IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4267 OF 2015
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11215 OF 2015]
Sumer Builders Pvt. Ltd. ... Appellant
Versus
Narendra Gorani ... Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated
10.03.2015 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Appeal No. 572 of 2013 whereby it has concurred with the view
expressed by the learned Single Judge in Chamber Summons No. 720/2013 in
Arbitration Petition No. 799/2013 dated 10.10.2013 whereunder the learned
Single Judge had revoked the leave granted by the court under Clause 12 of
the Letters Patent to file a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, “the 1996 Act”).
2. The facts which are essential to be stated are that the parties to
the lis entered into an agreement on 28.2.2008 for development of the land
of the respondent. As per the said agreement, the appellant was required
to develop a residential project and/or commercial complex and/or multiplex
and/or hotels and/or malls etc. as permissible in law. The respondent had
handed over the vacant possession of the land to enable the appellant to
start the development work. Clause 13 of the development agreement
contains an arbitration clause whereby the parties had agreed to refer the
matter in respect of any difference or dispute between them with regard to
the construction or the terms of the development agreement or with regard
to the project undertaken for arbitration. A Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) was entered into between the parties, which stipulates that the
developer was required construct a township project consisting of one
commercial building, 11 residential wings in four buildings and one club
house under licence from the Indore Municipal Corporation. It was further
agreed that if the MoU was terminated, the developer would not have any
right, title or interest in the township project and would be required to
remove his employees and machineries from the land. Clause 13 of the
developer agreement was also incorporated in the MoU.
3. As disputes arose with regard to payment, the respondent terminated
the MoU, forfeited the security deposit and invoked the arbitration clause
by issuing a notice through his Advocate on 6.6.2013. The appellant herein
replied to the termination notice by stating that it had carries out
substantial construction on the property by constructing three buildings
and by taking many other steps. It was also stated by the appellant that
the environmental clearance certificate for the project was not obtained by
the respondent and, therefore, further work was stopped. The appellant
required the respondent to perform his part of the contract in obtaining
the requisite environmental clearance, execute irrevocable power of
attorney, refund the part of the amount payable and pay interest on the
security deposit.
4. As the factual matrix would undrape, when arbitration was demanded by
the respondent, the appellant on 16.7.2013 replied that the arbitration
tribunal had to be in Mumbai. It was also put forth that it was in
physical possession of the property and its construction material,
machinery, office equipments and other equipments were at the site. At
this stage, the appellant moved the High Court of Bombay for grant of leave
under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent by filing an application under
Section 9 of the 1996 Act asserting that the courts at Bombay have the
territorial jurisdiction, and accordingly leave was granted. The
respondent after entering appearance filed an application praying for
revocation of leave. While seeking revocation of leave, it was contended
by the respondent that dispute pertains to the land which is situate at
Indore; that the development agreement and the MoU had been executed at
Indore where the immoveable property is situated; and that the dispute
fundamentally is for right and possession over the land, hence, the court
where the land is situated has the territorial jurisdiction in respect of
the arbitration or any application to be filed under the 1996 Act.
5. The learned Single Judge scanned the anatomy of Clause 12 of the
Letters Patent and various decisions of the High Court of Bombay and
referred to the decision in Moolji Jaitha & Co. v. Khandesh Spinning &
Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.[1], adverted to the issue relating to what would
constitute cause of action in the obtaining factual matrix, analysed the
decision of the Bombay High Court in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v.
Onkarmal Ishar Dass & Ors.[2], and referred to Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd.
v. Daulat and Anr.[3] and eventually came to hold as follows:-
“... the Petitioner has put up its machinery, staff for the construction
and the ultimate construction upon the land. Several buildings have been
constructed fully or in part. The parties are entitled to a part of the
construction each as per the directions of the development agreement or
amount in cash as per the MOU. The development work is in progress. An
order for protection of the property pending the arbitration would involve
the land itself. The dispute has nothing to do with the rights of the
parties in personam only....”
And again:-
“... The disputes in the development agreement are closely connected with
the land, the possession of which is disputed by the parties. The suit is
a suit for land. It would have to be filed in Indore where the land is
situate.”
6. Being of this view, the learned Single Judge revoked the leave that
was earlier granted. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the
appellant preferred an appeal before the Division Bench. Before the
Division Bench it was contended that the appellant was in possession of the
land and the possession shall remain with it till the completion of the
entire project and he was entitled to refund of security deposit.
7. In essence, it was urged that the application preferred under Section
9 of the 1996 Act was tenable before the High Court of Bombay and there was
no justification to revoke the leave. The Division Bench referred to
certain clauses of the agreement and the clauses from the MoU and the
correspondences between the parties, the assertions made in the Section 9
petition and the relief sought therein, addressed to the import of Clause
12 of the Letters Patent and what meaning had been given to the “suit for
land” in Moolji Jaitha (supra) by analyzing various passages, culled out
the principles stated in Adcon Electronics (supra), took note of the fact
that the development agreement and the MoU had been executed at Indore, the
statement of claim and the counter claim filed by the parties before the
learned arbitrator who has already entered into reference and in the
ultimate eventuality opined thus:-
“... In the present case, we are of the vie that the disputes between the
parties hereto in relation to the development agreement dated 28 February
2008 and the MOU dated 8 June 2012 are of such a nature that they are
rooted to the land. The disputes are not such that they relate only to the
execution of any document and/or specific performance thereof simplicitor.
The disputes relate to possession of the said land which is outside the
jurisdiction of the Court as also regarding the percentage of the parties
rights, title and interest in the said land and/or their entitlement to a
sizable portion of the constructed space thereon. These disputes would
certainly fall within the expression “suit for land” appearing in Clause
XII of the Letters Patent.”
Expressing thus, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the
order passed by the learned Single Judge.
8. We have heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for the respondent.
9. Criticizing the orders passed by the High Court, it is submitted by
Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel that the learned Single Judge as well
as the Division Bench has fallen into serious error in their appreciation
of the clauses in the agreement and the relief sought inasmuch as it was a
money claim and when the amount was paid at Mumbai, the High Court of
Mumbai had the jurisdiction. He has drawn our attention to various clauses
in the agreement to which we shall refer to in the course of our
delineation. In essence, his submission is that it is basically a claim
relating to money and it has nothing to do with the land and, therefore,
the analysis made by the High Court is fundamentally fallacious.
10. Mr. Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent
countering the aforesaid submissions would contend that the cause of action
had arisen at Indore regard being had to the fact that the land is situated
at Indore and the agreement in question and the MoU were executed at
Indore. It is his further submission that the order passed by the Division
Bench is absolutely defensible inasmuch as it is a claim for land and in
the backdrop of prayer under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, there could not
have been any other conclusion than what has been expressed by the High
Court that it has no territorial jurisdiction to deal with the controversy.
11. To appreciate the controversy, it is appropriate to refer to Clause
12 of the Letters Patent, which reads as follows:-
“12. Original jurisdiction as to suits – And we do further ordain that the
said High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in the exercise of its ordinary
original civil jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try and
determine suits of every description, if, in the case of suits for land or
other immovable property such land or property shall be situated, or in all
other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or in
case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within
the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High
Court, or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit
shall dwell or carry on business, or personally work for gain, within such
limits; except that the said High Court shall not have such original
jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause
Court at Bombay, in which the debt or damage, or value of property sued for
does not exceed one hundred rupees.”
12. The said clause fell for interpretation in Adcon Electronics (supra),
wherein the Court stated thus:-
“Thus, it is clear that under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the High
Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction will have power to
receive, try and determine: (1) suits for land or other immovable property
if such property is situated within the local limits of original
jurisdiction of the High Court; or (2) all other cases (a) if the cause of
action has arisen wholly within the local limits of the ordinary original
jurisdiction of the High Court; (b) if prior leave of the Court has been
obtained and the cause of action has arisen in part within the local limits
of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court; or (c) if the
defendant dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within
such limits.”
13. Be it noted under Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(for short, “CPC”), Sections 16, 17 and 20 are not applicable to the High
Court in original civil jurisdiction. Thus, as far as the Bombay High
Court is concerned, it is Clause 12 of the Letters Patent that would govern
the controversy.
14. In Adcon Electronics (supra), the two-Judge Bench referred to the
divergence of opinion in Moolji Jaitha (supra), the Full Bench decision of
the High Court of Madras in P.M.A. Velliappa Chettiar v. Saha Govinda
Doss[4], Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in Debendra Nath
Chowdhury v. Southern Bank Ltd.[5] and ruled thus:-
“From the above discussion it follows that a “suit for land” is a suit in
which the relief claimed relates to title to or delivery of possession of
land or immovable property. Whether a suit is a “suit for land” or not has
to be determined on the averments in the plaint with reference to the
reliefs claimed therein; where the relief relates to adjudication of title
to land or immovable property or delivery of possession of the land or
immovable property, it will be a “suit for land”. We are in respectful
agreement with the view expressed by Mahajan, J. in Moolji Jaitha case.”
15. It will be appropriate to reproduce what Justice Mahajan had observed
in Moolji Jaitha (supra):-
“If an attempt is made to find a comprehensive definition of the phrase, it
will eventually be discovered that it has created further complications. I
therefore content myself by saying that where the nature of the suit is
such that in substance it involves a controversy about land or immovable
property and the court is called upon to decide conflicting claims to such
property and a decree or order is prayed for which will bring about a
change in the title to it, that suit can be said to be in respect of land
or immovable property; but where incidentally in a suit, the main purpose
of which or the primary object of which is quite different, some relief has
to be given about land, the title to it not being in dispute in the real
sense of the term, then such a suit cannot fall within the four corners of
this expression.”
16. He had further added:-
“In my opinion, if the suit is for specific performance and a decree for
possession of the land sold is claimed, such a suit would certainly be a
suit for land; but if the suit is simpliciter for specific performance,
i.e., for the enforcement of the contract of sale and for execution of a
conveyance, in that event there can be no good ground for holding that such
a suit is a suit for determination of title to land or that the decree in
it would operate on the land.”
17. Recently, in Excel Dealcomm Pvt. Ltd. v. Asset Reconstruction Co.
(India) Ltd.[6], the controversy had arisen from the High Court of
Calcutta. The two-Judge Bench addressed to the issue “what is the suit for
land”, and observed as under:-
“A suit for land is a suit in which the relief claimed relates to the title
or delivery of possession of land or immovable property [see [pic]Adcon
Electronics (P) Ltd. v. Daulat]. Further, it is an established rule that to
determine whether it is a suit for land, the court will look into barely
the plaint and no other evidence (Indian Mineral & Chemicals Co. v.
Deutsche Bank[7]). If by the averments in the plaint and prayers therein,
it appears that the suit is one for land, it shall be so held and if it
does not so appear, then the suit shall continue under leave granted under
Clause 12.”
18. Be it noted, in the said case suit was filed for specific performance
of the agreement which contemplated sale of property as has been described
under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The issue that arose before
the Court is as follows:-
“In the present case, a suit was filed for the specific performance of the
agreement which contemplated the sale of property, as has been described in
Para 1 under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act in terms of the Rules. The
question with respect to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent in the present
case is that whether the present suit is suit for land.”
19. The Court referred to the relief clause, the authority in Adcon
Electronics (supra) and came to hold that:-
“It may be noted that the sale certificate sought under the prayer requires
the delivery of possession of the suit property. Thus, we find that the
prayer for delivery of possession was an implicit one in the present case.
The prayer as sought in the plaint could not have been granted without the
delivery of possession of the suit property as the sale certificate itself
contemplates the delivery of the immovable property. Thus, in view of this
we find that Adcon Electronics would not apply as there was a prayer for
delivery of possession in the present case. Therefore, we hold that the
present suit was indeed a suit for land.”
Being of this view, it concurred with the opinion expressed by the
High Court of Calcutta that it did not have the territorial jurisdiction.
20. The obtaining factual matrix has to be appreciated on the basis of
the principles that have been enunciated in the authorities we have
referred to hereinabove. It has to be borne in mind that it was an
application under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. Section 9 of the 1996 Act
reads as follows:-
“9. Interim measures, etc. by Court.—A party may, before or during arbitral
proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but
before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to a court—
(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound
mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or
(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the
following matters, namely:—
(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the
subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;
(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;
(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing
which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which
any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid
purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of
any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be
made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for
the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;
(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;
(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to
be just and convenient,
and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the
purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.”
21. There can be no cavil over the proposition that Section 9 petition
can be entertained in the absence of arbitral proceeding. Be that as it
may, it is imperative to scan the relevant clauses of the agreement and
carefully x-ray the clauses of the MoU and also critically scrutinise the
relief sought in the petition preferred under Section 9 of the Act.
22. Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel has drawn our attention to the
recital part of the agreement and certain other clauses. The recital part
reads as follows:-
“AND WHEREAS the Owner and Developer have agreed to develop the said land
by entering in a Development Agreement, by which the owner shall get 40% of
the Developed Saleable area and Developer shall get 60% of the Developed
Saleable Area in the proposed project irrespective of its being
residential/commercial or hotels or Multiplex or mixture of the either
etc.”
23. Clause 3 of the agreement deals with the security amount which
stipulates that for developing the said land of the owner, the developer
shall give a “Refundable Security Deposit” of Rs.20 crores to the owner. A
schedule was fixed for payment of the said amount. Clause 4 of the
agreement stipulates what events would take place after execution of the
development agreement. It basically relates to certain obligations to be
performed by the parties.
24. Clause 5(ii) of the agreement on which emphasis has been laid is to
the following effect:-
“5. (ii) The Developer and the Owner shall at all times thereafter be
entitled to receive money, take bookings, enter into leasing agreements,
sell, assign any or all portions of the proposed project falling under his
share, and owner hereby give express consent for the same to the
Developers.”
25. Clause 7 deals with refund of security deposit. Clause 7D from which
inspiration has been drawn by the learned senior counsel for the appellant
reads as follows:-
“7D. It is agreed between the parties hereto that if the Owner fails to
refund the security deposit and the parties hereto decides to sale the
units and/or blocks then in that event the Developer shall be entitled to
recover refundable security deposit from the sale of Units and/or Blocks of
the Owner’s share and in the circumstances the Developers shall be entitled
to receive 60% and the Owner shall be entitled to receive 40% of the sale
price of the Units and/or Blocks of the Owner’s share and the said 60%
price will be adjusted towards refundable security deposit.”
26. Clause 9 deals with the responsibility of the developer. Clause 10
deals with the joint responsibilities of the owner and the developer. The
said clause reads as follows:-
“10. Joint Responsibility of Owners and Developers:-
(i) To provide cooperation to each other for sanctioning the plans of the
project with all required permissions and obtaining occupation certificate
for handing over possession of the tenements to the Purchasers of
Tenements.
(ii) To clear all the dues of authorities concerned with respect of plot
under development.
(iii) To convey the land with building to the societies and/or condominium
or apex body after completion of project as per rules applicable.”
27. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to certain aspects which
have been enumerated in the MoU. The recital in the MoU is as follows:-
“& Whereas ‘YES BANK’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SAID BANK’) has
principally agreed to grant loan of Rs.85 crores to the Developers for the
development of the said Township for which purpose the Developers are
required to mortgage the Land and Development of the said Township to the
SAID BANK in lieu of which the SAID BANK has agreed to disburse
construction related loan which shall be disbursed as per the progress of
the project.
& Whereas as the Development Agreement did not provide for mortgage of the
Land of the Owner and for availing the facility of loan the Developer are
required to mortgage the entire project the Developer has proposed to pay a
lump sum amount of Rs.137 crores to the Owner in lieu of his share in the
said Township for which consideration the Owner has agreed to permit the
Developer to avail loan facility from the said Bank for the development of
the Said Township and to release/transfer his share in the said Township in
favour of the Developer.”
28. Clause 13 of the agreement refers to resolution of disputes. We
quote the said clause:-
“13. RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES:-
That in case of any difference or dispute between the parties with regard
to the meaning of construction of this MoU or regarding any terms of the
Development Agreement or with regard to the project undertaken under this
MoU or Development agreement to be executed between the parties, the same
shall be resolved by arbitration in conformity with the provisions of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.”
29. In this context reference to the reliefs prayed for under Section 9
petition gain significance. Prayers (a) and (b) of the paragraph relating
to relief sought read as under:-
“(a) pending the hearing and final of the proposed arbitral proceedings and
for a period of sixty days after the award therein, the respondent by
himself and through his servant and or his agent and/or in any manner,
howsoever, be restrained by a temporary order or injunction from entering
upon the property bearing Survey No. 1487/1 and 1487/2 at Kasba, Indore,
Patwari Halka No. 15/2, Tahsil & District – Indore, Madhya Pradesh, and
from dealing with or moving the petitioners’ construction machinery on the
said property and from disturbing or interfering with the Petitioners
possession thereof in any manner;
(b) pending and hearing and final disposal of the proposed arbitral
proceedings and for a period of sixty days after the award therein, the
Respondent by himself and or through his servants and/or his agents, be
restrained by a temporary order of injunction from or in any manner
directly or indirectly disposing off, alienating, encumbering or creating
third party rights in any manner whatsoever in the property bearing Survey
No. 1487/1 and 1487/2 at Kasba, Indore, Patwari Halka No. 15/2, Tahsil &
District – Indore, Madhya Pradesh, and from disturbing or interfering with
the Petitioners possession thereof in any manner.”
30. At this stage, we are obligated to state that the High Court has
referred to the correspondences between the parties. It has referred to
the letter dated 19.6.2013 in extenso. In the said letter it was mentioned
that as the owner of the land had terminated the development agreement and
the MoU, he had taken over the entire physical and actual possession of the
said land and the developer was called upon to remove its machinery and
construction material lying upon the said land. The said letter was
replied to vide letter dated 16.7.2013 refuting the fact that the physical
possession of the land had been taken over by the land owner and stating
that the possession was still with the developer. The Division Bench has
extensively reproduced from the petition preferred under Section 9 of the
1996 Act. We think it apt to reproduce the same:-
“10. The Petitioners have shocked to receive letter dated 6 June 2013,
from Respondent’s Advocates, informing the Petitioner that the Respondent
had terminated the MOU and the Development Agreement with immediate effect
and had allegedly taken over the possession of the Township in terms of the
MOU. By the said letter, the petitioners were further informed that the
Security Deposit of Rs.20 crores stood forfeited. The petitioners were
informed that without prejudice to the termination, the respondent made a
demand of payment of Rs.71 crores along with interest thereon. A copy of
the letter dated 6 June 2013 is annexed and marked Exhibit-F hereto.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
14. The respondent, by Advocates letter dated 30 June 2013 sought to
invoke the Arbitration Clause under the Development Agreement and the
Memorandum of Understanding. By the said letter, the petitioners were
informed that the entire physical and actual possession was allegedly
already taken over by the respondent. This is a false statement. The
petitioners were further called upon to remove the machinery and
construction material. Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit-I is a copy of
the respondent’s Advocates letter dated 30 June 2013.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
17. The petitioners submit that they had completed substantial work by
completing Building B-1, B-2 and B-3 (where only top slabs are pending),
construction of five slabs of Building C-1, commencing digging and footing
work of Building A-1. The petitioners’ machinery and labour are at site.
The petitioners are in possession of the site. Now, the respondent has
suddenly demanded a sum of Rs.71 crores, allegedly due to the respondent,
under the MOU dated 8 June 2012. Though not entitled, the respondent has
sought to forfeit the security deposit of Rs. 20 crores, in accordance with
the MOU.
18. In the circumstances, the petitioners submit that the petitioners are
entitled to, pending an adjudication in the proposed Arbitral proceedings
and for a period of sixty (60) days after the award therein, for an order
of injunction, restraining the respondent by himself or through his
servants or agents from entering upon the property, subject matter of the
Development Agreement and from dealing with and moving the machinery of the
petitioners used in construction activity and from disturbing or
interfering with the petitioners possession thereof in any manner.”
31. After discussing the facts in entirety, the Division Bench has opined
thus:-
“... The development agreement also stipulated that the appellant was
entitled to possession of the said land and accordingly the respondent, by
a separate possession receipt dated 28 February 2008 handed over to the
appellant possession of the said land which is the subject matter of the
development agreement. Thereafter, the parties entered into a MOU dated 8
June 2012 which inter alia recited that the appellant was to construct the
township project consisting of residential and commercial buildings and a
club house and further that the respondent would be paid a sum of Rs.137
crores in place of its 40% share under the development agreement. As
disputes arose between the parties, the said development agreement and the
MOU were terminated by the respondent by its Advocate’s letter dated 6 June
2013 and the respondent invoked arbitration. It is pertinent to note that
in paragraph 9 of the said termination letter, the respondent has
specifically stated that as on that date (6 June 2013), the respondent had
taken over the possession and absolute ownership of the said township
including the structures thereon, in accordance with the terms of the MOU.
This included the construction put up by the appellant on the said land.
In the said letter, at paragraphs 11 and 12, the respondent reiterated that
it was the owner of the said land.
32. And thereafter the Division Bench proceeded to analyse the letter
dated 30.6.2013 and on that basis observed that:-
“... This letter of the respondent further stated that since the Respondent
had terminated the development agreement and MoU, the respondent had taken
over the entire physical and actual possession of the said land and in view
thereof called upon the Appellant to remove its machinery and construction
material from the said land. Again, by its letter dated 16 July, 2013, the
Appellant once again denied that the physical possession of the said land
had been taken over by the Respondent as alleged in its letters dated 6
June 2013 and 30 June 2013 respectively.”
33. The seminal issue is whether on the factual score which has been
exposited, the application filed under Section 9 of the 1996 Act before the
High Court of Bombay can be regarded as a money claim. On a studied
scrutiny of the agreement and the MoU it is clear as day that the
development agreement indubitably had created certain interests in the land
in favour of the appellant. The assertions made in the application along
with the relief clause when read in entirety and appreciated in a holistic
manner, it becomes luminescent that the core dispute pertains to possession
of the land, for the appellant claims to be in exclusive possession and the
respondent, per contra, has asseverated that it had taken over possession.
It can irrefragably be stated that any order passed under Section 9 of the
1996 Act will have the impact on the land. It is difficult to accede to
the submission that it will not conceptually fall within the category of
“suit for land” as engrafted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. It is
clearly a dispute with regard to the possession which is evincible from the
correspondences and the averments made in the application preferred under
Section 9 of the 1996 Act. Thus, there has to be determination as regards
possession and impliedly issue of direction for recovery of possession.
Hence, the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench on the basis of the
scrutiny of documents that the dispute is embedded with regard to the
possession of the land because the fundamental claim pertains to certain
constructed space on the land and, therefore, it would conceptually fall
within the conception of “suit for land” appearing in Clause 12 of the
Letters Patent is unexceptionable. Prayer (a) quoted above seeks restraint
by a temporary order or injunction from entering upon the property. It is
difficult to accept the submission that it is a money claim and, therefore,
the Bombay High Court would also have the territorial jurisdiction and
accordingly we unhesitatingly repel the same.
34. Resultantly, we find no substance in the appeal and accordingly the
same stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
.............................J.
[Dipak Misra]
............................J.
[Prafulla C. Pant]
New Delhi
October 15, 2015
-----------------------
[1] AIR 1950 FC 83
[2] AIR 1952 Bom. 365
[3] (2001) 7 SCC 698
[4] AIR 1929 Mad. 721
[5] AIR 1960 Cal. 626
[6] (2015) 8 SCC 219
[7] (2004) 12 SCC 376
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4267 OF 2015
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11215 OF 2015]
Sumer Builders Pvt. Ltd. ... Appellant
Versus
Narendra Gorani ... Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated
10.03.2015 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Appeal No. 572 of 2013 whereby it has concurred with the view
expressed by the learned Single Judge in Chamber Summons No. 720/2013 in
Arbitration Petition No. 799/2013 dated 10.10.2013 whereunder the learned
Single Judge had revoked the leave granted by the court under Clause 12 of
the Letters Patent to file a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, “the 1996 Act”).
2. The facts which are essential to be stated are that the parties to
the lis entered into an agreement on 28.2.2008 for development of the land
of the respondent. As per the said agreement, the appellant was required
to develop a residential project and/or commercial complex and/or multiplex
and/or hotels and/or malls etc. as permissible in law. The respondent had
handed over the vacant possession of the land to enable the appellant to
start the development work. Clause 13 of the development agreement
contains an arbitration clause whereby the parties had agreed to refer the
matter in respect of any difference or dispute between them with regard to
the construction or the terms of the development agreement or with regard
to the project undertaken for arbitration. A Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) was entered into between the parties, which stipulates that the
developer was required construct a township project consisting of one
commercial building, 11 residential wings in four buildings and one club
house under licence from the Indore Municipal Corporation. It was further
agreed that if the MoU was terminated, the developer would not have any
right, title or interest in the township project and would be required to
remove his employees and machineries from the land. Clause 13 of the
developer agreement was also incorporated in the MoU.
3. As disputes arose with regard to payment, the respondent terminated
the MoU, forfeited the security deposit and invoked the arbitration clause
by issuing a notice through his Advocate on 6.6.2013. The appellant herein
replied to the termination notice by stating that it had carries out
substantial construction on the property by constructing three buildings
and by taking many other steps. It was also stated by the appellant that
the environmental clearance certificate for the project was not obtained by
the respondent and, therefore, further work was stopped. The appellant
required the respondent to perform his part of the contract in obtaining
the requisite environmental clearance, execute irrevocable power of
attorney, refund the part of the amount payable and pay interest on the
security deposit.
4. As the factual matrix would undrape, when arbitration was demanded by
the respondent, the appellant on 16.7.2013 replied that the arbitration
tribunal had to be in Mumbai. It was also put forth that it was in
physical possession of the property and its construction material,
machinery, office equipments and other equipments were at the site. At
this stage, the appellant moved the High Court of Bombay for grant of leave
under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent by filing an application under
Section 9 of the 1996 Act asserting that the courts at Bombay have the
territorial jurisdiction, and accordingly leave was granted. The
respondent after entering appearance filed an application praying for
revocation of leave. While seeking revocation of leave, it was contended
by the respondent that dispute pertains to the land which is situate at
Indore; that the development agreement and the MoU had been executed at
Indore where the immoveable property is situated; and that the dispute
fundamentally is for right and possession over the land, hence, the court
where the land is situated has the territorial jurisdiction in respect of
the arbitration or any application to be filed under the 1996 Act.
5. The learned Single Judge scanned the anatomy of Clause 12 of the
Letters Patent and various decisions of the High Court of Bombay and
referred to the decision in Moolji Jaitha & Co. v. Khandesh Spinning &
Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.[1], adverted to the issue relating to what would
constitute cause of action in the obtaining factual matrix, analysed the
decision of the Bombay High Court in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v.
Onkarmal Ishar Dass & Ors.[2], and referred to Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd.
v. Daulat and Anr.[3] and eventually came to hold as follows:-
“... the Petitioner has put up its machinery, staff for the construction
and the ultimate construction upon the land. Several buildings have been
constructed fully or in part. The parties are entitled to a part of the
construction each as per the directions of the development agreement or
amount in cash as per the MOU. The development work is in progress. An
order for protection of the property pending the arbitration would involve
the land itself. The dispute has nothing to do with the rights of the
parties in personam only....”
And again:-
“... The disputes in the development agreement are closely connected with
the land, the possession of which is disputed by the parties. The suit is
a suit for land. It would have to be filed in Indore where the land is
situate.”
6. Being of this view, the learned Single Judge revoked the leave that
was earlier granted. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the
appellant preferred an appeal before the Division Bench. Before the
Division Bench it was contended that the appellant was in possession of the
land and the possession shall remain with it till the completion of the
entire project and he was entitled to refund of security deposit.
7. In essence, it was urged that the application preferred under Section
9 of the 1996 Act was tenable before the High Court of Bombay and there was
no justification to revoke the leave. The Division Bench referred to
certain clauses of the agreement and the clauses from the MoU and the
correspondences between the parties, the assertions made in the Section 9
petition and the relief sought therein, addressed to the import of Clause
12 of the Letters Patent and what meaning had been given to the “suit for
land” in Moolji Jaitha (supra) by analyzing various passages, culled out
the principles stated in Adcon Electronics (supra), took note of the fact
that the development agreement and the MoU had been executed at Indore, the
statement of claim and the counter claim filed by the parties before the
learned arbitrator who has already entered into reference and in the
ultimate eventuality opined thus:-
“... In the present case, we are of the vie that the disputes between the
parties hereto in relation to the development agreement dated 28 February
2008 and the MOU dated 8 June 2012 are of such a nature that they are
rooted to the land. The disputes are not such that they relate only to the
execution of any document and/or specific performance thereof simplicitor.
The disputes relate to possession of the said land which is outside the
jurisdiction of the Court as also regarding the percentage of the parties
rights, title and interest in the said land and/or their entitlement to a
sizable portion of the constructed space thereon. These disputes would
certainly fall within the expression “suit for land” appearing in Clause
XII of the Letters Patent.”
Expressing thus, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the
order passed by the learned Single Judge.
8. We have heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for the respondent.
9. Criticizing the orders passed by the High Court, it is submitted by
Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel that the learned Single Judge as well
as the Division Bench has fallen into serious error in their appreciation
of the clauses in the agreement and the relief sought inasmuch as it was a
money claim and when the amount was paid at Mumbai, the High Court of
Mumbai had the jurisdiction. He has drawn our attention to various clauses
in the agreement to which we shall refer to in the course of our
delineation. In essence, his submission is that it is basically a claim
relating to money and it has nothing to do with the land and, therefore,
the analysis made by the High Court is fundamentally fallacious.
10. Mr. Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent
countering the aforesaid submissions would contend that the cause of action
had arisen at Indore regard being had to the fact that the land is situated
at Indore and the agreement in question and the MoU were executed at
Indore. It is his further submission that the order passed by the Division
Bench is absolutely defensible inasmuch as it is a claim for land and in
the backdrop of prayer under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, there could not
have been any other conclusion than what has been expressed by the High
Court that it has no territorial jurisdiction to deal with the controversy.
11. To appreciate the controversy, it is appropriate to refer to Clause
12 of the Letters Patent, which reads as follows:-
“12. Original jurisdiction as to suits – And we do further ordain that the
said High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in the exercise of its ordinary
original civil jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try and
determine suits of every description, if, in the case of suits for land or
other immovable property such land or property shall be situated, or in all
other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or in
case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within
the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High
Court, or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit
shall dwell or carry on business, or personally work for gain, within such
limits; except that the said High Court shall not have such original
jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause
Court at Bombay, in which the debt or damage, or value of property sued for
does not exceed one hundred rupees.”
12. The said clause fell for interpretation in Adcon Electronics (supra),
wherein the Court stated thus:-
“Thus, it is clear that under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the High
Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction will have power to
receive, try and determine: (1) suits for land or other immovable property
if such property is situated within the local limits of original
jurisdiction of the High Court; or (2) all other cases (a) if the cause of
action has arisen wholly within the local limits of the ordinary original
jurisdiction of the High Court; (b) if prior leave of the Court has been
obtained and the cause of action has arisen in part within the local limits
of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court; or (c) if the
defendant dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within
such limits.”
13. Be it noted under Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(for short, “CPC”), Sections 16, 17 and 20 are not applicable to the High
Court in original civil jurisdiction. Thus, as far as the Bombay High
Court is concerned, it is Clause 12 of the Letters Patent that would govern
the controversy.
14. In Adcon Electronics (supra), the two-Judge Bench referred to the
divergence of opinion in Moolji Jaitha (supra), the Full Bench decision of
the High Court of Madras in P.M.A. Velliappa Chettiar v. Saha Govinda
Doss[4], Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in Debendra Nath
Chowdhury v. Southern Bank Ltd.[5] and ruled thus:-
“From the above discussion it follows that a “suit for land” is a suit in
which the relief claimed relates to title to or delivery of possession of
land or immovable property. Whether a suit is a “suit for land” or not has
to be determined on the averments in the plaint with reference to the
reliefs claimed therein; where the relief relates to adjudication of title
to land or immovable property or delivery of possession of the land or
immovable property, it will be a “suit for land”. We are in respectful
agreement with the view expressed by Mahajan, J. in Moolji Jaitha case.”
15. It will be appropriate to reproduce what Justice Mahajan had observed
in Moolji Jaitha (supra):-
“If an attempt is made to find a comprehensive definition of the phrase, it
will eventually be discovered that it has created further complications. I
therefore content myself by saying that where the nature of the suit is
such that in substance it involves a controversy about land or immovable
property and the court is called upon to decide conflicting claims to such
property and a decree or order is prayed for which will bring about a
change in the title to it, that suit can be said to be in respect of land
or immovable property; but where incidentally in a suit, the main purpose
of which or the primary object of which is quite different, some relief has
to be given about land, the title to it not being in dispute in the real
sense of the term, then such a suit cannot fall within the four corners of
this expression.”
16. He had further added:-
“In my opinion, if the suit is for specific performance and a decree for
possession of the land sold is claimed, such a suit would certainly be a
suit for land; but if the suit is simpliciter for specific performance,
i.e., for the enforcement of the contract of sale and for execution of a
conveyance, in that event there can be no good ground for holding that such
a suit is a suit for determination of title to land or that the decree in
it would operate on the land.”
17. Recently, in Excel Dealcomm Pvt. Ltd. v. Asset Reconstruction Co.
(India) Ltd.[6], the controversy had arisen from the High Court of
Calcutta. The two-Judge Bench addressed to the issue “what is the suit for
land”, and observed as under:-
“A suit for land is a suit in which the relief claimed relates to the title
or delivery of possession of land or immovable property [see [pic]Adcon
Electronics (P) Ltd. v. Daulat]. Further, it is an established rule that to
determine whether it is a suit for land, the court will look into barely
the plaint and no other evidence (Indian Mineral & Chemicals Co. v.
Deutsche Bank[7]). If by the averments in the plaint and prayers therein,
it appears that the suit is one for land, it shall be so held and if it
does not so appear, then the suit shall continue under leave granted under
Clause 12.”
18. Be it noted, in the said case suit was filed for specific performance
of the agreement which contemplated sale of property as has been described
under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The issue that arose before
the Court is as follows:-
“In the present case, a suit was filed for the specific performance of the
agreement which contemplated the sale of property, as has been described in
Para 1 under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act in terms of the Rules. The
question with respect to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent in the present
case is that whether the present suit is suit for land.”
19. The Court referred to the relief clause, the authority in Adcon
Electronics (supra) and came to hold that:-
“It may be noted that the sale certificate sought under the prayer requires
the delivery of possession of the suit property. Thus, we find that the
prayer for delivery of possession was an implicit one in the present case.
The prayer as sought in the plaint could not have been granted without the
delivery of possession of the suit property as the sale certificate itself
contemplates the delivery of the immovable property. Thus, in view of this
we find that Adcon Electronics would not apply as there was a prayer for
delivery of possession in the present case. Therefore, we hold that the
present suit was indeed a suit for land.”
Being of this view, it concurred with the opinion expressed by the
High Court of Calcutta that it did not have the territorial jurisdiction.
20. The obtaining factual matrix has to be appreciated on the basis of
the principles that have been enunciated in the authorities we have
referred to hereinabove. It has to be borne in mind that it was an
application under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. Section 9 of the 1996 Act
reads as follows:-
“9. Interim measures, etc. by Court.—A party may, before or during arbitral
proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but
before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to a court—
(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound
mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or
(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the
following matters, namely:—
(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the
subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;
(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;
(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing
which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which
any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid
purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of
any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be
made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for
the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;
(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;
(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to
be just and convenient,
and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the
purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.”
21. There can be no cavil over the proposition that Section 9 petition
can be entertained in the absence of arbitral proceeding. Be that as it
may, it is imperative to scan the relevant clauses of the agreement and
carefully x-ray the clauses of the MoU and also critically scrutinise the
relief sought in the petition preferred under Section 9 of the Act.
22. Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel has drawn our attention to the
recital part of the agreement and certain other clauses. The recital part
reads as follows:-
“AND WHEREAS the Owner and Developer have agreed to develop the said land
by entering in a Development Agreement, by which the owner shall get 40% of
the Developed Saleable area and Developer shall get 60% of the Developed
Saleable Area in the proposed project irrespective of its being
residential/commercial or hotels or Multiplex or mixture of the either
etc.”
23. Clause 3 of the agreement deals with the security amount which
stipulates that for developing the said land of the owner, the developer
shall give a “Refundable Security Deposit” of Rs.20 crores to the owner. A
schedule was fixed for payment of the said amount. Clause 4 of the
agreement stipulates what events would take place after execution of the
development agreement. It basically relates to certain obligations to be
performed by the parties.
24. Clause 5(ii) of the agreement on which emphasis has been laid is to
the following effect:-
“5. (ii) The Developer and the Owner shall at all times thereafter be
entitled to receive money, take bookings, enter into leasing agreements,
sell, assign any or all portions of the proposed project falling under his
share, and owner hereby give express consent for the same to the
Developers.”
25. Clause 7 deals with refund of security deposit. Clause 7D from which
inspiration has been drawn by the learned senior counsel for the appellant
reads as follows:-
“7D. It is agreed between the parties hereto that if the Owner fails to
refund the security deposit and the parties hereto decides to sale the
units and/or blocks then in that event the Developer shall be entitled to
recover refundable security deposit from the sale of Units and/or Blocks of
the Owner’s share and in the circumstances the Developers shall be entitled
to receive 60% and the Owner shall be entitled to receive 40% of the sale
price of the Units and/or Blocks of the Owner’s share and the said 60%
price will be adjusted towards refundable security deposit.”
26. Clause 9 deals with the responsibility of the developer. Clause 10
deals with the joint responsibilities of the owner and the developer. The
said clause reads as follows:-
“10. Joint Responsibility of Owners and Developers:-
(i) To provide cooperation to each other for sanctioning the plans of the
project with all required permissions and obtaining occupation certificate
for handing over possession of the tenements to the Purchasers of
Tenements.
(ii) To clear all the dues of authorities concerned with respect of plot
under development.
(iii) To convey the land with building to the societies and/or condominium
or apex body after completion of project as per rules applicable.”
27. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to certain aspects which
have been enumerated in the MoU. The recital in the MoU is as follows:-
“& Whereas ‘YES BANK’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SAID BANK’) has
principally agreed to grant loan of Rs.85 crores to the Developers for the
development of the said Township for which purpose the Developers are
required to mortgage the Land and Development of the said Township to the
SAID BANK in lieu of which the SAID BANK has agreed to disburse
construction related loan which shall be disbursed as per the progress of
the project.
& Whereas as the Development Agreement did not provide for mortgage of the
Land of the Owner and for availing the facility of loan the Developer are
required to mortgage the entire project the Developer has proposed to pay a
lump sum amount of Rs.137 crores to the Owner in lieu of his share in the
said Township for which consideration the Owner has agreed to permit the
Developer to avail loan facility from the said Bank for the development of
the Said Township and to release/transfer his share in the said Township in
favour of the Developer.”
28. Clause 13 of the agreement refers to resolution of disputes. We
quote the said clause:-
“13. RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES:-
That in case of any difference or dispute between the parties with regard
to the meaning of construction of this MoU or regarding any terms of the
Development Agreement or with regard to the project undertaken under this
MoU or Development agreement to be executed between the parties, the same
shall be resolved by arbitration in conformity with the provisions of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.”
29. In this context reference to the reliefs prayed for under Section 9
petition gain significance. Prayers (a) and (b) of the paragraph relating
to relief sought read as under:-
“(a) pending the hearing and final of the proposed arbitral proceedings and
for a period of sixty days after the award therein, the respondent by
himself and through his servant and or his agent and/or in any manner,
howsoever, be restrained by a temporary order or injunction from entering
upon the property bearing Survey No. 1487/1 and 1487/2 at Kasba, Indore,
Patwari Halka No. 15/2, Tahsil & District – Indore, Madhya Pradesh, and
from dealing with or moving the petitioners’ construction machinery on the
said property and from disturbing or interfering with the Petitioners
possession thereof in any manner;
(b) pending and hearing and final disposal of the proposed arbitral
proceedings and for a period of sixty days after the award therein, the
Respondent by himself and or through his servants and/or his agents, be
restrained by a temporary order of injunction from or in any manner
directly or indirectly disposing off, alienating, encumbering or creating
third party rights in any manner whatsoever in the property bearing Survey
No. 1487/1 and 1487/2 at Kasba, Indore, Patwari Halka No. 15/2, Tahsil &
District – Indore, Madhya Pradesh, and from disturbing or interfering with
the Petitioners possession thereof in any manner.”
30. At this stage, we are obligated to state that the High Court has
referred to the correspondences between the parties. It has referred to
the letter dated 19.6.2013 in extenso. In the said letter it was mentioned
that as the owner of the land had terminated the development agreement and
the MoU, he had taken over the entire physical and actual possession of the
said land and the developer was called upon to remove its machinery and
construction material lying upon the said land. The said letter was
replied to vide letter dated 16.7.2013 refuting the fact that the physical
possession of the land had been taken over by the land owner and stating
that the possession was still with the developer. The Division Bench has
extensively reproduced from the petition preferred under Section 9 of the
1996 Act. We think it apt to reproduce the same:-
“10. The Petitioners have shocked to receive letter dated 6 June 2013,
from Respondent’s Advocates, informing the Petitioner that the Respondent
had terminated the MOU and the Development Agreement with immediate effect
and had allegedly taken over the possession of the Township in terms of the
MOU. By the said letter, the petitioners were further informed that the
Security Deposit of Rs.20 crores stood forfeited. The petitioners were
informed that without prejudice to the termination, the respondent made a
demand of payment of Rs.71 crores along with interest thereon. A copy of
the letter dated 6 June 2013 is annexed and marked Exhibit-F hereto.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
14. The respondent, by Advocates letter dated 30 June 2013 sought to
invoke the Arbitration Clause under the Development Agreement and the
Memorandum of Understanding. By the said letter, the petitioners were
informed that the entire physical and actual possession was allegedly
already taken over by the respondent. This is a false statement. The
petitioners were further called upon to remove the machinery and
construction material. Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit-I is a copy of
the respondent’s Advocates letter dated 30 June 2013.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
17. The petitioners submit that they had completed substantial work by
completing Building B-1, B-2 and B-3 (where only top slabs are pending),
construction of five slabs of Building C-1, commencing digging and footing
work of Building A-1. The petitioners’ machinery and labour are at site.
The petitioners are in possession of the site. Now, the respondent has
suddenly demanded a sum of Rs.71 crores, allegedly due to the respondent,
under the MOU dated 8 June 2012. Though not entitled, the respondent has
sought to forfeit the security deposit of Rs. 20 crores, in accordance with
the MOU.
18. In the circumstances, the petitioners submit that the petitioners are
entitled to, pending an adjudication in the proposed Arbitral proceedings
and for a period of sixty (60) days after the award therein, for an order
of injunction, restraining the respondent by himself or through his
servants or agents from entering upon the property, subject matter of the
Development Agreement and from dealing with and moving the machinery of the
petitioners used in construction activity and from disturbing or
interfering with the petitioners possession thereof in any manner.”
31. After discussing the facts in entirety, the Division Bench has opined
thus:-
“... The development agreement also stipulated that the appellant was
entitled to possession of the said land and accordingly the respondent, by
a separate possession receipt dated 28 February 2008 handed over to the
appellant possession of the said land which is the subject matter of the
development agreement. Thereafter, the parties entered into a MOU dated 8
June 2012 which inter alia recited that the appellant was to construct the
township project consisting of residential and commercial buildings and a
club house and further that the respondent would be paid a sum of Rs.137
crores in place of its 40% share under the development agreement. As
disputes arose between the parties, the said development agreement and the
MOU were terminated by the respondent by its Advocate’s letter dated 6 June
2013 and the respondent invoked arbitration. It is pertinent to note that
in paragraph 9 of the said termination letter, the respondent has
specifically stated that as on that date (6 June 2013), the respondent had
taken over the possession and absolute ownership of the said township
including the structures thereon, in accordance with the terms of the MOU.
This included the construction put up by the appellant on the said land.
In the said letter, at paragraphs 11 and 12, the respondent reiterated that
it was the owner of the said land.
32. And thereafter the Division Bench proceeded to analyse the letter
dated 30.6.2013 and on that basis observed that:-
“... This letter of the respondent further stated that since the Respondent
had terminated the development agreement and MoU, the respondent had taken
over the entire physical and actual possession of the said land and in view
thereof called upon the Appellant to remove its machinery and construction
material from the said land. Again, by its letter dated 16 July, 2013, the
Appellant once again denied that the physical possession of the said land
had been taken over by the Respondent as alleged in its letters dated 6
June 2013 and 30 June 2013 respectively.”
33. The seminal issue is whether on the factual score which has been
exposited, the application filed under Section 9 of the 1996 Act before the
High Court of Bombay can be regarded as a money claim. On a studied
scrutiny of the agreement and the MoU it is clear as day that the
development agreement indubitably had created certain interests in the land
in favour of the appellant. The assertions made in the application along
with the relief clause when read in entirety and appreciated in a holistic
manner, it becomes luminescent that the core dispute pertains to possession
of the land, for the appellant claims to be in exclusive possession and the
respondent, per contra, has asseverated that it had taken over possession.
It can irrefragably be stated that any order passed under Section 9 of the
1996 Act will have the impact on the land. It is difficult to accede to
the submission that it will not conceptually fall within the category of
“suit for land” as engrafted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. It is
clearly a dispute with regard to the possession which is evincible from the
correspondences and the averments made in the application preferred under
Section 9 of the 1996 Act. Thus, there has to be determination as regards
possession and impliedly issue of direction for recovery of possession.
Hence, the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench on the basis of the
scrutiny of documents that the dispute is embedded with regard to the
possession of the land because the fundamental claim pertains to certain
constructed space on the land and, therefore, it would conceptually fall
within the conception of “suit for land” appearing in Clause 12 of the
Letters Patent is unexceptionable. Prayer (a) quoted above seeks restraint
by a temporary order or injunction from entering upon the property. It is
difficult to accept the submission that it is a money claim and, therefore,
the Bombay High Court would also have the territorial jurisdiction and
accordingly we unhesitatingly repel the same.
34. Resultantly, we find no substance in the appeal and accordingly the
same stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
.............................J.
[Dipak Misra]
............................J.
[Prafulla C. Pant]
New Delhi
October 15, 2015
-----------------------
[1] AIR 1950 FC 83
[2] AIR 1952 Bom. 365
[3] (2001) 7 SCC 698
[4] AIR 1929 Mad. 721
[5] AIR 1960 Cal. 626
[6] (2015) 8 SCC 219
[7] (2004) 12 SCC 376
