REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8909 OF 2015
Arising out of SLP(C) No.1120 of 2015
ASHOK RANGNTH NAGAR ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHRIKANT GOVINDRAO SANGVIKAR …..RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
C.A.No.8910/2015 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1121/2015)
C.A.No.8911/2015 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1122/2015)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
2. We have heard Mr. Vatsalya Vigya, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and Ms. Chandrakant Giri, learned Amicus Curiae for the
respondents and perused the common impugned judgment dated 13.02.2014
passed by the Bombay High Court.
3. The short question that arises for consideration in these appeals is
as to whether the High Court was justified in passing the impugned judgment
without formulating any substantial question of law.
4. The facts of the case in a nutshell are that the plaintiff-
respondents filed a civil suit for perpetual injunction against the
defendant-appellant seeking a decree restraining him from alienating the
suit property.
5. After a full-fledged trial, the suit was dismissed. As against the
judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the plaintiff preferred an
appeal before the District Judge which was also dismissed by upholding the
judgment of the trial court. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff-
respondents filed second appeals in the High Court. The High Court without
formulating substantial question of law heard the appeals and reversed the
judgment and decree passed by the trial court as also of the appellate
court. Consequently, the suit was decreed. Hence, these appeals by
special leave.
6. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case prima facie
we are of the view that the matter need to be remitted to the High Court to
decide the second appeal afresh. The High Court, in fact, failed to notice
the mandate of Section 100 CPC while deciding a second appeal. Time and
again this Court has held that unless the High Court is satisfied that
there is a substantial question of law, jurisdiction under Section 100 of
the Code cannot be exercised.
7. Although not necessary but to remind ourselves the law settled by
this Court we may refer some of the decisions hereinafter.
8. In the case of Shiv Cotex vs. Tirgun Auto Plast (P) Ltd., (2011) 9
SCC 678, against the concurrent judgment and decree of the two courts, a
Second Appeal was filed before the High Court, which has been allowed by
the Single Judge and the suit had been remanded to the trial court for
fresh decision in accordance with law. While deciding the appeal and
reversing the judgment and decree of the two courts, the High Court
proceeded without formulating any substantial question of law. On these
facts, this Court observed that
“11. The judgment of the High Court is gravely flawed and cannot be
sustained for more than one reason. In the first place, the High Court,
while deciding the second appeal, failed to adhere to the necessary
requirement of Section 100 CPC and interfered with the concurrent judgment
and decree of the courts below without formulating any substantial question
of law. The formulation of substantial question of law is a must before the
second appeal is heard and finally disposed of by the High Court. This
Court has reiterated and restated the legal position time out of number
that formulation of a substantial question of law is a condition precedent
for entertaining and deciding a second appeal. Recently, in Umerkhan v.
Bismillabi decided by us on 28-7-2011, it has been held that the judgment
of the High Court is rendered patently illegal, if a second appeal is heard
and the judgment and decree appealed against is reversed without
formulating a substantial question of law.”
9. In the case of Umerkhan vs. Bismillabi, (2011) 9 SCC 684, the High
Court had allowed the second appeal and set aside the judgment and decree
of the First Appellate Court. While allowing the appeal and reversing the
judgment of the Appellate Court, no substantial question of law was
formulated. On these facts, this Court observed as under:
“11. In our view, the very jurisdiction of the High Court in hearing a
second appeal is founded on the formulation of a substantial question of
law. The judgment of the High Court is rendered patently illegal, if a
second appeal is heard and judgment and decree appealed against is reversed
without formulating a substantial question of law. The second appellate
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 is not akin to the
appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code; it is restricted to
such substantial question or questions of law that may arise from the
judgment and decree appealed against. As a matter of law, a second appeal
is entertainable by the High Court only upon its satisfaction that a
substantial question of law is involved in the matter and its formulation
thereof. Section 100 of the Code provides that the second appeal shall be
heard on the question so formulated. It is, however, open to the High Court
to reframe substantial question of law or frame substantial question of law
afresh or hold that no substantial question of law is involved at the time
of hearing the second appeal but reversal of the judgment and decree passed
in appeal by a court subordinate to it in exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 100 of the Code is impermissible without formulating substantial
question of law and a decision on such question.
12. This Court has been bringing to the notice of the High Courts the
constraints of Section 100 of the Code and the mandate of the law contained
in Section 101 that no second appeal shall lie except on the ground
mentioned in Section 100, yet it appears that the fundamental legal
position concerning jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal is
ignored and overlooked time and again. The present appeal is unfortunately
one of such matters where the High Court interfered with the judgment and
decree of the first appellate court in total disregard of the above legal
position.”
10. In the case of Rameshwar Dayal Mangala v. Harish Chand, (2009) 4 SCC
800, a suit for mandatory injunction was filed and the same was decreed by
the trial court. Challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court,
first appeal was preferred, which was eventually allowed. Questioning the
judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, a second appeal
was filed and the same was allowed by the High Court and the judgment and
decree passed by the Appellate Court was reversed without formulating any
substantial question of law. On these facts, this Court held that the High
Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, cannot interfere with or reverse the judgment without
formulating any substantial question of law.
11. Also in the case of B.C. Shivashankara vs. B.R. Nagaraj, (2007) 15
SCC 387, learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowed second
appeal and set aside the judgment and decree without first formulating
substantial question of law. This Court, therefore, after referring
earlier decisions of this Court, held that the judgment of the High Court
cannot be sustained in law and the matter was remitted to the High Court
for its disposal in accordance with law.
12. In the case of Patrick JJ. Saldanha vs. Antony M. Saldanha, (2007) 11
SCC 148, the High Court allowed the second appeal and set aside the
judgment and decree passed by the courts below. While allowing the appeal
and reversing the judgment, no substantial question of law was framed by
the High Court. In that context, this Court reiterated as under:
“3. In view of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short
“the Code”) the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial
question or questions of law involved in the appeal as required under sub-
section (3) of Section 100. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any
case any substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that
question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the
question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100.”
13. In the case of Mahavir vs. Lakhmi, (2007) 9 SCC 208, it was
reiterated by this Court that while reversing the judgment and decree in
second appeal by the High Court, Section 100, CPC mandates to formulate
substantial question of law before allowing the second appeal and reversing
the judgment and decree of the lower court.
14. In the case of Hardeep Kaur vs. Malkiat Kaur, (2012) 4 SCC 344, the
second appeal was allowed by the High Court and the judgment and decree
passed by the appellate Court was set aside. The short question considered
by this Court was whether a second appeal lies only on a substantial
question of law and is it essential for the High Court to formulate a
substantial question of law before interfering with the judgment and decree
of the lower appellate court. This Court, after considering almost all the
earlier judgments, held as under:
“18. The law consistently stated by this Court that formulation of
substantial question of law is a sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 100 CPC admits of no ambiguity and permits no departure. In
the present case, the High Court has allowed the second appeal and set
aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court without
formulating any substantial question of law, which is impermissible and
that renders the judgment of the High Court unsustainable.
15. In Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganial vs. Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai, (2006)
13 SCC 113, and Boodireddy Chandraiah vs. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC
155, this Court reiterated the same view that the second appeal cannot be
allowed by the High Court without formulating any substantial question of
law.
16. In the case of Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew, (2005) 7 SCC 667,
this Court again took the view that the High Court would not be competent
to reverse the finding recorded by the trial court or the first appellate
court without formulating substantial question of law.
17. In State of Kerala vs. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam, (2001) 10 SCC
191, a second appeal was filed against the concurrent finding recorded by
both the trial court and the first appellate court. However, the High
Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC interfered with the
concurrent finding of facts and allowed the appeal. This Court set aside
the order holding that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained
inasmuch as it reverses the judgment without formulating substantial
question of law. The Court observed, thus:
“5. Both sides have advanced several contentions in the appeal petition as
also in the counter-affidavit filed. We refrain from expressing any opinion
on the merits of the case as we propose to remit the second appeal for
disposal afresh. We have noted that the learned Single Judge has not
formulated any question of law, much less any substantial question of law,
which alone would have clothed the High Court with jurisdiction under
Section 100 CPC to deal with a second appeal. This Court has stated time
and again that unless the High Court is satisfied that there is a
substantial question of law, jurisdiction for second appeal cannot be
exercised. It is unnecessary to cite the authorities on that aspect as it
has now become well-nigh settled. Both sides agreed that no substantial
question of law has been formulated by the learned Single Judge. If so, the
learned Single Judge ought to have proceeded further.”
18. In the case of Ellangallur vs. Gopalan, (2000) 2 SCC 11, this
Court, considering a case where the High Court in second appeal reversed
the finding of the first appellate court on the re-appreciation of evidence
without formulating any substantial question of law, held that the judgment
passed by the High Court cannot be sustained in view of the prescribed
procedure of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Same view has
been reiterated by this Court in the case of H.G. Venkataramanaiah vs.
Subba Pujari, (2000) 10 SCC 412.
19. Similar view has been reiterated in the case of Ramavilasom
Grandhasala vs. N.S.S. Karayogam, (2000) 5 SCC 64, wherein it was held that
the High Court without formulating any substantial question of law as
required under sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Code cannot allow
second appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower court.
20. In the light of the provision contained in Section 100 CPC and the
ratio decided by this Court, we come to the following conclusion:-
(i) On the day when the second appeal is listed for hearing on
admission if the High Court is satisfied that no substantial question of
law is involved, it shall dismiss the second appeal without even
formulating the substantial question of law;
(ii) In cases where the High Court after hearing the appellate is
satisfied that the substantial question of law is involved, it shall
formulate that question and then the appeal shall be heard on those
substantial question of law, after giving notice and opportunity of hearing
to the respondent;
(iii) In no circumstances the High Court can reverse the judgment of
the trial court and the first appellate court without formulating the
substantial question of law and complying with the mandatory requirements
of Section 100 CPC.
21. Admittedly, the High Court by the impugned judgment allowed the
appeal and reversed the judgment passed by the trial court and the first
appellate court. We have, therefore, no option but to set aside the
impugned judgment passed by the High Court and remit the matter back to the
High Court to first formulate the substantial question of law and then
decide all these appeals in accordance with law.
22. Hence, we allow these appeals and remit these matters back to the
High Court to first formulate substantial question of law and then decide
all these appeals in accordance with law accordingly.
23. Since the plaintiff-respondents are old persons aged more than 75
years and they have been fighting the litigation since 1992, we request the
High Court to give preference of hearing to these appeals and decide the
same as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four months
from today.
24. However, interim order passed by this Court shall continue only for a
period of four months from today.
25. After hearing the respondents, who appeared in person before this
Court today and informed about their financial status, we request the
Maharashtra Legal Services Authority to provide all legal assistance to
them and to meet all legal expenses in defending the second appeals in the
High Court.
26. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and considering
the helplessness of the respondents who are old aged persons, we direct the
appellant to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five thousand only)
towards the legal expenses incurred by them in pursuing the case in this
Court.
27. Mr. Vigya, learned counsel for the appellant, very fairly submits
that the appellant be allowed some time to pay the aforesaid amount to the
respondents.
28. As prayed for, two weeks’ time is allowed to the appellant to pay the
aforesaid amount to the respondents.
29. The Registry is directed to communicate this Order to the Bombay High
Court forthwith.
…………………J.
(M.Y. EQBAL)
………………….J.
(C. NAGAPPAN)
NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 27, 2015
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8909 OF 2015
Arising out of SLP(C) No.1120 of 2015
ASHOK RANGNTH NAGAR ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHRIKANT GOVINDRAO SANGVIKAR …..RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
C.A.No.8910/2015 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1121/2015)
C.A.No.8911/2015 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1122/2015)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
2. We have heard Mr. Vatsalya Vigya, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and Ms. Chandrakant Giri, learned Amicus Curiae for the
respondents and perused the common impugned judgment dated 13.02.2014
passed by the Bombay High Court.
3. The short question that arises for consideration in these appeals is
as to whether the High Court was justified in passing the impugned judgment
without formulating any substantial question of law.
4. The facts of the case in a nutshell are that the plaintiff-
respondents filed a civil suit for perpetual injunction against the
defendant-appellant seeking a decree restraining him from alienating the
suit property.
5. After a full-fledged trial, the suit was dismissed. As against the
judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the plaintiff preferred an
appeal before the District Judge which was also dismissed by upholding the
judgment of the trial court. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff-
respondents filed second appeals in the High Court. The High Court without
formulating substantial question of law heard the appeals and reversed the
judgment and decree passed by the trial court as also of the appellate
court. Consequently, the suit was decreed. Hence, these appeals by
special leave.
6. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case prima facie
we are of the view that the matter need to be remitted to the High Court to
decide the second appeal afresh. The High Court, in fact, failed to notice
the mandate of Section 100 CPC while deciding a second appeal. Time and
again this Court has held that unless the High Court is satisfied that
there is a substantial question of law, jurisdiction under Section 100 of
the Code cannot be exercised.
7. Although not necessary but to remind ourselves the law settled by
this Court we may refer some of the decisions hereinafter.
8. In the case of Shiv Cotex vs. Tirgun Auto Plast (P) Ltd., (2011) 9
SCC 678, against the concurrent judgment and decree of the two courts, a
Second Appeal was filed before the High Court, which has been allowed by
the Single Judge and the suit had been remanded to the trial court for
fresh decision in accordance with law. While deciding the appeal and
reversing the judgment and decree of the two courts, the High Court
proceeded without formulating any substantial question of law. On these
facts, this Court observed that
“11. The judgment of the High Court is gravely flawed and cannot be
sustained for more than one reason. In the first place, the High Court,
while deciding the second appeal, failed to adhere to the necessary
requirement of Section 100 CPC and interfered with the concurrent judgment
and decree of the courts below without formulating any substantial question
of law. The formulation of substantial question of law is a must before the
second appeal is heard and finally disposed of by the High Court. This
Court has reiterated and restated the legal position time out of number
that formulation of a substantial question of law is a condition precedent
for entertaining and deciding a second appeal. Recently, in Umerkhan v.
Bismillabi decided by us on 28-7-2011, it has been held that the judgment
of the High Court is rendered patently illegal, if a second appeal is heard
and the judgment and decree appealed against is reversed without
formulating a substantial question of law.”
9. In the case of Umerkhan vs. Bismillabi, (2011) 9 SCC 684, the High
Court had allowed the second appeal and set aside the judgment and decree
of the First Appellate Court. While allowing the appeal and reversing the
judgment of the Appellate Court, no substantial question of law was
formulated. On these facts, this Court observed as under:
“11. In our view, the very jurisdiction of the High Court in hearing a
second appeal is founded on the formulation of a substantial question of
law. The judgment of the High Court is rendered patently illegal, if a
second appeal is heard and judgment and decree appealed against is reversed
without formulating a substantial question of law. The second appellate
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 is not akin to the
appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code; it is restricted to
such substantial question or questions of law that may arise from the
judgment and decree appealed against. As a matter of law, a second appeal
is entertainable by the High Court only upon its satisfaction that a
substantial question of law is involved in the matter and its formulation
thereof. Section 100 of the Code provides that the second appeal shall be
heard on the question so formulated. It is, however, open to the High Court
to reframe substantial question of law or frame substantial question of law
afresh or hold that no substantial question of law is involved at the time
of hearing the second appeal but reversal of the judgment and decree passed
in appeal by a court subordinate to it in exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 100 of the Code is impermissible without formulating substantial
question of law and a decision on such question.
12. This Court has been bringing to the notice of the High Courts the
constraints of Section 100 of the Code and the mandate of the law contained
in Section 101 that no second appeal shall lie except on the ground
mentioned in Section 100, yet it appears that the fundamental legal
position concerning jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal is
ignored and overlooked time and again. The present appeal is unfortunately
one of such matters where the High Court interfered with the judgment and
decree of the first appellate court in total disregard of the above legal
position.”
10. In the case of Rameshwar Dayal Mangala v. Harish Chand, (2009) 4 SCC
800, a suit for mandatory injunction was filed and the same was decreed by
the trial court. Challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court,
first appeal was preferred, which was eventually allowed. Questioning the
judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, a second appeal
was filed and the same was allowed by the High Court and the judgment and
decree passed by the Appellate Court was reversed without formulating any
substantial question of law. On these facts, this Court held that the High
Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, cannot interfere with or reverse the judgment without
formulating any substantial question of law.
11. Also in the case of B.C. Shivashankara vs. B.R. Nagaraj, (2007) 15
SCC 387, learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowed second
appeal and set aside the judgment and decree without first formulating
substantial question of law. This Court, therefore, after referring
earlier decisions of this Court, held that the judgment of the High Court
cannot be sustained in law and the matter was remitted to the High Court
for its disposal in accordance with law.
12. In the case of Patrick JJ. Saldanha vs. Antony M. Saldanha, (2007) 11
SCC 148, the High Court allowed the second appeal and set aside the
judgment and decree passed by the courts below. While allowing the appeal
and reversing the judgment, no substantial question of law was framed by
the High Court. In that context, this Court reiterated as under:
“3. In view of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short
“the Code”) the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial
question or questions of law involved in the appeal as required under sub-
section (3) of Section 100. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any
case any substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that
question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the
question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100.”
13. In the case of Mahavir vs. Lakhmi, (2007) 9 SCC 208, it was
reiterated by this Court that while reversing the judgment and decree in
second appeal by the High Court, Section 100, CPC mandates to formulate
substantial question of law before allowing the second appeal and reversing
the judgment and decree of the lower court.
14. In the case of Hardeep Kaur vs. Malkiat Kaur, (2012) 4 SCC 344, the
second appeal was allowed by the High Court and the judgment and decree
passed by the appellate Court was set aside. The short question considered
by this Court was whether a second appeal lies only on a substantial
question of law and is it essential for the High Court to formulate a
substantial question of law before interfering with the judgment and decree
of the lower appellate court. This Court, after considering almost all the
earlier judgments, held as under:
“18. The law consistently stated by this Court that formulation of
substantial question of law is a sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 100 CPC admits of no ambiguity and permits no departure. In
the present case, the High Court has allowed the second appeal and set
aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court without
formulating any substantial question of law, which is impermissible and
that renders the judgment of the High Court unsustainable.
15. In Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganial vs. Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai, (2006)
13 SCC 113, and Boodireddy Chandraiah vs. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC
155, this Court reiterated the same view that the second appeal cannot be
allowed by the High Court without formulating any substantial question of
law.
16. In the case of Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew, (2005) 7 SCC 667,
this Court again took the view that the High Court would not be competent
to reverse the finding recorded by the trial court or the first appellate
court without formulating substantial question of law.
17. In State of Kerala vs. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam, (2001) 10 SCC
191, a second appeal was filed against the concurrent finding recorded by
both the trial court and the first appellate court. However, the High
Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC interfered with the
concurrent finding of facts and allowed the appeal. This Court set aside
the order holding that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained
inasmuch as it reverses the judgment without formulating substantial
question of law. The Court observed, thus:
“5. Both sides have advanced several contentions in the appeal petition as
also in the counter-affidavit filed. We refrain from expressing any opinion
on the merits of the case as we propose to remit the second appeal for
disposal afresh. We have noted that the learned Single Judge has not
formulated any question of law, much less any substantial question of law,
which alone would have clothed the High Court with jurisdiction under
Section 100 CPC to deal with a second appeal. This Court has stated time
and again that unless the High Court is satisfied that there is a
substantial question of law, jurisdiction for second appeal cannot be
exercised. It is unnecessary to cite the authorities on that aspect as it
has now become well-nigh settled. Both sides agreed that no substantial
question of law has been formulated by the learned Single Judge. If so, the
learned Single Judge ought to have proceeded further.”
18. In the case of Ellangallur vs. Gopalan, (2000) 2 SCC 11, this
Court, considering a case where the High Court in second appeal reversed
the finding of the first appellate court on the re-appreciation of evidence
without formulating any substantial question of law, held that the judgment
passed by the High Court cannot be sustained in view of the prescribed
procedure of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Same view has
been reiterated by this Court in the case of H.G. Venkataramanaiah vs.
Subba Pujari, (2000) 10 SCC 412.
19. Similar view has been reiterated in the case of Ramavilasom
Grandhasala vs. N.S.S. Karayogam, (2000) 5 SCC 64, wherein it was held that
the High Court without formulating any substantial question of law as
required under sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Code cannot allow
second appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower court.
20. In the light of the provision contained in Section 100 CPC and the
ratio decided by this Court, we come to the following conclusion:-
(i) On the day when the second appeal is listed for hearing on
admission if the High Court is satisfied that no substantial question of
law is involved, it shall dismiss the second appeal without even
formulating the substantial question of law;
(ii) In cases where the High Court after hearing the appellate is
satisfied that the substantial question of law is involved, it shall
formulate that question and then the appeal shall be heard on those
substantial question of law, after giving notice and opportunity of hearing
to the respondent;
(iii) In no circumstances the High Court can reverse the judgment of
the trial court and the first appellate court without formulating the
substantial question of law and complying with the mandatory requirements
of Section 100 CPC.
21. Admittedly, the High Court by the impugned judgment allowed the
appeal and reversed the judgment passed by the trial court and the first
appellate court. We have, therefore, no option but to set aside the
impugned judgment passed by the High Court and remit the matter back to the
High Court to first formulate the substantial question of law and then
decide all these appeals in accordance with law.
22. Hence, we allow these appeals and remit these matters back to the
High Court to first formulate substantial question of law and then decide
all these appeals in accordance with law accordingly.
23. Since the plaintiff-respondents are old persons aged more than 75
years and they have been fighting the litigation since 1992, we request the
High Court to give preference of hearing to these appeals and decide the
same as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four months
from today.
24. However, interim order passed by this Court shall continue only for a
period of four months from today.
25. After hearing the respondents, who appeared in person before this
Court today and informed about their financial status, we request the
Maharashtra Legal Services Authority to provide all legal assistance to
them and to meet all legal expenses in defending the second appeals in the
High Court.
26. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and considering
the helplessness of the respondents who are old aged persons, we direct the
appellant to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five thousand only)
towards the legal expenses incurred by them in pursuing the case in this
Court.
27. Mr. Vigya, learned counsel for the appellant, very fairly submits
that the appellant be allowed some time to pay the aforesaid amount to the
respondents.
28. As prayed for, two weeks’ time is allowed to the appellant to pay the
aforesaid amount to the respondents.
29. The Registry is directed to communicate this Order to the Bombay High
Court forthwith.
…………………J.
(M.Y. EQBAL)
………………….J.
(C. NAGAPPAN)
NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 27, 2015
