REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Writ Petition (Civil) No.68 of 2011
Anil Kumar Gupta ....Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Uday U. Lalit, J.
1. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has been
filed in public interest by an Advocate practising in this Court
highlighting an incident that occurred on 01.02. 2011 near Mohammadabad
Crossing in Shahjahanpur Division in State of Uttar Pradesh. The
petitioner has prayed for directions, inter alia, for finding out reasons
for loss of lives, for assessment of damage to property and for grant of
compensation or financial assistance to victims. He has also prayed for
directions for laying down guidelines for necessary precautions and care to
be taken so that such tragedy is not repeated again.
2. The incident highlighted in the petition was:-
a. In a recruitment drive aimed at filling up 416 posts of Class IV
employees, Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP, for short) had called
candidates from eleven States at its headquarter located at Bareilly, a
small town in Uttar Pradesh on 1.2.2011. The aspiring candidates for said
posts were required to remain present in person and submit their forms for
registration. In response to said recruitment drive, aspirants started
arriving at Bareilly and by morning of 1.02.2011 more than two lakh
aspirants had arrived. The gathering was swelling and increasing in number.
The officers of ITBP found themselves incapable of managing the situation
because of such large gathering and as such they suspended and postponed
the drive.
b. The consequent resentment and shouting of slogans in protest by
aspirants provoked the higher officers of ITBP to use lathi charge to
push the crowd. This resulted in a chaotic situation with some aspirants
resorting to violence. The armed police then had to use tear gas shells to
disperse the crowd. Massive disturbance and lawlessness prevailed all over
the town causing law and order problem. Some buses were burnt and damage
was caused to public and private property. In the backdrop of such
situation the crowd of aspiring candidates rushed to rail and road
terminals to return back to their homes.
c. Because of congestion and crowd in large members, the train coaches
were all jam packed. Hundreds of young men then climbed atop Himgiri
Express that was on its way to eastern U.P. and Bihar from where large
number of aspirants had come.
d. When Himgiri Express left Shahjahanpur Railway Station with hundreds
of men on roof top and headed towards Rosa town, an accident took place at
Hathaurda Railway Over Bridge near Mohammadabad crossing in Shahajahanpur.
The Railway Over Bridge was not tall enough and the gap between the roof of
the coach and the bottom of the over bridge was hardly three feet. The
train was speeding fast and by the time the young men on roof top saw the
approaching bridge it was too late. At least 14 young men were crushed
there and then with 20 others seriously injured having been hit by the Over
Bridge and fallen from roof top. At this time, some high tension wire broke
and fell over the train as a result of which some received electric shocks.
Despite this mishap, the train continued running for a while and it finally
stopped some 3 kms from the place of incident.
e. The roof top of coaches was full of blood. The dead bodies and
injured were brought down. People rushed back to find out those who had
fallen from the roof top. The train driver, guard and other employees had
run away from the spot.
f. The incident provoked those young aspirants, some of whom torched two
coaches of the train. What followed thereafter was total chaos putting
tremendous pressure on the Administration in carrying out relief work and
taking injured to Hospitals for medical attention.
3. With the aforesaid assertions this petition was filed on 7.2.2011. In
the meantime Railway Administration had ordered an enquiry. By interim
order passed by this Court the respondents were directed to submit the
Report pursuant to enquiry instituted by them. Consequently, Enquiry
Report dated 09.09.2011 by Mr. Raj Kumar Kardam, Commissioner of Railway
Safety, Northern Circle, New Delhi was placed on record. The record
indicates that this Report was preceded by Prelimnary Report dated
23.02.2011. The relevant portions of Chapter 7 of the Report dated
09.09.2011 under heading “Discussion” are as under:-
“Time of the accident
……As per the statement of loco pilot, assistant loco pilot and guard of
train no. 12332 Dn Jammu Tawi-Howrah Himgiri Express, the train passed
Shahjahanpur station at 16:23 hrs. The other records also show that this
train passed Shahjahanpur station at 16:23 hrs a few passengers travelling
on the roofs of the coaches of this train got struck against the Public
Foot Over Bridge located at LKO (East) end in Shahjahanpur Yard near the
end of the platform.
7.2 Speed of the train at the time of accident:
Diesel loco No. 11133 WDM-3D LKO of train no. 12332 Dn Jammu Tawi-Howrah
Himgiri Express was provided with Medha Speed Time Distance Recording
System Type MRT 918. Analysis of speedometer recording of his loco was made
CRSE/CHg/NR in his technical note on the accident. Copy of the same is
enclosed as Annexure-X. As per the speed and time observations analysis
done by CRSE/Chg./NR, the speed of the train no. 12332 Dn at the time of
passing under the public foot over the bridge located at LKO (East) end in
Shahjahanpur Yard was assessed as 75kmph. A few passengers travelling on
the roofs of the coaches of this train got struck against the Public Foot
Over Bridge located at LKO (East) end in Shahjahanpur Yard near the end of
the platform.
From the above, the speed of the train no. 12332 Dn at the time of accident
is thus considered as 75 kmph.
7.3 Cause of the Accident:
From the particulars of injuries suffered by the roof travelers, it
was observed that most of the persons injured had been hit in the upper
portion of their heads. It was also evident that injuries were caused to
passengers, who were traveling and sitting/standing on the roof of the
coaches. An incident of hitting of an obstruction resulting in such type of
injuries to the roof riders could be caused, in all probabilities by
striking against the existing foot over bridge, road over bridge etc.
………………………………………
Evidence available reveals that before starting the trains, all possible
efforts were made by the railway and civil officials to get the roof riders
come down from roof. Continuous announcements were made through public
address system and loud hailers. ADRM, Sr. DSC/RPF, SP/Railway and civil
authorities were continuously monitoring the situation. However the roof
riders refused to come down from the roof top of the coaches. They were
also throwing stones on passengers and officials. Large number of “JYREENS”
had also gathered at railway station and approached ADRM for help and
protection. In this situation, possibilities of taking incidence a turn to
communal violence were very much there, as this area is a communal
sensitive area and has passed through communal violence very recently
(March 2010 and August 2010). In view of above, the situation had become
highly volatile and had the decision to move the train was not taken at
that time by the railway; the violent crowd would have damaged the station
property and trains on the platforms and could have resulted in stampede
and unmanageable situation at the railway station. DM/BE, IG/BE, DIG/BE,
SP/BE and other Civil and Police officials were themselves available at
Bareilly station to watch and control the situation. They also insisted for
the movement of the trains as quickly as possible and in whatever manner.
The idea was to disperse the crowd as early as possible. The situation was
even being watched at Rampur station by DM/Rampur and SP/Rampur who were
themselves available at Rampur station. At Rosa station also ADM, ASP, Co
were present themselves to control the situation.
……………………………………………………………
In the above circumstances, when 2332 Dn Jammu Tawi-Howrah Himgiri
Exp. Train running at a speed of 75kmph approached the Shahjahanpur public
foot over bridge at km 1237.255 km with passengers travelling and
sitting/standing on the roof of the coaches, few passengers sitting and
traveling on the roofs of the coaches got struck against the Public Foot
Over Bridge situated at the Lucknow (East) end of Shahjahanpur railway
station.
7.5.2 There was an infringement of 55 mm in the vertical clearance at
the Public Foot Over Bridge, Shahjahapur as per the Indian Railways,
Schedule of Dimensions, Revised, 2004. CE/P&D/NR prepared a technical note
in this connection and a copy of the same is enclosed as Annexure-XIV.
Details have been given in his letter No. 1-W/0/Accident/MB/Pt. IV dated
04.05.2011, a copy of which is enclosed as Annexure-XV. Northern Railway
Administration has given his comments on item No. 2 of my immediate
recommendations of Preliminary Report vide CSO/NR’s letter No.
10T/Spl./Occurrence/MB/2011 dated 20.06.2011 (Annexure XXVIII) and as per
this railway has to take further action in removing/regularizing the
infringements.
Railway must ensure that there are no infringements to any of the
dimensions as per Indian Railways, Schedule of Dimensions, Revised, 2004
for any of the overhead fixed structure like FOBs, ROBs etc. For this a
special drive should be launched by Railway Administration for
removal/regularization of the infringements.
7.5.3 On scrutiny of the Steel Structure Register of IOW/SPN and
Bridge Inspection Register for ROB/FOBs of ADEN/SPN, it was seen that
though the inspections were being carried out regularly but the vertical
clearances from the rail level to this fixed structures like FOB, ROBs were
not being measured during the inspections as this have not been prescribed
in the Proforma available for recording the various parameters. Clearance
is an important item as these may get changed due to track renewals, change
in ballast cushion or any other reason resulting into the rail level being
raised and may infringe the Schedule of Dimensions. Therefore it is very
much essential that proper record and upkeep of such an important item is
kept.
Railway Administration should issue a standard Proforma for Steel Structure
Register and Bridge Inspection Register to be maintained for the inspection
of ROB/FOBs which should also include the item of measurements to be taken
for clearances.
7.6 Role of Railway officials and others:
No railway officials were found to be responsible for the accident as such
this aspect is not discussed in the Report.
The primary responsibility rests with those persons who travelled on the
roofs of coaches in violation of Section 156 of the Indian Railways Act,
1989.”
In Chapter 8 titled “Conclusions” it was stated in the Report as under:-
“8.1 Cause of the accident:
8.1.1 Having carefully considered the factual, material and
circumstantial evidences available at my disposal, I have come to the
conclusion that unusual occurrence to a few passengers travelling on the
roofs of the coaches of train no. 12332 Dn Jammu Tawi-Howrah Himgiri
Express at km 1237.255 in Shahjahanpur Yard between Shahjahanpur and Rosa
railway stations on Moradabad-Shahjahanpur-Lucknow, Broad Gauge, Double
Line, non-electrified Section of Moradabad Division of Northern Railway on
1.02.2011 occurred due to a few passengers sitting and travelling on the
roof of the coaches got struck against the Public Foot Over Bridge situated
at the Lucknow (East) end of Shahjahanpur railway station.
The accident is classified under the heading of “FAILURE OF PERSONS
OTHER THAN RAILWAY STAFF”.
In Chapter 9 titled “Remarks and Recommendations” Paragraphs 9.2 and
9.3 of the Report were as under:-
“9.2 Railway must ensure that there are no infringements to any of the
dimensions as per Indian Railways, Schedule of Dimensions, Revised, 2004
for any of the overhead fixed structures like FOBs, ROBs, etc. For this a
special drive should be launched by Railway Administration for
removal/regularization of the infringements.
9.3 Railway Administration should issue a standard Proforma for steel
structure register and bridge inspection register to be maintained for the
inspection of ROB/FOBs which should also include the item of measurements
to be taken for clearances.”
6. After hearing the counsel and considering the aforesaid Report and
other documents on record, while reserving the matter for orders, this
Court passed following order on 17.2.2016:-
“Arguments heard.
Judgment reserved.
Learned counsel for the respondents-Union of India and Railways shall
within three weeks from today file an additional affidavit along with the
relevant documents indicating the following:
Names and particulars of the persons who died or were injured in the
incident that took place on 1st February, 2011 involving Train No.12332 Dn.
Jammu Tawi-Howarh Himgiri Express in Shahjahanpur Yard.
Whether any ex-gratia payment has been made to the next of kin to those
dead or to the persons who sustained injury, if so, the amount paid to
them.
The steps that have been taken by the Railways to remove infringement of
Foot Over-Bridges (FOB) in Lucknow Division as set out in Annexure XXVIII/2
to Report dated 9th September, 2011 submitted by Mr. Raj Kumar Kardam,
Commissioner of Railway Safety, in regard to the incident mentioned above.
Whether the Railways are aware that there are similar other infringements,
FOB or ROB, in regard to the other railway divisions, if so, whether any
steps have been taken to identify such infringements and to rectify the
same, in particular, whether the Railways have taken any steps in regard to
Recommendation 9.2, made by the Commissioner of Railway Safety in the
Report mentioned above. If no steps have been taken the reasons for the
omission and the time-frame within which the Railways shall do the needful.
The steps that have been taken or proposed to be taken by the Government to
avoid situations like the one referred to in the writ petition where lakhs
of people descended simultaneously in the town of Bareilly in connection
with the proposed recruitment for I.T.B.P., in the matter of
streamlining/rationalising the method of recruitments and procedures to
avoid the unmanageably large crowds who came to participate in such
recruitment rallies.
Circulars/orders/notifications, if any, issued to regulate such recruitment
process, rallies and crowds that assemble in connection with the same shall
also be placed on record.
Needful be done within a period of three weeks.”
7. In compliance of the aforesaid Order dated 17.2.2016, an affidavit
has been filed by J.N.Meena, Div. Commercial Manager, Northern Railway,
Moradabad. With regard to directions 1 to 4 above-named. The affidavit
states that following 20 persons died as a result of the incident in
question:-
“1. Deepak s/o Mohit, Age 22 years, R/o Village. Mohva Bujurg PS Choori
Choora Distt. Gorakhpur.
2. Ram Asrey S/o Masaipal, Age 20 years, R/o Khemapur Jansa, Varanasi.
3. Anil Kumar, S/o Sh. Ameer Chandr Bathora, Age 25 years, R/o Ps.
Dhanapur Chandauli.
4. Rahul Kumar, S/o Vedehi Saran, Age 25 years, R/o Hiroosa Ps Rohan
Jhansi.
5. Sarvoday Kumar, S/o UdayKumar Singh, Age 20 years, R/o Village Bansekhan
Tola Ps Aurangabad.
6. Shayam Sundar Yadav, S/o Bhola Nath Yadav, Age 26years, R/o Village
Yuvrajpur PS. Shoej, Gajipur.
7. Sukh Ram, Age 30 years, R/o Unknown
8. Arun Kumar Pandey, S/o Ram Chandra Pandey, Age 20 years, R/o Village
Bhanhi Pandeypurva, P/S Munshiganj Garuriganj Sultanpur.
9. Sunil Kumar Yadav, S/o Ved Prakash Yadev, Age 22 years, R/o Laxhmanpur,
P/S Choori Choora Gorakhpur.
10. Devendra, S/o Bhasol Singh, age 20 years, R/o Vill Lahara, P.S. Kotwali
Dehat, Distt. Aita.
11. Ram Pravesh, S/o Ramaserey, R/o Mahuava Ps. Choori Choora, Gorakhpur.
12. Ajay Kumar, S/o Sukhraj, R/o Vill Seepur Rakva, Post Raipur Rakwa P/S
Choori Choora Gorakhpur.
13. Ravi Kher, S/o Prakash Kher, R/o Singar P.S Gursaray Jhansh
14. Shailesh, S/o Mithailal, R/o Maupur Chota Tola, Choori Choora
Gorakhpur.
15. Purushottam, S/o Gayalal Yadav, R/o Maupur Chota Tola P.s Choori Choora
Gorakhpur.
16. Angad Avdhesh Chauhan, S/o Jiut Chauhan R/o Maupur Chota Tola, P.S
Choori Choora Gorakhpur.
17. Rajiv Jaiswal, S/o G.N. Jaisural, R/o Devmoov PS Gauribaja, Distt.
Devariya.
18. Satish Kumar, S/o Pawan Kumar, Age 24 years, R/o Village Mahuani, P/S
Avtar Nagar Chhapra Bihar.
19. Soun Kumar Gupta, S/o Bayag Bapu Prasad, Age 21 years, R/o Village
Mahuani, P/S Avtar Nagar Distt. Chhapra Bihar.
20. Saleam Ansari, S/o Barkhu Ansari, R/o Village Aurai Kalan, P/S
Bheampra, Distt. Baliya.”
8. The affidavit further stated that no ex-gratia payment was made to
any injured or relative of any person who died in the incident. As regards
direction No.3 regarding Lucknow Division it was stated:-
“Steps taken by Railways to remove infringement of Foot Over Bridge
in Lucknow Division. In this respect it is submitted that the action plan
for the removal of infringement of FOBs in Lucknow Division submitted by
Sr. DEV/C Northern Railways Lucknow vide letter no. DRM/LKO/Engg/ FOB/15
dated 29.02.2016 is annexed with this affidavit.”
A tabular chart giving details regarding required clearances and actual
available clearances as well as the nature and extent of infringement in
respect of 17 cases from Lucknow Division was also appended to the
affidavit.
9. With respect to direction No. 4 what has been placed on record are
communications dated 17.03.2011 and 28.5.2012 which were issued after the
Preliminary Report dated 23.02.2011 and the aforesaid Report dated
09.09.2011 respectively. These communications quoted relevant paragraphs
of the respective Reports and stated that a special drive be undertaken.
We also have on record a letter dated 04.03.2016 from Railway Board
addressed to Chief Claim Officer, Headquarter Office, New Delhi, saying
that a special drive was launched vide letter dated 17.03.2011. What
happened as a result of such special drive has however not been placed on
record. Nothing has been placed on record if similar infringements are
found present in Divisions other than Lucknow Division and if so what
safety measures are undertaken or are to be undertaken and what is the road
map for removing such infringements. It appears that despite Paragraph 9.2
of the Report dated 09.09.2011 no assessment of any kind has been
undertaken in Divisions other than Lucknow Division and consequently
nothing has been placed on record.
10. An affidavit has also been filed by Harendra Kumar, Senior
Administrative Officer, Directorate General, Indo Tibet Border Police
Force, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India dealing with Direction
Nos.5 and 6. In response to Direction No.5 the affidavit states as under:
“Reply to Direction No.5 - It is respectfully submitted that after this
incident the respondent/ITBP has not conducted open rally based
recruitments. The candidates are now being called for physical efficiency
test and physical standard test by post only under the supervision of a
Nodal Officer in a limited and controlled manner. State administrative
authorities at district and higher levels are being informed well in
advance regarding, the time venue, date and timing of recruitments and are
requested to ensure adequate arrangements to maintain law and order outside
the ITBP recruitment venues. The Presiding Officers of recruitment boards
and Nodal Officer have been directed to maintain close liaison with
district administration. A provision has been made in the Standard
Operating Procedure of the recruitment that not more than 600 candidates
will be called at one recruitment center at a time for recruitment test of
physical efficiency test and physical standard test etc. In the case of
Constable (Tradesmen) recruitment, 600 candidates are being called in two
days cycle at each centre.”
11. As regards Direction No.6, the Affidavit goes on to state that
Standing Order No.1 of 2011 dated 14.02.2011 and Standing Order No.5 of
2013 dated 26.02.2013 were issued ensuring that only 600 candidates would
hereafter be called in one cycle on a particular day. To similar effect is
the Standing Order dated 26.02.2013. However these Standing Orders pertain
to ITBP alone and it is not clear whether similar Standing Orders are
issued and are in operation as regards other Central Police Organisations.
12. The Report dated 09.09.2011 indicates that requests were made by the
Railway and Civil Officials to get the roof riders come down from the roof
and announcements were made in that behalf. Though the roof riders refused
to come down, in view of the volatile situation, a decision was taken to
move the train out of Bareilly. According to the Report, the civil and
police officials insisted for the movement of the train as quickly as
possible with an idea to disperse the crowd. One may accept this as a
reasonable and proper exercise as the crowd had to be dispersed which had
congregated in Bareilly. However, this does not explain and justify
further movement of the train for more than 60 KMs from Bareilly Station.
What is more worrisome is that the fact that train was running at a speed
of 75 kilometers per hour.
13. Those who were in charge of Railway Administration in the concerned
Divisions ought to have taken sufficient precaution. The Administration
can certainly be taken to be aware of the fact that the Foot-Over Bridges
or any structures on the way could possibly be a hindrance and could have
caused such incident with people in large number on roof top. The
Administration alone would be in a position to know about the existence of
infringements with regard to certain structures and what could be possible
implications if the train were to run at a great speed with large number of
people on roof top. Reasonable care would naturally be expected of those
incharge of the Administration. We therefore do not agree with the
conclusion in the Report that Railway Administration was not responsible.
14. In Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das[1], while considering the
liability of Railways when some of the employees had taken a lady from
Bangladesh to Rail Yatri Niwas and subjected her to rape, it was observed
by this Court,
“42. Running of the Railways is a commercial activity. Establishing the
Yatri Niwas at various railway stations to provide lodging and boarding
facilities to passengers on payment of charges is a part of the commercial
activity of the Union of India and this activity cannot be equated with the
exercise of sovereign power. The employees of the Union of India who are
deputed to run the Railways and to manage the establishment, including the
railway stations and the Yatri Niwas, are essential components of the
government machinery which carries on the commercial activity. If any of
such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Government, of which they
are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being
satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by
those employees.”
15. In M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood[2] this Court considered the
concept, “Duty of care” in a fact situation where teachers who had
accompanied school children for a picnic on the bank of a river when the
mishap happened and stated as under:-
“16. Duty of care varies from situation to situation — whereas it would be
the duty of the teacher to supervise the children in the playground but the
supervision, as the children leave the school, may not be required in the
same degree as is in the playfield. While it is true that if the students
are taken to another school building for participation in certain games, it
is sufficient exercise of diligence to know that the premises are otherwise
safe and secure but undoubtedly if the students are taken out to a
playground near a river for fun and a swim, the degree of care required
stands at a much higher degree and no deviation therefrom can be had on any
count whatsoever. Mere satisfaction that the river is otherwise safe for a
swim by reason of popular sayings will not be a sufficient compliance. As a
matter of fact the degree of care required to be taken, especially against
the minor children, stands at a much higher level than adults: children
need much stricter care.
……………………
“23. Turning attention, however, on to the issue of vicarious liability,
one redeeming feature that ought to be noticed at this juncture is that to
escort the children was the duty assigned to the two teachers and till such
time thus the period of escorting stands over, one cannot but ascribe it to
be in the course of employment — the two teachers were assigned to escort
the students: the reason obviously being — the children should otherwise be
safe and secure and it is the act of utter negligence of the two teachers
which has resulted in this unfortunate tragedy and thus it is no gainsaying
that the teachers were on their own frolic and the School had done all that
was possible to be done in the matter — safety of the children obviously
was of prime concern so far as the school authorities are concerned and
till such time the children returned to school, safe and secure after the
picnic, the course of employment, in our view continued and thus
resultantly, the liability of the School.
16. In Chandrima Das (supra) compensation of Rs.10 lakhs as awared by the
High Court was upheld while in M.S. Grewal (supra) this Court sustained the
order awarding compensation of Rs.5 lakhs in case of death.
17. In the backdrop of the aforesaid precedents, in our view, it must be
expected of the persons concerned to be aware of the inherent danger in
allowing the train to run with such speed having large number of persons
travelling on roof top. Though the people who travelled on roof top also
contributed to the mishap, the Railway Administration, in our view, was not
free from blame. Concluding so, we direct that the next of kin of those
who died in the incident and those who sustained injuries must be duly
compensated by the Railway Administration. Those who died were obviously
very young in age for they had come to compete for the jobs. Taking all
these factors in consideration we direct Railway Administration to pay:
(a) Compensation of Rs.5 lakhs to the next of kin in case of every death;
(b) Compensation of Rs.1.5 lakhs in every case of permanent disability
suffered by anyone in the incident;
(c) Compensation of Rs.75,000/- in case of any grievous injury suffered
by anyone; and
(d) Compensation of Rs.25,000/- in case of simple injury suffered by
anyone.
18. It is distressing that despite Paragraph No.9.2 of the Report, the
Railway Administration has not considered collecting data in Divisions
other than Lucknow Division whether there are any infringements as per
Schedule of Dimensions stated in said Paragraph 9.2. The
Administration must take every care so that such tragedy is not
repeated. The first step in that behalf is to have an assessment if any
such infringements exist and then to create a road-map to remove such
infringements. We, therefore, direct the Railway Administration to
implement directions stated in Paragraph No.9.2 of the Report dated
09.09.2011. The Committee headed by a senior officer and assisted by at
least three persons from the administration having technical knowledge and
expertise be constituted to have an assessment of all such infringements
and to chalk out an action plan to remove such infringements. It is
possible that in some cases road over bridges may have been built by State
Governments, Municipal Administrations or such bodies. Nonetheless, the
action plan must contemplate ways and means to deal with and remove such
infringements. We direct that the Committee as aforesaid be constituted
within a period of four weeks from the date of this order. We hope and
trust that the Committee shall take appropriate steps in collecting data as
stated above and creating road map or action plan to remove such
infringements, in the shortest possible time.
19 As regards the infringements pointed in Lucknow Division, the
aforesaid Committee shall take immediate steps. If the clearances are
specified and stipulated in Schedule of Dimensions Rules, 2004 the
Committee may do well to ensure strict compliance. Every dispensation
sought, may be considered threadbare and be granted only as a last resort.
20. We direct the Committee to complete the work as early as possible so
that all infringements could be removed in shortest possible time and, in
any case, not later than two years. We direct the Committee to file
periodic status Reports every six months in this Court.
21. We also direct that copies of this Order be sent by the Registry to
the Minister, Railways and Secretary, Railways who are requested to ensure
compliance of the directions as aforesaid.
22. Further, all Central Police Organisations must issue guidelines or
Standing Order akin to Standing Orders Nos. 1 of 2011 and 5 of 2013 of ITBP
ensuring that only 600 candidates or such number of candidates as could
easily be managed or taken care of be called in one cycle on a particular
day. For compliance in that behalf, a copy of this Order be sent by the
Registry to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs.
23. With these directions, the petition stands disposed of.
…..…………………………..CJI
(T.S. Thakur)
...………………………………J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
July 05, 2016
-----------------------
[1]
[2] (2000) 2 SCC 465
[3]
[4] (2001) 8 SCC 151
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Writ Petition (Civil) No.68 of 2011
Anil Kumar Gupta ....Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Uday U. Lalit, J.
1. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has been
filed in public interest by an Advocate practising in this Court
highlighting an incident that occurred on 01.02. 2011 near Mohammadabad
Crossing in Shahjahanpur Division in State of Uttar Pradesh. The
petitioner has prayed for directions, inter alia, for finding out reasons
for loss of lives, for assessment of damage to property and for grant of
compensation or financial assistance to victims. He has also prayed for
directions for laying down guidelines for necessary precautions and care to
be taken so that such tragedy is not repeated again.
2. The incident highlighted in the petition was:-
a. In a recruitment drive aimed at filling up 416 posts of Class IV
employees, Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP, for short) had called
candidates from eleven States at its headquarter located at Bareilly, a
small town in Uttar Pradesh on 1.2.2011. The aspiring candidates for said
posts were required to remain present in person and submit their forms for
registration. In response to said recruitment drive, aspirants started
arriving at Bareilly and by morning of 1.02.2011 more than two lakh
aspirants had arrived. The gathering was swelling and increasing in number.
The officers of ITBP found themselves incapable of managing the situation
because of such large gathering and as such they suspended and postponed
the drive.
b. The consequent resentment and shouting of slogans in protest by
aspirants provoked the higher officers of ITBP to use lathi charge to
push the crowd. This resulted in a chaotic situation with some aspirants
resorting to violence. The armed police then had to use tear gas shells to
disperse the crowd. Massive disturbance and lawlessness prevailed all over
the town causing law and order problem. Some buses were burnt and damage
was caused to public and private property. In the backdrop of such
situation the crowd of aspiring candidates rushed to rail and road
terminals to return back to their homes.
c. Because of congestion and crowd in large members, the train coaches
were all jam packed. Hundreds of young men then climbed atop Himgiri
Express that was on its way to eastern U.P. and Bihar from where large
number of aspirants had come.
d. When Himgiri Express left Shahjahanpur Railway Station with hundreds
of men on roof top and headed towards Rosa town, an accident took place at
Hathaurda Railway Over Bridge near Mohammadabad crossing in Shahajahanpur.
The Railway Over Bridge was not tall enough and the gap between the roof of
the coach and the bottom of the over bridge was hardly three feet. The
train was speeding fast and by the time the young men on roof top saw the
approaching bridge it was too late. At least 14 young men were crushed
there and then with 20 others seriously injured having been hit by the Over
Bridge and fallen from roof top. At this time, some high tension wire broke
and fell over the train as a result of which some received electric shocks.
Despite this mishap, the train continued running for a while and it finally
stopped some 3 kms from the place of incident.
e. The roof top of coaches was full of blood. The dead bodies and
injured were brought down. People rushed back to find out those who had
fallen from the roof top. The train driver, guard and other employees had
run away from the spot.
f. The incident provoked those young aspirants, some of whom torched two
coaches of the train. What followed thereafter was total chaos putting
tremendous pressure on the Administration in carrying out relief work and
taking injured to Hospitals for medical attention.
3. With the aforesaid assertions this petition was filed on 7.2.2011. In
the meantime Railway Administration had ordered an enquiry. By interim
order passed by this Court the respondents were directed to submit the
Report pursuant to enquiry instituted by them. Consequently, Enquiry
Report dated 09.09.2011 by Mr. Raj Kumar Kardam, Commissioner of Railway
Safety, Northern Circle, New Delhi was placed on record. The record
indicates that this Report was preceded by Prelimnary Report dated
23.02.2011. The relevant portions of Chapter 7 of the Report dated
09.09.2011 under heading “Discussion” are as under:-
“Time of the accident
……As per the statement of loco pilot, assistant loco pilot and guard of
train no. 12332 Dn Jammu Tawi-Howrah Himgiri Express, the train passed
Shahjahanpur station at 16:23 hrs. The other records also show that this
train passed Shahjahanpur station at 16:23 hrs a few passengers travelling
on the roofs of the coaches of this train got struck against the Public
Foot Over Bridge located at LKO (East) end in Shahjahanpur Yard near the
end of the platform.
7.2 Speed of the train at the time of accident:
Diesel loco No. 11133 WDM-3D LKO of train no. 12332 Dn Jammu Tawi-Howrah
Himgiri Express was provided with Medha Speed Time Distance Recording
System Type MRT 918. Analysis of speedometer recording of his loco was made
CRSE/CHg/NR in his technical note on the accident. Copy of the same is
enclosed as Annexure-X. As per the speed and time observations analysis
done by CRSE/Chg./NR, the speed of the train no. 12332 Dn at the time of
passing under the public foot over the bridge located at LKO (East) end in
Shahjahanpur Yard was assessed as 75kmph. A few passengers travelling on
the roofs of the coaches of this train got struck against the Public Foot
Over Bridge located at LKO (East) end in Shahjahanpur Yard near the end of
the platform.
From the above, the speed of the train no. 12332 Dn at the time of accident
is thus considered as 75 kmph.
7.3 Cause of the Accident:
From the particulars of injuries suffered by the roof travelers, it
was observed that most of the persons injured had been hit in the upper
portion of their heads. It was also evident that injuries were caused to
passengers, who were traveling and sitting/standing on the roof of the
coaches. An incident of hitting of an obstruction resulting in such type of
injuries to the roof riders could be caused, in all probabilities by
striking against the existing foot over bridge, road over bridge etc.
………………………………………
Evidence available reveals that before starting the trains, all possible
efforts were made by the railway and civil officials to get the roof riders
come down from roof. Continuous announcements were made through public
address system and loud hailers. ADRM, Sr. DSC/RPF, SP/Railway and civil
authorities were continuously monitoring the situation. However the roof
riders refused to come down from the roof top of the coaches. They were
also throwing stones on passengers and officials. Large number of “JYREENS”
had also gathered at railway station and approached ADRM for help and
protection. In this situation, possibilities of taking incidence a turn to
communal violence were very much there, as this area is a communal
sensitive area and has passed through communal violence very recently
(March 2010 and August 2010). In view of above, the situation had become
highly volatile and had the decision to move the train was not taken at
that time by the railway; the violent crowd would have damaged the station
property and trains on the platforms and could have resulted in stampede
and unmanageable situation at the railway station. DM/BE, IG/BE, DIG/BE,
SP/BE and other Civil and Police officials were themselves available at
Bareilly station to watch and control the situation. They also insisted for
the movement of the trains as quickly as possible and in whatever manner.
The idea was to disperse the crowd as early as possible. The situation was
even being watched at Rampur station by DM/Rampur and SP/Rampur who were
themselves available at Rampur station. At Rosa station also ADM, ASP, Co
were present themselves to control the situation.
……………………………………………………………
In the above circumstances, when 2332 Dn Jammu Tawi-Howrah Himgiri
Exp. Train running at a speed of 75kmph approached the Shahjahanpur public
foot over bridge at km 1237.255 km with passengers travelling and
sitting/standing on the roof of the coaches, few passengers sitting and
traveling on the roofs of the coaches got struck against the Public Foot
Over Bridge situated at the Lucknow (East) end of Shahjahanpur railway
station.
7.5.2 There was an infringement of 55 mm in the vertical clearance at
the Public Foot Over Bridge, Shahjahapur as per the Indian Railways,
Schedule of Dimensions, Revised, 2004. CE/P&D/NR prepared a technical note
in this connection and a copy of the same is enclosed as Annexure-XIV.
Details have been given in his letter No. 1-W/0/Accident/MB/Pt. IV dated
04.05.2011, a copy of which is enclosed as Annexure-XV. Northern Railway
Administration has given his comments on item No. 2 of my immediate
recommendations of Preliminary Report vide CSO/NR’s letter No.
10T/Spl./Occurrence/MB/2011 dated 20.06.2011 (Annexure XXVIII) and as per
this railway has to take further action in removing/regularizing the
infringements.
Railway must ensure that there are no infringements to any of the
dimensions as per Indian Railways, Schedule of Dimensions, Revised, 2004
for any of the overhead fixed structure like FOBs, ROBs etc. For this a
special drive should be launched by Railway Administration for
removal/regularization of the infringements.
7.5.3 On scrutiny of the Steel Structure Register of IOW/SPN and
Bridge Inspection Register for ROB/FOBs of ADEN/SPN, it was seen that
though the inspections were being carried out regularly but the vertical
clearances from the rail level to this fixed structures like FOB, ROBs were
not being measured during the inspections as this have not been prescribed
in the Proforma available for recording the various parameters. Clearance
is an important item as these may get changed due to track renewals, change
in ballast cushion or any other reason resulting into the rail level being
raised and may infringe the Schedule of Dimensions. Therefore it is very
much essential that proper record and upkeep of such an important item is
kept.
Railway Administration should issue a standard Proforma for Steel Structure
Register and Bridge Inspection Register to be maintained for the inspection
of ROB/FOBs which should also include the item of measurements to be taken
for clearances.
7.6 Role of Railway officials and others:
No railway officials were found to be responsible for the accident as such
this aspect is not discussed in the Report.
The primary responsibility rests with those persons who travelled on the
roofs of coaches in violation of Section 156 of the Indian Railways Act,
1989.”
In Chapter 8 titled “Conclusions” it was stated in the Report as under:-
“8.1 Cause of the accident:
8.1.1 Having carefully considered the factual, material and
circumstantial evidences available at my disposal, I have come to the
conclusion that unusual occurrence to a few passengers travelling on the
roofs of the coaches of train no. 12332 Dn Jammu Tawi-Howrah Himgiri
Express at km 1237.255 in Shahjahanpur Yard between Shahjahanpur and Rosa
railway stations on Moradabad-Shahjahanpur-Lucknow, Broad Gauge, Double
Line, non-electrified Section of Moradabad Division of Northern Railway on
1.02.2011 occurred due to a few passengers sitting and travelling on the
roof of the coaches got struck against the Public Foot Over Bridge situated
at the Lucknow (East) end of Shahjahanpur railway station.
The accident is classified under the heading of “FAILURE OF PERSONS
OTHER THAN RAILWAY STAFF”.
In Chapter 9 titled “Remarks and Recommendations” Paragraphs 9.2 and
9.3 of the Report were as under:-
“9.2 Railway must ensure that there are no infringements to any of the
dimensions as per Indian Railways, Schedule of Dimensions, Revised, 2004
for any of the overhead fixed structures like FOBs, ROBs, etc. For this a
special drive should be launched by Railway Administration for
removal/regularization of the infringements.
9.3 Railway Administration should issue a standard Proforma for steel
structure register and bridge inspection register to be maintained for the
inspection of ROB/FOBs which should also include the item of measurements
to be taken for clearances.”
6. After hearing the counsel and considering the aforesaid Report and
other documents on record, while reserving the matter for orders, this
Court passed following order on 17.2.2016:-
“Arguments heard.
Judgment reserved.
Learned counsel for the respondents-Union of India and Railways shall
within three weeks from today file an additional affidavit along with the
relevant documents indicating the following:
Names and particulars of the persons who died or were injured in the
incident that took place on 1st February, 2011 involving Train No.12332 Dn.
Jammu Tawi-Howarh Himgiri Express in Shahjahanpur Yard.
Whether any ex-gratia payment has been made to the next of kin to those
dead or to the persons who sustained injury, if so, the amount paid to
them.
The steps that have been taken by the Railways to remove infringement of
Foot Over-Bridges (FOB) in Lucknow Division as set out in Annexure XXVIII/2
to Report dated 9th September, 2011 submitted by Mr. Raj Kumar Kardam,
Commissioner of Railway Safety, in regard to the incident mentioned above.
Whether the Railways are aware that there are similar other infringements,
FOB or ROB, in regard to the other railway divisions, if so, whether any
steps have been taken to identify such infringements and to rectify the
same, in particular, whether the Railways have taken any steps in regard to
Recommendation 9.2, made by the Commissioner of Railway Safety in the
Report mentioned above. If no steps have been taken the reasons for the
omission and the time-frame within which the Railways shall do the needful.
The steps that have been taken or proposed to be taken by the Government to
avoid situations like the one referred to in the writ petition where lakhs
of people descended simultaneously in the town of Bareilly in connection
with the proposed recruitment for I.T.B.P., in the matter of
streamlining/rationalising the method of recruitments and procedures to
avoid the unmanageably large crowds who came to participate in such
recruitment rallies.
Circulars/orders/notifications, if any, issued to regulate such recruitment
process, rallies and crowds that assemble in connection with the same shall
also be placed on record.
Needful be done within a period of three weeks.”
7. In compliance of the aforesaid Order dated 17.2.2016, an affidavit
has been filed by J.N.Meena, Div. Commercial Manager, Northern Railway,
Moradabad. With regard to directions 1 to 4 above-named. The affidavit
states that following 20 persons died as a result of the incident in
question:-
“1. Deepak s/o Mohit, Age 22 years, R/o Village. Mohva Bujurg PS Choori
Choora Distt. Gorakhpur.
2. Ram Asrey S/o Masaipal, Age 20 years, R/o Khemapur Jansa, Varanasi.
3. Anil Kumar, S/o Sh. Ameer Chandr Bathora, Age 25 years, R/o Ps.
Dhanapur Chandauli.
4. Rahul Kumar, S/o Vedehi Saran, Age 25 years, R/o Hiroosa Ps Rohan
Jhansi.
5. Sarvoday Kumar, S/o UdayKumar Singh, Age 20 years, R/o Village Bansekhan
Tola Ps Aurangabad.
6. Shayam Sundar Yadav, S/o Bhola Nath Yadav, Age 26years, R/o Village
Yuvrajpur PS. Shoej, Gajipur.
7. Sukh Ram, Age 30 years, R/o Unknown
8. Arun Kumar Pandey, S/o Ram Chandra Pandey, Age 20 years, R/o Village
Bhanhi Pandeypurva, P/S Munshiganj Garuriganj Sultanpur.
9. Sunil Kumar Yadav, S/o Ved Prakash Yadev, Age 22 years, R/o Laxhmanpur,
P/S Choori Choora Gorakhpur.
10. Devendra, S/o Bhasol Singh, age 20 years, R/o Vill Lahara, P.S. Kotwali
Dehat, Distt. Aita.
11. Ram Pravesh, S/o Ramaserey, R/o Mahuava Ps. Choori Choora, Gorakhpur.
12. Ajay Kumar, S/o Sukhraj, R/o Vill Seepur Rakva, Post Raipur Rakwa P/S
Choori Choora Gorakhpur.
13. Ravi Kher, S/o Prakash Kher, R/o Singar P.S Gursaray Jhansh
14. Shailesh, S/o Mithailal, R/o Maupur Chota Tola, Choori Choora
Gorakhpur.
15. Purushottam, S/o Gayalal Yadav, R/o Maupur Chota Tola P.s Choori Choora
Gorakhpur.
16. Angad Avdhesh Chauhan, S/o Jiut Chauhan R/o Maupur Chota Tola, P.S
Choori Choora Gorakhpur.
17. Rajiv Jaiswal, S/o G.N. Jaisural, R/o Devmoov PS Gauribaja, Distt.
Devariya.
18. Satish Kumar, S/o Pawan Kumar, Age 24 years, R/o Village Mahuani, P/S
Avtar Nagar Chhapra Bihar.
19. Soun Kumar Gupta, S/o Bayag Bapu Prasad, Age 21 years, R/o Village
Mahuani, P/S Avtar Nagar Distt. Chhapra Bihar.
20. Saleam Ansari, S/o Barkhu Ansari, R/o Village Aurai Kalan, P/S
Bheampra, Distt. Baliya.”
8. The affidavit further stated that no ex-gratia payment was made to
any injured or relative of any person who died in the incident. As regards
direction No.3 regarding Lucknow Division it was stated:-
“Steps taken by Railways to remove infringement of Foot Over Bridge
in Lucknow Division. In this respect it is submitted that the action plan
for the removal of infringement of FOBs in Lucknow Division submitted by
Sr. DEV/C Northern Railways Lucknow vide letter no. DRM/LKO/Engg/ FOB/15
dated 29.02.2016 is annexed with this affidavit.”
A tabular chart giving details regarding required clearances and actual
available clearances as well as the nature and extent of infringement in
respect of 17 cases from Lucknow Division was also appended to the
affidavit.
9. With respect to direction No. 4 what has been placed on record are
communications dated 17.03.2011 and 28.5.2012 which were issued after the
Preliminary Report dated 23.02.2011 and the aforesaid Report dated
09.09.2011 respectively. These communications quoted relevant paragraphs
of the respective Reports and stated that a special drive be undertaken.
We also have on record a letter dated 04.03.2016 from Railway Board
addressed to Chief Claim Officer, Headquarter Office, New Delhi, saying
that a special drive was launched vide letter dated 17.03.2011. What
happened as a result of such special drive has however not been placed on
record. Nothing has been placed on record if similar infringements are
found present in Divisions other than Lucknow Division and if so what
safety measures are undertaken or are to be undertaken and what is the road
map for removing such infringements. It appears that despite Paragraph 9.2
of the Report dated 09.09.2011 no assessment of any kind has been
undertaken in Divisions other than Lucknow Division and consequently
nothing has been placed on record.
10. An affidavit has also been filed by Harendra Kumar, Senior
Administrative Officer, Directorate General, Indo Tibet Border Police
Force, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India dealing with Direction
Nos.5 and 6. In response to Direction No.5 the affidavit states as under:
“Reply to Direction No.5 - It is respectfully submitted that after this
incident the respondent/ITBP has not conducted open rally based
recruitments. The candidates are now being called for physical efficiency
test and physical standard test by post only under the supervision of a
Nodal Officer in a limited and controlled manner. State administrative
authorities at district and higher levels are being informed well in
advance regarding, the time venue, date and timing of recruitments and are
requested to ensure adequate arrangements to maintain law and order outside
the ITBP recruitment venues. The Presiding Officers of recruitment boards
and Nodal Officer have been directed to maintain close liaison with
district administration. A provision has been made in the Standard
Operating Procedure of the recruitment that not more than 600 candidates
will be called at one recruitment center at a time for recruitment test of
physical efficiency test and physical standard test etc. In the case of
Constable (Tradesmen) recruitment, 600 candidates are being called in two
days cycle at each centre.”
11. As regards Direction No.6, the Affidavit goes on to state that
Standing Order No.1 of 2011 dated 14.02.2011 and Standing Order No.5 of
2013 dated 26.02.2013 were issued ensuring that only 600 candidates would
hereafter be called in one cycle on a particular day. To similar effect is
the Standing Order dated 26.02.2013. However these Standing Orders pertain
to ITBP alone and it is not clear whether similar Standing Orders are
issued and are in operation as regards other Central Police Organisations.
12. The Report dated 09.09.2011 indicates that requests were made by the
Railway and Civil Officials to get the roof riders come down from the roof
and announcements were made in that behalf. Though the roof riders refused
to come down, in view of the volatile situation, a decision was taken to
move the train out of Bareilly. According to the Report, the civil and
police officials insisted for the movement of the train as quickly as
possible with an idea to disperse the crowd. One may accept this as a
reasonable and proper exercise as the crowd had to be dispersed which had
congregated in Bareilly. However, this does not explain and justify
further movement of the train for more than 60 KMs from Bareilly Station.
What is more worrisome is that the fact that train was running at a speed
of 75 kilometers per hour.
13. Those who were in charge of Railway Administration in the concerned
Divisions ought to have taken sufficient precaution. The Administration
can certainly be taken to be aware of the fact that the Foot-Over Bridges
or any structures on the way could possibly be a hindrance and could have
caused such incident with people in large number on roof top. The
Administration alone would be in a position to know about the existence of
infringements with regard to certain structures and what could be possible
implications if the train were to run at a great speed with large number of
people on roof top. Reasonable care would naturally be expected of those
incharge of the Administration. We therefore do not agree with the
conclusion in the Report that Railway Administration was not responsible.
14. In Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das[1], while considering the
liability of Railways when some of the employees had taken a lady from
Bangladesh to Rail Yatri Niwas and subjected her to rape, it was observed
by this Court,
“42. Running of the Railways is a commercial activity. Establishing the
Yatri Niwas at various railway stations to provide lodging and boarding
facilities to passengers on payment of charges is a part of the commercial
activity of the Union of India and this activity cannot be equated with the
exercise of sovereign power. The employees of the Union of India who are
deputed to run the Railways and to manage the establishment, including the
railway stations and the Yatri Niwas, are essential components of the
government machinery which carries on the commercial activity. If any of
such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Government, of which they
are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being
satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by
those employees.”
15. In M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood[2] this Court considered the
concept, “Duty of care” in a fact situation where teachers who had
accompanied school children for a picnic on the bank of a river when the
mishap happened and stated as under:-
“16. Duty of care varies from situation to situation — whereas it would be
the duty of the teacher to supervise the children in the playground but the
supervision, as the children leave the school, may not be required in the
same degree as is in the playfield. While it is true that if the students
are taken to another school building for participation in certain games, it
is sufficient exercise of diligence to know that the premises are otherwise
safe and secure but undoubtedly if the students are taken out to a
playground near a river for fun and a swim, the degree of care required
stands at a much higher degree and no deviation therefrom can be had on any
count whatsoever. Mere satisfaction that the river is otherwise safe for a
swim by reason of popular sayings will not be a sufficient compliance. As a
matter of fact the degree of care required to be taken, especially against
the minor children, stands at a much higher level than adults: children
need much stricter care.
……………………
“23. Turning attention, however, on to the issue of vicarious liability,
one redeeming feature that ought to be noticed at this juncture is that to
escort the children was the duty assigned to the two teachers and till such
time thus the period of escorting stands over, one cannot but ascribe it to
be in the course of employment — the two teachers were assigned to escort
the students: the reason obviously being — the children should otherwise be
safe and secure and it is the act of utter negligence of the two teachers
which has resulted in this unfortunate tragedy and thus it is no gainsaying
that the teachers were on their own frolic and the School had done all that
was possible to be done in the matter — safety of the children obviously
was of prime concern so far as the school authorities are concerned and
till such time the children returned to school, safe and secure after the
picnic, the course of employment, in our view continued and thus
resultantly, the liability of the School.
16. In Chandrima Das (supra) compensation of Rs.10 lakhs as awared by the
High Court was upheld while in M.S. Grewal (supra) this Court sustained the
order awarding compensation of Rs.5 lakhs in case of death.
17. In the backdrop of the aforesaid precedents, in our view, it must be
expected of the persons concerned to be aware of the inherent danger in
allowing the train to run with such speed having large number of persons
travelling on roof top. Though the people who travelled on roof top also
contributed to the mishap, the Railway Administration, in our view, was not
free from blame. Concluding so, we direct that the next of kin of those
who died in the incident and those who sustained injuries must be duly
compensated by the Railway Administration. Those who died were obviously
very young in age for they had come to compete for the jobs. Taking all
these factors in consideration we direct Railway Administration to pay:
(a) Compensation of Rs.5 lakhs to the next of kin in case of every death;
(b) Compensation of Rs.1.5 lakhs in every case of permanent disability
suffered by anyone in the incident;
(c) Compensation of Rs.75,000/- in case of any grievous injury suffered
by anyone; and
(d) Compensation of Rs.25,000/- in case of simple injury suffered by
anyone.
18. It is distressing that despite Paragraph No.9.2 of the Report, the
Railway Administration has not considered collecting data in Divisions
other than Lucknow Division whether there are any infringements as per
Schedule of Dimensions stated in said Paragraph 9.2. The
Administration must take every care so that such tragedy is not
repeated. The first step in that behalf is to have an assessment if any
such infringements exist and then to create a road-map to remove such
infringements. We, therefore, direct the Railway Administration to
implement directions stated in Paragraph No.9.2 of the Report dated
09.09.2011. The Committee headed by a senior officer and assisted by at
least three persons from the administration having technical knowledge and
expertise be constituted to have an assessment of all such infringements
and to chalk out an action plan to remove such infringements. It is
possible that in some cases road over bridges may have been built by State
Governments, Municipal Administrations or such bodies. Nonetheless, the
action plan must contemplate ways and means to deal with and remove such
infringements. We direct that the Committee as aforesaid be constituted
within a period of four weeks from the date of this order. We hope and
trust that the Committee shall take appropriate steps in collecting data as
stated above and creating road map or action plan to remove such
infringements, in the shortest possible time.
19 As regards the infringements pointed in Lucknow Division, the
aforesaid Committee shall take immediate steps. If the clearances are
specified and stipulated in Schedule of Dimensions Rules, 2004 the
Committee may do well to ensure strict compliance. Every dispensation
sought, may be considered threadbare and be granted only as a last resort.
20. We direct the Committee to complete the work as early as possible so
that all infringements could be removed in shortest possible time and, in
any case, not later than two years. We direct the Committee to file
periodic status Reports every six months in this Court.
21. We also direct that copies of this Order be sent by the Registry to
the Minister, Railways and Secretary, Railways who are requested to ensure
compliance of the directions as aforesaid.
22. Further, all Central Police Organisations must issue guidelines or
Standing Order akin to Standing Orders Nos. 1 of 2011 and 5 of 2013 of ITBP
ensuring that only 600 candidates or such number of candidates as could
easily be managed or taken care of be called in one cycle on a particular
day. For compliance in that behalf, a copy of this Order be sent by the
Registry to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs.
23. With these directions, the petition stands disposed of.
…..…………………………..CJI
(T.S. Thakur)
...………………………………J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
July 05, 2016
-----------------------
[1]
[2] (2000) 2 SCC 465
[3]
[4] (2001) 8 SCC 151
