for consideration.
8 Section 52 of the Forest Act forms a part of Chapter IX which deals with
penalties and procedure. In relation to Madhya Pradesh, Section 52 was
substituted by MP Act 25 of 1983 and is in the following terms:
“52. Seizure of property liable to confiscation and
procedure therefor.—
(1) When there is reason to believe that a forest offence has
been committed in respect of any reserved forest and
protected forest or forest produce, the produce, and all tools,
boats, vehicles, ropes, chains or any other article used in
committing such offence, may be seized by any forest officer
or police officer.
(2) Every officer seizing any property under this section shall
place on such property a mark indicating that the same has
been so seized and shall, as soon as may be, either produce
the property seized before an officer not below the rank of an
Extra Assistant Conservative of Forests by the State
Government in this behalf by notification (hereinafter referred
to as the authorized officer) or where it is, having regard to
the quantity of bulk or other genuine difficulty, not practicable
to produce property seized before the authorized officer,
make a report about the seizure to the authorized officer, or
where it is intended to launch criminal proceedings against
the offender immediately, make a report of such seizure to the
magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of
which the seizure has been made:
9
Provided that, when the forest produce with respect to which
offence is believed to have been committed is the property of
the Government, and the offender is unknown, it shall be
sufficient if the officer makes, as soon as may be, a report of
the circumstances to his official superior.
(3) Subject to sub-section (5), where the authorized officer
upon production before him of property seized or upon receipt
of report about seizure, as the case may be, is satisfied that a
forest offence has been committed in respect thereof, he may
by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded confiscate
forest-produce so seized together with all tools, vehicles,
boats, ropes, chains or any other article used in committing
such offence. A copy of order of confiscation shall be
forwarded without any undue delay to the Conservators of
Forests of the forest circle in which the timber or the forestproduce, as the case may be, has been seized.
(4) No order confiscating any property shall be made under
sub-section (3) unless the authorized officer—
(a) sends an intimation in form prescribed about initiation of
proceedings for confiscation of property to the magistrate
having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the
seizure has been made;
(b) issues a notice in writing to the person from whom the
property is seized, and to any other person who may appear
to the authorized officer to have some interest in such
property;
(c) affords an opportunity to the persons referred to in clause
(b) of making a representation within such reasonable time as
may be specified in the notice against the proposed
confiscation; and
(d) gives to the officer effecting the seizure and the person or
persons to whom notice has been issued under clause (b), a
hearing on date to be fixed for such purpose.
(5) No order of confiscation under sub-section (3) of any
tools, vehicles, boats, ropes, chains or any other article (other
than timber or forest-produce seized) shall be made if any
person referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (4) proves to
the satisfaction of authorized officer that any such tools,
vehicles, boats, ropes, chains or other articles were used
without his knowledge or convenience or, as the case may
be, without the knowledge or convenience of his servant or
agent and that all reasonable and necessary precautions had
been taken against use of the objects aforesaid for
commission of forest-offence.
(6) The seized property shall continue to be under custody
until confirmation of the order of the authorized officer by the
Appellate Authority or until the expiry of the period for
initiating ‘suo motu’ action by him whichever is earlier, as
prescribed under Section 52-A.
10
(7) Where the authorized officer having jurisdiction over the
case is himself involved in the seizure or investigation, the
next higher authority may transfer the case to any other
officer of the same rank for conducting proceedings under this
section.”
9 Under sub-section (1) of Section 52, where there is a reason to believe
that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any reserved or protected
forest or forest produce, the produce, and all tools, boats, vehicles or articles
used in committing the offence may be seized by any Forest Officer or Police
Officer. Under sub-section (2), the officer seizing the property is required to place
a mark of seizure and produce the property before the Authorised Officer or,
where it is not practicable to produce the property seized, make a report to the
Authorised Officer. Where it is intended to launch criminal proceedings against
the offender immediately, a report of the seizure has to be made to the
Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure
has been made. Sub-section (3) stipulates that subject to sub-section (5), the
Authorised Officer may upon being satisfied that a forest offence has been
committed upon the production of the property seized or on the receipt of a report
about the seizure, order the forest produce so seized, together with all tools,
vehicles, boats or article used in the commission of the offence to be confiscated.
No order of confiscation can be made unless the conditions mentioned under
sub-section (4) are complied with. Those conditions are:
(i) The Forest Officer must send an intimation in the form prescribed about the
initiation of proceedings for confiscation of the property to the Magistrate
having jurisdiction to try the offence;
11
(ii) The issuance of a notice to the person from whom the property has been
seized or any other person who appears to have an interest in the property;
(iii) Affording a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the
proposed confiscation; and
(iv) Furnishing of an opportunity of being heard to the officer effecting the
seizure and to the person to whom a notice has been given. Sub-section (5)
provides that no order for confiscation can be passed if the person to whom
a notice has been issued under clause (b) of sub-section (4) proves that the
tools, vehicles, boats or article were used without her knowledge or
connivance and that reasonable and necessary precautions had been taken
against their use for the commission of a forest offence.
10 Section 52-A provides an appellate remedy to a person aggrieved to the
Conservator of Forests, against an order of confiscation. Section 52-A provides
as follows:
“52-A. Appeal against the order of confiscation.—
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation may,
within thirty days of the order, or if fact of such order has
not been communicated to him within thirty days of date
of knowledge of such order, prefer an appeal in writing,
accompanied by such fee and payable in such form as
may be prescribed and by certified copy of order of
confiscation to the Conservator of Forests (hereinafter
referred to as Appellate Authority) of the forest circle in
which the forest produce, has been seized.
Explanation. - (1) The time requisite for obtaining certified
copy of order of confiscation shall be excluded while
computing period of thirty days referred to in this subsection.
(2) The Appellate Authority referred to in sub-section (1),
may, where no appeal has been preferred before him,
"suo motu" within thirty days of date of receipt of copy of
order of confiscation by him, and shall on presentation of
memorandum of appeal issue a notice for hearing of
appeal or, as the case may be, of "suo motu" action to the
12
officer effecting seizure and to any other person (including
appellant, if any) who in the opinion of the Appellate
Authority, is likely to be adversely affected by the order of
the authorised officer, and may send for the record of the
case:
Provided that no formal notice of appeal need be issued
to such amongst the appellant, officer effecting seizure
and any other person likely to be adversely affected as
aforesaid, as may waive the notice or as may be informed
in any other manner of date of hearing of appeal by the
Appellate Authority.
(3) The Appellate Authority shall send intimation in writing
of lodging of appeal or about "suo motu" action, to the
Authorised Officer.
(4) The Appellate Authority may pass such order of
"Interim" nature for custody, preservation or disposal (if
necessary) of the subject matter of confiscation, as may
appear to be just or proper in the circumstances of the
case.
(5) The Appellate Authority, having regard to the nature of
the case or the complexities involved, may permit parties
to the appeal to be represented by their respective legal
practitioners.
(6) On the date fixed for hearing of the appeal or "suo
motu" action, or on such date to which the hearing may
be adjourned, the Appellate Authority shall peruse the
record and hear the parties to the appeal if present in
person, or through any agent duly authorised in writing or
through a legal practitioner, and shall thereafter proceed
to pass an order of confirmation, reversal or modification
order of the authorised officer:
Provided that before passing any final order the Appellate
Authority may if, it is considered necessary for proper
decision of appeal or for proper disposal of "suo motu"
action, make further inquiry itself or cause it to be made
by the Authorised Officer, and may also allow parties to
file affidavits for asserting or refuting any fact that may
arise for consideration and may allow proof of facts by
affidavits.
(7) The Appellate Authority may also pass such orders of
consequential nature, as it may deem necessary.
(8) Copy of final order or of order of consequential nature,
shall be sent to the Authorised Officer for compliance or
for passing any order appropriate order in conformity with
the order of the Appellate Authority.”
Significantly, under sub-section (4) of Section 52-A, the Appellate Authority is
empowered to pass orders of an interim nature for the custody, preservation or
13
disposal of the subject matter of the confiscation. Section 52-B provides for the
remedy of a revision before the Court of Sessions against an order of the
Appellate Authority. Section 52-B is in the following terms:
“52-B. Revision before Court of Sessions against order of
Appellate Authority.—
(1) Any party to the appeal, aggrieved by final order or by
order of consequential nature passed by the Appellate
Authority, may within thirty days of the order sought to be
impugned, submit a petition for revision to the Court of
Sessions within the Sessions division whereof the
headquarters of the Appellate Authority are situate.
Explanation.—In computing the period of thirty days under
this sub-section, the time requisite for obtaining certified copy
of Appellate Authority shall be excluded.
(2) The Court of Sessions, may confirm, reverse or modify
any final order or an order of consequential nature passed by
the Appellate Authority.
(3) Copies of the order passed in revision shall be sent to the
Appellate Authority and to the Authorised officer for
compliance or for passing such further orders or for taking
such further action as may be directed by such Court.
(4) For entertaining, hearing and deciding a revision under
this section, the Court of Sessions shall, as far as may be,
exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as
it exercises and follows while entertaining, hearing and
deciding a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (No. 2 of 1974).
(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (No. 2 of 1974), the order
of the Court of Sessions passed under this section shall be
final and shall not be called in question before any Court.”
Section 52-C contains a bar to the jurisdiction of courts, tribunals and authorities:
“52-C. Bar of Jurisdiction of court, etc., under certain
circumstances.—
(1) On receipt of intimation under sub-section (4) of section
52 about initiation of proceedings for confiscation or property
by the magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on
account of which the seizure of property which is subject
matter of confiscation, has been made, no Court, Tribunal or
Authority (other than the authorised officer, Appellate
Authority and Court of Sessions referred to in sections 52, 52-
A and 52-B) shall have jurisdiction to make orders with regard
to possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of the property
in regard to which proceedings for confiscation are initiated
14
under section 52, notwithstanding anything contrary in this
Act, or any other law for the time being in force.
Explanation.—Where under any law for the time being in
force, two or more Courts have jurisdiction to try forestoffence, then receipt of intimation under sub-section (4) of
section 52 by one of the Courts of Magistrate having such
jurisdiction shall be construed to be receipt of intimation under
that provision by all the Courts and the bar to exercise
jurisdiction shall operate on all such Courts.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the power saved
under section 61.”
Section 53 deals with the power to release property which is seized under Section
52:
“53. Power to release property seized under Section 52.-
Any Forest-officer of a rank not inferior to that of a Ranger,
who, or whose sub-ordinate, has seized any tools, boats,
vehicles or any other article Section 52, may release the
same on the execution by the owner thereof, of a security in a
form as may be prescribed of an amount equal to the value of
such property, as estimated by such officer, for the production
of the property so released, when so required, before the
authorised officer under Section 52 or the Magistrate having
jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure
has been made.”
This provision was substituted by MP Act 7 of 2010. Prior to the substitution,
Section 53 stipulated the release of the property seized on the execution of a
bond, for the production of the property, when required, before the Magistrate
having jurisdiction to try the offence. Under Section 60, the property which has
been confiscated by an Authorised Officer under Section 52 is to vest in the
government, subject to the result of the proceedings before the Appellate
Authority under Section 52 or upon suo motu action under Section 52-A or a
revision before the Court of Sessions under Section 52-B.
15
11 The provisions for seizure and confiscation are depicted in Flow chart I
below:
Flow Chart I: Seizure and Confiscation
Section 52
Sub-section (1) - Where there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been
committed in respect of forest produce, the produce and all tools, ropes, vehicles
etc. used in commission of such offence may be seized by the Forest Officer.
Sub-section (2)
Mark the property and produce it
before Authorised Officer.
Or if the seized property is in bulk,
make a report to the Authorised
Officer.
Where it is intended to launch a
criminal proceeding against the
offender, immediately make a
report to the Magistrate having
jurisdiction.
Sub-Section (3)
Subject to sub-section (5), the Authorised Officer upon the production of the property
seized or report of seizure, on being satisfied that a forest offence has been
committed, for reasons to be recorded, can confiscate the forest produce so seized
together with the vehicle.
Sub-section (4)
No order of confiscation may be made unless the Authorised Officer sends an
intimation to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and issues notice, and grants an
opportunity of making representation and hearing to a person from whom property
had been seized or who has an interest in such property.
Sub-section (5)
No order under sub-section (3), shall be made if the person under clause (b) of subsection (4) proves that such tools, vehicles, etc. were used without her knowledge or
connivance and all reasonable and necessary precautions had been taken against
their use.
16
Section 52-A – Appeal against order of confiscation – Any person aggrieved by the
order of confiscation, may prefer an appeal in writing within thirty days.
Section 52-B – Revision before Court of Sessions against order of Appellate
Authority –
(i) The party aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority can submit a
revision to the Court of Sessions within thirty days.
(ii) The Court of Sessions may confirm, reverse or modify the order.
Section 52-C – Bar to jurisdiction of Court under certain circumstances –
(i) No court, tribunal or authority except the Authorised Officer or Appellate
Authority and Court of Sessions referred under Sections 52, 52-A and 52-B shall
have jurisdiction to make order in regard to possession, disposal, distribution, or
delivery of the property.
(ii) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the power saved under Section 61.
Section 53 – Power to release property seized under Section 52 – A Forest Officer,
not below the rank of Ranger, who or whose subordinate has seized the property
under Section 52, may release it on the execution of security, equal to the value of
such property in a form as prescribed, by the owner of the property.
17
13 Distinct from the proceedings for confiscation envisaged under the Forest
Act are those relating to criminal prosecution, as amended by the State of
12 Distinct from the proceedings for confiscation envisaged under the Forest
Act are those relating to criminal prosecution, as amended by the State of
Madhya Pradesh. Section 52(2) stipulates that where it is intended to launch a
criminal proceeding against an offender immediately, a report of the seizure has
to be made to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence. Where the
property which has been seized under Section 52 is released by an Authorised
Officer under Section 53, it must be upon execution of security in such form as
may be prescribed, equal to the value of the property, so as to ensure the
production of the property when required before the Magistrate having jurisdiction
to try the offence. On receipt of a report under Section 52(2), Section 54
stipulates that the Magistrate must take all measures necessary for the arrest and
trial of the offender and the disposal of the property according to law. Section 54
provides thus:
“54. Procedure thereupon.- Upon the receipt of any such
report, the Magistrate shall, with all convenient despatch, take
such measures as may be necessary for the arrest and trial of
the offender and the disposal of the property according to law:
Provided that before passing any order for disposal of
property, the Magistrate shall satisfy himself that no
intimation under sub-section (4) of section 52 has been
Section 60 – Property confiscated under Section 52 shall vest in the Government
free from all encumbrances upon:
(i) Expiry of period specified for preferring an appeal or for taking ‘suo moto’
action under Section 52-A, whichever is later.
(ii) Expiry of period specified for submitting petition for revision under Section
52-B.
18
received by his Court or by another Court having
jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the
seizure of property has been made.”
 (emphasis supplied)
This proviso is significant, because before passing any order for disposal of the
property, the Magistrate must be satisfied that no intimation has been received
under Section 52(4).
13 Section 55 provides that upon the conviction of the offender for a forest
offence, the forest produce together with tools, boats, vehicles and other articles
used for its commission shall be liable to confiscation, subject to the provisions
of Sections 52, 52-A, 52-B and 52-C:
“55. Forest-produce, tools, etc., when liable to
confiscation.- (1) All timber or forest produce which in either
case is not the property of the Government and in respect of
which a forest-offence has been committed, and all tools,
boats, vehicles, ropes, chains or any other article, in each
case used in committing any forest-offence, shall subject to
provisions of Sections 52, 52-A, 52-B and 52-C, be liable to
confiscation upon conviction of the offender for such forestoffence.
 (2) Such confiscation may be in addition to any other
punishment prescribed for such offence.”
14 The intent of the State Legislature is emphasised by the provisions
contained in the proviso to Section 54 as well as in sub-section (1) of Section 55.
Under Section 52(2) where it is intended to launch criminal proceedings against
the offender immediately, the officer seizing any property under the Section has to
make a report of the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence
on account of which the seizure has been made. Upon the conviction of the
offender for a forest offence, Section 55 clearly indicates that the forest produce
and all tools, boats, vehicles, articles etc. used in the commission of the forest
19
offence would be liable to confiscation subject to the provisions of Sections 52,
52-A, 52-B and 52-C.
15 Section 56 provides that upon the conclusion of the trial, any forest
produce in respect of which a forest offence has been committed shall, where it is
the property of the government or has been confiscated, be taken charge of by a
Forest Officer and, in any other case, may be disposed of in such manner as the
Court may direct.
16 Section 57 deals with a situation where the offender is not known or cannot
be found. Section 58 deals with the procedure to be followed in respect of
perishable property seized under Section 52.
17 Section 59 provides that the officer making a seizure under Section 52, or
any superior or a person claiming to be interested in the property seized, may
within a month of any order passed under Sections 55, 56 or 57 appeal to the
Court to which orders made by the Magistrate are ordinarily appealable. Under
sub-section (2) of Section 60, where no appeal has been preferred within the
period of limitation or where an appeal has been preferred and the order has
been confirmed by the appellate Court, the property shall vest with the
government free from all encumbrances.
18 Flow-chart II below indicates the scheme in relation to criminal proceedings
under the Forest Act as amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh:
Flow Chart II : Criminal Proceedings
Section 52(2) – Launch of criminal proceedings
Where it is intended to launch a criminal proceeding against the offender, the officer
seizing the property is to immediately make a report of such seizure to the
Magistrate having jurisdiction to the try the offence.
20
Section 54
Upon receipt of a report under 52(2), the Magistrate shall take measures for arrest
and trial of the offender and disposal of property under law. Provided there is no
intimation under Section 52(4) with respect to initiation of confiscation proceedings
by the Authorised Officer.
Section 55
Forest produce, vehicles and tools or any other article used in committing a forest
offence, shall be liable to confiscation upon conviction of the offender. Provision
subject to Section 52, 52-A, 52-B and 52-C.
Section 56
Disposal of produce in respect of which offence has been committed, on conclusion
of the trial – When a trial of a forest offence is concluded, any forest produce in
respect of which a forest offence has been committed, both property of government
or which has been confiscated, are to be taken charge of by the Forest Officer, and
in any other case, may be disposed of in such a manner as directed by the Court.
Section 57
When an offender is not known, or cannot be found – the Magistrate may order the
property to be confiscated and taken charge of by the Forest Officer, or the person
deemed fit by the Magistrate. No order to be made for thirty days from the date of
seizing or without hearing the person, who claims any right thereto.
Section 58
Procedure as to perishable property seized under Section 52 – Notwithstanding
anything contained hereinbefore, the Magistrate may direct sale of perishable
property and deal with the sale proceeds.
21
19 Several decisions rendered by this Court have a bearing on the
controversy involved in the present case. In a decision of 1985 in GV Sudhakar
Rao (supra), the issue before a two judge Bench of this Court was whether the
High Court could have taken recourse to Section 482 of the CrPC to stay
proceedings for the confiscation of illicitly felled forest produce which was seized
under the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967 till the disposal of a criminal case
pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, for offences under the Act. This Court
upheld the correctness of the view of a Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in State of AP v PK Mohammad14 and of a Division Bench in Mohd
14 (1978) 1 APLJ 391
Section 59
Appeal from orders under Section 55, 56 or 57 to be made within thirty days to the
Court to which orders made by such Magistrate are ordinarily appealable. The
order passed on appeal shall be final.
Section 60(2)
When no appeal is preferred under Section 59 or when the appellate court confirms
order of confiscation of property, such property shall vest in the government, free
from all encumbrances.
22
Yaseen v Forest Range Officer, Flying Squad, Rayachoti15 that the Andhra
Pradesh Forest Act, 1967 contemplated two procedures, one for the confiscation
of the goods forming the subject matter of the offence by an Authorised Officer
under Section 44 (2A)16 and the other for the trial of a person accused of the
offence so committed under Section 20 or 2917. Explaining the purpose of the
legislation, this Court noted with approval the view of the High Court in the above
cases that the provision for confiscation by an Authorised Officer had been
enacted in public interest to suppress an evil which the legislature wishes to
avoid:
“14. We find that a later division bench consisting of
Kondaiah, C.J. and Punnayya, J. in Mohd Yaseen v. Forest
Range Officer, Flying Squad, Rayachoti [(1980) 1 ALT 8]
approved of the view expressed by Jeewan Reddy, J. in P.K.
Mohammad case [(1978) 1 APLJ 391], and held that the Act
contemplates two procedures, one for confiscation of goods
forming the subject-matter of the offence by the Authorized
Officer under sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Act, and
the other for trial of the person accused of the offence so
committed under Section 20 or 29 of the Act. The learned
Judges held that the Act provides for a special
machinery for confiscation of illicitly felled timber or
forest produce by the Authorized Officer under subsection (2-A) of Section 44 enacted in the general public
interest to suppress the mischief of ruthless exploitation
of government forests by illicit felling and removal of
teak and other valuable forest produce.”
 (emphasis supplied)
15 (1980) 1 ALT 8
16 “(2-A) Where an Authorized Officer seizes under sub-section (1) any timber or forest produce or where any
such timber or forest produce is produced before him under sub-section (2) and he is satisfied that a forest
offence has been committed in respect thereof, he may order confiscation of the timber or forest produce so
seized or produced together with all tools, ropes, chains, boats or vehicles used in committing such offence.”
17 Section 20 provides for penalties for trespass or damage in reserved forest and acts prohibited in such
forest, and Section 29 provides for the power to make rules to regulate the transit possession of timber and other
forest produce.
23
Consequently, the mere fact that there was an acquittal in a criminal trial before a
Magistrate due to a paucity of evidence would not necessarily result in nullifying
the order of confiscation passed by an Authorised Officer based on a satisfaction
that a forest offence had been committed.
20 In 2002, a two judge Bench of this Court in KA Kunchindammed (supra)
dealt with the provisions of the Karnataka Forest Act 1963. The issue before the
Court was whether it is the Authorised Officer under that Act or the Magistrate
under the CrPC who is vested with the power to order interim release of forest
produce seized under the Act. Section 7118 contained a savings provision that
allowed an officer duly empowered by the state government to direct the release
of property seized under Section 62, which is the property of the government.
Section 71-G19 provided for the bar of jurisdiction, save and except of the
Authorised Officer or the Appellate Authority. Interpreting the provisions of the
Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 this Court held that the law is a special statute.
Moreover, the non obstante clause gave overriding effect to the legislation as a
result of which the general power which is vested with the Magistrate under the
CrPC is taken away. Justice DP Mohapatra, speaking for the Court, held:
18 “71. Saving of power to release property seized.—Nothing hereinbefore contained shall be deemed to
prevent any officer empowered in this behalf by the State Government from directing at any time the immediate
release of any property seized under Section 62, which is not the property of Government, and the withdrawal of
any charge made in respect of such property.”
19 “71-G. Bar of jurisdiction in certain cases.—Whenever any timber, ivory, Gulmavu (Machilus Marantha)
bark, Dalchini bark, Halmaddi (exudation of Ailanthus Malabaricum), canes firewood or charcoal belonging to the
State Government or any sandalwood, together with any tool, rope, chain, boat, vehicle or cattle used in
committing any offence is seized under sub-section (1) of Section 62, the authorized officer under Section 71-A or
the officer specially empowered under Section 71-C or the Sessions Judge hearing an appeal under Section 71-D
shall have and, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, any other officer, court, tribunal or
authority shall not have, jurisdiction to make orders with regard to the custody, possession, delivery, disposal or
distribution of such property.”
24
“23. The Karnataka Forest Act is a special statute enacted for
the purpose of preserving the forests and the forest produce
in the State. The scheme of the Act, as expressed in the
sections, is to vest power in the Authorized Officers of the
Forest Department for proper implementation/enforcement of
the statutory provisions and for enabling them to take
effective steps for preserving the forests and forest produce.
For this purpose, certain powers including the power of
seizure, confiscation and forfeiture of the forest produce
illegally removed from the forests have been vested
exclusively in them. The position is made clear by the non
obstante clause in the relevant provisions giving overriding
effect to the provisions in the Act over other statutes and
laws. The necessary corollary of such provisions is that in a
case where the Authorized Officer is empowered to confiscate
the seized forest produce on being satisfied that an offence
under the Act has been committed thereof the general power
vested in the Magistrate for dealing with interim
custody/release of the seized materials under CrPC has to
give way. The Magistrate while dealing with a case of any
seizure of forest produce under the Act should examine
whether the power to confiscate the seized forest produce is
vested in the Authorized Officer under the Act and if he finds
that such power is vested in the Authorized Officer then he
has no power to pass an order dealing with interim
custody/release of the seized material. This, in our view, will
help in proper implementation of provisions of the special Act
and will help in advancing the purpose and object of the
statute. If in such cases power to grant interim
custody/release of the seized forest produce is vested in the
Magistrate then it will be defeating the very scheme of the
Act. Such a consequence is to be avoided.
24. From the statutory provisions and the analysis made in
the foregoing paragraphs the position that emerges is that the
learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge were
right in holding that on facts and in the circumstances of the
case, it is the Authorized Officer who is vested with the power
to pass order of interim custody of the vehicle and not the
Magistrate.”
Consequently, in the view of this Court, it is the Authorised Officer who is vested
with the power to pass an order for interim custody of a seized vehicle and not the
Magistrate.
25
21 Subsequently in 2004 in Sujit Kumar Rana (supra) another two judge
Bench of this Court dealt with the applicability of Section 482 of the CrPC for
quashing of proceedings for confiscation of forest produce under the provisions of
the Indian Forest Act, 1927, as amended in relation to the State of West Bengal.
Sections 59-A to 59-G20 were inserted in the principal Act by the State
amendments to inter alia, confer a power of seizure and confiscation and to enact
a bar of jurisdiction of other courts and tribunals notwithstanding anything
contained in the CrPC. This Court held:
“31. Once, however, a confiscation proceeding is initiated; in
terms of Section 59-G of the Act, the jurisdiction of the
criminal court in this behalf stands excluded. The criminal
court although indisputably has the jurisdiction to deal with
the property which is the subject-matter of offence in terms of
the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure but once a
confiscation proceeding is initiated, the said power cannot be
exercised by the Magistrate.”
Once the criminal court had no power to deal with the property seized under the
Act, the High Court was held to have no jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
CrPC to quash proceedings for confiscation of forest produce.
20 “59-A. Confiscation by Forest Officer of forest produce in the case of forest offence believed to have
been committed.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter or in any
other law for the time being in force, where a forest offence is believed to have been committed in respect of the
timber or other forest produce which is the property of the State Government, the Forest Officer or the police
officer seizing the timber or other forest produce under sub-section (1) of Section 52, shall, without any
unreasonable delay, produce the same, together with all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in
committing the offence, before an officer of a rank not inferior to that of an Assistant Conservator of Forests,
authorized by the State Government in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette (hereinafter referred to as
the authorized officer).”
Section 59-B provides the procedure for issue of notice before confiscation. Section 59C provides for a
revision against the order of confiscation. Section 59D provides a right to appeal against the order of revision.
Section 59E provides a savings provision for award of punishment under other provision of the Act. Section 59F
provides that confiscated property and proceeds of sale to vest in Government.
“Section 59-G. Bar of jurisdiction in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in this Act or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being
in force, the officer authorized under Section 59-A or the Forest Officer specially empowered under Section 59-C
or the District Judge to whom an appeal may be preferred under Section 59-D shall have and any other officer or
Forest Officer or court, tribunal or authority shall not have jurisdiction to make orders with regard to the custody,
possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of any property or tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles or cattle
seized under Section 52.”
26
22 In 2017, a similar view has been taken by another two judge Bench of this
Court in Kallo Bai (supra) while construing the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh
Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969. By virtue of the amendments made
to the Adhiniyam, Sections 15-A to 15-D21 were introduced to provide for
confiscation proceedings in line with the provisions contained in the Forest Act as
amended in relation to the State of Madhya Pradesh. Relying on the earlier
decisions of this Court including GV Sudhakar Rao (supra), Justice NV Ramana,
speaking for the two judge Bench held:
“23. Criminal prosecution is distinct from confiscation
proceedings. The two proceedings are different and parallel,
each having a distinct purpose. The object of confiscation
proceeding is to enable speedy and effective adjudication
with regard to confiscation of the produce and the means
used for committing the offence while the object of the
prosecution is to punish the offender. The scheme of the
Adhiniyam prescribes an independent procedure for
confiscation. The intention of prescribing separate
proceedings is to provide a deterrent mechanism and to stop
further misuse of the vehicle.”
23 This leaves the Court to deal with a judgment rendered in 2008 by a two
judge Bench of this Court in State of MP v Madhukar Rao22. The issue in that
21 Section 15-A provides for an appeal against order of confiscation. Section 15-B. provides for a revision
before Court of Sessions against order of Appellate Authority.
“Section 15-C. Bar of jurisdiction of court etc. under certain circumstances.— (1) On receipt of
intimation under sub-section (5) of Section 15 about initiation of proceedings for confiscation of property by the
Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure of property which is subject
matter of confiscation, has been made, no Court, Tribunal or Authority (other than the authorised officer, Appellate
Authority and Court of Sessions referred to in Sections 15, 15-A and 15-B as the case may be), shall have
jurisdiction to make orders with regard to which proceedings for confiscation are initiated under Section 15,
notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or, any other law for the time being in force:
Provided that before passing any order for disposal of property the Magistrate shall satisfy himself that
no intimation under sub-section (5) of Section 15 has been received by his Court or by any other Court having
jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure of property has been made.
Explanation.—Where under any law for the time being in force, two or more Courts have jurisdiction to
try offence under this Act, then receipt of intimation under sub-section (5) of Section 15 by one of the Courts of
Magistrate having such jurisdiction shall be construed to be receipt of intimation under that provision by all the
Courts and the bar to exercise jurisdiction shall operate on all such Courts.
(2) Nothing hereinbefore contained shall be deemed to prevent any officer authorised in this behalf by
the State Government from directing at any time the immediate release of any property seized under Section 15.”
Section 15-D provides for confiscation of property when the produce is not the property of Government.
22 (2008) 14 SCC 624
27
case was whether upon the seizure of a vehicle or vessel under Section 50(1)(c) 23
of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, the Magistrate has no power to direct its
release under Section 451 of the CrPC during the pendency of a trial.
Significantly, in that case the provisions of the Wildlife Protection Act 1972 did not
contain provisions analogous to the MP amendments to the Forest Act or for that
matter those contained in the state laws noticed in Sudhakar Rao,
Kunchindammed, Sujit Kumar Rana and Kallo Bai. Section 50 empowered
the Director or the Chief Wildlife Warden, Forest Officer, Authorised Officer or
Police Officer, if they had reasonable grounds for believing that any person has
committed an offence under the Act, to seize a captive or wild animal, animal
article, meat, trophy etc. together with tools, vehicles, vessels or weapons used
for the commission of the offence. Under sub section (2) of Section 50, prior to its
amendment in October 199124, the Assistant Director or Wildlife Warden was
empowered to release inter alia, a vehicle, vessel or weapon subject to a bond.
This provision was deleted in 1991 and was substituted25 by a provision for
23 “Section 50 - Power of entry, search, arrest and detention.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, the Director or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf or the
Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer or any forest officer or any police officer not below the rank of a
sub-inspector, may, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that any person has committed an offence against
this Act,-

(c) seize any captive animal, wild animal, animal article, meat, trophy or uncured trophy, or any specified
plant or part or derivative thereof, in respect of which an offence against this Act appears to have been
committed, in the possession of any person together with any trap, tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon used for
committing any such offence and, unless he is satisfied that such person will appear and answer any charge
which may be preferred against him, arrest him without warrant, and detain him:
Provided that where a fisherman residing within ten kilometres of a sanctuary or National Park,
inadvertently enters on a boat, not used for commercial fishing, in the territorial waters in that sanctuary or
National Park, a fishing tackle or net on such boat shall not be seized.”
24 “(2) Any officer of a rank not inferior to that of an Assistant Director of Wild Life preservation of Wild Life
Warden, who, or whose subordinate has seized any trap, tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon under clause (c) of subsection (1), may release the same on the execution by the owner thereof of a bond for the production of the
property so released, if and when so required, before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on
account of which the seizure has been made.”
25 Section 50(2) was deleted post-amendment and replaced with Section 50(3A) as follows:
“(3A) Any officer of a rank not inferior to that of an Assistant Director of Wild Life Preservation or an
Assistant Conservator of Forests, who, or whose subordinate, has seized any captive animal or wild animal under
clause (c) of sub-section (1) may give the same for custody on the execution by any person of a bond for the
production of such animal if and when so required, before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on
account of which the seizure has been made.”
28
handing over custody of a captive animal or wild animal which was seized,
subject to the execution of a bond for production before a Magistrate of a
competent jurisdiction. In view of the more limited power of release postamendment, it was urged that Section 50 provided a comprehensive scheme and
it was not open to the Magistrate to direct interim release of a vehicle seized
under Section 50. This submission was rejected by the Court, which held that
Section 50 and other provisions in Chapter VI of the Wildlife Protection Act 1972
did not exclude the application of the provisions of the CrPC. The decision in
Kunchindammed was distinguished on the ground that it dealt with the
provisions of the Karnataka Forest Act 1963 whereas the provisions contained in
the Wildlife Protection Act were materially different. Consequently, it was held that
the provisions of Section 50 did not affect the Magistrate’s power to order interim
release of a vehicle under Section 451 of the CrPC. The decision in Madhukar
Rao involved legislation which had provisions distinct from the special provisions
contained in the state amendment to the Forest Act enacted in relation to Madhya
Pradesh. Indeed, the Court noted the distinction when it dealt with the earlier
decision in Kunchindammed which arose in the context of the Karnataka Forest
Act 1963.
24 In Kailash Chand v State of MP26, a Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court considered a challenge to the constitutional validity of the
state amendments to the Forest Act through MP Act 25 of 1983. Noticing that a
criminal prosecution and a proceeding for confiscation are distinct, each with its
own purpose and object, the High Court held:
26 (1995) AIR (MP) 1
29
“...Criminal prosecution is not an alternative to confiscation
proceedings. The two proceedings are parallel proceedings,
each having a distinct purpose and object. The object of
confiscation proceeding is to enable speedy and effective
adjudication with regard to confiscation of the produce and
the means used for committing the offence. The object of the
prosecution is to punish the offender...”
Explaining the underlying purpose and object of the state amendment, the
Division Bench noted:
“…The scheme of the Central Act contemplating successful
prosecution of the offender leading to confiscation has been
drastically modified by the 1983 Act to provide for an
additional procedure for confiscation, a procedure which is
less cumbersome and more expeditious than the procedure
of prosecution and at the same time, assuring necessary
safeguards to the affected persons. The scheme of the
Central Act provides for prosecution incidentally leading to
confiscation of property. The scheme of the amendments
introduced by the 1983 Act prescribes an independent
procedure for confiscation. The intention is to ensure that the
vehicle used in the transaction is no longer available for such
misuse and to act as deterrent for the other offender and
others. These objects can be well served by confiscating the
vehicle...”
25 In a judgment rendered by one of us (Brother Justice Hemant Gupta as
Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court) in Ramkumar Sahoo v State
of Madhya Pradesh27, these principles were followed while construing the
provisions of Rule 53 of the MP Minor Mineral Rules 1996.
26 Our analysis of the amendments brought by MP Act 25 of 1983 to the
Indian Forest Act 1927 leads to the conclusion that specific provisions have been
made for the seizure and confiscation of forest produce and of tools, boats,
vehicles and articles used in the commission of offences. Upon a seizure under
Section 52(1), the officer effecting the seizure has to either produce the property
27 Writ Petition No 18818 of 2017 decided on 15 February 2018
30
before the Authorised Officer or to make a report of the seizure under sub-section
(2) of Section 52. Upon being satisfied that a forest offence has been committed,
the Authorised Officer is empowered, for reasons to be recorded, to confiscate
the forest produce together with the tools, vehicles, boats and articles used in its
commission. Before confiscating any property under sub-section (3), the
Authorised Officer is required to send an intimation of the initiation of the
proceedings for the confiscation of the property to the Magistrate having
jurisdiction to try the offence. Where it is intended to immediately launch a
criminal proceeding, a report of the seizure is made to the Magistrate having
jurisdiction to try the offence. The order of confiscation under Section 52(3) is
subject to an appeal under Section 52-A and a revision under Section 52-B. Subsection (5) of Section 52-B imparts finality to the order of the Court of Sessions in
revision notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in the CrPC and
provides that it shall not be called into question before any court. Section 52-C
stipulates that on the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate under sub-section
(4) of Section 52, no court, tribunal or authority, other than an Authorised Officer,
an Appellate Authority or Court of Sessions (under Sections 52, 52-A and 52-B)
shall have jurisdiction to pass orders with regard to possession, delivery, disposal
or distribution of the property in regard to which confiscation proceedings have
been initiated. Sub-section (1) of Section 52-C has a non obstante provision
which operates notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian
Forest Act 1927 or in any other law for the time being in force. The only saving is
in respect of an officer duly empowered by the State government for directing the
immediate release of a property seized under Section 52, as provided in Section
31
61. Hence, upon the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate of the initiation of
confiscation proceedings under sub-section (4)(a) of Section 52, the bar of
jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 52-C is clearly attracted. The scheme
contained in the amendments enacted to the Indian Forest Act 1927 in relation to
the State of Madhya Pradesh, makes it abundantly clear that the direction which
was issued by the High Court in the present case, in a petition under Section 482
of the CrPC, to the Magistrate to direct the interim release of the vehicle, which
had been seized, was contrary to law. The jurisdiction under Section 451 of the
CrPC was not available to the Magistrate, once the Authorised Officer initiated
confiscation proceedings.
27 The Madhya Pradesh amendments to the Indian Forest Act 1927 are
infused with a salutary public purpose. Protection of forests against depredation
is a constitutionally mandated goal exemplified by Article 48A28 of the Directive
Principles and the Fundamental Duty of every citizen incorporated in Article
51A(g)29. By isolating the confiscation of forest produce and the instruments
utilised for the commission of an offence from criminal trials, the legislature
intended to ensure that confiscation is an effective deterrent. The absence of
effective deterrence was considered by the Legislature to be a deficiency in the
legal regime. The state amendment has sought to overcome that deficiency by
imposing stringent deterrents against activities which threaten the pristine
existence of forests in Madhya Pradesh. As an effective tool for protecting and
preserving environment, these provisions must receive a purposive interpretation.
28 Article 48(A) : "The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the
forests and wildlife of the country.".
29 Sub-clause (g) of Article 51A provides : “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve
the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for living creatures.”
32
For, it is only when the interpretation of law keeps pace with the object of the
Legislature that the grave evils which pose a danger to our natural environment
can be suppressed. The avarice of humankind through the ages has resulted in
an alarming depletion of the natural environment. The consequences of climate
change are bearing down on every day of our existence. Statutory interpretation
must remain eternally vigilant to the daily assaults on the environment.
28 For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court dated 29 July 2011 in MCRC 5171 of 2011.
Criminal Appeal No.525 of 2019 @ SLP (Crl.) No 5413 of 2013:
29 For the reasons which have been indicated in the judgment delivered today
in Criminal Appeal @ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No 2001 of 2012, the judgment
and order of the High Court dated 7 July 2011 in MCRC No 1818 of 2009 shall
stand set aside and the appeal is accordingly allowed.
Criminal Appeal No 1364 of 2012:
30 For the reasons which have been indicated in the judgment delivered in
Criminal Appeal @ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No 2001 of 2012, the judgment
and order of the High Court dated 7 July 2011 in MCRC No 2634 of 2009 shall
stand set aside and the appeal is accordingly allowed.
33
Criminal Appeal Nos 1362-63 of 2012:
31 For the reasons which have been indicated in the judgment delivered today
in Criminal Appeal @ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No 2001 of 2012, the
judgments and orders of the High Court dated 7 July 2011 and 21 September
2011 in MCRC No 1751 of 2009 and MCRC No 5673 of 2011 shall stand set
aside and the appeals are accordingly allowed.

……......................................................J
 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
.….….....................................................J
 [Hemant Gupta]
New Delhi;
March 26, 2019.

whether a death due to malaria occasioned by a mosquito bite in Mozambique, constituted a death due to accident.= In a policy of insurance which covers death due to accident, the peril insured against is an accident: an untoward happening or occurrence which is unforeseen and unexpected in the normal course of human events. The death of the insured in the present case was caused by encephalitis malaria. The claim under the policy is founded on the hypothesis that there is an element of uncertainty about whether or when a person would be the victim of a mosquito bite which is a carrier of a vectorborne disease. The submission is that being bitten by a mosquito is an unforeseen eventuality and should be regarded as an accident. We do not agree with this submission. The insured was based in Mozambique. According to the World Health Organization’s World Malaria Report 2018, Mozambique, with a population of 29.6 million people, accounts for 5% of cases of malaria globally. It is also on record that one out of three people in Mozambique is afflicted with malaria. In light of these statistics, the illness of encephalitis malaria through a mosquito bite cannot be considered as an accident. It was neither unexpected nor unforeseen. It was not a peril insured against in the policy of accident insurance. We are hence of the view that the interpretation placed on the terms of the insurance policy was manifestly incorrect and that the impugned order of the National Commission is unsustainable.

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No 2614 of 2019
(@SLP(C) No. 4297 of 2017)
The Branch Manager
National Insurance Co. Ltd. …Appellant
Versus
Smt. Mousumi Bhattacharjee & Ors. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.
1 The present appeal raises an interesting question of law. The Court is tasked
with determining whether a death due to malaria occasioned by a mosquito bite in
Mozambique, constituted a death due to accident. The appeal by the insurer has
been filed against the judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission1
, which upheld a decision of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal
1 “National Commission”
1
Commission2
. The State Commission, in first appeal, had upheld the award of a
claim under an insurance policy.
2 Debashis Bhattacharjee, the spouse of the first respondent and the father of
the second respondent applied for a housing loan for an amount of Rs. 13.15 lacs
from the Bank of Baroda on 16 June 2011. The loan was sanctioned and was
repayable in 113 monthly installments, each of Rs. 19,105/-. Incidental to the loan,
he availed of the facility of an insurance scheme called “National Insurance Home
Loan Suraksha Bima”. On 25 August 2011, a policy was issued to cover the loan
amount of Rs. 13.15 lacs with a term of 20 years commencing on 25 August 2011. A
single premium was paid against the policy. The policy was a non-life insurance
product intended to provide insurance security to a person who obtains a loan for
constructing, purchasing or repairing a residential house, flat or apartment. Section I
of the policy insured the house against fire and allied perils, including earthquakes.
Section II insured the borrower against personal accidents.
3 The insured was working as a Manager of a Tea Estate in Assam. He
thereafter took up employment in 2012 as a Manager of a Tea Factory at Cha-DeMagoma, District Gurue, Province-Zambezia, Republic of Mozambique. During his
stay in Mozambique, the insured was admitted to the hospital on 14 November
2012. He was diagnosed with encephalitis malaria and died on 22 November 2012
due to multi-organ failure. His death certificate issued by the Republic of
Mozambique spelt out the conditions and causes of death thus:
2 “State Commission”
2
“VII. Conditions and causes of death
 56. Causes of the Death WRITE ONE DIAGNOSIS PER LINE
 Direct cause a) Multi organ failure
 Intermediary cause b) Encephalitis Malaria
 Basic Cause c) Pnasituria – Malaria.”
4 The heirs of the deceased filed a complaint under the Consumer Protection
Act 1986 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum3
, North 24 PGS,
Barasat alleging that the insurer had committed a deficiency of service in not settling
the claim under the insurance cover. In the written statement filed by the appellant, it
set up the plea that Section II of the policy insured the borrower of the loan against
personal accident. Death due to malaria caused by a mosquito bite was, in the
submission of the insurer, a result of an infection or disease and was not an
accidental death under the terms of the insurance policy.
5 By an order dated 28 February 2014, the District Forum allowed the claim and
called upon the insurer to pay the entire outstanding EMIs in respect of the loan to
the Bank of Baroda. A statutory appeal was filed by the appellant before the State
Commission4
. The State Commission by its order dated 2 February 2016 affirmed
the order of the District Forum, holding that a “sudden death due to mosquito bite in
a foreign land” was an accident; it would be rather silly to say that it was a natural
death. The order of the State Commission was assailed in revision before the
National Commission. The National Commission observed thus:
“The term “accident” has not been defined in the policy which
the deceased had taken and therefore contextual dictionary
meaning of the said term has to be taken for the purpose of
3 “District Forum”
4 “the “West Bengal State Commission”
3
deciding whether the death of the deceased was due to an
accident or not. An accident is something that happens
unexpectedly and is not planned in advance. It is defined as
(i) as unpleasant event, especially in a vehicle, that happens
unexpectedly and causes injury or damage, (ii) something
that happens unexpectedly and is not planned in advance, in
the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (New 8th Edition).
The word ‘accident’ is defined as (i) as accident, an
unforeseen injuries occurrence, something that does not
come in the usual course of event or that cannot be
reasonably anticipated, (ii) an unforeseen and injurious
occurrence due to mistake, negligence, neglect or
misconduct; an unanticipated and untoward event that
cause(s) harm (In Black’s Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition).”
(sic)
6 On whether a death as a result of encephalitis malaria was an accident, the
National Commission held:
“It can hardly be disputed that a mosquito bite is something
which no one expects and which happens all of a sudden
without any act or omission on the part of the victim. In
Consumer Complaint No. 223 of 2006, Shri Matber Singh
versus Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. decided on 05.09.2014,
this Commission noted that as per the information available
on the website of the Insurance Company, an accident may
include events like snake bite, frost bite and dog bite. Hence,
it would be difficult to accept the contention that malaria due
to mosquito bite is a disease and not an accident.”
During the course of hearing Ms Madhavi Divan, learned Additional Solicitor General
submitted that:
(i) Among the perils which were insured against by the policy is ‘death due to
accident’;
(ii) Clause 3(A) of the conditions specified that the insured was required to
give immediate notice of any change of business or occupation;
4
(iii) No intimation was furnished by the insured of having taken a job in
Mozambique which was a material breach of the policy condition;
(iv) Malaria is a common occurrence in tropical countries, particularly so in
Mozambique;
(v) The death of the insured was hence not accidental, since the expression
‘accident’ postulates an occurrence which is unnatural, unforeseen or
unexpected;
(vi) It is well established that the expression ‘accident’ does not include
disease and other natural causes;
(vii) The insured died of multi-organ failure which may not necessarily be a
direct consequence of a mosquito bite;
(viii) The analogy drawn by the National Commission with a snake bite or a
scorpion bite is inapposite; and
(ix) A variety of ailments can be caused on account of mosquito bites such as
Dengue, Chikungunya and Zika, which if unattended can lead to
complications and result in death, but it would be absurd to term the cause
of death as an accident.
7 On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents
supported the decisions of the District Forum, the State Commission and the
National Commission. Counsel submitted that sustaining the mosquito bite is by its
very nature a matter of chance or accident since it is unforeseen. Malaria traces its
origin to a mosquito bite and hence, it was urged that a death which is caused as a
result of malaria must necessarily be construed to be accidental in nature.
5
8 The rival submissions fall for consideration.
9 Section II of the policy covered the following perils:
“Section II:
1. Death due to accident.
2. Accidental loss of two limbs, two eyes or one limb and
one eye.
3. Permanent total disablement or injuries other than
that named above.”
10 The exclusions from Section II were:
“1. Loss of one limb or one eye
2. Any accidental injury or loss not mentioned under
Section-II above
3. Cumulative Bonus
4. Education Fund
5. Cost of transportation of the dead body
6. Persons below the age of 18 years at the time of
disbursement of loan, and above 60 years at the end of
repayment period
7. People having Hysteria
8. Death or accidental resulting from intentional self injury,
suicide or attempted suicide
9. Death or injury from accident while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drug
10. Death or injury from accident caused by insanity or
venereal disease
11. Death or injury from accident arising or resulting from the
insured committing any breach of law with criminal intent
12. War or war like operations
13. Lionising radiations or contamination by radioactivity
14. Loss by delay, loss of market or any other consequential
or indirect loss or damage
15. Default in repayment of installments and or loan due to
any reason whatsoever except due to the occurrence of
insured peril.”
In support of the submission that death due to malaria is a common occurrence in
Mozambique, Ms Divan has adverted to the World Health Organization’s World
Malaria Report 2018. According to it, in 2017, there have been an estimated ten
million cases of malaria in Mozambique and an estimated 14.7 thousand deaths.
6
According to the World Population Prospects 2017 Report published by the United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, nearly one
out of three people in Mozambique contracted malaria.
11 In our view, it would be appropriate to approach the issue which has been
raised in the present case as a matter of interpreting the conditions contained in the
insurance policy.
12 A line of precedents, both of this Court and international, have dealt with the
meaning of the expression ‘accident’. In Union of India v Sunil Kumar Ghosh5
, this
Court held that:
“13…An accident is an occurrence or an event which is
unforeseen and startles one when it takes place but does not
startle one when it does not take place. It is the happening of
the unexpected, not the happening of the expected, which is
called an accident. In other words an event or occurrence the
happening of which is ordinarily expected in the normal
course by almost everyone undertaking a rail journey cannot
be called an “accident”. But the happening of something
which is not inherent in the normal course of events, and
which is not ordinarily expected to happen or occur, is called
a mishap or an accident.”
13 In a subsequent decision in Regional Director, ESI Corporation v Francis
De Costa6
, the expression ‘accident’ was defined as follows:
“4…The popular and ordinary sense of the word ‘accident’
means the mishap or an untoward happening not expected
and designed to have an occurrence is an accident. It must
be regarded as an accident, from the point of view of the
workman who suffers from it, that its occurrence is
unexpected and without design on his part, although either
5 (1984) 4 SCC 246
6 1993 Supp (4) SCC 100
7
intentionally caused by the author of the act or otherwise.”
The same principle was adopted in Jyothi Ademma v Plant Engineer, Nellore7
,
where this Court held:
“7…the expression accident means an untoward mishap
which is not expected or designed.”

P Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon8
, defines the expression ‘accident’:
“an event that takes place without one’s foresight or
expectation; and event that proceeds from an unknown
cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and
therefore not expected, chance, causality, contingency.”
The above Law Lexicon, relying on Lovelace v Traveler’s Protective Association9
,
defines the expression ‘death by accident’ as:
“Death from any unexpected event, which happens, as by
chance, or which does not take place according to the usual
course of things.”
14 In order to constitute an accident, the event must be in the nature of an
occurrence which is unnatural, unforeseen or unexpected. The present case
concerns death caused due to a disease being contracted. Section II of the
7 (2006) 5 SCC 513
8 3rd Edition, 2012
9 47 Am. St. Rep. 638
8
insurance policy covers death caused by accident. Death or injury from accident
caused by insanity or venereal disease has been specifically excluded and not
covered under the policy. The issue is whether death caused by any other disease
not specifically excluded under the policy, is be covered. The issue whether a
disease can be covered under the ambit of the expression ‘accident’ has been
analysed in A W Baker Welford’s The Law Relating to Accident Insurance10
,
where it was stated:
“The word “accident” involves the idea of something
fortuitous and unexpected, as opposed to something
proceeding from natural causes; and injury caused by
accident is to be regarded as the antithesis to bodily
infirmity caused by disease in the ordinary course of
events.” (emphasis supplied)
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance11 elucidates on the ambit of the expression
‘accident’:
“Accident excludes disease. It follows from the above
principle that a disease cannot be classified as an accident.
Although disease proximately caused by an accident, in the
absence of any exclusion for disease will be covered by a
personal accident policy, it is well established that the word
“accident does not include disease and other natural causes,
and implies that intervention of some cause which is brought
into operation by chance and which can be described as
fortuitous.” (emphasis supplied)
The expression ‘accidental death insurance’ has been explained in P Ramanatha
Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon12:
“Insurance that provides coverage in the event of death due
to accidental injuries, but not illness. In the event of death,
10 2nd Edition, 1932
11 10th Ed.by Robert Merkin
12 3rd Ed. (2005)
9
payment is made to the insured’s beneficiary. If bodily injury
occurs (e.g., the loss of a limb), the insured receives a sum
specified by the contract. (insurance)”
The treatises extracted above construe accidents and diseases as distinct concepts.
Baker Welford regards ‘accident’ as a term which does not include disease in the
ordinary course of events. Colinvaux acknowledges that a disease caused as a
proximate cause of an accident will be covered by a policy for personal accident, in
the absence of an exclusion. But then it is also argued that the term accident does
not include disease.
15 Courts across international jurisdictions - including in the UK, US and Canada
have interpreted the term ‘accident’. There is a fine distinction between the
occurrence of a disease which may be considered as an accident and a disease
which occurs in the ‘natural course of events’. In 1861, the Queen’s Bench Division13
in the UK was called upon to consider whether a sunstroke suffered by a person
while on board a ship in the course of performing his ordinary duties would amount
to an accident. Cockburn C.J., delivering the judgment of the court held:
“It is difficult to define the term “accident”, as used in a policy
of this nature, so as to draw with perfect accuracy a boundary
line between injury or death from accident, and injury or death
from natural causes; such as shall be of universal application.
At the same time we think we may safely assume that, in the
term “accident” as so used some violence, casualty, or vis
major, is necessarily involved. We cannot think disease
produced by the action of a known cause can be considered
as accidental. Thus diseases or death engendered by
exposure to heat, cold, damp, the vicissitudes of climate, or
atmosphere influences, cannot, we think properly be said to
be accidental; unless at all events, the exposure is itself
13 Sinclair v Maritime Passengers Assurance (1861) 3 E&E 478
10
brought about by circumstances which may give it the
character of accident. Thus (by way of illustration), if, from
the effects of ordinary exposure to the elements, such as is
common in the course of navigation, a mariner should catch
cold and die, such death would not be accidental; although if,
being obliged by shipwreck or other disasters to quit the ship
and take to the sea in an open boat, he remained exposed to
wet and cold for some time, and death ensued therefrom, the
death might properly be held to be the result of accident. It is
true that, in one sense, disease or death through the direct
effect of a known natural cause, such as we have referred to,
may be said to be accidental inasmuch as it is uncertain
beforehand whether the effect will ensue in any particular
case. Exposed to the same malaria or infection, one man
escapes, another succumbs. Yet diseases thus arising have
always been considered, not as accidental, but as proceeding
from natural causes.”
The Court contrasted the term ‘accident’ with an event that occurs naturally and held
that death due to a sunstroke was not an accident:
“In the present instance, the disease called sunstroke,
although the name would at first seem to imply something of
external violence, is, so far as we are informed, an
inflammatory disease of the brain, brought on by exposure to
the too intense heat of the sun’s rays. It is a disease to which
persons exposing themselves to the sun in a tropical climate
are more or less liable, just as persons exposed to the other
natural causes to which we have referred are liable to
disastrous consequences therefrom. The deceased, in the
discharge of his ordinary duties about his ship, became thus
affected and so died.
“We think, for the reasons we have given, that his death must
be considered as having arisen from a “natural cause,” and
not from “accident,” within the meaning of this policy.”
16 In Fenton v Thorley & Co. Ltd.14
, the House of Lords held that a rupture
caused by an act of over-exertion would not fall within the ambit of the term ‘injury by
14 (1903) AC 443
11
accident’. Lord Macnaughten speaking for the House of Lords held thus:
“Now the expression “injury by accident” seems to me to be a
compound expression. The words “by accident” are, I think,
introduced parenthetically as it were to qualify the word
“injury,” confining it to a certain class of injuries, and excluding
other classes, as, for instance, injuries by disease or injuries
self-inflicted by design.”
The Court of appeal followed this decision in Steel v Cammel, Laird & Co.15
,
Cozens Hardy L.J. observed:
“The doctor called as a witness by the workman said that the
paralysis was an “occupation” disease, which he should
expect in a certain number of cases to follow on the work on
which the workman was engaged. It was not unforeseen; it
was not unexpected…
Injury by disease alone, not accompanied by an accident, is
expressly excluded, as pointed out by Lord Macnaughten in
Fenton v Thorley & Co.”
 (emphasis supplied)
17 In Co-operators Life Insurance Company v Randolph Charles Gibbens16
,
the Supreme Court of Canada was tasked with determining whether contracting a
rare complication of herpes that resulted in paralysis caused due to engagement
in unprotected sex would be covered under the definition of ‘accident’. The Court
held thus:
“59. In the present case the evidence is that genital herpes
is a sexually transmitted virus that spreads by sexual
intercourse. Sex is its normal method of transmission. As
such, unlike for example an internally developing condition
leading to an aneurysm, its transmission requires an
outsider’s participation. But the same could be said of
15 (1905) 2 K.B. 232
16 2009 SCC 59
12
infectious diseases generally. Viruses and bacteria pass,
directly or indirectly, from person to person, and
occasionally across species. In the “ordinary language of
the people”, an individual would not say on coming down with
influenza that “I had an accident”. We come down with the flu
“in the ordinary course of events.”
 (emphasis
supplied)
18 As the law of insurance has developed, there has been a nuanced
understanding of the distinction between an accident and a disease which is
contracted in the natural course of human events in determining whether a policy of
accident insurance would cover a disease. At one end of the spectrum is the theory
that an accident postulates a mishap or an untoward happening, something which is
unexpected and unforeseen. This understanding of what is an accident indicates
that something which arises in the natural course of things is not an accident. This is
the basis for holding that a disease may not fall for classification as an accident,
when it is caused by a bodily infirmity or a condition. A person who suffers from flu or
a viral fever cannot say that it is an accident. Of course, there is an element of
chance or probability in contracting any illness. Even when viral disease has
proliferated in an area, every individual may not suffer from it. Getting a bout of flu or
a viral illness may be a matter of chance. But a person who gets the flu cannot be
described as having suffered an accident: the flu was transmitted in the natural
course of things. To be bitten by a mosquito and be imbued with a malarial parasite
does involve an element of chance. But the disease which is caused as a result of
the insect bite in the natural course of events cannot be regarded as an accident.
Particularly, when the disease is caused in an area which is malaria prone. On the
13
other hand, there may well be instances where a bodily condition from which an
individual suffers may be the direct consequence of an accident. A motor car
accident may, for instance, result in bodily injuries, the consequence of which is
death or disability which may fall within the cover of a policy of accident insurance.
Hence, it has been postulated that where a disease is caused or transmitted in the
natural course of events, it would not be covered by the definition of an accident.
However, in a given case or circumstance, the affliction or bodily condition may be
regarded as an accident where its cause or course of transmission is unexpected
and unforeseen.
19 Recently, in Gloria Wells v Minnesota Life Insurance Company17, the
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, dealt with a case where the question of
law before the court was whether death caused by a bite of a mosquito carrying
West Nile Encephalitis virus in Texas was covered under an accidental death
insurance policy. The Court while remanding the case to the lower court on the
disputed issue of facts, observed that the determinate, single act of a mosquito bite
was not incidental to a body process and the mosquito, an external force produced
an unforeseen result. However, this may be distinguished from the facts in the
present case. Malaria is most commonly transmitted to humans through malaria
virus infested mosquito bites, and when a virus is contracted through normal means
brought about by everyday life it cannot be deemed to be an unexpected or
unforeseen accident.
17 No. 16-20831 (5th Cir. 2018)
14
20 In a policy of insurance which covers death due to accident, the peril insured
against is an accident: an untoward happening or occurrence which is unforeseen
and unexpected in the normal course of human events. The death of the insured in
the present case was caused by encephalitis malaria. The claim under the policy is
founded on the hypothesis that there is an element of uncertainty about whether or
when a person would be the victim of a mosquito bite which is a carrier of a vectorborne disease. The submission is that being bitten by a mosquito is an unforeseen
eventuality and should be regarded as an accident. We do not agree with this
submission. The insured was based in Mozambique. According to the World Health
Organization’s World Malaria Report 2018, Mozambique, with a population of 29.6
million people, accounts for 5% of cases of malaria globally. It is also on record that
one out of three people in Mozambique is afflicted with malaria. In light of these
statistics, the illness of encephalitis malaria through a mosquito bite cannot be
considered as an accident. It was neither unexpected nor unforeseen. It was not a
peril insured against in the policy of accident insurance.
21 We are hence of the view that the interpretation placed on the terms of the
insurance policy was manifestly incorrect and that the impugned order of the
National Commission is unsustainable.
22 We have been informed during the course of the hearing that the claim under
the insurance policy has been paid by the insurer. We direct in exercise of our
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution that no recoveries shall be made.
15
We have embarked on the present exercise since the issue raised in the present
case will have a bearing on similar questions of interpretation in policies of insurance
envisaging an accident cover.
23 The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the National
Commission shall stand set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
…….………….…………………...........................J.
 [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD]
.…….…………………………...............................J.
 [HEMANT GUPTA]
NEW DELHI;
March 26, 2019.
16

No mala fides - Resume order of land is correct - This plea of mala fides was based on political rivalry. = First, admittedly the land in question belongs to the State; Second, clause 4 of the allotment order empowers the State to resume the land either in the event of violation of any of the terms and conditions of the allotment order by the appellant or if it is required for public purpose, the State is entitled to exercise their right of resumption of the land; and Third, the State admittedly exercised the right of resumption of the land for a public purpose.A plea of mala fides, in our view, has no factual and legal foundation to sustain because we find that it is only based on the averment that since the appellant happened to be a member of the opposition party, the party in power at that time had taken the impugned action to resume the land against them. Such averments by itself do not constitute a plea of mala fides without there being any substantial material in its support. In our view, the appellants having failed to point out any legal infirmity in the resumption order except to take the plea based on mala fides, the Division Bench was right in upholding the resumption order as being legal and in conformity with clause 4 of the allotment order.

     REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.7703­7704 OF 2009
V. Krishnamurthy & Anr.              ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.           …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. These   appeals   are   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 11.04.2008 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.A. Nos.1030
& 1031 of 1998 whereby the Division Bench of the
High   Court   allowed   the   appeals   filed   by   the
respondent­State   and   set   aside   the   order   dated
19.06.1998 of the Single Judge in W.P. Nos.11058 &
11059/1989.
1
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in
these appeals, it is necessary to set out a few relevant
facts infra.
3. The appellants herein are the writ petitioners and
the respondents herein are the respondents in the writ
petitions out of which these appeals arise.
4. The Agricultural Horticultural Society(Society) is
the   appellant   in   C.A.   No.7704/2009   which   is
registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration
Act, 1975 whereas the appellant in C.A. No.7703 of
2009   is   its   Secretary.     The   State   of   Tamil   Nadurespondent   No.1   herein   had   allotted   the   land   in
question to the appellant­Society on certain terms and
conditions by agreement dated 28.04.1980.
5. By  order  dated   05.08.1989  (GO   Ms.  No.1259),
the respondent­State resumed the land in question in
terms of clause 4 of the allotment order for public
purpose,   namely,   development   of   sports   facilities
2
without affecting the environment and development of
horticulture and horticulture research.
6. The appellant­Society felt aggrieved by the said
order   and   filed   two   Writ   Petitions   (Nos.11058   and
11059   of   1989)   in   the   Madras   High   Court.   The
challenge to the order was essentially based on the
plea of mala fides. The Single Judge of the High Court,
by order dated 19.06.1998, allowed the writ petitions
and quashed the resumption order dated 05.08.1989.
7. The respondent­State felt aggrieved and filed two
writ   appeals   (Nos.1030   &   1031/1998)   before   the
Division Bench of the High Court.   Earlier, the writ
appeals   were   withdrawn   but   later   on   they   were
restored to their files on an application made by the
State in that behalf for their disposal according to law.
8. By impugned order, the Division Bench allowed
the   writ   appeals   and   while   setting   aside   the   order
passed   by   the   Single   Judge   dismissed   the   writ
3
petitions giving rise to filing of these appeals by the
writ petitioners in this Court.
9. So,   the   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in these appeals, is whether the Division
Bench was justified in allowing the appeals and, in
consequence,   was   justified   in   upholding   the
resumption order dated 05.08.1989 of the respondentState in relation to the land in question.
10. Heard   Mr.   Sanjay   R.   Hegde,   learned   senior
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Balaji Srinivasa,
learned AAG for the respondent­State.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no
merit in these appeals.
12. As   mentioned   above,   the   appellants   (writ
petitioners) had impugned the resumption order dated
05.08.1989   essentially   on   the   plea   based   on  mala
fides. This plea of  mala fides  was based on political
rivalry. According to the appellants, since they were
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the   members   of   the   opposition   party,   the   party   in
power at that time issued the impugned resumption
order.
13. This plea found favour to the writ court (Single
Judge) but the Division Bench reversed the view of the
Single Judge and dismissed the writ petitions.  In the
other words, the Division Bench held that a plea of
mala fides raised by the appellants (writ petitioners) to
impugn   the   action   was   not   factually   and   legally
sustainable. 
14. In this Court also, the learned counsel for the
appellants (writ petitioners) reiterated the same plea of
mala fides  for assailing the resumption notice dated
05.08.1989   but   we   find   no   merit   therein   for   the
following reasons:
15. First, admittedly the land in question belongs to
the   State;   Second,   clause   4   of   the   allotment   order
empowers the State to resume the land either in the
event of  violation of any of the terms and conditions of
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the allotment order by the appellant or if it is required
for public purpose, the State is entitled to exercise
their right of resumption of the land; and Third, the
State admittedly exercised the right of resumption of
the land for a public purpose.
16. A plea of mala fides, in our view, has no factual
and legal foundation to sustain because we find that it
is only based on the averment that since the appellant
happened to be a member of the opposition party, the
party in power at that time had taken the impugned
action   to   resume   the   land   against   them.   Such
averments by itself do not constitute a plea of  mala
fides  without there being any substantial material in
its support.  In our view, the appellants having failed
to point out any legal infirmity in the resumption order
except   to   take   the   plea   based   on  mala   fides,   the
Division Bench was right in upholding the resumption
order as being legal and in conformity with clause 4 of
the allotment order.  We concur with the view taken by
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the   Division   Bench   calling   for   no   interference.
Needless to observe, the State will ensure that the land
in question would only be used for the public purpose
and not for other purposes.
17. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   further
pointed out from the impugned order that the Division
Bench has made some disparaging remarks against
them at some places in the impugned order. In our
view, those remarks were irrelevant for deciding the
short controversy involved in the case.
18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals
fail and are accordingly dismissed.
          ………...................................J.
       [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                               
    …...……..................................J.
                [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
March 26, 2019
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