REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 325 OF 2012
AJAY KUMAR SINGH ...Appellant
Versus
THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF
& ORS. ...Respondents
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos………..… OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 8037-8038 of 2012)
DHIRENDRA KUMAR SINGH ...Appellant
Versus
THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF,
INDIAN NAVY & ORS. …Respondents
And
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 471-472 OF 2013
UMESH KUMAR SINGH …Appellant
Versus
THE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF
& ORS. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Delay condoned and leave granted in SLP (Crl.) No.8037-8038
of 2012.
2. Appellant-Ajay Kumar Singh (AK Singh), Ex-Seaman, First Class
(appellant in Criminal Appeal No.325 of 2012) and Umesh Kumar Singh (UK
Singh), Ex-Radio Operator (Special), First Class (appellant in Criminal
Appeals No.471-472 of 2013) have assailed the judgments of Armed Forces
Tribunal, Chennai in T.A. No.139 of 2010 dated 11.11.2010 and T.A. No.11 of
2011 dated 05.01.2012 and order dated 17.02.2012 passed in Review Petition
No.2 of 2012 in and by which the tribunal affirmed the conviction of the
appellants under Sections 342 and 392 IPC read with Section 77(2) of the
Navy Act, 1957 and modified the sentence of imprisonment to that of the
period already undergone by them. Appellant Dhirendra Kumar Singh (DK
Singh), Ex-Leading Seaman, Physical Trainer, Second Class who was acquitted
by the tribunal with pensionary benefits, has preferred separate appeals
seeking direction for reinstatement and other monetary benefits. These
criminal appeals though assail separate judgments of Armed Forces Tribunal,
Chennai, as the appeals arise out of the same bank robbery incident, all
the appeals were heard together and are disposed of by this common
judgment.
3. Brief facts which led to filing of these appeals are as
follows: Mr. N.K. Marwaha, Branch Manager of Andhra Bank, Extension
Counter, situated at Utility Complex, INS Virbahu filed a complaint on
04.06.1998 at Malkapuram Police Station alleging that at about 7.20 p.m.
while settling the accounts for the day along with Nallamuthu Dass, the
cashier, noticed two persons entered the bank stating that they wanted to
open a bank account and the third person entered after them. Of three
persons, two were armed with two countrymade pistols, a khukri and an iron
rod and they together threatened the manager and cashier to open iron safe.
Manager-Marwaha and cashier opened the iron chest and the culprits removed
Rs.2,54,376/- from the cash tray of the iron safe and kept the same in the
blue colour rexin bag which they were carrying. They removed the money,
the three persons locked the manager and the cashier inside the strong room
of the bank before escaping in a metallic blue Bajaj Chetak scooter
alongwith the blue colour cash bag. During the commission of the offence,
the culprits were concealing their identity by wearing helmets with visors
and masks. After forcing open strong room where they had been locked, the
manager filed a complaint on 04.06.1998 before Malkapuram Police Station
based on which first information report was registered in Crime No.34 of
1998 under Sections 392 and 342 IPC read with Section 25 (1-A) of the Arms
Act. The Naval Police had taken over the investigation; but they were
unable to make headway into identity of the accused persons despite
recovery of the scooter and other articles on 23.07.1998. The
investigation was then handed over to the civil police. After further
investigation, civil police arrested appellants AK Singh and UK Singh on
30.07.1998. Appellant DK Singh was arrested at Howrah Railway Station on
24.07.1998 and thereafter brought to Visakhapatnam on 28.07.1998. On
30.07.1998 all three persons were remanded to custody in central jail,
Visakhapatnam. Based on the statement of the accused persons, certain
recoveries were made. On 17.08.1998, identification parade was conducted
and PWs 14 and 18 identified the appellants.
4. The Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatnam vide letter dated
28.10.1998 advised the Flag Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval
Command, Visakhapatnam to try the accused persons by Court Martial.
Therefore, the appellants were transferred to naval custody under the
provisions of Section 475 Cr.P.C. read with Criminal Courts and Court
Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978 and the matter was
investigated afresh by the Commanding Officer, INS Circars. After
completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed against the appellants
on 26.06.1999 under Sections 392 and 342 IPC read with Section 77 (2) of
the Naval Act and Section 25(1-A) of the Arms Act read with Section 77(2)
of the Navy Act:-(i) for committing a robbery of Rs.2,54,371/- at the
Andhra Bank Extension Counter at INS Virbahu; (ii) for wrongful confinement
of the bank manager and cashier; (iii) for possession of country made
pistol and three rounds of ammunition whilst committing the offence; and
(iv) that accused had remained absent without leave. The Court
Martial was convened on 16.07.1999 and the appellants were tried before the
Court Martial.
5. Before the Court Martial, twenty nine prosecution witnesses
were examined. Upon consideration of evidence, the Court Martial found the
appellants guilty of various charges and sentenced them to undergo various
imprisonments. Additionally, all three appellants were imposed punishment
of dismissal with disgrace and to suffer such other consequential penalties
involved. The appellants preferred statutory appeals before the Chief of
the Naval Staff in accordance with Section 162 of Navy Act 1957. The Chief
of Naval Staff confirmed the conviction of the appellants and reduced the
imprisonment and maintained dismissal of the appellants with disgrace from
the naval service.
6. The details of charges framed against the appellants, findings
of the court martial, punishment and findings of the appellate
authority/Chief of the Naval Staff are as under:-
|Name of |Charges Framed |Findings of the |Findings of the |
|the | |Court Martial and |Appellate |
|Appellant| |Punishment |Authority/Chief |
| | | |of the Naval |
| | | |Staff |
|AK Singh |1. Under Section |Found guilty of |Maintained the |
| |392 IPC read with |charges 1 and 2 |conviction and |
| |Section 77 (2) Navy|under Sections 392 |reduced the |
| |Act. |and 342 IPC read |sentence to |
| |2. Under Section |with Section 77(2) |twenty four |
| |342 IPC read with |Navy Act and |months; |
| |Section 77 (2) Navy|sentenced to undergo|Confirmed |
| |Act. |RI for sixty months;|dismissal from |
| |3. Under Section 25|dismissal from |service with |
| |(1-A) Arms Act read|service with |disgrace. |
| |with Section 77 (2)|disgrace and to | |
| |Navy Act. |suffer consequential| |
| | |penalties involved. | |
|UK Singh |1. Under Section |Found guilty of |Maintained the |
| |392 IPC read with |charges 1, 2 and 4 |conviction and |
| |Section 77 (2) Navy|under Sections 392, |reduced the |
| |Act. |342 IPC read with |sentence from |
| |2. Under Section |Sections 77(2) and |ninety six months|
| |342 IPC read with |51 of Navy Act and |to seventy two |
| |Section 77 (2) Navy|sentenced to undergo|months; confirmed|
| |Act. |RI for ninety six |dismissal from |
| |3. Under Section 25|months; dismissal |service with |
| |(1-A) Arms Act read|from service with |disgrace; |
| |with Section 77 (2)|disgrace and to |forfeiture |
| |Navy Act. |forfeit fourteen |mullets of pay |
| |4. Under Section |days mullets of pay |and allowances |
| |51 Navy Act. |and allowance and |for fourteen days|
| | |suffer consequential|and to suffer the|
| | |penalties involved. |consequential |
| | | |penalties. |
|DK Singh |1. Under Section |Found guilty of |Maintained |
| |392 IPC read with |charges 1, 2,3 and 5|finding of Court |
| |Section 77 (2) of |under Sections 392, |Martial except on|
| |Navy Act. |342 IPC read with |charge No.5 under|
| |2. Under Section |Sections 77 (2), 60 |Section 49(2)(b) |
| |342 IPC read with |(a) and 49 (2)(b) of|who is found |
| |Section 77 (2) of |the Navy Act. |guilty of |
| |Navy Act. |Sentenced to undergo|alternate charge |
| |3. Under Section |RI for 120 months |under Section 51 |
| |60(a) Navy Act. |dismissal from |of the Navy Act |
| |4. Under Section 25|service with |and reduced |
| |(1-A) Arms Act read|disgrace and |sentence from 120|
| |with Section 77 (2)|consequential |months to 96 |
| |Navy Act. |penalties involved. |months. Reduced |
| |5. Under Section 49| |the rank to Sea |
| |(2) (b) of Navy |Charge No. 4 – Not |I. |
| |Act. |guilty. | |
| |Alternatively, | | |
| |under Section 51 | | |
| |Navy Act. | | |
7. Challenging the conviction and the punishment of dismissal with
disgrace, the appellants have filed writ petitions before the Andhra
Pradesh High Court which upon constitution of the Armed Forces Tribunal
were transferred to Armed Forces Tribunal, Chennai and the tribunal
disposed of the appeals confirming the conviction of the appellants AK
Singh and UK Singh. The tribunal disbelieved the versions of PW-14
(Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) and held that PWs 14 and 18 could not have
seen the faces of the culprits at the time of committing the crime since
even according to the prosecution the accused covered their faces with
masks and helmets and were conversing only by lifting the visors of the
helmets. PW-15 fingerprint expert opined “that fingerprints marked as ‘A’
and ‘B’ tallied with the specimen fingerprints of appellants AK Singh and
UK Singh” (Exs.P46 and P47). Based on the evidence of PW-15 V. Hanumantha
Rao, Fingerprint Expert, the tribunal confirmed the conviction of the
appellants-AK Singh and UK Singh and reduced the sentence of imprisonment
imposed on the appellants AK Singh and UK Singh to the period already
undergone by them and maintained their dismissal.
8. In so far as DK Singh is concerned, the tribunal held that
there is no satisfactory evidence to establish his guilt and acquitted him
giving him benefit of doubt. The tribunal directed that DK Singh’s period
of arrest till the date of sentence by the Court Martial shall be counted
for the qualifying service to enable DK Singh to get his pension. The
tribunal however held that DK Singh shall not be entitled to any monetary
benefit like backwages etc. for the interregnum period except that the same
is counted for qualifying service for getting pension. Being aggrieved by
declining the relief of reinstatement and other monetary benefits, DK Singh
has preferred Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8037-8038 of
2012.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants and appellant DK Singh
who appeared in person reiterated the pleas urged before the court martial
and the tribunal and submitted that great injustice has been done to the
appellants in not following the procedure established by law inasmuch as
there was non-compliance of the provisions of Section 5 of the
Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 in taking the fingerprints of the
appellants. It was submitted that the photographs of the appellants were
taken and were shown to the PW-14 (manager) and PW-18 (cashier) to enable
them to identify the appellants-accused without which, it would not have
been possible for PW-14 and PW-18 to identify them since even according to
the prosecution version when they entered the bank in order to conceal
their identity, they were wearing helmets and visors. It was submitted
that the Court Martial and the Tribunal committed serious error in
appreciating the evidence and material on record.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that
the case of the appellants have been extensively dealt with by the tribunal
and all the questions of law and fact have been considered at length and
the tribunal has passed a reasoned order wherein all the issues raised by
the parties have been considered and the impugned order warrants no
interference. In so far as appellant–DK Singh it was submitted that
acquittal in the criminal case does not entitle him for reinstatement as he
was not honourably acquitted but was given benefit of doubt and cannot
claim reinstatement as of right.
11. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and perused
the impugned judgments and material on record.
12. PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) have clearly spoken about
the occurrence that on the date of incident on 04.06.1998, three persons
entered into the bank and threatened PW-14 and PW-18 by showing gun and
committed robbery in the bank. Before the Court Martial, PW-14 and PW-18
have identified the three appellants as the culprits who committed robbery
in the bank. PW-14 and PW-18 have also spoken about the identification
parade held in the prison and that they have identified the appellants in
the test identification parade.
13. The tribunal disbelieved the evidence of PW-14 and PW-18 and
their identification of the appellants on the ground that they could not
have seen the faces of the culprits at the time of commission of offence,
since even according to the prosecution, the appellants were covering their
faces with masks and helmets with visors and they lifted the visors only
while conversing with the bank personnel and tribunal held that there was
no possibility of PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) seeing the faces of
the accused. The tribunal further relied upon the representation made by
the appellants to the Metropolitan Magistrate that they had been
photographed by the police to enable the eye-witnesses (PWs 14 and 18) to
identify them in the test identification parade and on those findings, the
tribunal disbelieved the evidence of PW-14 and PW-18 insofar as the
identification of the appellants.
14. The tribunal, in our view, was not right in disbelieving the
evidence of PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) as to the identification of
the appellants as the culprits who committed robbery in the bank. The
occurrence was at 7.20 p.m. on 04.06.1998. At the time of occurrence, the
bank personnel including PW-14 and PW-18 were working and settling the
accounts and were about to close the bank. Since the bank personnel were
still at work in the bank, it is reasonable to assume that there was enough
light to do so inside the bank. The appellants who entered the bank
initially asked PW-14 to open the bank account. Before however PW-14 could
refuse, the appellants took out a revolver and other weapons. From the
evidence of PW-14 and PW-18, it is clear that the incident lasted for a
brief period during which the appellants were talking to each other. As
per the evidence of PW-14 and PW-18, while the culprits were so conversing
lifting their visors, they were able to see the culprits. It is obvious
that the extraordinary situation, in which the incidence occurred must have
left an indelible impression in the mind of the witnesses about the
identity of the culprits. Be it noted that immediately after the incident,
PW-14 (Manager) lodged the complaint before Malkapuram Police Station
wherein he gave the descriptive particulars of the three culprits namely
their age, height, colour complexion etc. and also given the details of the
weapons. As noted earlier, identity of the appellants by PW-14 and PW-18
in the court is also corroborated by identification of the appellants by PW-
14 and PW-18 in the test identification parade. In that view, the tribunal
was not right in disbelieving the evidence of PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18
(Cashier). It is also pertinent to note that PW-14 and PW-18 had no reason
to falsely implicate the appellants which aspect was not kept in view by
the tribunal. To that extent, we differ from the findings of the tribunal
and accepting the evidence of PW-14 and PW-18 and maintain the conviction
of appellants-AK Singh and UK Singh.
15. Yet another piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution is
the recovery of weapons from AK Singh. As per the prosecution, appellant-
AK Singh was arrested on 30.07.1998 and based on his confession, the
weapons used in the commission of offence were recovered under Section 27
of the Evidence Act. Photographs of the weapons/material objects recovered
were produced before the court martial and the tribunal has noted that the
photograph of the weapon was taken on 29.07.1998 itself, as seen from the
requisition for taking photo of the weapons. The tribunal therefore
disbelieved the prosecution case in so far as the recovery of the weapon
used at the time of committing the offence. Since we did not have the
benefit of perusing the photographs, so produced, we are not expressing any
view about the findings of the tribunal on this aspect.
16. To sustain the conviction of AK Singh and UK Singh, court
martial as well as the tribunal relied upon the evidence of Fingerprint
Expert-V. Hanumantha Rao (PW-15) who had stated that upon information to
the control room on 04.06.1998, he reached the scene of occurrence at Naval
Base, Andhra Bank Extension Counter, INS Virbahu at 9.00 p.m. While
examining the scene of occurrence, PW-15 observed two chance fingerprints
on the glass entrance door of the bank. PW-15 developed the same with his
universal or white powder and marked them as “A” and “B” for the purpose of
lifting them by taking photos. As the photographer was not available, PW-
15 left the scene of occurrence and on the next day morning i.e. 05.06.1998
at about 0800 hrs., PW-15 took the police constable Trimul Kumar-
photographer of MFSL Unit, Visakhapatnam and photographed the preserved
chance fingerprints. The chance fingerprints so lifted were kept in the
office of PW-15 for comparison. The police supplied the specimen
fingerprints of bank officials for comparison and as per the evidence of PW-
15, fingerprints of the bank employees did not tally with the chance
fingerprints lifted from the entrance door of the bank. Two months later
after the arrest of the appellants, specimen fingerprints of AK Singh, UK
Singh and also DK Singh were sent to PW-15 for comparison. On comparison,
PW-15 noted that the chance fingerprint marked “A” was identical to the
specimen right middle finger impression marked as “S1” which is the
specimen fingerprint of appellant-AK Singh and the said report was marked
as Ex.P-46. In Ex.P-47-report, PW-15 opined that chance fingerprint marked
“B” was identical to the specimen right index finger impression as “S(a)”
which is the specimen finger impression of appellant-UK Singh.
17. Contention of respondents is that evidence of PW-15-Fingerprint
Expert incriminates the appellants AK Singh and UK Singh. However, in
proving this incriminating evidence, there seems to be lapses on the part
of the prosecution. As noticed earlier, police constable Tirumal Kumar-
photographer of MFSL Unit had taken the photographs of the preserved chance
fingerprints. To prove the chance fingerprints lifted from the entrance
glass doors of the bank, the prosecution should have proved the photographs
by examining constable-Trimul Kumar and should have produced the negatives
of the photographs of the chance fingerprints. This lapse in the
prosecution, in our view, cannot result in acquittal of the appellants.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution must be scrutinized independently
of such lapses either in the investigation or by the prosecution or
otherwise, the result of the criminal trial would depend upon the level of
investigation or the conduct of the prosecution. Criminal trials should
not be made casualty for such lapses in the investigation or prosecution.
Evidence of PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) identifying the appellants
and their evidence as to identity of the appellants in the test
identification parade ought not to have been disbelieved by the tribunal.
In exercise of power under Section 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act,
this Court normally does not re-appreciate the evidence and slow to
interfere with the findings of the tribunal unless there is substantial
question of public importance. But when it is found that appreciation of
evidence in a given case is vitiated by serious error, this Court can re-
appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings. In our view, the
tribunal was not right in disbelieving the evidence of PW-14 (Manager) and
PW-18 (Cashier) in identifying the appellants AK Singh, UK Singh and DK
Singh as culprits and their identity in test identification parade and
their conviction is to be affirmed on the evidence of PW-14 and PW-18, if
not on the evidence of fingerprint expert and the appeals are liable to be
dismissed.
18. In so far as appellant-UK Singh, prosecution has adduced
evidence to show that after the incident, he has deposited huge amount in
his bank account. PW-29-Gopal Priyadarshi, Assistant, Central Bank of India
stated that appellant-UK Singh is having account No.8206 in Central Bank of
India, Azamgarh Branch, Uttar Pradesh and that he had deposited Rs.81,600/-
on 11.06.1998. Ex. P76 is the certificate issued by the Central Bank,
Azamgarh dated 07.10.1998 as per which the last balance in the account of
UK Singh is Rs.1,32,670/- including an interest of Rs.570/-. PW-29 deposed
that as per Ex.C-11, pay in slip, the denomination of the cash of
Rs.81,600/- deposited by the accused was, one bundle of Rs.500/-
(Rs.500x100=50,000/-), 316 notes of Rs.100/- (Rs.100x316= 31,600/-) total
Rs.81,600/-. Appellant-UK Singh has not explained the source of such huge
amount deposited in the bank on 11.06.1998 which is a strong incriminating
circumstance against the appellant.
19. Facts leading to DK Singh’s arrest are slightly different from
those of AK Singh and UK Singh. DK Singh was serving on Board alongwith
other sailors in INS Anjadip, Visakhapatnam on 04.06.1998. He collected his
Genform No.358/S dated 03.07.1998 from ship INS Anjadip at Visakhapatnam
and proceeded to his next duty station for POPTI ‘Q’ course at INS,
Venduruthy, Cochin. DK Singh alongwith his wife, children and brother-in-
law proceeded towards his native place by Corromandal express. On the
basis of information, DK Singh was arrested at Howrah Railway Station on
24.07.1998, was kept under custody till 28.07.1998 at Calcutta and
thereafter he was brought to Visakhapatnam on 28.07.1998. In Court Martial
inquiry, DK Singh was found guilty and sentenced to undergo ten years
rigorous imprisonment and dismissal with disgrace from navy with
consequential penalties. Upon appeal, his conviction was confirmed and
sentence was reduced to eight years. The tribunal acquitted appellant-DK
Singh by giving him benefit of doubt. While acquitting DK Singh, tribunal
directed that the appellant-DK Singh is deemed to have been retired from
service with effect from 03.05.2004 on completion of qualifying service
required for pension. Assailing the same, appellant-DK Singh has filed the
appeal seeking for reinstatement and other consequential benefits.
20. As in the case of other appellants, tribunal disbelieved the
identification of DK Singh by PWs 14 and 18. The tribunal accepted DK
Singh’s plea that his photograph was taken on the same date when he was
placed under custody i.e. on 29.07.1998 and identification parade was
conducted on 17.08.1998. The tribunal was of the opinion that there was
probability for the investigating agency to have shown his photo to PWs 14
and 18. As discussed earlier, we have differed from the approach and
finding of the tribunal in appreciation of evidence of PW-14 and PW-18 in
identifying the appellants. However, since Union of India has not filed
any appeal challenging acquittal of appellant DK Singh, we do not propose
to go into these aspects.
21. It is fairly well settled that acquittal by a criminal court
would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the
Rules and Regulations in force. [vide Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager
(PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 764,
T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. v. K. Meerabai (2006) 2 SCC 255]
22. Acquittal in a criminal case does not entitle a person to
automatic reinstatement. In Union of India and Anr. v. Bihari Lal Sidhana
(1997) 4 SCC 385, it was held as under:-
“5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal court but
acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into
the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take
decision whether the delinquent government servant can be taken into
service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary
Service Rules. Admittedly, the respondent had been working as a temporary
government servant before he was kept under suspension. The termination
order indicated the factum that he, by then, was under suspension. It is
only a way of describing him as being under suspension when the order came
to be passed but that does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal of
government employee does not automatically entitle the government servant
to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate
competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct
is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action
should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent
is only a temporary government servant, the power being available under
Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent authority to
invoke the said power and terminate the services of the employee instead of
conducting the enquiry or to continue in service a government servant
accused of defalcation of public money. Reinstatement would be a charter
for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of public money.”
23. Only if the employee had been honourably acquitted, could he
make a claim for reinstatement. In the case in hand, the tribunal
acquitted the appellant-DK Singh:-(i) as in the case of AK Singh and UK
Singh, tribunal disbelieved the identification of appellant-DK Singh by PW-
14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) and (ii) the weapons that were alleged to
have been recovered on the basis of confession of DK Singh on 12.08.1998
appears to have been photographed on 29.07.1998 by the prosecution, the
tribunal thus rejected the prosecution case that weapons, bag and suitcase
were recovered on the basis of confession given by DK Singh. Unlike AK
Singh and UK Singh’s case, DK Singh did not have incriminating fingerprint
evidence at the scene of occurrence and DK Singh raised defence plea of
alibi. According to DK Singh he was on duty along with four others on
aboard Indian Naval Ship, Anjadip on 04.06.1998 from 0900 hours to 1300
hours and then again from 1525 hours to 0740 hours on 05.06.1998. To
examine this plea of alibi, the tribunal called for the Duty Ashore Book
maintained at INS Anjadip (Original of Ex. P.32). DK Singh claimed that
the document entry at Sl. No.53 was tampered with and consequently,
tribunal noted that there indeed was some overwriting in Sl. No.53 besides
the column for the name of the individual. The tribunal concluded that
prosecution had not placed any material on record to show that after
finishing his duty at 1300 hours, appellant-DK Singh was allowed to avail
off and thus the tribunal concluded that in the absence of evidence that DK
Singh was allowed to go off after 1300 hours on 04.06.1998, the benefit of
doubt must be afforded to him.
24. The tribunal came to the collective conclusion that no
satisfactory evidence had been adduced by the prosecution to sustain the
conviction of DK Singh and therefore the tribunal set aside the conviction
giving him the benefit of doubt. From a perusal of the impugned judgment,
it is clear that the tribunal has acquitted the appellant-DK Singh on the
ground that the prosecution has not established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not as if, the appellant-DK Singh was
honourably acquitted. It is also to be pointed out that as discussed above,
that we have taken the view that the identity of the appellants by PW-14
(Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) is credible and acceptable. Evidence of PW-14
and PW-18 identifying DK Singh as one of the culprits is a factor to be
reckoned with while considering the plea of the appellant-DK Singh for
reinstatement. Additionally, it is to be pointed out that as seen from the
evidence of K. Rama Krishna Rao-Inspector of Police (PW-17) on 10.06.1998,
DK Singh deposited Rs.90,000/- in his bank account No.3395 of SBI BR
Township Branch and the explanation of the appellant for this deposit is
not convincing. Having regard to our findings on the evidence of PWs 14
and 18, the acquittal of appellant-DK Singh itself becomes a debatable
point. However, we do not propose to go into this aspect since the Union
of India has not filed any appeal challenging acquittal of DK Singh.
Appellant–DK Singh who was only granted benefit of doubt cannot seek for
reinstatement and the consequential benefits and his appeal is also liable
to be dismissed.
25. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed.
……………………..CJI.
(T.S . THAKUR)
………………………..J.
(R. BANUMATHI)
New Delhi;
July 13, 2016
